Date: 1923-01-01T07:00:00+00:00
Keywords: state
Description: Charles Normon Fay Too Much Government, Too Much Taxation
Publisher: Doubleday, Page & Company, Garden City, NY

Too Much Government, Too Much Taxation

Charles Normon Fay

TOO MUCH GOVERNMENT TOO MUCH TAXATION TOO MUCH GOVERNMENT TOO MUCH TAXATION BY CHARLES NORMAN FAY GARDEN CITY NEW YORK DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY 19 2 3 COPYRIGHT, 1923, BY CHARLES NORMAN FAY ALL RIGHTS RESERVED, INCLUDING THAT OF TRANSLATION INTO FOREIGN LANGUAGES, INCLUDING THE SCANDINAVIAN PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES AT THE COUNTRY LIFE PRESS, GARDEN CITY, N. Y. First Edition PREFACE THIS book is,written to convince others, as I myself am convinced, quietly and without hysteria, that al ready, after but 146 years of national life, we Ameri cans must face the same old fight with Too Much Government and Too Much Taxation that has scarred the history of every nation ever since history ,itself began. As it is with autocracy, so it is with democracy. There is no magic in mere form of government to change human love of power and wealth, or to make politics unselfish. Our contem porary, William J. Bryan, sometimes called the "Great Commoner," in his palmy day was plainly as willing to rule as was William of Hohenzollern, or Julius Cresar; while no tyrant in history, I imagine, actually governed more, or taxed more, than Bryan's fellow democrat, Woodrow Wilson. Indeed, sincere Americans are just now engaged in raising a fund in honor of the man who led his country, farthest of all our political theorists, away from that traditional distrust and hatred of too much government and too much taxation which drove our Pilgrim ancestors overseas.

When the Puritan Fathers came to New England, they and their forbears had been "fed up" for cen turies with over-government, hereditary monarchs, class legislation, restraints upon civil and religious liberty. They determined to sweep out of existence everything in the way of class or hereditary privilege; to elect for themselves their rulers great and small, [ v ] Preface and see to it that their power and terms of office were so limited as to preclude their using one to prolong the other. There was to be no permanent class of governors or officeholders living in luxury upon the industry of the people. The old New England town meeting was to come once a year-where every free man might arise and discuss every affair concerning the community, and might be candidate for every office; indeed was considered rightfully entitled to his turn at public office now and then-and well ex pressed the crude idea, later crystallized in words by Abraham Lincoln of" Government of the people, by the people, and for the people." The small concerns of the little villages, which then made up the colony, were placed each under its elective officer; the roads under the road master, the pound under the pound master, the taxes under the assessor, the ordinances under the selectmen, and so on; and terms of office were limited to a single year. The New England theory was once a year "to turn the rascals out"

before they got too rich and powerful; and the New England practice became one of rotation in office. For the larger affairs of the colony, in which the villages combined for common purposes, such as the making of laws, establishment of courts, maintenance of prisons, defense against Indians, construction of highways, etc., the same principles of decentraliza tion and local autonomy, of restriction of authority and brevity of term were still religiously guarded. Each little community was represented at the Gen eral Court by one of its own residents, who was sup posed to look after and protect the special local in terests of the village as against that of other vil lages, and to some extent against that of the colony. His term also was limited. In general, the organiza[ vi ] Preface tion of government, in the day of our New England ancestors, was based apparently upon the principle of extreme distrust of those endowed with power; that is, of jealousy of government, carried to the last degree.

Later, when the colonies evolved after the revolu tionary war into a Federation, and finally into the United States, the same general principle of distrUst of the governors, and jealousy· of government, was carried into the Constitution. There is like brevity of term, the same limitation of constitutional power; and a system of checks and balances by which, for instance, the Senate may reject the action of the House, the House that of the Senate, the Executive can veto both, the Supreme Court can over-rule all three; while the Executive, by reason of the pardon ing power in criminal cases, can bring to no effect the finding ofthe jury and the verdict of the judge. This principle of distrust, of giving power with one hand and taking away with the other, has been developed still further by the adoption in many states of the Initiative and Referendum, through which the mass of the people can compel or review the action of their representatives; and it has been seriously proposed that the people may recall the judges, and thus, by and by, reverse judgment of the Suoreme Courts.

It is curious indeed to note how much broader and wiser was our forefathers' theory of representative government, as disclosed in the Constitution of the United States, than was their practice of it, as em bodied in the local, state, and national governmental machinery actually set up. We can realize to-day that they must have been men of small experience in organization of large affairs; and we cannot but wonder at their broad vision yet narrow range of . [vii r Preface action. Following them religiously, however, and ac cepting their rather primitive institutions almost as sacred, we have struggled in a patient, blind way for more than a century with the growing burden of a political system so complex and multifarious that it constantly breaks down of its own weight and. cost. As our institutions stand, there never was in all his tory so unlimited an opportunity for crass demagogy.

We deserve indeed to be ridden as we are by the law maker and the tax gatherer; because by way of hating the tyrant we become stupid enough to love the demagogue. Especially for the last thirty years have we been bitten by the German bug of COLLECT IVISM, until we habitual,ly run to Washington, or the State House, or the City Hall (though always in vain), to correct the mistakes of the Almighty, in making men, or events, or things, as they are, or as they change from day to day. The great American demagogue is on top; and is likely to stay there, until we simplify politics, and make things a little less pleasant for him. For the first ninety years of our existence as a na tion we acted on Jefferson's principle, "That gov ernment governs best which governs least," and so reaped the benefits of unheard-of freedom of business (within our own borders at least) in the shape of unheard-of prosperity. The Civil War and the aboli tion of slavery gave us also the added benefit of ut most freedom of labor; say until 1880, when trades unionism began to shackle the workers. About the same time the social gospel of Karl Marx, "made in Germany"-his cult of class-consciousness and class-solidarity, of collectivist control of industry and wealth by the State, in place of free individ ualistic capitalism subject only to natural eco nomic law-began to spread among us, under val viii] Preface rious .guises. First came the Granger movement attacking the railways; then Populism, attacking the gold standard; Progressivism, attacking big busi ness, Wall Street, the bankers, and the trusts, etc., and finally Woodrow Wilson's vague doctrine of "The New Freedom," working out as Government Ownership and Operation. All of these, and their first cousin, Trades Unionism, are but variants of the Marxian attack on "Capital." Curiously like them, in substituting state control for natural econo . mic freedom, yet born of the selfishness of capitalism itself, there have tangled themselves in our politics the contradiction of shutting out instead of trading with foreign industry; and in our commerce the con tradiction of monopoly, or combination in restraint instead of in development of trade.

All of these devices-whether of the predatory state to plunder the individual and thereby enrich the people or of the predatory individual to plunder the people, and thereby enrich himself-are bound to fail, because contrary to economic law; and the former have failed, signally and conclusively, in a very few short years of trial. The latter, also, in my personal conviction, .can never pay anybody, and must go into the discard. It is the business of this book, without questioning the patriotism of those responsible either for primitive over-organization of our government, or for modern over-extension of its activity into fields of commercial industry (where government meddling is superfluous and worse than useless) to point out the consistent and inevitable weakness and failure of both; and the natural and logical limitations that should fix our conception of, and determine our return to, our original constitu tional purpose of utmost liberty, and least govern ment.

[ix.J Preface Here is in simple language our modern situation: Written history now dates back five or six thou sand years. From the earliest times, government has been duplex. On the one side it is protective, with waste of force and money, and sacrifice of liberty, merely to protect the peaceful from the predatory; on the other, it is cooperative, with economy of both, in providing at common expense for certain universal needs, otherwise not possible universally to provide for. The carrying out of these purposes constitutes the business of govern ment-for business it is, subject to the rules of busi ness. Yet neither of them is productive; both, on the contrary, cost heavily and add nothing to the wealth of the community; both must be paid for out of property otherwise created-that is, by taxation. While no people has managed to do without government, history is one long record of the rise and fall of peoples; and of government after government for each people. Indeed, there is no one thing so firmly established by history as the sure and certain decadence and fall in due time of every government; yet I have nowhere happened to see the plain and simple reason for· such failure pointed out by the historian.

It is, in my belief, merely that government is, necessarily, the largest and most difficult of human undertakings, even in its simplest and most primi tive form-tending always to overgrowth; whereas nature on its part abhors overgrowth, and destroys it. In our day of great states, vast peoples, and huge cities, the simplest government operates on such a giant scale, and in so many different fields of effort, as rapidly to outgrow the mental powers of the man or men at the top. For there can be but one govern ment in the normal community; and like every living Ix] Preface organism, that government can obey but one head, in order that its various parts shall co-ordinate; yet the brain of man can work only so fast and so far. In overgrowth, in overloading the mental power of its executives, lies its inevitable breakdown, decay, and death; for government, like other living things, cannot keep on growing forever, and .when sound growth ends, death begins.

Even during its heyday government never func tions as well or as economically, man for man, as private or commercial organization; and for the same old reason-overload of personnel and red tape. There is indeed no such thing as efficient government, measured by.commercial standards of efficiency. In private industry, carried on for profit, the cost of overload and red tape is prohibitory; business cannot stand it, and it is cut out. To simplify work and concentrate it in the fewest hands is vital to success. But with government, not run for profit, and paid for by taxation increased to cover whatever the cost may be-often carefully camouflaged to hide that cost, however excessive-it is well-nigh impossible to check its overgrowth, or' to hold its vast and varied activities down to the measure of human managing capacity. , Two fundamental weaknesses in governmental organization-that it is not, and indeed ought not, to be run for profit; and that it must lack the constant automatic check on overload and waste that comes to business with the grim necessity of paying its own way-these are far more responsible for its invariable breakdown, as recorded in history, than the mere crookedness of politicians. Yet these inherent weak nesses seem to me to be very little understood; per haps because, prior to the unheard-of growth of modern transportation and industry, there had been [ xi 1 Preface no form of human organization big enough to measure government by, or compare it with.

To-day, on the contrary, there are, especially in these United States, many great corporations whose territory, personnel, and scale of operation exceed in· size, though not in complexity, those of most local and many state governments, and fairly compare with our national government. With their growth there have grown up during the last half century standards of corporate efficiency; and a considerable group of great captains of industry, who have added to unusual mental powers worldwide experience in successful modern trade. Such men realize the difficulty, the human im possibility, involved in too much government. They alone, perhaps, can forecast from ample experience its sure and costly consequences, of small service and large taxes. The rest of us, average men and women, who merely earn and spend a modest weekly wage, without the least suspicion that government is a costly burden for which everyone of us is paying every day; a lot of guileless folk-who for the last fifty years have been cajoled with the socialistic theory "made in Germany" that, given but enough government, its vast machinery will pump from some imaginary reservoir of boundless supply a plenty of everything for everybody; we, I say, have not stud ied and hardly heed the long story of the breakdown of one government after another, for 6,000 years, as told in history. It all means little to us, and says nothing at all to our demagogues-who plan for us vast political machinery and unlimited taxation, in the good old political way; for the good old politi cian's purpose of running that machinery, of levying and personally spending those taxes.

Therefore I appeal in this book to the few whose [ xii] Preface large affairs teach them the limitations of human brain power, the boundaries beyond which successful human organization cannot ·hope to go~I.mean the men who actually create our great commercial cor porations with their unrivalled efficiency-I urge them to educate the rest of us! As an appropriate text for this preface, let me quote a recent eulogium upon the master of Standard Oil-so far·perhaps the most successful of human organizers in his chosen tasks-spoken of his father by young John D. Rockefeller: "If there is one thing above all others I admire my father for," said the young man, "it is that in the great business he has built up he has always applied the principle of sticking to that business. My father has been interested in many other things, but he has kept his attention centred on one thing." So, indeed, by concentrating on one thing, he has accomplished many things. No doubt many of those who chance to read this book will have been trained by most fluent Scribes and Pharisees, who never cre ated a useful thing in their lives, to denounce the elder John D. and all his works; but no one can deny that "Standard Oil" is magnificently alive and successful in its chosen field, or that its master mind is still clear and going strong. On the other hand, nothing looks deader or smells worse than the huge, unsavory, yet unburied carcasses left by Too Much Government, say in the shipping and nitrate, the railroad and telegraph, the food, coal, and labor fields-the reek of which brings flocks of tax-gather ers like buzzards about us; unless perhaps it be the rotting of Soviet Russia-of unlimited state mono poly, which, as I write, seems to carry with it the rotting also of its master minds.

For us here at home there never was a more favor[ xiii] Preface able psychological moment, a more opportune time, to realize that unless we limit our government to its fewest, simplest, and most vital functions, it must in our great modern states and cities become an affair too huge for human genius; one which even at its best must always fall far behind our simplex, profit seeking corporations, in results attained. We have but to look about us to wake up to the fact that we free and self-governing Americans, whose ancestors came to the barren shores of Massachusetts to get away from tyranny and taxes, have now for many years presented the extraordinary spectacle of deliberately piling on our own backs, with infinite pains and stupidity, a growing burden of collectivist control, bureaucracy, and taxation, that would have delighted the souls of Engel and Karl Marx. They indeed swore by those "good old German gods" -Envy and Jealousy; whose cult decrees that no one man shall be better off than another! To be sure, these are ever the smallest, the meanest of motives; while, with nations as with men, they are the stupidest as well-inevitably bound to wreck things. But we Americans swear by our country and our free institutions. It may be foolish for us to dream that they can last forever, prosperous and mighty as they are to-day; but we would do our ut most to that end. The time is at hand for better political engineering; for simplification of govern ment; for reversion to the sound American prin.ciple of unlimited reward for great and greater service; for rejection of imported new-fangled creeds of class advantage, of state-spoliation and brute-coercion.

As the boys used to say in France, it is the Zero hour; "Let's go." [ xiv] TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE PREFACE. V I. OUR PRESENT OVERLOAD OF GOVERNMENT 1 II. GOVERNMENT MEDDLING WITH BIG BUSINESS DuPont Powder 4 Bell Telephone . 7 Western Union Telegraph. 10 Typewriter Trust . 13 U. S. Steel Corporation 14 Standard Oil 23 American Tobacco . 28 Packers 28 Other attacks on Business 40 Diagrams of Prices and Stock Markets 43-44 III. GOVERNMENT WAR CONTROL OF Sugar 47 Wheat . 66 Railroads 72 IV. GOVERNMENT ATTITUDE TOWARD Labor 87 Great Strikes 99 Railway Strike, 1922 • 149 Coal Strike. 153 V. USELESS U. S. BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS Interstate Commerce Commission. 160 l xv] Table of Contents CHAPTER PAGE Federal Trade Commission. 168 Railway Labor Board 180 VI. USELESS STATE AND LOCAL BOARDS Multiplex Government Activities . 184 Railroad and Warehouse Commissions 188 Chicago Gas Experience 194 City Halls and Street Railways 196 VII. Too MANY OVERLAPPING LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND TAXING BODIES. 207 VIII. Too MANY ELECTIVE OFFICES, CHECKS AND BALANCES 213 IX. Too LONG BALLOTS. COMPLEXITY OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM • 220 X. Too MANY ELECTIONS. Too SHORT TERMS.

Too MANY LAWS 233 XI. PRINCIPLES THAT SHOULD LIMIT LEGISLATION 249 XII. LEGISLATION ON LABOR. 264 XIII. LEGISLATION ON PROFITEERING 270 XIV. REMEDIES SUGGESTED. POLITICAL APATHY 274 XV. OUTLINE OF PROJECT FOR SIMPLIFIED STATE AND LOCAL POLITICS 282 XVI. CANDIDATES AND QUALIFICATIONS FOR OFFICE. 287 XVII. SHORT BALLOTS 295 XVIII. SIMPLIFICATION OF NOMINATION AND ELECTION 298 XIX. EFFICIENCY AND COMPENSATION OF GovERNMENTAL PERSONNEL 308 XX. Too MUCH AND TOO COMPLEX TAXATION 315 [ xvi] Table of 'Contents CHAPTER PAGE 367 . 37° · 377 • 380 387 • 391 XXI. SIMPLIFICATION AND VISIBILITY OF TAXA TION New Canons of Taxation Needed. 339 New Methods-Retail-Sales Taxation . 350 Taxation of Rents . 361 .Local Government to Collect all Taxes 364 Estimated Sales-Tax Rates Required for Present Budgets . Obstacles to Sales-Taxation . Other Political Obstacles . Resume. XXII. REMEDIES WORSE THAN THE DISEASES XXIII. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS ApPENDIX I ApPENDIX II The Volstead Act • • 4°1 Our Merchant Marine Tangle • 4 11 [ xvii] LIST OF TEXT ILLUSTRATIONS PAGE Diagram of Fluctuations, Prices of Commodities · 43 Diagram of Fluctuations, Stock Market Prices · 44 N. Y. Stock Exchange Transactions in Railways . 85 Diagram of Mass. DepartmentalOrganization • 189 How to Vote for Mills for State Senator.

[xix] • 21 4 TOO MUCH GOVERNMENT TOO MUCH TAXATION TOO MUCH GOVERNMENT TOO MUCH TAX.A TION CHAPTER I OUR PRESENT OVERLOAD OF GOVERNMENT WE Americans are, if not the most governed, cer tainly the most governmented people in the world. We have, when we come to look squarely at the situa tion, in our political system, about seven separate categories of overload, viz.: First. Too Many Units of Government. Too Much Subdivision. Second. Too Many Elective Offices, Checks, and Balances. Third. Too long Ballots. Too Many Politicians. Fourth. Too Many Elections. , Fifth. Too Many Legislators. Too Many Laws. Sixth. Too Many Government Activities. Too Much Bureaucracy. Seventh. Too Much Taxation. In consequence of this great complexity, with the resulting vast routine of cond ucting el~ctions, "politics" -that is, the business of naming candi dates and polling the votes for them-necessarily becomes an absorbing profession; demanding sub stantially all the time of many politicians, who must live, and some of whom must get rich, out of that profession.

[ I ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation Meantime, as we are a self-governing people, the work involved in thus choosing our own governors, the whole business of elections, is supposed to be the voluntary, unpaid job of good citizens; and no provi sion whatever is made, by constitution or statute, to pay even the living expenses of many thousands of political workers, without whose constant attention most of our minor elections would be positive jokes, for lack of votes and voters. Well-those workers don't starve! They merely turn to those whom they elect to office for reward; and they get it, as follows: First. From campaign funds, collected before election. Second. From salaries of office, or percentages thereon. Third. From contract graft on government purchases. Fourth. From legislative graft. Fifth. From blackmail graft. Sixth. From protection of vice and crime graft. The first two sources of reward are legitimate enough in principle; but, if also legitimate in amount, are insufficient to pay both governmental and poli tical workers. The last four sources thus become perhaps not the mainstay, but at least the backstay of politics. Meantime, the more government there is and the more elections there are, the more money there is in handling both. Here, then, in a nutshell, is very nearly the whole problem of government of, by, and for the people, viz., how to cut the various kinds of graft out of politics.

Better stated, the problem is how to make honest administration profitable, both in reputation and cash, as it ought to be, to those who run govern ment; while making honest politics profitable, as [ 2 ] Our Present Overload of Government they should be, in reputation, but not in money, to those who run elections. Both questions, let me say once more, are but questions of good political engineering; and fortunately neither seems to me insoluble. Broadly speaking, the necessary, vital, sovereign, and primary functions of government are limited to the making and enforcement of peace and law-to protection of life, liberty, and property from foreign or domestic violence; while its secondary, merely cooperative functions, not vital, but known by long experience to be advisable, include the establishment of standard moneys, weights and measures, of public works and service--such as roads, bridges, water supply, mails, and certain other utilities-of educa tion, sanitation, recreation, poor relief, and the foster ing of trade, art, and science.

In this secondary group of merely advisable func tions lies most of the modem mischief of too much government; in the sixth category aforesaid, which we will now review . For to mere fostering of in dustries and utilities our collectivists, from tempera mental jealousy of the rich, and for supposed beneht of the poor, do not hesitate to add their govern mental ownership· and operation at public risk, with all the enormous bureaucracy involved. Already it would take several books as large as this to make a complete survey of our superfluous national, state, and municipal activities. I will, therefore, cite but a few conspicuous examples to prove my rather sweeping assertions, and will leave the reader to pick up a hundred more on every hand for himself; commencing with the campaign of government against Big Business, that ran so fast and far before the Great War.

CHAPTER II GOVERNMENT MEDDLING WITH BIG BUSINESS IN 1912 I wrote a short book, "Big Business and Government" -in which I considered, case by case, our local and national government meddling with various large industries; and showed, or predicted, its mischievous futility. I mention the book only to continue those studies down to date, and to show how completely another ten years' experience confirms predictions. First came the story of the so-called "Powder Trust"; the DuPont DeNemours Powder Co. My chapter of 1912 on this great concern, up to that time unmolested by government attack, ended as follows : "Now it has but one genuine competitor in the New York market. Powder (salt petre) sells at $2.60 per keg, which should be fairly profitable; and the tariff keeps out foreigners.-If the protective tariff on explosives were abandoned and the Sherman law were repealed, competition would come quickly and to stay."

Well; the tariff and the Sherman Law were not repealed-the foreigners are still out in the cold. However, President Taft's Attorney General secured that same year (1912) a decree dissolving the DuPont DeNemours Company, as a combination in restraint of trade, into three competing groups of factories, respectively called DuPont DeN emours, Hercules, and Atlas Powder companies-each of which later took in several competitors. Government here did [ 4 ] Government Meddling with Big Business its best in the way of "Trust Busting." Now what were the consequences to the rich devils who created the Trust, to the trade _generally, and to prices of powder to the public? Here is the answer. Nothing whatever was accomplished, as far as the recotds show; except to load lawyers' bills both on the Trust and the U. S. Treasury. The shares of the old DuPont DeNemours Company, par value $45,500,000, were worth at market values of 1912 $44,7°0,000. Those of the three new companies into which it was broken up, par value $161,638,000, are now worth, at market of May, 1922, $152,026,000.

Meantime, the new DuPont DeNemours Company has paid since 1915 in dividends an aggregate of 251 per cent., and the Hercules and Atlas have paid 8 per cent. dividends annually on their shares from the be ginning. Certainly the breakup did not hurt the rich devils much ; though it effectually proved that their political power was purely imaginary. What effect, then, did the dissolution have upon the trade, upon competition? It actually created three large and powerful combinations, each with numerous producing plants scattered at strategic distributing points through the country, where for merly one controlled them all. Evidently, the com petition of the three amongst themselves, if genuine and vigorous, should have kept prices down to a level so low as to discourage the building of new indepen dent competing plants-necessarily smaller and weaker at the outset than these formidable old giants.

But what has been the case? The answer is that there are to-day no fewer than 35 outside competing manufacturers; many of them local, but say half of them possible competitors in the New York region, where in 1912 were but one or two. Doubtless they thus multiplied under the stimulus of enormous war [ 5 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation prices for explosives. But what earthly difference could the government attack upon, and breakup of, the old .DuPont Company possibly have made either in war-prices or new competition, unless to depress the fonner and thus discourage the latter ? Yet the market record shows that it did neither one nor the other; but was absolutely barren and futile! Lastly, what effect did the government suit vs. the DuPont Company have on prices to the public for whose protection from robbery by a trust the whole attack was engineered-let us hope in good faith? Using the price of ordinary blasting (soda) powder as typical of the fluctuations of all explosives in the market, here is what actually happened: Soda powder sold, f. o. b. factory, as follows: 1909 $1.20 1912 $1.2 5 19 13 $1.2 5 1914 $1.25 1915 $1.30 1916 $1.35 1917 $1.85 1918 $2.15 1919 $1.85 1920 $2.45 1921 $2.25 1922 $2.10 Can the reader detect with a microscope the least reaction favorable to the consumer, by reason of the breakup of 1912; or indeed any movement of prices whatever, but those dictated by the law of supply arid demand?

If he cannot (as I cannot), can he then see any use whatever in the government war on the DuPont Company? The most conspicuous single phenomenon of the trade in explosives since 1912 certainly was the enormous efficiency displayed by that old company and its children, the Hercules and Atlas, in helping to win the World War. If President Wilson's Attorney General had later weakened these great concerns as planned, what could they or the United States have done, in comparison with what they did do, to smash the German war machine? The Attorney [ 6 ] Government Meddling with Big Business General will hardly point, in reply, to his Govern ... ment's useless expenditure of over $100,000,000 upon the "Nitro" and "Muscle Shoals" projects; neither of which ever produced a pound of anything wherewith to blast the Kaiser! It was indeed lucky for his Government that its effort to cripple the power of the great DuPont Company failed so completely! Not only did it and its offspring supply explosives, but it developed the numerous byproducts so closely connected with the recovery of nitrates from coal distillation; among them many much-needed aniline dyes. Thanks notably to the DuPonts, among others, we are not far from independence of German dyemakers.

The Bell Telephone System. As I noted in my study of this great organization, in 1912, its states manship-to use a word befitting its record-has been extraordinary. It is justly regarded by stu dents of such things as the model public-service cor poration of the whole world. It is hard to speak of it without almost extravagant praise. Its policy and performance have been an open book for all men to read for fully twenty years. Its Annual Reports are treatises on monopoly and public service that might be textbooks in our colleges. Its avowed purpose and consistent practice have been to bring the telephone facilities of the United States, as fast and as far as lawfully possible, into one fiscal and operative control; in order to give the broadest and best service at the lowest cost; always consistent, however, with, such dividends on its shar'es and re serves for replacements, as will insure their high and stable market value; with easy sale of the constant issues of new securities required by its rapid growth.

The average gross receipts per telephone came to the very reasonable sum of $4°.5° for the year [ 7 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation 1917. Its shares have paid 8 per cent. for years and now sell for about 129. They have never been "watered," and at the end of 1920 had reached the huge total of $512,000,000. The bonds on the system then totaled $546,000,000; the whole $1,058,000,000 of stock and bonds having been paid for in cash or its equivalent. The plant was worth $1,216,000,000 and served 11,796,000 stations, han dling nearly 31,000,000 messages daily. No more staggering proof of the cheapness and value of the service rendered could he asked for than the mere record of this colossal growth; far, far surpassing that of government-owned systems abroad, and including as compiled by the Company, on January I, 1913, about sixty-four per cent. of all the telephones in the world. This record particularly impresses me, because 1 myself had happened to be in active charge of the business at Chicago during its first eight years. When 1 took hold in 1879, 1 was instructed to obtain sub scriptions for the stock of a Chicago telephone ex change company capitalized at $loo,oOQ-instruc tions very soon countermanded. Meantime,·1 had succeeded in getting the desired subscriptions on a prospectus written by myself, in which 1 said it was conservative to figure on enrolling at least 1,000 telephone subscribers in the course of time, at $5.00 per month per telephone. But before 1 left the busi ness, in 1887, there were in Chicago over 8,000 sub scribers averaging about $10.00 per month; while in 1920 ther~ were 700,000 telephones connected, aver aging only a little over $4.00 per month. What government ever did anything for its people compar able to the above in the way of telephone service?

Evidently that prospectus of 1879 was not exag gerated; and since then my prediction of 1912 that [ 8 ] Governmen.tMeddling with Big Business future telephone competition would not hurt has proved entirely correct. The Bell system grows and grows. Independent exchanges, though several thou sand strong, .do not develop greatly, nor seriously rival the great Bell system as a broad national utility. Neither has any very general popular hos tility to the Bell expansion arisen, nor has it shown the least political. power. All the same, the Wilson Administration seized upon the war emergency to procure from Congress an Act under which it took over the telephones, tele graphs, and cables in 1918, for no reason apparent to the looker on-certainly as far as the telephone was concerned-other than politics; that is to say, to add another huge unit to that colossal bureaucracy, which was perhaps a political ideal, perhaps a war measure, perhaps a party game, of those in power at Washington. .

Fortunately for the Bell stockholders, the war ended, and the unmistakable revolt of the country against overgrowth of bureaucracy stopped the whole Administration programme. All wires were returned to their owners by order of Congress, July 31,1919. The net effect upon the telephone stock holders meantime had not been very great; as their dividends were practically guaranteed. As to the business, Postmaster General Burleson, much to his credit, was acute enough to realize its masterly and unselfish management up to the moment of govern ment control, and to leave it practically undisturbed. No changein executives or in methods was made by Mr. Burleson. Such deterioration as there was in service was akin to and much the same as the war deterioration experienced in all service, public or private-which even yet continues-by reason of loss of morale among wage-workers. Telephone [91 .

Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation construction and repair work also were held back by war pressure upon factory facilities; the Government could do little to relieve it. Cost and prices of telephone service went up under Federal control about twenty per cent.; the latter, however, not more than would have been imperative to cover rising wages, etc., if the Telephone Company had remained in possession of the plant; and not nearly as soon. The Government therefore failed to earn the compen sation guaranteed the Telephone Company, on the basis of its former earnings, by about a million dollars a month. Not long before the property was returned by the Government to private operation, to overcome this loss, the Government advanced telephone rates; by which the Telephone Company benefited when it took control again, for the last five months of 1919. In fine, the stockholders lost nothing; the Govern ment lost some 12 million dollars; the public pays more for service; and the employees draw more for wages. These last increases probably would have come, anyway.

But-as in the case of the DuPont Powder Co. -just what good was accomplished by the Govern ment's breaking into the telephone business; and losing some millions of the taxpayers' money, without any other visible effect? Even politically, the play was a first-class blunder; for it had no possible excuse. The Western Union Telegraph Company. The American Telephone & Telegraph Company-us ually called "The Bell Telephone"-had bought a controlling interest in the stock of the Western Union Telegraph Company during 1910. The late Theo dore N. Vail, then president of the Bell Company, publicly announced its policy in making the purchase substantially as follows: "One telegraph and tele phone system working together under one control, [ 10] Government Meddling with Big Business on the broad lines of the. greatest benefit to the public." He proceeded to co-operate the two prop erties with general popular approval and great financial success. New and improved services were introduced; and the Telegraph Company's gross revenues rose in three years 45 per cent., largely by reason of increased use of the lines. The telephone was used as a feeder and distributor of telegraph ser vice, to the great convenience of the public.

Nevertheless, in 1913, the Wilson Administration -for no very evident reason but that general dis trust of the workings of actually free big business, which the President had intimated in his essay called "The New Freedom"-was about to attack the relations of the two companies in the courts. The Bell Company with characteristic breadth and statesmanship voluntarily, if reluctantly, sold its Western Union shares at a considerable loss; and did other things desired by the Administration, in the way of giving both to competing telephone and telegraph companies the right of service over its own lines for their patrons. The Western Union shares were distributed in the open market, so as to end all connection with the Bell interests. Later on, however, in 1918, again without other apparent reason than politics, the Wilson Administra tion took over the Western Union, with all other telegraph and telephone companies, pending the war.

As far as the Department· of Commerce reports the results of these. government interferences in the telegraph business (Statistical Abstract, 1920, Table 221) the effect of the first dissolving of the Bell af filiation hardly showed in 1914. In 1915, 1916, and 1917, the Western Union, which had left Bell Tele phone control in better physical and financial con dition than for years before, prospered hugely, like rII ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation all other big business in the country, by war activity and rise of rates. But in 1918, when the Government took over the wires, wages and expenses jumped so much faster still that earnings by $9,5°0,000 greater than for 1917 yielded $4,5°0,000 less profit. West ern Union earnings and stock values fluctuated as follows: 104,000,000 41,700,000 45,800,000 46,300,000 51,200,000 61,9° 0,000 77,000,000 54,300,000 55,300,000 120,000,000 Year Old ownership 1907 Bell ownership . 1912 Do 1913 Divorced ownership 1914.

Do ~ar 1915Do Earn.. 1916 Do ings 1917 , 'f.ages 1918 Gov t Op n & Rates. 1919 Do Increase4 1920 Ret'd to own's Bad times 1921 Do Net ;, 5,675,181 5,674,000 4,572,000 6,7°9,000 11,503,000 14,894,000 .15,697,000 :12,297,000 13,639,000 14,635,000 -11,269,000 Gross Price of Stock 7° 79 65 59 73 9582 86 87 85 85 Under government operation, however, service to the public ran down fast; hundreds of local tele graph offices were closed; deliveries were made by telephone, or very tardily by messenger. The average price of telegrams had long before risen from its minimum of 30.1 cents in 1898 to 38.8 in 191l and in the next three years rose to over 50 cents, though largely because of general introduction of longer messages, the so-called Day and Night Letters. After the divorce from the Telephone Com pany in 1914, during the war prices gradually ad... vanced to average 58 cents in 1917, 59 cents in 1918 and 1919; and under the Government, to an average of 73 cents in 1920; since falling to 70 cents.

Once again it seems clear to the student that no perceptible benefit to anybody came from govern"' ment operation; nor, if we can judge from the tele[ 12} Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation The U. S. Steel Corporation. Next in my 1912 review came the so-called "Steel Trust"-the great est of all corporations. It was all along an obvious mark for perfectly useless government attack; though the facts invited almost sure defeat and huge waste of the taxpayers' money; with advantage to nobody on earth except the lawyers hired by the Attorney General. It is worth while to quote here my study of 1912 in support of this last remark: "As everyone knows, the Steel Corporation has been managed for the most part with extraordinary breadth and skill. It was freely prophesied at first by the wise men in the trade that, having bought out most of the brainy men who had built up its constituent units, it would fall to pieces of its own bulk and weight. On the contrary, its present organization, largely of new men, is wonderfully effective. But it is handicapped by its very size. Its capitalization is so huge, and its trade so great, that though entirely able to do business at starvation prices it cannot afford to do so. As I write, for instance (December 5, 191 I), it is more than doubtful whether it is earning divi dends on its common stock at present low-record prices.

It has averaged at the prices which have heretofore pre vailed a profit of about 15 per cent. on its gross turnover; too large a profit for security. Competition was bound to develop and increase, as it has already done, it seems to me. Though abundantly able to smash its weaker com petitors by cutting prices, yet for the sake of its common stock dividends, and also probably for political reasons, it has not cared until now to do so. Consequently, it has for years held up the umbrella of moderately remunerative, steady prices over its competitors and customers alike, minimizing both the extremes of rise and fall. This steadying of price has been immensely profitable to the Corporation itself, but yet more so to its constantly more numerous and powerful competitors. Jones & Laughlin, [ 14 ] Government Meddling with Big Business Cambria, Lackawanna, Bethlehem, Republic and other big concerns, have increased their trade relatively far faster than has the Steel Corporation;so that, though it also has greatly grown, its proportion of the trade is steadily de creasing.

"Of late the Independents have crowded the Corporation out from under its own umbrella, which it has consequently closed, and all are out in the wet; a metaphorical way of saying that the Trust has stopped maintaining prices, while the others got the business, and is now out after its share of the orders at cut prices, with excellent results to itself and the trade. If the Independents were not so big, it would now be in order for them, like the Independ ent Tobacco men, to set up a howl that Congress must lay the heavy hand of Government upon the Steel magnates and stop their'infernal price-cutting. Meantime, we hear no more of the much-denounced Gary Dinners. "Such are the results at home. Abroad, if we may believe an English authority, who writes in the Decem ber, 191 I, Atlantic Monthly ('A British View of the United States Steel Corporation,' T. Good), its over-capital ization and consequent enforced high wages and manu facturing costs have shut it and the United States gener ally out of the foreign market for steel, which has gone to English and German manufacturers, as shown by the following table: TONNAGE OF STEEL SHIPPED TO OTHER COUNTRIES United States 1,154,000 1,535,000 England 3,213,000 4,594,000 Germany 838,000 4,868,000 Mr. Good points to our successful start upon invasion of foreign markets in 1898 as an indication of what might have been done later but for the Steel Trust; and says that cost of pig iron and rails in the United States was far [ 15 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation below foreign cost in 1898, but since has risen from $5.00 to $8.00 per ton here, while substantially unchanged there. Consequently, he says, with idle capacity here, nearly sufficient to supply the whole foreign demand, we take but an eighth of it; and he prophesies that the Trust will not be able to earn its common stock dividends.

"Well, we shall see. Costs are said to be still as low or lower here than abroad, and the Trust is again aggres sively after export trade. Prices, too, are said to be lower here than abroad, so that it is not necessary to sell there cheaper than at home; a process always provoking political attacks on our tariff-protected Trusts. The time seems ripe to drop protection like a worn-out garment, and leave our husky steel industry to take care of itself at home and abroad. The volume of trade resulting to the Steel Cor poration would, I imagine, take care of its Common Dividends, even at the low prices for metal necessarily thereby established for all time. For the Common Shares are no longer 'watered'; but have been thickened up with undivided earnings, and boiled down by concentration of enormous resources into a good substantial porridge, use ful to sustain financial and industrial life.

"The moral of the story of this Trust, the greatest of all corporations, is that great size, instead of being proof against competition, merely demands and develops a larger scale of warfare; that inflated capitalization cannot command inflated prices, but on the contrary is a heavy handicap in price warfare, being necessarily and at all times a temptation to hold up the umbrella of artificially high prices, to the holder's own detriment and the benefit of competitors." The above excerpt commenced with the words "as everyone knows." The Steel Corporation is so big that its operations are necessarily common talk. "The city that is set ona hill cannot be hid," says the Bible. Especially must just wh(lt it was doing have been known to the Taft Administration, which [ 16] Government Meddling with Big Business started suit against the "Steel Trust" at the end of October, 191 I. For the Roosevelt Administration, in the person of Jas. R. Garfield, Commissioner of the then new Department of Corporations (an instru ment of the "Roosevelt Policies") had spent some two years, from 1905 on, in investigating the Steel Corporation, and had reported to the President that he found nothing wrong. In 1907 Roosevelt him self was consulted in advance, and with Dutch common sense approved the buying of the Tennessee Coal and Iron Co. by the Steel Corporation-in order to save a great New York Trust Company, and resulting disaster, during the panic of that year. By and by President Taft came in; and his Commissioner of Corporations, Herbert Knox Smith, who suc ceeded Garfield and inherited this investigation, finished it, and reported to Mr. Taft, criticising mainly two things~ to wit: original over-ca pital ization, and the "Hill ore-leases." Mr. Smith's Report was not put in, however, until after the Democratic majority of the House of Representa tives at Washington had ordered a Gongressional in vestigation of that Republican pet, the Steel Trust presumably as ammunition for the coming Presi dential campaign. The investigating (or Stanley) Committee reported to Congress during August, 19lZ-just in time for the elections-the majority (Democratic) report damning the Corporation and all its works, with J. P. Morgan, Gary, et al. as R~pub..

lican robbers of the people~ Meantime, a Republican administration partly spiked this Democratic gun by bringing suit to dissolve the Corporation. More over, the entire investigation was somewhat dis credited by the assertion of one David Lamar, known as the "Wolf of Wall Street," that he had himself originally drawn the Stanley Resolution for an in-' [ 17 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation vestigation, in order to club the Morgan interests, and had procured its introduction by Stanley! Altogether it was a very pretty mess. Suit was commenced by the Attorney General early in 1912, and dragged along till 1915, when the District Court in a notable decision denied the prayer of the Government for dissolution of the Corporation, and completely absolved it from the charge of monopoly or restraint of trade. Of course the Attorney General appealed, and the appeal was argued, and reargued, in I917-for the Wilson Administration had come in, and the tax payers paid all costs; but the Steel Corporation was just then so useful, and its breakup would have had consequences so disastrous, during the Great War, that the Attorney General asked for a postponement of the appeal, against the efforts of the Corporation to hasten decision. So it was not until the war was over, in 1920, that in final decision the Supreme Court said, "We are unable tosee that the public interest will be served by yielding to the contention of the Gov ernment respecting the dissolution of the Company, or the separation from it of some of its subsidiaries; and we do see in a contrary conclusion a risk of in-jury to the public interest, including a material dis turbance of, and it may be a serious detriment to, the foreign trade."

The government lawyers made Qne dying kick asking the Supreme Court for a rehearing, which was refused; and the great case was irretrievably lost, as well-informed folk were sure it would be. Look back now at my words of 1912. A rank outsider like myself knew as a matter of common knowledge that here was no monopoly or breach of the Sherman Law. The Taft Administration knew it far better than I did. Nothing under the sun but a political [ 18 ] Government Meddling with Big Business "gallery play" induced President Taft to waste the taxpayers' money in worse than useless litigation. If he had not commenced the suit in 191I, President Wilson certainly would have done it later, when it seemed good politics, with the same foreknowledge of its futility. (Note the Wilson Administration prosecutions for" profiteering," just before the cam paign of 1920.) Meantime (to wit, in the years following 1915), when the Steel Corporation, fortified by the decision of the lower court, might develop its business with some confidence-did it use its restored freedom to monopolize or restrain trade, or rob the people by raising prices? No; the vast upheaval of the war shows the Corporation constantly holding back and steadying the upward rush of prices, and putting its great resources whole-heartedly at the service of the very government which was seeking to destroy it.

Precisely the evolution outlined in the last patagraph of my 1912 "moral," quoted above, actually took place. The Corporation's competitors were the free lances in making high prices and huge profits; and they grew greater and greater, though the Cor poration by no means shrank. As I write (May 1 I, 1922) comes the announcement of the purchase of Lackawanna Steel by the Bethlehem Company; and another great merger of Midvale, Inland, Republic, and other large steel works is under negotiation. The "large scale of warfare," which I forecast, is everywhere coming to pass, with its far reach after world trade. * *Since the foregoing 'was written the interference of the Federal Trade Commission with the proposed merger of the Midvale, Republic, Inland, and other so-called independent steel concerns has resulted in its abandon ment. This seems to the writer a particularly characteristicinstance of the stupidity of government regulation. The ground of the Commis sion's objection to the merger was that it tended to reduce competition, [ 19 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation But in the name of common sense (or of "dam ..

foolishness," if you prefer) what on earth have these Democratic and Republican political" gallery plays" accomplished for the relief of the great American people from alleged robbery; or for the punishment of Morgan, Gary, and other alleged steel profiteers? To be sure, the Steel Corporation voluntarily gave up the Hill ore-lease, probably in part because it was condemned by the Knox and Stanley Reports -but also, the wise men say, because it was burdened with excessive royalties. Otherwise the big Corporation went on as usual. It continued to take more and more of its earnings to build up the business than it paid out in dividends on the once watered Common Stock. Up to the end of 1921 it had so reserved some $649,000,000 against $482,000,000 total dividends paid on $508,000,000 of Common Stock in twenty years, thus pretty thoroughly de-watering that stock. The following table gives, year by year, the average price of steel presumably between the concerns to be combined; which undoubtedly was true as far as those companies were concerned. Their aggregate output averaged less than one tenth of the steel production of the United States; so that the competition between themselves could not have been of very great importance to the American people, even in the immediate neighborhood of the mills. However, their reason for combining was not because they competed with each other, but for the advantage which integration into a larger unit, with resulting economies of production and distribution, would afford to the concerns combined in competing with their great and overwhelmingly powerful rival, the lI. S. Steel Corpora tion, and such other greater producers as the Bethlehem and Jones & Laughlin. In other words, the combination would be in very much better competitive position, able to serve the public better and cheaper than the individual concerns composing it have been or will be able to do. The very essence of modern competition is development of production on the very largest scale consistent with physical and market conditions. But, of course, being a governmental institution, and endeavoring to execute a bureaucratic law for the regulation of business, the Federal Trade Com mission is in honor bound to ignore common sense and the advantage of the public. That fact, however, cannot commend its continued existence to the thoughtful citizen.

[ 20] Government Meddling with Big Business billets in open market; the output thereof of the Steel Corporation; the dividends paid on its Common Stock, and the average market value thereof: u. S. STEEL CORPORATION RECORD 1901-1921 94 95 42 68 76 66 31 4 3l o o Dividends A ve~age Market on Com Stock. Pnce of Stock(Common) 39t 381 25 211 34 Tonnage of Billets Price of Steel Year Billets nearest Dollar 1901 $24 14,735,000 1902 3I 13,470,000 1903 28 12,796,000 1904 22 8,4°5,000 1905 24 11,995,000 (Garfield Investigation) 1906 27 13,510,000 1907 29 13,099,000 (Tenn. Coal & Iron Purchase) 1908 26 7,839,000 2 1909 25 13,345,000 2! 1910 25 14,179,000 5l 1911 21 12,750,000 5 (Stanley Com. Report-Smith Report-Government Suit) 1912 22 16,901,000 5 70 1913 26 16,656,000 5 60 1914 20 11,826,000 41 55 1915 22 16,376,000 ° 64 (District Court decided favor Steel Corporation) War Prices , 1916 44 20,9II ,000 7 104 1917 71 20,285,000 16! 108 1918 47 19,583,000 16 . 101 1919 41 17,200,000 6 100 (Supreme Court confirms District Court) Business Boom 1920 58 19,278,000 5 1921 35 10,966,000 5 Dividends of 7% paid all along on Preferred Shares The first, or Garfield, government investigation of the Steel Corporation commenced in 1905; the Tennessee Coal and Iron purchase was approved by Roosevelt in 1907; the Stanley investigation and Knox dissolution suit commenced in 191 I, and the Corporation abandoned the Hill ore-leases in 1912.

The Decision of the U. S. District Court against [ 21 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation the Government came in 1915, and was finally sus tained by the Supreme Court in 1920. It is probable that the price ofD. S. Steel Common would have ranged several points higher in the market but for this suit between 191I, when suit was commenced, and 1915, when the lower court threw out the Government's plea. But the great rise in 1916 was evidently far more due to the war profits that came rolling in than to that decision; as is shown by the subsequent fall of the same stock to 69 in 192I, following the fall of steel billets from $58.00 to $35.00 per ton. Apart from an unimpor tant and transient scare to the stockholders (of whom some 50,000 were working people, employees of the Company) I defy the most rabid collectivist to trace from this table of net results any effect whatever of the determined Government-war on the Steel Cor poration; either in helping the American people by lowering the prices of steel, or in hurting Wall Street by lowering the values of stocks or cutting down dividends.

Yet one, or the other, or both, must have been the sole objectives in this attack; this simply stupid attempt· to nullify the laws of trade! The eminence of the successive leaders in this war fare, and the real or fancied patriotism of their mo tives, make the student hesitate to label the whole business as rotten demagogy. But in my earlier conviction of 1912-still stronger in the light of 1922--;it was just "politics"-no more, no less. Let me end this chapter by quoting the end of my 1912 chapter on certain "Stock Exchange" Trusts, that had come, unlike "Steel," to well-deserved grief: "These three unfortunate ventures do not stand alone. Moody lists, as far back as 1904, no less than forty-eight I 22 ] Government Meddling with Big Business unsuccessful trusts capitalized at 1,132 millions of dollars. I single out the above for illustration here because they were confections of the Morgan, Standard Oil, and Moore parties, one or other-that is, of men of powerful con structive influence and ability, dominant in the so-called Money Trust; and because it is the· fashion to say that these particular men and a few others literally carry the United States in their breeches pockets, and with their enormous money power will set aside the course of trade, reverse all economics, make water run up hill, and the like -unless Congress shall re-enact the once eternal laws of gravity, supply and demand, etc., and bid the world rely for their enforcement on a mixed commission of politicians and reformers.

" Bosh! The fact is--and no candid man who opens his. eyes to the selfish and hard-hearted quotations of the New York Stock Exchange can blink that fact-that every at tempt to evade the inexorable law of the survival of the fittest, by combining the unfit together with the fit, has merely loaded the former on the back of the latter, and weighed down the whole, as Sindbad the Sailor was weighed down by the Old Man of the Sea. In the long run-not so very long, either-the burden has had to be thrown down, the unfit has had to be sloughed off and the fit only retained. For this reformation neither passion nor panic has been needed, nor the wrath of gods and men, nor the might of the people, nor Congress, nor even Mr. La Follette; nothing but the quiet action of the laws of trade and a swing or two of the scythe of Father Time." Standard Oil. I made merely passing reference to the Standard Oil Co. in my book of 1912, not be cause there was not plenty to say, but because its latest breakup, by action of the Governmerit, was then too recent to present the actual results achieved, either for trade, on stock-market prices, or prices of oil.

I did venture the following general conclusions and predictions: . [ 23 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation "Then, too, the magnitude of world trade, too great for any man or set of men to monopolize, is a third and yet more important cause of its division. I do not believe it to be within the bounds of possibility for any concern long to monopolize any large trade. Certainly the evidence be fore us does not justify the extraordinary fear of monopoly which has possessed us all. The late H. H. Rogers said to me not long before his death that the ever-present problem confronting the Standard Oil Company was too much oil. In order to maintain its power to steady production and prices it has to be prepared to put tanks and pipe lines in every new field as fast as it comes in; and be ready to take and pay for the oil. But new fields are con stantly developing, not only in North America, but all over the world. In spite of the Standard's enormous capital and perfect organization, competition is develop ing and will more and more develop here at home; it has plenty of foreign competition already. There is no protective duty against oil coming from abroad; and our home market has long been protected only by the match less efficiency of the American refiners-unless perhaps there may exist ~ecret agreements with the great foreign producers to stay out of our market, which I have never heard said. Anyhow, such agreements always break down when times are dull and trade scarce. Even the Standard Oil is not big enough to do all the oil trade of the world.

Competition is bound to increase; and the Standard's management, in order, like Carnegie, to keep the "under .. hold," must constantly maintain its unrivalled facilities for manufacture and distribution; and keep its prices low enough and stable enough to take the trade, as it does now. "To-day's papers (January 22, 1911) say that, despite the recent disintegration of the Trust, prices of oil-of 'independent' oil, too-are rising. That is rough on Washington t "To sum up, I do not believe it to be possible actually to enforce competition or prevent combination by law; or to control prices hyCommission or otherwise. Still less do I believe it necessary, in the common interest, or wise to Government Meddling with Big Business attempt to do either, Sooner or later, if we may. judge by the past, even by the short twenty years of Trust history, world supply and demand:..-nay, domestic supply and demand-will adjust prices: whilt as to all other ele ments of competition, it is to the public interest that quality, brands, patents, and trademarks, good serviceand salesmanship should inure to the benefit of those who develop them, be they big or little in their business; else they will never be developed."

The reader will remember perhaps, that Standard Oil had once before been broken up, in suit brought about by Attorney General Monett of Ohio. It then reorganized to comply with the order of the court, setting up corporations in different states to hold its properties in the same; the stock of all of which was, I think, held by the Standard Oil of New Jersey. I may be wrong about this detail, but that does not much matter. The Standard was the pet octopus of every demagogue in and out of Congress; and John D. Rockefeller, its head, was unquestion ably the most conspicuous target for denunciation of wealth in all the United States of America. Of course the U. S. Government got after Standard Oil; and this time attempted the divorce of the various, subsidiary corporations from the old-time centralized management at 26 Broadway, New York. Here again I do not attempt exact details ; but my under standing is that the stocks of the subsidiary compa nies were distributed in 1912 as dividends to the stock holders of the Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey; and that the latter now vote directly for the election of in dependent boards of directors for each of the former subsidiaries, so that they are in fact, as well as in name, entirely independent corporations. Never theless the provision in the Constitution of the United States that no man's property shall be taken away [ 2s1 Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation from him except by due process of law has made this breakup the merest technicality; inasmuch as the same men, or group of men, who formerly owned control of the Standard Oil of New Jersey, now own control of the subsidiaries. They are still directed by the same controlling brains and their operations are still co-ordinated in masterly manner.

"To a man up a tree," it looks as though the reor ganization had immensely benefited the Standard stockholders and stimulated the business itself. Not long after the breakup I heard a young man, an accountant in the auditing department at 26 Broad way, casually remark that to his astonishment it took fewer auditors to audit the accounts of the various subsidiaries, on the spot, than it had done when the auditing was centralized at 26 Broadway. I can well understand this, because decentralization and com plete unit control, upon the spot, is naturally better practice than any method of control from a distance by mail and telegraph; that is, if the unit has at tained sufficient magnitude to support a complete and well-balanced overhead staff. One new development is of interest, and was probably another agreeable surprise to the masters of Standard Oil. The subsidiary stocks were listed on the New York Stock Exchange and regular state ments of operations, earnings, and expenses are now furnished by the companies in the customary fashion (which had never been done before) so that the pub lic knows all about them. The more it knows, the better it seems to like them; and the suspicion of sharp practice which always attaches to secrecy is rapidly fading from the public mind. At any rate, the stock-market quotations and dividend returns, since the breakup, must make the Government and the Attorney General and-"ut parva magnis"[26 ] Government Meddling with Big Business Miss Ida Tarbell herself, feel that their greatest effort in life, viz., what might be called John D-molition, has been a dismal failure. Standard Oil stock before the breakup in 1911 sold on the New York Curb Market at an average price of $573 a share. Soon after the breakup, in 1912, it sold for an average of $1,100 a share, and the market value of the various subsidiary stocks which now represent one share of the old Standard Oil was at last quotations given by the Financial Review, say for 1920, about $1,185.

Certainly the Government did not hit the Rocke fellers very hard in this breakup. John D's minions still· send their tank wagons farther and farther out on to the prairies and into the backwoods, and more and more bring those elusive, but necessary, hydro carbons, kerosene and gasoline, to the farmer's back door; and the farmer's wife still persists in buying them, Ida to the contrary notwithstanding. Fur thermore, "Texaco," and "Sinclair," and the pur veyors of "That Good Gulf Gasoline" have followed Standard Oil's example, building pipe lines and re fineries, and sending tank wagons all over the land; to say nothing of several hundred minor competitive concerns that are drilling and refining wherever oil is found. It seems that my various· predictions of 1912 have already come true; and I think it safe now to predict that the once-execrated plutocrat, Rocke feller, will go down into history as the man who founded: first, a business as immensely beneficial as it was successful; next, a great University (in whose chapel, by the way, his portrait hangs, called by the irreverent "The Vision of John the Baptist"); next, a colossal fund for General Education; next, a won derful organization for abolishing the dread hook worm disease and other parasitic plagues that have tortured humanity for centuries; next, as one who r27 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation sent a relief ship to stricken Belgium; next, as one who taught modern medicine to China; and only the good Lord knows what next the man will do I Ida, per haps, will go down to history-or oblivion-as the woman who, not doing any of these, things, zealously slammed the man who did them. "The pen" may indeed be "mightier than the sword"; but verily it is not a marker to the oil-can.

American Tobacco Company. I am not a smoker and never had very much interest in tobacco or the American Tobacco Company. The. Government did, however, and broke it up for the benefit of the people. Most of my readers are probably smokers, and will. know better than I just how much the price of cigars (by the way, they are advertising "Rocke fellers" just now); of "Camels" and "Bull Durham" has fallen in consequence of this breakup; but I understand that the Tobacco Company still con tinues in business at the old stand and, indeed, at a good many new ones. The market fluctuations of American Tobacco Common Stock read as though the shares were still good property, videlicet: 1912 282 1913 247 1914 216 1915 223 1916 210 1917 161 1918 169 1919 250 1920 (increased capital comparison difficult) The Packers. Until very recently the business of the great meat packers has, fortunately for the country, escaped the intrusion of the Government.

It is now destined to suffer that fate, and I venture to predict the general consequences. The industry started, that is in a large way, I think in Cincinnati three quarters of a century ago, but reached· its first great development in Chicago. When I first went there in 1877 there were many packers down at the stockyards, most of whom have [ 28} Government Meddling with Big Business now I think passed into the discard. The great firms of Armour and Morris, however, were then, as they have remained, conspicuous for ability and success; and with them, as I remember it, Hammond and Swift constituted the then "Big Four." The dressed beef business had not commenced, and cured or salted meats, principally pork, constituted the bulk of the trade. The packing houses were ramshackle affairs and none too clean. All the same, they were far superior to the local slaughter houses, whose stench daily pervaded some unlucky suburb of all large cities, and the whole of every small town when the wind blew that ,vay. Although very early in the game, the Chicago packers boasted that they "uti lized all of the hog except the squeal," and the big houses killed at the rate of 5,000hogs a day. A profit of a dollar a hog was considered royal in those days, though that meant but z! to 3 per cent. upon gross sales. Salt pork, hams, and like cured products could, of course, stand transportation to any distance; and the large scale of operations and the utilization of all parts of the animal, with the recovery of all byproducts, gave the large packers' so great an ad vantage over the small local village slaughter houses that they were able very soon to distance them in competition, even in their own local trade.

Dressed beef and other fresh meats could not, of course, stand transportation unless iced; which led to the evolution of the refrigerator car. With it came the business of beef slaughtering and distribution on a large scale. From the very outset the packers found it necessary to build and own their own cars; because the railroads were not willing to undertake the burden of equipment and the delay and cost of icing in transit. Nevertheless, the advantage gained . by wholesale handling of fresh meat in this way was [ 29] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation so great that the packers were enabled to finance the purchase and operation of their own refrigerator cars, with icing stations at convenient distances apart, until they covered substantially the entire country. In their business, however, as in all aggressive mod ern merchandising, they found it necessary, in order to insure quick unloading and return of empty cars, and facilities for storing and distributing fresh meats at the point of destination, to own and control their own local refrigerating and distributing plants.

Armour's cars, yellow stores and wagons, are now seen near the railway stations in every important town in the United States, as are Swift's, Wilson's, and Mor ris's; but the smaller, feebler packers dropped behind in this race for transporting and distributing facilities; and to-day, though many of them exist, their small influence except on local trade is evident in that the politicians take no notice of them. At the time of the Garfield Report, made, I think, to the Roosevelt Ad ministration, there were and are still local slaughter and packing houses in every important city in the country besides not a few in the larger towns. This means that the great packers, like Armour, Swift, Morris, Wilson, and Cudahy in the West, are shipping fresh beef which was calved perhaps in Texas, fat tened in Nebraska, slaughtered in Omaha, Kansas City, or Chicago, and transported in refrigerator cars to refrigerator plants in far-distant Boston or Balti more, for sale in direct competition with beef grown and slaughtered in Massachusetts or Maryland, and sold almost at the door of the slaughter house; all at a minute profit ranging from I to 3 per cent. of the gross turnover, and probably not averaging over 2 per cent.

The immense economies realized by their enormous operations enable the great Western packers at this minute profit to sell from 70 to 80 per cent. of the fresh [3° ] Government Meddling with Big Business beef consumed in Eastern markets. Naturally the price of the remaining 20 to 30 per cent. produced by local firms must be held down to the level fixed by the Western competition; and that fact has occasioned bitter hostility on the part of the former. The West ern packers are accused of underselling and driving the small Eastern producer out of business; which is true, in fact-but the whole Eastern· population is equally guilty of underbuying as to the aforesaid 70 to 80 per cent. If it is legally or morally wrong to undersell, it must be equally wrong to underbuy; yet everybody does it! In whose mouth then does it lie to accuse the great packers of ruthless competi tion? The demagogue promptly answers, "In mine"; and he proceeds to demand government regulation of the great Western packers.

Moreover, the farmers throughout the land have been in the habit of selling their cattle on the farm to travelling buyers, either of the great packers, or of middlemen in packing centres. Many farmers ship direct to commission men at Chicago and the other centres, who sell the cattle at auction as they come in. Of course, cattle must be watered and fed, both in transit and after receipt at the slaughtering point until killed. Meantime, as it is impossible to feed and treat them as well in transit, or in crowded stock yards, as on the farm, they lose weight and condition rapidly . For every reason of profit and economy they must be sold at once without delay; conse quently the prices realized at auction sale from day to day in the various stockyards fluctuate greatly with the number of head daily received; much the same as' with fish in the seaport markets, though the fluctuations are not quite so sharp. At all packing centres the, great packers are represented by buyers, who move from pen to pen as the lots of animals are [ 3I ] Too Much ·Government-Too Much Taxation auctioned off, bidding against each other and a mis cellaneous lot of outside bidders, representing pack ing houses at points farther east, export houses, and other cattle buyers; but the great packers over shadow the miscellaneous buyers, and their bids go far to fix market prices.

Therefore the farmers, when prices fall below ex pectations, very naturally accuse the great packers of conspiring together, to purchase cattle at lower figures than would prevail, if they were not so big and had no understanding with each other. Lastly, the public, which has seen with dism~y from year to year the mounting costs of meats, and has also seen the packing firms grow great, puts 2 and 2 together and calls it 10; and for its part accuses the packers of conspiracy to extort extraordinary prices for beef. One more step in the evolution of this business re mains to be considered. The great packers are con stantly sending refrigerator cars loaded with meat prod ucts to .California and the South; and at first there were no return freights offering from those sections to make use of the special equipment pos sessed by these cars. In order not to haul them several thousand miles back empty, the packers commenced buying fruits in California, melons in Colorado, and berries and fresh vegetables throughout the South. This was a perfectly natural, perfectly legitimate, and exceedingly beneficial procedure to the public, and of course very profitable to the owners of the cars. Naturally it took large capital to carry on. It extended, in the course of time, to the can ning of fruits and the handling of butter, eggs, cheese, milk, and the like.

Here again the big fellows trod on the toes of the small fellows in the various trades, and some outcry ._~ [ 32 ] Government Meddling with Big Business arose against the packers; the little fellows complain ing that the big ones are out for the control of the entire food business of the United States. Meantime, nobody did the business of bringing California fruit or Southern vegetables,etc., to Northern and Eastern consumers better than did the packers. Naturally their business· grew; and again, naturally the dealers who have not their vast facilities were disgruntled, though the public was better served. Once more came the opportunity for the demagogue to jump on the back of the big fellows in alleged behalf of the little ones; and he did it with enthusiasm. The packers were between the devil and the deep sea. On the one hand the farmers said they kept down the price of beef. So also asserted the local butchers; but the public said they conspired to keep up the price of beef':-and to catch big profits both ways, going and coming! Same thing with fruits.

Well; the Roosevelt Administration started an investigation of the packers; and an exhaustive re port was made by Mr. Garfield, then I think the head of the Bureau of Corporations of the. Depart ment of Commerce. The substance of his report was that there were still many hundred local slaugh tering and packing houses in operation throughout the United States, which always competed in killing and marketing of local beef and pork with the great Western packers. That the latter, nevertheless, by superior methods and nearness to the great cattle ranges were enabled to dress and ship, all over the country, from 20 to 85 per cent. of the meat con sumed; the larger percentages being in the greater Eastern cities and the smaller percentages in country towns and smaller Western cities. The Garfield Report showed that the great Western packers did not compete with each other to the extent of a finish [ 33 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation fight, but did compete with local packers and slaugh ter houses all over the country, holding down prices generally to a level which yielded themselves a very minute profit. That minute profit was a matter of common knowledge at Chicago, for instance, years ago, as hereafter set forth.

As a matter of fact, there was nothing like mo nopoly in the packing business in spite of the fact that the great Western packers did not fight each other to a finish and did do the bulk of the business in large cities. The Garfield Report was denounced at the time by Democratic politicians and Socialists be cause it told the truth, and the truth was favorable to the packers. Its result was, however, that they were let alone for some years. Later, under the Wil son Administration, the Federal Trade Commission got after them, and proceedings were commenced by the Attorney General, for some reason that I don't understand, not in the U. S. Courts at Chicago, but before the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia at Washington. The burden of the complaint of the Federal Trade Commission seemed to be that the packers were going into too many lines of trade, and its objective was to force them to give up the owner ship of refrigerator cars, of fruit, butter, egg, and grocery business, and stick to the slaughtering of beef and pork.

The packers apparently thought best to yield as Standard Oil and other great concerns had done, probably seeing (as we all of us see) that the segrega tion of the business into various corporations, carry ing on its various branches, would make no great dif ference in the net results, or in actual ownership. They consented, in 1920, to court decrees, which have since been carried out, in pursuance of which Armour, Swift, and others have disposed of their [ 34 ] Government Meddling with Big Business railroads, stock yards, fruit-car lines, market news papers, cold-storage plants, their retail meat business, and other general food business outside of meat. It must be remembered that it took all of these busi nesses to give the great packers the 2 per cent. profit on turnover actually realized. Congress has lately passed a law putting them under the regulation of the Federal Trade Commission; and it is presumably going to knock out that 2 per cent. profit, of course for the benefit of the PEOPLE!

But 2 per cent. is an awfully small margin! Sup pose the F. T. C., as is barely possible, does not know as much about beef as Armour, and knocks out 3 per cent., or 4. What becomes of Armour? And what becomes of Boston-So per cent. of whose beef comes from Armour and the West? What would Boston have paid for beef all these years but for Armour? What will it pay before the F. T. C. gets through for beef, fruits, butter, etc? The question naturally arises to an inquiring mind: "How can the public possibly benefit by divorcing these naturally related industries, and forcing them into separate hands, which cannot possibly do them as well or as cheaply as they are now done?" Certainly no one else is doing them any better or any cheaper; and there is no one in sight likely to do them any better or cheaper. The Federal Trade Commission will infallibly be befogged, just as the Interstate Commerce Commission has been and is, by the conflicting claims of competing dealers, com peting prod ucers, middlemen, cities, region~, and perhaps transportation companies, whose private in terests may not jibe continuously with the routine adopted by the great packers. The Commission will be urged to favor this or that or the other com[ 35 ] Too Much Government-Too M~ch Taxation plainant; and will favor the most ingenious and persistent of them, with very little regard to the commercial factors that enter into the case. The public will never be represented by attorney before it. A huge mass of vexatious rules, regulations, and limitations will be built up around this great business, the cost of which will inevitably fall upon that public.

To put the matter in a nutshell, the consumers of meats and fruits and fresh vegetables, preserves, butter, cheese, eggs, and the like, are just as certain to pay more for what they eat, under what may be called without exaggeration an idiotic attempt to run the entire food business of the United States through a bureau of politicians at Washington, than ever they paid in the past or would pay in future if they and the packers were left to the tender mercies of the law of supply and demand. The simple and easy proof of the foregoing predic tion lies in the public statements made by the great packing companies to the Stock Exchanges and Commercial Agencies. They have always been large borrowers of working capital from the banks on short-time paper, frequently renewed; and in the strenuous finance of the last ten years they have been obliged, like most other large manufacturing concerns, to convert this dangerous and troublesome floating indebtedness into a long-time bonded debt; which could not be done without entire publicity of their earnings and operating expenses, for the benefit of investors in their securities. It is now several years that Armour, Swift, and the other great pack ers have annually filed such statements, and they are open to the public. Armour, for instance, made gross sales of 1,899 millions of dollars during the years 1918 and 1919; upon which was realized the net profit of 37 millions of dollars, that is not quite [ 36 ] Government Meddling with Big Business 2 per cent. of gross sales. On a pound of beef that meant a profit of -'llTf of a cent upon the packers~ wholesale price of about 2Z! cents. How long does the reader suppose that minute profit will last under government control? What actually did become of a far larger margin of railroad and telephone profit under government handling in 1918 and 1919, and what happened forthwith to railroad and telephone rates paid by the public? Why, naturally, the profit had to go down; the rates to go up!

History is bound to repeat itself. What will surely happen to the meat trade, unless the nation turns its back upon collectivist tomfoolery, and re turns to the sound principles upon which in the past, our wonderful prosperity was based, is: first, heavy loss to the packers; next, application to the Federal Trade Commission for permission to raise prices; and last, the raising of prices to the public. Along with the pressure of conflicting commercial interests will come that of the butchers' unions, for fatter jobs and better pay for working men; again, as always, at the expense of the public. There will be strikes and interruptions of meat supply and dead locks, as 'to-day in the railroad and coal trades, with eventually the demand by labor and farmer dema gogues for nationalization of the great food-supply ing. industries; so that each of these classes may feather its own nest by dint of votes rather than by hard work. Indeed, the demand for national ization of the packing industry has already been made by some who pretend to speak for the farmer bloc.

Only one thing is visible, at the end of a long vista of politics and paternalism, in government regulation of the packers; and that is the handwriting on the dead wall ahead, always growing bigger and plainer, [ 37 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation as we travel down the road toward it; and its legend, always more terrifying: High Cost of Living Higher Cost of Living HIGHEST COST OF LIVING Although, as shown above, the government attack upon the packers had not reached the point of dis integration and regulation by the Federal Trade Commission until 1920-1921, so that the market re sult of the attack upon prices of beef and of packing securities is yet to come, it is worth while to note at this point how insignificant such results must necessarily be in comparison with those worked by the law of supply and demand .. On the diagram of commodity prices which will be found later in this book the fluctuations of the wholesale price of beef from 1910 to 1920 are given, showing a rise from $4.40 to $9.35 per hundred pounds. This was the consequence of the enormous war demand for dressed and cured meats coming from all over the world, together with the cutting off of the South American supply by lack of ships for two or three years. The Wilson Administration's at tack upon profiteering was started in 1919, but pro duced not the least apparent result in lowering the cost of beef.

At the close of the war, however, the return of the meat trade to its old accustomed channels produced the same violent deflation that took place with most staple commodities. The year 1921 was one of dras tic readjustment and heavy loss to the great packers. To-day the level of wholesale prices is given by Mr. Thomas E. Wilson, in an address before the Institute of American Meat Packers, on October 9, 1922, as I 38 ] Government Meddling with Big Business substantially the same as that of 1913. I quote his address as follows: "In the week of September 30, 1919, the best grade of beef at Chicago was selling at wholesale in the form· of dressed steers at 23.5 cents per pound, as compared with 17.5 cents during the week of September 30 this year; good carcasses of veal at 29.5 cents, then, as compared with 17.5 cents this year; pork loins 38 cents, as compared with 29 cents; leaflard 29 cents, as compared with 12 cents; spare ribs 19 cents as compared with II cents; fresh skinned pork shoulders 27 cents, as compared with 14 cents; fresh hams 30 cents, as compared with 19 cents; smoked hams 34.8 cents, as compared with 23.6 ·cents.

"Heavy native steer hides were quoted in wholesale mar kets then at 49 cents a pound, as compared with 22 cents in the corresponding period of this year; light native cow hides at 51 cents, as compared with 19 cents. "In the calendar year 1919 the meat products exported weighed 3,242,603,537 pounds and had a value of $985,011,33°, according to the United States Department of Commerce; exports of meat products in the last calendar year weighed 1,945,660,210 pounds and had value of only $287,070,966. The average value per pound of the ex ports had dropped from 3°.38 cents to 14.75 cents and the quantity also had been reduced as noted. The shrinkage in value per pound was 15.63 cents, or 5I per cent.; the shrinkage in total value was $697,94°,364, or 70 per cent.; and the shrinkage in quantity was 1,296,943,327 pounds, or only 40 per cent. "Those figures indicate, even to the casual statistician, what a readjustment of trade and values the meat and live-stock industry experienced; in only three years a decrease in exports alone of more than a half-billion dol lars, or 70 per cent., by value; and a decrease of more than a billion and a quarter pounds, or 40 per cent., by weight."

How perfectly puny and idle do the efforts of the United States Government appear as compared with [ 39 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation the huge and rapid world-market deflation in price of beef here shown. Can the reader study these figures without intense disgust at the utter stupidity of governmental meddling in such an affair as this? Other Attacks on Business. My 1912 book stud ied, in greater or less detail, the 53 big trusts capi talized at more than twenty million dollars each, aggregating over 5,000 millions, which then survived; besides a lot more that were dead and buried failures. I showed that in 1912 but three of them had achieved substantial monopoly ; but four had slight competition and all the rest had to fight for their lives against fierce and abundant competition; in short, that com bination to prevent competition was a necessary and inevitable failure. Of the first three, the Harvester Trust was shortly attacked by the Government, and voluntarily gave up some of its control of the trade.

All of the next four, viz.: Tobacco, Standard Oil, DuPont Powder, and United Shoe, have since been broken up, or limited in operation, by government suits; while the Packers, the Telephone, the Western Union, and the Sugar Trust, have been haled into court and before Congress repeatedly. Long before (as I knew to my sorrow, because I was a large stock holder at the time) the Chicago Gas Trust, a combination formed to stop a destructive price-war between the four gas companies in that city, had been dissolved by the Courts of Illinois, in a suit· at Common Law, as 'an unlawful combination in re straint of trade; away back in 1889, two years before the Sherman Law was passed by Congress. That is to say, not only could the state or national governments have fought the Trusts perfectly well under the old Common Law, without any Sherman Law or Clayton Act whatever-but the actual his tory of all the big Trusts, as long ago as 1912, showed [4° ] Government Meddling with Big Business conclusively that it was perfectly unnecessary to fight them at all; because of their complete failure to monopolize or to fix prices above or below those determined ,by the law of supply and demand, even for a short time. In fact, only a little patience, a very few years' pressure of the natural forces of trade, were needed to force all these great combines, with out exception, either to suicide, dying of their own acts, or else 'to utter change of their ways, to vigorous and legitimate competition, in order to remain alive at all.

What, then, have our successive Presidents from Roosevelt to Wilson actually accomplished, in protecting the people from Wall Street, from railroad and manufacturing robbers, or in punishing the latter for their crimes? Let me, to save burying my unlucky readers alive with statistics, answer this question by plotting on the same diagram several curves; showing for each of the great industries attacked by the Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson administrations the fluctuations, for the last twelve years, of the prices of their products or service to the public, and of their shares in the Stock Market. Surely, if the Government succeeded in punishing these "malefactors of great wealth" (as Roosevelt called them), the stock quotations should reflect it, or, if it succeeded in stopping robbery of the public, the prices of goods should reflect it. If, .however, it did neither one nor the other, satisfying nobody, the elections ought to reflect it.

Here are two diagrams, made up for "Sugar," "Tobacco," "Standard Oil," "DuPont," "Tele phone," "Western Union," and "Steel" -noting each government attack, victory or defeat, in its proper year upon the diagrams, so that its effect [41 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation upon the rise and fall of stock and commodity mar kets can be seen at a glance. I have added to the commodity diagram the curve of what is known as "Bradstreet's Index Number" -representing the composite fluctuations of the open market value of all leading commodities (which is of course quite beyond the disturbing influence of any .particular trust or government suit); and to the stock dia gram that representing the composite fluctuation of "10 Industrial Stocks," used by the daily papers, for comparison with the prices of the trust shares and commodities. The reader will search in vain for any marked differences between fluctuations, that can either be charged to the trusts or credited to govern mental "trust busting"; while the elections totally ignored the whole contemptible business. In short, nothing has come out of the "mountain in labor" not even the traditional mouse!

(Note.)-Standard Oil of New Jersey stock sold on N. Y. Curb as follows: 1911 $ 593 (Broken up by Government late that year.) 1912 1100 (Just before distribution of "subsidiary" stocks) 1914 396 1915 477 1916 582 After dividend distribution of 34 subsidiary stocks, 1917 637 worth in 1920 $548 additional to values quoted 1918 645 for Standard Oil of New Jerseyo 1919 600 1920 728 The student will note here and there temporary disturbances in stock-market values-for instance, the lower range of prices for the Steel shares already mentioned above; but he will bear in mind that the great public does not trade in stocks on the exchanges -and does not care "a tinker" about the price of Steel Common. On the other hand, it is much in[42 ] Government Meddling with Big Business terested in the prices of sugar, tobacco, flour, gaso line, telephones, telegrams, railroad tickets; and not a few care something about the price of powder, har vesters, steel, etc.

Look now at the diagrams carefully. I shall be very grateful to the reader who will point out any great' reduction in the market prices, for goods, coin cident with, or apparently caused by, the government move into or against big business. (I do not include in it the government pricing of wheat and sugar during the Great War, which will be considered else where in some detail.) Two broad. conclusions stand out irresistibly from this diagram-record of these most conspicuous and important victims of government attack, showing the action of the open markets. First. That government attack on the trusts not only was always entirely unnecessary, but has actually been entirely futile-either to benefit the public or to punish the trusts-or their builders even where in some cases a technical breakup of combinations into several possibly competing units was effected. Second. That the natural forces of trade are not only amply sufficient, but, indeed, are the only forces necessary (and powerful enough) to correct automatic ally and at the earliest possible moment what is called "profiteering" -namely: the reaping of ex cessive profits from the many by the few; an excess which is necessarily rare, always temporary, and quite impossible of artificial maintenance.

It is true that the element of time must always come in; and that occasionally-as in the Great War a dire emergency exists that seems to demand action of the Government,.more immediate and more stable than that of time and trade. Very well; good citizens [ 45 ] Too Much Government-· Too Much Taxation in all the lately warring countries freely accepted government control of many things and would prob ably do so again; though now that the smoke has cleared away, it is, to say the least, doubtful whether free commerce would not have done the needful as quickly and more cheaply.. But, as to government interference in· times of peace, when we compare the far more numerous trusts that were not "busted" by the Government with the few that were; and note that the flow of trade ran on substantially alike in all -"the smoke went up the chimney just the same" as far as the public was concerned, it is hard to escape a gust of contempt for the demagogy that piles con gressional investigation on investigation, and Federal Trade Commission on InterState Commerce Com mission, Clayton Act on Sherman Law, and Trans portation Act on Adamson Act, plus taxes on taxes, on top of the whole huge useless mass-all utterly without visible result other than litigation and bureaucracy, and paralysis of industry!

CHAPTER III GOVERNMENT WAR CONTROL OF SUGAR HERE again the net benefits of war control may fairly be called doubtful. Take sugar control, for instance. Before the war Great Britain, Canada, and the United States used over six million tons of sugar an nually, of which 85 per cent. came from Germany, Russia, France, Java, and Cuba, in sl!ips. Then the submarines got in their deadly work, till, in 1915 and 1916, there were practically no ships. Russia and Germany could export nothing, and the French beet~ sugar industry was right in the heart of the devas tated region. Java had a lot of sugar all through the war, but could not deliver it for lack of ships. Cuba, Porto Rico, Hawaii, and the United States be came the main sources of available supply. They jumped their output from 4,4°0,000, pre-war aver age, to 6, I 15,547 tons for crop of 1919-1920. Before we got into the war, England, France, and Italy had long ago established food control; and to prevent putting up raw sugar prices on each other, had pooled their buying in the hands of the British Royal Commission on Sugar Supply. This last, competing with our refiners, had bid up the price of Cuban raw sugar (our own main source of supply) from $3.55 in 1914 to $6.17 per 100 pounds in 1916.

When we declared war on Germany, we, too, passed a Food Control Law, in August, 1917, and Mr/. Hoover was made administrator. He at once set up a [47 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation United States Sugar Board; prohibited trading in sugar futures on the exchanges; and stopped exports of sugar, except to the Allies. Then, to head off combination of the Cuban sugar planters to put up raw sugar prices still further, he joined the Allied nations in setting up an "International Sugar Committee" of five members; representing the British, French, and Italian governments, the Ameri can Sugar Refiners, and the U. S. Food Administra tion. He then got the Attorney General to assure him that under the circumstances a combination of the American Refiners to keep prices down was not a breach of the Sherman Law; and he got the refiners, as patriots, to reduce the price of refined sugar to $7.25, and to refuse to pay for raw cane sugar more than $6.90, New York. Then he went after the American beet-sugar men and got them to make equivalent prices. Finally, he fixed the differential between raw sugar and refined at $1.3°, as against that of 80 cents reported to me as enjoyed by the Sugar Trust in 1912; and the International Sugar Committee made a deal with a Cuban Sugar Com mission, appointed by that government, to buy the entire 1917-1918 crop at $4.60 f. o. b. north side Cuban ports, for fair division among the four nations represented by the Committee. Thus all govern ments, planters, and refiners were tied up tight, and the way was clear to hold wholesale· selling prices down to an agreed figure of $7.25 f.o.b. New York.

By next year all costs had gone up, and the 1919 Cuban crop was bought at $5.60 f.o.b. north side Cuban ports; while the selling price for refined was made $9.00 f.o.b. New York. In all this the voluntary patriotic aid of the great American sugar refiners and wholesalers who pulled together with the Government, and also of the whole [ 48 ] Government War Control of Sugar American people, who cut down their own daily use of sugar to help the Allies to a better supply, made it possible to accomplish a very extraordinary thing, viz., in the face of a world shortage in production for 1919 of about 2,000,000 tons, nearly one eighth of an average crop, the U. S. Sugar· Board succeeded in getting for this country one quarter of the world crop as compared with its usual share of one fifth. The wholesale price of refined sugar' was held down to an average of $8.80 New York; which was cheaper than in any country in the world but Denmark. Joshua Bernhardt, statistician of the U.S. Sugar Board, says that under free market conditions price probably would have averaged $15.00 per 100 pounds from January, 1918, to October, 1919 (the whole period of government control); and he figures out a saving to our citizens of $7.00 per capita, say $750,000,000.

At the same time the producers and refiners made handsome profits, while, as already noted, American, and more yet Cuban, output was immensely stimu. lated. This same Bernhardt, chief statistician of the American Sugar Board, and proud of its work, ends his book ("Government Control of the Sugar Indus try in the U. S."-Macmillan, 1920) with the follow ing paragraph: Government control of the sugar industry and trade in the war period and in the year of reconstruction which fol lowed, is an interesting example of wholesome and effec tive cooperation between business, the general public, and a government organization, functioning in a period of na tional stress and world upheaval. In order that the ex periences and-information derived in the period' of control might not be lost to the general public, the Directors of the U. S. Sugar Equalization Board have authorized the publication of this book.

Too Much Government-Too Much Taxatton So far, so good. "The devil was sick, the devil a monk would be; the devil was well, the devil a monk was he." As long as the war lasted, and the trade was patriotic, and the world was content to pay any old price for sugar, all was lovely, as Mr. Bernhardt says-writing, I imagine, just before the smash came in 1920. Now for the other side-the aftermath. Let me quote at length from the highest possible authority upon the sugar business as it is-not as Congress thinks it ought to be-I refer to the An nual Reports for 1920 and 1921 of President Babst of the so-called "Sugar Trust," the great American Sugar Refining Company. In the 1920 Report he says: In the United States sugar industry 1920 will always be remembered as the year of attempted government de control. Our annual reports since 1915 give an account, year by year, of the various steps of control. We venture now a statement of the larger aspects of government con trol, and of attempted de-control, in the hope of lessening somewhat the general bewilderment on the subject.

For some years prior to the Great War the various sugar producing fields found their markets with almost fixed regularity. Deficiencies were met by exportable margins from remoter fields without marked price fluctuations. Experience had worked out the world's supply and demand within comparatively narrow limits. Continental Europe produced almost half of the world's sugar. The United States field was self-contained. Upon the outbreak of the Great War these fixed rela tionships were immediately overturned. Locked within the battle lines was about a third of the world's normal production. The European Allies held almost no sugar producing territory. The necessity for conserving ship ping, and the price-stimulating effect of competitive bidding for the diminished supplies, led to government control of sugar in the United Kingdom as early as 1914, to [5° ] Government War Control of Sugar inter-allied European control in 1916, and finally to inter national control in 1917; to which last the United States, Canada, and Cuba also became parties. These steps rapidly led to government control in practically all the countries of the world, which in some form largely con tinues. To retrace these steps is quite as important in its economic and commercial bearing as was the coming of the control itself. Whether or not the methods of de-control in anyone country prove to be sound is of importance to the entire world.

The Armistice on November 1I, 1918, found sugar a rationed staple in most countries, notwithstanding the great achievement of Cuba and of other producers in in creasing production. CQntrol, therefore, continued as before. On June 10, 1919, however, France suddenly, and without any accumulations of stocks, de-controlled sugar for domestic purposes. The result was a scramble in the world's market with little regard to prices, which later found its unhappy counterpart, on an enlarged scale, in the de-control experience of the United States in 1920, attempted under similar conditions. Such was the general situation when, on July 29, 1919, the Cuban producers, through their government, offered to renew again their contract for the sale of their entire crop for international division. While your Company rec ognized from the first that our Government's programme involved an unusual economic experiment, yet the CQ operation of the sugar industry with the Food Administra tion had succeeded for two years in providing the public with sugar at a price below its world's parity. Therefore your Company again offered on August 6, 1919, in answer to an inquiry from the Government, to continue to conduct its business under government control for the year 1920, if the Government so desired. No definite official action in reply was taken by our Government on which we could rely until January 2, 1920.

Meanwhile the sudden de-control in France greatly strengthened. the price of sugar in the world's market, and a flood of export orders for refined sugar came from Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation Europe to the United States. Our Government having made no decision, the Cuban producers withdrew their offer on September 22, already having entered into "toll" contracts with many refiners to secure this European business. Under a "toll" contract the refiner accepts raw sugar and delivers refined sugar and receives a charge or "toll" for the refining. Almost immediately bills were introduced in our Con gress directing a continuation of sugar control. A total of 37 bills were introduced in our Congress and 2 bills in the Cuban Congress relating to sugar and sugar control, as shown in the recapitulation appended to this report. N at urally these bills kept the industry in great uncertainty.

Meanwhile, the active foreign demand absorbed through "toll" contracts a large part of the sugar produced in the early months of the new Cuban crop. Finally, on Decem ber 22, 1919, Congress in the McNary Bill enacted, That the President is authorized to continue the Uni ted States Sugar Equalization Board . . . to adopt and carry out until December 3I, 1920, plans and methods of securing, if found necessary for the public good, an ade quate supply and an equitable distribution of sugar at a fair and reasonable price to the people of the United States! The President signed the bill on December 3I, 1919, but on January 2, 1920, announcement was made that" It is doubtful whether it will be practicable or wise for the President to exercise the powers conferred." It was fur ther announced that the .President would continue as directed by Congress to control the industry by licenses under the provisions of the Lever Act. So de-control and control were both attempted, at a time when the country was bare of supplies. As pointed out in our last Annual Report, the Government through the McNary and Lever Acts continued its responsibility for supply, price, and dis tribution of sugar throughout the year 1920.

Between July 29, 19 19, and January 2, 1920, during the time of indecision, raw sugar prices had almost doubled. The foreign demand was stated by the Cuban producers to [ 52 ] 'Government War Control of Sugar have absorbed 25 per cent. of the new crop, or about 1,000,000 tons, before grinding started on the island. In view of the fact that the shelves of our :country were bare, your Company did not accept export business or make "toll" contracts, holding its capacity for domestic distri bution in the ordinary way. This course, while under taken in the interest of the public, caused us the loss of a large volume of business, for early deliveries from produc ing countries were delayed by strikes, and those coming forward were applied largely 011 "toll" contracts. As a result both of the long period of uncertainty and of the continuance of the war-time Lever Act, "toll" con.. tracts were extended to domestic business also and at a time when demand exceeded supply. Ordinarily the re finer and producer oppose. each other as buyer and seller and the result is a m,arket price turned into profit or loss.

Under the Lever Act, however, the refiner was controlled and the foreign producer was uncontrolled. By means of paying a "toll" to the refiner, out of which came all the refiner's profit under the Lever Act, the producer had charge of the refined-sugar market at a time when the de mand vastly exceeded the supply. Prices mounted and distribution became demoralized. The sugar shortages of the previous three years, the indecision and uncertainty as to the Government's course, the pressure for exports, a flood of reports, legislation, prophecies and strikes, engendered a spirit of hysteria in the domestic trade. We annex a chronology of these events and of their publicity which will serve to recall this agitated period. The public demanded sugar in any form, at any price, in any quantity, and for any delivery. Householders, retail and wholesale merchants, manufac turers, .speculators and many interlopers, excited by the repeated predictions of higher prices, entered upon a mad scramble for sugar. Probably no one event exercised a more powerful influence in creating this panic of buying than the news of a partial crop failure in Cuba. Sugar statisticians repeatedly reduced their crop estimates until by May the difference between the highest original I 53 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation estimate and the lowest reduced estimate represented a loss of almost 1,000,000 tons.

With a known world sugar shortage and the large sales to Europe of Cuban sugar this partial failure of the Cuban crop made the outlook for sugar supplies for the United States most unfavorable. It became a question of price and of credits. The American people were eager to outbid the world for sugar. "Human nature," a prominent New Englander has said, "is so weak that the vast majority of people who in a large section of the country were deprived of sugar, said in their unthinking way that they would rather have paid a higher price and had some sugar." "Get us sugar" was the substance of thousands of pleas and of the urgings of government officials. Seemingly this was the view of the entire public, and in April a de mand arose, regardless of price, beyond any possibility of apparent supply from our ordinary sources. As the largest merchandising unit in the refining industry this Company was faced with the duty to :£ind and to sup ply its customers with a reasonable amount of sugar, based on their former purchases. Accordingly, we and other refiners bought sugar outside our ordinary sources of sup ply but at prices substantially lower than prevailing Cuban prices, and as much as 5 cents and 10 cents a pound lower than the subsequent asking price of the Cuban planters' pool. On May 24 we began to offer these purchases to our customers at a uniform net price of 22.06 cents per pound for the refined product in the months corresponding to the arrival of the sugar. The price gave us a reasonable mar gin over cost and was I! cents to 3! cents a pound lower than the prevailing competitive refined prices for similar deliveries. So the public and manufacturers were as sured of a better supply, which was then in doubt, and at prices below the prevailing market for prompt and for future deliveries.

Our customers eagerly took our tenders of sugar. In most instances it was necessary for us at this time to ac cept orders for less sugar than the customer desired. By their contracts with us the trade impliedly agreed to keep [ 54 ] Government War Control of Sugar open the channels of distribution for their purchases from us. However, contrary to all precedent, and without the possibility of knowledge as to the amount of purchases made, tlole trade also went to South America, Europe, the West Indies, and'the Far East to purchase consumption sugars on their own account for arrival during the last six months of the year. The world was scoured for sugar, and it was found. The great demand and high prices acted as a magnet. Sugar which had disappeared from the world's statistics, and sup posedly was consumed, found its way to the warehouses of manufacturers and jobbers even from the interior of China.

Sugar began to pour into the United States from nearly 50 countries. In the single month of July alone 587,000 tons of sugar reached United States ports. The refiners have adequate facilities for distributing re fined sugar according to trade requirements, and through years of experience understand the needs of the trade and of the country. Ordinarily the trade buys from the re finers. This year, under the excitement of attempted de control, this policy was departed from by the manufac turing and grocery trade, who purchased direct from the foreign producer beyond all possible needs of the country. The total amount of these direct consumption sugars purchased by the trade is estimated as high as 700,000 tons, and about two thirds came to the Atlantic ports. This direct consumption sugar included 250,000 tons from Java, 35,000 tons from Europe, 30,000 tons from Canada, 45,000 tons from Argentina, 35,000 tons from Central America, 25,000 tons from Mexico, and 85,000 tons from Brazil, Peru and the West Indies, as well as large quanti ties from Japan, China, British India, and washed sugars from St. Croix, Porto Rico and Cuba and many other foreign countries.

These vast commitments by the trade, entirely aside from their commitments through the refiners, could not have been foreseen. No machinery is available for re cording them. In fact, in many instances they were con cealed. These direct purchases by the trade were at [ 55 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation prices often higher than the equivalent of your Company's selling price of 22.05 cents net for refined sugar. Many of these sugars were found on arrival to be unfit for household or canning. use. Part were of dark color in the nature of raw sugar. Some must be sent to refiners to be cleaned and purified by the refining process. Most of the pur chases were under confirmed letters of credit, and payment became a most difficult problem, resulting in attempted resales, which hastened the collapse of prices. Under the pressure of these sales the market weakened, and in August broke into the most violent price decline ever recorded in sugar.

As great as was the buying panic, so was now the hysteria of cancellation and of repudiation of contracts. The trade became so demoralized that on August 24 your Company withdrew from the market and devoted its facili ties to completing the business already on its books. Not until the writing of this report, more than a month after the close of the year, were figures available of total imports for the entire country, showi.ng the unprecedented figure of 4,460,166 tons of sugar imported in 1920, as com pared with 3,976,331 tons in 1919 and 3,115,143 tons in 1918. Making adjustment of stocks, of exports, and of the in creased crop of domestic beet and of Louisiana cane sugar, there was in the National Sugar Bowl for domestic con sumption, in round figures, probably 775,000 tons, or 4,957,779 barrels, or 1,735,222,000 pounds more sugar in 1920 than in 1919. It is significant that the surplus in the National Sugar Bowl is nearly the same as the purchases by the trade of imported direct consumption sugars.

Making the comparison with 1918, there was probably 1,075,000 tons, or 6,880,000 barrels, or 2,400,000,000 pounds more refined sugar in 1920 than 1918. Stated in another way, the increased amount of sugar for domestic consumption in the National Sugar Bowl in 1920 over 1919 was sufficient to last the people of the United States 70 days, or from Labor Day until almost Thanks giving, had we been dependent upon that supply alone.

Government Wat' Control of Sugar The increase in 1920 over 1918 was sufficient to last 98 days, or from Labor Day until almost Christmas. Stated in money, the value of the sugar imports alone, as revealed by figures of the United States Customs De partment, was $347,643,887 in 1918, $522,259,538 in 1919, and $1,294,632,866 in 1920. These figures do not include the domestic beet and Louisiana cane sugars, customs duty, cost of refining, cost of distribution, freight charges, nor many other attendant costs, probably bringing the total cost to the American people of all sugar consumed in 1920 to more than $1,5°0,000,000, at wholesale prices. The stockholders will understand the conservative course followed by your Com pany in view of this largely increased supply of sugar in the United States in 1920, when it is recalled, for reasons already given, that our own tonnage was less than usual.

Ample justification is again afforded for the comment of the United States Tariff Commission under recent date, that your Company "cannot be said to occupy a mono poly position in control of supply and prices," nor, we might add, of responsibility either directly or indirectly for the results of the attempted de-control of sugar. As a result of attempted de-control, we have had famine and plenty, prices ranging from 4t cents to 24! cents for duty-paid raw sugar, and from 7! cents to 27! cents re finers' list price for refined sugar, with financial wreckage from producers to grocers, not only in the United States but in Cuba, in Canada, and in many foreign countries. More serious still, attempted de-control on an empty shelf, and the resultant panic of prices, may profoundly affect all United States producing fields, including Cuba. How violent were the fluctuations in raw sugar prices in 1920 will be understood when it is stated that an investiga tion of the prices of over one hundred years, including the years of the Mexican and Civil wars, \fails to reveal a change in anyone year one half so great as the fluctuation of 19.875 cents per pound of last year. Even in 1914, the year of the sudden outbreak of the Great War, the fluctua tion was only 3.625 cents, while from 1900 to 1910 the [ 57] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation greatest fluctuation was in the year 1905 and that with only a variation of 1.815 cents per pound-less than one tenth of the fluctuation of the de-control year of 1920.

In the year 1920 the people of the United States paid the highest prices ever recorded, amounting to many un necessary hundred millions of dollars in the attempted de control by our Government of a world staple, for two years held below its world's parity, without the caution of ac cumulating stocks or of taking any other preparatory measure for the transition . .The volume of refining operations was the smallest in the history of the Company. We were unable to overcome the handicaps growing out of the long period of uncertainty and indecision as to whether there would be government control or de-control. Strikes and importation of direct consumption sugar also caused a loss of volume. More over, the continuance of the Lever Act not only affected our volume by providing a field for the "toll" contract, but also affected our earnings by reason of the uncertainty which prevailed and still prevails, as to whether cost or replacement value may be used in determining prices.

How de-control conditions interfered with our refining operations will be seen from the following table: Brooklyn Refinery . Jersey City Refinery . Boston Refinery . Philadelphia Refinery . Chalmette Refinery . Started Jan. I Mar. 17 Jan. 16 Jan. 21 Jan. 20 Mar. 9 Closed Nov. 17 Sept. 4 Nov. 17 Nov. 17 Feb. 13 Oct. 5 Melting Days 265 173 253 229 200 The total business of the Company, including all its operations, sugar, syrup, molasses, cooperage, tim her, lumber, tank cars, tank steamer, and railroads, was over $35°,000,000. It was the high prices, notwithstanding the reduced volume of our tonnage, which resulted in this large figure. On this large business we secured an operat ing profit of only $1,802,437, a return of about! cent on each dollar of sales, or less than llf of a cent (one mill) on [ 58 ] Government War Control of Sugar each pound of refined sugar sold. The operating profit continues to be one of the narrowest in the manufacturing field, and for 1920 was wholly inadequate. It was arrived at after setting aside at cost all raw sugar necessary to ful fill our outstanding contracts with the trade, but after an adjustment to market prices of our unsold inventory.

(From 1921 Annual Report) The events of 1921 are merely a continuance of those of 1920, all incident to the disastrous attempt by our Govern ment to de-control a world staple, for two years held below its world's parity, without the caution of accumulating stocks or of taking any other preparatory measure for the transition. While the financial effect on the refiners and producers of the United States field, both beet and cane, has been most disastrous, yet the abject distress of Cuba has been the outstanding feature of the year. Cuba had to bear not only the burden of its ordinary crop, but of its stimulated production. So violent was Cuba's reaction that most of its own banks were carried away. In the stress of its financial needs it, too, undertook the risk of sugar control. It should be set down, however, to the credit of the Cuban sugar industry that even in its great national financial distress the necessary consent of 70 per cent. of Cuban production was obtained with the very greatest difficulty.

The Cuban sugar industry, like others, had learned the peril of government control. However, in February, 1921, the Cuban Sugar Finance Committee was formed by the Republic of Cuba with large powers. Created to "obtain the necessary credits for the realization of the crop," it suc ceeded too well. By bringing about a recovery of prices during February and March, the producers were encour aged to such an extent that the usual crop of nearly 4,000,000 tons was produced. Cuba's difficulties were not overcome notwithstanding a most skillful de-control on Decem ber 3I st, last. We are setting down these facts of control and of de-con[ 59] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation trol in the United States and in Cuba, not in the spirit of complaint, by reason of their effect on the business of your Company, but rather to point out the inevitable drift of government control and the futility of any effort to set aside economic law. The success of the earlier efforts of sugar control during the war was due to its international character, and especially to the help of internationally controlled shipping. It was no guide, and certainly was no precedent, to encourage any of the efforts which have been made since the Armistice, all of which have failed so griev ously, whether in the United States, Cuba, or elsewhere.

For these experiments of government control and of de-control the people of the United States and of the world have paid hundreds of millions of dollars. The magni ficent sugar industry of the United States field, including the producers and refiners, both beet and cane, whether of continental United States, the Philippines, Hawaii, Porto Rico, or of Cuba, has paid almost with its life. United States investments, in the hands of hundreds of thousands of people, amounting to several billions of dol lars, have been put in jeopardy. The United States sugar industry, the greatest of its kind in the world, ranking in importance with steel, railroads, and farm products, was de-controlled by legislative fiat and executive order, with out proper regard to elementary economic laws. Is it not time for the public, who must in the end pay the bill on every pound of sugar they buy, to insist that the sugar industry be given a rest from any further control or experiments of any kind, of any name, of any device, and be given an opportunity to recover its position under its own direction and administration? In any event, whoever undertakes to introduce further artificial measures in the present complicated position of the sugar industry, does so at great risk and under grave responsibility to the entire people of the United States.

The refiner stands between the producer and the con sumer and usually bears the burden of the consumer's complaints, but he will assume no responsibility for the high prices which will come with any artificial crop curtail[60 ] Government War Control of Sugar ment or other experiments. The people of the United States understand that the Government stepped into the sugar situation during the war, but certainly they will be unwilling to pay the price of any further experiments, or of any efforts to exploit the disaster of de-control to the ad vantage of any section of the industry. The law of supply and demand is inexorable in itself, and before it all people, whether governments or individ uals, whether legislators or consumers, still must yield. Since the Armistice little progress has been made in re viving the sugar industry within the European war area, so .there still is little exportable surplus. The world's supplies and demands remain in about the same proportion as during the war.

The United States sugar industry as a great world factor is an incident and accident of the Spanish War. We went to war to save Cuba and by accident got the Philippines. Porto Rico was an incident. The so-called United States field may be described as comprising the beet and cane sugar of the United States, the cane sugar of Hawaii, Porto Rico, the Philippines, Santo Domingo, Hayti, the Virgin Islands, and, by reason of the Reciprocity Treaty and of our investments, the cane sugar of Cuha. The total production of the United States field in the year 1898 at the close of the Spanish War is set forth in the following table: United States Beet . Louisiana and Texas Cane . Hawaii . Porto Rico : .. Philippines . Santo Domingo and Hayti . Virgin Islands . Cuba . Tons 41,000 310,000 225,000 54,000 15°,000 4 8,000 13,000 315,000 1,15 6,000 At the outbreak of the European War in 1914 there had been the large development shown by the following table of production for 1913: [ 61 1 Too Much Government-· Too Much Taxation Tons United States Beet. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . 624,000 Louisiana and Texas Cane. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 153,000 Hawaii. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 488,000 Porto Rico. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350,000 Philippines. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155,000 Santo Domingo and Hayti. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84,000 Virgin Islands. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,000 Cuba 2,428,000 4,288,000 What with devastation, neglect, and the substitution of other crops, the sugar output of Europe is now 2,000,000 tons less than in pre-war days. The Old World's loss has been the New World's gain.

In contrast with the foregoing tables, the one below gives the production for that field in the year 1921, which shows an increase since the outbreak of the war of over 2,000,000 long tons, most of which has been in Cuba: United States Beet . Louisiana and Texas Cane . Hawaii . Porto Rico . Philippines . Santo Domingo and Hayti . Virgin Islands . Cuba . Tons 969,000 157,000 508,000 437,000 252,000 191,000 4,000 3,936,000 6,454,000 The United States and Cuban fields are sufficient to meet for some years all the needs of the United States and of Europe. It would have been a wise provision if some commitments, aside from informal assurances, had been secured by Washington before it inaugurated its war programme of stimulation of sugar production in the United States field. The initiative of producers and refiners and the investment of hundreds of millions of American capital have made possible in Cuba and the United States a vast increase in the production of a food staple of pre-eminent world im portance. The world needs this sugar. The United States has the excess capacity to refine at least a million tons for export. Not another brick need be laid.

[62 ] Government War Control of Sugar There is bound to be a race for foreign markets. Will the ultimate prize go to Cuba and the United States, or will it go elsewhere? The answer must be made by the industry itself. It had the pioneer courage to invest hundreds of millions in production. Without doubt it will have the courage, vision, and sustained patience to find and to hold foreign markets. In the foregoing quotations we have the pros and cons of government control stated by experts on both sides, after a huge experiment on the broadest scale and under most exceptionally favorable conditions. Mr. Bernhardt says the United States was 750,millions better off at the end of 1919, after two years' control. But Mr. Babst says we were "many unnecessary hun dredmillions" worse off at the end of I 920, because of government methods of de-control. At the end of 1921, he says, theyear has largely increased the disaster of 1920; and he begs hard to be spared control in the future.

No man can read Mr. Bernhardt's book, or Mr. Babst's Reports, without being dazed by the size and complexity of the problem of control of a great world trade; or without being struck with the absolute im possibility to the best minds, both in the trade and in the Government Commissions, of sizing up the world market situation, and foreseeing its course. Pro fessor Taussig seems to have made the best guess as to the impending avalanche of sugar-though perhaps not the best as to means of breaking its fall. While my own opinion is as worthless as the next man's, two things seem to me to stand clearly forth. 1st. That the increased Cuban and United States production, which so greatly helped out during 1915-16-17, certainly would have come just the same under an open market price of above $7.00 per 100, [ 63 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation north side ports, as it did under a controlled price of but $4.60 to $5.60. There would certainly have been just as much sugar and just as many vessels afloat (though perhaps not carrying sugar), if commerce had had its free way. For sugar was practically a war necessity. And we, the richest of the nations, would have got our full share. Retail prices might have been far higher during the war, but I guess would have dropped far quicker after the Armistice had released the Java supply; and while there must have come a reaction in the sugar trade, it would probably have been no worse than in most trades and not nearly so ghastly as it was. Thank heaven, the emergency has passed; but should it recur, the success of government control in sugar as a war measure is not so clear as to warrant trying it again.

2nd. That the experts of the Commissions and the wisest merchants in the trade were utterly unable to forecast its course; yet Congress was perfectly ready at all times to "butt in," ignorantly. No less than 37 bills as to sugar and sugar control were introduced in 1919; one of them, as it happened, by my own Congressman; an able and estimable local lawyer before going to Congress-but surely at least as ignorant as I myself of the vast and complex com merce in sugar-one in which so many thousands of producers and brokers had spent their lives, yet could not forecast it in 1920. If those Congressmen evolved those 37 bills out of their own inner conscious ness, for the good of the country generally, the odds are 100 to I that they did not know in the least what they were going about. If, on the other hand, they were prepared and handed to the Congressmen by particular constituents for introduction, the chances are 100 to I that those constituents planned a private dip into the United States sugar bowl.

[64 ] Government War Control of Sugar One or the other is almost sure to be the case, when Congress steps in to limit the free action of any law of trade, in any way whatever. Limitation neces sarily means pinching opportunity for some and swelling it for others; so at once both parties are either forced, or tempted, to bring pressure on Con gress for selfish ends. Right there is the fundamental vice of all meddling of government in business I Before leaving this chapter, a few figures will show why Mr. Babst is so bitter against that vice. As I showed in my 1912 book, the "Sugar Trust" had bought out competitors in vain, over and over again; but it had quit combining and gone in for open com~ petition years before; and had become in that way a solid earner and dividend payer of from 7 to 9 per cent. on its shares. Now see what happened to it because of government control and de-control: It had started the year 1914 with a surplus of $18,229,425 accumulated from fornier years. It paid dividends of from 7 to 9 per cent. right along on both preferred and common shares from 1914 until 1920, out of earnings or surplus, as the case might be; but that surplus lost or gained, meantime, as follows: 11,074,935 $ 7,15~hf9°Surplus remaining end 1921 [ 65 ] 1913 Surplus brought forward $18,229,425 Loss Gain 1914 Free market $ 1,198,631 1915 Do 701,992 1916 Do $2,019,909 1917 Do 1,912,815 1918 Government control 1,121,9°6 1919 Do 1,768,7°6 1920 De-control & Smash 10,686,280 1921 Do 5,311,368 Total loss $17,898,271 Total gain Net loss Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation So the Sugar Company had to borrow $30,000,000 on mortgage bonds to tide over the smash. No wonder Mr. Babst felt bitter!

If·meantime the people had benefited at the cost of the Trust, the demagogues in Congress could point with pride to that achievement. But, alas, there was no old-time cheap sugar till the Government let the open markets drop on the United States trade, in 1920. Even when it finally did so, could there be a better example of the total incapacity of such a body as Congress-and other legislatures are no wiser-to deal intelligently with such a kaleidoscopic trade, than the stupid, dilatory vacillation, of a thoroughly dazed bunch of politicians, that ensued? They were not so much to blame for going wrong, where the wisest experts in the trade could not see the way aright. But, now that the thing is over, it seems clear enough to me, at least, that they never should have monkeyed with that particular buzz-saw at all; but should have let prices run their natural course, during the war and after it.

Government War Control of Wheat. During the ten years before the World War, from 1904 to 1913 in clusive, our United States farmers had sowed every year an average of nearly 47 million acrestowheat; had raised an average of 710 million bushels; and had ex ported an average of 98 million bushels (rising at times to around 150 millions) at an average farm price of 84! cents a bushel. When the war came and Russian and Rumanian wheat supply was barred by the fighting lines, while Argentine and Egyptian wheat was cut off by the German submarines-as with sugar, so with wheat, the United States became the most available source of supply. Prices, acreage sown, and production jumped about under war stimulus, farm-labor short age, and the weather, as per the following tabulation: [66 ] Government War Control of Sugar Farm price Acreage Bushels Exports (cents) (millions) (millions) (millions) 1914 98.6 53·5 891 332 1915 91.9 60·5 1026 243 1916 160·3 52.3 636 204 1917 200.8 45.1 637 134 1918 2 04.2 . 59.2 921 287 1919 215.1 72.3 (bad crop) 934 220 1920 144·3 57.2 787 293 (Authority, U. S. Statistical Abstract, 1920, and Chicago Board of Trade for Exports from 1920 crop in 1921) As soon as the United States went into the World War, Congress passed a Food Control Act, and Mr.

Hoover was made Food Commissioner as aforesaid. He promptly organized the Wheat Corporation, with $100,000,000 capital furnished by the Government, to act with the Allied Governments to buy and sell the American wheat crop, in so large a way as to block speculation and profiteering in the wheat markets of this country. Here, as in control of sugar, he called in the loyal voluntary aid of the great ex changes and their members, the leading buyers, ship pers, and millers of the United States; at the same time starting a popular educational campaign for saving wheat, by substituting corn and other meal for wheat flour. Furthermore, he stimulated the grQwing of wheat in the United States by guaranteeing to buy all wheat grown by the farmers at the very high price of $2.00 per bushel, for the seasons of 1918 and 1919. The result was an enormous increase in acreage sown, especially. in 1919; though largely offset by a very bad crop that year.

This, with the voluntary use of substitutes for wheat by millions of American housewives, permitted heavy exports to Europe, at prices Europe could pay. Without Mr. Hoover's powerful intervention and government guarantees, it is hard to say what might have been the course of the price of wheat. Govern[ 67] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation mental shipping control came in, of course, with wheat as with sugar. Let us admit, for the moment, that the price of wheat was stabilized in the world market, and that there was no speculative "profiteer ing'" on a great scale during government control. But what happened afterward? Precisely the same violent deflation that happened to other commodities came upon farm products in 1920. With over-abundant shipping and conse quent release of the Argentine and other surplus ac c:umulations of wheat during the war, along with the fall in all European exchanges, the values of wheat melted away like the traditional snowball in hell; although the empty granaries of Europe took liberally of the 1920 crop. By 1921 the American farmer was in dire need; precisely because the abnormal support of the' Government was ruthlessly withdrawn just when he had got in the habit of depending on it.. Under the stimulus of patriotism, of helping the Allies in the World War, and most of all under government guarantee of ,an almost fantastic price for two years, the farmer had sown huge acreage to wheat; he had bid up in competition with manufacturers the wages of farm labor three to one; he had often bought land at double price per acre; and was paying for every thing he had to buy in the same proportion. For three years he had made money; but no one warned him to save and put his profits in the bank against the day of deflation. When it came, sudden and swift, with the restoration of world crop-selling and the poverty of world crop-buying, he woke up to find out that he could not get for his 1921 crop anywhere near what it had cost to raise.

True enough, he was in much the same boat as everybody else-especially the great manufacturers, who hClrd reaped enormous war profits. (Not~ the t68 ] Government War Control of Sugar utter demoralization and huge shrinkages of profits suffered by the great corporations in 192I, almost without exception, as tabulated at the end of this chapter.) But such an experience was new to the farmer, though familiar enough to manufacturers; and he straightway thought everyone, the railways, the elevators, the speculators, the retailers, the bank ers, were robbing him; while his pet demagogues, Townley and LaFollette, did not wait a minute to tell him that an all-powerful but all-foolish Congress at Washington was the easy gang to scare stiff with the farmer vote, until it should rob Wall Street in turn for his benefit. Yet the farmer was hit no whit harder than the rest of us. The average price of wheat of 1919, $2.15 per bushel, dropped to $1.44 in 1920, or 33 per cent.; while Bradstreet's Index Num ber of wholesale prices ~n 106 leading commodities fell during 1920 from 20.869 to 13.626, or 35 per cent.

Unfortunately, the average price of wheat of 1916, namely $1.60 per bushel, being under "control" had risen. by 1919 to but $2.15, only 34 per cent.; while Bradstreet's Index Number of the commodities rose from an average of 11.824 in 1916 to 18.664 in 1919, or nearly 58 per cent. In other words, the farmer suffered almost the same deflation as· all the rest of us on the price of wheat; but government control had previously robbed him of 58 less 34, or 24 per cent. of the inflation by which all· the rest 'of us benefited! No wonder the poor fellow was caught short of cash; and no wonder that he squealed to Congress! As I write (June 10, 1922) Mr. Hoover is en deavoring to control prices of coal-not by law, but l by voluntary cooperation among producers and re tailers-according to a fixed maximum suggested by himself. The instant result, even before consum .. [ 69] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation mation of the voluntary agreement by all the parties concerned, is an advance of retail prices in the open market; and a double squeal from some of the re tailers, and from President Lewis, of the Coal Miners' Union-the retailers complaining that they can't take it out of the public; and the Unions roaring that nevertheless they and the producers must! A very pretty mess; beautifully illustrating how impossible it is for any "control" but that of the law of supply and demand, to satisfy anybody, for any length of time. I have the warmest admiration for Mr.

Hoover's magnificent ability and world services; and the greatest hesitation in setting my ignorant opinion against the vast knowledge at his command; yet I cannot for the life of me see that the results, as actually recorded, of his control of wheat and sugar, should lead us all to expect anything better from his present attempt artificially to control the price of coal. He seems to contemplate a more or less temporary stabilization, at a price high enough to stimulate non-union mine production; which nat urally brings a howl from the union mine-workers. By the time control comes to an end (when the effect of the strike ends) heaven only knows what tor rents of coal will flood the market, from abroad and at home, and sweep away any price-dam set up to hold them. The coal operators are experienced busi ness men, and should not be caught as were the farmers; but so were the sugar manufacturers ex perienced men-yet see what happened to them when government control ended.

Perhaps Mr. Hoover counts on the voluntary cooperation of the coal trade as more flexible and intelligent than Congressional "control"; as indeed it should be. Let us hope for the best-and end this chapter with a "Scotch verdict"-namely, that the [7° ] GovernmentWar Controlof Sugar success of sugar and wheat control during the Great War is "not proven." (Note.) To show that the sugar magnates were not the only business no more able than the farmers to es cape the disaster of world inflation and deflation of prices, I append the following table, already referred to above. RISE AND FALL OF CORPORATE PROFITS, 1912-1921 (Net earnings-millions) Ameri-DuPont Ana-Standard Swift & u. S. InterYear can Powder conda Oil-N.]. Co. Steel national Sugar Copper Paper 1912 7·439 6.87 2 15.851 35.108 8.250 77.075 3.238 1913 3·995 5·347 11.333 45·692 9.250 104.537 2.984 1914 5.277 5.603 9. 198 31.458 9·45° 45·6II 3.089 1915 6. 185 57.841 17.680 60·777 14.087 96.997 3.122 1916 13·455 82.013 51.780 70.792 20.465 293.000 7.466 1917 14.191 49· II3 34.860 81.4 16 34.650 243.875 12·932 1918 12.552 47.221 21.479 57.9 19 21,157 157·794-8.195 ,19 19 15.251 27.725 6.380 77.986 13.870 97· IIO 7. 171 1920 6.405 28.058 5.035 164.461 5.170 129. 167 21.239 1921 0·9°3 5.562 (13·953) 33.846 (7.812) 55.210 1,114 Loss Loss The same tale of. violent inflation and deflation of sales and profits is told by the published annual re ports of many hundreds of great corporations. There is substantially no exception, even though foresight led many captains of industry to lay aside part of the huge profits of the years of inflation, to provide for shrinkage in the years of deflation sure to come.

Just so Moses, in the Old Testament days, laid aside reserves of corn during seven fat crop years, to take care of the Egyptians during the seven lean years that ensued. But neither Moses nor our modern captains of industry could prevent lean years and deflation. If [ 71 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation the latter, the wisest men in their respective trades, are yet not wise enough for such prevention, what utter folly is it for four or five hundred Congressmen, half-baked-no, one hundredth part baked-econo mists, to attempt to stem the mighty ebb and flow of world commerce and values. Government War Control of the Railroads. I now come to the largest, longest-winded, and most convincing failure of government interference with big business-the slow starvation of the railroads by the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Federal Railroad Administration. For nearly forty years we have attempted, with the best intentions, to regulate, by general rulings of a centralized political commission, the countless millions of daily transac tions of the vast railroad systems of this great coun try in such a way that justice should he done by arbitral authority to every road, every shipper, and every community. But what is justice, and who shall determine it, in the vast welter of different and constantly changing conditions, commodities, values, prices; of clashing regional interests, local and gener al, natural and artificial, that swamp every effort to establish general rules, and everlastingly contradict each other in specific cases?

The impossibility of answering this basic question is over and over again evidenced by the army of workers, and the millions of money, for forty years worse than wasted in and about the work of the I. C. C. Tons and tons of contradictory expert reports, files and transcripts of testimony, cumber its offices at Washington. Thousands on thousands of pages of railroad valuations, accepted or disputed, bewilder the mentality of its poor devils of rate-makers, who are ground between the upper and nether millstones of low freights for the farmer, the manufacturer, and [ 72 ] Government War Control of Sugar the miner, high wages for the workers, and just re turn for the investor~between Boston and Baltimore exporters, between Chicago and Kansas City job bers and packers, or Eastern and Western coal operat ors and steel makers. Who, of all the disgruntled claimants that appear before the Commission, is satisfied? What class or section is content? How do the common people, the small shippers, the masses who are the peculiar care of the politicians-how do they benefit by reason of the I. C. C.?

If, for a few moments, we can shut our ears tight to the clamor of the Farmers' "Non-Partisan League, the Railway Brotherhoods, the A. F. L. and the One Big Union; of the Soft Coal Strikers, and the Hard Coal Knockers; of Gompers, LaFollette, Lewis, Jett Lauck, and their vociferous company; and open our eyes wide to the great, big, simple, ugly facts that stick out at us from the pages of official documents-such as the "Statistical Abstract of the U. S." for 1920 and the I. C. C.Reports-we can get a sort of air plane view of the whole huge subject; enabling plain average citizens, like you and me, to size the situa tion up broadly, without much possibility of error. Railroading in the United States dates back a little before 1830. In that year 73 miles of railroad were in operation. Population was then 13 millions. By 1886, when the Interstate Commerce Commission was created, population had grown to 57 millions, say more than four-fold, but the railroad mileage had grown to 136,338, or nearly six thousand-fold! Even during the terrific· financial strain of the Civil War, far harder on this country than that of the recent World War, and despite the paralysis of deflation which followed; with an unsound currency system and repeated panics-despite the wrecking of the Southern systems during the war-the railways of r73 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation the United States rose continuously to every demand.

They had no trouble in financing and building exten sions, nor in providing adequate equipment and good service. The Government was not obliged to take them over, or carry them during the Civil War. It is true that some of them were aided by grants of wild lands, and some by subscriptions for stock, paid by local or national bond issues; but for the most part the roads took care of themselves; grew like forest fires; competed fiercely with each other, and gave always better service at lower cost; so long as, but no longer than, the heavy hand of Government was kept off them. Doubtless, Vanderbilt and Gould did some stock watering; Scott, Garrett, and Plant made fortunes, big for those days, though not now. The railroad presidents sometimes, though not very often, were somewhat arrogant; and by and by our dema gogues found that elections could be won just by promising to humble the railway magnates and bleed the railway treasuries. For more' than 30 years, commencing with the I. C. C. law in 1886, Congress has kept on, year by year, fettering the railroads, or their owners, more tightly; always ostensibly for the protection of the "People."

Well, what of it? Have the people gained? Are rates lower? Is service better? Not at all! I suppose everybody knows the reason-it was simply that for twenty-five years the roads had become the plaything of politics. Not only the Interstate Commerce Commission at Washington, but State Commissions at most of the State capitols, took away from them their old-time power to make rates that the traffic could comfortably bear; taxes and burdens were piled upon them, issues of securi ties and mergers were rigidly controlled; ownership of coal and connecting trolley and steamship lines [ 74] Government War Control of Sugar was taken away. Meantime, the labor-unions were encouraged by the Government to constantly grow ing centralization of control and monopoly of rail way work, to shortening of hours and limiting of duty done; against constantly rising payrolls. Long be fore the Great War, railroad .net earnings had fallen in consequence until railroad stocks and bonds no longer greatly attracted the investor. The great banks and bond-houses no longer cared to finance the railways, knowing that the public would not take off their hands new issues of railway insecurities. Mean time, a thousand industrial companies grew like weeds. Henry Ford, for instance, made the most unparalleled "killing" in the history of business; such as Vanderbilt and Gould would have called fantastic. Rockefeller and Carnegie, Schwab and Frick, Armour and Weyerhauser, and the rubber and copper men, piled up their multimillions. By and by came the war; and Bethlehem, DuPont, and other "war brides" danced gaily forth. Everybody "profiteered" except the railroad men; who, poor devils, under worse and worse conditions, moved greater and greater loads of men and goods.

Next came the Adamson Law, as final back breaker-with impossible retroactive advance of wage rates; yet for long months the roads were held fast, without authority to raise charges for freight and passenger service. Last of all came Wilson and ·McAdoo to take over and operate the railways, on the pretext-perhaps true enough so long as the Government should continue to throttle them, but no longer-that their vitality and emergency re source (so conspicuous during the Civil War, when Lincoln and Stanton left them alone) was exhausted -so that they could not carry the war load. Of course there was much searching of hearts [75 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation among the railroad men, many of whom protested bitterly, as they had been protesting for years, at least as far back as the date of James J. Hill's cele brated statement of the railway situation in Decem.ber, 1912: every word of which had been confirmed by the event again and again meantime. I am not a railroad man. I know as little of railroading as any ordinarily well-informed business man should know, and hold no commission for eulogizing them-but I can not help taking, off my hat to those great railway executives who laid aside their personal griefs and opinions, and turned to with one accord to help that devastating Administration to win the war 1 But that, as Kipling says, is another story.

The melancholy effects of Federal Railroad Ad ministration are too fresh in mind to need presentation here. Wages were raised with enthusiasm, and tar iffs decidedly later, but without enthusiasm. Trains were laid off and slowed down, sleeping and dining and express and postal service was cut and delayed, passenger and freight speed lowered; and a net operating revenue, or profit,of 1,185 million dollars for 1917 was changed almost instanter to a loss of 349 millions for 1919 and 1,039 millions for 1920. (Statistical Abstract, 1920.) The naturally resulting reaction of public opinion against government owner ship and operation was so marked by 1920 that al though McAdoo wanted to retain the roads for an other term of years, a Democratic Congress dared not risk the issue in a Presidential year; and the roads were turned back to their owners, burdened with a labor situation that only now (July 4, 1922) is coming to a showdown (and a possible and welcome end) of the rottenness of the trading between Labor and Politics.

Consideringthe railroadsituationby itself, at the [ 76 ] Government War Control of Sugar outbreak of the war-and not how it came about with the uncertainties that clouded the future, no patriotic man would too severely criticise President Wilson, either for taking over the roads,' or for his handling of them during 1918-1919. He might easily have acted from sincere conviction of vital necessity, and not for possible political advantage though no such necessity was apparent for taking over the telephones, telegraphs and cables soon afterward; nor earlier when he first put the United States into the shipping business, while he "kept us out of the war." The existing railroad situation was neither unforeseen, accidental, nor created under vital neces sity.' It was the effect of deliberately "playing politics" for many years with the nation's greatest single industry, by successive administrations; par ticularly the President's own.

In saying this I intentionally sidestep the enor mous mass of argument and statistics involved in tortuous discussion of railroad rates; of competition; of regulation, state and national; of "twilight zones" and intrastate traffic; to say nothing of railway wages, "collective bargaining," "the right to strike," "peaceful picketing," overtime and craft rules, costs of living, and all the rest. If a man once gets into that quicksand or swamp of collectivism and regula tion-Heaven help him-there is nothing for it but to go on floundering deeper and deeper in the bottom less quagmire, until his name is Liquid Mud~ Let me invite him then to stay well out on dry, solid ground, where ordinary folks like you and me can set sure foot; for there is such solid ground, and an old, familiar pathway over it. From 1830 to 1890 the railroads were practically unfettered by the Government, free to develop along natural business lines. The railway system and"

[ 77 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation service of the United States became the greatest, best, and cheapest in the world. In 1800 it cost $100 a ton to haul freight by wagon from Buffalo to New York, say 500 miles, or 20 cents per ton per mile. When the Erie Canal opened in 1826, the cost of the same haul fell to $5 per ton, or I cent per ton per mile. Those figures were equivalent to $2.7° for a bushel of wheat by wagon, and I3! cents by canal for the entire distance. The earliest railroad freight rates reported by Poor were 1.72 cents per ton per mile in 1873, I. I 5 in 1878, and 1.02 in 1879, but by 1890 they averaged on all kinds of freight over the whole United States .93 of I cent per ton per mile. By IgOO-Up to which date the I. C. C. had done little to affect rates freights had fallen to .72 of I cent per ton per mile, and swung around .75 of I cent until 1917, when they reached.72 of I cent again; advancing under Federal control to .850f I cent in 1918 and .97 of I cent in 1919. To put the result of government meddling in a nutshell, railroad rates fell automatically and continuously until the I. C. C. got in its deadly work ..

Since then they have stopped falling and have sub stantially advanced. It is idle to conjecture what might have happened to service and equipment if there had been no I. C. C. from 1900 to 1919. What did happen, we can see plainly enough. Railroad rates were held back, while train-operating cost mounted steadily beyond that of most commodities, over threefold. (Statis tical Abstract, 1920-Table 233.) Railroad earning power was thus destroyed-though business con stantly grew. Most roads could not keep up their existing plant, and pay interest and dividends; much less sell new securities, or enlarge equipment and terminals to keep up with growing traffic. t78 ] Government War Control of Sugar Here is the record kept by the Department of Commerce (Statistical Abstract, 1920.) Capitaliza tion before 1903 not given: Year Railway Capital Dividends & Inter-Income Yield est Paid Per Cent.

19°3 J 2,600,000,000 481 ,000,000 3.8 2 19°4-13,200,000,000 520,000,000 3·94 19°5 13,800,000,000 549,000,000 3.98 1906 14,600,000,000 595,000,000 4.08 19°7 16,100,000,000 65 2,000,000 4·°5 1908 16,800,000,000 759,000,000 4·52 19°9 17,5 00,000,000 7 04,000,000 4.02 1910 18.400,000,000 8°5,000,000 4·38 19 II 19,200,000,000 87 1,000,000 4·54 19 12 19,800,000,000 829,000,000 4. 19 19 13 19,800,000,000 802,000,000 4·°5 1914 20,200,000,000 892,000,000 4.4 2 19 15 21,100,000,000 793,000,000 3·76 1916 21,100,000,000 81 7,000,000 3. 87 19 17 21,200,000,000 7 85,000,000 3.70 19 18 20,7 8 5,000,000 73 6,000,000 3·54 The railroads were held down by the Government to returns of 4.54 to 3.54 per cent. from 1903 to 1918. Then came the climax of government mishandling, ,vhen the Wilson Administration took over the roads, January I, 1918, and held them for 26 months. The Class I roads (those with operating revenues over $1,000,000 per annum) showed the following conse quences of buying the labor-vote at the expense of the railways: (J. Krutschnitt-Railroad Efficiency, Past and Present, 1922) Year 1917 1918 19 19 1920 1921 Net R'way ReI. percentage Op' g Income Op' g Inc. Payrolls Earned 934,000,000 100 100 5. 26 639,000,000 68·4 150·3 3·51 455,000,000 48.7 163.4 2.46 62,000,000 6.6 212.6 0.32 Jan. & Feb. only 8,214.542 deficit.

[79 ] COLLEGE Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation Fortunately for the railroad stock and bondholders, they were guaranteed during operation by the Govern ment the same return as lately received under pri vate control. To pay that guarantee ran the Government behind in its 26 months of railroading, according to Senator Cummins, $I,800,000,00o-thus transform ing in so brief a time a profit of roughly $2,560,000 a day into a loss of $2,280,000 a day! Of course, Gompers and the United Mine Work ers (who would like to nationalize the railways and keep up the merry game of high wages and high taxes) will say the war was to blame for the frightful loss. But how did it happen that during the Civil War, under just as great a strain, with like rising prices and wages, the railroads not only lost no money, but grew and prospered mightily? They were free then to raise rates as well as wages, and in general to "fit the punishment to the crime "-that's all. And they did it without calling on the Government for a penny.

The whole bonded debt of the United States in inherited from four years of the Civil War was $2,7°0,000,000. That inherited from 26 months of this single ghastly demagogic blunder of United States Railway Mal-Administration was two thirds as much-$I,800,ooo,ooo! A .further costly inheritance from the latter is the present labor situation, to be discussed else where. A great deal is said just now by all sorts of politi cians, labor-leaders, pink socialists, and collectivists, to the effect that extravagance and bad management for the last few years had brought the railroads down to present starvation of their labor and their stock holders; but, as is customary with those fluent gentry, they carefully avoid citing the records. We can do so, however, as follows: [ 8o] Government War Control of Sugar (Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract, 1920. Table 232.) Passengers carried 1 mile per mile of line, 1890 75,75 1; 1918-183,3°5 Tons of freight carried 1 mile per mile of line, 189°493,638: 1918-1,738,3°5 Average journey per passenger, 1890-24.06 miles; 1918-39.33 miles.

Average passengers per train, 1890-41; 1918-76. Average haul per ton of freight, 1890-122.21; 1918 175.81 miles. To translate these figures into simple words, the railroads in 1918 carried two and one half times as many passengers per mile of road, more than one and one half times as far: and three and one half times as many tons of freight per mile of road, one and four tenths times as far; as against a drop from 5.16 per cent. in interest and dividends paid to railroad owners on capital of 1890 to 3.51 per cent. earned (not paid) in 1918, and but 0.32 per cent. earned in 1920. (See Krutschnitt article.) Such huge in crease of service rendered with such fearful decrease of reward makes talk of bad management as absurd as it is dishonest. So-called "economists," like Jett Lauck, seem to me to be not even skilled liars as the most cursory examination will convince the reader. I have no interest whatever in railroads or railroad men; but once more I must take off my hat to the great railroad executives of this country for the splendid patience and courage with which they have carried an increasing burden in spite of decreas ing revenue, oppression and abuse from press, labor, the politicians, and alas, the public. It is high time to treat them better I Why wonder, then, that the last thirty years of enormous expansion have not built up the , [ 81 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation American railroads as they did the oil and steel concerns, the packers, the motor-car works, the electric-power-and-light companies, the explosive and fertilizer works, and a thousand others? Why complain that the great, old, long-established rail roads did not, as they did during the Civil War, show themselves more than the peer of any or all our other capitalistic forces? Everybody knows the reason.

It was for no other cause under heaven than that the Government of the United States had for over twenty years weighed down and throttled its own railways. Every other kind of big business, of free business, prospered beyond belief during those same years; Standard Oil, U. S. Steel, Ford, General Mo tors, Armours, General Electric, Bell Telephone, and their competitors, big and bigger, grew and gained marvelously. When the war came, they" arose like giants refreshed with wine," as the Bible says, and mightily supplied the Allies with the sinews of battle. When we went into it, these great producers were the very mainstays of our wonderful military power, without whom we could not possibly have done what we did. No, once more, let me say, there was nothing the matter with America; or with Wall Street, or with the railroad managers. The deadly blight of govern ment interference with natural economic law is the only cause in sight for past and present unsatisfac tory railway finance and operation.

Unless it is done away with, the roads, which have been and ought now to be the greatest of all factors in our national development, will continue to cramp our prosperity and bedevil our politics, until we cast Government clean out of them, and reverse the miracle of Christ and the herd of swine. You [ 82 ] Government War Control of Sugar will remember that there was a man possessed of many devils, which, when cast out, entered into the swine; and that the latter forthwith ran violently down a steep place into the sea and perished. So it is with the railways possessed by the devils of gov ernment. The only way to keep them out of deep water is to cast out the devils. The New York Com mercial, first among the journals of. the great me tropolis, has recently come out for the repeal of the Sherman Law; and the country owes its courageous publisher a debt of gratitude therefor. If but the Interstate Commerce Law and the Transportation Act (and, while about it, the Clayton Act and Federal Trade Commission Act) were also to be re pealed, and the roads (and other enterprises) were left free to attract money and energy into their work as of old, with the certainty of reward to the investor, proportioned to the service rendered-how railroad ing and business generally would hum and boom for the next few years in the U. S. A! We could certainly set a lot of new marks for the world to jump at.

As the best demonstration of the disastrous effect of government meddling with railway' rates and ex penditures, I reproduce a diagram from Barron's Weekly, published by C. W. Barron, owner of the Wall Street Journal, the Boston News Bureau, and the Philadelphia News Bureau.' Mr. Barron is recognized as one of the first financial authorities and economists in the United States. This chart shows the fluctuation in the volume of transactions in rail way and industrial stocks from 1895 to 1921 . In '95, which was at the height of the craze for flotation of industrial or trust securities upon the New York Stock Exchange, transactions in such stocks were a little less than half of the entire volume of the busi[ 83 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation ness of the Exchange and the railways a little more than half. But by 1922 the sales of railway stocks had shrunk to less than one fifth and those of industrial stocks had risen to more than four fifths of the total.

In short, the. American investor has been starved, frozen, and scared out of operating in the securities of the greatest railway system on the face of the earth. What possible gain has the American people made thereby? To-day's papers (October 17, 1922) note the ap plication of the Southern Pacific Co., filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission under the provi sions of the recent Transportation Act, seeking authority to acquire control of the Central Pacific Railway Co. The reader will recall that the Supreme Court of the United States recently decided the suit commenced by the Wilson Administration in 1914, for the divorce of the Central Pacific and the Southern Pacific Railway systems, against the railway com panies, and ordered the dissolution carried into effect. Meantime, under the Transportation Act, provision has been made for regional consolidations of railway systems all over the country, in direct opposition to the spirit of the Sherman Law and the original In terstate Commerce Law. The application says the dissolution would create "in place of the present unified system, each part designed to operate with every other part, two systems, neither of which was constructed as a separate system and neither of which could give the public the satisfactory and efficient service which is being rendered by the existing single system. By reason of the foregoing, applicant alleges that the public service now rendered by these lines will be greatly impaired; and the cost thereof will be greatly enhanced unless the applicant is per mitted to acquire lawful control of the lines of the [ 84] 00 V"1 ! I s; ~ ! ~ .... ! § §~I"'I~=""N~'= &oft = ~ ==~ .... 0/0% e:::tl .... .... .... ! _ ! ii ~ 'il ~ =... ~ 1922:s ~i e') ~ ~ CJ') ~ 100 - ... ... ... ... ... 100 N. Y. STOCK EXCHANGE 90 TRANSACTIONS IN PERCENTAGE 80 ..,.... , .... 6' 'I 80 80 - a INDU.STRIALS ,.....:.......I-AIT 70 .-'"" 70 A/ ...... " 'II!

I'<Il :-... eo 60..... .T . II - " ...... I 80 60 ~ ... , .. I' 40 40 -- -# ?\ '" ~ ... , I 30 30 'a. ~ 20 20 '.......... "'"RAILROADS .... ....... "10 10 m.: .-.. ! ! 8 S ~ COW; ! Lri ! ! j~ I ~ .... ~.5! ~;= ~ CO; i :s." m- ·1 .... :~ :1,.Ill)oo......... >,-v . = I~ C> .... 5 it_ "1j!.C"C~ ~~"UCIIIII 00 = ~ .~ eft ~ ~, ~-~ ...'2c .......... ozo!""t .... -... .... .~ _r ... .... .... ... .... ..... P1 C6pYriPtbytti "'.IONES A co. .,ZZ This chart shows vividly the growing unpopularity of railroad shares with the capitalist public, under the throttling hand of regulation by government, and their drift of investment toward the unregulated industrial shares. The mul timillionaires have used the machinery of the Stock Exchange to unload their holdings upon the small investors. In consequence, the stronger roads show a great increase in the number of small shareholders, and decrease in large hold ings. This should popularize them in the long run, but makes it harder for them to get in new capital, for extensions, etc.~ meantime. (Quoted by kind Permission/rom "Barron's Weekly.") Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation carrier to the extent and by the means proposed herein."

We shall see what the Interstate Commerce Com mission does with this application. It is cited here merely as one more illustration of the kind of bru tum fulmen of which government is so fond. ( 86] CHAPTER IV GOVERNMENT ATTITUDE TOWARD LABOR PERHAPS the worst of all government inter ferences with industry, in immediate and remote consequences, has been its relations with Organized Labor. As I write (July 20, 1922) we are fighting for coal and transportation, the very breath of civilized life, against the hard knot drawn tight by Organized Labor around the throat of the coal and railway trades; which needs quick,sharp, and decisive cutting by the sword of law. The game of labor-organization is very old, simple, raw, and always the same, viz., Find a hundred, or a thousand, or ten thousand men, quietly at work for one employer, every man of whom individually has deliberately accepted stated work at stated wages, presumably as the best job in sight; and has kept it contentedly, ofttimes for years, without paying union dues. Send a well-paid and fluent organizer to tell those men that they have "grievances"; that their employer is rich; that they work too long and hard, and do not get pay enough. Promise them less work, more pay, their own way, if they will join a few unions and pay dues. When enough are per suaded, then "organize," and call a strike. Throw a picket line about the job, and keep labor and ma terial away from it; by force, if necessary! Call sympathetic strikes, and tie up other concerns, to in[ 87 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation crease the pressure. Tie up whole industries; cut off transportation, coal, water, food, the necessaries of life, without mercy, from whole cities, states, the nation. The people are the goats anyway, and must pay the bill, or go without. Eventually nationalize all industry and "organize" the nation!

Meantime, it is full as well to get off a lot of hot-air about "wage slavery," "autocracy of capital," the "aspirations of labor," the "right to organize," the "right to strike," the "right of free assembly," the "right of collective bargaining," etc., for the bene fit of the press and the pulpit; also to tip the wink to the politicians, that the Labor vote is theirs, or not, according as the police permit or prevent a little wholesome slugging of non-union men, who come around the plant after work. All this is such an old, old story, of such common knowledge, that there is no need to prove it here. The point in repeating it is, that just to buy Labor's vote, politicians have long accepted its programme (of unlimited combination to restrain trade, fix prices, and coerce all concerned) as man-to man fair, lawful, and within constitutional right; despite the fact that it is denounced as criminal by good conscience, common sense, and the Common Law. The aforesaid acceptance has been a progres sive process, as the trade-union programme itself has broadened. Fifty years ago but a few local unions, in isolated cities, held up one employer at a time; and traded only with the local authorities, for the labor vote at local elections, in exchange for blind, deaf, and dumb policemen along the picket line. (For if there is no picket line, or if the picket line cannot terrorize all comers, strikes fail nine times out of ten.

Organized Labor knows, by long experience, that there are plenty of men ready to take open jobs; if [ 88 ] Government Attitude Toward Labor no one is waiting around the corner to call "scab!" or beat them up.) Before very long union leaders found out that it was often necessary, in order to keep a long strike going, to pay the men on strike a· few dollars a week to keep them and their families going, too; but that, on the other hand, such use of union funds often left little to speak of for the leaders themselves. For it takes about all the men can pay in dues to cover normal leaders' salaries and general expenses, not to mention a lot of extras during strikes; and strikes are apt to "spread" to other plants in the same neighborhood, causing further drain on union funds. So, very naturally, the leaders made alliance, offensive and defensive, between groups of unions of the same crafts, but not in the same strike field. This also broadened the political power of the alliance, as its membership came to number votes in many cities and states. The evident advantage to labor was enormous.

Finally, came Gompers and his American Federa tion of Labor, covering all trades, all cities, all states, all industries, all politics; in short, the nation. It matured the present union conception of the "right to organize, to strike, and to bargain collec tively"; to wit, that Gompers and Co. may deliber ately work up conspiracy among a few hundred or thousand men, who hold strategic jobs-switchmen, or railway shop men, or coal miners, for instance to stop vital work all at once,everywhere, in order to "hold up" the community for cash; and yet break no moral or statute, even though "incidental" violence results. Let me do the politicians the justice to say that while they came generally to accept this monstrous pretension of Organized Labor they probably have [ 89 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation fallen into the habit of doing so merely to oblige the Labor Vote, without reflecting where it would land the country; until forcibly brought up against it, again and again. But now at last, in this year 1922, some few of them refuse, and many more do not dare any longer, to leave the nation at the mercy of wage-bandits.

Charles Reade's novel, "Put Yourself in His Place," written in the 50's, I suppose-in my boy hood, anyway-gave me my first glimpse of trades union ferocity. After that, from time to time as I grew up, the newspapers printed tale on tale from life, always to the same general effect. A strike was called, a picket line was formed, men seeking work came along; some poor fellow was beaten, crippled, killed-seldom one of the strikers; his wife and children were left destitute. Nobody ever saw it, no one was arrested; or, if arrests were made, no witnesses came forward to convict the guilty mur derer. The blame was often their own, so said the papers, just as it was the other day at Herrin put upon the dead man himself, for "provoking unknown strike sympathizers" to kill him. The unions al ways forbade their members to do violence-so they said; yet they never prevented it, though their pickets were at hand; and they never gave evidence to convict a "sympathizer." The murder was merely a "regrettable incident; such as seems unavoidable in industrial warfare."

In short, during my reading lifetime of say sixty years there has been very little enforcement of law, or keeping the peace during strikes ; unless the crime attains such magnitude as to menace everybody, and arouse popular outcry. Then, indeed, the author ities get busy-but not before. Such has been the story of-countless local strikes, and such the con[ 90 ,] Government Attitude Toward Labor temptible share of local government therein. By now some 80,000 of them must be on record, since 1880, at the Department of Labor. Latest and worst of these "regrettable incidents" -but only because more exactly reported-and precisely like all the rest· in every hideous feature, was the massacre of non-union miners at Herrin, Illinois, June 22, 1922, and the shameful refusal of the dastards. who hold local and state offices there either to protect or to avenge the victims of cold blooded murder and torture.

To show that the Herrin horror was not accidental or exceptional, but merely an aggravated case of vi olence and law-breaking regularly practiced by Unions affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, and that these things were, to say the least, well known to and winked at by the Government, I here quote at some length from one of a series of open letters to Congress of Ex-Governor J. M. Brown, of Georgia, dated September 22, 1921. "A PARTIAL LIST OF ASSAULTS UPON NON-UNIONWORK MEN AND WOMEN." Assaults upon only one non-union man at a time Instances. By one striker. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 By two strikers. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 By three strikers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 27 By four strikers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 By five strikers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 By six strikers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 By seven to ten strikers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 By ten to fifteen strikers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 By fifteen to twenty strikers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 By twenty to fifty strikers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 By fifty to one hundred strikers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . II By "strikers" (numbers not given), victim wounded 121 By "strikers" (numbers not given), victim killed 29 By "a mob, or crowd," of strikers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 [ 9 1 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation Instances By one striker's" picket" .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . z By two strikers' "pickets".. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 By three strikers' "pickets". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • 14 By four st~iker~' ,:' ~icket~:' ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 By five stnkers pIckets... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 By six to ten strikers' "pickets".. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 By ten to fifteen strikers' "pickets" . .. . . . . . . . . . . . 3 By fifteen to twenty-five strikers' "pickets" . ... . . . 7 By thirty ~trikers' "pickets" .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I By:: a .crow~, of" strikers' "p~ckets" . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4By pIckets (numbers not gIven) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 486 Note that of the above total in only forty-seven instances were the as saults made upon one man by only one striker or strikers' picket.

But to the above total must yet be added the following: Homes invaded by strikers who' vilely insulted 'and in several instances brutally attacked the women dwelling therein. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5S Union pickets were the miscreants who invaded five of these homes. Dwelling houses dynamited (four women, two girls wounded, one woman killed) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Dwelling houses stoned. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. IZ Dwelling houses shot into (four women shot) . .•. . • IZ Dwelling houses burned. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 3 Dwelling houses invaded, dynamited, shot into, stoned or burned. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 Could the combination of contemptible cowardice and brutal, heartless crime which mark the activities of the American Federation of Labor in the domain of this "government of law, not of men" (?) be more con clusively exposed than in the above table?

"J. E~ Atterburn testified, on November 10, 1906, that members of the iron molders' union insulted the employees of the foundry company (in Kansas City, Kas.) applied to them vulgar, obscene, and profane lan guage. such language being too vile and indecent to be placed in an affi davit. Affiant further avers that more than twelve times in three months he was met by mobs composed of members of the iron molders' union and sympathizers who forcibly stopped and surrounded him, pulled his coat, rubbed their hands over his face and used the most vile and insult ing language, daring him to just lift a hand or make a move to give the mob an excuse or an opportunity of assaulting him." (D. S. Circuit Court, Kas.) [92 ] Government Attitude Toward Labor "John M. Busby testified that, on October 10, 1906, on leaving work in the foundry (in Kansas City, Kans.), he was followed by a mob of strikers, members of the iron molders' union, surrounded and forcibly stopped, insulted and called scab and other vile, obscene, vulgar, and profane names. This crowd got on the car with him, crowded about and threatened to kill him, He was struck in the back of the neck and severely injured. On October 20, 1906, he was pursued from ·the foundry gate by a crowd of men, cursed, threatened, and struck with a brick and again severely injured. Affiant believes he would have been killed by this mob had not a policeman met him; that by reason of these assaults he was forced to give up his employment." (U. S. Circuit Court, Kans.) "Frank York testified that on September 19, 1904', he left the foundry (in Cincinnati) and, on his way to the street car, was followed by a large crowd of strikers. One Berger struck affiant with his fist. Another also struck affiant with something in his hand, hitting him over the left eye cutting a deep wound, causing a flow of blood. Others of the strikers jumped on affiant and tried to strike him. In crossing the street, an other person struck affiant on the jaw. A large crowd gathered around affiant, calling out: 'Scab! throw him into the river,' and using many epithets and threatening language; he was pulled off the car and com pelled to walk across the (Ohio river) bridge." (U. S. Circuit Court, S.

D. Ohio). "Joseph Six testified that, on August 6, 1907, on returning to his home from the foundry (in Detroit, Mich.), he was assaulted, pulled from a street car by twenty men of iron molders' union, struck heavy and vicious blows from all sides and pounded Uiltilhe became unconscious. One of his ribs was broken. On becoming conscious a stranger helped him to a police station and he was taken home. On August 10, 1907, on going to work, he encountered a crowd of fifty striking molders, who surrounded and assaulted him, many of them struck and kicked him He was hit in the nose, mouth, a·nd eyes. One of the strikers said to him: 'If you don't stay out of that shop we'll kill you.' He escaped and afterwards was taken to the foundry in an automobile.". (Circuit Court, Wayne Co., Mich.) Proof has been accumulating for years to the effect that various organizations composing the American Federation of Labor have had in their employ trained thugs, or sluggers, for enforcing their process of brutality. Recent triais in courts have brought this fact clearly before the public. The following press telegrams tell their own story: Chicago, April 28.-Details of an alleged system of slugging, through which, it is charged, officials of the Upholsterers' Union forced workers to obey their orders, were related to-day by Sam Fischer, self-styled slug ger, at the trial of fourteen members of the union for. acts of violence during the strike from August, 1919, to April, 1920.

[ 93 ] Too .Much Government-Too .Much Taxation Fischer declared he had been ordered to cripple men who refused to obey orders, so that they could not work. "I remember one non-union man, another fellow and myself were ordered to slug," he said. "We hit him on the head with a blackjack you could hear his skull pop half a block away. Then my companion kicked him until there was no chance he would be able to work. "Edwin E. Graves, international vice-president of the union, told me one day to get a certain man and to 'get him right.' We cracked him on the head. 1 was afraid we had killed him. 1 ran down town to Graves and told him I thought we had killed the man. " 'Don't worry about that,' said Graves, 'all you have to worry about is your money; here it is.' " From a telegram dated April 29 I quote: "We want to make this guy an object lesson. Fix him right," Fischer testified Graves told him regarding another victim.

"Get anybody who comes out of a shop," was the order Fischer said that Graves gave him just after the international vice-president came to Chicago to direct the strike. "Did you comply with the order?" he was asked. "You bet we did," he said. "vVe stood at the door and waited till we spotted our man. Then we followed him until we could get him in a good place." Otto Ludtke, secretary of the Chicago local No. 24 of the upholsterers' union, who turned State's witness, testified that his union paid sluggers $10 for each victim, and that six bombs to be paid for at $100 each HAD BEEN ARRANGED FOR BY OFFICERS OF THE UNION. Chicago, May 2o.-A confession was obtained to-day by Chief Fitz morris from Andrew Kerr, believed to be the leader of the gang of bomb ers in Chicago responsible for the vandalism in many of the recent labor troubles and race wars. Kerr is a member of Local 42 of the International Union of Steam and Operating Engineers, which recently waged a strike against the laundry owners of the city, who, stirred by a desire to clear up the reign of terror which has menaced Chicago, voluntarily confessed.

He named a dozen men who, he said, had been prominently identified either as the perpetrators or as the instigators of sluggings and bombings. Nine men, including Kerr, are under arrest and others are expected. "1 was really the payoff guy," said Kerr. "That is, I took the money from the union and gave it to the sluggers and bombers. They slug anybody or bomb anything they get money for." The rate· schedule of the "bombing trust," according to Kerr's con fession, was: Government Attitude Toward Labor Ordinary slugging (two men), each $25. Bombing, where two sticks of dynamite are used, $200. Where four sticks of dynamite are used, $250. Where six sticks of dynamite are used, $3°0. "We never carried any guns or anything when we went out on slugging jobs," said Kerr. "When we went bombing we carried guns and we were ready to fight and shoot to kill, because we knew what would happen if we were caught. ."

"There are always three in the car. The driver sits always at the wheel with the engine always running. They whittle the fuse in the car. They always light the fuses in the car. Then they place it and get away." Kerr said the following was a typical order to the bombers: "The orders from Peterson are: Mr. Parkie, the owner of Scrivner's laundry, is on the executive committee of the Laundry Workers Associa tion, and he is the one who is standing in the way of an agreement or doing business with the Laundrymen's Association, and consequently he is not going to get one stick or two sticks, he is going to get four sticks, and if four don't move him he will get six and one in the house where he lives on the back steps, and if it don't kill the wife and children it will make them get down on their knees to him and say 'Papa, we don't want to get killed.' " Chief Fitzmorris announced that Kerr's confession and the arrests cleared up all the mysteries of bombings in Chicago.

When asked to give an estimate on the number of bombing outrages and the amount of damage, the Chief replied: "Dpward of· a 100 and close to $2,000,000 worth of damage to property." These are records of the destruction or invasions of homes and infamous insults to and brutal assaults upon the respectable women and children therein. Some of these I have already given you, but their context with the duty of our Government to protect useful, law-abiding people against vicious elements of lawlessness justifies their reproduction, viz.: "John Ryan (Kansas City, Kans.) testified that on October 9, 1906, affiant, his wife and son were assaulted by members of the iron molders' union because he refused to quit work for the company. ms WIFE WAS KNOCKED DOWN, his son was struck in the side and affiant him self was struck on the head and all were severely injured." (D. S. Cir cuit Court, F. D., Kans.) "Mrs. Joe Polaski (St. Paul, Minn.) testified that on June 19, 1906, striking molders' pickets followed her husband home, jeering and swear ing at him, and on reaching her. called her vile and indecent names.

These pickets rernained around the house for some time." (Notary Public, Ramsey Co., Minn.) "Mrs. John Swanson (St. Paul, Minn.) testified that on June 17, 1906, [ 95 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation striking molders' union pickets called at her house and frightened herself and children by one of them carrying an open clasp knife trying several times to get into the house and remaining around the outside to catch her husband. Policemen were sent for and upon arrival the pickets left the vicinity." (Notary Public, Ramsey Co., Minn.) "Henry Flaherty, July, 20, 19°6, was walking with his brother Daniel when they were met by about twenty molders' union strikers who knocked the brothers down and pursued them to their home, and one J ames Henry, a striker, forced the door open partly and was ejected, and again returned and pounded the door, terrifying Henry's wife." (Circuit Court, Milwaukee, Wis.) "Birmingham, Ala., August 13, 1908.-House of a non-union coal miner at Margaret Mines was shot into. Two women in the house wounded, one wounded seriously." (Birmingham Age-Herald.) RBirmingham, Ala., August 19, 1908.- The dwelling house of Thos.

Duggan, non-union miner and contractor, living in Pratt City, was dynamited and practically destroyed. Duggan's two daughters were thrown across their sleeping room and injured." (Birmingham Age Herald.) "Struthers, Ohio, September 18, 1909.- The residence of C. I. Gibson, steel mill manager, was dynamited last night and badly damaged, the family being severely shocked." "New Kensington, Pa., October 20, 1919.-T. B. Pollard, a non-union steel worker, was shot at and wounded in the leg while on his way to work on October 20. On the night of November 2, Pollard's residence was dynamited, his family being thrown from their beds and much damage being done to property." "Mrs. Anniela Banicki deposes on oath that she and her husband have six minor children; that her husband has been employed by the Illinois Steel Company (Chicago) for,about thirty-one years; that on September 27, 1919, three men wearing union badges knocked on her door; that when she answered the call one of them pointed a revolver in her face and told her that if she did not get her husband away from the South Works of the Illinois Steel Company they would kill him and her.

"She also deposes that on two other dates men wearing union badges had called at her house and made like threats against her husband and her if he did not quit work, and says that by reason of said threats and action of pointing the pistol at her face she was in constant fear of her life and the lives of her husband and children, and suffered extreme mental anguish therefrom." (Notary Public, Chicago, Ill.) "Birmingham, Ala., October 14, 1920.- The house occupied by Holly Jones, working coal miner, and his family, was riddled with bullets (some 40 shots) about 7:30 o'clock last night, Jones was wounded in the foot, his wife wounded in the leg." (Birmingham Age-Herald.) "Birmingham, Ala., December 14, 1920.- The house of Ullman Law ler, coal miner, Lewisburg Mines, was blown up by dynamite, 9:15 p. m." last night. Lawler's wife was killed by the explosion and Lawler himself injured. Lawler was a union miner who had returned to work, having quit the union." (Reported in both the Birmingham dailies.) [ 96 ] Government Attitude Toward Labor Lack· of space debars me from reporting but one of the cases of invasions of homes by strikers in Macon, but in it we see the soul of labor unionism, viz. : "Macon, Ga., September II, I9I9.-Rioting was resumed in the mill district here to-night, where two thousand textile workers have been on strike for nearlythree weeks.

"The police guard at the mills was reduced to-day ON.A PROMISE OF THE STRIKERS that women would not be allowed to do picket duty, and THAT THERE WOULD BE NO DISORDER. "Nevertheless, the non-union workers were followed from the mills and ATTACKED AT THEIR. HOMES, it is asserted. "According to reports, a body of strikers followed Mrs. Alice Wheeler from the mill where she works to her home on Hazel Street and FORCI· BLY ENTERED THE RESIDENCE. "There were two other women present, in addition to M·rs. Wheeler and her daughter Lizzie, who is about 19 years of age. "When the strikers entered they were ordered to leave by Mrs. Wheeler, but instead THEY BEGAN BEATING HER. THE DAUGH TER CAME TO THE AID OF HER MOTHER,AND WAS ALSO BEAT EN BY THE STRIKERS." (Associated Press telegram.) "Desperate Cases Found "The investigation conducted by Lieutenant Hamilton proceeded with difficulty on account of the fear sttuck in the hearts of Cramps' employ ees by the strikers and sympathizers. However, the cases of eleven families were investigated. Their condition was so poignant that Lieu tenant Hamilton at once filed their complaints withoflicials of Cramps'.

"Each of the eleven complaints gave specific instances of the boy cotting dealers refusing to sell to them. "In several instances the Cramps' employees were at first supplied by neighbo'rs who bought ice, milk, and other sustenance for their friends. When that became known the dealers' agents refused to supply those persons, although they were not in the employ of the Cramps' shipyards. "One of the most striking cases is that of Elmer Bateman, a Cramps' worker, who lives at 3069 Memphis Street. The Batemans have two children, one six years old and the other eighteen months. .The older child has been suffering from scarlet fever five weeks. At the time his illness was discovered his temperature was 105.2 degrees. "There was not a piece of ice in the house. The attending physician had to go out to buy some, as the members of the family had been refused repeatedly by dealers in the vicinity.

"As the head of the household is at work all day and Mrs. Bateman is nursing her sick child, an aunt, a woman of fifty, has to do the buying for the household. This she does stealthily, going great distances from her niece's home. For fear of personal attack by strikers, she is literally compelled to smuggle the food into the house. What ice she takes in is concealed in wrapping paper." [97 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation "Boycott Because of Kind Action "Because the aunt supplies her niece with the necessities of life her husband's paint store at Clearfield Street and Trenton Avenue is boy cotted. "Patrick Jordan, a Cramps' foreman, with his wife and four children, lives at 3139Aramingo Avenue. The oldest child is six years, the young est nineteen months. A five-year-old boy is on a diet of milk and eggs. "For the last two weeks there has been no ice in the house, and very little for a month before that. A minimum of two quarts of milk a day is required by the family. Now they can get only an occasional quart, and that by stealth. The five-year-old child refuses to drink condensed milk.

Day by day his parents have watched him grow thinner and weaker. "Mrs. Jordan has not been out on the street in two weeks. THROUGH THE 'UNDERGROUND TELEGRAPH' SHE HEARD THAT SHE WOULD BE HORSEWHIPPED IF SHE VENTURED FORTH AGAIN. ANOTHER THREAT SHE RECEIVEDWASTHAT HER SIX-YEAR-OLD SON WOULD MEET SIMILAR TREATMENT IF HE TRIED TO BUY PROVISIONS FOR THE FAMILY. "For five weeks there has been no ice in the house of Thomas Mc Govern, of 3019 Aramingo Avenue. He is a Cramps' foreman. The McGoverns have two children, Miriam and Anna, aged respectively ten and twelve years. Neither is strong. They are on a diet under a physician's order. But there is neither milk nor eggs for them. "Child Pleas Refused "Miriam, according to her parents, was 'turned down' so often by store keepers when she attempted. to do the family marketing that she had a nervous attack, which was complicated by fever. Her parents, fearing for her life, sent her to her aunt's, where she remained ill two weeks.

"'We have to sneak out like thieves to buy the necessities of life,' said Mrs. McGovern. 'If I or my children go out we are jeered and sub jected to danger. As I did not want to start trouble I waited three days beforegoingto see my sister, who was very ill. " 'We have been chased from one shop to another. The nearest place where I can buy ice is seven blocks away. My husband is away all day at work. He leaves here and returns under a guard of policemen. I and my children are not strong enough to carry ice seven blocks, even if we were unmolested. It is the same with milk and eggs. Even if we could get milk we could not keep it because we have no ice. " 'And now the meat dealers are refusing to sell to us. Some of the dealers want to sell us the things we need but they are afraid to do so. They say the neighbors are watching. Last week the laundry wagon driver told me that he could not call for any more laundry at my home because strikers had told him if he did they would tear his wagon to pieces.' "

"Mother ru, Children Suffer "Next to the McGoverns lives John McDermott, at 3017 Aramingo Avenue. Of his five children the oldest is fourteen years, the youngest a little more than two years. Their mother is ill from worrying over the undernourishment of her children on account of the boycott. [98 ] Government Attitude Toward Labor "Lieutenant Hamilton explained yesterday that the Policemen of his district were unable to accompany the· Cramps' workers to the stores because they knew that violence to the property would result in their absence. More than fiftyhomes ofworkers, HE SAID, WERE GUARD ED 'TWENTY-FOUR HOURS A DAY' TO PREVENT DAMAGE BEING DONE." In quoting so freely from Governor Brown, I would say that I have not verified the facts he states, though I have no reason whatever to doubt his care ful accuracy. Government Attitude Toward Great Strikes. The story of the greater strikes, with one notable excep tion, as handled by governments of great cities, states, or the entire country, under political terror ism, is still worse.

The first that I remember was, naturally, a coal strike, the "Mollie McGuire's" affair, back in the 70' s, in Pennsylvania; in which Allan Pinkerton's famous private police had to be employed to protect mine property. His testimony at the trial of one of the murder cases involved ,in the strike has become classic. "Organized Labor," he said, "is Organ ized Violence." That, I think, was the beginning of the miserable and dangerous necessity of employing private police, and armed ,guards, such as the Baldwin-Felts forces are just now in West Virginia. It has grown more and more imperative; as politics has kept the hand of public authority more and more off from the lawless shoulder of Organized Labor. The furnishing of "strikebreakers" -tough devils· who are not afraid to use guns on union-sluggers-also has become a regular and profitable industry. A third trade, developed to meet Union Propaganda, is that of labor-spying; and a fourth, that might be called [ 99 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation labor-jollying, has developed of late years. There are now several large firms, with branches in many' cities, that respectively will furnish on short notice experts to create good morale among workers, spies to watch union organizers, strikebreakers to keep the wheels turning, and armed guards to protect the strikebreakers and the plant. None of these services were ever needed or even dreamed of when I first worked for wages; or would be dreamed of to-day, if local, 'state, and national government had done and would do its plain, simple duty of compelling strikers to obey the law and protect non-union men in their right to work. All four of them are loudly and bitterly denounced by Organized Labor; and, too, by many clergymen and pink socialists.

If these two last-named groups reasoned in the or dinary way it would be answer enough merely to ob serve to them that no "selfish, grasping employer" ever voluntarily contracts for any such totally un productive and costly service except under stress of dire need of that protection which the Government owes but usually fails to give. To return to my review of great strikes, next came the Railway Strike of 1877. I remember it very well (though rather vaguely) because its conse quences precipitated a large failure in the steel trade and brought me to Chicago in the midst of it. When I left the Iron District of Lake Superior, all telegraph communications were cut and it was supposed I could not reach Chicago. I did, however, and found the city an armed camp, its citizens enrolled in volunteer companies, armed with shotguns and revolvers, and stationed for the protection of the strategic railway points, waterworks, tunnels under the river, etc. Meantime derailing, wrecking, and burning of trains was going on, and violence was [ 100] Government Attitude Toward Labor inflicted 0n those who stuck to their work. My only memory worth citing here is of the wide break down of local authority in Chicago; and its inability to protect life and property. The cause of the strike was the contraction of the currency and the deflation of wages, following the panic of 1873; which was part of the disastrous aftermath of the Civil War, much like the present deflation.

During the years that followed grew great the organization known as the Knights of Labor, which still exists, and is credited by the World Almanac with a membership of 2oo,ooo-but has been far overshadowed in the public eye by the American Federation of Labor and the I.W.W. Eugene V. Debs came to the surface as its head, and its opera tions resulted in the labor troubles of 1894, during the bad times caused by the Silver Panic of 1893. Precisely the same attempt as at present was made by the labor organizations, both in 1877 and 1894, to retain the inflation of wages which accompanied the inflation of all commodities and costs of living; notwithstanding the fact that the entire community was suffering from deflation and the coming of hard times. Accusations were bandied about, though not so freely as in this day of full-paged and heavy headlined columns in the daily papers for the utter ances of labor demagogues. "Capital" was ac cused of deliberately causing deflation, and of the intention to crush labor; in phraseology somewhat different, but in demagogy quite the same as the romancing of the labor leaders just now. The re sult was, of course, in due time, that wages came down then, despite the strikes, as they will certainly come down now, to the level fixed by th e law of supply and demand.

The labor leaders lost prestige for a while and the [ 101 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation unions lost membership; but the union business is a profitable one for the leaders, and they bobbed up again serenely, as they will bob up in years to come, so long as union men can be induced to pay dues. In 1894 during the Pullman, or Debs, Railway Strike, occurred the one creditable episode of strike handling by Government that I now recalL Grover Cleveland (peace to his ashes), who believed that "public office is a public trust," promptly ordered United States troops to Chicago, to see to it that the strikers-who were wrecking trains and burning cars without let or hindrance from the Governor of Illi nois or the Mayor of Chicago-should not stop the United States mails. That broke the back of the strike; and all Illinois-I lived there then-except its Governor sang one paean of praise to a real President; who rests secure, for that and many other deeds of courage and integrity, forever in the hearts of the American people.

It is worth noting, that the mere keeping of the peace, in that one decisive crisis, freed the nation forever of the menace of Debs and the Knights of Labor; just as the President, and back of him the Congress, could and ought to, by enforcing law and order, liberate us to-day from the tyranny of Gompers and the A. F. L. In 1902 came the anthracite strike. After it had run for many weeks, and had enshrouded all the Eastern cities in the filthy pall of soft-coal smoke so familiar west of the Alleghenies, President Roosevelt, who believed in doing things, served notice on the United Mine Workers that unless they and the an thracite mine owners would accept and abide by the decision of an arbitrator-commission appointed by himself, the Government would seize and operate the mines under military protection. This was a [ 102 ] Government Attitude Toward Labor knockout blow to the strike, and the miners came back to work-for as I have said before, the chance of winning a strike, when violence is tabooed, is hardly one in ten. The Commission was a notable one, headed by Judge Gray, and its award had the merit of conspicuously proclaiming the right of every man to work or not to work; to be striker or strikebreaker; to wear the union collar, or none at all, as he chooses; without coercion from any man or group of men, large or small.

The President's action "settled" the strike, but it also settled a mischievous precedent, in "recogni tion," or quasi-recognition, of a combination to "hold up" an entire and vital industry, as legitimate; rightfully entitled to sit in, as party to an arbitration officially arranged by Government, between sub stantially all anthracite coal operators as a collectiv ity and all anthracite coal miners as another collec tivity. It is true that the Commission carefully safeguarded the right of the non-union man to hire and be hired; but the effect of the Roosevelt Arbitra tion Commission was, nevertheless, to force every anthracite mine (I think none of them were running non-union) to· tie its labor troubles into those of every other; and to prevent, or at least discourage and impede, that direct dealing with workers them selves-not through "representatives of their own choosing," which the Commission itself so vigor ously defended. Furthermore, Roosevelt's action assumed the dangerous duty, or the equally danger ous optional right, of Government to step in between employer and employee, in order to compel conti nuity of relations between theIn, in the interest of the public; disregarding the wishes of either or both, and superseding by forced arbitration the slower but better adjustment sure to come-that is, under [ 1°3 ] Too' Much Government-Too Much Taxation orderly conditions-with lapse of time and free operation of the law of supply and demand.

I have elsewhere shown the consistent policy of Organized Labor, to monopolize work, coerce em ployers, use its voting power to control Government, and finally to use Government, so controlled, for its own ends;· certainly President Roosevelt's settle ment of the Anthracite Strike (though applauded and credited at the time with starting coal supply), was one of the first important successes scored by Gompers's "don't work-just vote" policy. Not long after came Gompers's lobbying through Congress of the 8-hour day law-first for all government employees, and afterward on all work done for Government by private contract, the effect of which last was to force the 8-hour day upon all manufac turers, any part-no matter how small-of whose sales might go to the United States. The natural consequence was, that few manufacturers could bid on government work; and those who did charged high prices. But, as the slang goes, "Gompers should worry-nit."

The net result of Mr. Gompers's forty years' work is that there now exists in this country a Labor Trust or combination that for power and actual mischief done casts all other Trusts entirely in the shade. This is largely due to connivance of our Government, founded on the Roosevelt precedent. Another result of Mr. Gompers's work is that it is now possible to develop and complete the. half formed popular conviction that Labor Trusts, as well as other trusts, cannot be tolerated; that busi ness cannot be run by Organized Labor, or by Government, singly or in combination; but must be free to respond to world and local conditions of sup ply and demand; that any other course means but one [ 1°4] Government Attitude Toward Labor and the same disaster, of political trickery and cor ruption, plus loss of constitutional liberty and economic prosperity. However, let us return to our story. The years 1903 and 1904 were prolific of strikes mainly against manufacturers-until ended by the considerable commercial depression of 1904; which began, as such depressions always do, a period of corresponding depression in the strike industry.

Trades Unionism thrives only in good times, when prices and wages are going up, while it can claim credit for increase of union wage scales. Meanwhile, it is easy to get in new members. But when deflation comes, and wages go down, along with prices, as at present, and strikes only serve to exhaust the savings of the union members, they are apt to quit paying useless dues, and "Organization" has to wait for the next business boom. So it was in 1904, after the loss of the great Teamsters' Strike in Chicago. So it had been in 1894, after the Debs Strike was lost. Both strikes failed, because Government inter vened before long to prevent violence. In the Debs case, Grover Cleveland, with his rare political cour age, sent United States regular troops to Chicago, to stop wrecking and burning of railroad trains, and slugging of non-union men, for the constitutional pur pose of keeping up the United States mail service. In the Teamsters' Strike, the violence and terrorism on the public streets was so brutal ,that public wrath forced the City Hall to use the police power to stop it.

Dp to that time, the political pull of a labor-vote, claimed to be 100,000 strong in Chicago, had given the unions their own way at the City Hall and the State Capitol. But conspicuous tests of union ability to deliver the solid labor-vote were soon made, in 1904, I think, in union campaigns to defeat for re[ 1°5 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation election Judges Holdom and Chytraus, in Chicago, and Congressman Littlefield in Maine, all three of whom had antagonized "Labor." All were re elected; and for a few years the labor leaders had to lie low and bide their time. Meanwhile, the "Cause of Labor" was undoubt edly popular with the average voter. The wave of hostility to Wall Street and the "interests," which brought the Progressive Party into being, and seated Wilson in the presidency, operated powerfully to aid "Labor" in its attack on "Capital" by holding back the protection of Government. So astute a politician as Senator Hanna, for instance, had long ago recog nized that in Organized Labor party leaders were confronted with a great fact; "with a condition, not a theory" -as Cleveland said of something else.

Mr. Hanna once remarked to me, "All right; let 'em organize. Then, just capture the Organization!" That is the practical politician's point of view; but it costs money to capture such organizations, and they do not stay captured. Someone is bound to pay the bill, as business has paid it for years, in the first place; and then has passed it along to the public in costs of living, not at all willingly, but perforce. Here are a few of the more conspicuous strikes within recent years; whose records as to vio lence and government attitude thereon I do not stop to set down here. The reader may easily have been familiar with one or more of them himself. SOME RECENT CONSPICUOUS STRIKES, WITH NUMBER OF WORKMEN INVOLVED Calumet Copper Miners . Colorado Coal Strike . West Virginia Coal. . Eastern Ohio Coal . Westinghouse Electric . [ 106 ] 15,5 00 8,000 15,000 18,000 36,000 1913 191 3-14. 1914 19 14 1914 GovernmentAttitude Toward Labor Pac. Coast Longshoremen .

New York Shipbuilding . N. Y. Garment Workers . Penn. Bit. Coal Strike . N. Y. Harbor Strike , Cleveland Building Trades . Textile-Lowell & Nashua . Textile-Paterson, N. J. . N. Y. Marine Harbor Workers . Seattle & Tacoma Strike " Willys-Overland, Toledo . Lawrence Textile Strike . Chicago Building Trades . Cincinnati Machinists . Outlaw Rail Strike 18,000 20,000 59,000 75,000 15,000 3°,000 50 ,000 28,000 16,000 60,000 19,000 15,000 15,000 Spoo 1915 1917 1916-17 1917 1917 1918 1918 1919 1919 19 19 19 19 19 19 . 1920 1920 Another letter written .by Ex-governor Brown of Georgia, and sent to all members of Congress, upon street railway strikes, is sufficient evidence of the political relations of "Labor" to local govern ment; which alone makes such ghastly violence possible. ' I reproduce it without assuming responsibility for its facts, or comment on its strictures upon public men; but for its value in showing the feebleness of local government administered by elective officials.

AN APPEAL FOR JUST LAWS AND FOR THEIR IMPARTIAL ENFORCEMENT TO THE SENATORS AND REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES SOME OF THE CRIMES OF THE AMALGAMATED ASSOCIATION OF STREET AND ELECTRIC RAIL WAY EMPLOYEES OF AMERICA. 79 Strikes with Anarchic Atrocities brought about by this Association in at least 65 cities from Portland, Me., to Portland, Ore., and from Duluth, Minn., to New Orleans, La., inclusive, in 31 States and the District of Columbia. [ 1°7] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation (If you get tired of reading the following list of lawless happenings scattered through thirty states of our Union, just think how tired the law-abiding public must be of seeing its convenience disregarded, its business activities suspended, many of its members brutally assaulted and some of them murdered by the organized elements of anarchy whom the present President of the United States has made it his special personal business to lodge in the midst of peace-loving, law-obeying communities.

Are you going to enact laws to protect the responsible, industrious, peaceable people of tQis country, or are you going to join President Woodrow Wilson in making them the prey of proven agencies of aggressive anarchy? If you demand evidence of the charge that the Gompers headed brand of labor unionism is synonymous with mur der, you will find it here. The best that I can say for it is that undoubtedly the half has not been told.) ANNISTON, ALA.-Street car employees, members of the Amalga mated Association, went on strike in August, 1919. No property damage or deaths, but two non-union employees who operated cars during the strike, were assaulted and wounded. GADSDEN, ALA.~Amalgamated organized stre~t car employees September 19, 1919, and at once struck. For next five weeks the com pany operated the cars with strikebreakers, despite persistent annoyance. Strikers, et aI., took out rails on curves in rural section to cause wrecks, and hundreds of sticks of dynamite were dropped on tracks, but were dis covered before they were struck by wheels, with possible loss of lives.

Yet, there was property damage of about $1,000. One night, the last of October, eight of the loyal employees were at tacked by about 150 strikers and others. Revolvers, bricks, and bottles were used by the assailants. One of the eight was shot down and an other's brains were beaten out with bottles, but the remaining car men, with pistols, repulsed the strikers. This was the culmination of a series of attacks, the others, however, having no serious casualties, but resulting in intimidating the public from patronizing the cars. After the above-mentioned tragic affray the citizens in mass meeting forced the local authorities to give protection, which ended the strike. MONTGOMERY, ALA.-Street car employees struck August 15, 1917. Strike lasted some days. Strikers started a riot by attempting to remove the operating crew from a car. In the melee four men were shot, one seriously. On two or three other occasions there was general fighting [ 108 ] Government Attitude Toward Labor between the car crews and the strikers who attacked them, several of the loyal car men being badly bea.ten. The company won the strike.

In August, 1918, the Amalgamated brought on another strike, but negotiations secured a settlement. which prevented violence, inconve nience to the public being the only condemnable feature of this strike. OAKLAND, CAL.-Qn October 1,1919, the Amalgamated's members went out on strike, in violation of their contract with their employers and in violation of provisions in their own by-laws. The men returned to work on October lion the company's terms. During the period of the strike there was serious rioting daily on the streets of the city and many people were injured more or less severely. So far as recorded nearly forty persons were wounded, and in an accident indirectly traceable to the strike six persons were killed. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.-A letter from a prominent. c;tizen of San Francisco says, regarding the depredations committed by members of the Amalgamated: "During the last strike here, several persons were killed and a lot of property destroyed."

He also says: "A state official has in his possession copies of letters passing between Thos. J. Mooney and W. D. Mahon, president of the Amalgamated Association, and also between Mooney and Mother Jones, in which Mooney admits that he had destroyed $400,000 worth of prop erty of the Pacific Gas and Electric Company, and that he was going to use tactics in the street railroad strike that he dared not mention in the letters, and stated that they knew what tactics he used." It was also proven in his trial that Mooney dynamited the towers of the Sierra Light and Power Company, which supply power to the street railroads in/San Francisco.' This was the same anarchist and murderer, Thos. ]. Mooney, in whose behalf President Woodrow Wilson used persistent and determined efforts, beginning in January, 1918, and lasting till the end of November that year,. to induce Governor Stephens, of California, to commute the death sentence for wholesale murder of - which Mooney had been convicted ..

A press telegram dated November 29, 1918, said: "President Wilson was manifestly the determining factor in saving Mooney." MYSTIC, NEW LONDON, NORWICH, CONN.-On July IS, 1919, the Amalgamated's members struck on about nine hours' notice, and for ten days not a wheel turned, and the public was thus robbed of the use of this utility. The company then began operating with non-union men. For the next two months there were outrages by the strikers. Three [ 1°9 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation non-union men were beaten up at the end of the lines in Norwich. A worker in the power house in Mystic was assaulted and mercilessly beaten by a gang of strikers. Several cars were derailed and the usual boycott and intimidation methods were used. The merchants in Nor wich were threatened if they rode on the cars, AND THEm. WIVES WERE CALLED UP ON THE TELEPHONE and given to understand that trouble would come to their husbands if they continued to ride.

In New London, from time to time, cars were derailed by plugged switches or a piece of iron on the track, and in the town of Killingly one of the company's houses was burned. All through this period of disturbance there was always one and some times two of the Vice-Presidents, or Special Agents of the Amalgamated Association on the scenes directing the strike, etc. WASHINGTON, D. C.-In March, 1917, the Amalgamated's mem bers went on a strike which lasted a month or more, and was replete with deeds of violence. There was considerable damage to cars and other property; a number of assaults were made on loyal crews, and passengers were hurt by stones and other flying missiles; obstructions were placed upon the tracks at various times and places to derail or impede the move ment of cars, and in one case a car was boarded by about fifteen men, the crew taken off at the point of a gun and the car turned loose with the current on. But for the fact that it turned over, at high speed, on a curve, it would likely have had a collision,with disastrous results, with a car loaded with passengers.

AUGUSTA, GA.-Qn September 23, 1912, the Amalgamated's mem bers in Augusta went on a strike which lasted till October 19. During this strike, two loyal employees were murdered one night at the end of their run in the outskirts of the city. Besides these, it is stated that several non-union men were killed and several non-union men disap peared in riots and have never been heard of since. Also, from fifteen to eighteen men, mostly loyal employees, were either shot or brutally beaten, and many more people, some of them passengers, were injured by flying missiles. On call of the mayor, the night of September 23rd, the Governor ordered out the local military to protect the city from rioting strikers. Three citizens were killed by the military while trying to ride through the cordon around the car bam despite the command to halt. One of these was a strike sympathizer who fired at the captain and was then instantly shot dead by the sentries.

During the period of lawlessness attending this strike, even women and children were attacked and one woman was shot. ATLANTA, GA.-During the major part of October and November, 1916, Atlanta was in a state of turmoil, caused by a strike forced by the Amalgamated Association which had just organized the street car em ployees. During almost every w~ek cars loaded with passengers were dynamited, generally after nightfall, and some of the loyal car men were [ 110 ] Government Attitude Toward Labor shot at on the outskirts of the city-attempted murder. The following telegram portrays a characteristic "incident" of the strike: "Atlanta, Ga., November II, 1916.-A state of anarchy exists in the City of Atlanta. Not less than three times· in the past month one of the judges of the Fulton Superior Court has felt called upon to make reference from the bench to the acts of lawlessness and brand them as ana~chy.

"Last night, on North Boulevard, just off Ponce de Leon, the best sec tionof the City of Atlanta, two young women-than whom there are none who rank better in the State-were maimed, a young man's foot shattered, a street car loaded to almost capacity with people returning to their homes was wrecked. "The city to-day discusses it as a 'horror.' "A stick of dynamite fastened to the track. was exploded by the right front wheel of the car. That wheel and that side of the front truck were demolished, the car was wrecked, every glass broken. The flooring over the demolished truck was driven upward and shattered in splinters. On the front seat, directly over the spot were seated the two daughters of an Atlanta minister, Misses Rosa and Eva Belsham, of 749 North Boulevard. The feet of both the young ladies were badly lacerated and the splintered flooring, driven by the force of the explosion, horribly tore through one of the young ladies' legs. In a near-by seat was George L.

Porter, a young man.. His injuries were such that he was rushed to the Grady Hospital where efforts are now being made to cure his wounded feet." It is of interest to add that one of the young ladies above mentioned was stated to have lost a foot, and the young man, near the end of 1918, was reported to be walk ing on crutches, probably maimed for life, both as the result of the above-described criminally caused explosion. The State's courts, in Fulton County, aided by public opinion, took vigorous charge of the situation created by the lawless deeds, of which the above was but one, and practically expelled the anarchic Amalgamated Associa tion from Atlanta. But from the courts and from public opinion in Georgia, the Amalgamated Association of street car employees manifestly "appealed to Ccesar," and Ccesar was respon sive, as we note from the following: "It was formerly the policy and practice of this company not to retain a man in its employ who was a member of the Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway Employees of America. This company believedthat this policywas essentialin orderto preventstrikes. Ac cordingly it did dismiss from its employment men who joined local No.

732• . [ I I I ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation "But in response to the urgent request of the President of the United States, the company has recently . . . changed this policy and con sented that any of its employees who may desire may join the Amalga mated Association of local 732," etc.-Preston S. Arkwright, President of the Georgia Railway and Power Company, in a published statement, July 19, 1918. Concerning the above enforced change in the company's policy Mr. J. J. Spalding, the company's attorney, said in a public speech: "No other power on earth could have made us do it as long as there was any breath left in our body." COLUMBUS, GA.-The above-named agency of anarchy having thus been restored to Atlanta by President Woodrow Wilson, who could not possibly have been ignorant of its criminal practices, and having signal ized its return by violating the law of Georgia by suspending the opera tion of the cars by a strike, next organized the street car employees in Columbus, and promptly put them on strike. This was during August, 1918.

A well-known citizen of Columbus informs me that rocks and other missiles were at various times thrown at cars in Columbus. This was also done in Phoenix City, across the river, whereby passengers were hurt. The strikers frequently also pelted the interior of the cars, through the open windows, with eggs, smearing the dresses of ladies and making the seats unusable, and by these means and by threats in timidated many people from riding for about two weeks. SAVANNAH, GA.- Th~se anarchic proteges of President Wilson next organized the street car employees in Savannah and caused three strikes during the winter of 1918-1919. In the first of these strikes cars were stoned, a lady passenger's face was crushed in and children badly hurt. Therefore, we see this Amalgamated Association and its members standing forth as the shedders of the blood of the people of Georgia in the cities of Augusta, Atlanta, Co~ lumbus, and Savannah.

BLOOMINGTON, ILL.-(Telegram, condensed.) The Amalga mated forced a strike July 6, 1917. GovemorLowden promptly ordered out six companies of the Dlinois National Guard in response to a call from the authorities here, where the striking street railway employees had resorted to mob violence. Following an address by Mother Jones to a mass meeting of strikers, a mob formed and attacked the motormen and conductors of the street cars that were still in operation. Several of the employees at work were badly beaten, and one of the mob was shot and will probably die. [ 112 ] Government Attitude Toward Labor CmCAGO, ILL.- The officials of the leading street and elevated rail way lines in Chicago without exception have ignored all requests for information concerning their experience with the Amalgamated Associa tion. This would indicate that they are so terrorized by that agency of anarchy that they do not dare to tempt its wrath by even telling of their dealings with it.

From a citizen of Chicago, however, who is not connected with those lines I have gatheredthe followinginformation: In Chicago the Street Railroad and. Elevated Railroad men who are members of the Amalgamated Association have had two strikes (dates not given). The strikes lasted only four or five days, and the companies simply shut down their plants and did not operate any cars, therefore there was no disorder. In each of these cases the men had contracts with the companies which they simply ignored. Their attitude was absolutely defiant to the public and to the constituted governing.authorities. He added that most of the workmen in Chicago belong to unions, and said that MANY OF THE UNIONS HAVE GUN MEN AND CROOKS ON THEIR STAFF WHO DO NOT HESITATE TO GO OUT AND BEAT tiP THE OPPOSITION, EVEN THOSE MEN IN THEIR OWN UNIONS WHO ARE MORE OR LESS CONSERVATIVE. He stated, however, that on one of the smaller lines which attempted to operate despite a strike by the Amalgamated's members, the latter "beat up" some of the loyal employees who remained at work.

The followingtelegram will lay bare to us the spirit which animates the Amalgamated's members in Chicago and measurably accounts for the timidity of the street and elevated railway officialsin giving information as to its lawlessness, viz.: "Chicago, July 29, I9I9.-Early last night heads of the union and officialsof the street railway companies reached an agreement. But at a mass meeting shortly before midnight the men repudiated the agree ment and voted to strike to-day. Finally L. D. Bland, member of the International Board of the Union, attempted to place the terms of the agreement before the meeting. Getting a brief silence,<hesaid: " 'Remember, men, we are not fighting the traction companies in this matter. We are fighting the Chicago public'" 'TO HELL WITH THE PUBLIC 1 THE PUBLIC BE DAMNED I' several shouted, and Bland threw up his hands and sat down." SPRINGFmLD,ILL.-In July, 1917, the Amalgamated organized about three fifths of the street car employees and brought on a strike which lasted fifteen months.

By this strike there was much property damage. Street cars· were stoned and derailed, many were dynamited. Loyal employees were assaulted, passengers were wounded. Five hundred soldiers of the Dlinois national guard had been called out to protect the street car property after a violent and destructive out burst by the strikers who burnt a car and shot into other cars carrying passengers. The troops, later, having been withdrawn, were recalled on September [ 113 ] Too Much Government-· Too Much Taxation 4th, after a night of turbulent disorder which left the streets littered with evidences of the havoc wrought by the riot-crazed mobs of striking street car employees and their labor-union associates. Street cars carrying passengers had been stoned or shot into, many had been dynamited, some were wrecked and piled up on the public square, others were set on fire and burnt. During this night the strikers had signalized the close of Labor Day (September 3rd) by completely demolishing the street car company's office building with dynamite.

From August 12 till well into September a number of car men who in sisted on holding their jobs and remaining with the company were shot or assaulted. The presence of more than 3,000troops was required to quell the vicious lawlessness of the strikers and their allies in other labor unions. One policeman was killed during the rioting; three motormen were in jured for life, one losing both his legs. Of both employees and the public who were wounded during the strike the number would probably approxi mate one hundred. ANDERSON, IND.-In 1908 street car employees struck. There was considerable property damage particularly to cars, high tension and trolley lines, and ONE MAN WAS KILLED. A number of persons were seriously injured by bricks, stones, and other missiles thrown, and the pub lic was greatly inconvenienced by lack of use of the cars. During this strike the State militia was called out and guarded the street car property several days. The Amalgamated was, later, forced off of this line by a United States court injunction.

FORT WAYNE, IND.-Amalgamated's members went on strike on September 27, 1915, remained so for nine months and came back on the company's terms. Violence was used in the way of derailment of cars by placing tie plates on the tracks, by throwing bricks through car windows, and general interference with traffic. Constant vigilance pre vented any serious injury to loyal employees or to passengers, but the union so intimidated the public that very few rode the cars. Now, upon what basis of law, propriety, or justice can one establish the right of this irresponsible gang to deprive the law-abiding, industrious members of the public in Fort Wayne of the peaceful and safe use of the street cars for nine months? LOGANSPORT, IND.-Amalgamated's members went on strike July 19, 1916. Two city cars and a line car were badly damaged by the strik ers. One loyal employee was assaulted, resulting in the fracture of a jaw and other serious injuries. From time to time cars were derailed and stoned, causing the greater percentage of the public to fear to use them.

[ 114 ] Government Attitude Toward Labor And yet, the Amalgamated Association not being incorporated, no damages could be collected from it for the willful wrongs it had done. TERRE HAUTE, IND.-In February, 1902, the Amalgamated's mem bers went on a strike which lasted till May. They resorted to violence, whichresulted in THE DEATHOF ONE PERSON and the wounding of a number of others and the destruction of a great deal of street car prop· erty, mostly rolling stock. In 1914, another strike, caused also by the Amalgamated, degenerated into a riot, which was the means of the willful destruction of very much street railway property-tolling stock and passenger station. There were some casualties, but no deaths reported. Following the above riot, the company secured from the United States court a permanent injunction, and its employment service has been open shop ever since. INDIANAPOLIS,IND.-The Amalgamated organized the street car employees in the fall of 1913, and put them on strike October 30, that year. This strike lasted eight days, completely tying up the traffic in the city, and resulted in THE KILLINGOF ONEMANand the wounding of a number of others. The organization of the Amalgamated Association, while not recognized, was:continued on the property under arbitration agreement until 1916, during which period two or three attempts were made to call a strike, which was prevented by injunction in the Federal Court. In 1916, the Amalgamated's members were called off the cars on a strike, but were promptly replaced by other employees, and the Amalga mated is not now on the property.

In the 1913 strike there was vicious rioting, and much property dam age, particularly to cars which were broken up, and in one instance set on fire; many people were hurt, and the city was thrown into such turmoil that the entire National Guard of Indiana,-more than 2,000 men,-was called to the city to protect life and property. OTTUMWA, IA.-The Amalgamated got a foothold in this city in 1901, and in the fall of 1902 went on a strike which lasted four days. During this time the company attempted to operate the cars, but did so with great difficulty. A number of the cars were damaged, but no lives were lost nor was any person seriously injured. In December, 1918, the employees went on strike, which lasted about a week. , In October, 1919, they had a third strike, which lasted more than three weeks. During the last two strikes the company made no attempt to operate the cars, hence the main damage caused by the strikers was the incon venience suffered by the public.

WATERLOO,IA.-In the year 1905 the Amalgamated undertook the organization of the employees of the Waterloo, Cedar Rapids & Northern electric railway system. Only a small proportion of the men joined [ I I 5 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation the union, but these went on strike, and resorted to rioting in their en deavor to force the majority to als'o "organize" with them. There were some casualties among employees and others, but no one was killed, and there was considerable property damage as the result of the efforts of, the Amalgamated's members to coerce the majority of the employees as well as the company. But the majority remained loyal and worked whenever the street cars were operated. The Amalgamated's strike in New York City, in September, 1916, was practically a replica of this, its strike in Waterloo, la., in 19°5; though on a much larger scale. LOUISVILLE, KY.-In 1917 there were two strikes by the Amalga mated, concerning which no particulars have been received for this letter.

On August I, 1919, the Amalgamated's members went on strike in violation of their employment contract. Very much property was destroyed by the strikers or their allies, and about one hundred persons were wounded, about twenty-five of them seriously. Besides the almost daily stoning of cars during some weeks, two cars carrying passengers were dynamited, and dynamite was thrown against a car barn, the explosion wounding four persons and damaging the building. The strike lasted for several weeks, during which strikers would go from one barn to other barns and to other men who did not know them, and threaten to kill members of their families and burn their residences, and threaten to kill the motorman or conductor if he did not do picket duty. More than ninety of the strikers were either convicted or held to the Grand Jury for criminal deeds during the strike. NEW ORLEANS, LA.-The Amalgamated's members went on strike, November 29, 1902, and remained till about December 9. The com pany's operation of the cars resulted in stones and other missiles being hurled at them, which damaged a number of the cars and injured pas sengers.

PORTLAND, ME.-The Amalgamated's members went on strike, July 12, 1916. The strike lasted five days. On the first day the com pany attempted to operate cars by strikebreakers, but obstructions were placed on the tracks, stones were hurled at the cars, breaking windows, etc., and so intimidating the loyal men that attempts to maintain service for the public were abandoned, and the cars were pulled into the barns. During the remaining days of the strike there was no service. No pas sengers were hurt, thanks to precautions by the company. NORTHAMPTON, MASS.-One strike by the Amalgamated "several years ago." Obstructions were placed on the tracks and the cars were assailed with stones, bringing a stay to operation till the differences caus':' ing the strike were adjusted. No person was seriously hurt. DULUTH, MINN.-The Amalgamated put the men on a strike in May, 1899, which brought interruption to service and disorder for several [ 116 ] Government Attitude Toward Labor weeks. There was much property damage, and many passengers on the cars, and other persons, W6remore or less seriously injur~d.

In September, 1912, the Amalgamated's members brought on another strike. Again there was much property damage ahd quite a number of persons were wounded, some seriously. The company then forced the Amalgamated's members off of its properties, hence has had no further disorders or interruptions of service since 1912. ST. PAUL, MINN.--Qn October 9, 1917, the Amalgamated caused a strike on the street car lines. Rioting caused much trouble and prop erty damage, but no 'personwas seriously injured. United States troops restored order. Another strike by the Amalgamated began December 2, 1917. Violent rioting. Great property damage done, about a dozen cars being ahnost destroyed and many people wounded by broken glass and stones. .Po licemen shot one rioter and several policemen were sent to the hospital from injuries. ' GULFPORT,MISS.-Amalgamated's members struck in December~ 1918. Second strike by Amalgamated's members in February, 1920. The first night of the strike all lighting and power wires leading from the power housewere cut by the strikers. This left Pass Christian, Gulfport, Long Beach, Soria City, Mississippi City, Biloxi,Ocean Springs, and out lying points in darkness, all these points being supplied from the power house in Gulfport. This was an act of needless and wanton inconve nience and annoyance to the public.N 0 damage was done to the cars as the company kept them in the barns for protection, but the public again was the Amalgamated's victim.

KANSAS CITY, MO.-The Amalgamated Association was the an archic agency causing and conducting three strikes, with property de struction and bloodshed, in Kansas City within eighteen months, the first being August 8, 1917, the gecondin March, 1918, and the third start ing December II, 1918. The last two strikes were in direct violation of the Amalgamated's contracts. In the first strike, in August, 1917, four streetcars were burned in the streets. During the last strike more than 75 cars were dynamited, trolley wires were cut, two car barns wetedynamited, and there were various minor acts of violence. In the three strikes at least fifteen persons were badly injured. In one case a dynamite bomb was thrown against the window of a car barn, resulting in four clerks going to the hospital for some six months. Other people were wounded on cars which were dynamited, and there were the miscellaneous numbers of broken heads, etc.

The State militia was called out in March, 1918, and in December, 1918. There are now under indictment a number of local and national offi[ 117 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation cials of the Amalgamated Association by the Federal Grand Jury, for conspiracy, inciting of riots, etc. In addition, about a dozen others were convicted in the Federal Court for having dynamite in their possession, and served terms of from three to nine months. A gentleman in Kansas City who is well posted on the facts connected with the Amalgamated's coursein the foregoingthree strikes says: "I can see no good to be derived from recognizing an organization which has absolutely no respect for its contractual relations, and whose record on one property consists of three strikes in a period of eighteen months." SPRINGFIELD, MO.-The Amalgamated's members struck in the spring of 1916. This strike lasted but three days. No material damage was done, but the public was inconvenienced.

During October, 1916, the Amalgamated began another strike, which lasted until June, 1917. During this period there were numerous riots, a number of citizens were shot or otherwise injured, not less than fifteen of them seriously wounded, and many other criminal deeds traceable to the reign of lawlessness characterizing the strike damaged and annoyed the community. This strike was forced upon the street car company by radical leaders in both the Amalgamated and other labor unions BECAUSE OF THE DISCHARGE OF A CONDUCTOR WHO HAD BEEN CAUGHT APPROPRIATING STREET CAR FARES, the evidence being positive and conclusive. It has been estimated that the strike cost the company $200,000, and the loss to the public was placed at $2,000,000. The seven months' strike left the company virtually in bankruptcy and the city split wide open with factionalism and swarming with radicals. It is stated that the union employees are, to this day, constantly annoying the non-union employees who were loyal to the company during the period of the strike.

We may well ask here, as well as elsewhere in this letter: What hold has this Amalgamated Association on President Woodrow Wilson that he has made himself the patron and ally of this said association in its course of crime against the peaceable and law-abiding elements of our country's population? LINCOLN, NEB.-Strike by the Amalgamated's members in May, 1917. Many car windows were broken, flanges knocked off wheels by dynamite exploded under cars moving through the streets, besides other property destruction. A number of passengers were injured by stones, or by glass from windows crushed in by missiles. A trainman was at tacked by several strikers et aI., and in defense killed one of the assailants by a shot with a revolver. This trainman was tried and vindicated by the court. Some of the loyal trainmen were kidnapped by the strikers out at the ends of their runs and carried away and hurt.

OMAHA, NEB.-Qn December I, 1918, the Amalgamated's mem bers, with the authority of the Association's heads, struck against the [ 118 ] GovernmentAttitude Toward Labor conditions laid down by the National War Labor Board, and demanded a recognition of their union and a'complete "closed shop," and remained out eight days. During this time the company made no attempt to operate the cars, but the strikers assaulted and kidnapped loyal em ployees, throwing them into automobiles after assaults, and carrying them fifteen or twenty miles out in the country and turning them loose, with threats to tar and feather them if they returned. The strikers finally returned to work after inflicting on the business men of Omaha very large losses and entailing upon the entire community serious inconvenience and expensive transportation by automobiles. NEWARK, N. J.-The Amalgamated's members struck once in 1918 and once in 1919. They resorted to their process of violence and murder, resulting in not only property damage to cars, etc., but in the rioting they brought on, ONE PERSON WAS KILLED and four were wounded.

JAMESTOWN, N. Y.-In 1<)00 the Amalgamated organized the street car employees and struck on May 29. The strike lasted about six months, during which the company absolutely refused to recognize the union, which was forced out. Again, in 1913, representatives of the Amalgamated organized the street car employees and struck on May I. This strike lasted about two months, the company again refusing to recognize the union, which was again expelled. In both strikes, there was more or less rioting and breaking, of car windows, damaging of car barns and, in some instances, pulling down of interurban wires. In both strikes there were numbers of passengers struck by stones hurled through the windows, but no one was killed. NEWBURGH, N. Y.-The Amalgamated's members struck in 1906. As results of the strike there was some damage to the company's property and one person, a child,was wounded. BINGHAMTON, N. Y.-In 1907 the Amalgamated sent one of its leading organizers and Lrought on a strike and made a determined fight for more than a year. They placed dynamite on the track and blew off parts of about a half-dozen cars, placed near the car barn a dynamite cartridge which would have blown up an outgoing car and the entire barn had it not been detected and removed. One of the Amalgamated's men was sent to the penitentiary for a dynamite outrage. Injury to persons is not detailed in the report.

In 1913, the Amalgamated caused another strike. The company employed about two hundred new employees and broke this strike, the details of which were not given. BUFFALO, N. Y.-Amalgamated's members went on strike in April, 1913, and resorted to rioting so violent as to necessitate the sending of 3,000 of the State's troops to subdue the strikers and restore order. It was stated in the press that battles of strikers [ 119 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation and their sympathizers with the militia' and police resulted in the wounding of a number of men besides a woman and child. Militiamen were fired on from housetops and-other points of vantage. THIS STRIKE WAS HANDLED BY THE AMALGAMATED'S PRESI DENT, WILLIAM D. MAHON, assisted by Organizer William B. Fitzgerald, and was quoted by the Amalgamated's officials, during their strike in New York City during September, 1916, as a model to be followed by their members to win the latter strike.

There was another strike by the Amalgamated's members in Buffalo, beginning October 3 and lasting till October 23, 1918, as the company made no attempt to run the cars, the public was the chief sufferer through the paralysis of the power of this utility to serve it. SYRACUSE, N. Y.-In 1913 there was a strike by the Amalgamated's members, of which no specificdetails have been secured; but the fact that it was found necessary to send the military to control a situation which had been found too strong by the local authorities tells its own story. NEW YORK CITY.- The Amalgamated's members went on strike July 23, 1916, and returned to work about two weeks later. I have no details of this strike except the following press telegram: "New York, August S.-Fourteen arrests on charges of attempting to destroy railroad property were made to-day in connection with the strike, which was indirectly responsible for the deaths of two persons and injury to nearly fifty others. . . . A score of passengers and guards were hurt in rioting."

Another strike by the Amalgamated's members in this city began September 6, 1916, and lasted several weeks. This is referred to at length in the first half of this letter so far as pertained to the Interborough system. The following telegrams, however, give some results of the Amalgamated's attacks on the other lines: "New York, September 12.-after a night of intermittent rioting, motormen of the Sixth and Ninth Avenue elevated roads reported to the police that they had been fired upon by the strikers from roof tops. Third Avenue elevated trains were repeatedly bombarded with bricks and stones from buildings. One passenger, a woman, was struck on the head and seriously injured." "New York, October 4.-Four passengers on elevated trains were injured to~day when sympathizers with the striking railway men show ered the trains with brickbats and stones from roof tops." "New York, October 17.-Strikers and sympathizers to-day made several attacks on the surface cars in upper Madison Avenue. Bricks were thrown through windows and several passengers were injured and a conductor was assaulted."

The New York Evening Post of September 20 gave instances of as saults by mobs, etc., on four Third Avenue elevated trains, four Sixth Avenue elevated trains, and says that nine attacks on passing trains were made at I09th Street and Columbus Avenue, and that attacks were made at various points on surface cars. In many of these cases passengers were wounded, some,seriously. [ 120 ] Government Attitude Toward Labor I here, moreover,. add the following from the testimony in court as showing the desire of the loyal employees to be allowed to work: '~William Gardner has been a conductor twenty years. He had been assaulted at Broadway and Willoughby Avenue on the morning of the strike. He had been injured in the leg. Asked what the feeling among the employees of the company was, the witness said that many of the old men were willing to work if they could be protected, but that the general impression was that handling a car under present conditions was too hazardous."-N. Y. Times.

And the following is added to show the invasion of homes by the . Amalgamated: "Practically all the witnesses stated that STRIKERS HAD FOLLOW ED THEM TO THEIR HOMES, had frightened their wives by threaten ing to injure the workers, and had created such a panicky feeling in the homes that the women folks had coaxed the men not to attempt to work. "Mrs. Henry Bentz and Mrs. George Heineman testified that strikers visited them at their homes, and told them their husbands would be in jured if they did not stop working. The women were warned to keep their husbands at home. Mrs. Bentz added that those who had called upon her threatened to 'get her' if her husband continued to work. So she persuaded her husband to stop."-N. Y. Times. OLEAN, N. Y.-In June or July, 1919, an Amalgamated organizer came to Olean, and succeeded in organizing a large majority of the street car employees, and immediately made a demand for large increase in salary, less hours, better working conditions and recognition of the union, which the company rejected. A strike was called on August 12. The company brought in other men, housed them in the car barn and made an attempt to operate the cars, but received practically no protection from the city or county authorities.

Conditions grew worse until the afternoon and night of August 18, when at the car barns occurred one of the worst riots ever known in that section of the State.· The damage to property amounted to about $5,000, and, while no one was killed, about twenty men were wounded. Indictments followed, and several strikers and others are now serving terms in the penitentiary for their criminal acts in this riot. CHARLOTTE, N. C.-The following extract from a letter written by a prominent citizen of Charlotte covers this case: "So far as I know, none of the street car men in Charlotte were mem bers of this Amalgamated Association prior to sometime in August, 1919, when organizers visited Charlotte and Winston-Salem, N. C., and Green ville, S. C., and secured as members practically all the street car men in those cities. Prior to this time there had never been the slightest dif ficulty between the company and its employees; in fact, it is known that the employees had never asked for a raise in wages or a betterment of working conditions-,-all this having been anticipated by the company.

However, after this organization, demands were made upon the company that it recognize the Amalgamated Association and deal with it under a [121 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation contract. This the company refused to do, as it is known that this association at its pleasure makes its contracts worthless. "The result was a simultaneous strike on the company's properties in all three of the cities above named, and soon thereafter a strike of all the electrical workers, and a violent pulling of the switches at the substation, thus attempting to deprive the citizens of Charlotte of power not only for lighting and heating but for pumping the city water and flushing the sewers, in other words, the acts carrying out an attempt to strike a direct blow not only at the comfort of our citizens, but at their property and at their health and even their lives. "This strike lasted nearly a month, and finally culminated in rioting at the car barns in Charlotte, the intention of the rioters being to take from the barns the employees whom the company had quartered there for the purpose of operating the cars. As a result of this outrage, the policemen fired upon the rioters, five of whom were killed and twenty to thirty wounded.

"Afterwards, the Governor ordered the State militia here, and our streets were patrolled by soldiers for two or three days. "Soon thereafter the strike came to an end by the company's dealing with its men as an organization of their own, which it had been ready to do from the very first moment its lTlanagementwas approached in this be half." CINCINNATI OmO.-During the administration of the "reform" mayor, Henry T. Hunt, an Amalgamated organizer came to Cincinnati and organized about 200 of the approximately 2,500 street car employees, and proceededto call a strike by this bunch ofless than ten per cent. of the employees. Through what was considered the active influence of the mayor the remainder of the employeeswere brought into the union, and then, during May (year not given), ensued a real out and out strike, which lasted for some time. Riots followed,SEVERAL PEOPLE WERE KILLED, it is stated, and others wounded, and the reform administration made no apparent effort to stop these assaults upon the law and the lives of law-abiding people.

LIMA, OmO.-In August, 1917, street car employees struck. The strike continued for 35 days. Cars were operated on only eight occasions, and in each case rioting caused their return to the car barns. On August 9th, in a riot four men were shot, ONE MORTALLY. In this riot, two cars were badly damaged, and attempts were made to burn them. The Amalgamated's strikers succeeded in tying up the entire transportation facilities of the city, with its population of about 40,000. DAYTON,OHIO.- There was a strike by the Amalgamated's members in January, 1918, on one of the lines during which, while a non-union conductor was performing his duty to the company and the public, he was assaulted by striking members of the Amalgamated Association and seriously wounded, being incapacitated for work for several months. He, [ 122 ] Government Attitude Toward Labor however, recovered and is still with the company, a conductor, and still non-union.

There was another strike by the Amalgamated's members in June, 1918. One company operated cars with loyal employees a part of the day, but at length, under threats of assaults, put its cars in the barn, keeping them there till the strike was over. This strike affected the unionized men on other street railroads,. concerning which a correspondent says: "Some violence and destruction of property took place." TULSA, OKLA.-Strike by Amalgamated's members June 20 to July 23, 1919. During the strike there was some property damage by the strikers et aI., and a deputy sheriff and a strike sympathizer were both wounded by a rifle shot intended doubtless for one of them, while the two were scuffling. PORTLAND, ORE.-"Some fourteen years ago" (1905 or 1906?) there was a strike on street car lines which was called by other unions in the city of Portland. There was some violence in this strike, but no one was killed. The great majority of the street car employees loyally stood by the company. "The labor interests at that time, through the Amalga mated Association and other unions, tried to make all the trouble they could, but the strike was of short duration."

SCRANTON, PA.-The following extracts from an address "To the Public" by the Citizens Alliance of Scranton, dated December 16, 1901, refer to this same Amalgamated Association. "Men from a distance, without interest in our community, came here and stirred up discontent among our wage earners. A series of strikes was precipitated. With the strikes came disorder, riot, murderous as saults on persons and destruction of property, unlawful picketing, patrol ing, violent intimidation, and worst of all-the boycott. "As the climax came the present ill-advised street car strike, constrict ing the travel of our people, visiting great losses upon our tradesmen, evoking riots, dynamite outrages, and attempted murder in our streets and, by means of wholesale boycotting and terrorism, violating our fundamental rights and liberties as American citizens. "Well-authenticated instances might be cited where women have been stoned, insulted, called vile names, and have even been deprived of their employment, and honest workmen driven from our city, for no other rea son whatever than that they dared to ride back and forth between their homes and their work on the street cars.

"Dynamite, the favorite weapon of the anarchist, has been used to destroy property, intimidate the public, and endanger innocent lives." PHILADELPHIA, PA.-The Amalgamated Association called a strike, May 29, 1909, which lasted seven days, during which there was serious interruption to service and some disorder. February 19, 1910, it called another strike, which lasted till April 17, 1910. During these nine weeks the city suffered from a serious interfer .. [ 123 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation ence with her activities, by reason of this suspension of street railway service, with its accompaniments of riots, dynamiting of cars, and blood shed, the extent of which at this late day cannot be measured or even estimated. A gentleman residing in my own home town, Marietta, Ga., tells me that he was visiting in Philadelphia while this strike was "on," and was riding in a street car one day when a throng of strikers stopped the car, forced the pas sengers to get out, "were rough with the crew," and then set the car on fire and burnt it on one of the most promi nent streets in Philadelphia.

HAZLETON, PA.-The Amalgamated's members struck January I, 1916, to force the company to restore to service a man it had discharged because it had found him to be dishonest, and tied up the street car lines for more than three months. Operation was resumed April 8, with non-union men. The strike was declared off in the latter part of August. The street car employees are not organized now. During the strike, poles and portions of track were dynamited, also one bridge; cars were stoned, breaking windows, etc.; telephones located at various points along the line were smashed and wires cut. At least a half-dozen persons were shot and stabbed, besides those in jured by stones which were thrown. Many persons were threatened with violence for riding on the cars. The Pennsylvania State Constabulary were called in and did excellent work in restoring order. But for their presence the situation undoubt ..

edly would have been much worse. WILKES-BARRE, PA.-on October 14, 1915, in :flagrant defiance of a wage-award of a board of arbitration which they had helped to create, the Amalgamated's members on the Wilkes-Barre Railway quit work, and the memorable strike which interfered with the traffic facilities of twenty-seven cities and towns and brought hardships and suffering to fully 200,000 people of the Wyoming Valley during the ensuing fourteen months began. The owners of this system of 110 miles of railways knew that a sur" render to the faithless employees meant that ultimately their property must be operated for the benefit of the employees instead of for the con venience and use of the public and the benefit of the owners, hence "they determined to force the men to abide by their agreement at any cost. Arrangements were instantly made to run the cars as usual and to protect their new employees and the public as best they could."

From a statement about the strike I quote: "As soon as the men saw that the railway managers were determined to operate their lines, disgraceful rioting resulted. Several of the local employees were attacked by mobs of strike sympathizers, women passen gers in the cars were insulted, and delegations of strikers warned large [ 124] Government Attitude Toward Labor employers not to permit their employees to use the street cars. Cars everywhere were stoned and badly damaged, dynamite and high ex plosives being used to destroy the company's property. It was as much as a man's life was worth to run a car in Wilkes-Barre or its environs those days. The strikers finally returned to service under the terms of the wage scale specified by the arbitrators-the scale which they had rejected and against which they had struck and entered upon this career of crime. The company also reserved the right to refuse to re-employ any of the strikers who had damaged its property or had otherwise made themselves objec tionable.

Note that while the location of this strike is put as Wilkes-Barre, yet the statement shows that the Wilkes Barre railway and its controlled lines furnish "traffic facilities of twenty-seven cities and towns" and that their clientele numbered "fully 200,000 people of the Wyoming Valley," and that cars everywhere were stoned, etc. Hence it is probable that within fourteen months, the period of the strike, there was rioting or other serious disorder in fully twenty cities and towns besides Wilkes Barre. PITTSBURGH, PA.-Qn August 15,1919, the Amalgamated's mem bers went on strike on the chief street and electric railway line in Pitts burgh. During this strike two of the company's cars, while operating with passengers, were attacked on one of the main streets of the city. All the windows in these two cars were broken by stones and other missiles, the occupants showered with fragments of glass, and the motorman of one of the cars pulled from the car and badly beaten by the lawless as sailants.

Besides the above strike the Amalgamated's members had also gone on strike on the above railways June 27-28, 1919, May I and 2, 1916, and May 15-18, 1919. YARDLEY, PA.-Strike declared March 24, 1920, a publication May I, says, "Has been marked with violence." "The first two days two cars were run on the Bristol-Doylstown division, but the operators were stoned and service had to be abandoned." On April 24, strikers assaulted a new employee who, after being badly beaten, was rescued by an officer. Former service men were then sworn in as deputy sheriffs and later were reinforced by members of the Pennsylvania constabulary, who restored order. The strike was for higher wages, despite the fact that the com pany's earnings are less than the expenses. The strike has held up hundreds of commuters, "livingin Pennsylvania, whose business is in Trenton, N. J. [ 125 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation PROVIDENCE, R. I.-In 1902 an unsuccessful attempt was made by the Amalgamated Association to organize the employees of the local street railway. Rioting ensued and the State militia was called out to maintain order.

In the spring of 1913 the Amalgamated organized the street car men in Providence. In 1915 a two-day strike occurred on July 15th and 16th. In this strike an attempt was made to operate cars with the few em ployees not members of the union and· a few additional men who were hired. Some of the motormen and conductors were assaulted and some car windows were broken by stones. The attempt at operation was then given over after a few persons had been wounded. In 1919 the members of the organization were out on strike from July 19 to August 6. No attempt was made to operate passenger cars during the last strike. Thus it will be noted here and elsewhere in this list that, if not organ ized by the Amalgamated, street car men will get along together in full accord, but that those who come under the control of the Amalgamated at once seem willing if not, in fact, eager to kill those whom a week before they esteemed as brothers.

And it is well to note that the spirit of callous and brutal anarchy which animated the freshly initiated members of the Amalgamated in Provi dence, New York City, Buffalo, Springfield, Ill., St. Paul, and San Fran cisco, which have, each, a large percentage of foreign-born population, has its full counterpart in the freshly initiated members of this same as sociation in Charlotte, Spartanburg, Augusta, Atlanta, Chattanooga, Knoxville, Gadsden, and Springfield, Mo., in almost all of which the percentage of foreign born is negligible. This is one of the proofs that the very genius and motive power of the organization is anarchic and murderous, and hence that its activities should be ever under the eyes of the law, that the law's weapons should ever be at hand to defend the public against it. WESTERLY, R. I.-In July, 1919, the Amalgamated's members went on strike and continued so for the next two months. During this strike a part of the street car track was blown up at night, and in the same city a non-union conductor was pulled off of his car and badly beaten.

SPARTANBURG, S. C.-The Amalgamated organized the street car employees in 19II and induced them to go on strike. Considerable riot ing resulted from the strike, during which several loyal men who at tempted to run cars were severely beaten. The situation becoming very acute, Governor Blease sent three companies of militia to take charge of it. The strikers thereupon surrendered and in about a year their or ganization disintegrated. In June, 1919, the Amalgamated again organized about seventy per cent. of the street car employees and on July 3, brought on a strike. The company attempted to run some cars with the non-union men who had remained loyal, and as a result there was rioting and much disorder~ l 126] Government Attitude Toward Labor Several of the loyal men were assaulted, one being beaten over the head with the controller handle so mercilessly that he was laid upfor weeks. Governor Cooper then ordered a militia company to take control of the situation. Its captain quickly established the supremacy of the law, and the strikers came back to work as individuals.

CHATTANOOGA, TENN.-After the street car company's refusal to reinstate men who had been discharged for rank insubordination and the objection of certain conductors to the introduction of a new fare register, the Amalgamated's members went on strike at 6 A. M. Septem ber 7, 1917. Cars were deserted wherever they happened to be at that hour and several of them were purposely wrecked. Much disorder fol lowed, continuing for a number of days. On September 17th there was an outbreak of great violence. Several strikebreakers were assaulted, beaten with door levers, etc., horribly lacerated with broken glass and seriously injured. CARS WERE FIRED INTO and stoned, and passengers hurt. ONE MAN WAS MORTALLY WOUNDED. After some days the men yielded to the company's demands and re turned to work after signing individual contracts. Shortly after the strike was called, two companies of United States infantry were sent into the city from Fort Oglethorpe to maintain order.

In ten days after they had returned, because the company refused to re-employ some of the radical members of the union the men struck again. This second strike was not called off until January, 1918. Dur ing this period there was the usual stoning, shooting into and dynamiting of cars, and several cars were seriously damaged in collisions. On Sunday, September 23, 1917, while a labor demonstration parade was passing down a leading street, two street cars were attacked by a mob. About twenty persons were shot, and one man who attempted to assault the motorman was shot by some one on the car and killed. NASHVILLE, TENN.-The Amalgamated effected its organization of street car employees, August 2, 1919, bringing on a strike which was characterized by notable violence which resulted in much damage to the company's cars, and hurting several persons. KNOXVILLE, TENN.-The Amalgamated organized the street car employees, and a member of its executive board took charge of and directed a strike during October, 1919. Rioting by the strikers soon ensued. A number of newly employed men were pulled from the cars and badly beaten. Dynamite was placed on the tracks in various sections of the city, and the explosions resulting therefrom injured many people.

Cases of rocking the cars, thereby breaking windows, etc., were numer ous. In one instance, where a main line passes under the Southern Rail way, two crossties were suspended at night from the railway trestle, where by the windows in the front end of a car were shattered, the vestibule of the car wrecked, and the motorman cut with the broken glass. There were many other cases of malicious damage. ( 1 2 7 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation Soon after the violence began the Governor sent four companies of the State's militia to preserve order, and, owing to threats that the coal miners, then about to strike, would come down and overpower the State's soldiery, 600 United States regulars, under General Lewis, were sent up to reinforce them. The troops remained on guard till quiet was restored. SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS.- The Amalgamated's members brought on a strike in 1903. The strike was the source of destructive disorder, two street cars being blown up with dynamite, and one loyal motorman being shot and wounded, besides minor encounters, and acts of injury to loyal em ployees and annoyance to the public.

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH.-Amalgamated's members struck, May I, 1907. Disorder resulted, in which several persons were wounded or bruised. There was also property damage. RICHMOND, VA.-In April, 1903, the Amalgamated's members went on a strike which continued throughout the summer. There was very much disorder and rioting during that period, and it was necessary to call out State troops to maintain order in the city. The troops were stationed at the power houses and controlled the com pany's property, and were also assigned to ride on the cars. After the militia got the situation in hand service was restored and the strike gradually broken. Secret service reports showed that at the time the strike was in progress, some of the radical element of the employees were instigators of and leaders in the rioting. However, a large number of the employees did not take any part in these outbreaks, and conducted themselves in an orderly manner.

SEATTLE, WASH.-In July, 1917, the Amalgamated's members went on strike. The company attempted to operate the cars, but the strikers or their allies stoned them, breaking windows, endangering the safety of many passengers, and painfully wounding three by missiles and flying fragments of glass, and thus forcing a suspension of the service. Military protection was asked for but refused. In February, 1919, the Amalgamated caused a second strike, but this time a strong military guard was provided, and, owing to this protection, no violence was attempted. WHEELING, W. VA.-Two strikes by the Amalgamated's members, one seven or eight years ago, the other on May I, 1919. There was prop erty destruction but no recorded injury of persons in the first strike. There W;lS no damage done during the second. SUPERIOR, WIS.-In September, 1912, the Amalgamated's mem bers struck and interrupted the street car service for a number of days, during which there were times of disorder which resulted in damage to [ 128 ] Government Attitude Toward Labor property and the more or less seriously wounding of persons. No per son, however, was known to have been killed.

I have already called your attention to the fact that so uncontrollable by the local authorities were the brutal and bloody assaults of the Amalgamated Association upon law-abiding people in seventeen cities in thirteen States of our Union that it w~s necessary to call State troops or United States troops to these scenes of rampant crime to uphold the laws and protect person and property between the years 1902 and 1920 inclusive. These cities and States are identified in the foregoing list. , THE AMALGAMATEDEXPELS ALL MEMBERS WHO JOIN THE NATIONAL OR STATE MILITARY In view of the developments in the last few paragraphs above, there can be no better place. than this to copy Section 63 of the constitution and general laws of the Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway Employees of America, viz.: "Where a member of this Association enters military service, such as Army, Navy, State Militia or State Police or Con stabulary, such member shall take a withdrawal card from this organization, it being the duty of the local division to see that such member is granted a withdrawal card and terminates his membership in this organization, and if any member of this Association should meet with death or injury while temporarily serving in the. militia or other' Military or Police Organization, this Association shall not be liable for any funeral or disability benefit to said member or his beneficiaries."

Now note: Since I began writing this letter, I have been furnished with a copy of the February, 1920, number of The Motorman and Conductor, the official organ of the Amalgamated Association. On page 9 is a picture showing the "Federal Electric Railway Commission, created by President Wilson to investigate and recom mend a plan for rehabilitation of the street railway in ,;dustry." CONSPICUOUSLY SHOWN AS A MEM BER OF THIS COMMISSION IS W. D.MAHON. [ 129 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation Think of this! Here is a man who for years has headed an organization which has been the cause of the blowing up, burning, or otherwise wrecking of cars, houses, etc., belonging to street railway companies, and has by the process of violence enforced wage increases so extreme as have bankrupted some of these companies, and Presi dent Wilson has appointed HIM, THIS WRECKER, THIS TRAITOR (see strike in Buffalo, N. Y.) on a board to "recommend a plan for rehabilitation of the street rail way industry"-the industry Mahon had been a potent factor in wrecking.

Do you wonder, then, that I, as a member of the Democratic party, cherishing prideful devotion for that great party, a devotion inherited and of my free choice, repudiate all party allegiance to this patron and partner of anarchy, President Woodrow Wilson? Do you wonder that I hold that the lives and the protection from brutal assaults of the persons of the women and children of Georgia, California, and all our other States is worth more to me than can ever be THIS GOMPERS-WILSON MAHON TRIAD and the bloodstained fruits of their joint activities? And do you wonder that the hand of two thirds of the electorate, in the democratic primary in Georgia, on April 20th, wrote upon the wall as their message to President Wilson: "Tekel, thou art weighed in the balances and art found wanting"? (Signed) JOSEPH M. BROWN. Marietta, Ga., June 25, 1920. The outbreak of the World War in 1914 caused a tremendous upset in commerce and manufacturing in the United States. At first the effect was one of paralysis; in the latter part of 1914 and the early part of 1915. Then the demand for foodstuffs and munitions of war from the Allied countries suddenly stimulated fierce activity in the United States.

[ 13° ] Government Attitude Toward Labor Producers of war goods accepted huge orders and set large and larger forces of men at work. Wages mounted fast; and the time was opportune for the . great labor leaders to make a "killing" for them selves and their following. The railway brotherhoods started things in 1916, demanding the 8-hour day for railway labor throughout the United States together with an advance in wages; and threatened a general strike unless their demands were granted. We were not yet in the war; but the President was seeking re election, and badly wanted the labor vote; so did a majority of the Congressmen and not a few of the Senators. The President took the initiative, and went to Congress for the necessary legislation, an nouncing the "sanction of Society" for the 8-hour day. A hot debate arose; the attention of the coun try was fixed on Congress, member after member rose and said he was ashamed, but could not help himself, in voting for this compulsory legislation.

Others simply did as they were ordered by Gompers. The labor leaders sat in the gallery and, it is said, held their watches on the debate. The Adamson Law was passed, the President and Congress were reelected, and in 1917 the nation went into the World War. At the time, that law was bitterly denounced throughout the country as deliberate robbery of the people for the benefit of the Democratic Administra tion and party, though not a few Republicans shared in the disgrace. Undou btedly that legislation was a heavy factor in creating the profound distrust and repudiation of the Democratic party and its candi date, which followed in 1920. But in the meantime "Labor" was in the saddle and, as the newspapers put it, Gomperskept the back-door key to the White House. He himself testified the other day, as else[ 131 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation where quoted in this book, that the Federation of Labor had much to do with President Wilson's election and that he had paid for its aid in legislation.

But the stress of the World War and the necessity of the daily co-op eration of the labor of the country during these years of intensive production ought perhaps to be c.onsidered in extenuation of the Presi dent's course. It certainly was, in his judgment, good politics; and it may have been good business though I doubt the latter. I say that I doubt, be cause levels of wages would probably have risen just the same under the law of supply and demand, without any interjection of politics whatever; while the aftermath, the entanglement of politics with la bor, which still complicates all readjustment of our trade, would largely have been prevented. It was not prevented, however, and the handling of railway wages and rules of work by the U. S. Rail way Administration under Mr. McAdoo laid the last straw, or rather I-beam, whose crushing weight broke the back of the patient railway camel; and incidentally cost the Government $1,800,000,000 loss in 26 months of railway operation.

Now, no government can lose a billion or two in railways, and two or three billions in building and operating ships, and waste many hundreds of mil lions additional in operating telephones, telegraphs, cables, nitrates, etc., out of the public purse, all within two years, without forcing the taxpayers to sit up and take notice. The popular outcry became so great that the Government was compelled forthwith to drop railway, telephone, and telegraph operation; and has been trying ever since to get out of the ship ping business. The railways came back to their owners in 1920; but with the properties the latter had to take over the impossible railway-labor situa[ 132 ] Government Attitude Toward Labor tion created by the Government, with more strikes sure to come. Earlier came the Willys-overland strike at Toledo in 1919. This was a local affair, though typical. The Overland Company called on the Mayor for protection; but at first he did nothing. Subse quently, under pressure from business men, the Mayor enrolled one or two hundred returned soldiers in the police force; but they were forbidden to use arms, until after some time they were permitted to shoot to quell a very dangerous riot, and did so, killing. and wounding several. The U. S. Court then interfered by injunction proceedings, and hired about 200 special constables or guards, who efficiently kept order, and the strike naturally collapsed.

In the same year came the Boston Police Strike, involving the essential question of the division of authority over police officers between their city government and their trade union. Governor Cool idge and Commissioner Curtis acted promptly and vigorously; the striking police were dismissed, the Massachusetts militia were called to guard the city of Boston and did so admirably. The trouble ended with one day's rioting; and since then Boston has enjoyed a most efficient police force. Governor Coolidge went to Washington as Vice-President, upon the wave of approval of his courage that swept over the United States. Meantime, the great Steel Strike of 1919 was in progress. As a nation-wide affair, the Wilson Ad ministration at Washington took a hand in it; as a sort of post-war measure. It was engineered· by a man named Foster, who had a record as a Red Socialist and was supposed to have ambitions to dis place Mr. Gompers in control of the A. F. of L. At any rate, Gompers, perhaps not to break with Presi[ 133 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation dent Wilson, who deprecated the strike-perhaps to let Foster bear the onus of failure if the strike should not succeed, did not heartily further it at first.

Later on he gave full aid and countenance of the A. F. of L., which included everyone of the 24 international unions engaged in the Steel Strike. Presently, probably with Gompers's assent, the Presi dent appointed a tripartite Commission, representing employers, the strikers, and the public, to act as arbitrators or conciliators, and settle the difficulty somehow. Probably the President's idea was that, as with such commissions usually, a settlement would be arrived at by splitting the difference in some way. But the main question at issue was unsplittable, being "recognition of the union"; which Judge Gary, the head of the Steel Corporation, simply declined to give. The majority of the Steel Corporation's em ployees were not unionized, and Judge Gary declined to deal with representatives of a minority; in fact, he declined to deal with the unions at all. The Commission split on this proposition, as the majority would not, and indeed had no power, to force the Steel Corporation to deal with anybody or anything; though Judge Gary, as a matter of common courtesy, accepted the President's invitation to attend the conference. Thus the first Commission dissolved without accomplishing anything; and the President then· called a second, which met with the same fate.

Presently sporadic violence developed in the Pittsburgh district, and threatened at Gary, Indiana. The President, who had intimated in calling the con ferences, that breach of law would not be permitted, ordered General Leonard Wood to use United States forces to keep the peace at both points; which he did with a quiet and good-natured efficiency that greatly enlarged popular support for the presidential nomina[ 134 ] Government Attitude Toward Labor tion which came freely to him the following year. After this assertion of the government intention to keep the peace, the Steel Strike rocked along for about four months, gradually dying a natural death. Foster's great drive to "organize" the steel industry came to nothing, and the big corporation remained free and untrammeled in its labor relations, as it had been for many years. The net outcome of government interference in the Steel Strike was a distinct fiasco. The attempt was inherently vicious, because it constituted a formal recognition of the legality of national labor combination in restraint of trade; and was a direct effort to compel the Steel Corporation against its will to similar recognition. In the opinion of the writer, Judge Gary did a national service of no small magni tude when he declined, in the face of a very divided public opinion, to surrender the Corporation's con stitutionalliberty of action in the premises.

Then came the 1919 troubles in the Seattle neigh borhood. I do not stop to look up and set down here the details of that far-off affair. The interesting outcome of it, which made Mayor Ole Hanson of Seattle over night a man of national reputation and popularity, was his answer to some command of the riotous strikers (perhaps to handbills, warning citi zens off the streets after 8 P. M., put out by the Unions), "The seat of city government is at the City Hall"; which he followed up by enforcement of law and order. TheU nited States was called on for troops, which came at once. The A. F. L., as a mortal terror, promptly faded out of the dreams of the Pacific Coast; and the I. W. W. is fading. In Seattle, in San Francisco, and in Los Angeles, the leaders of industry, finance, and the professions, have created a public opinion that has forced the authori,;. [ 135 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation ties during 1920 and 1921 to put an end to union violence. In consequence, those cities are breaking out far sooner than our Eastern towns can hope to do from the shadow of business depression.

During all these years of growing violence and coercion, of constant demand by Gompers and his following for more and more pay against less and less work; accompanied by lowering of all law and order standards, and raising of all commodity prices, the people began to see and appraise more intelligently the true inwardness of "the aspirations of Labor" and their relation to practical politics. The passage of the Adamson Law, and the whole course of the Wilson Administration toward Organized Labor during the World War, gave immense impetus to this reversal of popular judgment; which this year for the first time in my personal observation permits the business interests of the whole country to stand openly up for restoration of free labor markets and the maintenance by public authority of the freedom and peace of the public streets and railways. Quite distinct from the political and constitutional blunder of government meddling in wage-adjust ments is the economic blunder which goes along with it as a sort of. running mate. Hardly any two rail ways, hardly any two coal mines, certainly no two regional groups of railways or coal mines, operate under the same natural conditions, serve the same territories, are conditioned by the same costs of ma terial and of living, or compete sharply in all the same markets. There is no earthly reason why they should be tied together in any general settlement of standardized wages and rules of labor; but, on the contrary, there is every reason against it. As to these peculiarly national elements in modern life, even more than as to purely local elements like iso[ 136 ] Government Attitude Toward Labor lated factories, it is worse than stupid, it is positively criminal, to tangle them all together in one vast snarl of labor trouble. In tlie long run the labor relations of each railway, each coal mine, each unit in any industry, must finally be settled according to its own local conditions; local abundance or shortage of labor, local living costs, local competition of other employers; for the very simple reason that the employees themselves are free agents and will gravitate inevitably from one job to another, follow ing the strongest pull upon their pockets and their preferences.

Furthermore, the mere task of arriving at a settle ment at all permanent in character, acceptable to all parties, in the presence of so vast· and various an array of contradictions, as invariably blocks all na tional negotiations, is entirely beyond human power. In support of this statement, it is only. necessary to recall the mass of conflicting testimony which is just now bewildering the Railway Labor Board in its efforts to do justice. The lahor leaders constantly demand, to befog the issue, a "fair living and saving wage"; involving, of course, the underlying question of the cost· of living.. But what is the cost of living? One of the experts, the much-advertised Jett Lauck, brought forward as an "economist" by the Railway Brotherhoods, fixes the minimum cost of living of the average family at $2,534 per annum; whereas the gross earnings of the whole population of the United States as shown by the Statistical Abstract for 1920, . printed by the Department of Commerce, averaged but $1,44° per wage-worker! In other words, Mr.

Lauck says that the least sum on which each family could live is some $1,100 greater than the actual sum on which some 50 million workers and their families actually did live very comfortably in 1920; [ 137 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation and in addition banked large savings-deposits out of! As a matter of common sense, the cost of living should be left out of the discussion entirely_ That cost, for about 9 families out of 10, whether of labor ers or capitalists, comes to just the amount they have to spend; and with not a few, a little more than they have to spend. If their income rises, their expenses rise to eat it up; and but about one tenth of the population save anything at all. That is not so much the fault of the income as of those who spend it. Two men work at the same hench, and their families live side by side in the same street; they draw the same wages, yet one is always ahead of the game, and the other behind. The Almighty made the men and their families that way, thrifty or wasteful, and that is all there is to it. The employer can do noth ing on the face of the earth to alter these innate characteristics; and the men themselves are the last people in the world that wish him to butt in. When it comes to the Government's butting in and trying to regulate what all workers shall receive, what they shall spend, orwhat their savings shall be, Govern ment only undertakes a task which is certain to result in utter failure. History is now a good many thousands of years old, and it records these general conclusions almost on every page.

Let me make clear the essential and progressive vice of the dealings of successive national administra tions with what Gompers calls "the labor move ment." The consistently followed plan of the latter is to organize each craft nationally, the Carpenters' Union covering the whole country and all establish ments which employ carpenters, whether one or one thousand; the Blacksmiths, the Coal Miners, Rail way Men, etc., in like manner. -There can be but [ 138 ] Government Attitude Toward Labor one purpose, namely: that each craft shall be in posi... tion to hold up all the rest of the nation for its own peculiar benefit; in other words, to take a special class advantage of all other classes. The Gompers theory is, of course, that the profit so gained comes out of a singleimaginary class,namely, the rich. One can examine history in vain, however, to find that such has ever been the actual result. The rich are rich not by accident, but because they have brains enough to trade with the entire community, and to pass along to the community the entire cost of what they have to sell, together with their profit thereon.

In consequence, any class-advantage gained by the carpenters, for instance, is passed along and spread out. over the whole of us; and the whole of us are at last beginning to find it out. The American Federation of Labor is simply the integration to a higher power of the craft-organiza tion plan. Whereas the latter constitutes a sort of oligarchy of a mere craft, the former constitutes a larger oligarchy of a group of all crafts; but it is and always must be necessary to its success to limit it to a very small fraction of the population. In two words, the entire game is the national combination of a very limited number of craftsmen, to perpetrate a national hold-up. Of course it became perfectly evident at the out set, as I have said above, whenever limited local craft organizations attempted limited and local coercion which Jike all coercion necessarily.involved greater' or less violence-that local authority must be per suaded or prevented from interfering to keep the peace and block coercion. This was done, of course, by means of the labor vote. Accordingly, when the American Federation of Labor was organized to cover the entire country, its logical move was upon [ 139] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation Washington, where it established a great headquar ters and maintained the most conspicuous and brazen lobby that ever has wrought upon American legisla tion. Mr. Gompers openly has shaken the labor vote at the head of every Presidential, Senatorial, and Congressional candidate for years; and the worst of it is that every last one of them has bowed before its menace. Congress and the Executive (perhaps in some sincere confusion of thought as to the Constitutional rights of laborers to organize, to strike, and to demand collective bargaining-though the Supreme Court of the United States had clearly informed them on the subject time and time again; or perhaps from sheer terror of the labor vote, with its personal and party consequences) have accepted these huge national combinations in restraint of trade as great, legitimate, accomplished facts. They have, so far, done nothing but lie meekly down, whenever Gompers cracked the whip, as far as asserting the criminality of his attempt at super-government is concerned. From Roosevelt down to Harding no president-and so far, with the exception of Gover nor Allen, and Governor Miller, no governor-has dared or chosen to stand squarely up and denounce this huge class organization of labor for class ad vantage, as distinctly criminal and contrary to law.

The courts have done so repeatedly, however; where fore Gompers, recognizing the growth of a formidable mass of legal precedent, destructive of his centralized autocracy, went. to Congress a few years ago and ingeniously secured during the passage of the Clay ton Act an amendment to it excepting laborers (and farmers, too) from the penalties against combina tions in restraint of trade, provided by the Common Law and the Sherman Law. In settling the An thracite Strike, Roosevelt was the first to .deal with [ 140 1 Government Attitude Toward Labor the Miners' Union, not as a criminal combination in restraint of trade, but as a legitimate collectivity; very much as he would have dealt with a political party, or any other lawful association of citizens. His course has been followed repeatedly by state and city executives; notably during street railway strikes, which were numerous and particularly ag gravated by violence during the next few years.

The union game was always the same; first, to hold up an essential public service with riot and terrorism on the public streets; next, when the authorities were forced more or less half-heartedly to interfere, to accept from the Mayor or Governor some sort of mediation, or arbitration, of the dispute, as merely a commercial matter; with much to be said on both sides, and careful consideration to be paid to the constitutional rights only of the rioters. The neces sary and calculated .result was always a splitting of the difference by the mediators; so that it was simply necessary for the labor combine originally to demand enough m.ore than they meant to take, in order to secure the latter by way of compromise. This always left the way open to do the same thing again, by and by, after the first compromise had been digested, so to speak, by all concerned. Precisely such has been the mistaken course of all succeeding national administrations in dealing with the "labor movement." Roosevelt began it with the Anthracite Strike. Taft, fortunately for him, was not brought up against a national labor emergency_ Wilson, though he Inay have been merely a sincere idealist, certainly gave a perfect imitation of a practical politician, out to buy the labor vote with the taxpayers' money. He swal lowed Mr. Gompers and the Federation of Labor whole; and conspicuously, dealt with them through[ 141 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation out the war, despite 6,000 strikes meantime, as patriotic Americans, entirely within the law and constitutional right! As I have narrated above, his administration deliberately loaded the country with wages, rules, and conditions of labor which are absolutely unjust and uneconomical; which this great nation is to-day tied down by and struggles against-much like Gulliver tied down by the Lilliputians. It is certainly time for common sense to cut away the whole tangle and let our industry once more rise and move freely about on its own good, solid legs.

While referring to the Anthracite Strike, it is worth while to note Roosevelt's own revelation, years after, of what he intended to do, if arbitration failed, namely: seize· the anthracite mines and operate them, by United States military force, under his own direct and personal dictatorship, with, or without, the consent of owners or miners. Roosevelt believed in doing things, and did not worry much about Constitutions and rights. He was confident that Congress and the country would sustain him in this "Man-on-Horse back" procedure, merely for the sake of a little an thracite coal; but in my guess he would have had a rude awakening-by deafening outcry, demanding that he simply keep the peace,and let owners run mines. But I am no politician, as he certainly was. Maybe he knew the people better than I. They are apt to love men who do things, until consequences evilly come home to roost. Then they curse them.

Moreover, and to a politician perhaps the most conclusive argument, let me note that governmental meddling is always risky, because Organized Labor itself fights with all its might against anything in the way of compulsory arbitration, or centralized govern mental control of wage questions; especially when [ 142 ] Government Attitude Toward Labor there is any attempt to "put teeth in it." As I write, July 24, 1922, the news dispatches from Cleve land say that the Big Four Railway Brotherhoods are determined to go ahead with their campaign to legislate the Railway Labor Board out of existence. This is entirely consistent and true to form; for if the reader cares to look back over the records of the various arbitrations, some successful and some not, which have been undertaken by Government, he will find that Mr. Gompers and his associates always oppose everything in the way of arbitral rulings which in the least limits their personal arbitrary power. As he said on March 20, 1920 (with ref erence to the recommendations of President Wilson's Second Industrial Conference, devising machinery for national settlement of industrial disputes): "Tried and tested machinery for conciliation and arbitration of questions between employers and employees exists wherever employees are organized. This machinery functions perfectly wherever employers forsake the spirit of dominance and the attitude of autocracy. No machinery devised or supervised by the government could achieve results superior." [Emphasis mine.] In Gompers's opinion, the A. F. L. is the be-all and end-all,of labor control; nothing else is needed-or would be needed, if all the rest of us agreed with him.

Only we don't! Let us try to forget the President and Congress and Politics; to forget Gompers, the A. F. L., the Railway Brotherhoods, and the "aspirations of Labor." Let us not be confused by the sophism that "labor is not a miere commodity of commerce," or by super-elastic evidence of the cost of living. Fortunately, indeed, •there is one eternal, omni present, ever-vigilant, and absolutely just arbitrator, which alone can, and which always does, fix wages of [ 143 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation labor with entire justice. I refer to the old, fami liar Law of Supply and Demand. A few years ago, when wages were rising fast, Mr. Gompers considered that law an exploded capitalistic theory easily set aside by the power of Organized Labor. If he was ever so stupid as to believe his own words, which I doubt, then he has probably changed his mind by this time. The Law of Supply and Demand has been very much in evidence these last two years of depression; and what it says goes. Its verdict, as between Labor and Capital, is expressed in what are called "going wages."

The one thing for the working man, or his Con gressman (or his clergyman, if he has one) to worry about, is whether he is getting as much out of his job as some other job around the corner, or within one carfare, is offering for work that he can do. In other words, is he getting "going wages"? All other worries, such as cost of living, a share in the employer's profits, the ultimate disposition of what Karl Marx calls "surplus values created by Labor," are purely academic, and a waste of time. "Going wages" means the cash needed to buy a substan tially uniform and equal share, man for man, of the total production and importation of the necessaries , of life in the commercial region-usually the coun try or state-where ·he lives and works. This does not mean the luxuries of life, of which there are never enough to go around; and which belong to, and under the inexorable justice of the law of trade expressed by the phrase "value for value" are rightly reserved for, the few who do more than or dinary service to mankind (viz., who employ more, produce more, sell more) for themselves or t~eir families. It does mean such staples of food, cloth ing, fuel, shelter, etc., as the work done by the [ 144] Government Attitude Toward Labor average man, his contribution to the common store, commands in exchange. It is not far in practice from an equal share of all staple commodities, rising or falling with the total output thereof-which last never far exceeds the customary consumption of the total population.

For instance, the wheat crop of 1920 was all gone by autumn of 1921; there was just about enough wheat sown in that year, bar disastrous crop failures, to tide the world over to the coming into market of the 1921 crop. So it is with cotton and woolen cloths; just enough production is undertaken to stock up the drygoods counters from season to season. If the farmer's' 1920 wheat does not sell, but stays unsold in his barn, he sows very little or no acreage .to wheat for 1921. Just so, the millman will not pile up more cloth if his last season's output is still in the warehouse unsold. Substantially the entire produc tion of all the perishable necessaries of life, food, fuel, clothing, and all sorts of public service, recreations and amusement, is sold. and consumed every year; but who uses it? Rockefeller does not eat an extra barrel of flour, or wear two suits of clothes at once, because he is as rich as Crresus. He does not use up or hide away the bulk of the wheat crop, or the cotton goods, or the meat supply, or even the oil his own company pumps. Neither does any other rich man; or' all of them put together. We, the people, the great mass of average men and women, use up everything our .country produces each year, except houses, railroads, factories, etc., and in pretty nearly equal share. What we call "going wages" is the daily or weekly sum necessary to pay for that share; and it is all that the average among us are entitled to.

Whether it runs high or low in dollars and cents, it actually buys all there is to sell, every year, just [ 145 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation the same. Everything is used, nothing is left; there is no more to go around. In short, it is physi cally impossible for average men to get more than "going wages." They cannot get more out of the world than they themselves put in. It is probable that what Marx calls Labor actually produces, and uses, with the help of what he calls Capital, here in America, from three to ten times as much as it produces without capital, in non-capitalis tic countries, like darkest Africa, or even China; and is that much better off here. Marx says, "Well; what of it?" Labor produces it all just the same, doesn't it; and is entitled to the whole of it, isn't it; whether three or ten times what it could produce unaided?" Unfortunately for Marx and for Labor, Capital does not see it that way; and will not deal with Labor on any such "You take it all" basis.

Furthermore, there is another apparently unescap able law of trade, the "law of diminishing re turns," which gives to Capital, as its operations grow great, smaller and smaller share in profit. Capital actually gets, in this our day and country, only per haps the last 5 per cent. of gross turnover; and richly earns it. Labor gets the first 95 per cent. and (thanks to Gompers & Co.) does its very least to deserve that huge share! Now, then, in the name of common sense, let us forget Marxian sophistry, and give to the working man some simple, familiar criterion by which each can judge for himself what job to take and when to quit; for he himself is the only one who knows what offers, and what suits his own particular case best. Don't fuddle him with expert investigations of cost of living and his employer's profits; whose results are certain to be months behind the daily fluctua tions of both-stale long before ready. Don't tie [ 146 ] Government Attitude Toward Labor him with thousands of. his own craft, ruled by some labor czar, into or out of a job, working or idle; as suits the czar, or even the majority. Just let him shop around freely, and balance one definite job at so much per week against the next, and take the best; and by and by, if he hears of something better somewhere else, and has saved his railroad fare, let him move on and·up higher, with nothing to stop him. To hunt for the best "going wages" is common sense for him, and ten thousand times more is it common sense to let him do so; for the Presi dent, for Congress, for the governors and legisla tures, for the mayors and aldermen; for the politi cians. If, we, the people, can but get this simple idea clearly fixed in our honest heads, we will mighty soon fix it in our law and government, too, despite our politicians.

All that is really necessary to carry out this sim ple idea, is for Government to prevent violence. "Organized Labor Is Organized Violence," as Allen Pinkerton said; a fact that cannot be too thoroughly understood by ourselves. Our governments, na tional, state, and local, are already perfectly well aware of it; because there is never a case of arson, murder, or sabotage that does not come directly to the notice of the police; and few of them that are not noticed in the papers. To verify the frequency of both organized violence itself and official knowledge of it, I quote above letters of Ex-Governor Brown of Georgia sent to every member of Congress in 1921. The country owes Governor Brown a debt of grati tude for hanging this frightful record so conspicu ously on the outer wall that he who runs may read; but what does the county owe to that Congress which has so complacently ignored it all? What to the city governments that have permitted the in[ 147 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation . famy of the 44 street railway strikes reported by Governor Brown; the last of which, I think, held the city of Albany in terror for weeks, directly at the door of the State House? What to the government of Illinois for the Herrin horror?

Let me repeat again and again that the founda tion of existing trades unionism is violence; and its huge superstructure is national combination in re straint of trade. Why, for instance, should the street-railway employees of all the cities in the United States be tied together in one great centralized Union? What competition is there between the street rail ways of one city and of another? What could be more purely local than street-railway employment? Why should that of one city be made dependent upon or related to that of another? Why should the labor troubles of one spread like cholera or yellow fever to another? What sense is there in the con.catenation? The answer from the union stand point is very simple; first, it increases the political and financial power of the union leaders; and, second, it combines the funds of unions in many cities to carry through a strike in one. It is especially true of street railway service that it is hard for a strike to succeed if the management is left free to fill the places of the strikers with men competent to do the work, from the same or other cities. That is, however, no reason whatever why the mayor and city council, or the governor and the legislature, should not enforce the Common Law forbidding combination planned to the great injury of the community. There is every reason why the legislatures should go yet farther and compel the incorporation of unions; making their treasuries financially responsible, their officers criminally re[ 148 ] Government Attitude Toward Labor sponsible, for damage and personal injury to em...

ployers and non-union men, occurring during strikes. For they can readily' prevent both. There is every reason why legislative bodies should entirely forbid picketing; which has nothing to do with the right of union men to quit work, but has all to do with the wrong of preventing non-union men from taking the work so quitted. Perhaps I have gone too far in saying above: "There is no reason whatever." For the politician there is always the terrifying reason of the labor vote. Naturally, the vote of all the rest of us, which is ten times as large, if cast for law and order, however, should scare the politician ten times as badly as the labor vote now does. One good whole some scare administered to him is all· we need to write "Finis" to the frightful record compiled by Governor Brown. Coal and Railway Strikes of .1922. As I write (September 27, 1922), the Coal and Railway Strikes are gradually fading out by reason of regional settle ments, which have commenced in both industries and are rapidly covering the whole field. President Harding's Administration has made what is gener ally admitted to be an inconclusive mess of the whole situation. In both strikes, his government sub stantially recognized as lawful the national conspir acy of railway and coal workers to hold up the Amer ican people, for higher wages and better conditions for themselves, than were obtainable under free oper ation of the law of supply and demand, and were actually being accepted by workers, union or non union, in other industries.

In the RAILWAY STRIKE, the Administration sought to interpose the Railway Labor Board as umpire representing the people, perhaps, to split the [ 149] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation differences between the railways and their employees. But both sides refused to accept decisions of the Railway Labor Board and to split differences; while the Board itself was not empowered by law to enforce its own conclusions. The strike rocked along for months; and meantime the public very rapidly became educated to the fact that the Govern ment was practically standing in with the railway shop workers in their attempt to dictate terms to the whole people. It became very evident that public opinion was turning against national strikes and strike machinery; and by and by the Pennsylvania Railroad and others were able to educate their own employees, whether union or non-union, to the point of perceiving that it was to their own interest to cut loose from the national programme of the strike leaders and settle regionally and directly with the managements of their roads. But for the attempted intervention of the President and the Railway Labor Board this process of regional settlement would probably have gone much faster and farther than it has done. However, it made such progress and so seriously threatened the leadership and the whole policy of the American Federation of Labor that the Big Four Railway Brotherhoods offered their services as mediators. About the same time the .head of a large association of investors in American Railway securities, Mr. Warfield of Baltimore, did the same thing. This intermediation gave Mr.

Jewell and the railway labor leaders an opportun ity to back down without the appearance of out and-out defeat; which they took, by consenting to the regional settlements through direct negotiation of the railways with unions of their own employees. By now a great many such settlements have taken place, in which, apparently, the crucial question of [ 150 J Government Attitude Toward Labor "seniority," upon which the unions made their final fight, seems to have been settled against them. On the other hand, reduction in wages made or de manded by the railways seem to have been rescinded or postponed ; while the Railway Labor Board's award, or scale, against which the Shopmen struck, finally prevails. The shortage of common labor growing out of the return· to Europe of many thousands of foreign la borers during the war, and the restriction upon foreign immigration now in effect, have checked the deflation of 1921 and caused a rise in wages not only in railway, but in other industries within the last two months. Levels from 80 to 85 per cent. higher than wages of 1915 seem to have been reached. The United States Steel Corporation began advances in wages and was rapidly followed by the great textile mills and other employers. The railways were obliged to follow suit or lose their men altogether; and they sometimes also found they could easily take back all the strikers, except those guilty of violence, without displacing any of the new employees whose seniority rights they were bound to protect. Con sequently the Railway Strike is practically over.

This result (though but one more demonstration of the irresistible working of the law of supply and demand, whether against or in favor of the employer) is likely to be misinterpreted by the public and by politicians; and will, to that extent, delay the forma tion of sound public opinion as to the unmitigated evil of trades-union coercion. It becomes more important, therefore, that writers and students of labor economics should continue to enlarge upon that theme, until it becomes familiar common knowledge. From the pOInt of view of the masters of the [ 15 1 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation American Federation of Labor, if they dared openly to tell the truth, the great Railway Strike of 1922 has been a disaster I First of all, the public has been educated to accept Governor Coolidge's dictum, that "there is no right to strike against the public safety by anybody, anywhere, any time." Next, the Ad ministration has been educated as to the blunder of trying to butt into an impossible situation; the Railway Labor Board has proved of little use.

Finally the railway-union men themselves have been educated to see, for instance, that employees of the Pennsylvania should be free to make their own settlements, and go back to work when they get good and ready, without being forced to wait on those of the New York Central, or any other road. This last-that is the decentralization of labor control, the freeing one railroad from another, of one region from another-strikes at the very foundation of the whole vast political and industrial structure of the American Federation of Labor. It must come down, it ought to come down, and it will come down! Rather late in the day, the Harding Administra tion, in the person of Attorney General Daugherty, sued out before the-District Court at Chicago an injunction, very broadly forbidding conspiracy by the unions and their leaders to prevent the operation of the railways and the transmission of the United States mails. The terms of this injunction were very sweeping, and some of the proceedings brought under it-such as the restraint of editorial comment in the press adverse to the spirit of the injunction have aroused opposition among editors, and even other genuine lovers of liberty and free speech.

Very similar opposition was aroused during the war by proceedings against pacifists and conscientious objectors. It might indeed have been wiser to [ 152 ] Government Attitude Toward Labor trust to the American people not to be carried away by Gompers's strike talk; and to leave it to nullify itself in the judgment of the average man. Never theless, it has had the merit of raising the broad question and bringing the issue squarely before the people, whether or not the country is-to tolerate conspiracy to hold up whole industries; the entire transportation, coal and food supply of the United States. There seems to me but one answer to that question: the sooner it is submitted to a popular vote, and the sooner a showdown is had, the quicker and more decided will be the American an swer, "No!" Mr. Gompers has recently fixed Octo ber first in 1922 as "Impeachment Day," upon which union men all over the country shall demand the impeachment of the Attorney General and of a, Chicago Judge, for malfeasance in office. I will take the risk of setting down here, long before the result can be known, the prediction that the Ameri can people will never order Congress to impeach an Attorney General for going to the U. S. Court to protect themselves against such conspiracy; nor will it condemn a Judge for granting such protection, even if in so doing he may slightly stretch its scope beyond bare necessity. Freedom of speech is not freedom of conspiracy, no matter how artfully the speaker may skirt the danger line of the unlawful!

COAL STRIKES. Very similar to the outcome of the Railway Strike was that of t,he Coal Strikes. There was no Anthracite or Bituminous Labor Board created by Congress, and put forward by the Ad ministration as arbiter of wages and conditions in the coal industry. The Government interfered only to the extent of inviting the coal operators and the union leaders to get together, and settle or split their differences for the benefit of the community. There .~ [ 153 1 Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation was more or less intimation that the Government might find itself obliged to seize the coal mines, and operate them under military protection; but I doubt that President Harding ever seriously meant to do so. Such utterances as he gave out pointed rather toward protection of life and property by the military of the United States, if called upon by the state authorities. There was very evident public opinion against a repetition of the union miners' march against the non-union mines in West Virginia that had resulted in bloodshed in 1921. West Virginia mines were able to keep running and became the key to the strike situation. Their operation throughout the summer postponed the pinch of fuel shortage until September. Meantime, the union miners in other bituminous coal fields were out on strike; and, of course, the strike funds of the United Mine Work ers had been largely depleted, and the miners them selves had largely spent their savings. Perhaps most important factor of all, the "Herrin Horror"

took place in June, and gave a tremendous impulse to the growth of popular hostility to union methods. Not long after came the abandonment of the railway trains in Arizona, which, though it had nothing to do with the coal strike, yet fanned the flame of popular indignation. The Federation of Labor and the United Mine Workers showed clearly, by the public utterances of their leaders, that they felt and feared the wrath of the people. Nevertheless, throughout it all, the Harding Administration made no move toward recognition of national conspiracy to cut off coal supply as the crime it actually is; and as far as Administration influence went, it seemed to be re stricted to urging the coal operators as good citizens not to raise the price of coal, no matter what the demand for it might be; but rather to reorganize the [ 154 ] Government Attitude Toward Labor coal trade, presumably by, putting a lot of surplus mines out of business, or perhaps by running short time, so as to keep thousands of surplus miners em ployed without reducing wages. Of course this was to be accomplished by charging the public more for coal; the curse of which the Administration proposed to take off by establishing maximum prices and dis countenancing somehow that rather elastic offense known as "profiteering."

Here, again, thanks to the shortage of labor above noted and the fact that it will be necessary for all American industries for some time to come to pay higher wages; and at the same time thanks to the development in the bituminous coal trade of a cen tral faction, the bituminous miners of Illinois, that wishes to make its own regional settlement with the regional operators, instead of being tied to the tail of a national strike, like a tin can tied to the tail of a dog; Mr. Lewis, President of the United Mine W'ork ers, has been enabled to save his face, and slip out without total defeat, by consenting to regional settle ments, which are rapidly taking place. Under them, last year's wage scales are continued until April I, 1923. This puts off the evil day; and 'will give the country a coal supply at rather higher cost, though there will be some shortage in the anthracite output for the coming winter. There is, however, nothing permanent about this settlement; and the only gain, so far, is in the education of the people in the Calvin Coolidge gospel of no strikes against the' public welfare; also in the tendency to regional (as against national) settlement of coal wage questions.

In connection with the bituminous-coal strike once more comes up the question of what Organized Labor calls "government by injunction." An in junction had been granted over a year ago in Indiana [ 155 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation by the U. S. District Court, restraining the coal oper ators from making payments to the miners' unions under the so-called "check-off" agreement imposed upon the operators by union contracts. The U. s. District Court at Huntington, W. Va., has just now done the same thing (September 18, 1922). A con siderable portion of the funds derived from these "check-off" payments had been used by the United Mine Workers for the purpose of unionizing the non union fields of West Virginia; and the attorneys for the non-union mines sought to restrain the payment of check-offs on the ground of unlawful conspiracy. Let me explain for those who do not understand, that the "check-off" is perhaps the most ingenious of all union contrivances for perpetuating union domination. It is invariably asked for in United Mine Workers' agreements with operators; and is often asked of large manufacturers, though not so often granted. Under it the employer is obliged to check off every week the union dues of every union member and take them out of his pay-check, handing over the total so deducted from many miners' pay in one lump to the union treasurer. In this way the union dues constitute a first lien upon the wages of all union men, and must be paid whether they work or are idle, no matter what their family neces sities are, or ,vhat else they owe. The aggregate so checked off is enormous, and in the case of the United Mine Workers was stated, on behalf of the operators, to average $3.00 permonth per man. The operators were thus compelled to finance the fight against themselves; to cut a stick to welt their own backs with. Of course insistence upon the "check-off' is a shrewd and most vital business move on the part of those who have the spending of the money, namely, the union leaders. It saves them all of the [15 6 ] Government Attitude Toward Labor trouble of collecting hundreds of small sums every week, and guarantees their personal incomes.

Naturally, when the check-off payments were enjoined, union counsel raised a great to-do about interference by the courts with the obligations of contracts; and denounced the argument relied upon by the court that unlawful purpose is. sufficient to nullify a vicious obligation of any contract. Such use of the injunction to forestall particular unlaw ful acts was bitterly resented by the United Mine Workers. Organized Labor always fiercely re.sents injunctions intended to restrain the commission of crime. Organized Labor's position is simply that this is a free country . It demands freedom to commit crime, and proposes then to stand trial by jury, after the mischief has been done! This position would be more tenable if Organized Labor were in corporated, and were financially responsible at civil law for damages as well as personally responsible at criminal law for injury committed by its members.

But it carefully avoids incorporation and financial responsibility; and trusts to the sympathies of the average jury to escape criminal responsibility. For both reasons the remedy of injunction forbidding irreparable damage is entirely reasonable and right. The United Mine Workers nevertheless announce cooperation with Mr. Gompers at the polls, for the election of congressmen and legislators, who will stand for crippling the power of the courts both in granting injunctions and in declaring laws unconsti tutional. Here again it is up to the American people to put Organized Labor in its rightful place. Fortunately the Harding Administration has left the country in no doubt as to its own attitude on this particular question. However good-natured and lenient the [ 157 ] Too Much Government-· Too Much Taxation President may have shown himself to be as to the "right to organize and the right to strike," he does not flinch for a moment in his assertion of the rights and powers of our courts.

Both of these great strikes of 1922 have then been inconclusive, thanks largely to the labor shortage and the paramount law of supply and demand. It is, therefore, up to the American people to see to it that whether there be a labor shortage or not there shall never again be national labor conspiracy for holding up the people; either permitted by law, or winked at, to say the least, by Government.

,CHAPTER V USELESS U. S. BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS I HAVE tried to show the futility of governmental attempt to break up big business. This attempt was necessarily accompanied by the creation of governmental machinery, to continue the interfer ence with big business, and carry out the permanent regulation contemplated. It has become the fashion for Congress and the state and city legislative bodies to establish special Boards or Commissions, charged each with the duty of regulating public service and particular industries. This fashion has been, to. put it broadly, just as mischievous and useless as the attempt to minimize business by break ing up great organizations. The most conspicuous illustrations are, of course, the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Federal Trade Commission, because they are national in their jurisdiction. There are also, I think, in every state in the Union, State Railway and Warehouse Commissions, Public Utility Boards, and special Boards and Commissions of all sorts, almost ad infinitum.

These Boards and Commissions are necessarily appointive; the appointment resting with the execu tive, and often subject to confirmation of the legisla tive body. The logical and invariable effect is to subdivide and divert responsibility, usually for the expenditure of large sums, from the directly elected executives and representatives of the people. It is [ 159 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation true that subdivision and minimizing of responsi bility are characteristic of the whole system of politi cal "checks and balances" handed down to us by our distrustful forefathers; but that does not better the situation. It was bad enough before; and to mul tiply the subdivision simply makes it worse. It is high time that we took the back-track toward sim plicity, and concentration of responsibility in very few and most conspicuous hands. Let us consider the results so far achieved by a few typical boards and commissions.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. We have already seen what the Interstate Commerce Commission has accomplished in the way of bank rupting the railways; and in the general course of freight rates and of service rendered we have seen how utterly it failed to benefit the people. Whom, then, has it benefited? It has considered a very large number of complaints of shippers against carriers and has, during the 30 years ormore of its life, made a great many decisions; establishing a large body of rules and precedents which now constitute a· working code more or less intelligible to a few experts and, presum ably, fairly understood in practice· by railway offi cials. By examining the annual reports of the Com mission one can get some idea as to who have been the sheep and the goats throughout. The excellent intention of the law was, of course, to protect the "great inarticulate, unrepresented public"; but it is hardly an exaggeration to say that they never appear from beginning to end of the I. C. C. record. Those who do appear as complainants are for the most part the great corporations, the big shippers, eager for competitive advantage in the way of freight rates over their competitors in their own lines of business.

Only now and then an unknown name of a small [ 160] Useless U. S. Boards and Commissions shipper, appears. But communities and regions come before the Commission, to demand differentials or routings of freight, that will put them in better competitive position against other communities. St. Louis or Kansas City, for instance, wishes to be put on a competitive basis with Chicago, as to freight rates to points northwest of Omaha. The Gulf ports wish to be put on better competitive basis as against Baltimore and New York. In old times, the raii ways that served the different ,regions. used to get together with the individual shippers, or parties by or to whom the freight was routed, and agreed upon rates and routing possible and profitable to both parties under the immediate and local conditions prevailing, the competition of the different roads serving the same ultImate shipping point being the deciding factor in fixing the rates. This led in old times to freight and passenger wars, and then to freight and passenger pools; but Government in its wisdom had prohibited both, attempting to sub stitute a sort of poetic justice in railway service, in place of the hard-boiled law of supply and demand.

Of course that poetic justice had to tread on various toes in various localities; and various squeals re sulted. It became the endless task of the Inter state Commerce Commission to hear the squeals and try to quiet the various squealers. If the attempt had a sound basis, the results should be lower rates, better service all around, and everybody hap py. The figures given, alas, prove the exact con trary. Let me go further and analyze the report of the Interstate Commerce Commission say for 1920, which summarizes its operations as follows: 1,040 complaints were filed by shippers, communities, boards of trade, etc.; 478 of them were decided for or against the [ 161 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation railroads on their merits; 142 were dismissed by con sent of complainant, and 420 were pending at the end of the year. 1,203 hearings were held; and 15°,986 pages of testimony were taken. At the close of the year, the docket stood as follows, complaints brought to statement of issue, 146; ready for hearing, but not heard, 92;. heard, but not submitted for decision, 505; submitted for decision, 383; total 1,126. Inves tigations made, 47; total expenditure of Commission, $5,732,673.I 8. ..

Here are a few typical titles of cases under consid,., eration: Cheboygan Association of Commerce vs. Chicago & Northwestern Railroad. Subject of complaint, that the railway freight rates to and from Cheboygan were such as to discriminate against the merchants of that town in favor of Milwaukee. Merchants' Freight Bureau of Little Rock, Ark., vs. the Atlantic Coast Line Railway. Complaint, that rates on knitting factory products from the south eastern states were such as to discriminate against the merchants of Little Rock. Case 88. Substance of complaint, that through second-class express rates on cream in cans from points in New Mexico and Texas via interstate routes to EI Paso exceeded the aggregate of inter mediate rates and were, therefore, unlawful. Case 89. Beaumont Chamber of Commerce complains that "rate of 25 cents per hundred pounds on clean rice in carloads from Beaumont to New Orleans, though not unreasonable, was exceedingly prejudicial, as it exceeds by more than 5 cents per hundred pounds the rate from Lake Charles, La., to New Orleans."

Among the names frequently occurring as com plainants in this report are those of the DuPont de Nemours Powder Co., United Shoe Machinery Co., [ 162 ] Useless U. S. Boards and Commissions Solvay Process Co., Mathiesen-Hegeler Zinc Co., the American Steel & Wire Co., and other great ship pers. What indication can the student detect in the 1920 report of the Interstate Commerce Commission, or in any of its predecessors, that the great, inarticulate public is in the least protected by that costly tri bunal; or even .that the efforts of· various trade centres to secure competitive advantage against each other are more justly handJed by the I. C. C. than they would have been had ordinary competitive policy governed the railroads which served them? These decisions as to differentials, routingof freight, and other matters of regional dispute between dif ferent communities seem to me the most important and far-reaching work of the Interstate Commerce Commission; but are they sound, and do they satisfy anybody? Take the city of Boston, where I live.

Just now its Chamber of Commerce is agitating, as it has long agitated, for some revision of the freight differentials which make Baltimore a good ocean shipping terminal and Boston a poor one. Boston has a magnificent harbor, and splendid municipal pier, and a considerable railroad system, virtually including the Canadian roads. The port is many hundred miles nearer European destinations than are the ports of N ew York and Baltimore. Nevertheless, it is comparatively a "dead one." Now, life is too short, for me or any other man but an Interstate Commerce Commissioner to study and do justice, if . justice can be done, between the conflicting interests and variable factors which enter into this vexed question. On the other hand, I am perfectly certain, from past experience and common sense, that, if the trunk-lines, which· are natural feeders to the port of Boston, were free to make their individual bargains [ 163 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation with the individual shippers, routing directly or otherwise as conditions might permit, and taking freight at such rates as for the moment might satisfy their traffic managers-lam certain, I repeat,· that . the dead port of Boston would come to life again, without doing mischief or injustice to any other port.

Under such free conditions most of the traffic must come from the "hinterland" tributary to each port, by the most direct and cheapest route available. This certainly must facilitate traffic, reduce transpor tation costs, and stimulate trade in general. Another salient illustration is that of the freight rates to Rocky Mountain cities; such as Spokane, Washington, and Colorado and Utah points. There has been a controversy for years before the I.C.C. between the wholesale merchants of Spokane and, Seattle on the question of freight rates. Through' railroad rates to Seattle are fixed to some extent by transcontinental rail-competition, both for Pacific Coast and Asiatic traffic, with water rates via the Panama Canal. Transcontinental railroads, to get Seattle freight, must meet, or nearly meet, the water rates. The merchant in Spokane, however, cannot take advantage of water rates via Panama without paying also the rail rate from Seattle back to his own city. The practice has, therefore, grown up of mak ing the direct rail rate from eastern points to Spo kane equal to the sum of the through rate to Seattle, plus the local rate from Seattle back to Spokane.

Thus the Spokane merchant pays on Chicago ship ments, for instance, which are put off the cars at his own door, as much as the Seattle merchant pays for transporting by rail 400 miles farther; and in addi tion, the local rate for another 400 miles from Seattle back to Spokane. Naturally this puts the Spokane merchant at a serious disadvantage In selling to towns [ 164] .

Useless U. S. Boards and Commissions on either of the three routes between his own city and Seattle. Now what can the Interstate Commerce Commis sion possibly do in such a case as this? Who but the traffic manager of the road in question can tell at the moment when asked by a merchant. for a rate, what car loadings and car movements are immediately be fore him? And who but the shipper can tell at the moment the purchase price and selling value of the particular shipment, and can judge as to the freight rate which .he can afford to pay? How can the Interstate Commerce Commission, at its distance, both of time and space, state in ad vance general rules to meet each particular case? Seattle is on the coast, and has the natural advantage of water com petition, which cannot and should not be taken away from it. How can the Commission attempt to equalize competitive conditions between the Spokane and the Seattle merchant? Evidently the Commis sion must force up the through rail rate to Seattle or force down that to Spokane. If the former, the business will go by water, and the railroads will oft.:.

times haul half-empty cars, which were better filled with cheap freight than not at all. Furthermore, Seattle and the other coast cities would be put en tirely out of Oriental and Alaskan business, so far as rapid-transit goods are concerned. On the other hand, if the Commission shall force down theSpokane rate, it will force the railroads to do Spokane busi ness at less than reasonable mileage rates; although not forced to accept them by water competition. This latter ruling would ignore the right of railways to reasonable returns, both upon investment and for services rendered. While it could perhaps be ap plied by the power of the I.C.C. to railroads already built, it would certainly tend to discourage the build[ 165 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation ing of new ones into the mountain sections, where both construction and operation are necessarily costly. In the case of Spokane, as in that of Boston, it seems to me common sense to let the railway traffic managers be free and untrammelled judges of the rates which will best develop business, and keep their cars running regularly and fully loaded. They cannot make excessive rates without immediately seeing the result in empty cars. On the other hand, they cannot make unprofitable rates without at once seeing the result in lack of earnings. In any case, the merchant of Spokane has no local or moral right to be put on even competitive terms with Seattle at the expense of either railways or steamship lines.

As for the people of Spokane, presumably they do not live there, unless they can by so doing make a comfortable living, although paying freights pro portionate to their remoteness and inaccessibility from central markets. There must be compensating local advantages which even up the cost of freights. Why should the Interstate Commerce Commission disturb one community and not the other? What is true of Boston and Spokane would apply to all regional disputes. Next as to individual claims against the railways brought before the Interstate Commerce Commission-except to the extent that the existence of the Commission relieves what might be called "a state of mind" among shippers, politi cians, and agitators (the great public is profoundly ignorant and indifferent in such matters), I cannot see that working results achieved before the I. C. C. at all improve those formerly attained by direct ap peal of the shipper to the traffic manager of the road at fault; or, in case of unfair treatment from the latter, by going next time to the traffic manager of [ 166] Useless U. S. Boards and Commissions another road. Sometimes, of course, there was no other road, but that was the good old-fashioned way which for 50 years resulted in lower average freight and passenger rates for the whole country than have prevailed under the Commission, and in much build ing.of new roads. The proof of the pudding is in the eating.

I am free to say that my necessarily superficial study of the 25 or 30 volumes of reports issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission has deeply im pressed me with the utter wastefulness and super fluity of the whole huge machinery. If any of my readers will take the trouble to glance over a single volume and can then answer succinctly the question how any railroad traffic manager can be expected to apply in everyday railroading, to the thousands of transactions over his line, the multifarious rules and principles established in all these decisions by the I. C. C., I will take off my hat to his perspicacity. Moreover, looking back upon the 50 years of free railroading that preceded the I. C. C., I seek in vain for any record of great wrong un-righted, of business strangled or rising communities dwarfed; to justify such vast and resultless labor and expense as those of the Interstate Commerce Commission. I am confident that the reader will agree with me that its regulatory work is hardly worth the powder to blow it up with; and that he will share not only my im pression of present helpless strangulation, but my conviction of the impossibility of future helpful regulation, of railway service, by any centralized po litical bureau, or by any other thing on earth but the pressure of traffic and regional necessity, locally ap plied from day to day-leaving each traffic manager free to follow the momentary lines of least resistance.

It is perfectly true that so doing will naturally [ 167 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation establish a routine and a body of rates and customs which, though flexible, will amount to something like a standard code established by the laws of trade for each road and region; which is precisely what I suppose the Interstate Commerce Commission is intended to prevent. But why prevent it? Very likely a traffic manager or division freight agent might once in a while be dictatorial to a small shipper; but why cripple the whole railway system for that reason, with a perpetual rate dictatorship centralized at Washington? Why build a Krupp gun to shoot sparrows-and then miss every single shot? The statistical information accumulated 'by the I. C. C. is of value; and perhaps would not have been standardized by the roads themselves. The rail road valuation that the I. C. C. forced on the roads at a cost of many millions must be largely guess work as to the replacement costs-especially as to the right of way and terminal real estate owned, value of strategic positions, etc.; but they yet may prove worth their cost, in quieting the public mind as to watered stocks, etc.; provided Townley, La Follette, and the rest of the roaring company of demagogues do not succeed in pumping wild-western "hot-air" into railway securities in place of Wall Street "water."

Outside of this statistical information, and per haps of railroad valuation, I can see no use in taxing the country to pay for the I. C. C. It could well be cut down to a mere statistical bureau in the Depart ment of Commerce, except for dislodging a few bureaucrats from their handsome jobs. Federal Trade Commission. This institution, which was one of the pet creations of President Wil son, is not old enough to have a very long history, and has not figured importantly enough in the actual [ 168 ] Useless U. S. Boards and Commissions business of the country to attract much attention. It probably never will amount to anything as a real factor in business, large or small, except as a sort of blister or tormentor upon the commercial body pol itic. It has succeeded in spending quite a number of millions of money, and its jobs are among the per fectly dignified, respectable, and agreeable places at Washington, highly flavored plums shaken from the political plum tree as administrations change.

When, with some flourish of trumpets, President Wilson announced the formation of the Federal Trade Commission, it was to serve as a benevolent and friendly guide of big business along the path of rectitude. Those who wished to control or enlarge or exploit this or that situation in industry were first to go the Federal Trade Commission, to find out whether what they were about to do was or was not a breach of the Sherman or the Clayton Act, or of The New Freedom, or of any other existing or future humanitarian ideal. An amusing experience of my own will show how far this fine intent was realized. About 1915, I was looking after some slate quar, ries in Maine and Vermont belonging to a friend, and found a situation which seemed peculiarly to demand the merger of several quarries in order to give good service and make good profits. .. Slate is a very widely distributed commodity, and these quarries in question, if combined, could not have represented more than one tenth of the existing trade.

Under the rulings already made by the Courts of the United States as to greater industries, such as steel, the proposed combination was too small to tend toward monopoly, or rank as a restraint of trade. N ev ertheless, to make sure, I went to Washington and interviewed Mr. Hurley, then at the head of the Fed eral Trade Commission. He is a man of experience [ 169 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation and common sense. He said in effect, "What you are planning is all right and, if I were you, I would go ahead and do it, but I cannot tell you so officially. It is not for the Federal Trade Commission to teach people how to combine. Suppose you go to the At torney General, whose office is really the one to pla cate. The fact that you have applied to this office in advance will of course count in your favor." So I walked over to the Department of Justice and inter viewed the Assistant Attorney General, who had charge of the subject of combinations in restraint of trade. He said to me, "Mr. Fay, the Department of Justice cannot decide supposititious cases. The only thing for you to do is to go ahead with your combination, and after you have got it formed, we mayor may not look into it; but if we do, and if we think you are breaking the law, we will then proceed against you. Of course the fact that you have ap plied to the Department in advance will count in your favor."

That experience has been repeated several times on larger scale by other inquirers. As far as bene ficial guidance is concerned, the Federal Trade Commission has proved to be a fake, pure and simple. As to its restraints, take next its recent action in so conspicuous a case as that of the meat packers. It examined and reported a dangerous tendency to practical control, not only of meat packing, but of the fruit trade, and of various farm products; also an accomplished control of stockyards and refriger ator car lines, prejudicial to the farmer and the public. It recommended legislation, which has since been enacted by Congress, divorcing fruit and dairy prod uct trades, and putting the meat-packing industry under its own (F. T. C.) control; all of which has now been done. [ 17°] Useless U. S. Boards and Commissions Throughout the whole investigation, the Federal Trade Commission, which is supposed to act in the interest of the whole people, consistently ignored the great outstanding, dominating fact (in the compre hension of the ordinary man) that the huge business built up by the packers has been transacted for many, many years upon the unprecedentedly minute margin of from I to 3 per cent. on gross turnover! The Commission has apparently been blind to the ex traordinary service thus done by the packers, in furnishing the public with perhaps three quarters of its meat supply, at minimum cost plus but say 2 per cent. profit; also to a minimum cost extraor dinarily low, reached only by uncommonly good management combined with large capital; and, finally, to the fact that there is no other agency in sight either able or at all likely to serve the public at anything like the packers' cost, even adding their minute profit.

In other words, the Federal Trade Commission has deliberately set out to destroy in part the existing efficiency and economy of these great industries, and to force upon the public the burden of higher cost; for no reason under heaven but the fact that the concerns attacked are very large, and are able tv hold down to the minimum the prices asked by smaller and more local competitors. But why, in the name of honesty and common sense, the United States Government should create an elaborate and expensive Commission at Washington, to raise the cost of living to the public, and inflict heavy loss upon men whose operations have been a public bene faction, is a mystery! It is probably true that the Big Four (or Five or Six) packers do not fight each other to a finish, fiercely competing and cutting prices with each other until one only survives the [ 17 1 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation struggle; and it is for that reason doubtless that the Federal Trade ·Commission attacks them without stopping to ask whether the public would be the gainer if they did fight to a finish and but one should actually survive. But let me ask, how much better off would the public. be if Armour alone controlled 75 per cent. of the country's beef business instead of dividing that large fraction with Swift, Morris, Wilson, and the rest? Is the Federal Trade Com mission entirely destitute of business judgment?

No; I beg the reader's pardon. What is the use of asking politicians questions that go straight to the root of the real injury or interest of the people? Such questions to them are purely academic; not practical politics t The Federal Trade Commission was and is, and probably always will be, an elaborate piece of bureaucracy; and, as such, will continue to serve party politics so long as the voters can be humbugged into believing that it serves a public purpose. Here is its record. It spent, according to its re ports for part of 1917 and 1918, $1,423,394; for 1919, $1,543,894; for 1920, $964,735; for 1921, $924,680. For this sum it conducted certain cost investigations, for use in making war purchases (for instance, gaso line and fuel oil, lumber, steel, ore, cement, alum inum, print paper, meat and food supplies, etc.), though the war purchases were made, as a matter of fact, largely upon liberal. prices rather hastily agreed to; often fixed by the various trade associations formed under government initiative during the war.* In the slate trade, for instance, with which I. was familiar, such an association was formed and a com mittee was appointed; bids were invited by the Government on electrical slate, and roofing slate *The Government is just now suing cantonment contractors for over~ charges said to total $78,000,000.

[ 17Z 1 Useless U. S. Boards and Commissions propositions for army and navy housing. The com.... mittee suggested good prices, which the Government allowed; nevertheless, patriotism prevailed to the' extent that the Government was not unduly held up. The Federal Trade Commission exerted no influence whatever upon these particular bids; and I very greatly doubt whether its reports seriously affected other bids. Those who were bidding would hardly have been likely to combine to ask higher prices than those they actually did ask. The Commission also served and serves as a source of information for Congress during Congressional investigations, most of which are equally barren of results. Finally, it receives and hears complaints of unfair competition, which seemed to be increasing in number. It entertained 154 such complaints in 1918; 1,040 in 1920. Both figures are, of course, insignificant in comparison with the innumerable business transactions in this great country. Most of the crooked practices complained of could be remedied by private suit brought under the Common Law, but such action would have to be taken at the expense of the complainant; while complaints brought before the Federal Trade Commission are prosecuted largely at the expense of the Govern ment, if entertained. The reader will see at once the clever point that, if a man does not like his competi tor's methods, it is much cheaper to get back at him at the expense of the Government, than to pay law costs out of his own pocket.

The Commission has made one or two rather far reaching rulings, which have been sustained by the courts; probably upon complaints brought by deal ers who found themselves under some competitive disadvantage by reason of the business practices of the parties complained of. I have not examined into [ 173 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation the history and origin of these complaints; but neither is very material here. I refer to resale price rul ings, rulings against A. B. Dick & Co., covering license restrictions upon mimeograph supplies and a ruling against the United Shoe Machinery Co. as to "tying contracts." As I understand it, the Dick Co., which had from the first exploited and developed the Edison mimeo graph patents, many of which have long ago expired, were using later or subsidiary patents to prolong their practical monopoly, by treating their patents, expired and unexpired, asa whole, and licensing their use accordingly. That is to say, they would not permit the use of competing mimeograph supplies, the manufacture of which was free by reason of the expiration of patents, in connection with their own machines and supplies, still protected by living patents. The Federal Trade Commission and the courts decided, probably rightly enough as a matter of law, that the Dick Co. should place no restrictions upon the use of its still protected specialties along with supplies made by competitors.

The United Shoe Machinery Co.'s case was some what similar. That company had from the outset developed the McKay sewing-machine patents and machinery upon which the entire shoe-manufacturing industry of the country i$ largely based. The ori ginal patents must have expired years ago; but as is always the case, many subsidiary patents have developed, and will continue to develop, which tend to continue the commercial control of the trade in machinery largely in the hands of the original ex ploiters. Other manufacturers had entered into the shoe-machinery business; and of course had disre garded the basic expired patents. The Shoe Machinery Company, however, treated their own [ 174] Use[ess U. S. Boards and Commissions system of special machines, which supplemented each other, as a co-ordinated whole. It made con tracts, as I understand the matter, with shoe manu facturers to use its system as a whole, taking all or none of its machines. The Federal Trade Com mission and the courts decided, probably rightly enough as a matter of law, that this constituted a practical prolongation of the original basic patents far beyond the original term, and was, therefore, un lawful.

In both cases, the real question is one rather of public policy than of legal construction. The ori ginal purpose of granting patent monopoly was and is the stimulation of invention. In order to induce inventors and capitalists to risk the many years of time and many thousands of dollars needed to place any essential invention at the service of the public, the United States enacted the Patent Law, granting absolute monopoly of new inventions for 17 years. The Patent Laws of the United States have been much broader, more far-reaching, and more protec tive than those of other· countries; in consequence of which, and of American inventive energy and ge nius, the development of invention in this country has far exceeded that in all others. The same principle has been applied to copyrights and trademarks, which are intended to reward the original author of a useful book, or the original crea tor and advertiser of a widely used article of com merce by protecting the same from piracy.

This protection has enabled the publisher of a book or the manufacturer of for instance a toilet article to risk the investment required in facilities for quantity production and for national advertising, under guarantee of a monopoly; and protection of a retail-or resale-price, fixed by the manufacturer at [ 175 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation a figure sufficiently large, as compared with the wholesale price, to insure a profit for handling his goods, even to the small retailer. The practice had become almost universal, among manufacturers of widely advertised goods,· of fixing retail prices so as to give the large retailer no advantage over the smaller. This resulted, of course, in the sale of such articles by a vastly increased number of retailers; and in consequence of a far wider market. It seems to me that, from the point of view of public interest, this policy was wise· and legitimate ; for, if a thing is useful, the more readily it can be obtained, at a price which the public is willing to pay, the better for the public!

As I said above, I have not examined into the history and origin of the complaints brought before the Federal Trade Commission upon which these various decisions were rendered; but their immediate effect is to help the sale ,of competing mimeograph supplies to users of the Dick Machines; to help the sale of certain competing shoe machines, for use along with other machines made by the United Shoe Machinery Co.; and to leave the large department and chain stores, who buy in great quantities, free to cut the retail prices of certain advertised articles to figures far too low for the small retail store to meet with reasonable profit. These last should suffer! What may be the ultimate result upon cheap and abundant supply to the public of mimeograph and other supplies, of shoes and of toilet articles, would be pure guesswork on my part. * Offhand, however, *Since the foregoing was written, the United Shoe Machinery Co.

has rearranged its lease forms in accordance with the decree of the Court. It will hereafter lease 75 machines out of a total of 325; of which 60 will be on a royalty basis as against 15 heretofore. Shoe manufacturers figure that the increased cost resulting from this change will be about 2 cents per pair of shoes; others say it will not be [ 176 ] .

Useless U. S. Boards and Commissions it does not seem to me that the public is likely to gain in the long run, either in quantity or price of the articles in question; while as to good service, it is almost certain to lose in the long run. The effect upon established trade in now well-known articles will probably be insignificant; but mischief is bound to result to those who undertake the development of new inventions and the supply of new commodities, which require, but will not receive, the broad protec tion which had heretofore so rapidly achieved com mercial results. As to the principle I have most at heart, to wit, simplification of government activity, and the protection of the taxpayer from the bureau crat, I am certain that the interference of the Federal Trade Commission is unwise and costly. I have, of course, no means for guessing the net results, but I doubt that the saving to the public, which has re sulted from the policy of the Federal Trade Com mission to date would cover its actual cost to the United States Treasury in millions of dollars ex pended. Moreover, the mere determination of a wise and consistent policy for the Commission to pursue is exceedingly difficult.

Take as an illustration complaint 168 in the report of 1918: "Wrongfully and unlawfully engaging in a combination to 'discourage, stifle, and prevent com petition in the wholesale drug trade; and unfairly hampering certain competitors, by inducing manu facturers to refuse to recognize competitors as job bers, entitled to the benefits such competitors as jobbers would receive, by means of notices to manu facturers that certain competitors, not members in over I cent. Either way, it is perfectly plainthat the labors of the Federal Trade Commission in this particular instance are going to add at least I cent per pair to the cost of the shoes of the United States. Further comment is unnecessary. [ 177 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation the said association, were not entitled to recognition as jobbers; also by notice to manufacturers that such competitors were underselling"; etc. etc.

Does not the reader agree with me, not only that the mere title of this complaint would puzzle a Philadelphia lawyer but that the jobber who chose to stay outside of, and fight the combination, doubt less because it left him free to do business in his own way, ought himself to have borne the cost of attack ing the combination at Common Law, instead of loading onto the Government the expense of making his perfectly selfish commercial fight for him? Or take the report of the Commission for 1919: and note the argument in the Sears-Roebuck case, which reads: "The Commissioners, representing the Government as parens patrice, are to exercise their common sense to stop all those practices that have a tendency to injure competitors directly or through discipline of purchasers." The Report goes on to say: "As the Commission must substitute a construc tive measure for destructive, revive an economic principle or remove an economic factor, the task must appear almost overwhelming. Were it not for its Economic Department, the work would be im possible."

Does it not appear to the reader that, with or without an Economic Department, the work at tempted by the Commission actually is impossible? For it is nothing more nor less than the attempted supervision of the simply unbelievably huge mass of the nation's daily business transactions, in the course of which this or that competitor, out of many hundred thousands, will occasionally work this or that trick. Is it hu~anly possible for the Conunis sion to accomplish anything worth while? Will not and does not the great flood of commerce flow on, [ 178 ] Useless U. S. Boards and Commissions almost absolutely ignoring the existence of the Commission? Is the latter not exactly like a raft or boat borne along on the surface of a tremendous river, entirely impotent to affect its flow? To apply what is called "horse sense" to this par ticular attempt of Wilsonian paternal government (note the "parens patrice") to scoop up the ocean with a dip net, one need only observe that for about 140 years the vast business of the United States went on perfectly well without a Federal Trade Commission; and would continue to go on perfectly well without one if let alone. If, however, bureauc racy insists on levying and spending' a million or so of extra taxes, the taxpayers will have to grin and bear it; and the most conscientious business men will suffer the greatest handicap. Their competitors who have no consciences will, on the other hand, possess a slight advantage, by devising ingenious expedients to get around the Commission's rulings.

Let me say in fairness that there is one. useful pub lic purpose that it attempts to serve, and may well serve in perpetuity, namely: the gathering and com piling in form for use of trade information. Mr. Hoover has rightly said that broad and accurate in formation is vital and necessary for the guidance of the individual in modern trade. It is true that there are many trade associations which compile their respective trades information (and are at tacked by the Attorney General and the F. T. C. for so doing), but no one can study the C.ensus Re ports, the Reports of the Departments of Commerce, Agriculture, etc., without realizing the great labor of compiling accurate totals and their great value when compiled. Well-organized government de partments, especially if conducted under the rules governing private business, can cover the whole range [ 179 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation of statistics better than can private agencies. The work is akin to that of education; which last must always be carried on at public expense because too great and too unprofitable for private exploitation.

I am not sure that such statistical work might not be properly done by the departments, each for itself, but that is a matter of detail. My main conclusion is that what might be called the meddling function of the Federal Trade Commis sion is a costly and perfectly useless parasite upon our commerce. Attack upon trade combinations is superfluous. Unless useful, they are bound to perish automatically, in due time! One combination in any trade invariably means more combination; it means always continued competition, only on a larger scale. Free commerce and free operation of the law of supply and demand are the only effective and only needed protection for the public interest. Both always come, with or without Federal Trade Com missions, in the market's own good time. To sum up, the reports of the Federal Trade Com mission show small reason for its continuance. It could and ought to be abolished; and its statistical work might be done by a bureau of the Department of Commerce. * U. S. Railway Labor Board. Before leaving the subject of useless boards and commissions I can not omit a short discussion of the Railway La bor Board; although in preceding chapters I have *Since writing the foregoing short commentary on the Federal Trade Commission, to-day's paper (October 17, 1922) announces that the California Cooperative Canneries have appealed from the District of Columbia Supreme Court's refusal to allow them to in tervene in the case brought by the Federal Trade Commission in that court against "The Big Five" packers. The reader will remember that the Commission sought to compel the packers to abandon un related lines of business such as refrigerator car transportation and dealing in fruits and dairy products handled in refrigerator cars. By [ 180 ] Useless U. S. Boards and Commissions already pretty fully covered the principles which it sets at naught.

The Railway Labor Board represents an attempt by Congress to protect the railw~yworkers' wages, while forbidding them to strike. Now, Congress in tended to protect THE NATION, a majority twenty times as great as the minority called "Organized Labor," by preventing railway strikes; nevertheless, it has recognized the great national railway unions, which are essentially strike machines, as legitimate organizations, for a lawful purpose! It sought to interpose a railway-labor board as a sort of arbi tration and conciliation machine, between the public on the one hand and the strike machines on the other. Like all political straddles, this attempt was a first-class political blunder. For two things were perfectly evident from the outset: first, that the leaders of Organized Labor would fight every limita tion of their own arbitrary power to call strikes upon which rests their whole power, and the control of their respective organizations; second, that the Railway Labor Board would appeal to and be sup ported by the rank and file of union labor only so long as it continued to mark wages up. The mo ment it should attempt to mark wages down, there was bound to be trouble, with the political hostility of the labor vote, previously educated to that end.

All along, moreover, the Railway Labor Board agreement with the complainant, the packers did abandon these various lines of business and have conveyed them to independent corporations. The California Cooperative Canneries, who are large handlers of fruits and had contracted with Armour & Co. to pur chase their output for ten years, now seek to rescind the decision of the Court and permit Armour to carry out their contract. This is a very pretty illustra~ion of the stupidity of the Federal Trade Com mission's original attack. They seem to have succeeded in injuring California fruit shipllers; as they undoubtedly will injure the public consumers of fruit before they get through. [ lSI] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation had to face the immense practical difficulty of ar riving at what is called "social justice"; that is, what actually constitutes a fair wage, not only for different workers, but for different classes of workers, on dif ferent roads, under different traffic and climatic conditions and facing different costs of living. As I have often said elsewhere, there is nothing so purely local as the question of fair wages, which is and must always be determined by local supply and demand of labor and by local living conditions.

No national labor board can, in the nature of things, be omniscient and omnipresent enough to fix wages fairly, in practice, for so many roads and so many men. As a matter of the very simplest com mon sense, nothing could be more absolutely un intelligent and futile than Organized Labor's pro gramme of tying all roads and all railway labor into one hard knot; unless it be the acceptance of that programme by Congress and its connivance therein by means of the Railway Labor Board. The out come has been inevitable. Gompers promptly raves of compulsory servitude; the Railway Labor Unions reject the awards of the Railway Labor Board and are now out on a political campaign to abolish it. The railway executives, though they have, partly for effect on public opinion as a matter of policy and partly for good citizenship, here and there assented to its rulings, yet have just as definitely here and there (for instance, in the matter of seniority, with popular approval) rejected them. There can be no question that railway managements would heave a sigh of relief if the Railway Labor Board were chucked into the discard. If, then, neither Labor nor Capital has any use for this ponderous inter mediary, why on earth should the taxpayers be called upon to support it, and why should Congress [ 182 ] Useless U. S. Boards and Commissions and the Administration continue to be bedevilled by its evident helplessness? Verily, the sooner it is abolished and forgotten, and the sooner each railway is permitted to deal directly with its own employees, without centralized· intermediation of any kind, the better for the railways, for railway labor, and for the politicians themselves.

[ 1 83 ] CHAPTER VI USELESS STATE AND LOCAL BOARDS I HAVE so far considered the extraneous activities of our government in meddling with or regulating transportation, big business, etc. I had intended to examine also at some length the multiplex more ordinary activities undertaken by our national and state governments. I find, however, that the mass of material is altogether too great to condense into the space available in this book. It will be suf ficient, I think, to submit the following analysis of the governmental activities of the State of New York, classified rather hastily into groups as they naturally fall together. A mere glance will show the very great complexity of the business which must be handled by the State, even when reduced to its lowest terms. A more careful reading of this N ewYork list will at once suggest the possibility of great simplification and concentration of administra tive detail. Furthermore, and to me very much more important, it will raise the question of the dilu tion of authority, and the subdivision, if not the dis appearance, of responsibility, among such a welter of departments, institutions, superintendencies, boards, and commissions. The State of New York seems to be more given to government by boards and com missions than any of its sister states. In many cases, the voluntary and local supervision of leading citizens must be of great advantage; in other cases, it must be of very questionable utility.

[ 184] Useless State and Local Boards Here follows the classification: Governor Secretary of State Comptroller Treasurer Attorney General State Engineer Harbor Masters EXECUTIVE State Department of Health Department of High ways Commissioner of Land Office Militia Naval Militia State Troopers Port Wardens Supt. of State Prisons Supt•.of Public Build. ings Supt. of Public Works. Port of New York Authority " EDUCATIONAL AND PROMOTIONAL Experimental Sta-N. Y. State Normal SchoolAlbany " Brockport Buffalo Cortland Fredonia Geneseo New Paltz Oneonta Oswego Callsburg Potsdam Trustees Cornell University Dept. of Labor & Industrial Commissioner Nautical School State Schoolof Agriculture, Delhi N. Y. State College of Forestry State Dept. of Education, University ofN. Y Agricultural tion State School of Agriculture, Al fred State College of Agriculture, Cornell State Fair Commission State School of Clay Working & Ceramics State Institute of Applied Agri culture State School of Agriculture, Morrisville State School of Agriculture, St.

Lawrence State Schoolof Agriculture &Do mestic Science, Schoharie State Architect Superintendent of Banks Superintendent of Insurance Board of Law Examiners Board of Medical Examiners State Board of Pharmacy Public Service Commission SUPERVISORY Transit Commission State Racing Commission State Licensing Board for Engineers State Athletic Commission State Motion Picture Commission State Board of Embalming Examin·· ers State Commission for Blind State Board of Charities Fiscal Supt. of State Charities CHARITI~S State Hospital Commission State Hospital for Insane, Binghamton " Brooklyn Buffalo [ 185 1 Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation " State Hospital for Insane, Central Islip "(Homeopathic) Gowanda " Hudson River Kings Park Manhattan Middletown Rochester St. Lawrence Utica " Willard Commission to Provide Hospitals for Dis charged Soldiers, Sailors and Marines State Advisory Commission for Rehabili tation of Handicapped Persons Institute for Improvement Instr. Deaf Mutes St. Joseph's Inst. Impr. Instr. (Female) Mutes St. Joseph's Inst. Impr. Instr. (Male) Mut.es Central N. Y. Inst. for Deaf Mutes, Rome Rochester School for Deaf Mutes Northern N. Y. Inst. for Deaf Mutes, Malone Albany School for Deaf Mutes, Albany N. Y. State Lecouteulx for Deaf Mutes CHARITIES-Continued State Commission for Men tal Defectives Newark State School for Mental Defectives Syracuse State School for Mental Defectives Rome State School for Mental Defectives Craig Colony for Epilep tics, Sonyea Letchworth Village. Thiells N. Y. State Hospital for Crippled and Defective Children N. Y. State Hospital for Incipient Pulmonary Tu berculosis N. Y. State Hospital for Soldiers and Sailors, Bath N. Y. State Women's Relief Corps Home, Oxford N. Y. State School for the Blind N. Y. State Institute for Deaf and Dumb LANDS, PARKS, ROADS, ETC.

Palisades Park Newtown Battlefield Niagara Park Buildings, Watkins Glen Commissioners Herkimer Home Allegheny State Park Commission Roosevelt Memorial Commission Pla~tsburgh Centenary CommisGrounds & Sion Enfield Trees Reservation Bronx Parkway Bridge & Tunnel Commission Gettysburg Monument Trustees of Public Kingston Schuyler Mansion Trustees Washington Headquarters Trus tees Commission on Sites, Buildings Fire Island Park Canal Board Commissioners of Canal Fund TRANSPORTATION Long Island Waterway Improvement Board River Regulating District Commission on Canadian Boundary Waters r 186 ] Useless State and Local Boards PENAL AND REFORMATORY N. Y. State Reformatory, Elmira N. Y. State Agricultural & IndusN. Y. State Reformatory for Women trial School. Industry Western House of Refuge . N. Y. State Training School for N. Y. State Institution for Defective Girls, Hudson Delinquents State Commission of Prisons State Board of Classification Court of Claims JUDICIARY Supreme Court County Courts CONSULTATIVE Pension Commission Hospital Development Commission N. Y. State Bonus Commission Commission to Examine Laws on Child Welfare Board of Child Welfare, Mothers' Allowance Com. Judiciary & Bar on Rules of Civil Practice Com. Legislation, Judiciary &. Bar on Article 6 of Constitutional Amendment Civil Service Commission Conservation Commission N Y Water Power Commission Public Health Council Ultimate System of State & County Highways Legislative Bill Drafting Com mission Armory Commission Commission for Uniform Legisla tion State Probation Commission MISCELLANEOUS State Board of Canvassers Board of Geographic Names Commission for Examination of Voting Machines Onoridaga Indians, Onondaga Onondaga Indians, Tonawanda Seneca INDIANS St. Regis Thomas Indian School Commission on Indian Affairs LIBRARIES Legislative Law Library, Albany, Elmira and 27 other cities LEGISLATIVE Miscellaneous Reporter 'Budget Commission STATE TAX DEPARTMENT State Board of Equalization Board of Estimate and Control [ 187 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation Such is the complexity of the governmental activ ities of the State of New York. The State of Massa chusetts not long ago reorganized and concentrated what might be called its legitimate state activities, and more than 100 State Boards and Commissions, of various kinds, into 20 Departments, with great self gratulation and popular approval. I have not been able to find out how many useless bureaus were cut out; but have no doubt that the. reorganization was greatly needed. I append a reduced zinc-etching from the Official Diagram of this reorganization.

In order to get within the page size of this book, it had to be photographed down so small that the finer legends of the chart cannot be. read without a magnifying glass; if even with one. But it is of no earthly use that the reader should bother him self to try to decipher them. He can see at a glance the exceeding complexity of the business under taken by that state, and the vast organization re quired for it, even at the best; which is the only purpose to be served by reprod ueing the diagram at all. Minute as the print here shown is, it is suffi cient to illustrate the point I would make. What is true of Massachusetts is true of every state in the Union. There is not one of them that is not actually doing more kinds of business than any indus trial corporation ever succeeded in doing well. Doubtless many of these undertakings are important, but the effort should be to cut out every single one that is not absolutely necessary and unattainable ex...

cept by government action. Many of the states had established Boards of Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners before the [ 188] DIAGRAM OF DEPARTME~TAL ORGANIZATION UNDER CHAPTER 350 •.GENERAt ACTS 1919 ..... 00 '"....... OEPAIlT.. tN~ 0' M-.~;;;::UL~~~~\r-. ::~::: ~;:'::.I ~':r ~:~: ~?-":'mI-.~ -~1;;:, Ol"'~ ~........ ... ~ t.::~ DEP"'R~"t;. ..~ Of I:-..~~·.I.. $2= ;E: ~ u;u ,.,.. c-..~. ~!:~ =-" .~= --= OEPAIlT"'ENT 0 • • CO:"":'RATIONS'''''DTA~::ON D.t:.'~ .•..,. ~l'''~ ~~.. ~ ~frl ,,'O•. ~ ...~ -" ~."..=.~~ Maximum Salar)' "no authority to eppo.nt ~uOo,.dln.t. o,ff'I'"el·!. nnd enl~l()y"'~~ DEPARTMENT 010 ~ ...~:~.L1e :~RK.:".... ,.1'~• •1IfII.~. II&VtstoM OI~ • ..... w..-s ..... ".i:= :z.:: Prep3~d tty tho Ofliea ", 'til .. Sup<'rvisor of A..... inistr.tion s: ~ ~ t: CI') ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t'-t<::> ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation passage of the Interstate Commerce Law and the advent of national regulation. The State Boards were a consequence of the Granger agitation of the early 70'S; and of the Munn & Scott decision, making grain elevators in effect a part of the transportation system of the country. Before that, an investor put his money into a railway, an elevator, or public service corporation, ashe would into a private affair, a mine or a grocery; quite free to make all he could, and to tax the traffic all it would bear. This freedom led to the rapid development of the Western rail ways, streetcar systems, and the like; and with them that of the West itself. The Granger move ment-that is, the organization of the farmers into local and state Granges-came along in the 70's, and started, I think, in Wisconsin, where LaFollettes and other eccentricities grow and flourish. At any rate, the movement was most heard of in that state.

The Grangers in many Western states went for legis lation to control the railways and reduce rail rates, on the theory that corporations are creatures of the state, subject to regulation by the state-and that railways, which avail themselves of the right of eminent domain to procure their rights-of-way, were for that reason also beholden to the state and subject to its behest. The Grangers' argument was that the roads were owned by the rich devils in Wall Street, who were autocratic, and plunderers of the farmer; and they acted on the assumption that Western grains and farm products would net the farmers more if the railroads got less for transportation to the seaboard. They had not much difficulty in getting the passage of the necessary laws, but it took some time to try [ 19°] Useless State and Local Boards out test-cases made by the railways, and secure the final verdict of the Supreme Court of the United States, confirming their constitutionality.

Not long after came the Munn & Scott decision. Munn& Scott were receivers and shippers of grain who had built a grain elevator in Chicago between a spur of one of the great railways and the waters of the Chicago River. Cars could come up on one side of the elevator and unload into it; and the grain could be stored there, to be spouted later into the hold of a vessel on the other side. The business was, as a matter of fact, as private as that of any other warehouse, for the storage of household furniture, for instance, that possessed convenient receiving and loading facilities. Nevertheless, under Granger pres sure, the legislatures passed laws making the ware housemen, as it were, common carriers; upon the rather vague ground that they had put their property into the path of commerce between rail and water carriers in such a manner that it became fraught with a public interest. Once more the Supreme Court of the United States (which, by the way, always reflects public opinion) confirmed the constitutionality of those laws. Since those decisions, railways and ware houses, and, of late years, public utilities, have been subjected by the various states to the supervision and regulation of boards and commissions.

In the case of the Interstate Commerce Commis sion, as already noted, this supervision has been of no very perceptible benefit to the public; but, on the other hand, has been of great annoyance and ex pense to those directly interested, whether carriers, warehousemen, or shippers. Of late years, under [ 191 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation repeated decisions of U. S. Supreme Court, the In terstate Commerce Commission has gradually taken the reins of regulation from the State Railway Com missions, not only as to interstate, but even as to intrastate rates. This, of course, has gradually lessened the importance of the State Commissions; but there is constant friction between the national and state authority, with occasional flare-up.. Of course the United States are bound to prevail, so that the State Boards are falling into more or less "innocuous desuetude," so far as rates are con cerned. They are still competent to establish technical rules and local rates, good only so far as the state line; and I believe that occasionally they greatly bother the railways which cross state lines, as most of them do. There are also what President Roosevelt called "twilight zones" in railroad practice, the regulation of which does not belong either to the state or national governments. All in all, the state Railway and Warehouse Commissions are about as useless as so many vermiform appendices. The best thing that could happen to the states would be to cut them out.

Still more recently in many states, Public Utility Commissions have been established to regulate rates and service of corporations furnishing water, gas, electric light and power, telephones, etc., in cities and towns. These commissions perhaps serve to better purpose than railway and warehousecommis sions; for in many cases, and especially with all street railways, the corporations controlled are neces sarily monopolies. The population served by them has no competitor to go to when disgruntled with [ 192 ] Useless State and Local .Boards service rendered by an ill-mannered employee. It must willy-nilly deal with the monopoly, and is con sequently in a chronic state of antagonism against it. A friend of mine used to say to me while I was a public utility president, "No man is broad enough to run a monopoly," and there was a good deal of truth in this. I know, by personal experience, that no matter how fairly or faithfully a man works for the joint interest of his stockholders and the public, he never gets much credit from the latter. He can, however, .if he is actually doing the sq uare thing, get along pretty well with a reasonably honest Public Utility Commission and at the same time, the public feels that it is being protected from a conscienceless corporation. Practically, the exist ence of the Commission makes very little difference in the quality and cost of service to the public which the corporation can furnish, consistently with rea sonable profit. The natural business interest of all parties invariably coincides in the long run; and the prices accepted by the public, which are generally accepted by the Public Utility Commission, are the resultant of the customers' need of service on the one hand and of the corporation's need of profit on the other. Between the two, the Public Utility Com mission usually does the best it can, but claims the credit for everything. It is a political organization, bound to hold its job and save its face. A great many managers of public utility corporations think that it serves as a useful buffer to ward off the at tacks of free lances, demagogues, and reformers. Per haps they are right.

Nevertheless, a short story of two or three conspic uous public service corporations will show, first, that local governments are just as futile, stupid, and mis chievous when they interfere with business as is the [ 193 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation National Government; and, second, that the public utility commissions merely go through certain mo tions just like the Interstate Commerce and Federal Trade commissions, to save salaries and appear ances. Chicago Gas. Take, for instance, my own ex perience with the Chicago Gas Trust Co. This was a corporation, of which I was president for a while, formed in 1877 by a composite group of Chicagoans, New Yorkers, and Philadelphians to hold the stocks of four subsidiaries, local gas companies which had been in fierce competition in that city. Two of them were old and strong, and by tacit agreement had never encroached upon each other's territory, but divided the city; the Chicago River forming the dividing line. The other two came later to introduce the then new process of making water gas, in com petition with the old coal gas. The newcomers both laid mains in the heart of the city east of the river, and competed vigorously with one of the old companies, leaving the other alone. The competi tion bankrupted the two new companies, and ex hausted .the surplus orone of the old ones; while the other had to make sympathetic reduction in the price of gas. Eventually the men who financed the two new concerns, in order to save themselves from total loss, had to buyout the old ones and stop de structive competition. Gas had fallen to $1.00 per thousand, and they raised its price to $1.25, which was half of its price when the fight started. The public were entirely satisfied and· paid the $1.25 without complaint; but the press and the reformers and the politicians. got after the combination hot foot. The city refused permits to open the streets, and mend leaky gas mains, so that frequent ex plosions occurred. The Council took action, can[ 194] Useless State and Local Boards ceIling the franchises granted to the two new com panies (the old ones were under old state charters not forfeitable), the Citizens Association brought suit at Common Law (this was before the enactment of the Sherman Law) to dissolve the Gas Trust Co. as a combination in restraint of trade; and after two years of litigation, carried to the State Supreme Court, it was so dissolved.

Meantime, the chairman of the Gas Committee of the City Council came to me with a proposal that the company should pay him, for private distribution among "the boys in the Council," 25 per cent. of the city's annual gas bill; which meant the distribution Of$I7S,ooo annually among them. When this was refused, he saw to it that no gas appropriations were passed for nearly two years; which made it impossi ble to collect for gas, lamp posts, etc., furnished the city. He also procured the passage of appropria tions for building a city electric street-lighting plant. By the second year the situation became so aggravated, the city owing the gas companies nearly $600,000, that I asked my directors to let me make a fight, cut off the gas, leave the city in the dark, and publicly give the reason why; or else to let me resign. They declined to fight and I resigned. One of the principal owners, now dead, then went to Spring field, during the following session of the legislature, and paid somebody (so runs the story) $300,000 for the passage of a special act permitting the consolida tion of the four companies and legitimatizing the whole situation. It is said, too, that something was paid the "boys" in the Council to hush them up.

Stories like that were frequent among the public utility men whom I knew, coming from many cities of the United States. Local government thoroughly understood what an Indiana statesman about that [ 195 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation time called the art of "frying the fat out of the manu facturers." I was a hired president, not having had anything to do with the formation of the cor poration, or with the gas business prior to the fight. Just after my election, in a meeting of the Executive Committee, I was asked to sign some checks which had been overlooked by my predecessor until. too late for his signature. One of them was for $5,000, to the order of one of the directors, and, as all were properly vouched and initialed, .I signed them with out hesitation. A few days after, meeting the direc tor in question, I said to him, "By the way, what was that $5,000 check for? The voucher seemed a little vague." HOh," he answered, "it had to be! That was the Gas Company's share of a lump sum that I paid fOf it and the Street Railways to the Chairman of the State Board of Equalization. You know the State Board fixes the capital-stock tax assessmenti of all public service corporations; and the only way to avoid being stuck like the devil is to come across with a good fat check for the members of the Board."

All the parties to this transaction have been dead for many years, which, perhaps, is the only comment necessary. None is needed as to the why and where fore of that particular Board. City Halls and Street Railways. Precisely par allel was the course of the street railway experience of the three cities of New York, Boston, and Chicago. When I was a small boy, street transportation in the city of New York was by omnibus at a Io-cent tare. By the time I went to Ha{'vard, the horsecar had developed in and around Boston at, I think, a 7-cent fare. By the time I got to Chicago, the street car fare there had dropped to 5 cents, as in all large cit ies, and remained almost undisturbed until the Great War. All the same, the streetcar companies, while [ 196 ] Useless State and Local Boards not further lowering the· price, developed their· sales and profits by the equivalent device of giving more for the money. First the cable and then the trolley car speeded up transit and lengthened the radius of operation so that at the 5-cent fare the average citizen rode twice as fast and twice as far as he did in earlier years. The cable car as a method of rapid transit was· first used, I think, in Los Angeles, CaliforlJia.

Mr. Holmes, the manager of the street railway system there, noticed that it is human nature to hate to wait for a street car; and that, rather than wait, the possible passenger would walk along to wards destination; frequently going so far that by the time the car overtook him he made up his mind he might as well walk the whole distance and save his carfare. Mr. Holmes theorized that, if the cars came oftener and moved faster, many thousands of fares lost fDr the foregoing reason would be saved; while at the same time, by the use of the now obsolete cable for the motive power, great operating economies would be effected. He succeeded in ob taining the authority of his stockholders to try the experiment and it was an instant success. I haven't the figures at hand, but it was understood at the time that gross receipts doubled and profits, while they did not double, very greatly increased. Mr.

Holmes was invited to come to Chicago and apply the cable to the South Side Street Railway system. Then the North and West Side systems, bought by the Elkins-Widener Philadelphia group, were cabled in their turn. Subsequently electric motive power was developed and proved to be much more economi cal and flexible than the cable system, which it dis placed entirely.' Precisely the same results of enor mously increased patronage on the same lines, in the same cities, and by substantially the· same popular197 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation tion, through increasing the speed and frequency of car service, and extending the radius of transit, justified the great increase of capital required for the new equipment and permitted the issue of many millions of junior, or "watered," shares, on which fair dividends were earned and paid. Looking the whole transaction squarely in the face, it seems to me that no honest man can deny that the capitalists, who gave so much more for the same fare that the public doubled their use of the transit facilities, legitimately deserved the increased profit which they made. N evertheless, the new junior shares could be stigmatized as "watered stock" because no cash was paid for them. They merely represented the increased earning power developed by the im provement of the· property and service. They be came at once a shining mark for the socialist, the agitator, the legislative or governmental blackmailer; and they have been shot to pieces by political bom bardment ever since.

In Chicago, Carter Harrison won four or five mayoralty campaigns upon his proposal to wreck the street railway companies and substitute city owner ship and operation of the street railways. The owners of the North and West Side systems, those who had bought in after the Elkins-Widener opera tions, were fleeced almost of their entire investment by refusal of the city to extend expiring street fran chises, and by legal attacks upon the validity of the stock and bond issues held by investors. There were years of litigation, during which the street railway management never knew when the end might come, or what it might be. Of course it was impossible to finance new development; it was foolish to maintain motive power, tracks and cars in first-class order, which might at any moment be taken away; and - [ 198 ] Useless State and Local Boards there was but one thing to do, namely, to make what was possible in cash returns. to the· investors, letting the property go to rack and ruin meantime. After ten years of such chaos the people of Chicago re belled against an intolerable transportation situation; a new mayor was elected and a reorganization was effected in which, as I have said before, the old own ers lost the greater part of their investment. The so-called water was squeezed out of the street railway securities by the modern process of expert valuation; that is, by taking the supposed cost of replacement, without allowance for the years of time or the mil lions of money spent in development of the existing situation. The owners were allowed to refinance and rehabilitate, under guarantee of rates of fare sufficient to pay 5 per cent. interest upon the official valuation and additions to it; any excess earned above 5 per cent. to be divided 55 per cent. to the city and 45 per cent. to the owners. This guarantee let the latter off with perhaps the hind legs and tail of their own hide, the body, shoulders, and head going to the public and the city.

At the time I was innocent enough to suppose and prophesy· in the Outlook magazine that that settle ment would hold good forever; as the city became a partner to the extent of 55 per cent. of the net profits over bond interest; but such has not proved to be the case. City demagogy found the issue too useful, and has of late years merely shifted the attack upon another flank. As everywhere throughout the land, the more than doubled cost of wages and material made the 5-cent fare in Chicago a losing proposition. Meanwhile, a Public Utilities Commission had been established to which the corporation turned for relief and authority to charge a higher fare. Just where the matter now stands, I do not know, but when I [ 199] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation was in Chicago a few weeks ago the corporation was between the devil of employees' demands for increased wages and the deep sea of refusal of the Public Utility Commission to allow an increased fare. For nearly two years the corporation has been trembling on the verge of default of interest on some of its junior bonds; while the stocks issued many years ago at the time of the first forced reorganiza tion have never paid a cent in dividends. The City has received, meantime, under that former settlement, many millions of dollars, which it is supposed to have on hand as a fund for building subways; but no one knows where the cash is. Dur ing the ten years of the former fight not a dollar in capital could be raised, service ran down, rails and cars would hardly hold together, operating expenses ran up, and the people cursed and swore because they were so poorly served. As yet history has not re peated itself, but may easily do so before long, unless the city government stands out of the way.

One would suppose that Chicago's politicians and blackmailers would have no valid excuse for further agitation against its street railways. Nevertheless, when the Great War doubled the cost of everything and sent the cost of street railway service up from say 3! cents per passenger to 7 cents, and the owners naturally wished to raise the 5-cent fare to 8 cents I think they did not ask for more-political war once more broke loose upon them and the present mayor fought his campaign largely on the issue of retaining the 5-cent fare for the People. Very similar has been the situation in N ew York, with which I am comparatively unfamiliar; but everybody who goes to that city and travels on the street cars has noticed during the last four or five years the tontinued appeals to the public printed . (zoo] Useless State and Local Boards for instance, as the Subway Sun and posted in the cars where he who rides may read---asking for simple justice in the way of an increased railway fare and for popular support of the Public Utilities Com mission in granting it. Everybody knows also that Mayor Hylan was reelected not long ago largely upon the issue of a continued s-cent fare and that he proposes to realize that proposition by starving out the street railway companies and the purchase of their properties at slaughter price by the City.

Of course, we all know that purchase and operation by the City (that is by Tammany Hall) will not lessen, but on the contrary will greatly increase, the cost of service and the staggering deficit against which the street railway companies have been strug gling for several years. The 5-cent fare paid to the City will be far more inadequate to cover cost than it already is,when paid to the street railway com panies. The deficit, which will certainly come to many million dollars a year, will first be paid through the public treasury by the taxpayers; and will surely in the long run come out of the pockets of the public in the shape of increased rents and cost of living. The average laboring man may never know it, and , may continue to think that he is paying a 5-cent fare instead of the, 10 cents really taken out of his pocket. Mayor Rylan and Tammany will meantime get an excellent rakeoff, plus enlargement of quasi-political patronage by virtue of controlling the many thou sands of employees of the railway systems. ,New York will be -that much deeper in the political mire.

In Boston, the situation is not quite so bad. The street railways went through precisely the same cycle of evolution from slow to rapid transit; except that I think the cables did not intervene, the change being direct from horsecars to trolley. As in New [201 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation York, the cost, as well as the advantage, of subways was superimposed upon that of surface operation (in Chicago there are as yet no subways), and with the World War that cost of operation doubled and increase of fares became imperative; bankruptcy threatened the street railways, and the Public Utilities Commission was in a quandary. Even tually the street railway properties were turned over to public trustees, I think, under special legislation, authorizing them to give service at cost, including therein a reasonable return upon capital.* Further more, because, just as elsewhere, the agitation against an increased fare had delayed the same so long as to *The Supreme Court of the United States has just decided a case which is an illuminating commentary on the coolly confiscatory atti tude of the City of Boston toward· the Boston Street Railways.

As noted above the rise in cost of labor and coal, in all operating ex pense, to double old figures, made the old 5-cent fare a rapid bankruptcy proposition. For several years all advance of fare was forbidden by the action of the city authorities; and the street railways faced ruin. The service and equipment ran down till, as above stated, the state passed a law taking over the Boston Elevated, to be operated by Trustees for the public benefit; any deficit resulting to be apportioned among and paid by the various municipalities served by the system. This took effect in 1918, and by 1919 a loss of nearly $4-,000,000 was rolled up by the Trustees. Of course they promptly raIsed fares with consent of the Public Utilities Commission to a paying point, ten cents; and the property is rapidly getting back into condition again. But meantime, the city of Boston refused to pay its share of the 1919 deficit, some $2,900,000, and carried its contest to the court of last resort. It is now most jllstly compelled to pay.

But the dishonest politicians who control the city of Boston have all along told the voters, and still tell them, that they will make the rich men who own the street railways to carry the people for a 5-cent fare, no matter what it costs them to do so. They promise to procure authority from the state to force a sale of the railways to the city; and then to continue the 5-cent fare, paying the losses out of the public taxes, contributed by the same rich men who own the railways. But for the Massachusetts and U. S. Supreme Courts, they would openly rob them now, without the shadow of justification, after their roads have shown under the handling of trustees named by the state the absolute inadequacy of the 5-cent fare. It isa pretty ob ject lesson in demagogy. [ 202} Useless State and Local Boards put the street railways in a serious financial hole, the trustees were empowered to collect a lo-cent fare until sufficient net earnings should accumulate to re habilitate the properties and restore decent service, as well as pay interest on securities. That is still the situation; though it is evident that a reduction in fares can be made before very long and is now under consideration.

To sum up the history of transportation in the three great cities named, which has been repeated more or less in the case of every city and suburban street railway in the United States, the net result of government control of street railways has been' sim ply disastrous, as it has meant elastic expenses and an inelastic fare. The investors in those properties, who had for forty or fifty years furnished a profitable, legitimate, cheap, and inestimably valuable service to the mass of the population; who were by every law of honesty and common sense entitled to as great reward for their investment, their patience, and their risk as if they had put their money into furnishing any other neces sary of life; have been treated as criminals, and robbed of their property, usually without process of law. In the meantime, political blackmailers have swarmed about them like gadflies upon an unlucky mule mired in a swamp. As I know by personal experience, neither the corporations, their managers, nor their owners have had the smallest show ofjustice, the remotest chance of a fair hearing from politicians, legislators, councils, the press, or even the reformers.

Here and there the courts of last resort, whose jus tices are generally appointed for life and are above and free from political pressure, have intervened to save the unfortunate investors, in some part, from the consequences of putting their money into the r 203 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation service of the public. Such relief as the courts have given was, however, necessarily limited by the nature of the case, and after all was based merely upon the personal conviction of this or that judge as to what constitutes a reasonable return upon investment. There arose the whole question of what the invest ment actually was, usually answered with disregard of all the history of the corporation, of its necessities from time to time, the cost of its abandonment of old methods and adoption of the new, the changes in values and conditions brought about by time and growth; also, of course, utterly ignoring the values fixed by the law of supply and demand, and the sound old commercial maxim that a thing (service, for instance) is worth what the public will pay for it.

Nevertheless, that very standard of value-the willingness or refusal of the public to pay-is, and must always be, the great governing criterion which determines the charge for service fixed. by the suc cessful corporation manager. It cannot be too high without killing his trade; it cannot be too low with out making it worthless. It must automatically rise and fall with the natural ebb and flow of general value, with or in spite of the slow and vacillating ob struction which must inevitably characterize public utility commissions. The latter are political ap pointees, job holders, usually anxious to retain their jobs and to placate the public. Their whole position is necessarily a false one; they are almost bound to do injustice; and as a matter of history their interference has worked mischief to that public service, which is the only excuse either for their existence or for that of the corporations themselves. It may be true that they operate as a sort of safety valve, to relieve pos sible explosion of popular wrath at supposed extor tions; but, if so, it is merely that the public are [ 2°4] Useless State and Local Boards easily fooled. The public utility commissions are but one more of the political fakes with which dema gogues humbug American voters. It can be said of them, however, that they are far better than Mayors, City Councils, and State Legislatures, to deal with in a pinch, because there are comparatively few of them; and because the theory, at least, of their appointment is to do justice.

New York, like Chicago, is confronted by a condi tion very difficult to work out. Only one thing is certain, which· is that for the last fifty years in and about both colossally growing towns there have been literally hundreds of great private business organizaItions, which, free from the blight of government in terference, have grown and prospered commensur ately with the growth and prosperity of the city, have served their clientele always better and cheaper, and thus have made constantly greater profit in pro portion to the service. For the same period of time their street railways have grown and served always more and more, yet "have gone broke," solely be cause of government regulation. They must now serve less and less. It is true that the occupancy of the public streets by a street railway company must necessarily be a monopoly, and that the cost of service cannot be regulated by competition. It. is further true that solid monopoly "tends to inspire its management with arrogance and irresponsibility toward the public." On the other hand, the law of big business tends in precisely the opposite direction to create, for the sake of its greater profitableness and smaller friction, the best service and the friendliest relations possible between the public service corpora tion and its great master, the public. My personal conviction is that far better results would be ob tained entirely without state or city regulation in the [ 205 1 ' Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation matter of public utilities. In the present state of public prejudice against such uncontrolled oppor ..

tunity for profit as the corporations would then possess, their freedom from regulation is probably impossible; but let us hope that it may come some happy day. I 206] CHAPTER VII TOO MANY OVERLAPPING LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND TAXING BODIES I HAVE heretofore considered my sixth category, "Too many lines of government activity" (especially government interference with business) because that category is most in the public mind at present. Let me now consider in briefest detail the unnecessary complexity of government itself, and of our politics my First Category. Whether the Pilgrim Fathers, in devising the New England town meeting, ever dreamed of its applica tion to our modern cities and their great populations, I do not know. They were plain men of little ex perience with large affairs, and probably were not in the habit of crossing bridges before they came to them. Their rather crude organization still survives, more or less modified, throughout our entire North ern, Central-western and Western states. Here it is, for instance, as it now exists in Massachusetts. The state is divided into 14 counties and they again into 37 cities and 317 towns. Towns frequently comprise more than one village, but they are one for political purposes. The state elects a governor, lieutenant governor, 8 councillors, a secretary, a treasurer, an attorney general, an auditor, 40 senators, and 240 representatives; also presidential electors in a presi dential year. The county elects a district attorney, a clerk, or clerks of court, or courts, a registrar of probate, a registrar of deeds, a sheriff, a county [ 2°7 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation treasurer, one county commissioner and two assist ants. The cities elect differing numbers of officers, according to their charters, the difference corning mainly in the number of aldermen. They usually elect a mayor, a clerk, a treasurer, and a board of aldermen, the total probably averaging 20 elective officers per city. A town elects 3 or more tax as sessors, 3 or more poor overseers, a treasurer, a col lector, an auditor, I or more highway surveyors, I or more sewer commissioners, I or more constables, a field driver, 2 fence viewers, a tree warden, 3 or more school commissioners, 3 or more health com missioners, 3, 5, 7, or 9 selectmen. The above totals 294 elective officers for the state, 9 for the county, an average of 20 for the city, and not less than 25 for the towns.

Now it is true that the State of Massachusetts is a big thing with a population of 3,8 50,000. Naturally it takes quite a little machinery of government and a good many officers to govern so considerable a number. But the first thing that strikes a man accustomed to large but efficient organization is the excessive complication and multiplicity of elections, and the fact that many elective officials are mere ad ministrators, chosen to carry· out the law, not to make it. For instance, of all the 34 different sorts of elective official chosen as above by state, county, city, and town, only the state senators and· represent atives, the city aldermen and the town selectmen have power to legislate. They alone represent the will of the people, as it changes from time to time and is expressed. at elections; all other elected officials are mere servants of the law, whose duty it is to carry it out without altering it in one jot or tittle. As they are bound to obey the law, there is no necessity for their election by the people; since in that election no [208 ] Too Many Overlapping Local Governments other mandate is given them by the people. Once more I repeat, they are mere servants of the law; and for the best interest of the community they should not be made independent of the legislature, able to defy it; or be subject to disturbance by elec tions, so long as they fill their offices satisfactorily, becoming more and more expert in their duties by long familiarity. Election should logically be limited to the legislative body; which expresses the changing will of the people in the changing law.

The next thing which strikes one accustomed to large organization is the multiplicity and· inconve nience of county, town, and city lines; that is, the il logical and unnecessary division of the state into so many local governmental units. It is probable that until recent years no great thought has been given to efficiency in government and, as I have remarked elsewhere, there has been no standard of comparison, such as we now find in great modern corporations, by which to measure governmental efficiency. Overgrowth of empire was undreamed of; distance did not count in old time politics. If Spain could conquer the Philip pines, conquer them she did; just as Rome conquered Great Britain. The theory of ,government was mainly military; and the standard of military ef ficiency has always been its coercive, not its con structive power. It is a maxim of warfare not to count the cost, but to carry the objective. In com merce it is just the opposite: one does not attempt an objective if threatened with too great a cost.

I do not know that the theory of the limitation of efficient organization has been reduced to writing certainly I have not seen such a treatise-but the experience of our great railways and corporations seems to indicate that successful organization of men [ 2°9 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation cannot get away from family life; in other words, the great majority of workers, to constitute efficient personnel, must be able to go home at night to their families. The railways find themselves obliged to limit their train-people to runs one or two hundred miles in length; so that the engineer, the conductor, and others may not be obliged to spend more than every other night away from home; and their roads are cut up into divisions accordingly. The great manufacturing concerns find it better to plant their works at strategic points, convenient to raw material and distribution of finished product; grouping their employees in the immediate neighborhood, and then decentralize-that is, leave each unit to operate under its own local management, there on the spot; merely co-ordinating the activities of the different independent units from a central office. Both rail ways and manufacturing corporations find that economy and efficiency accompany increasing size and volume of business transacted by each unit, only so long as personnel is concentrated sufficiently; that is, so long as the great mass of its employees can go home at night. Personal contact with management must be maintained throughout, from day to day.

If we apply the same reasoning to governmental organization, it follows that local units of government can be enlarged advantageously, only up to the commutation radius; that is the distance within which all city employees can go daily to work and home. In the United States, by reason of our wonderful railway system, each state possesses a number of naturally strategic railway centres, each of which is the metropolis, or sub-metropolis, of an area with a radius of perhaps fifty miles. Within late years the automobile makes each such railway centre less dependent upon the railways for its natI 210 ] Too Many Overlapping Local Governments ural trade; but the 50-mile radius is still approxi mately the limit within which population daily flows to and from a market centre, as the life-blood flows to and from the heart. A great governmental simplifi cation and advantage would result if each such nat ural centre should annex what the newspapers call its "hinterland," abolishing all the smaller govern mental units formerly existing.

Some years ago I amused myself by making a study for a simplified state of Illinois. I have forgotten now the details, but I think I reduced local govern ment in the state to some 15 units. Chicago with its hinterland; Bloomington, Springfield, Peoria, and other cities with theirs. My recollection is that the plan did away with something like 300 local govern mental units within the commutation radius of Chicago alone ! Furthermore, the plan did away with all elections but those of legislative officers, leaving it to them to appoint all administrative offi cers; precisely as boards of directors are elected by the shareholders of great corporations; and then proceed to appoint their chairman, the president, and perhaps one or two other high administrative officers-the latter being entrusted with the "hiring and firing" of all the rest of the personnel, whether large or small. Especially in these days· of the automobile has it become possible everywhere to consolidate our existing small units of local government to the greatest advantage, around natural commercial centres within say a 50-mile radius. In the crowded eastern states, such as Massachusetts, a 2 s-mile radius would be sufficient. For instance, all of the local governments in Worcester County, Mass., might be concentrated in two consolidated units, centring, let us say, on Fitchburg and Worcester.

[ZII ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation Take, for instance; the service of fire protection. One fire department, with a sufficient number of en gines apportioned among the largest centres of population, would serve each unit; with a common central reserve both of machines and firemen, which could be detached and sent at short notice to any point requiring either emergency service or relief in case of sickness or absence of regular men, or break down of machinery. The same is true of police ser vice, and would carry with it the advantage of a mo bile reserve, capable of being thrown by automobile at any moment to any point within an hour's time. It would be necessary, of course, that the regular details from each department of public service, such as Police Department, Fire Department, Street Department, etc., allotted to each community, should be placed under the local command of a manager or general executive officer for that com munity; very much as the Division Superintendent of a railroad is in general charge over his entire divi sion. The co-ordination of the activities of the local managers could be accomplished to the best advan tage by their daily meeting in conference for an hour or two, at the central office of the consolidated unit; which could easily be accomplished by automobile.

There would naturally be a chairman or general manager of the whole consolidated unit, to whom the local managers would be responsible. Such a plan of organization as this would reduce the number of local consolidated governmental units in the State of Massachusetts to something like I I or 12; and with the further suggestions for uni fication contained in later chapters, should enor mously simplify the business of elections while considerably reducing costs and greatly increasing efficiency of local government. [ 212] CHAPTER VIII TOO MANY ELECTIVE OFFICES, CHECKS AND BALANCES THE useless multiplicity both of governmental units and of elective offices, to which I have just re ferred, necessarily results in a huge ballot. I would here illustrate this fact by a reduced zinc-etching of a ballot that I picked up a year or two ago in front of a polling booth in New York City. It contains, as the reader will note, the names of 88 candidates for 15 different offices. It is decorated with a large finger-pointer showing how to vote· for Ogden Mills for'State Senator. Evidently it wa's distributed by wholesale in Mills's district (he is a rich man) so that the voter might ea'sily identify his name and mark his ballot accordingly. You will note that the election covered State officers, District Judges, mem bers of the State Assembly and Senate, and Repre sentatives and Senators in Congress; affording a most beautiful opportunity for trading votes between these three different classes of candidates. Such Australian ballots, more or less complicated, are used nowa days at nearly every election in the United States.

Merely to see them is to condemn such complication. Here again, if administrative officers were not elected, and election limited to legislative officers, only a very short ballot would result immediately and auto matically; and with it for the most part would come the separation of local, state, and national elections, so as to do away with all possibility of trades. The [ 21 3 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation mere necessity of such a device as Mr. Mills used is enough to damn so bewildering an array of candida cies at an election submitted to many thousands of voters, often very ignorant voters. It is a sort of "Find the candidate" picture-puzzle. There could hardly be a better example of useless multiplicity of elective offices than that presented by the State of Connecticut. I sent out a few weeks ago a questionnaire to the Secretaries of State of the 48 states, asking, among other questions, how many elective offices on the average there were to the county, city, and town in their respective states.

Most of them answered the questions, showing wide variations both between and within the different states. But the Connecticut Secretary threw up his hands, and sent me a copy of the State Register, tell ing me to dig out the multitudinous figures for my self. Here are the results. The state seems to he divided into 8 Counties, 19 Cities, 21 Boroughs, and 169 Towns. All officials are elected annually, except in 26 towns where biennial elections prevail. State officers and Legis lature are elected in April. Town officers in Octo ber, and Borough and City officers in November. Most voters must go to the polls at least twice a year. Here is the roster: City officers, State officers, Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary, Treasurer, and Comptroller ... State Senate, ....................•............. State House of Representatives. . . County officers, Sheriffs . Other officers appointed.

Mayor, Clerk, Treasurer, Selectmen, Registrars, Sheriffs, Aldermen, Audi tors, Assessors (from 13 to 104) 19 cities at average of 40 . Borough officers, Warden, Burgesses, Clerk, Treasurer, Assessors, Auditor, Collectors, Inspec[ 214] 5 35 262 8 I •.' TO YOTlt FOR A CAllDlDAtt 011 1'HIS 8AIL01' IIAU A CIIOII X IIAIIIt IN ONI! OF TIlE SQUAaU OIl III TIll. SPACt 41' TIlE LDT OF IUS·~ Z. TO VOTlt POI A CANUlDATIt NOT 011 THIS BAUOT WII1'It HII IIAIIIt • THE &.\NIt IPACa UlCDIIl THE <:.ulOIDATU FOR 'l'HAT OffICI. So MAlUC ONLY WITH A PENCIL HAVING aLACK LEAD. 4. ANY OTHER MAlK,. EltASUU OIl TEAll ON TIlE IIAILOT IUHDIIS IT VOID. S. IF YOU TEAll, OR DEFACE, OR WAOIICLY IIAIlIt nus IIAILOT, Il£TUIIN IT AND oaTAIN ANOTH£L ........... ~ .................... ALPHONSO ••HOPICINS ................ BItNEST POOUI , WILUAM J. MOItAN v. HAItRY B. STOWEl.L Nc811 SOL. P1£LD.AN ~ .ATTHBW T' UNDIBY ••, ••••••••••Pro ........

PETER J. DOOLINO : {=.~.:: , JAMES A. ALLeH J::= JI,"N :5LOA,N MEMBER OF ASSEMBLY-T.-IJ' ........ A..emb!y DiItrict (Vote for _) 12 I17mozor'rim crn oon'!'~'!'o au.,~ a:ptrt1Ir~S1,1919(V*'...). ... __._A_R_TH_U_1t_JO_NE_S__..._,,_._,,_,,_. _..._._.. _.00_-_-_-1 ! __._C_H_AIt_LU_E_.1t_IC_E_,J_r_._. _._._._.._.._ __-1 III ICItUYLER M. MEVER Pro __ s.clall,. .Soclall,. p,.,rt •••v, lIIIC:HASL ICItAAP . ',' . NICHOLAS ALEINIKOFF wAl:ra It HIIUICIC. ... .00....... CHARLES E. MANIERRE 5. JOHN BLOCK • HUGH GOROON MILLER JOHN It. DAVIES, ISIDOIt WASSER VOGEL JAMES C. MEYERS BAItTOW S. WEEKS AIIOcu''I'Il mDoZ or 'rim COUlt'!' or APPULI (Vote lor 0IIlI)_8OOllPTltOLLD (vote lor. ODe).4OOVUIfOIt'(Vote for ODe). M4RTIN H. GLYNN.. .. ••. • • .'. rr.:~= qlARLES " WHITMAN , ',' . ; , ,k'_ .

Judges Probate Town officers,-Too Many ElectiveOffices, Etc. tors, Bailiffs, etc. (From 10 to 22) 21 Boroughs at average of 14· . . . . . . . . 294Clerk, Selectmen, Tree Warden, Tax Collectors, Assessors, Board ofRe view, Grand Jurors, Registrars, Auditors, School Committee, etc. (From 20 to 40) 169 Towns at average of 29 •••••••••••••••••••••••4,90 I ..........••.••••••••••••••••••••.114 6,379 There are 209 units of local government whose laws might well be made say by a body of not more than 3 men in each case; and the State Legislature might well be red uced to a single chamber of say 15 members-at-Iarge. The number of elective officers would thus be reduced from 6,379, most of them elected annually, to· 642. All the rest of the elective officers are purely administrators, and should not be elected at all; but should be mere em ployees, with tenure of office according to efficiency and good behavior. If also legislators' terms were made long enough (say four years) to dignify office and make it important, and all were unsalaried, all the legislative offices, state or local, in the State of Connecticut would very certainly become attractive only to candidates of highest standing; and the local elections would become of the greatest interest and importance to the electorate, instead of, as now, the merest of local squabbles.

The foregoing assumes the retention of all the 209 units of local government; but if they were to be consolidated into say one tenth as many, around the important towns as centres, how much more im portant and interesting would local elections at once become to candidates and electors alike! Connecticut is not the only multi-governed state. l subjoin a statement compiled from the 35 replies [ 21 5 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation received from a questionnaire sent to the secretaries of all the states. It is very difficult to make up exact totals of county, state, and town elective offices, by reason of the great variation between cities and towns. So many of them are organized under special charters, without much reference to each other. However, such totals as I am able to arrive at indicate an average of 167 elective state offices, 10 elective county offices, 10 elective city and town offices. Inasmuch as there are 3,065 counties in the United States and many thousands of cities and towns, the total number of elective offices is simply bewilderingly great. Of course, the bureaucrat will reply that this is a great country and that it needs a lot of paid officials to run it, which is true enough.

But the essential point to bear in mind in consider ing our existing situation is this: that by far the vast majority of all elective offices are administra tive, not legislative, in character. All administrative officers simply carry out the law, which is deter mined for them by elective legislators. Those elec tive legislators are supposed to reflect and carry into effect the changing will of the people. They, and they alone, ought to be elected, as elsewhere set forth. To elect administrative officers-namely, the vast majority of those now voted for at our frequent elections-simply makes them independent; able to disobey the mandate of the legislatures without risk' of removal, and deadlock the Government. This happens constantly. It ought never to happen. RESULTS FROM QUESTIONNAIRE SENT TO SECRETARIES OF STATE (See Tabulation at end of this chapter) 48 states elect a total of 5,677 state representatives, or an average of 118 each.

[ 216 ] Too Many Elective Offices, Etc. 48 states ele~t a total of 1,795 state senators, or an average of 37 each. 19 states have no limit to their legislative sessions. 29 states have an average limit of 60 days per session, the maximum 90 and minimum 40. 25 states elect an average of 12 state administrative and judicial officers. 24 states elect an average of 10 officials for each county. 13 states elect an average of 10 officials for each city and town. 27 states passed 11,629 acts and 986 resolutions at the last sessions average 467, of which approximately 58! per cent. were "private" acts for special interests. Using the averages obtained from the replies recorded above, we get the following totals for the 48 states: State Representatives 5,677 Legislative Acts and Resolutions State Senators 1,795 passed, say 23,000, of which over State officers 576 13,000 were "private" acts. County officers, say 30,650 Local officers, too numerous to guess at.

Since the for~going was written, in the election of November 7, 1922, according to the Boston Herald of November 20, in spite of a large Democratic majority for Governor and House of Representatives, the State of New Hampshire by virtue of "Gerryman dered" districts has elected Republicans for two thirds of the Senate and four fifths of the Executive Council. That state seems to be blessed not only with two houses of the Legislature, but a third house, an Executive with only five voters. A member of the Lower House is frequently elected with only two voters participating in his choice. Could there be a more striking example of democracy run into the ground? Could political thoughtlessness go farther? [ 217] TABULATED REPLIES TO QUESTIONNAIRE N f No. of No. of No. of No. of No. of No. of State Elec. Elec. Session 1921-22 0.0 Resolu-Gen;. Pri-Days Sena-Rep- Elec-County Off. Acts tions eral vate ses-tors resentative Officers Cities Acts Acts SlOn tives officers Towns ---r ~ Arkansas ............. 690 25 249 441 60 35 100 II 9 91-4 00 Arizona ............. 42 22 - - 60 19 39 10 9 -Colorado ............ - - - - 91 35 65 14 8 8 Connecticut 886 2 4°4 482 80 35 262 5 I Florida .............. 723 3° 202 521 60 32 77 15 Georgia ............. 285 38 81 2°4 5° 51 206 Idaho ................ 262 - - - 61 44 54 8 12 8 Illinois ............... 318 48 - - 100 51 153 8 10 9Indiana .............. 280 19 - - 61 5° 100 20 20 14 Kansas .............. 295 8 116 179 - 4° 125 8 13 -Kentucky ............ 138 29 112 26 60 38 100 8 9 9Louisiana ............ 142 35 - - 60 41 118 9 4 8 Maine ............... 387 175 224 163 60 31 151 2 10 Maryland ............ 548 22 136 412 60 27 106 4 14 Massachusetts ....... 545 55 - - - 4° 24°Michigan ............. 4°4 4 398? 6? 19° 32 100 Minnesota ........... 527 14 - - 9° 67 131 9 II Missouri ............. 321 7 - - 60 34 142 6 17 Montana ............. 318 25 - - 60 54· 108 44 14 Nebraska ............ 313 4 - - - 33 100 II New york ............ 672 9 396 276 60 51 15° 7 10 North Carolina ........ 1°72 52 237 835 60 5° 120 39 8 6 Oregon .............. - - - - 4° 3° 60 - 19 14Rhode Island ......... 184 186 149 35 63 39 100 5 - -South Dakota ........ 418 7 - - 60 45 1°3 34-8 6 Tennessee. ; .......... u60 141 178 981-75 33 99 - 6 Vermont ............. 314 46 29° 24 86 3° 247 6 5 18 Virginia .............. 520 - - - 69 4° 100 - - -Washington ........... 19° - - - 60 42 97 9 14-7,......, West Virginia ......... 220 41 133 87 64 3° 94 7 II 8 t-) Wisconsin ............ - - - - - 33 100 5 10.-4 \0 Totals 12,174 1,041 3,305 4,686 1,900 1,212 3,747 3°4-252 124 No. Reports .......... (28) (25) (IS) (IS) (27) (3 I) (3 1) (25) (24) (13) Averages' ............. 435 42 220 292 70 39 121 12 10 10 S8!% Private.

CHAPTER IX TOO LONG BALLOTS. COMPLEXITY OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM THE mischief of the long ballot is not merely that it confuses the voter. There is a greater mischief in the legislative and executive complexity, of which the long ballot is the initial evidence. As I said before, our New England ancestors might have been called short-term cranks. They were also.cranks on local representation, and on "checks and balances," or splitting up of political power. They were afraid to entrust, for instance, a single representative chamber with the making of the laws, but provided two, an upper and a lower, whose concurrent action was needed for. legislation. They divided govern ment into three branches, legislative, executive,· and the judiciary, each with some check on the other. They insisted on direct election of all three by the people, although both the executive and the judi ciary are bound to obey the laws enacted by the legislative body. Apparently they feared to entrust the power of appointing executives and judges to the law-making body, although they gave the latter authority over both. Furthermore, they were un willing to give the legislative power to a chamber chosen at large, insisting that each little community should be represented in legislation by one of its own inhabitants. Naturally at the outset the com munities were small and scattered; and as each had [ 220] Long Ballots. Initiative and Referendum to be represented by an inhabitant, the number of legislators in the legislative body became very large.

It thus became cumbrous and incapable of rapid action, as is always true of numerous bodies. Inheriting this New England type of state and local organization has given nearly every state in the union a very large 'and cumbrous lower house, in addition to a less numerous, but still over-large upper house; and moreover a group of elective and executive officers deriving their power directly from the people, under obligation to obey laws passed by the legislature, but at the same time independent of the legislature, and able not seldom to defy and come to a deadlock with it. When one contrasts such a curious contrivance of cross-purposes, and its neces sarily inefficient working results, with the simple and logical democracy of our great corporations (whose stockholders elect annually a board of direc tors; and ,that board appoints a single executive, removable by and directly responsible to itself; after that leaving that executive to develop an entire per sonnel removable by and directly responsible only to him)-when, I say, one contrasts the two systems of organization, it is easy to understand why our corporations work so well and our governments so badly.

Breaking away from the New England conception, the makers/of the Constitution of the United States seem to have· conceived a broader theory of Rep resentative Government. Their thought a12~ar ently was not so parochial, so limited, as the New England idea; which last seems definable as repre sentation of the people by a multitude of average men rather than by a few exceptional men. For instance, the Federal Constitution provides for the election of the President, not by direct vote, but by [ 221 J Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation the choice of a limited body of electors; who in turn were supposed to choose the President. Its theory was that these electors would be exceptional men, carefully selected by the people for integrity, ability, and experience; better qualified than the multitude to choose one man for executive head of the nation. In the same way, the Senate of the United States was to be chosen, not by the people direct, but by the legislatures of the different states; that is again by ex ceptional men, supposed to be of unusual integrity, ability, and experience. Lastly, the Supreme Court Judges, ultimate arbiters of all, were appointed for life, by the President. It is true that the thought of the makers of the Constitution has not been en tirely followed out; and that neither Presidential nor Senatorial elections are actually the task of excep tional men chosen for that purpose; but on the contrary, are determined by direct vote of the people.

Nevertheless, it remains equally true that the Consti tution builders' principle of representation of the people by exceptional men (if of their own choosing) is just as democratic as that of representation by average or under-average men. A cynical friend of mine used often to say that democracy is bound to be a failure for the reason that, as the proverb says, "The fountain cannot rise higher than the source." He meant, of course, that government is an affair far too large for all but a few men of ex ceptional ability, integrity, and experience; and that inasmuch as average men are the source of power in every democracy, they would not be likely to choose exceptional men for officers of government so that it must fail. This I do not believe, for, if there is anything recorded by history, it is the fact that the masses love to follow leaders of distinguished mental and [ 222] Long Ballots. Initiative and Referendum"

personal force. But circumstances must of course be such as to call such men into activity, and enlist their interest. Whenever they do come forward to take the lead, the people are bound to follow. It seems to me, therefore, that to secure the ablest men for public office, it is necessary only to make office itself attractive to such men; which brings me back to the New England idea-just the reverse! To put my thought in a nutshell, we have now tried out ad nauseam the New England theory that all of us are good enough to run government; that all of us must take a hand in it; and all of us must see that no one of us really runs it. It is time to sim plify, to admit that very few are competent to run government; that very few are needed to run gov ernment; that very few can accomplish better results in government than the mass of us put together; and, finally, that democracy, or all of us, can safely choose and trust that few.

The weak point of our governmental system is first and always the quality of our legislatures, local, state, and national. There can be no question that they are filled with cheap men, for the most part quite unfitted for their responsibilities; without exception too numerous, too unintelligent, too wasteful of time, effort, and money, and ofttimes too dishonest. The public properties and revenues which they badly handle, and the laws affecting human rights which they often selfishly devise, are closely parallel,~d in vol ume, scope, and human significance by those which are well handled and unselfishly devised for great corporations by very small groups of exceptional men, in very short time, with very small waste of money and effort. There is an old New England proverb: "You can't run business by town-meeting" which applies perfectly to public business; in spite of the [ 223 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation fact that American government originates in a towr: meeting. Again I say, it is time to simplify.

Realization of this has now been growing amongst us for several years. The so-called commission form of city government. 15 evidence thereof. Some 250 cities have adopted it by popular vote, and on the whole it is succeeding admirably. The .problem of city government has simmered down to that of wise election of a limited number, usually of five Commissioners, who make the city laws, appoint the administration, lay and collect the taxes. The essence of the plan is the abandonment of the old New England ictea of distrust. Every man of ex perience .in the organization of large business knows that the way to get good work out of men is not to distrust them; but the contrary. First pick a good man for the particular job in hand; then trust him with power and authority to act; and, finally, hold him responsible for results, meantime leaving his hands free to get them. Do not check or bal ance him, do not bother or hamper him with too many bosses; do not let him escape responsibility by imposing checks and balances on his authority.

Simplify, concentrate, trust, and reward, if you wish results. But I am wandering from the Long· Ballot. As an excellent example of complex politics, I cite personal observations at Chicago, about 1890, when I happened to study the local situation. Here is the tangle of constituencies in which I was attempting, and utterly failing, to vote intelligently; I lived in the old 18th Ward, which was my smallest political constituency. I there voted for two aldermen, one one year and one the next. (An excellent device to keep the people from accidentally capturing the Board of Aldermen some fine election day-a~ Henry Villard once said to me of the Oregon Trans~ [ 224] Long Ballots. Initiative and Referendum .continental Stockholders and its Board of Directors; only one third elected each year.) The boundaries of the I8thWard were marked by certain city streets.' It stretched from the Lake across to the Chicago River. On the Lake were residences of the rich; on the River and covering the· larger part of the ward were the residences of the far-more-numerous poor.

The River end of the ward swung the vote. Ot':' casionally a rich man was picked out from the other end, for the sake of a campaign contribution; but for the most part the aldermen were chosen from the River end. The Republican boss of the ward was, I think, a livery-stable keeper, and the Democratic boss . a saloonkeeper. Their organizations were well in hand, and they picked their candidates for the most part to suit themselves. When election day arrived, it was ofttimes a choice between a Repub lican grafter and a Democratic ditto-there was not the toss of a biscuit between them. The matter of aldermanic elections became perfectly indifferent to me, though I tried to be a good citizen.' No one but the candidate of one party or the other could be elected, and .there was really no choice between them, though they voted and spent most of the taxes. I also voted for a Representative in the State Legislature, his district covering part of the 18th and part of another ward. I voted for State Senator in a larger district, including my Representative's dis trict and one or two others. I never could recall the boundary lines of Senatorial or ... Representative districts, but as they crossed ward lines, other ward bosses were concerned in the makeup of the party slates. Of course I knew nothing and could know nothing about the personality of the candidates, or about their political views. Then I voted for [ 225 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation officials of the North Town, Chicago· being divided into three towns, North, South, and West, separated by the branches of the river. Each of the towns included several wards, and here again, though I knew the town boundaries, I had no knowledge of the candidates for the various town offices, nor of their political views, nor of the ward bosses who nominated them. N ext I voted as a citizen of all Chicago, for the Mayor and other city officers, the constituency comprising the entire city. As the constituency grew larger, my grasp of its politics grew smaller. There was, however, a compensating advantage, that the office of Mayor was sufficiently important to attract at least conspicuous or notori ous candidates, whose personalities were familiar from newspaper reports, or otherwise.

Before passing outside of the city lines, let me not forget to mention that I voted for a Representative in Congress, as resident of a Congressional district, in cluding several wards (Chicago had 4 representatives in Congress) . Next I voted as resident of Cook County, including all of Chicago and some outlying territory, for various county officers. Next I voted as resident of a certain judicial district for Superior and Circuit Judges. The boundary lines of these constituencies I learned but once, and promptly forgot them. I occasionally knew a candidate for Judge, as he was generally a pretty good lawyer, whom one might meet in the life of a large city; but I could know but very little of the political machin ery which nominated him. Then I voted as resi dent of the so-called North Side for the North-Side Park Commissioners, the district embracing the North Side of Chicago and vicinity. Then I voted for Drainage Canal Commissioners, whose con stituency comprised the entire City of Chicago, with [ 226 ] .Long Ballots. Initiative and Referendum a large territory north, west, and south thereof. They built and operated the drainage canal; taking the waters of the Lake down to the Mississippi River, and carrying with them the sewage of Chicago.

Then I voted as a resident of Illinois for the Governor and State officials and United States Senators; and finally I voted as resident of the whole United States for President. As I said above, I knew the boundary lines of all these districts only once, and for a very short time. While making this study, I took a city map, and hav ing ascertained these boundaries, marked them in different colored inks on the map. The result closely resembled a crazy quilt. Except in the payment of taxes (every single one of these elections, except for the judiciary, carried with it the taxing power), I· never knew or thought of their boundary lines. Nobody else ever thought of them, and no one I ever met knew them. Even the election commis sioners had to refer to their maps to ascertain many of them. Of course their multiplicity resulted in an excessively long ballot. In Illinois, city and local elections took place annually in the spring; county, state, and national elections in the fall every other year; making three regular elections every two years.

Besides that there were judicial elections, votes on bonds, constitutional amendments, etc., and other sporadic submissions to the people, including the Presidential election. In every cycle of four years the voters were called to the polls to vote about I I times, more or less. Too Many Politicians At the time I made this study, long before female suffrage, Chicago polled about 450,000 votes. There, as everywhere, they had to be polled within a few [ 227] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation hours of a single day. This then necessitated about 1,450 polling places, scattered about the city. More over, the voters were required to go to them, first for registration, afterward to the same or other places for primaries, and, finally, to vote; three trips in all to be made, each within certain hours on a certain day. During those hours on each occasion, these places had to be taken charge of by judges and clerks of registration and election, ticket peddlers, challengers and party-workers representing the vari ous parties active in the election; usually at least three, Republican, Democratic, and Socialist. Also policemen had to be in attendance to keep order; and incidentally to favor the party in power at the City Hall as far as possible in the exercise of their duties.

As nearly as I could ascertain, it took from six to seven workers of each political party to man each place, aggregating somewhere from 25,000 to 30,000 working politicians whose services were indispensable merely to go through the routine of getting out and counting the vote. But that was not all; the vari ous parties were obliged, in order to handle these frequently recurring elections to advantage, to organize in permanent Ward Clubs with regular monthly meetings, meeting places, officers, etc. For several months before each election the political columns of the newspapers were filled with accounts of factional contests within these clubs, looking forward to the nomination at the primaries of this or that factional candidate for office. As the different offices covered different constituencies bounded by different lines, the Ward Clubs neces sarily had to act together as a party organization, and eventually to parcel out amongst themselves the nominees for different offices for whom the party strength should be thrown at primaries and elections.

[ 228 ] Long Ballots. Initiative and Referendum This was no easy task, as the ambitions of all fac tions had to be recognized. The result was "trad ing" of various candidates amongst themselves; a candidate for Alderman, for instance, saying to an other candidate to stand out of the way, and in re turn re-support. as candidate for County Commis sioner. To deliver that support required on both sides continuous personal work among the voters through the entire year. I go into all this detail in order that the reader may realize that to be a working politician demands prac tically continual attention for many months prior to each election; and where electIons are as numerous as indicated above, a man must give his entire time, must be a working politician, and in practice nothing else, in order to succeed. It is unquestionably true that of the great army of 25,000 men above men tioned as necessary merely to man the polls of Chicago, everyone was a working politician who made politics his main business in life.

Now these 25,000 men had to live and support their families just as other· men do; but under our form of government the work of election of governors is supposed to be voluntary; the right and duty of each citizen, provided for him for his own benefit and protection. 'There is no provision made by law for payment for this enormous task or for the support of these 25,000 men and their families. Necessarily, then, they must get their living indirectly from the fruits of political victory. Andrew Jackson ex... pressed this in his statement: "To the victors belong the spoils." The enormous and, as it seems to me, the entirely unnecessary, complication of our political system, resulting from the original New England principle of distrust of government and of continuity of political power, has created a situation which [ 2291 Too Much Government-- Too Much Taxation necessarily throws the control and handling of these innumerable elections into the hands of a permanent professional political body of predatory character; one which continues itself in office and subsists upon the public taxes quite as completely as did the hereditary autocracy which our ancestors were so determined to destroy.

The same thing is true all through the United States whether in city or country. In Chicago they have just now the regime of Mayor Thompson and its machine; in New York they have Tammany Hall; in Boston we have Curley, Lomasney, and the domi nation of the Irish contingent. In the other cities and states there are other bosses. And there are everywhere the Labor Unions with their bosses, the Farmers' Non-Partisan Leagues with their bosses, etc., etc. But, you will say, that is democracy; that is the formation and operation of public opinion; that is the result of the necessity for leadership, which must exist everywhere and always-seeing that few men think for themselves, but follow those who do think for them. How, then, can the situation be altered for the better? The answer is, that it cannot be fundamentally changed; but that much can be done in the way of simplifying and modifying the principles of govern mental organization so as to reduce complexity, and the power of unavoidable political machines to the very minimum, by what might be called good poli tical engineering. Free government must be rep resentative; but there is no reason for representa tion by the poorest, instead of by the best; Granted, we are in trouble now; and the reader may say to himself that we cannot get out of it; that government is a big and complex thing at best, [ 23° ] Long Ballots. Initiative and Referendum and that we must simply face its difficulties. This, of course, is true; but it is no excuse for enduring a completely stupid mess of things. Every now and then some collectivist gets off the sounding phrase: "The cure for the evils of democracy is more de mocracy"; and he proceeds to agitate for, let us say, the Initiative and Referendum! May I rejoin with out seeming to appear too contemptuous of his sincerity, "Bosh!"? The Initiative and Referendum are usually attempts to submit, to the vote of the uninformed crowd, questions which are actually in debate among the few who really understand them; upon which they have not arrived at unity of opin ion. The result of such popular submission is neces sarily farcical! No better illustration of it could be given than the Referendum in supposedly intel ligent Massachusetts in 1918, upon the Amendment to the State Constitution establishing the Initiative and Referendum itself. The Amendment was car ried by a very narrow majority of a so-called vote upon it, totaling, as I remember it, less than one third of the total voting power of the state and less than two thirds of the total vote cast for the candi dates for Governor. Here was the most important Initiative and Referendum that could ever by any possibility be submitted to the people of that state; because without it no future Initiative or Referendum could be had at all! The very existence of the institu tion depended upon this vote. Yet more than two thirds of the voters did not take the trouble to record their judgment upon it, and a minute fraction carried it! What a perfect farce!

Such has consistently been the history of that in stitution in this country. Woodrow Wilson, when a professor of history, examined into this subject and correctly certified to the fact. To be sure, the same [ 23 I ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation Woodrow Wilson, as Democratic candidate for President, when the New York State Democratic platform included a plank favoring the Initiative and Referendum, and he badly needed the New York vote, reversed his former verdict, saying that he was mistaken and the thing did work. But it seems to me that Wilson, the professor, was honest; while Wilson, the candidate-for whom, by the way, I voted that year-was-a politician! But why pile Pelion on Ossa of evidence? It is time to simplify our politics and get busy about it. The total vote on the Initiative and Referendum was: Yes, 170,646; No, 162,1°3. Majority for it, 8,533. Total vote on question, 232,749. Total vote for Governor, a little over 422,000. Estimated total voting strength of the state, about 800,000. Poll tax paid by 1,097,000.

[ 23 2 ] CHAPTER X TOO MANY ELECTIONS-TOO SHORT TERMS I MET, one Christmas Day years ago, at the Chicago Club, the late Marshall Field. He, like myself, happened to be alone at home, and had gone down to the Club hunting for company upon that festal day. We lunched together, and I remarked upon a recent item in the papers suggesting his name as Democratic candidate for the Vice-Presidency of the United States. I asked him in jest whether there was any thing in it. He answered with some vigor, "No. Some of the politicians think that I might make a big campaign contribution to get the honor; but they are mistaken. There is no office in the gift of the ' people that I would take." I said, "What, none?" qnd he answered, "Yes, on second thought, there is one, namely, Alderman of the city of Chicago under certain conditions. It would be fun to clean this city up and make it a decent place to live in; and it could be done for half the money the city is spending now."

No one who knew Marshall Field's good citizen ship, enormous executive force, and gift for finding able men, could doubt for a moment his entire seri ousness, or his ability to do exactly what he said. I thought a moment and answered, "I think I can guess one or two of those conditions you refer to." "What are they?" said he. I answered, "In the first place, you would wish to be one of a working majority [ 233 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation of men of your own kind; not checkmated by such a gang as has been passing boodle ordinances for the past two years." "Yes," he answered, "that would certainly be one condition." Then I went on: "You would wish a term of office long enough to enable you to accomplish something." "Yes," he said, "I think that is the other; and I :think that is about all that would be needed." In Chicago, then, and I suppose still, the city was governed by a board of aldermen, two from each of the 34 wards, one elected each year at the spring city election and the other the following year. The term was indeed too short in which to accomplish anything unless the man himself, and the working rna..

jority to which he belonged, were sure of re-election, which is seldom the case. Of course length of term becomes far more important in a great city like Chicago than in a small country village; for the rea son that the problems and projects passed upon by the board of aldermen are so much larger and must necessarily take account of growth and changing conditions for so much farther ahead than is the case in country towns. That old distrust and prejudice of our Pilgrim Fathers against anything like conti nuity in office, works overtime against all continuity in plan and execution; and is one large contribu .. tory cause of the makeshift and changing policy and equipment of our American cities; enormously expensive as they are. It is true that popular legisla· tive bodies should be keenly responsive to the move., ment of public opinion; and if that were the only way to secure this, the advantage would lie with annual elections. They work well with our great corpora tions, many of which have many, many thousands of stockholders. (The Steel Corporation, for instance, has about as many voters as the city of Indianapolis.) [ 234] Too Many Elections-Too Short Terms The same men are usually reelected year after year; which would tend to be the case in legislative elec tions. But a far greater objection to the old New England love of annual elections is that they mini mize too much their·own importance. If you think you can turn the rascals out once a year you don't care so much whether they get in as you would if their election meant a term of several years. Short terms hurt quality.

The reader will recognize that our Congressional and local elections are not taken seriously enough by the average voter. Once in four years we get "all het up," as the Vermont Yankees say, over a Presidential election; but in the intermediate years, the local and by-elections hardly attract notice at all, especially in the large cities. Nobody can per sonally know the candidates on a huge ballot, such as that just heretofore instanced. Candidates are put up by party organizations; largely by primaries which few attend. The whole matter of their nomination and election becomes a mere formality, which we turn over bodily to the professionals whom collectively we denounce as "the machine"; yet with out its hard work these elections would go begging for lack of voters; the offices, the terms, and the candidates are too trivial, or so we think them, to take any trouble about. If an honest young fellow wants to do his civic duty and go into politics, and if he has the means to pay a party assessment, he be gins his political career by running for alderman, or the lower house of the state legislature; or for county commissioner, or for some other so-called minor office. If, on the other hand, a crooked grafter wants to work one office or the other for his own benefit, or for that of his friends, he, too, after establishing his place and learning how to "control" a following of [ 235 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation a few votes, also becomes a candidate for one of these minor offices. What average voter among us knows or cares whether the man is a grafter, or merely an honest ignoramus? . Yet the city council, or the state legislature, to which he aspires, is sure to vote the expenditure of a great many millions of taxes during the year; and the men who do the voting ought to be, for the good of the community, the ablest and the most disinterested men we have. Per sonal character, mental equipment, and broad ex perience are the essential qualifications for legisla tive office. Yet manipulation of, and selection by, party machinery are the only requisites to-day to qualify for control of local government (which comes nearest to our daily lives and our pocketbooks), a group of second-or third-rate grafters, and ignor amuses; with rarely an accidental, honest,. and able man, if providence is good to us. Such politics is not democracy-it is merely stupidity; it is a patent blunder that intelligent voters should correct-thus to make a "Kindergarten" for youthful politicians out of our local law-making and taxing bodies!

Too Many Laws. The natural result of filling local and state legislative bodies with second-or third-rate men of small experience and limited educa tion, who go there to make what they can out of the job; especially when coupled, as it is in most states, with the practice of paying them a per-diem allow ance for time spent in session, is a flood of perfectly useless legislation. Each alderman, representative, or senator feels, of course, that he is there to legis late, and that he ought to do something himselfin that direction. Some bill must be introduced and passed that bears his name. The most enticing proposition to him is apt to be one involving the expenditure of public money in his district; or perhaps the regulating [23 6 ] Too Many Elections-Too Short ·Terms or controlling some other fellow whose ways he does not like; or per contra the throwing of something in the way of someone whom he does like. If he thinks, as many do, that his per-diem allowance is not large pay for his distinguished services, he is very apt to contrive things so that some man whom he does not like shall pay him a little something for staving off the passage of an unpleasant bill; or perhaps so that some man he does like will recognize legislation in his interest with a comfortable quid pro quo. The legislator himself is seldom rich; few politicians save, though they have to take in money enough to control a political following. A politician has to be a good fellow and payout his money liberally. He is not beyond the reach of temptation; and a few dollars picked up quietly on the side look very large to him.

Or perhaps he is, or has a friend who is, a reformer or a theorist, inspired with the conviction that ma ternity, or aviation, or good roads need state aid; or that a new street must be cut through, or a new' bridge built. There are a thousand reasons for in troducing a thousand or more bills; and introduced they certainly are. In farmer states the session drags along till seeding-time comes, and then the farmers adjourn in a hurry. Till.then it is pleasant to remain at the state capital, draw a good per-diem allowance, and get one's name in the papers. At the city hall, where one is not chased out by spring planting, it is pleasant to remain in session until hot weather and summer vacations. Of course when it pays legislators to burn time, legislatures burn it. Economy of time, speeding up legislation, are things quite unknown. Parliamen tary proceeding seems ingeniously contrived to waste most days in futile speeches, with nothing done; and then crowd closing sessions desperately. Here is the [ 237 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation record of one such meeting of the Common Council of the city of Chicago on the 21st day of April, 1902.

It covered 143 pages of fine print, and recorded consideration (so called) of no less than 296 different subjects. About one hundred of these were private or special ordinances for erection of signs, barber poles, scales, bow-windows, etc., contrary to general ordinances. Another big lot were for petty claims and rebates. A third large batch were ordinances for paving specific streets and alleys, with detailed paving specifications; and for water mains and ser vice 'pipes, with specifications again. Undoubtedly all had been through Committee; but only eight or ten of all these 296 documents, which the record avers were received, filed, referred, considered, amended, passed, or defeated in a session of about three hours, were such as would ever have come be fore the board· of directors of any large corporation at all. They should have been purely administrative matters, each one acted upon affirmatively or nega tively by a single responsible administrative officer, in accordance with the general law governing the case. What sense is there, for instance, in requiring the action of 68 aldermen of Chicago to permit the erection of a single lamp-post in front of a certain house? Is it not idiotic to subject such a' trifling matter to costly consideration by so ponderous a body?

At the time this record came to my attention I contrasted the legislative methods of the city of Chicago with those of the Chicago & Northwestern Railway. The budget of the city was then about sixty-five millions a year; which was just about the same as the gross turnover of that great railroad. The making of the general laws of the latter was handled by its Board of Directors, then consisting, [23 8 ] Too Many Elections-Too Short Terms I think, of I I men, who met about once a month, except during· the hot we,ather, in the city of New York. Their meetings were usually short; their deliberations confined to. important general proposi tions; and such a thing, for instance, as submitting to the Board of Directors the question whether a small shipper, a flour mill, let us say at Ottumwa, la., should or should not have a side-track put in, would have been laughed to scorn by the able and busy gentlemen who constituted the Board of Directors.

Much of their work was put through by a much smaller Executive Committee; which met more fre quently, thrashed out smaller matters, and prepared larger ones for the meeting of the full Board. Little time was wasted in speech-making, at the meetings either of the Board or of the Executive Commit tee. When general policies had heen adopted, in the form of Resolutions, they became the law of the corporation, to be applied by its executive offi cers, each in his own department who were given power to act, and made responsible for the exercise of that power. The reason for such swift and efficient· transaction of business by the Northwestern Directors, in a few hours of a few sessions, as compared with some 40 to 45 Monday-night sessions of the City Council of Chicago in each year; and the serious character of the business done, as contrasted with the mass of triviali ties which so often encumbered the records at the City Hall, came from but one cause, namely, the calibre of the men in session. The Northwestern Directors were mainly New York and Chicago rail way men and financiers of the highest character and widest experience; and themselves of ample fortune, who had no time to waste in trivialities. Matters that ought to be decided by a district superintendent [ 239 ] Too Much Government-Too Much· Taxation or traffic manager were left to that man with power to act. For themselves were reserved merely the matters of broadest general policy. In the case of the City Council, on the other hand, there were representatives of 34 wards, 6 of them along the Lake Front, known as "silk-stocking" wards-"vhere great business was concentrated, or well-to-do men resided; the other 28 included the manufacturing institutions, the river with its docks and shipping, and the dwellings of the great middle and lower classes. Hardly a man of these last two classes had or ever could, in the course of his daily life, have had to deal with any project of city size; or any annual expenditures larger than those of his own little trade or family . For it is rare indeed that a man of ability sufficient to handle large affairs does not, in so doing, acquire a larger income; and thereupon promptly move out of the middle and lower class wards in any city, to take up his resid~nce in one of the silk-stocking wards. That is human nature.

The result is, however, to leave most of the wards in every city quite destitute of suitable timber for the city councils. Yet always, under the old New England town-meeting system, the wards must be represented by men who live within their borders. But to come back to my theme and give an idea of the Niagara of legislation that whelms us every year -pouring over with tremendous fuss, only to flow away and spread out entirely forgotten, its force wasted below the fall-I refer to the tabulation aforesaid. I· have tabulated as well as possible from the replies of the Secretaries of State, the Acts of general application separately from those of private application; the last named comprising special Acts for the relief or benefit of exceptional cases. The reader will note that the latter comprise 58! per cent. [ 24°] Too Many Elections-Too Short Terms of the total; while the proportion would be much greater if the classification were more accurate; for many acts, though generally worded, are intended for specific application.

Now, there should be no such thing as a special act of the legislature for the relief or benefit of a partic ular case. Exceptions to general laws must, of course occur; but they should be provided for in ad vance under discretionary power conferred by the statute upon the administrative officer charged with enforcement of the law; and such officer should be made specifically responsible for excepting specific cases. The result of such. specific responsibility, im posed upon an administrative officer, would be the exercise of far greater care, and the far more fre quent doing of justice, than is possible of attain ment under specific acts subject to log-rolling, and the pressure of more important general legislative business. The whole principle of special legislation is inherently vicious, and should be tabooed. So do ing would enormously simplify and facilitate the work of legislation.

I have heretofore roughly estimated the number of laws placed upon the statute books of our forty eight state legislatures at the huge total of 23,000 per annum. Mr. H. F. Atwood, in his book "Back to the Republic," gives the number of statutes en acted during five years, 1909 to 1913, as over 62,000. By far the greater part of this enormous mass of legislation was, as lawyers say of testimony, "super fluous, irrelevant, and incompetent." Any reader can verify this drastic statement for himself by running over the session laws of his own state for a single year. I have glanced over those of several states, intending to tabulate them for the benefit of the reader; but the task proved greater than it was [ 241 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation worth. It will be quite sufficient, I think (and I will forgive the readerwho skips to the endof this chapter), to take at random the first twenty-five Acts of the Massachusetts session laws of 1919, and say twenty more at random, commencing with Act 200, as fair samples of the whole grist of that year. Their sub stance may be briefed as follows: ACT 2.

ACT 3. ACT 4. ACT 5. ACT 6. ACT 7. ACTS. ACT 9. ACT 10. ACT II. ACT 12. Authorizes paying market rates of interest on certain state bond issues. Authorizes payment of market rates on metropolitan waterworks bonds. Authorizes payment of market rates of interest on Neponset Valley bonds. Authorizes cities and towns to spend money to celebrate the return of soldiers. Postpones taking effect of a prior act to more convenient date. Authorizes paying market rate of interest on Belmont and Watertown water bonds. Repeals act ordering Middlesex County Probate Court to hold certain sessions in Framingham. Prohibits fishing for alewives in Wee weeantit River for 5 years. Exempts soldiers from poll tax. Limits liquor licenses to the first half of 1919, on account of the Volstead Act. Increases maximum lawful savings bank deposits permitted from $2,000 to $4,000. Makes signature of delinquent warrants by fac-simile rubber-stamp signature valid.

[ 242 ] Too Many Elections-Too Short Terms ACT 13. Railroad bonds not to become illegal invest ments for savings bank by reason of government operation, of railroads. ACT 14. Reinstates discharged soldiers in Classified Civil Service. ACT 15. Permits the Department for Education of the Blind to spend more than $7,000 a year, with approval of Governor and Council. ACT 16. Repeals the requiring of certain statements from savings banks. ACT 17. Decrees that appeals must be filed in Probate Court cases within 20 days. ACT 18. Makes State Adjutant General rank as Brigadier instead of Colonel. ACT 19. Amendment constitutes insurance brokers agents of companies with penalty for false representation. ACT 20. Authorizes Departments to continue expenditures on basis of previous year until Appropriation is passed for cur rent year. ACT 21. Pensions laborers in service of cities and towns after 25 years' service, at half pay.

ACT 22. Gives crippled soldiers peddler's licenses without fee. ACT 23. Orders cities, towns, and districts to notify Bureau of Statistics of all loans, bond issues, etc. ACT 24. Discontinues printing Book of Rules for members of legislature. ACT 25. Authorizes Governor to appoint Private Secretary, Assistant Private Secretary, and other Assistants at salaries ap proved by Council. [ 243 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation ACT 200. ACT 201. ACT 202. ACT 203. ACT 204. ACT 205. ACT 206. ACT 207. ACT 208. ACT 209. ACT 210. ACT 211. Offers bounty on seals killed in State of Massachusetts, at $2 per head. Raises salaries of Assistant Engineers at State House to $1,820; firemen, $1,456; helper to steam-fitter, $1,4°0; all other helpers, $I,200. Raises salary of watchman to $1500; Assistant Watchman, $1,4°0. Raises salary of Elevator Operators to $1,4° 0 . Amends Workmen's Compensation Act to cover weekly payment to injured em ployee partially incapacitated of two thirds of the difference between wage before and after injury, not to exceed $16 per week, or $4,000 in all.

Amends Workmen's Compensation Act to include dependent child incapable, or under 16 years of age, though living apart from parent. Increases Payroll Clerk's salary from $1,600 to $1,900. Amends license to carry weapons. Provides for settlement by Public Ad ministrator of estates where no heirs are found. Regulating traveling expenses of Clerks and Assistant Clerks of Courts in the town of Bristol. Amends prior act by authorizing Auditor to appoint Supervisor of Accounts with salary approved by Governor and Council. City of Worcester authorized to borrow $75,000 instead of $25,000 for a bridge over Lake Quinsigamond. [ 244] Too Many Elections-. Too Short Terms ACT 212. Amends Automobile Act by requiring mir rors on autos and prohibiting spotlights which point two feet above the road bed. ACT 2I 3. Raises salaries of Turnkeys and Watch men in State Prison and Reformatory to $980 the first year; after that $120 a year increase until maximum of $1,700 is reached.

ACT 214. Amends Act by defining a "dealer" in motor cars. ACT 215. Raises salaries of Porters at State House; Chief, $1,200; Assistants $1,150. ACT 216. Fixes salary of Medical Examiner in the . County of Suffolk at $5,000. His As sistants, $833 each for two months; proportionately increased for more than two months, increase to come out of the Examiner's salary. Examiner allowed expenses not over $6,000 per annum; Assistants not over $1,000 per annum. ACT 217. Amend Act authorizing cities and towns to provide for public playgrounds at discretion of Park Commissioners or Recreation Commissioners, or School Commissioners. ' ACT 218. Permits Essex County Commissioners to· layout highway between Rockport and Gloucester and borrow for the same. ACT 219. Provides additional clerks for the Police Courts of the City of Lowell. ACT 220. Provides additional 2nd Assistant Dis trict Attorney for the Western District.

I would comment on these 46 sample acts as follows: ACT I authorizes State Officers to pay market [ 245 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation rates of interest in floating new bond issues. This appears to correct some previous act fixing rates of interest at figures no longer acceptable to the bankers. The blunder in the previous legislation consisted in attempting to limit rates of interest, which should have been left to the finance officers of the state to negotiate with bankers, upon the most favorable terms, merely charging these officers with direct responsibility for protecting the interest of the state. That course would have been followed originally by the Board of Directors of any large corpora tion; and the necessity of further legislation would have been entirely avoided. This same criticism applies to ACTS 2, 3, 6-a total of 4. All were sim ply stupid. ACT 4 authorizes towns and cities to spend money to celebrate the return of soldiers from the war. What business was it of the General Court of Massachusetts whether this or that city spent money to celebrate the return of the soldiers? Why should not such expenditures be left entirely to the city councils that pay the cost without requiring an Act of the Legislature of the whole state? The same criticism applies to ACTS 3, 6, 209, 21 I, 216, 217, 219, 22o-a total of 9.

ACT 7 repeals an Act requiring the Probate Court of Middlesex County to sit occasionally in Framingham. Evidently the prior act was un necessary. Framingham is only 20 to 25 miles away from the regular Probate Court; and the prior act must have been passed for some small, local purpose that would never have commended itself to men of large affairs. The same criticism applies to ACTS I I, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 204, and 214-total 9. ACT 8 prohibits fishing for alewives in Wee weeantit River for 5 years. A prohibition so purely [ 246 ] Too Many Elections-· Too Short Terms. local and trivial that to submit it to the Legislature of the great State of Massachusetts was an absurdity. Such prohibition doubtless should have been effected; but by a responsible executive officer of the state at his discretion, in performance of a general Game Law. The same criticism applies toACTS 12, 18, 200, and 209-3 total of 5. All were trivial.

ACT 9 is legitimate legislation. Also ACTS 10, 17, 20, 22,23, 24, 207, 208, 212, and 218-a total of II. ACT 1I increases the maximum lawful Savings Bank deposit permitted from $2,000 to $4,000. There may be a better reason than appears on the surface for fixing any maximum to savings deposits by state enactment. If it is worth while for the state to protect savings of $2,000, it should be still more worth while to protect· $4,000. The only apparent value of state regulation of Savings Banks is to protect the very poor from spoliation by fake bankers; it is not or should not be to limit either savings or their protection. The passion for useless limitation is characteristic of inexperience, and frequently works out in necessity for amendment, as in this case. Like ACT 7, this Act is unnecessary. ACT 19, Amendment, constitutes insurance brokers agents of company with penalty for false represen tation. Unnecessary, as a remedy must exist at the Common Law. The title reads like "spite work"

of some disgruntled Solon. ACT 21 pensioning laborers; also the series of Salary Acts, commencing with 201. Good examples of voting away public funds by practically irrespon sible majorities, rather than concentrating credit for economy and blame for waste upon a single responsible Department Head. Very likely salaries had to be increased, but boards of directors of great railways, and other corporations, almost never fix I 247] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation salaries of individual employees, which are left to be determined by the law of supply and demand, at the discretion of some responsible officer charged with hiring. The practice of lobbying through a legislative body the increase of particular salaries is fundamentally vicious. This criticism covers ACTS 202, 203, 206, 213, 215, as well-a total of 7. ACT 204 amends Workmen's Compensation Act to cover weekly payment to injured employee, partially incapacitated. Looks like a disguised Special Act, though it may be legitimate.

ACT 216 regulates the salary and expenses of the Medical Examiner of Suffolk County and his Assistants. Should have been left to the discretion of a responsible executive officer of Suffolk County, under a General Act. Same as to ACTS 25 and 210. SUMMARY OF ABOVE COMMENTS . 19 Acts should have been left to the discretion of Executive officers. 9 Acts should have been left to local councils. 9 Acts were amendments due to sloppy prior acts. 35 Acts were too limited-uselessly so. I I Acts only, out of 46 here considered, were really legitimate enactments, fit for the attention of the General Court of the State of Massachusetts. The Session of 1919 passed 364 General Acts (of which the 46 cited above are part); 253 Special Acts, con cerning more or less individ ual cases; and 78 Reso lutions. The Acts cited were fairly representative of the general run of legislation accomplished; three quarters of them should never have been passed at all.

The same thing is. true of every state in the Union. As to Congress, no reader needs to have his attention called by me to the waste of time and the· futile enactments of that body. [ 248 ] CHAPTER XI PRINCIPLES THAT SHOULD LIMIT LEGISLATION BEFORE going on to suggest remedial laws, it seems to me that a few simple general principles should be laid down as guides to thought and legislation. Laws creating government must contemplate: First: the purpose and scope of government; to wit, its reaction on and value to the governed. Second: the framework of government; to wit, its design as machinery, the cost and extent of service, its efficiency and its reaction upon the governors. In considering the relations of governed and governors, let me lay down two simple guiding principles; the first, that of "Least Strain on Human Nature," and the second, that of "Least Govern ment," which follows as a corollary to the first.

Both governors and governed are men and women; human beings with average human limitations and ambitions. Good political. engineering, like all good engineering, must consider the stuff to be worked, the product desired, the machinery needed, and the material available for its construction; and must then layout the work and design the machine so as to put least strain upon the material of the machine yet turn out the most and best work. The primary purpose of government is protective, and grows straight out of every man's "inalienable right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness"; to use the sonorous words of the Declaration of Inr249] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation dependence. Jefferson's thought is simple, and awakens a sympathetic thrill in every breast-free dom to live and get one's bread in one's own way. "Li berty, " however, might well mean no government at all, did I, for instance, not feel that your liberty to swing your fists ends where my nose begins; that your hands are not free of my pockets; and vice versa.

To protect our unoffending noses, and keep our lawful gains, we all stand for government; enough, but not more than enough, for those purposes. The secondary purpose of government is coopera tive, for the common service; and has always followed closely upon its primary function of protection and defense. This last necessarily involves establish ment of military and police power, administration of law and justice, and taxation for the support of all; in short, the framework of government. To en large and use it for providing also roads, water sup ply, and other common needs, which are too unprof itable, too large, or politically too dangerous for private exploitation and supply, and to pay for these too, by taxation, has always been so natural and so easy as to become universal, far back in the history of nations. In legislating for both purposes, also. for low cost and high efficiency of government, with favorable reaction on the governed in creation of good citizen ship, let me once more repeat that the twin princi ples of "Least Strain on Human Nature" and "Least Government" should control.

At its very best, government must always be too complex, too· multifarious-as abundantly shown by the diagram of the Massachusetts organization in a preceding chapter-for good business manage ment; good, that is, in comparison with the simpler affair of big private business, done for profit, and r250) Principles That Should Limit Legislation strictly limited by profit and loss to concentrated and repetitive, simplex activity. It is a well-known maxim of private business suc cess not to spread out too far, not to diversify so much ~s to overtax the brain of the responsible man or men at the top. Mere growth, or extension along existing lines, can go far to the very horizon of trade without excessive mental effort or confusion; but suc cessful effort in many widely divergent directions is humanly impossible. Right there lies the weakness of all. government, especially of democracy; and the blank impossibility of Socialism, to-day so convinc ingly demonstrated by Soviet Russia; in its tempta tion to undertake, at the behest of this or that group, but at the cost of the whole, many more cooperative functions than the very human brain of any responsi ble head of government can possibly direct with suc cess.

It is a rule of good engineering to lighten the load, or else strengthen the material of the machine when the latter threatens to break down. But in the case of government we cannot strengthen human mental ity. Nothing is left but to lighten the burden upon it to the utmost; to invoke the principle of "Least Government." Consider if you will the vast range of governmental function, even at its minimum. Its primary, or protective functions, well settled by centuries of experience, include military, naval, and diplomatic establishment, law-making, main taining courts of justice and police control, and sup port of all by means of taxation. How vast and di verse are these functions; none of them performed for profit, limited by profit and loss, or by any consid eration other than emergency extraordinary! Next consider the secondary, or cooperative func tions, many of them familiar also by centuries. of [ 251 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation experience, such as establishment of moneys, weights and measures, water supply, highways, bridges, posts, education, sanitation, poor relief; and the fostering of trade, art, science, etc. We know that in practice all of the above, and not a few more, are worth establishing, and indeed must be established, by law, at common cost, financed by taxation; be cause too great or too unprofitable, or politically too dangerous, for spontaneous private exploitation.

How vast and various they are in our modern states and cities. Each is a huge and separate business of itself, having nothing in common with the others but public ownership for public service. All must· be organized, like other big businesses, for continuity of policy and operation, with permanent and expert staff; yet they cannot be independent, or decentral ized, but must be co-ordinated and integral parts ofa political administration, which changes from year to year, whose head or heads must answer for them all to the people, and must therefore try to direct them, even though the task is impossible. There are limits, best known to big-business men, to efficient business organization. What they are, in any given case, is best learned by trial; but any old and experienced organizer will, I think, confirm my assertion, that the protective and cooperative functions, which are forced on modern government by their inherent impossibility as private under takings, which must be developed by government at the cost of the taxpayers, are already too numer ous for efficient organization. That, of course, cannot be helped; but we can at least undertake no more, and can leave it to' private exploitation, for private profit, to supply every additional human service and human need whose creation offers such profit. The state need seldom guarantee a profit; history proves [ 252 ] Principles That Should Limit Legislation that fact. But it also proves that nothing so stimu lates and insures private supply of human needs as government protection, along with the lives and savings of the poor, of the capital and profits of the rich. Indeed, creation and supply of the necessaries and luxuries of life are so directly dependent on protection of capital and profits, that we might well coin as a political slogan the phrase, "For Maximum Protective, but Minimum Cooperative, Govern mental Activity."

There is one· more powerful reason for believing in "Least Government" in its reaction on the gov erned. I refer to the inestimable value of its byproduct of "Individualism." . As a chain is no stronger than the metal of its links, so the race is no stronger, relatively to other races, •than the fibre of its men and women, in dividually. Strong races make strong nations; therefore government should do nothing whatever to foster in its people the vicious habit of lying down on the public treasury for private support ; should re lieve no man from the stern necessity of earning his own living and saving his own money, especially if he wishes to be well off; should exempt no one from the consequences of his individual idleness, improvidence, or dishonesty. The state is the creation, not the creator, of its citizens. To teach any man that it, or anyone else, owes him a good living, or an easy job, because some other man makes one by brains or hard work, is to hurt him as deeply as pauperizing him can hurt the state. So rfar as history tells the story of 'Paternalism, of ~Collectivism in actual practice, of attempt to make government support the people instead of their supporting government, nothing but demoralization and disaster has come to government [ 253 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation and people alike. Such a tale is unrolling itself to day in vast misfortune to Soviet Russia. How long will it be, I wonder, before that great country will be forced back to "Least Government" ? As for poverty and· riches, unequal distribution of wealth, etc.-all that legislation can or ought to do for the people is to guarantee to all grown folks equal political oppor tunity for life and liberty, and for such pursuit of happiness as their individual powers permit of; and to all children at least such reasonable chance to develop a sound mind in a sound body as can be given them with or without their parents' help. No legislation can equalize the natural endowments of human beings, or nullify their natural weaknesses.

Why the Creator made men differ so we cannot tell; but certain it is that "Society" cannot change them. It can leave the Creator's work alone, with a clear conscience; while legislators may well, to paraphrase the Declaration of Independence, pay decent regard to the experience of mankind when tempted to allot men equal division of unequal earnings. For most human relations there is no better re liance than upon the Common Law, that wonderful accumulation of long centuries of Roman and Anglo Saxon evolution of justice---the actual working result of countless experiments in unravelling the tan gles of men's affairs far more completely than made to-order law, class legislation, can do to-day. I am not a lawyer, and speak ignorantly; but I have already cited, as a conspicuous instance, the failure of the Sherman Law, and shown the entire sufficiency of the Common Law to protect us all against combination in restraint of trade. We can safely let well enough alone. The less new law, the better.

Lastly, for government's own sake, for its efficien cy, let us apply the principle of "Least Strain on Hu[ 254] Principles That Should Limit Legislation manNature." As the Lord's Prayer puts it, "Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil." The law should so limit the scope and layout the detail of government function as to offer least op portunity for graft; and should so reward employees as to make faithful service pay better than graft. These are easy things, and are actually done every day in thousands of businesses, far larger in the ag gregate than government itself. It is common sense to make it worth while for good men to work for government. This applies especially to the Secondary, or Cooperative Functions enumerated above. These are undertakings at the common cost, for the common good, forced upon the state, not conducted for profit, and ultimately financed by taxation. For both reasons, and because it is hard to say when to stop (for instance, in extension of sanitation at the demand of .enthusiasts to the point of making provi sion for maternity at the.cost of the taxpayers) they are too often the children of bureaucracy and graft; malevolent sisters, that with their mother, demagogy, have been the bane of all government, from that of Imperial Rome down to that of Soviet Moscow. It is hard to gain popular support nowadays for a six-word rule or principle like "The Less of them the Better"; but it is safe to say "The Less Legislation about them the Better."

They should be organized under general laws, not by special procurement; as bureaus of as few depart ments as possible. The law should state the gen eral intent of each activity, and fix its appropriation, but leave details to its official head, who should be given power to expend his appropriation; be loaded with full responsibility; and given a substantial money interest in results and economies actually [ 255 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation achieved. This last would require in each case a system of accounting such as to reveal performance within estimate, and service beyond estimate, both within appropriations; so that a valuable man and his staff can enter the public service with the prospect of leaving it in later life, well off as well as honored members of the community. But no such Coopera tive Function should be undertaken, no service for the common good should be established at public cost, no matter how eagerly sponsored by some perfectly respectabl~ group of faddists; legislators should never tax the people to put the Government into any activity, which has already developed, oris likely to develop, spontaneously, at private risk for private profit.

Two good reasons dictate this rule: first and strongest, that a situation is at once created which offers almost irresistible temptation to politicians and department employees to blackmail private invest ors already in or about to enter the same field of enterprise; second, and plenty strong enough for hon est legislators, the fact that it is almost impossible for government to serve the public as well or as cheaply as would private ownership and control. In passing from this interesting subject of efficient organization of Cooperative Functions of govern ment I would remark that my plea for giving broad power and responsibility to executive heads of such organizations, with corresponding concentration of responsibility on their shoulders, is in flat contradic tion of the old New England temperamental dis trust of men in office; though it embodies the princi pIe of successful commercial management, thus to centre power and responsibility in the hands of well-chosen men and leave their hands untied by clumsy statute.

Precisely the same plea applies to drafting municipal [ 256 ] Principles That Should Limit Legislation charters; which would thus become flexible, and en tirely workable without the frequent amendatory legislation now customary. Coming back to consideration of the governed and their human rights, which democracy is supposed to protect (Vice-President Coolidge defined democracy the other day as "obedience to law made by the people") the principles of Individualism and Least Government order that laws protecting life and liberty must be few, broad, simple, and negative. They need not strictly compel what I am naturally free to do, but must broadly forbid that which I may not do without injury to my neighbor. Human activity needs neither stimulation nor compulsion; nothing but protection and freedom to follow lines of least resistance. This negative principle should be substituted, and the sooner the better, for the affirmative principle, now so widely held, of state restriction or compulsion of industry and commerce.

The whole great mass of laws, and the useless boards and commissions enforcing them, to regulate big business, should be done away with. They are not needed to protect life or liberty. They never should have been placed upon the statute books -at all; for if liberty be there the natural energy and the daily need of man will automatically make the best of natural conditions. The sound rule of legislation fostering commerce and trade is to leave them absolutely free from governmental control, subject only to the natural forces of the markets, the law of supply and demand. First, because they are spontaneous, and grow best when most -let alone; second, because control means preference, conflict of interest, and division of class against class; and third,· it breeds constant tempta tion to corruption of government by bribery. In ,[ 257] Too ~Much -Government-Too Much Taxation short, the state is better off without the interests; that is, without laws that create them.

Legislation Affecting Property. We come along now to a third group of Principles: In the civilized state the law has mainly to deal with and protect property-not merely public, but private property; the absolute right of every free man to the product of his own energy, his own work with hand or brain, his own thrift, his own risk taken. Protection to property is the very essence of law. The ruling principles of legislation regarding prop erty are twofold: first, that of JUSTICE-that he who does any service whatever shall get reward pro portionate; small or great, or even unlimited-except by the obligation to keep bargains, and never to deceive; second, the principle of EXPEDmNCY that original creation and accumulation of property, or capital, is the prime need of every country, and is out of all comparison more important than its mere distribution. For it goes without saying, that wealth must first certainly exist before it can be distributed at all.

Now, the world is several thousand years old, and countless experiments have been made in getting rich quickly, both private and public. Yet the great big fact that sticks out at the student is, that all actually existing wealth has been gathered and saved by private individuals; comparatively few in number,though exceptional in ability and thrift. Furthermore, that the great mass of the people, whether in capitalistic or non-capitalistic countries, never create and never save at all, except when in spired by someone of creative mind; and, third, that no more does government, in practice, create or save wealth, but only grabs it in taxation, often badly expended. [ 258 ] Principles That Should Limit Legislation Moreover, history reveals that even private energy will not save and use wealth in productive industry unless encouraged to do so by state protection in sure and undisturbed ownership thereof. ·Take away that protection, and wealth disappears, industry and com merce die, unemployment and general misery ensue; as to-day in Russia-and a thousand times before in the long history of war, conquest, and fO hher govern ment.

Lastly, what we call CAPITAL,or wealth, is unbe lievably small in proportion to population, and al ways will be. There never was or can be enough of it to go around, and make everyone well off. At the outbreak of the World War, iUI9I7, wealth averaged for the United States $4,560 per worker-men and women included (Census Bureau estimated wealth of United States in 1917, 220 billion dollars. Selective Draft Bureau roll of workers same year, 48,283,000. Quotient, or average per worker as above, $4,560.) Does anyone imagine for a moment that those work ers saved that capital themselves? Or does anyone believe they would in future save any such sum, even if presented with the entire income upon it? In 1919, the N. Y. World Almanac figured at 72 billion dollars .(which far exceeded other estimates) the total prod uet of the United States-or for say 50,000,000 workers, $1,44° apiece; so the income ort each worker's pro rata share of all capital (say $4,560 as above) at usual rate of 5 per cent, would be $228; which, if added to his $1,440 earned would make his total income $1,668. Labor would then get everything, and Capital nothing, out of the na tion's year's work; but would the workers' grow rich, or does anyone imagine in that case that Labor would save anything worth while out of that extra 75 cents a day? Would not most workers simply spend a [ 259 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation little more on food, clothes, and movies? Further more, would owners keep on working their plants to produce that extra 75 cents if they got nothing them selves doing so? If not, what would then b,ecome of plants and workers, too? Ask Soviet Russia the answer!

I have digressed long, because this is perhaps the most immediately important general principle to be grasped by an honest legislator, to wit: "THE MORE CAPITAL, THE BETTER," for the state and all its people. For, 1st, capital pays its owners nothing un less employed; 2nd, if employed, it must forthwith employ labor-usually paying the latter, collectiveiy, far more than it pays owners; 3rd, it is created and saved by very few-even though they employ many in creating it-while the many save very little be cause most workers would rather spend than save; 4th, there is nowhere enough capital to supply the demand for starting new industries; 5th, the greatest stimulus that ever has caused creation and saving of capital is unlimited private ownership, protected by the state; and, therefore, 6th, however selfish the capitalist, however rich he may be already, it is still to the best interest of state and people to leave him absolutely free to create and save more capital; and to protect him in its ownership!

The laws relating to business corporations are but a part, I may here remark, though an important one, of those affecting private property. A lot of blundering regulation' and confiscation of corporate earning power has been preached and practised for many years, on the pretext that a corporation is the crea ture of the state, owing its life and powers to the state; and that what the state gave, the state can take away. So the legislatures cutloose against the corporations, mistakenly. [ 260] Principles That Should Limit Legislation As a matter of fact, the only thing the state gives any corporation is the permission for a lot of citizens to contribute, each so much-and no more-to the, capital of some lawful enterprise, which everyone or all of them have already entire constitutional right and liberty to go into as individuals, or pattners. The one reason why an investor prefers to become stock.

holder· in a corporation, instead of partner in a firm, is to limit his liability for, debts of the concern to the sum already put in; instead of becoming liable, as a partner does, for every dollar it may ever owe, even though it costs him his entire fortune. The one reason why the state interposes the corporate form of business, and thus relieves him of extra risk he never meant to take, is to induce him to put in the sum he did mean to risk. The state recognizes the fact that only by means of thus limiting risk is it possible to finance great enterprises, involving enor ous liabilities; and therefore permits all men to chip in only as much as they please, and stop chipping in when they please. The state creates absolutely nothing, except a record and certificate of organiza tion, at cost of a dollar or two; a fee for the Secretary of state, or some Bureau; and for itself, you bet, a capital stock tax, promptly collected in advance.

All the cash, plant, employment, product, sales, and profit (or loss) are created solely by the thrift, cour age, and management of private citizens, who. al ready had the constitutional right to create all these things as individuals; and who would do so but for fear on the part of each of them of undesired and unlimited future liability. To illustrate this assertion, I cite past experience. Twenty-five years ago the State of Illinois, desiring to rid its records of the names of a host of dead stock companies, passed a law taxing all corporations each [ 261 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation $1.00 per annum for annual registry. The result was that over 10,000 corporations, many of them nominally capitalized at hundreds of thousands, even millions, of dollars, died an instant death for lack of $1.00 each to pay that registration fee! Two of them were corporations of my own promotion whose property had passed into larger combinations. Yet all the power of the great State of Illinois had been exercised on behalf of these so-called creatures of the state; whose worthless names were tangled in the records at the State House like the empty, tenuous carcasses of moths and midges in a last year's spider web.

There is no moral right and no political sense in the control of the corporation by the state, on the ground that it is the creature of the state. The state has already received the desired consideration for the use of the corporate form, in the mere estab lishment of productive enterprise financed by the corporate capital. The possibility of added material prosperity to the state is full compensation I will not say for the powers conferred, but for the menace withdrawn. Further demand, in the way of taxa tion, regulation, or limitation of the free and natural course of the business of corporations is nothing more or less than demagogic blundering the inevita ble result of which is to check the very production which was the object in view. Therefore, let the honest legislator apply to the treatment of corporations the identical principles applicable generally to private undertakings, namely, of justice-or reward limited only by service; and of expediency, or stimulation of the creation of capital in every possible way.

In the case of what might be called natural mo nopolies (such as telephone service-in which it is to [ 262] Principles That Should Limit Legislation everyone's interest to belong to the same telephone system; or street railways-in which no more than one line can occupy the same street, and universal transfers between lines of the same company on different streets are desirable) the argument for protection of the public from possible grasping ava rice deserves due consideration. There is, of course, such a possibility under such circumstances; but his tory shows that the risk is negligible. I have been able to find no instance in large American cities dur ing the past half-century, of advantage taken, or great plunder realized, by any such natural mono poly; though many a promoter has ·done handsomely himself. Cost of service to the public has always come down; and for the most part, voluntarily, as its volume increased. The canon of· business which I have heretofore referred to, known as the "law of diminishing returns," is far too powerful for any mistaken greed of owners; and rapidly brings down charges for service· to the lowest profitable figure which the vendor can afford to make, for the very simple reason that such is, in practice, the best way to make money for the owners of the property. In law or in theory, there is no reason why the city or the state should not go into or regulate the street railway, or the gas business; or the bakery, or any other business, in order to furnish the lowest, best and cheapest service to the people; but in practice there is the entire experience of mankind dead against it. It is safe to make the broad assertion that such attempt has never been made with sub stantial advantage to the state or the people. Why then should an honest legislator slam his constituency against a stone wall, when he can lead it comfortably through an open gateway?

[263 ] CHAPTER XII, LEGISLATION ON LABOR BEFORE passing from talk about legislation it is worth while, on account of its immediate interest, to apply the general principles above laid down to the specific sub ject of Labor . You will notice I spell the word with a capital L, because Gompers & Co. spell it that way. When they use the word, it always means Organized Labor; it does not mean laboring men in general. Mr. Gompers is, however, a master of camouflage and his phrases intentionally carry the impression that they are the utterances of a vast and inarticulate multitude of very human beings. They are, in fact, those of a powerful, closely compact, quasi-political machine; which no more represents the actual temper of the mass of American laborers than the high-tariff group in Congress ex presses the wish of the mass of American consumers ; who kick bitterly when, for instance, their bill for coffee, sugar, or a suit of clothes, is marked up, be cause of a rise in tariff. According to the United Mine Workers, the whole people are just now crying for high-priced coal; and according to the Farmer Bloc and the mill-men they are crying for high priced flour and woolens; but you and I, reader, know they are crying for just the contrary.

Coming back to legislation on Labor, it belongs to the PRIMARY FUNCTION of government; which is to protect life, liberty, and property. Mr. Gompers . [ 264 ] Legislation on Labor says Labor is not property; but as it is the only thing that the laborer has to sell, he would be pretty badly off without it and the right to get· all. he can for it. That right, however, is limited by his neighbor's right to do exactly the same thing. All that the law ought to say to one laborer is the broad negative, that he may ·not stop other laborers from selling their labor if they choose. He is already free, as they are, with out any law, to sell his own labor. It is as essential to him as it is to them that nobody on .earth shall put any obstacle in the way of that sale. All'of this is fully established by the Common Law; and its provisions for keeping the peace, and main taining law and order, are entirely sufficient, if faith fully executed by government, to remove every ob stacle from the open path of every laborer to the highest market price obtainable for his own work.

The Common Law against combination in restraint of trade (which last includes the laborer's sale of his own labor) is entirely sufficient, if faithfully enforced by government, to prevent mass, or mob action to obstruct that open path. Absolutely nothing is re quired in the way of further legislation, or further action of government, to insure to every worker the best going wages obtainable for such skill and in dustry as he possesses. Such insurance is inherent in entirely free operation of the law of supply and demand. Now, Organized Labor, Gompers's "Labor," is the combination of as many laborers as its organizers think best (and no more), for the purpose of block ing the free operation of the law of supply and de mand; of closing the open path to going wages, or doing entirely away with free competition of laborer against laborer in determining them; and of estab lishing an arbitrary wage, for the partners in the [ 2651 Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation combination, by withholding labor and products of labor from the employer, and through him from the general public. All this is frankly avowed by Gompers and his associates; and because it has again and again been declared criminal under the Common Law by the courts, Organized Labor has lobbied through Congress the provisions of the Clayton Act, exempting trade unions from Common or Statute Law penalties; furthermore, it is openly and con stantly in politics, to take away from the courts all power to enjoin or penalize labor lawlessness.

Thus Organized Labor becomes a quasi-political machine, and to the extent of its voting power it is able to menace candidates for legislative office. This menace has proved so far dreadful enough to scare Congress and several successive administrations down to the soles of their shoes. Gompers and his associates have been permitted to expand labor combination to several million men; organized into so-called international unions, the latter integrated into the great American Federation of Labor. It maintains imposing headquarters and a powerful lobby at Washington, both so well known as to need no further description here. Because of its possible voting power, its utter criminality has been and is ignored by Congress after Congress, and President after President. It loudly trumpets the "right to organize, the right to strike, and the right of collective bargaining," as among the rights guaranteed to free citizens by the Constitution of the United States.

On the contrary, they are no such thing; and every body knows it. The Federation and the Railway Brotherhoods have, however, grown so bold that they hold up all of the people without hesitation on the one hand-and menace the country, especially the great. cities, with loss of transportation, starva[ 266] Legislationon Labor tion, and lack of fuel; while, on the other, they menace the Administration and Congress with defeat at the next election unless Government becomes their willing tool. At the same time, recognizing that Organized Labor numbers less than a tenth of the voting popula tion and that the other nine tenths may at any time upset their political programme, and throw all wages and working conditions into free determination by the law of supply and demand, its crafty leaders continually and consistently work to hoodwink the mass of voters by interposing governmental agencies or commissions for establishing arbitrary wages and conditions. These boards. and commissions have so far been largely composed of Organized Labor's own representatives and have been regarded by the public, until very recently, as something like courts of social justice, intended to do the right thing between worker and employer. Inasmuch, however, as Organized Labor has no intention whatever of mere social justice, but proposes frankly to secure for organized laborers the greatest possible advantage over the outside nine tenths above mentioned, in practioe it. accepts the decisions of those commissions only when they suit, and ruthlessly rejects them when they do not.

Furthermore, as the decisions are generally arbitrary, fixed without any relation to markets and commer cial conditions, they are equally apt to be rejected by employers, whose rights they are supposed, by way of political camouflage, likewise to safeguard. All the way through, the constitutional power of the na tional and the state governments to interfere between buyer and seller of labor or anything else, and arbi trarily to determine the conditions and the considera tion to be accepted by both parties to what is' sup posed to be a free and voluntary bargain, has been [ 267 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation excessively shady and doubtful; and always in dan ger of denunciation by the Supreme Courts as ultra vires. To make a very long story short: this whole mon strous scheme of Gompers & Co. to organize and maintain the A. F. L. as a national combination in restraint of trade, together with that other political monstrosity, begotten by Roosevelt, brought to present overgrowth by Wilson, and hung around Harding's neck like a boa constrictor-I mean. na tional arbitration and conciliation-is not only in violation of Common Law and of constitutional in dividual right, but is and has been throughout a practical failure of the largest magnitude. There could be no more conspicuous demonstration of its uselessness than President Wilson's commissions to settle the steel strike; the present (August, 1922) dead lock between the railway strikers and the Railway La bor Board; or the futile efforts of the Administration, through the Department of Labor, to force the coal operators of the whole United States into collective bargainingwith the United Mine Workers. All parties concerned without exception are dissatisfied and at a standstill. The only employers and laborers who are working happily together in the coal trade just now are in the non-union mine regions. The great rail road which most conspicuously is succeeding in giving the public service is the Pennsylvania, which has come to some sort of direct dealing with its own men, en tirely sidestepping the national organizations. The reader, if he wants to burden himself with a lot of perfectly useless research, can multiply illustrations literally by hundreds, in looking over the long record of strikes in the last 40 years. The greater the Fed eration of Labor has grown meantime, and the broader the extension of political interference between em[ 268) Legislation on Labor ployer and employee, the worse the tangle and the harder the knot into which commerce and industry have been tied. It is indeed high time that the aver age voter should see through the camouflage of gov ernmental adjustment; and demand that the national tangle shall be cut away at once by law.

Coming back to the legislator, the question for him is absolutely simple. As a matter of fact, he need do nothing except to leave strikes to time and the Common Law as it is. Nevertheless, it would serve to clarify the situation and crystallize public opinion, which is now in a state of active ebulition, were Congress simply to repeal the Clayton Act and pass a declaratory Resolution, denying, as Calvin Coolidge did, the "right to strike against the public safety anywhere, anyhow, any time"; particularly, all "international" or "federated" right to organize and strike nationally in any tirades; and finally deny ing the right to picket and prevent the free operation of the law of supply and demand. Such action by Congress, if followed, as it naturally would be by state legislatures,would leave to the union laboring man entirely unimpaire.d his constitutional right to work or cease work for· the individual employer; and to the non-union laboring man the same freedom.

The right to conspire to strike in combination against all employers never existed! [ 269] CHAPTER XIII LEGISLATION ON PROFITEERING ANOTHER hangover of Collectivism that continues to plague Washington is the Wilsonian dream of stopping "profiteering," to wit: the theory that a moral duty rests upon· national or state administra tions to see to it that no man makes a good thing out of his fellow man by happening to control, with or without intention, a lot of some commodity short in supply and wanted by the public. If I am not mistaken, the Common Law is sufficient to provide against that contingency also if the man who resorts to it is willing to risk the cost of suit; certainly there were a few centuries ago in England laws against "forestall and regrating," which were meant to prevent rich men from buying up food in times of coming famine and holding for the rise in prices bound to come.

Whatever may have been advisable in old times, with their lack of commerce and transportation facili ties, it is to-day at least a matter of opinion whether governmental interference is needed at all; still more whether it can he applied without becoming a remedy in ultimate economic and political conse quences far worse than the disease. My own per sonal conviction is very definite indeed, namely: that no man, group of men, or government can under modern conditions of finance, transportation, and communication, effectively control prices of any [ 27° ] Legislation on Profiteering world commodity; or limit its distribution as wisely or as justly from start to finish as does the free opera tion and infinite variation of local supply and de mand. The job of such control is too vast for the human brain, and the delays and mistakes inevitable are too costly for the human pocket; even of the ablest and most experienced men actually engaged in trade itself. Witness the disastrous failures of the historic Secret an copper corner, the Leiter wheat corner, etc. etc.; and the aftermath of governmental sugar and grain control during the World War.

When we come to legislation, the proposal to submit such a trackless jungle and bottomless morass of trade to the survey and exploration of some hun dreds of Congressmen or State Legislators, in the limited time at their command, is too idiotic for calm descriptive language. General Dawes' succinct An glo-Saxon would best suit the case. Here again the duty of the legislator is absolutely simple: to do nothing whatever, unless, if he is a Congressman, it be to repeal the laws establishing the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the Railway Labor Board~ and the Board of Arbitration and Conciliation of the Depart ment of Labor, etc.; and utterly do away with all of these agencies to the extent that. they attempt to regulate or interfere with buyer and seller of labor or anything else on earth. In so far as they merely re cord, tabulate, and establish the results of free rela tions between buyer and seller, they are most useful and well worth maintaining.

In actual operation, "profiteering" -which means the making of unusual profits-is its own quickest and surest cure. Nothing stimulates production like excessive profit, while nothing does away with excessive profit like excessive prod uction. The whole [ 271 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation· history of trade and the fluctuation of prices is one long demonstration of that fact. Why in the name of common sense Government should interfere to do what nature, left alone, is bound to do much quicker and better, is a question that can be answered only by the demagogue; or the crank who thinks he knows it all, and can beat nature, the law of supply and demand, and the Almighty in general. Nevertheless, I have never personally happened to meet either demagogue or crank who, for instance, if he chanced to pick up in the desert or on the public street a piece of gold or a diamond, would turn it over to the next man he met, "at cost of production plus a fair profit, say 6 per cent." On the contrary, although to pick up the gold or diamond cost him absolutely nothing, he would sell it, if he sold it at all, certainly for what the first buyer was willing to pay; and in all human probability, at the best price that he could obtain by shopping around between that buyer and his neighbors.

I need say but one word more. When President Wilson first recognized the political value of such phrases as "the high cost of living," "profiteering," etc., which was just before the Presidential cam paign, I think in 1919 or 1920, he announced, with much approval from the womenfolk, a crusade against profiteers; and started it by asking Congress for an appropriation of $4,5°0,000 with which the Attorney-General should prosecute them. The four and a half millions was voted him by a subservient House, and doubtless was paid out in hiring lawyers and detectives to catch and jail profiteers; but can anyone of my readers recall that the high cost 'of liv ing came down by so much as a nickel or a dime in consequence? The record thereof, as tabulated by R. G. Dun & Co., shows no result whatever from the [27 2 ] Legislation on Profiteering Considered President's gallant effort, as the reader will see from the following: DUN'S INDEX NUMBER PRICE OF ALL COMMODITIES 1914-119.9°8 1916-145.142 1918-232.575 1915-124.95 8 1917-211.95 0 1919-233.707 1920-260.414 192I-General Deflation.

Was there ever in all history a better chance for government to step on profiteering? Was there ever in office an executive more willing to do so, or a con gress more lavish with public money to chase the profiteers to their lairs? If Wilson and his Attorney failed as utterly as the Dun Index Numbers-and the common knowledge of every man, woman, and ten year-old child in America-prove that they did, what government is likely to succeed? Ask the same question in Soviet Russia, if you choose, and get the same answer. Away with· the whole rotten demagogy of price regulation, oh, ye readers of this book! and let our Commerce be freed at least from governmental dis.. honesty! [ 273 ] CHAPTER XIV REMEDIES SUGGESTED-POLITICAL APATHY THE time is now upon me for suggestion and discus sion of remedies. I have thus far played the easy role of "knocker"; of the man who simply denounces things as they are. I have done it, of course, in a very sketchy way, endeavoring simply to hit the high spots of my huge subject, without overburdening the reader with the enormous mass of evidence that lies ready at hand. Now comes the far more difficult task of constructive suggestion, upon which I ven ture with great hesitation; but with the feeling that the mere "knocker" is almost the most useless of human beings. There is no use in the ablest analysis of evil if it does not serve as a basis for attempt at remedy. I would, therefore, now set down such structural outlines of better politics as seem to me worth noting; to be filled in, I hope, in the course of time, by abler and perhaps more practical men than I deem myself. They are throughout consistent with the broad yet definite idea of minimizing the difficulties of free government by minimizing govern ment itself. Their constant object is LEAST GOV ERNMENT, simplification.

First of all, and most important, we Americans must so plan our elections as to do away to the ut most with that political apathy which is the curse of our so-called by-elections. Every four years the great mass of the voters takes lively interest in the [ 274] Remedies Suggested-Political Apathy election of a president. The great party organiza ... tions make up with infinite care platforms and issues upon which to base a campaign, and appeal to the intelligence and conscience of the voters. The elec tion is important, the term is long, the office con spicuous, and the effect upon the personal fortunes of the party workers, in and out of office, is so great as to command their eager activity. The very sim plicity of a struggle between two strong personalities, a Republican and a Democrat, with perhaps a third Socialist or Prohibitionist personality somewhere in the offing, arouses the voters and brings out the vote with less than ordinary strain upon party machinery.

On the contrary, in off years, as we call them, only congressmen, governors, state legislators, county officers, and the like are elected, and apathy reigns supreme. There are no very definite issues upon which to fight a campaign. The State and county rock along comfortably enough whether controlled by Republicans or Democrats. The voters hardly care to go to the polls, and, but for the activities of party machines, the elections would be almost farcical be cause of the apathy of the voters. The strictly local elections of the cIties and towns, usually held at dates of their own, are rather more important; because the greater part of local taxation is likely to be expended on local improvements, and local questions arise from time to time upon which the voters become interested. Even here, however, political apathy dominates the voter for the most part; and the cogent question arises to the mind of the student how to dispel it, and wake the voter up to the importance and the value of his vote.

There seems to me but one way, and that a very simple one; namely, enormously to increase the im portance of local and state elections by redueing to [ 275 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation the very minimum the number of elective officers; at the same time increasing the length of the terms and broadening the power and responsibility of those elected. To offer a concrete illustration, I lived for many years in Chicago; and was always, as this book will testify, much interested in the question of good gov ernment. Nevertheless, it was a distinct effort for me even to remember, much less vote at, the spring elections for .aldermen and the fall elections for county commissioners and state officers. As I have said elsewhere, for many years the Republican boss of my ward was a livery-stable keeper and the Democratic boss a saloon keeper. The candidates put up by both party machines for the responsible office of alderman were equally insignificant per sonages, equally unfit for the duties of the office; and the two aldermen from my ward were elected, one this year and one next, for the short term of two years. What earthly difference did it make to me which of them held office; and how could I, except by becoming a part of the political machine and practically· giving my life to it, influence the nomina tion of better men? Political apathy descended on me like a fog, dispelled only once in four years by the glare of a presidential election; or occasionally by a mayoralty contest in which some such thing as rapid-transit was made a political issue, though it ought not to be.

What was true of me was true of the mass of voters. The total vote cast by the city fluctuated enormously from election to election. As a usual thing there was no real issue except that of personal qualifications of candidates for their respective offices; and that issue was lost in the insignificance of the men them selves. What went on in Chicago also went on in [ 276 ] Remedies Suggested-Political Apathy some 300 small towns, on the twenty-five or thirty railways radiating from Chicago, and within forty miles of that city; precisely the same conditions of oft-repeated elections, short terms, unimportant offi ces, and insignificant candidates proposed by petty local political machines. The success of one set of candidates or· the other hardly was· worth the toss of a penny to the voters; and general apathy pre vailed, excepting in presidential year. Now let the reader picture to himself the contrast in the importance and vitality of an election for local government, if Chicago should take in the 300 afore said outlying towns and should elect at large for a long term, say four years, a very small Board of Al dermen or commissioners, say seven in number (which would be ample) to whom should be intrusted as to the Board of Directors of a corporation, the creation of an Administration and the passing of all laws and ordinances governing its activity. The governmental expenditures of the city, thus enlarged, would prob ably approach 150 million dollars a year, so that the seven men would have the spending of 600 millions of the people's money during their four-year term!

Would not that election, and the personality and qualifications of the candidates to be voted for, at once become of supreme importance, equalling, if not exceeding, that of a presidential election? Would not political apathy vanish instantly? Would the voters, as they do to-day, require to be chased to the polls by party workers? . This illustration suggested to me the outline of what follows; namely, a plan for enlarging to the working limit all local units of government, lengthen ing terms, reducing the number of local elective offices, and in every way increasing their power and importance; with the double hope of increasing to [ 277] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation the utmost the interest of the voters and arousing the keenest ambitions of candidates fitted by ability and education for important office. For, the short ness of term and the insignificance of local office has caused political apathy to fall upon the latter as well as upon the voters. What man of standing, ability and earning power cares for local office under existing conditions? Can we not make both candidacies and elections more interesting?

Simplification of Framework of Government. During the last one hundred years or so modern commerce has evolved avery perfect type of pure democracy with high efficiency, to wit: the great business corporation; one well worth our study. The reader may interject at this point that business is one thing and politics another; and that the efficiency of the great corporation is no criterion of possible effi ciencyofgovernment, if organized alongthe samelines. The reply to this objection is, that the conduct of government is nothing more or less than an aggrega tion of many big businesses; but businesses they are, all the same. First, the Government must insure its own existence; and for that it must undertake the business of levying and collecting taxes; which is as purely a matter of business as banking, for instance. Next comes its business of legislation. Here again is an affair governed by the same intent as engineer ing or architecture or any other matter of purely commercial design, namely: to accomplish the most at the least expenditure of time, effort, and money.

Then comes the business of police and military pro tection of life and property; again an orderly employ ment and disposition of many men for a given purpose, subject to the same requirement of accom plishing the most at the least cost. And so on through the long array of the secondary [ 278 ] Remedies Suggested-Political Apathy functions of government; fire. protection, sanitation, poor-relief, education, etc; each of them is a business, best governed by business rules. In its entirety, the whole is a business machine, operated to maintain and further the human rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The more efficient the ma chine, the better those rights are maintained. There is then no essential difference to safeguard between political and business organization. Many of our great corporations equal or exceed in annual turnover our greatest cities and states. The turnover of the United States has, however, al ways been great~lr than that of any single corpora tion. "Billion Dollar Congresses" were denounced as wasteful and extravagant before the war, though a billion would now doubtless be considered as quite rea sonable turnover for the United States Government.

The Steel Corporation comes in annual turnover well beyond that figure, and Henry Ford must approxi mate six hundred millions. The Steel Corporation had in 1920 over 105,000 stockholders or voters at its elections; about as many as voted in the State of New Mexico, although the Ford Company had but three actually one! The Bell Telephone Company had in 1921 over 186,000; not far from as many as the State of Florida. The· Steel Corporation once a year elects nineteen directors. Ballots are for the most part cast by mailing written proxy; the election .is held in a moderate-sized room with perhaps fifty to one hundred stockholders present, and the whole proceeding occupies perhaps an hour or two. The State of Connecticut (by way of comparison) holds annually three sets of elections, for which a tre mendous amount of political work has to be done in state, towns, and counties by many hun dreds of politicians; working also the entire year [ 279 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation round in order to elect no less than 6,379 state, county, and local officers. The gross annual turn over of the Steel Corporation for 1920 was $1,755,000,000; that of the State of Connecticut, with its counties, cities, and towns, as compiled by the Census Bureau for 1912, was about $16,500,000, or about one hundredth part as much. The operations of the Steel Corporation resulted in a net profit of $55,210,000. Those of the state, county, and local governments of the State of Connecticut resulted only in the foregoing amount of taxation. Of course the business of the Steel Corporation was carried on for profit, while that of the state and local governments was not; yet one may make the comparison to illus trate what can be done by the highest type of repre sentative in the transaction of business, whether chosen by the stockholders of a corporation or resi dents of a state, toward minimum cost and effort and maximum efficiency. In both political and busi ness organization the simple object to be obtained is honest and faithful transaction of common busi ness. The old New England political theory was that this could be accomplished only by almost infinite diffusion of authority and responsibility.

But the results achieved by our governments, or any others, as compared with those shown by our great corporations, demonstrate the exact contrary that the interest of. all is best subserved by concen tration of authority and responsibility. They show that great results can be best achieved by elected officers of great mental power; and that it is perfectly safe to trust such men with corresponding authority over property and personal rights if at the same time they are held to concentrated and real responsibility. The difference between our political and our business theory is as fundamental as the difference in results. [ 280] Remedies Suggested-Political Apathy I found it a most entertaining mental diversion some years ago to make a rough draft of state and local political reorganization along the well-.known lines of private corporate organization. When com pleted I could see no reason why simplification should not work as well in politics as in business. I submit the outline herewith for the entertainment of the reader, if nothing more.

[ 281] CHAPTER XV OUTLINE OF PROJECT FOR SIMPLIFIED STATE AND LOCAL POLITICS LET me say in advance that there is nothing more difficult than to change rooted political habits of a democracy; nobody is more conservative, more "standpat," than the average voter. For that rea son it is easier to maintain and modify existing politi cal forms and boundary lines than to attempt to abolish and reconstruct them in toto. This has been borne in mind throughout the following sugges tions: 1st. Make a commencement wherever the mind of the voters may be sufficiently plastic to consider a novelty. The best starting point would be in a state in which a number of cities have already adopted a simplified form of commission government. Start with the local governments. Build up consolidated units as follows: 2nd. Let each natural railway centre, namely, the wholesale marketing city of the region, annex all surrounding towns for which it already serves as a central marketing and distributing point. In the past this has depended mainly upon nearness by railway lines. In the future good roads and automo biles may change certain boundary points by mak ing them tributary to other centres of distribution, but hardly enough to make much political difference.

The radius included in this way will probably be [ 282] Simplified State and Local Politics that of "commutation"; that is, such that all unit employees can comfortably travel to work day by day, and return to spend the nights at home, say twenty five to fifty miles. 3rd. Abolish all local government within the consolidated area, and set up one common unit government for the whole. Elect at large a Com mission of limited number (from five to seven Com missioners should ordinarily be enough) to whom, as to the Board of Directors of a corporation, shall be entrusted for their term of office the entire control of local legislation, public property, and public ex penditures. Abolish all other elective offices. 4th. Let the Commissioners organize government by appointing a General Manager or Executive, upon whom shall devolve the duties of appointing local Manag~rs or Executives, for each of the former towns consolidated, and of creating a General Staff' and Supply Department, for co-ordinating and sup plying labor and material, to be divided between, or used in common, by all; exactly as is done in railway or other large and extended organizations. No more need be done in changing the form of governmental organization; for once the central Commission is created and installed, it will work out or modify local governmental organization for itself, without further action by the voters.

5th. One element only should be carefully guarded, to wit: the qualifications of the men elected Commis sioners. They should be substantially the same as of the directors of our great corporations, namely: they should be of mature years, ordinarily not less than forty; of unblemished record, and large and successful experience, in constructive business or professional life. Not nore than one should be a lawyer, or of any particular vocation. They should [ 283 ] Too Much Governn'lent-· Too Much Taxation be men of ample means, and should receive no sala ries whatever for their services as Commissioners; but should be content with the honor and the opportun ity of governing their own community. They should be men so well off and so conspicuous as to be quite beyond the temptation to feather their own nests. As the phrase goes: they should be "men who cannot afford" to smirch their own names by corrupt or partisan use of power. They should realize Grover Cleveland's conception that "public office is a public trust."

I think the, reader will agree with" me that under such conditions .the office of Commissioner (espe cially if it were strengthened and dignified by lengthen ing its term, say to the presidential term of four years, or even ten, instead of a single year, as in the case of the great corporations) would be most at tractive to the first men of the community. They would, I am sure, enjoy putting their tested abilities at the service of their fellow-citizens, and could be trusted to be responsive to sound public opinion. Certainly they are now thus responsive, in thousands of instances of modern life, as unsalaried directors of great corporations and trustees of public and semi public institutions. They would be so well known that voters would not be obliged, as I was for nearly forty years in Chicago, to try in vain to find out any thing about party candidates; they could not be men without known history and without ascertainable character.

6th. When a sufficient number of consolidated local units have been created, the next step would be to attempt reorganization of state government along similar lines, namely: election annually of a single (not dual) legislative body-suppose we call it a Senate-composed of a limited number of Senators [ z84 ] Simplified State and Local Politics (fifteen would be plenty) elected at large. It might be that the old New England prejudice for local repre sentation would survive so strongly that each con solidated unit would still insist upon being repre sented in the legislative body. If so, there might be two Senators against each local unit, one elected at large and the other by the voters of the unit itself. That would in practice leave legislation under the control of Senators-at-Iarge, while providing for the representation of local interests. This last would be, however, in my own opinion entirely superfluous; as able and independent Senators elected at large could be trusted to give careful consideration to reasonable local wishes and actual local conditions.

The Senators would appoint the Executive; call him, say the Governor; and leave to him, as to the president of a railway corporation, the appointment and control of the entire personnel of subordinate officials and employees in the service of the state. The Governor would appoint his own department heads, who would be directly responsible to him; they in turn would employ, discharge, and control their department's personnel. He would be respon sible only to the Senate, and would be removable by them at pleasure. The Senate would enact all laws, and the Governor and his administration would simply execute them, that is all. The Judiciary, which should, it seems to me, in... elude all local and appellate courts throughout the state (since even according to present practice the decrees of all local courts are subject to review by the Supreme Court) might well be organized in similar manner; that is to say, the Chief Justice and mem bers of the Supreme Bench entire might be ap pointed by the Senate, and Judges of the lower courts might in turn be appointed by the Chief Justice, [ 285 ] ]"'00 Much Government-Too Much Taxation or the entire Supreme Bench, all for life, removable only by process of impeachment.

The principle of organization throughout would be that the entire personnel of the executive and the judiciary branches of government, \vhose duty is merely to execute the law, should be non-elective, non-partisan, non-political in every way; so that their main interest in life would be, as in private business, the honorable and successful performance of their duties and the earning of their salaries; neither of which should change in the least because of poli tical changes. On the other hand, the Senate, the legislative body, should reflect and be responsive to the shifting of public opinion and the change in public policy. In private life it is a well-known fact that sense of obligation and faithful discharge of duties as manager or trustee for others, or the public, are most certain to be found among men of amplest means, most in dependent position, largest achievements, and highest standards of life and living. Certainly, if it is good sense to make such men directors of our great banks, corporations, and philanthropic institutions, it is in comparably better sense to entrust them with the far larger interests of the entir~ community.

[286 ] CHAPTER XVI CANDIDATES AND QUALIFICATIONS FOR OFFICE I AM quite aware that every demagogue will promptly roar, at this last proposition, that it would rob the "poor man," American citizen though he be, of all chance at public office; and that selfish plutoc racy would take the place of generous democracy in this supposedly free land. If so, let him roar; that is his vocation! It is true in fact that, under the plan proposed, and indeed under any plan which makes public office at tractive to men of the first ability, such men would seek, and, by reason of that ability would capture and substantially monopolize, public office. But there is no reason based on common sense and good citizenship why they should not do so I Poverty is certainly no qualification for public office; which, once more to quote Grover Cleveland, "is a public trust." Poverty generally means, if it means anything, that a man is poor because he is too lazy, too wasteful, too stupid, or simply too small calibre, to earn, save, and wisely use more than the very least property. Why should that fact be a rea son for entrusting him with the vast property and business of the public? The poor man himself does not hire a carpenter to build him a house, for instance, because the carpenter is poor; or a doctor to attend his wife because the doctor is poor. On the contrary, he is apt to fight shy of paupers all along the line., [ 287 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation He hires a man who knows his job; who for that rea son is usually well off and responsible. His wife buys at the great department stor~ or at, perhaps, the big tencent store; not, however, because they are poor-for on the contrary they are rich. If he puts his week's wages in bank, he is apt to go to the largest and strongest savings bank in town because it is known to be rich, not poor. In one word, the mere fact that a man is poor should, and usually does, discredit him for all positions of important trust; because so long as .he is poor, he is not beyond the reach of temptation. I say this in no contempt of poverty; but in recognition of the fundamentals of human nature. A few pages back I quoted the late Marshall Field's remark, that he would take no office in the gift of the people except that of alderman of the city of Chicago. I forgot to add his further remark, that there was no danger of his being elected, because of the prejudice against rich men. I an swered at the time, and I still think, that he was mis taken; and that if he had offered himself as candidate, especially for election at large, he would have been elected by the overwhelming vote of the poor, the so-called common people. They well knew Marshall Field. His trade had grown great because the public knew that it was sure to get its money's worth over his counters; and I am certain they would have had the same confidence in getting better value from him than perhaps from any other alderman at the City Hall.

The difficulty has been, certainly throughout the Northern States and in my lifetime, to induce first.. rate men like Marshall Field, or even men of second and third rate in comparison with him, to stand as candidates at all. Very few men of large achieve ment and independent means will so much as look at [ 288 ] Candidates and Qualifications for Office state, local, or even national office; with perhaps the exception of the Mayoralty of a great city, the Governorship of a state, or the Senatorship at Washington. The so-called minor legislative· offices, such as Selectman, Alderman, State Representative, or Senator, even Congressman, though in reality of immense collective importance, are not very attrac tive individually to men of character and independ ence. The reasons why are threefold: First, such men are unwilling to become mere cogs in either of the existing political "machines," in whose working they must rely on the support, or meet the opposition, of petty grafters for whom politics is a mere trade, and a very selfish and crooked one. Second, it seems an irritating waste of time to an experienced man to take part with stupid, selfish, cowardly majorities in long-drawn, tedious legislative sessions; without hope of accomplishing much of anything, but merely to rage internally at futilities. Third, the terms of such offices are too short, the constituencies represented, even in Congress,. too small, and the whole position too insignificant, too destitute of honor and reputa tionto be worth bothering with.

If, on the other hand, to take a concrete illustra tion, the city government of Chicago were reduced from 68 Aldermen (chosen by Wards, with elective Mayor, Comptroller, Treasurer, etc., as in my time) to say 7 Commissioners, chosen from the entire city at large, with control of appointive Executives; and their term of office were lengthened from the present aldermanic two years to four, or more; if the whole responsibility for organizing and carrying on the government, and handling the huge expenditures of that great city (which since my time have mounted, though unwarrantably, from $65,000,000 [ 289 ] Too ·Much Government-Too Much Taxation to $133,000,000 per annum) were entrusted to these' seven men; does not the reader feel, as I feel, that every first-rank man in that city would vie with Marshall Field in the legitimate ambition to crown a successful business career by successful public service as one of Chicago's Commissioners?

Would not the same thing hold proportionately true of the smaller governmental units and of the pro posed Senate (chosen at large) of the State of Illinois? Does not the reader agree with me that, if our ablest men did but desire public office, they would cer tainly put their abilities to work to get it? Finally, does not the reader agree with me that, if they got it, they could not afford to do other than their best, as constituting government of, by, and for the people ? Does not dignified, honorable, and conspicuous ser vice, destitute of money reward, appeal with peculiar force to those best fitted for it; and are they not such men as I have described? Qualifications for Public Office. As the plan proposed would limit elections entirely to legis lative office, and as it would concentrate legisla tive power in the hands of a very few members of each legislative body, upon whom public attention could readily be concentrated, and whose responsi bility could readily be enforced at the polls, the qualifications of candidates become a question of the highest importance.

They would be in general the same as the qualifica tions required for directorship or trusteeship in any large private enterprise, such as a railroad, bank, trust company, great manufacturing corporation, or great educational or charitable institution, public or quasi-public. The first of these qualifications is that of known success in private life, accompanied by sufficient private income to place the candidate [ 29°] Candidates and Qualifications for Office beyond the temptation of using his office for personal profit. Both of these qualifications are invariably required in choosing .directors or trustees for large private concerns; and they are justified by every reason of common sense and expediency. I have heretofore argued that the· circumstance of poverty is, of itself, a distinct disqualification for public office. After poverty should come, as a lead ing disqualification, the lack of experience in large affairs. No man should be entrusted with the farseeing commitments and large current expendi tures of the community, the state, or the nation, unless he has in his previous personal career showed his capacity for intelligent, efficient, and economical planning of big business, or its equivalent. No mere qualification. of honesty or good intention, though both of these are essential, can take the place of actual experience.

This means that candidates should not be young men. A senate should not be a political kindergar ten to teach toddlers. Despite such brilliant exam ples as Napoleon, Pitt, and Hamilton, they are so very exceptional. as to justify a general ruling against the candidacy of men younger than, for instance, forty-five. It would merely be, in the case of any particular man, a matter of waiting a few years,to attain the age necessary to justify his candidacy. Meantime, the business of the community would. not be half so likely to suffer, while waiting for his ma turity, as it would be by frequent immaturity in the rank and file of membership. Most men of first-class ability, by the age of 45, can save money enough to enable them to look forward to· political service in their later years, without becoming dependent thereon for their daily living. This last seems to me an indispensable requisite, for sound and un[ 291 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation biased judgment in public matters; and, taken to gether with the factor of experience, should be a sine qua non of candidacy. Both could easily be verified at the time of nomination; the question of income by sworn statement of the candidate, and the ques tion of experience by his record in business or profes sional life.

Even a "poor man," the trained and experienced representative ofa great political party, or labor organization, or social movement, would be entirely eligible under this qualification, if provided with a sufficient income by the organization for which he stands, though lacking private means of his own. His record of achievement, in building up and con trolling his own organization, would render him inde pendent; at least in regard· to matters not directly affecting that organization. There indeed he might be, and probably would be, biased; but, though un desirable, that bias might be disregarded, as true democratic representation of a group. I am not myself clear in my mind about this last; for the natural effort of existing organized minorities would be to put members of each organization as such into nomination and support them for election. This evil might, however, be minimized by the next rule regarding qualification, namely: No two members of the legislative body should belong to the same business, group, profession, or vocation, or should be supported financially by the same organized party. That is to say, there must not be two railroad men, two bankers, etc.; or two mem bers supported financially by the Democratic, Re publican, or Socialist parties, or by any trade union, farmer bloc, or the like. This would prevent the "packing" of any legislative body with members financially dependent upon any particular party or [ 292 ] Candidates and Qualificationsfor Office group; even upon a party which might for the mo ment constitute a majority of the people.

Public legislative office, under this plan, would become a sort of crowning reward ofa successful career in business, professional, or public life; but could never be the means of earning a livelihood, or accumulating a competence during the formative years of a man's career. As things are now, young men go into politics with the expectation of making their living and a successful career out of electing public officers; with all the demoralizing tendency to political selfishness and corruption which that implies. It seems to me that there is nothing in the theory of democracy that should enable a young man to pick and choose the public business and its treasury as his oyster, to be opened and devoured at his pleasure. It seems to me, again, that nothing in the theory of democracy demands representation of "the poor," or of any other class, by men whose circumstances and training are such as to disqualify them for safe and efficient representation. It seems to me (parenthetically, I may say that I am poor myself) that the poor would themselves better enjoy the privilege of choosing their representatives from among candidates of already accomplished fortune and success, than the necessity of casting their votes for one or another "cheap skate," who knows nothing about large affairs but is in great danger of small temptations. In short, I believe representative government can mean, if the people so desire, repre sentation by the richest mentally (and therefore financially), rather than by the poorest of their fellow citizens in both regards. / Once more, our most important task is to make public office attractive to high-grade men. In all local matters it is now distinctly unattractive; and [ 293 ] Too Much Government-"-Too Much Taxation the consequence is that high-grade men steer clear of it. If they really cared to serve the public, their great ability would certainly carry them into office.

The most far-reaching purpose of my suggestion, as here outlined, is to lead the ambitious American, whether banker, railroad man, merchant, lawyer, farmer, investor, or mere agitator, to look forward to serving his city, his state, or the nation in public life, as the finish of his successful career, in unselfish, unsalaried, and honorable work for all. For it is very certain that a man will work only for what he wants; and that in this strenuous world of ours very little comes to a man that he does not work for. -[ 294] CHAPTER XVII SHORT BALLOTS THE reader will at once perceive that the reduction in the number of local units and of elective officers to two, namely, local Commissioner and State Senator, would result in an extremely short ballot. As any such change could take place only by piecemeal, local unit by local unit, and state by state, it must synchronize with United States elections for Con gress, the Senate, and the Presidency. The Sena torial cycle is six years, the Presidential cycle four years, and the Congressional cycle two years. The state and local elections could be synchronized by holding one election each year, and making the term of office for local Commissioner and State Senator four years. The reader will then see that elections would drop naturally into cycles of four years. The first year's election might cover, for instance, only the office of local Commissioner; all the commis sioners to be elected at large on the same ballot.

The next year's election might cover elections to the Senate and Congress of the United States. The third ;year's elections might be allotted to the State Senate, namely: the election of fifteen Senators at large upon the same ballot; and the fourth or last year might be for President, Senator, and Congress men of the United States on the same ballot. This allotment would entirely avoid tying together of local, state and national elections and would prel 295 ] "Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation' vent trading of votes between candidates therefor. Furthermore, the political issues in each case would be clearly and sharply defined and not clouded by confusion of local, state, and national controversies. For instance, President Wilson is said to have carried Ohio and California at his second election by reason of local controversies in the Republican party of those states; and as it happened, the vote of either one determined the election. Whether this story is true, or not, I am not politician enough to know, but. it will do as an illustration of what ought not to be possible in the interest of good popular elections; the essence of which, as I see it, is importance and simpli city of candidacies and an actual issue, sharply de fined presentation of it, and then a clean fight to a finish, the decision of the majority to stand.

In local government, political issues properly so called-that is, broad questions of constitutional right and national policy-seldom arise. Contro versies generally occur over local questions merely of administration, education, public works, or public service. There is, however, one great and eternal question always present, especially as to local gov ernment, namely: the question of economy, effi ciency, and least taxation. The answer to it is, of course, control of government by able and honest men. Personal character and qualifications of can didates for public office always must be the first and most vital issue in local political campaigns. It seems to me that the short ballot of the foregoing plan, narrowing, for instance, the first year's election in the cycle of four down just to the choice of city commissioners, and clearing it of further complica tion, would present to the voters an unclouded view of any issue at stake and of the life records of the various candidates. The press should be able to [296 ] Short Ballots present both and the public to judge of candidates' fitness for office without the interjection of confusing or extraneous considerations. The same is equally true' of the remaining three elections of the cycle; though broader and more strictly political considera tions are more likely to affect them. The same ad vantage of a clarified campaign situation would ob tain, and could not but be helpful. .

( 297] CHAPTER XVIII SIMPLIFICATION OF NOMINATION AND ELECTION OF COURSE the old New England spirit of distrust would be likely to file its protest against my plan somewhat a'S follows: "But what will happen to the country if the Republican, or Democratic, or Social ist 'machine' shall capture the Board of Commis sioners, or the State Senate, and find itself in uncon trolled power for four long yeats? Are you not handing the community over to the Tammany Tiger, perhaps; or the Donkey, or the Elephant, or some other hungry beast that will fatten on it?" And the question does not lack force. Certainly the political parties and the labor unions will continue to exist, and will do their utmost to capture such concentrated power. Nevertheless, I think the reader will perceive that their permanent position would be far weaker than under the present system with its immense de tail. And there is no reason why the matter of nomi nations also should not be enormously simplified in its turn, for the very purpose of doing away in toto with the "machine" and its many thousands of costly parasites.

If we boil down each election to that of a very few men for a single office, it becomes entirely practicable to adopt the method of self-nomination, which has been practised for centuries in England in the election of Members of Parliament. Any man in that coun try can offer himself as candidate for any seat in [ 298 ] Nomination and Election Parliament, from any borough, whether he is resident of it or not.· One might suppose that a vast number of ambitious men would put themselves forward as candidates, for mere notoriety, if for nothing else. But such is not actually the case, because of the small chance of accomplishing anything except to be laughed at, in the case of insignificant and unsup ported personalities. A candidate must have either the support of one of the political parties, obtained from its committees in the usual way, or he must hav~ a large personal following acquired by public work, or agitation, or in some other fairly legitimate way. For instance, a great Socialist, or great labor agitator, could present himself as candidate with reasonable prospect of election; but a mere ward politician of the type so familiar in this country would have small chance except in his own home borough; while even there at home he would be sure to be opposed by one or more candidates, perhaps from outside, of national reputation, or special fol~ lowing.

In short, the method works over there. It does not at all do away with party organization or party politics; but, as I understand it, it does minimize the machine. In order to do this, and in order to reduce my thought to concrete form, I added to my project of some years ago the following outline of methods of nomination and election: I. Candidates to nominate themselves, whether for local Commissionership or State Senatorship, by the simple process of advertising their candidacy in the daily papers long enough before election, say six months, to permit full investigation and discussion of their personal records, character, political views, and purposes in seeking office. This does away at one stroke with the entire necessity for primary elec[ 299] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation tions and permanent party sub-organizations, such as ward clubs; though, of course, there is nothing to prevent the continuance of such party machinery; and it would probably survive, though much reduced in size, because it would hardly pay anybody a living.

2. Do away with registration days, and substitute a permanent Bureau of Registration and Election, with branches, whenever necessary, located at nat ural centres of traffic; that is on the main street of country villages, and at the prominent subcentres found in every city, by one of which every adult resident must pass once or twice a week in everyday life. Divide the voting population into regional blocks of about 25,000 voters; at least one block to each local governmental unit, even though smaller than 25,000 voters. The Registration Bureau to employ a permanent staff of canvassers, who shall make a houseto-house canvass of the entire popula tion at least twice a year, say the middle of May and the middle of October; so as to catch the spring and fall movings. Keep at each bureau, or branch bu reau, a complete duplicate-card census-index, alphabetical and residential, of every man, woman, and child in its district, with full street address and cen sus particulars; with a third index: card for each voter, consecutively numbered and bearing also for identification his signature; the residential cards to be filed by streets and numbers, the alphabetical cards to be filed alphabetically, and the voters' trip licates also to be filed alphabetically.

3. A sufficient time after the announcement of all candidacies, say six weeks before election, the canvassers of the Bureau to prepare and distribute from house to house to every voter an Australian ballot bearing his name and index-card number, and containing· the names of all candidates for election [ 300 ) Nomination and Election with such party designations or symbols as they may request; with three columns at the right of the column of names for marking first, second, and third choices. A detachable coupon to form part of each Australian ballot, duplicating the names of candidates and the three choice-columns. 4. Divide the territory served by the Bureau or branch into regional blocks of approximately 1,000 voters, taken in neighborhood order, to each block; and mark on each Australian ballot conspicu ously for each block a certain day of the election month. For instance, the first week day of the month for the first thousand voters, the second week day for the second thousand; and. so on until at the end of 25 week days the entire 25,000 voters can be polled, at the rate of 1,000 a day. Modify the elec tion law accordingly, so that the existing congestion of polling the entire vote on a single day may be done away with, and the polling conveniently spread out over the month.

L 5. Furthermore, permit the voter to vote by marking his Australian ballot with first, second, and third choices for as many candidates as are to be elected; signing it, and delivering it by mail or in person to the Bureau on or before the voting date shown on its face. Give him the alternative, if he desires to vote a secret ballot, to sign and deliver his ballot personally at the Bureau, on or before its elec... tion date, without marking it; and then personally to register his votes for the res'pective candidates upon voting machines installed there for that purpose. 6. Each candidate to pay the advertising ex pense of announcing his candidacy; and a reason able sum for printing his name upon the Australian ballots, and allotting to him a special adding wheel upon the voting machines at all bureaus. [ 3°1 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation 7. Make it the duty of the Bureau to register upon the voting machines all ballots properly marked and sent in, so that· from day to day the total vote polled for each candidate, whether by marked or secret ballot, can be ascertained publicly from the voting machines. The voter in all cases to fill out and retain the duplicate coupon as his private record of his vote, and as evidence in case of investigation and recount.

8. The first, second, and third choices for each candidate to be registered on the voting machine, the total thereof to be recorded as his total vote. The intention of this provision is to provide a sort of substitute for the primary in concentrating party votes upon the actually strongest party candidates by giving them and their party the benefit of the first, second, and third choices. As far as I can forecast things in the entire absence of experience, this project would work out in practice about as follows: Let us say that five Commissioners are to be elected to govern the city of Utica, N. Y., and its tributary region. Say that five or six gentlemen were 'to nominate themselves for each vacancy, or a total of thirty names. Each of them would pay for his own advertisement, and in addition pay to the city a stated sum for placing his name upon the ballot and upon the voting machines. For the next four months and a half the merits of the respective can didates would be debated in the papers, and from mouth to mouth. They might hold the usual mass meetings, or present their views by advertising, as is now being done more and more; and their parties or adherents could trumpet their respective merits, as they do now.

Meantime, the Bureau of Elections would make its [ 3°2 ] Nomination and Election canvass and bring down to date, six weeks before election, its verified card index of voters, which would detect voters who had moved into the district, or from some other branch of the Bureau, since the last election. Those who moved from one branch to another within the six weeks before election would not lose their votes, as they do now, but would merely be obliged to report their shift both to the old and new branches, in order that their index cards should be transferred from one to the other in time for delivery of their Australian ballot; or perhaps to vote at their old branches for the nonce. Each voter would talk the matter over with his friends and his party managers and mark his ballot in peace and quietness at home, or elsewhere, and sign it and drop it in the box the next time he hap pened to pass the Bureau-which he certainly would do two or three times a week because of its situation -always keeping the coupon.

As received, the votes would be registered from day to day by the Bureau officials upon the voting machines; and the candidates, the reporters, and others interested would report the state of the race from morning to morning in the papers. The count would be automatically completed with the registra tion of the last vote, on the last voting day, and the result could then be announced. Bad weather should have no influence whatever upon the vote cast, even in the silk-stocking districts. Repeating, and colonizing votes, should be absolutely impos sible. The card index so maintained could supply all information now obtained by several different and expensive canvasses; viz.: for the city directory, for the post office directory, for the school census, for the police census of vagrant and criminal char acters, and for poll taxation, as well as for registra[ 3°3 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation tion of electors. In other words, a complete record of much floating and all permanent population would be in the hands of the authorities at all times; which should be extremely useful in the prevention of crime, and should cost considerably less than, the various separate canvasses now made.

I have been able to discover but two political dis advantages in the proposed method of nomination and election: the first, that it would facilitate the buying of votes. For the voter could simply mark and sign his ballot, and hand it over to the purchaser in return for so many dollars in cash. However, that is about what he does now, excepting that, to make sure, some ward worker goes along with him, marks his ballot for him, and watches him put it into the box. I see no way now or then in which a man who wants to sell his vote can be prevented from doing so. The second objection should be made only by the existing parties whose strangle-hold on the situation would be somewhat interfered with. Of course independent candidacies should be much easier and more numerous; while the very small number of elective offices and the very great importance that elections would necessarily assume by reason of .limited numbers and longer terms involved would make it almost imperative for the great parties to name candidates of the highest standing. Fortu nately, they have always been obliged to do so for the Presidency, and to a lesser extent for the United States Senate, the Governorships, and a few other very conspicuous offices. I do not see how it would be possible, for very long, with such a simplification of government, to pay the enormous number of party workers whose services are now indispensable, but who would then have almost nothing to do, as far as the detail of running elections is concerned. It [ 3°4] Nomination and Election seems to me that the business of the ward politician would be absolutely gone, and that he would have to seek some other means of livelihood-which were, as Shakespeare says, "a consummation devoutly to be wished."

The voter would never have to go to a registration place or to think about registration at all; it would come to him. He would never have to go to a primary or think of one at all. His first, second, or third choice on the ballot would express his preference as between candidates. The "slate" now made up, upon our long ballots of 30 or 40 candidates, for merely administrative offices,· would entirely disap pear; and all the preliminary fighting and trading of the working politicians merely to get their names before the voters would be utterly unnecessary and would vanish. It is possible that there might be too many candidates; men who for mere advertise ment, if for nothing else, would offer themselves to the voters. I think, however, that this would not often happen, both because of the considerable expense involved, as aforesaid, and because an in conspicuous or crooked candidate would hardly get his money's worth from the voters in an election at large. He might be laughed at, that is all. As to the permanent staff required to man the Registra tion and Election Bureau, it would not be very costly, because the distribution·· of the polling of the vote over the entire month instead of its congestion into a single day makes it possible to handle the polling with very few men.

The suggestion comes from my own experience in the gas business. When I was at the head of the gas consolidation in Chicago we used to read in the old fashioned way some 275,000 gas meters on the last day of every month, and then get the gas bills out in [ 3°5 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation a night-and-day rush within the next two or three days. In order to do this, we used to hire 2,000 students of Rush Medical College and the University, and give each man 100 or more meters to read; and when he had read them, he worked afternoons and evenings to write up the respective gas bills. The men were amateurs, and many of them unfamiliar with their routes. Ofttimes they could not find meters in dark cellars, and would skip them, guessing at the reading from the last month's bills; on the theory that the meter would keep on running and eat up any excess or catch up any shortage by the time the next inspector actually found it and read it.

Since my day, some clever gas-man saw there was no sense in reading all those meters on the same day of the month. All that is necessary is to read each one once a month ; 1,000, for instance, on the first of the month, another thousand on the second, and so on, spreading the work over the whole month, and ren dering the bills from the first of one month to the first of the next, from the second to the second, and so on-the consumer does not care which.' The discoverer of this simplification at once applied the idea, and it resulted in ctl~ting""aown the force re quired to read, ~tr~ an,d write 'pills to consider';lblY less tha~ one tentIt\qff~h~ 014 n~1Pber. MeantIme, the publIc are exactly~' 1*11 sa'tIsl'ied, and the work is better doNe.J ~ ~\ \,' : It seems l~\? "exactl~ ,tpe{saqle' with elections. There was in my ·~ime no eartlUJ reason why they should have to po'll;450,000 Votes ,in Chicago in a single day. It meant a congestion of work and an expense altogether disproportionate to its value.

Public opinion on the merits of candidates can just as well be expressed during the course of a month as during any particular 24 hours; and such expression [ 306 ] Nomination and Election is far easier to handle and to keep track of than the other. Conversation at the time with the publishers of the Chicago City Directory led me to believe that the permanent staff required at the Registration Bureaus would not exceed one person for every thousand voters, and that that number could not only make and keep up accurate card indexes of the entire population, and handle the entire vote, but could also compile all information for the city directory, the post office directory, etc., above re ferred to. To my mind, however, the great result achieved would be doing away with the present unquestion able necessity of the existing political "machines," which are the most costly, the most corrupting, and the most destructive parasites that affiict American democracy.

[ 3°7] CHAPTER XIX EFFICIENCY AND COMPENSATION OF GOVERNMENTAL PERSONNEL TURNING back to the question of efficiency of the small and concentrated governing bodies (namely: the local commissions and the State Senate) vested by my plan both with legislative and administrative control, it is probable that for the first two or three terms 'they would have to live strenuous lives. If, however, the methods of handling big business cus tomary in the great corporations are of value as criteria, such bodies would very rapidly cut legisla tion to the minimum, and confine it to matters of wide and general application only. They would probably commence by employing first-rate lawyers, to boil down and codify the great mass of statutes now on the books; and thereafter would pass no laws, and adopt no resolutions, which had not previ ously been filtered to clarified form by the best expert talent. As to administration, they would turn over existing complex organizations, of many wheels within wheels, to their appointed Manager, and leave them to him to reduce also to an orderly minimum; which would take a little time. One thing they would almost certainly do, and that is to arrange a system of compensation for the General Management, and for administrative heads of depart-, ments and their more important assistants, which would make it as interesting and profitable for an [ 308 ] Efficiency and Compensation of Personnel able man to serve the community as it would be to go into business on his own account. Our public policy throughout the United States has heretofore been to underpay the men entrusted with the large interests and great expenditures of the people. Private busi ness life is far more remunerative, far more inde pendent, and far more attractive than the higher grade service of the city and the state. The public servant's only compensation is that his name is oftener in the papers, though very frequently but as a target for abuse. As to his remuneration, our public policy is all wrong. He who serves the state well· necessarily does far larger and more disinter ested work than he who runs a grocery or a motor factory for himself and a few stockholders. The consequence of underpayment is for the most part mediocre talent in our higher service, waste and inefficiency in our public operations, and the con tinuous mounting of our tax rates. If control of our local governments were vested iIi men of successful record as managers of large affairs, they would be fote long, I am sure, invent methods of accounting which would enable them to give shrewd and eco nomical managers of public activities and finance an interest each in his own results attained; so that a faithful and successful public officer might retire, at 50 or 60 years of age, with an ample fortune, hon estly and openly earned by. constantly incre'lsed ser vice of the people, at constantly reduced cost, just as he would in private business.

On the other hand, our public policy has been to reward the rank and file of public employees, from common labor up, because they cast many votes, considerably better than the same persons could hope for at similar work for private employers. That, too, is all wrong. There is no reason why a [ 3°9] Tao Much Government-Too Much Taxation man should earn more money as a city policeman than as night watchman in a warehouse; .or why a trimmer of electric street-lights should earn more than a trimmer of the same lamps in a railway yard. Yet such is the custom all over the United States; and the difference between the wages in the one case and the other is in part grafted out of the man who earns it by the parasites of the political machine. In short, the thoroughly tested principle of big business should be applied, it seems to me, in public affairs, namely: to make the compensation of the constructive directing minds commensurate with the results actually achieved, and at least equal to the rewards of private business; in which case the honor and distinction of public office should attract the very ablest men to the public service. Onthe other hand, the compensation of those who merely work with their hands or pens (simply skilled work men under orders, average men and women whose ambition stops with doing a moderate day's work and drawing a full day's pay) should be fixed by the law of supply and demand, exactly as in other occupa tions, at merely "going wages."

Pensions. In this connection a word about pen sions is in order. Most governments grant pensions to superannuated military or civil servants of the community, besides their wages, which last in this country range higher for the rank and file than going wages in private business. I am personally doubtful as to ordinary pension systems, for the great reason that they discourage thrift and encourage wastefulness during the best years of men's producing power. Why should a man work hard to earn, and save hard to lay by, if gov ernment is to step in by and by and take care of him? .His family will probably be off his· hands by that [ 310 ] Efficiency and Compensation of Personnel time; and meantime he can spend as he likes. I can not believe in discouraging thrift or relieving any man of responsibility for his own future, especially at the expense of the community. Pension systems based upon compulsory contribution, taken out of daily or weekly wage, have at least the merit that the man provides for his own old age; but they have the vice of compelling him to do so. Voluntary thrift is the.

great desideratum. For instance, in France and Belgium, thrift is perhaps inborn, perhaps only habitual among the working classes.; but either way it is one of their most striking characteristics. Pauperism is almost un known. I remember one day walking down the Rue St. Antoine near the· Bastille in Paris; a street which corresponds to the Bowery in New York. I saw a crowd staring into a shop window and joined it, expecting to see a parrot and a monkey, or similar happy family in a cage. But what the crowd looked at was a lot of small-denomination bonds of one of the great French railways exposed in the front window of a local branch of the Credit Lyonnais. The bonds were in pieces as small as 50 francs (or less than $10.00) and bore 4-per-cent. coupons. That laboring crowd was going in, and buying those bonds, as fast as the clerks could hand them over the counter. Even so the common people and the farmers of France took t1}.e French government bonds back in the 70's, whose proceeds paid the German war indemnity of 5,000 million francs!

Look now across the Channel to England, where there was at that time (fifteen years ago) the most extravagant system of Poor Laws in the world. (Since then I think an old-age pension system has been added and an unemployment insurance, too). The consequence was what Commander Booth, of [ 311 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation the Salvation Army, called in his book that appeared just then "The Submerged Tenth." According to him, one tenth of the population of Great Britain was pauperized, dependent upon poor relief and destined to die in the poor house. Yet the popula tion of Great Britain was no more dense than that of France; nor its natural conditions in any way harder upon the working classes. It is true that the great distilleries and breweries, then as now owned and financed the English public-houses, and developed the sale of ale and beer, rum, gin, and whiskey, with all the powerful machinery of commerce; whereas the French cafe, and the sale of the cheap red wines of the country, was not so organized and financed.

This difference undoubtedly meant much; but it then seemed to me that the existence of so frightful a fact as "the submerged tenth" was directly traceable to the English Poor Laws; to the popular habit of wast ing during the productive years, without fear of, or shame at, becoming a dependent on public charity sooner or later. I expressed this thought one night to an English gentleman whom I met on a steamer crossing the North Sea some fifteen years ago. He turned out to be a magistrate, and one of the Poor Law Guard ians for his country. He answered about as fol lows: "I am afraid you are right. In my county we keep on building new poor houses and infirmaries. Our population does not grow, but the new houses all fill up at once. 'Nature abhors a vacuum,' you know. Create a free lodging, and that will bring a lodger to fill it." This matter seems to me fundamental and vital to the virility of a nation. For the manhood of any nation can be no stronger than that of its individual [ 312 ] Efficiency and Compensation of Personnel cItIzens. For that reason, I doubt the wisdom of governmental or compulsory pension systems; while, on the other' hand, I thoroughly believe in voluntary life and endowment insurance, in private or regular insur~nce companies-the insured saving up his own premIum.

Conclusion. Finally, it is my conviction that a marked distinction should be made between legisla...; tive and administrative public office. Legislative office should be entrusted only to the ablest, most experienced, most unselfish, and most incorruptible members of the community. When a man under takes to lay down the law for his fellowmen he should work for the honor of it and not for cash. That would put him in position to say to his fellow men, with authority, what they should or should not do; and without suspicion of selfish motive on his part in framing the law. His sole motive should be the general prosperity of the community; and his personal interest should, as far as is humanly pos sible, coincide with that general prosperity. It is a powerful argument for selection of men of ample fortune to serve as legislators, that in direct propor tion to their fortunes, must increase their interest in the general prosperity. It is as impossible for great properties to escape loss from general shrinkage in values as to escape gain from general prosperity.

While it is true that the poor man also likewise loses or gains, the rich man loses or gains more. Of course, he can live longer than the poor man upon his own fat, but his waist-measure shrinks much faster in proportion. Administrative office may, on the other hand, be a life career, commencing in youth, at the bottom of' the ladder in· the public employ; or else the reward of ability proven outside of that employ. It should [ 313 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation offer as great opportunity for not only an honest and comfortable living, but for brilliant success and large personal fortune, as is offered by private enterprise; for the latter, plus the prestige of high office, alone can command the highest ability. [ 314 ] CHAPTER XX TOO MUCH AND TOO COMPLEX TAXATION No CONSEQUENCE of the Great War is more interest ing or fraught with more beneficial possibilities than its ultimate effect on taxation. Everywhere through out the world, or at least among those nations lately belligerent, the powers that be are looking for new sources of national and local revenue-for something new to tax. At the same time everywhere the tax payers are rebelling against further imposition.

Pretty much everything in sight, in the way of ex isting property and income, has been taxed already. So the attention of the tax-gatherers is now turned to taxation of what does not· yet exist, toward future production rather than past thrift, by means of levies on turnover or sales. This new tendency seems to me wholly salutary and worth while, be cause by the very nature of such taxation, the atten tion of the taxpayers at last will be focussed on what the tax-gatherers are about. The vice of our existing taxation has been that it is so largely hidden from the voters that they have paid no attention to it. I am not a tax expert, and have not studied the history of taxation at all exhaustively, but it is a reasonable guess that the worldwide habit of taxing existing real and personal property grew up through the centuries, because the property was there; not to be hidden, convenient for seizure by Government in enforcing payment. Probably for the contrary rea[ 31 5 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation son the poor have largely escaped direct taxation, even under old-time autocracy; not from any particu lar sympathy for them, but because the property was not there; and it is impracticable to collect cash from those who have nothing but services with which to pay. Under modern democracy another powerful reason for not appearing to tax those who have little or nothing exists in the fact that there are so many of them, and that they are apt to be voters. The game of the average modern demagogue is to fool the many poor into the belief that the few rich pay all the taxes. Playing that game for fifty years or so in the United States has resulted in taxation so largely invisible that perhaps a majority of our voters imag ine that they pay no taxes at all.

'rhenatural result is that taxation seldom becomes a political issue. The writer has been a voter for more than fifty years, and has lived east and west in small and large communities, yet never has he known a single election to turn upon the issue of taxation, or governmental expenditure, national, state, or local. That issue is, in practice, not raised. Nevertheless, taxation is the paramount issue-the great issue profoundly affecting all good government; and most of all, democratic government. History is one long record of the rise and fall of governments; in which last overtaxation is usually a potent factor. Ind ustry, commerce, and the creation of weaJth are everywhere spontaneous, and spring up first; then government follows, and with it taxation. The cost of government has always been, always will be, and always should be, like the overhead expense in any productive industry, merely a protective, non-pro ductive charge upon industry. The less such a charge costs, the better for all concerned.

Whenever taxation grows excessive, and poverty [ 316 ] Too Much and Too Complex Taxation becomes unbearable to the people, then come revolu tion and overthrow of government. Meantime, daily life and industry go on somehow-as in Soviet Russia to-day-although crippled by violence and disorder . Eventually new government arises, and for a generation or two, while the lessons learned are fresh in mind, individual and national economy, law, order, and protection of property, prevail; and there commences a new cycle of prosperity. Men who love their country rejoice in that prosperity, and dream· that it will endure for ever; but it never does! The most that humanity can hope for is gradually to learn from the experience of the past; and so to reorganize government as to prolong cycles of pros perity to the utmost. Under democracy (the most likely form of future government in sight) no single factor is more vital to vigorous and prolonged na tional life than that of least and fairest taxation; and, as I said a moment ago, the colossal taxation of the Great War is now pressing on the attention of all nations almost to the exclusion of other factors. It is' the' psychological moment for a free people to stud y methods and amounts; and stand for least and fairest taxation.

Adam Smith's Four Canons; Their Viola tion. Adam Smith laid down over a century ago four cardinal principles or canons of taxation, which have been accepted generally ever since. They were as follows: First, EQUALITY OF TAXATION Second, CERTAINTY OF TAXATION Third, CONVENIENCE OF TAXATION Fourth, ECONOMY OF TAXATION. That' is to say, taxation must be just as between citizens, or proportionate to income received, direct or from property; it must not be arbitrary, subject [ 317 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation to the will or whim of assessors; it must be conve nient of assessment and collection; it must be econom ical, not costing the people materially more by its reaction on trade than it yields to Government in revenue. Let us examine our existing taxation for its con formity .. or failure to conform to these canons taken in their order. My own thought was first directed to the subject of equality of taxation by personal experiences away back in the 80'S when head of the gas industry in Chicago. I was nearly forty years old, and had had broad business training, yet never before had had occasion to reflect on that great factor in civil and political purpose. I have already told the story of a gas company voucher for $5,000 paid to a member of the Illinois State Board of Equalization, who threatened tax assessment of ruinous size. The Illinois laws imposed a capital-stock tax upon certain corporations, and placed the assessment thereof in the hands of the State Board of Equalization. But that Board was entrusted also with "equalizing,"

or distributing, state taxation among various local governments embraced in the state. These local governments, as is often done elsewhere, include the state tax along with local taxes, in making local as sessment and collection; but as the rural communities of Illinois were always trying to load upon the great city of Chicago what Chicago considered an unfair share of state taxation, the Chicago Assessors side stepped by assessing city property at only one fifth of its actual value; increasing the city rate of taxation accordingly to 6 or 7 per cent. The state rate of less than I per cent. thus applied, of course, to but one fifth of the real value of city property; which divided by 5 the share of the state taxation laid upon Chicago. [ 318 ] Too Much and Too Complex Taxation Under another statute, however, capital stock had to be assessed at market value, which therefore could not be divided by 5. Consequently a city assessment at 6 or 7 per cent. of market value, which in the case of the Pullman Company, for instance, was about $200 per share, would .have penalized that un fortunate concern (which was taxed also on its tan gible property in the state) with taxation of some 12 per cent. upon its capital; or more than its entire dividend. Such a working-out of a purely demagogic law was so manifestly and ruinously unjust that the law was ignored and became a dead letter; and the State Boar4 of Equalization used to assess such capital stocks upon the general principle of "you tickle me, I'll tickle you." The opportunity for graft was unique, and appointment to membership in the Board of Equalization became a political plum of such high flavor as to fetch $5,000 checks. The elements of "equality," and "certainty," too, were conspicuously ·absent in this taxation.

Chicago city taxation was no better. About the time of the experience with tax grafters noted above I suffered from simple stupidity of taxation, in which there was no graft asked or paid. I owned some real estate in the heart of the city, where skyscrapers were being erected; but this particular piece could not be so utilized without extending any lofty structure that might be. built upon it also over a small corner lot adjoining and essential to my property. Without the corner a profitable skyscraper could not be built; but it was tied up in litigation, and could not be ob tained. I waited in vain several years. Meantime, my property was taxed upon the valuation paid for near-by lots on the same street, upon which sky scrapers actually were erected. Upon my lot stood an old six-story building, which no desirable tenants [ 319 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation would enter. The taxation and expenses took more than the entire shrunken rents of the property, and cost me a net loss of six or seven thousand dollars a year. Finally, in desperation, I sold it at a heavy loss, to a corporation that wanted a well-situated low building' for its own special use, and was looking for cheap property. It has remained so occupied ever since. Yet that unjust tax assessment was levied according to law, though contrary to Adam Smith's principles of equality and certainty.

These are but haphazard cases out of thousands, to illustrate how any system of ad-valorem taxation, whether of land, or personal property, or income, must necessarily be subject to vast fluctuation of natural and artificial values; and must offer almost unlimited lack of "equality" and "certainty" with constant temptation to undervaluation, fraud, and graft. On general principles, any system which imposes any such strain upon human nature should be relegated to the scrap-heap as soon as any better substitute can be found. I have given only one or two instances, but the history of our taxation reeks with favoritism and corruption. Certainly we can do better by planning better. I repeat that I am no tax expert, and the very fact that experts are so necessary in our taxation speaks volumes for its violation of Smith's third canon, of "Convenience." Take, once more for instance, the most time-honored of existing ·taxes-championed by many as the only tax-that upon real estate.

The assessment of real estate for taxation is one of the most difficult of governmental functions. No two pieces of land are exactly alike, and the condi tions surrounding any given piece are continually changing. Thoroughfares are opened or closed, drainage' and sanitation improve or deteriorate, [ 320 ] Too Much and Too Complex Taxation fashion or industry causes shifting of occupancy. So great is the fluctuation in the value of real estate, especially in cities, that-as I know· by the bitter experience already cited-investment in any real property except a grave is quite as hazardous as stock speculation; the only advantage offered to the real estate plunger being that he is in practice com pelled to put up say 30 per cent. margin instead of the 10 per cent. demanded upon stocks-so that to that extent he is better financed against fluctuation. On the other hand, his market is far less broad and less immediate. So, when it comes to determining values of real estate for taxation, year after year, it requires the services of experts, intimately familiar through long .contact with neigh borhoods and changes, to··assess the value for taxation of one piece of property as against another; and like every govern mental function, this assessing power must beexer cised by human beings. It is therefore subject· to human error, human cupidity, or human favoritism; with the frequent results of inequality and injustice and graft. Furthermore, continuous and· com plicated records of taxable property, of changes of ownership, of liens, payments, and penalties, of court proceedings to enforce collection and the like, neces sarily load and encumber taxation of real estate, and aggravate its burdens.

Or consider our internal revenue and tariff taxa tion. Survey the huge machinery and complication of detail required in the assessment and collection of, for instance, the liquor taxes, or· the taxes on im ports; consider the necessity· of bonded warehouses, of entry and withdrawal thereat of liquor or goods, of following stuff in bond through years of storage, of hunting down and prosecuting illicit distillers; con sider, too, the immense premium placed upon crime [ 321 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation and fraud by the very nature of the taxes, of the commodities and of those who deal in them. Or, finally, consider the income and excess profits taxes. The Treasury Department at Washington is some three years behind in mere auditing of some millions of returns, and meantime there hangs over the heads of those who made them an unknown liability for taxation dependent upon the whim or judgment of the auditor, which will not even be known for years to come! Yet some 3,000 employees are engaged upon that audit!

Almost worse still, consider the demoralizing by products of personal property and income taxation; the constant opportunity and temptation to conceal personal assets and minimize income. Consider also the enormous establishments required for as sessing and collecting both and the huge govern mental expenditure involved. The cost of collection of internal revenue and cus toms taxation as given by the latest Statistical Ab stract of the United States (for 1919)-about $30,ooo,00o-was not excessive for the amounts collected. But for the cost of assessing and collecting state, municipal, and rural local taxation, statistics from public records are not so readily available; and more or less guess work must be indulged in. Per haps the following may not be too misleading: Tabulation shows that there are in the forty-eight states some 250 cities of over 25,000 inhabitants, and about 3,000 county governments; all of which prob ably elect or appoint, under various appellations, assessors and collectors of taxes. It is probably fair to estimate the number of these officials and their staff of bookkeepers, etc., at five persons per county in the rural communities, and in the cities at ten persons each; and that they draw nowadays an [ 322 ] Too Much and Too Complex Taxation 'average salary of $2,7°0 per annum all around.

The office accommodations, books, stationery,· etc., might average as in commercial offices, say $25 per month, or $300 per annum per person em ployed. A little arithmetic then gives roughly the total resulting bill for cities and counties as $52,5°0,000 per annum; and the entire cost for nation, state, and municipalities totals as follows:For the Nation, say as above $30,000,000. For the State (!% of revenue) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,500,000. For the Municipalities (17,540 employees @ $3,000 salary and expenses per annum. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52,500,000. $87,000,000. All expended without the creation of one cent of value, simply for laying and collecting a total tax ation say of ninety-two hundred and fifty million of dollars. These figures are too huge to grasp, but when com pared, as they will be further on, with the cost of collecting sales taxation, they constitute cumulative evidence of breach of the canon of "Convenience."

Last in our order of review comes violation of the canon of "Economy"; most frequent in tariff taxa tion-and one of the most potent arguments against that mode of raising revenue. Here are sonie typical cases: I was handed at the office of the Home-Market Club of Boston, yesterday, a leaflet from the Textile World Record of April, 1909, touching the tariff on washed and unwashed wools. It seems that wool shrinks tremendously in washing, some wools more than others. Ten thousand pounds of a certain greasy wool, said this leaflet, pays duty under the Payne Protective Tariff of $110. The same wool scoured weighs 6,652 pounds and pays $2,194.16; [ 32 3 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation difference $1,°95.16. Now it costs for labor to scour this wool $80.99; showing clearly that the man who scours has a tariff protection of $1,°95.16 to cover labor cost of $80.99, and need therefore have no fear of foreign importation. The details of this article are too confusing to go into, but I wish to point out the transgression of Adam Smith's fourth principle; that is, in tariff taxation which takes an extra cost of $1000 on every 10,000 pounds of wool out of the pockets of the people, and hands it over to the man who does the scouring, without yielding a cent to the Government in revenue. This case of scoured wool is comparatively unimportant, I fancy; does not run into the millions of dollars so fast. But consider a conspicuous instance, that of the tariff on iron and steel, which was for many campaigns the backbone of the Republican party's protective policy. Here is a much more effective illustration of violation of Smith's fourth canon.

When I first went west to Lake Superior, in 1869, there was a protective tariff on iron ore of 75 cents a ton. The lake ores went by water to Cleveland and by rail as far east as Harris burg, on the Pennsylvania R. R., there to meet the Spanish, African, and Cuban ores coming in by water to Philadelphia and thence by rail and paying 75 cents a ton import duty. West of Harris burg the freight rates on the foreign ores increased as they left the seaboard, while those on the lake ores decreased, and the foreign ores' came no farther inland. It did not pay to use them. The effect of the tariff of 75 cents a ton on the foreign ores was to give to the lake ores a strip of territory west of Harrisburg as wide as a freight charge of 75 cents a ton would bridge. If, for instance, the rate had been one half a cent a ton a mile, as it easily may have been, the lake ores kept a strip of ISO miles west [ 32 4 ] Too Much and Too Complex Taxation from Harrisburg that otherwise might have been penetrated by the foreign ores. From Johnstown westward, clear to the Rockies, the whole interior of the country, the great Ohio and· Mississippi valleys producing perhaps two thirds of our entire output of iron and· steel was already handed over to the lake ore owners, and absolutely protected from competi tion of foreign ores by freights. All the same they drew down a tariff bonus of 75 cents a ton, paid by the people of the United States in the shape of in creased costs of iron and steel, without turning in a dollar to the United States Treasury. There was a proportionate tariff on iron and steel, both of which enjoyed a largely unnecessary protection.

The consequence was the extraordinary growth of the great iron and steel fortunes, such as Carnegie's. He told me himself, one evening in 1875, that his properties were then worth at a conservative valua tion two millions and a half of dollars; and that he and his brother had started fifteen years before with less than twenty-five thousand dollars. He thought that growth astonishing and so did I; yet in 1901, only twenty-six years later, he sold those same prop erties and accretions to the. U. S. Steel Corporation for $450,000,000, and had earned $41,000,000 profit the current year. During that interim he had averaged an extra profit, presented to him by the tariff laws of our country, which I have heard es timated at 1>5 per ton on his enormous output, for which the people paid, whiletheTreasuryofthe United States got nothing. Nor can it be said even that the tariff created the giant industry; forit was created by the demand of the country for steel, which certainly was not stimulated by loading with an extra 1>5 the price of every ton hought. Certainly every ton that was bought would have been bought just the [ 32 5 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation same, if the price had been that much less; the mills would have grown just the same, and a comfortable profit would have been made, though not just the same. Mr. Carnegie would have been obliged to take in many more owners in financing his growth; and would not have accumulated so much and so fast himself.

The stock argument for a protective tariff is that it is vital to develop American industry and raises American wages; that it means the "full dinner pail," to quote the slogan of the McKinley campaign. If this argument were broadly true, its force would have to be admitted; but it has always been extremely difficult to establish any direct connection between high wages and high tariffs in any given industry; for instance, between the tariff on garments and the wages of the Sweat-Shop Garment Workers in New York. Furthermore, though some of our great manufac tures, such as steel and woolen, have certainly pros pered immensely under tariff protection (which has been credited by politicians with that great prosper ity), what has caused the immense development, for instance, of the oil or the automobile industries? The Carnegie fortune was, indeed, largely owing, as I have just said, to the protective tariff; but what of the· Rockefeller fortune, or the greatest fortune of all times, that of Henry Ford ? Neither Rockefeller nor Ford benefited at any time by tariff protection.

Yet theirs have been our most colossal business suc cesses-and both, particularly Ford, pay the highest wages in the world! The case for the Protective Tariff is, as the Scotch say, "not proven." It may be said truly enough that, though Carne gie's $450,000,000 came out of the pockets of our one hundred million people, they did not know it; nor did it make any practical difference to them. Four [ 326 ] Too Much and Too Complex Taxation dollars fifty cents each, spread over a period of forty years growth, or say eleven cents a year, certainly did not hold the American people back as much as it pushed Carnegie on. All the same, taxation that furtively takes out of all our earnings every year a few cents each for the enrichment of one of us, even upon the political excuse of reasonable war pre paredness, is economically vicious; and as certain to breed lobbyism and corruption in legislation and administration as carrion is to breed maggots.

Moreover, it always pays incomparably better to tra?e with other nations than to fight them at arms, or In commerce. Surely the simpler and better ultimate policy, especially for the United States, now the strongest and richest of all exporting nations in industrial resources, is that of universal peace and the "open door" at home and abroad; kept open perhaps by some form of association of the nations for disarma ment and maintenance of international justice. Meantime our exports languish, and our tariff and internal taxation are the plaything of politics and parties, constantly violating Adam Smith's Four Canons; and so complex and unintelligible, even to Congressmen and State Legislators who try to master them, as shown by their debates and blunders, that the average voter like myself can but conclude that they violate also every canon of common sense. No more convincing evidence of the demoralizing impossibilities of tariff legislation can be presented than the struggle in Congress over the Fordney McCumber Tariff Act, which has been so freely denounced in the press for months past. The Bill originated in the House, but the Senate loaded it with some 2,000 amendments~think of it! A Conference Committee will somehow iron out the differences ber 327 ] Too iMuch Government-Too Much Taxation tween the two chambers on this Bill, but what sort of intelligent or. just consideration can possibly be given by a Senate of 96 and a House of 435 members to endless variation in tariff rates, in a bill covering over 100,000 schedules! I personally am not a be liever in any taxation upon imports; but, if we must have a tariff, its schedules should never be framed by Congress or become a matter of political, as distinguished from economic, expediency. Maybe this suggestion is impossible. If so, so much the worse for our politics.

Hidden Taxation. I have spoken of least and fairest taxation. But what is least and fairest taxa tion? What should be the cost of government? No living man can answer these questions, for the excellent reason that we have no standards of com parison, and so far have never taken the least trouble to establish any. As I have said already, I have never known an election to turn on governmental economy or extravagance; because our taxation, while constantly growing, has been so largely hidden that legislators who vote away our taxes are not held responsible by those who pay them but never know it. It reminds me of an old-time telegrapher's story of the early days of the Western Union Company, when it was noted for iron-clad treatment of its employees. A highly trusted lineman was sent out one day in a blizzard to repair some lines downed by the storm, where the Pennsylvania Railroad crosses the Alleghany Mountains. He fought his way through snowdrifts and worked for several hours between two or three poles; and when his job was done, at the risk of his life, he could not find his overcoat, which he had had to throw off while climb ing among the cross arms and wires, and which had [ 328 ] Too Much and Too Complex Taxation become buried by the driving snow where he had tossed it. He reported to the Division-Superinten~ dent at Pittsburgh, and asked fora new overcoat at company expense. ' "You did a great job, Jim, and deserve a new coat all right," was the reply, "but you know mighty well that I never ca~ get a voucher for an overcoat past the Auditor at New York. I am sorry!" The lineman said "all right," and went his way; but for several weeks after that, every time he put in an expense voucher he asked the Superin~ tendent to look at it carefully, until at last the latter asked him why the devil he was so particular about his vouchers. The lineman answered: "I will not be any more, Sir; this is the last one. That overcoat was in those vouchers, but the Auditor will never find it, any more than you could" -and the Auditor never did. Jim got his coat, and the company paid for it.

Just so with our taxes: the voters pay them, but never find it out. Shall I give proof of this asser tion? Take, for instance, an item so conspicuous in our national revenue before the days of prohibition as the spirits tax. Out of a total national income of $724,000,000, in 1913, it yielded approximately $164,000,000. For a population of say ninety-seven millions in 1913, this tax amounted to $1.70 per cap.;. ita. Perhaps sixty per cent. of itwas paid by manu facturers, using alcohol in the industries; and passed along to the public in the price of their product.No body saw it there. Forty per cent. of it was paid, however, for the most part only by those who were known as moderate drinkers; probably not over one tenth of the population, or say ten millions in num ber. These men paid say $6$,000,000, or $6.50 apiece per annum; which was quite lost in the price [ 32 9 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation of their daily drink or drinks, costing say 10 cents each. The manufacturing cost of whiskey at Peoria used to be around 19 to 20 cents per gallon: the revenue tax about $1.10 per gallon-say six times as much. This revenue tax came to perhaps 2 cents per glass, or one fifth of the retail cost to the men who bought. Did the latter, largely laboring men, real ize the heavy burden of taxation thus laid upon but concealed from them? They did not!

Or consider the customs tax on woolen cloth. On the average these same working men probably bought before the war for say $75 or $80 retail prices, two suits of clothes and an overcoat annually. Ac cording to the Department of Commerce Statistics, the customs duty for 1917 was 37 per cent. ad va lorem on wholesale CQst of about $55. The aver age American working man that year paid a hidden tax of about $20 on these garments alone. Did the man know it? Did he realize that he was paying taxes of $26.50 per annum on but two items (clothes and drink) of his living cost? No; he had not the least idea that the tax-gatherers were reaching into his pocket, or that the Government was spending his money. On the other hand, our state and municipal taxa tion has been assessed for the most part upon land and personal property values, and further meagre revenue has been derived from licenses of various kinds; but in general only those who possess real property, or personal property that cannot be con cealed from taxation, are called upon to face the tax gatherers. In the country the farm owners, and in the towns the owners of buildings, industrial and commercial property, are taxed and know that they are taxed. But transient farm and industrial labor ers, and the large urban classes who live in rented[ 330 ] - - - - - Too Much and Too Complex Taxation lodgings, who together must constitute a very con siderable majority of our voting population-never have to worry about paying local or other taxes from the cradle to the grave. They pay most of the real estate taxes in increased rents but· never know it.

They think they pay none at all; and that the real estate owners, corporations, railroads, banks, and the rich fellows generally are paying the taxes. So our law makers figure that, as there are not many rich men, and as corporations have no votes, not very many voters will squirm and fight invisible taxation; and that laying the visible burden upon the rich will be popular with the poor, the majority. Well-the politicians are right enough in their shrewd estimate; taxation of the rich, especially the income tax, has undeniably appealed to the mass of the voters. Under such camouflaged taxation no fear of consequences has held back Congress, or the local governments, from lavish expenditure. Too Much Taxation. Coming now to state and local taxation, I have heretofore called attention to the multiplicity of taxing bodies, each taxing inde pendently of the other, for such amounts as each in clines to spend. This mayor may not result in extravagance; but must always tend in that direc tion. The logical remedy to-day is that of simpli fication, and consolidation of all taxing bodies to the utmost. This, of course, would .automatically be accomplished if the consolidation of local units and the simplification of local government suggested above were first to be carried out; which is also true of state government. Even making due allowance for the abnormal national and local expenditure caused by the Great War, the following revelation of what is annually taken out of his pbcket by our [ 33I ] Too Much Government-· Too Much Taxation various governments, national, state, and local, will stagger the average man when compared with his own annual income. Here it isl Note the steady increase in our burdens.

PER-CAPITA COST OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT (Statistical Abstract of the U. S., 1920, Page, 770) 1800-$2.04 1876-$5. 87 1891-$5.56 1906- $6.49 1810-1.17 1877-5.21 1892-5.29 1907-6.41 1820-1.90 1878-4.98 1893-5.77 1908-7.10 1830-1.18 1879-5.46 1894-5·43 1909-7.45 1840-1.42 1880-5.28 1895-5.16 1910-7.30 185°- 1.77 1881-5.06 1896-5.01 1911-6.96 1855-2.15 1882-4.92 1897-5.10 1912-6.84 1860-2.01 1883-4.94 1898-6.07 1913-7.01 1865-37. 27 1884-4·45 1899-8.14 1914-7.07 1870-7.61 }CiVil 1885-4.63 1900-6.39 1915-7.26 World 1871-7.16 War 1886-4.22 1901-6.56 1916-7.08 War 1872-6.66 and 1887-4.56 1902-5.96 1917-11.06 land 1873-6.84 Con-1888- 4.32 1903-6.26 1918-85.38 Con 1874-7.04 sequ-1889- 4.60 1904-6.50 1919-144.77 sequ 1875-6.25 ences 189°- 4.75 1905-6.77 1920-57.72 ences. NEW YORK CITY BUDGET INCREASE IN FIVE YEARS (From New York Herald, October 21, 1922) The following table shows New York City's steadily mounting budget during the Hylan administration. The figures for 1923 are those proposed for adoption yesterday by the Board of Estimate and may be trimmed somewhat before final acceptance October 31: Increase $ 9,9° 1,675 25,564,23° 71,881,935 4,944,9 25 11,252,457 Budget $248,025,759 273,689,664 345,571,599 35°,5 16,5 24 361,768,981 Year 1919 1920 1921 192 2 1923 (pro posed) The budget for I9IS-the last year of the Mitchel administration-was $238,123,759, and for 1914, Gaynor's last year, $199,388,158. The increase of [ 33 2 ] Too Much and Too Complex Taxation the proposed 1923 budget over the 1918 budget IS $123,645,222, about 52 per cent.

A particularly vicious feature of the 1923 budget is the fact that salaries were increased, not appar ently by the City Council, but by the State Legisla ture. On what principle taxation of New Yorkers for New York local expenditures, by vote of represen tatives from Buffalo and other towns in the-State of New York, can possibly be based, is one of those costly conundrums inseparable from our American variety of Too Much Government. Hardly a city in the United States but will furnish a record of increased expenditure, varying in degree, not often forced on it by State Legislation, but still unreasonably great. For many years to come we must foot the cost of the World War, gradually and year by year. A bil lion of the Civil War debt was still unpaid when the World War began; so we cannot now hope to get back to pre-war taxes in the near future. We can, however, lay down sounder limitations of govern ment activity, and curb ordinary national taxation at the same time.

TotaLnational receipts from taxation in 1919 were four billions six hundred forty-eight millions; for 1920 the estimated requirement was four billions one hundred and eighty-five millions; of which one billion was to pay interest on war loans. That is to say, from a population of one hundred and five mil lions as per the census of 1920, the National Govern ment planned to take for taxes in various forms nearly $40 per capita. The various state govern ments also spent during 1918 (figures for 1920 not yet available) eight hundred and ninety-three mil lions; or in round numbers as the population then stood, $8.50 per capita. The 227 municipalities of ( 333 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation over 50,000 population throughout the United States, for 1919, took eleven hundred fourteen mil lion dollars from their population of thirty-four mil lion seven hundred thousand; or$35.58 apiece.

In Massachusetts the bill came higher. Seventy five towns of over 5,000 population took from 680,600 residents thirty-eight million five hundred thousand dollars, or $56.50 apiece. Two hundred and one small towns in Massachusetts, of less than 5,000 popu lation, took from 400,000 people eighteen million five hundred thousand dollars, or about $46.50 each. Apparently government costs the country taxpayer in Massachusetts more than it costs the average city taxpayer (not in his own state, but in the United States generally); which is logical-and should be the case universally . For the cost of government ought to decrease per capita with the increase of population served, just as the cost of doing any kind of business tends to decrease with the growth in volume of business done. However, if we accept the grand average of all the 50,000 population cities in the country, namely, $35.58 annual tax per capita, in order not to over estimate, as fair for the entire country (that is, no higher in the rural communities than in the cities), we have the following result for 1920: The national collection from each of us was $4°.00 The state do do 8.50 The municipal do do 35.58 Total collection for that year per capita and it is not likely soon to be less.* $84.08 *The National Industrial Conference Board's Research Report No. 55 of October, 1922, gives total taxation per capita as $87.4o-a more ac curate survey than my own-for year 1921. Percentage of average income absorbed by taxation, 16.7 per cent.

[ 334 ] Too Much and Too Complex Taxation How does this compare with our national earnings per capita? The Statistical Abstra'ct of the United States Census for 1919 estimates the gross income of the American people for 1914 at $35,282,000,000, or $388 per capita. Various estimates of gross income for 19I 9 taken from the statistical record of the Census Bureau at Washington, and from the pub lications of the Bankers Trust Co. of New York, and of other economists, run from forty billion to sixty-eight billion dollars per annum. Assuming fifty billions as the mean, and a population of one hundred five millions, we have in round num bers an earning power of $475 per annum per capita, as against an average tax per capita of $84.08. In other words, more than one sixth of the average income is absorbed by national, state, and local government in aggregate average taxation. It makes no diffetence what the form of that taxa tion is; this great average burden of say 18 per cent. of the annual income is actually laid on every man, woman, and child of our population, directly or indi rectly-and the bulk of it is paid indirectly by the original producer, the worker. If taxation lies on real estate, the poor man pays his share of it in rent; if it lies on whiskey and clothing, he pays for it in the increased price of both. Even in the case of taxes on income or excess profits (both yielded by high prices to the consumer), though they are laid pri marily on,the rich and on the successful corporations, still a burden· is shifted eventually. to the shoulders of the working man; for those taxes seriously cut down the accumulation of capital which otherwise would be employed in useful industry, giving him new openings for employment, paying new wages, stimulating productiop, increasing the volume of [ 335 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation commodities, and lowering prices. Moreover, in come and excess-profits taxation cause the well-to-do to switch their inve~tments, from successful produc tive industries where they are heavily taxed, into tax-free obligations of government, where they neither produce revenue nor serve useful purpose in creating future industry; although they do have the merit of contributing to pay the piper for past governmental extravagance.

Collectively, we now payout this sixth of our gross receipts}n taxes; but how many of us know it? Let us enquIre. There are 6,400,000 farms as per Census of 191o,' and 20,000,000 homes, including the farm houses. There were 275,000 manufacturers in 1914 and 3,500,000 persons reported for income tax in 1919, 345,000 corporations reported earnings for taxation in 1917. Merchants numbered about 1,200,000 according to Census of 1910. Probably all of the foregoing, numbering together by this time perhaps twenty-five million persons, were taxed, and knew it -but how many of them were voters? In the rural districts probably half of the voters were taxed, and knew it; but in the cities, the centres of industrial population, my guess would be that two thirds of the voters never knew or now know that they are taxed, or have any interest in cost of government at all. It is high time that everyone of us waked up and looked about him, to see where our Ship of State is going; to find the leaks in its hold and stop them before the decks are awash. To stimulate our curiosity, let us note the extraordinary differences in cost of government in different years and coun tries. For instance, the Dept. of Commerce Statis tical Abstract for 1920 gives the taxation per capita [ 33 6 ] Too Much and Too Complex Taxation collected by leading governments as follows (re duced to dollars) : ItalY-I 919 .

Belgium-I 914 . France-I 9 19 . Germany-I 918 . ]apan-I 919· .. ~ . Great Britain-I91.o . United States . Canada-I9 18 ......................•...••..• 1> 49·94 1.0·35 49·44 17·37 7.0 7 11.3.40 41.~91. 3°.18 What vast differences are shown; and why should they be so vast? I have in the foregoing pages on taxation taken the hastiest, most superficial crack at a few of the most conspicuous inequities of a huge problem, that of just and wise taxation. I should be ashamed to write of it in so sketchy a way did I not know that I paint a picture familiar to every reader's eye. I have been paying taxes, domestic and foreign, for myself and others all my life; and I can truly say I never knew anything about them. I have had to take the word of tax experts, or go it blind, every time. I never met a man, not a tax expert, who knew, any more than I did, what our governors were spending; how much they ought to spend; how they apportioned the amount amongst us; or how they ought to do so !

Now I submit that amounts and methods of taxa tion-the very foundation of all government, the crux of good government-which are so complex as to be utterly beyond the m~stery of men of ex perience as broad as my own (to say nothing of the millions of average voters) are utterly unsuited to democracy. The profoundest concern of the peo ple lies right there, in taxation! That they should be absolutely without knowledge of it would ,be [ 337 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation called unbelievable if it were not so universally habitual and true. Every man ought to know what government ought to cost him. With this apology for wasting no more time in proving what nobody denies, I leave the existing situation for the moment; to return to it later in making suggestions for better methods of taxation. { 338 ] CHAPTER XXI SIMPLIFICATION AND VISIBILITY OF TAXATION New Canons of Taxation Needed. Adam Smith's Four Canons of Taxation were enunciated rather early in the evolution of· British democracy; when for the most part the suffrage was restricted to the few, and taxes. were assessed against those who had visible, tangible property; upon landholders and capi talists. Probably they were reasonably fair and just then, as between the men who paid them. But in our day and land of universal suffrage our American principle that "taxation without representation is tyranny" necessarily implies the converse principle, that representation without taxation is injustice.

Smith's intention was, of course, to do justice; to make every citizen bear his fair share of the burden of common defence, security, and welfare. In his day, as I have said before, taxes were assessed and col lected upon existing property, mainly upon land; and it was admitted that a certain recognition was due those who paid the largest taxes. That recognition worked out in the form of graded suffrage, or right to elect representatives and governors; which was granted only to those possessed of property, and to some extent in proportion to the amount thereof. The value of property was fixed by the rents or in come received from it; and the value of government as protection to the property owner, viz., his contribu tion to taxes, was estimated in proportion. Here [ 339] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation and there some injustice resulted; as, for instance, in the case of misers, who paid increased taxes by reason of savings useful to the community-whereas no man himself profits by stinginess. However, among the comparatively small number of tax payers of that day such a distribution of taxes on the whole probably worked out fairly enough; and it was not unfair, as between taxpayers, that voting power should conform to taxpaying power. How now do our present methods work out?

To-day, as we give every man, rich or poor, and indeed every woman, equal voting power, the choice of governors and the determination of national policy has passed from the hands of those who have much property to those who have little or nothing. There is no longer any justice in laying taxation only upon those who have, and according to what they have, if others who have nothing have equal voting power. Let it not be supposed that government is instituted for the benefit solely or mainly of the rich and strong. On the contrary, from the very earliest dawn of history government has been and is framed for the protection of the poor and the weak, against the rich and strong-who are abundantly able to protect themselves. The poor are always in the majority, in every age and clime; because most men, like most animals, work and save just hard enough to keep themselves comfortably alive. If they have set up good government, they keep their little sav ings in ·peace and safety and they prosper. The abler and thriftier among them produce more, keep more, and prosper more. To that extent govern ment is more useful to the able than to the dull; it helps to make them rich faster in reward for their greater energy. It is perhaps just that the able and thrifty should contribute proportionately to cost of [34° ] Simplification and risibility of Taxation government, but not that they should pay its entire cost.

A very little consideration shows that the middle class and poor folk really benefit more by government than do the rich; and actually cause most of the cost of government. They occupy, use, and wear out more square ~ yards of the public streets and high ways than do the rich, by ten to one at least. They drink more of the water supplied by public works; their children fill the larger part of the public schools; the police are occupied in watching over criminal classes recruited mainly from their number; the hospitals and asylums are mainly filled by them; the street-cleaning and sanitary service, the removal of garbage, and prevention of disease, are almost en tirely for protection against their willingness to live without cleanliness. Local government, good local government, is an essential factor in· their daily lives; while most of the functions it performs for them are privately performed, and paid for, by the rich for themselves. National and state govern ments are farther removed than local government from the daily life of the poor, and come more to the direct attention of the rich and well-to-do; yet still underlie all industrial peace and prosperity, upon which the welfare of the working men so entirely depends. Here again the latter get their full share of benefit from cost of government; and everyone of them should contribute full-share to it. They do so only in military service at present.

To Adam Smith's Canon of Equality should now be added a new canon, that of Universality. For it is utterly false to every principle of free representative government that even a single voter should share by ballot·the power of ordaining government, yet seek by exemption from taxation to escape sharing in its cost. [ 341 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation Furthermore, as Adam Smith's Canon of Equality, as explained by him, meant contribution to cost of government in proportion to property or income, our modern conception of universal suffrage without regard to property or income, per contra, logically demands for taxation a measure of proportion with out regard to either. No other measure remains but that of every man's expenditure; of outgo in stead of income. All that a man gets out of life is what he and his consume. The inscription upon the tomb of the old knight at Innsbruck-was it not ?-sums up the story of riches in three lines: "What I saved I lost: What I spent I had: What I gave I have."

That is the true philosophy of wealth-how best to get rid of it. All that a man works for is the means to spend. His home, his food, his clothes, his lux uries-one of the greatest of which is to maintain a certain social station-to enjoy all of these things is his excellent reason for laborious years in office or work-shop, and for constant economy all through life. His main object in supporting the burden of government is to insure to himself and others, weak or strong, their respective rewards for thus working and saving. But only when and as he quits saving, and begins spending, does he actually realize that reward; and only then, logically, should he pay what might be called an insurance premium upon, and proportioned to, the reward actually enjoyed, in the shape of taxation on his personal expenses. How would taxation so levied-that is, upon ex penditure-satis(y us here in America; whether for [342 ] Simplification and risibility of Taxation justice to poor and rich, or for the good of the community?

The answer is, I think, that for every reason of justice and patriotism as well, every voter rich or poor, man or woman-should be taxed, should bear and should be glad to bear, should be ashamed to shirk, his or her fair share of the cost of government. Once more let me submit that a new canon should be added to our theory of taxation, namelv, "Taxa tion must be Universal as well as Equal." W But what is each voter's fair share of universal taxation? Shall it be proportioned to what the voter has? But many voters have nothing; and from those who have little-who have no fixed abode, who are migratory by trade or by nature-how shall taxes be collected, and to what community shall they belong? Shall the man or his property be taxed, where found, on a day certain, once a year? How, then, shall payment of taxes be enforced? The same old conundrum presents itself-for which no an swer has ever been found, and which apparently has freed the poor heretofore from paying for govern ment maintained principally for their benefit!

We have already seen in a very sketchy way, yet clearly enough, I think, the inevitable failure of existing methods to reach all property and reach it fairly; also their deliberate deception of the voter, their intent to make the many think themselves not reached at all by the hand of the tax-gatherer. We have recognized the poison of graft and corruption fed into administration and party politics by the very impossibility of doing justice in taxing property; we admit the vice of penalizing that most useful human virtue, thrift. Is there then no better way, no fairer measure of the voters' duty and ability to contribute to the common expenditure for all, than [ 343 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation taxation of what they have? What, indeed, can we levy on and how can we collect, in the frequent case of those who spend everything and have nothing? The mere putting of the question in the foregoing form at once suggests its simple and logical answer that the fairest measure of duty and ability to contrib ute to the public expenditure is the amount which every voter privately expends upon himself, includ ing, of course, his family; that that expenditure ac curately measures the value of government to him, and his just ratio of payment therefor; and that the way to collect is to do so as he spends. Let us follow out this thought a little.

If the workingman's family spends the bulk of the family income, as most working families do, it must payout every year at recent rates of wages let us say $1,500 or even $2,000. (Families average more than one breadwinner each.) Supposing now that Rockefeller spends, as he easily may, $500,000 per annum upon his personal and family living, he would spend two hundred and fifty times as much as the working family; and if both were taxed in pro portion to expenditures he would pay 250 times the taxes paid by the latter. Certainly Rockefeller on that basis would get off much cheaper, as far as his check for taxes is concerned, than he does now; but will any man contend that he and his family cost government anything like as much as two hundred and fifty workingmen and their families? Rocke feller is a peaceful, law-abiding, orderly citizen, for whom police and jails are not maintained, and who is said to employ his own special guardians of life and home. He probably educated his children 'at private schools; and will pay his own doctor's bill and funeral expenses when the inevitable day comes. He creates small demand for cleaning and sanitation at public [ 344] Simplification and risibility of Taxation cost where he lives; and about the only direct return he gets for his taxes that 1 can think of offhand is a fairly good roadway under his motor car. To be sure,' his home is safer frt'm Bolsheviks and thugs than if there were no state troops or city police; yet I fancy he could surround himself with retainers, as the robber barons used to do, for less than the amount of his present tax bill.

Will any man of common sense argue that govern ment is worth to Rockefeller two hundred and fifty times as much as to the average head of a family? How can or does he, or any other very rich man, get much more out of government than any poorer fellow citizen? Government does not make his fortune for him; but, on the contrary, in this our day tries to prevent his making it, and taxes it away from him to the utmost. Very often even his own country men do not make it for him; but he goes after it to the ends of the earth. All his government can do for him is just what it does for the poorest of his na tion; namely, to protect what he honestly creates or acquires. It can do no more, and ought to do no less, for any citizen. Unfortunately for the very rich, they can eat but three meals a day; just like the nearly rich, the well-to-do, or even the average workingman. No rich man can conveniently' wear more than one suit of clothes at a time; in which he resembles the well-to-do and the poor man. There are only a few multi-millionaires in America, and but one of them a Rockefeller; yet there are many hundred thousand well-to-do men, and their families, who live sub stantially as well as he. He surpasses them ap parently only in magnificent power to give away which after all is the supreme luxury! Of what other use to him, or to any other rich man, are surplus accumulations in excess of his cost of living and [ 345 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation giving? They but increase his cates, since he must reinvest and make them productive-which is cer tainly worth far more to the men employed than to the rich man himself; for their livelihood depends on the success of one particular venture that employs them; while his usually does not. For him, there is merely to accept the immutable law of nature, and of idle wealth as well, that "Moth and rust doth cur rupt, and thieves break through and steal." There is but one salvation for modern wealth, namely, to keep it employed in useful industry. Therein lies the value of the multi-millionaire; and there must be his function in the world, the reason for his existence, so laid out by the creator of all things, as I guess it -to act as conservator for part of the world's wealth, and a wise director of its useful employment.

Let him, for instance, build a new factory in a coun try village. Everyone welcomes the industry and the quiet town starts at once into life unknown before. Let him build a railway or steamship line, and link together isolated communities. Every one rejoices, population grows, and agriculture pros pers. But the man himself cannot eat, drink, wear, or house his family in either factory, railroad, or tnine. Oftentimes he never even sees either one or the other, and has to be content merely with appointing some other man to run it; hopeful of profit if it prospers, but certain of loss if it does not. Even if it does prosper, the very rich man himself enjoys nothing from increased income, but merely carries an ever-increasing load of investment and care. He has, of course, the gratification of financial power and reputation, and the respect of his fellow men for his achievements; but why should these intangible though just rewards of thrift, courage, and brains be penalized and discouraged by taxation?

[ 346 ] Simplification and risibility of Taxation Are such penalty and discouragement for the best interest of the community? Is it not better for all of us-even the very poor-that capital should ac cumulate, and be kept usefully employed? Are not, for instance, the banks,' railways, and factories of these fortunate United States the foundation of the difference between the lot of the working folk here and, let us say, in Soviet Russia, or in China, where to-day thirty million people have just been starving for lack of means of transportation and finance, and asking alms from us? Indeed it is altogether stupid to tax a man on what he saves but does not enjoy. That is to penal ize thrift; the most thrifty thus paying the greatest taxes-though they contribute least to cost of govern ment, and most to the common welfare. Thinking A.mericans must recognize that thrift, though per fectly selfish in its purpose, is in practice first bene ficial to the community, and only later to the thrifty man himself-namely, when he spends. So long as he saves, his savings only increase his capital, which under modern conditions must accumulate in pro ductive industry, trade, and transportation, and be come the foundation of the common prosperity.

To tax that capital is therefore a blunder. We are just now seeing upon a very large scale the evil result of Excess-Profits taxation in penalizing thrift and prosperity. The reinvestment of American capital in active industry and the development of produc tion thereby have sensibly been checked; while ex travagance and .crooked effort to evade taxation have been stimulated. The owner says to himself, "What's the use of working harder, of taking greater risks and doing more business, only to have my hoped-for greater profits absorbed in ever more ruth less taxation?" Perhaps that man is not quite right; [ 347 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation but he is eminently human, if he lets up in effort and slows down in pace. Thrift should not be punished! Finally, it does not stand to reason that a man's income or accumulations should measure his fair share of taxation; but rather should his rate of spend ing. Rockefeller has five hundred millions and the average worker say five hundred dollars.' Is the former a million times happier, or more of a man, or does he cast a million times the vote of the latter?

He spends perhaps two hundred fifty times as much, or so we assumed a little while ago-but does he get even the odd fifty times as much out of life as does the average worker-or anything like the joy of living of fifty husky "hunkies"? The master of Standard Oil was said, not long ago, vainly to have offered one of those millions for a good digestion. Certainly he has only one life for government to protect-not two hundred and fifty; nor even the nine lives of the traditional cat! No, it is not just to the poor man (nor good for the community) to maintain government mainly for his benefit; yet tax him nothing for it. It is not just to Rockefeller, nor good for the community, to tax him out of all proportion to what government does for him; or spitefully to penalize him, for being enor mously successful in furnishing the world with oil. In fact, no matter how rich he may he, the multi millionaire can derive from government, as com pared with the rest of us, no benefit that cannot be fairly squared by payment of the same rate of taxa tion as paid by us all, applied to his greater cost of living. Such taxation would more truly meet the intention of Adam Smith's Canon of Equality than does our present nondescript mess of system and no system. It seems to me high time to add to our modern theory of taxation a Sixth Canon: "That [ 348 ] Simplification and J7isibility of Taxation taxation should be proportionate to Expenditure, not to property or income."

I have showed the mischief of .concealment of' taxation in a former chapter. While we are amend ing or adding to Adam Smith's Four Canons the two new ones that "Taxation must be Univers'al", and upon "Expertditures," let us add also another, a Seventh Canon-if anything more vital still to Free Government; that "Taxation must be Visible to every voter." It is one saving grace of the Great War, one of the "sweet uses of adversity," which may well be borne in on this fortunate country of ours, that we are at last aware of taxation. May we never shut our eyes to it again, if we value the integrity of our system of representative government! I would urge that our taxation be laid not only on every voter without exception, but should also daily be thrust upon his attention; in form so simple and com prehensible, and at rates so plain and so easily com parable with his total cost of living, that a rise or fall in public expenditure shall as instantly be recog nized by him, as it is in his own daily wage or in come. I would have him keenly conscious of taxa tion; and continually alive to the responsibility of legislators and administrators, for honest conduct of the vast business of the people.

"Eternal Vigilance is the price of Liberty!" -!nost of all perhaps in the vital affair of taxation! Lastly, I would add an Eighth Canon, that of "Least Taxation," or in other words, Least Govern ment-based upon the simple principle that gov ernmental function, supported by taxation, should be limited to those activities for the common good, which are too costly or too unprofitable to spring up spontaneously; or else by their nature are fraught [ 349] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation with power too great safely to be entrusted to private initiative and control. New Methods---Retail-Sales Taxation. I have argued above, as the gravamen of my charge against our existing taxation, that it is not "Universal" while suffrage is universal; and that it is largely and intentionally "Invisible," while its constant and dangerous· growth, for every reason of honest citizen .ship and free self-government, should never be con cealed for a moment.

My prior argument, or showing of constant viola tion of all of Smith' s Four old Canons, was relatively not so important; though, again for every reason of good democracy, such violation should be stopped at once. Let me now go on to argue that our whole attempt to punish the rich for being rich, by taxing away their money; our whole existing theory of taxation of property, or income, especially when pyramided or repeated during the various steps in production, is not only ethically false, but economically unsound. The whole machinery of industry, the creation and distribution of all products, exists only in anticipa tion of final consumption of every product by some body; and leads but to its disappearance from the face of the earth once for all. Increased production and consumption of commodities, and they alone, mean higher standards of living; they alone cause common prosperity and are universally desirable.

Every obstacle to the former-especially such a negative obstacle as taxation-should, in common sense, be removed from the path of industry; up to the final point when production and distribution cease and consumption takes place. At that point the value created and consumed must always be exactly and automatically assessed, in the process [ 35° ] Simplification and risibility of Taxation of final retail sale; and taxation upon it should then be paid by the ultimate consumer-as his perfectly visible, unquestionably just, and entirely unavoidable contribution to the common purse. Just now has come into the spotlight a new method of taxation-namely, upon sales; publicly proposed by responsible political leaders, and by business men and economists-largely adopted al ready in France and elsewhere-which is likely to be forced upon the slow acceptance of the mass of our voters by the mere pressure for revenue and the exhaustion of old sources of supply. I hail this new departure with enthusiasm; because, if rightly limited to Retail Sales, it will not only conform perfectly to all four of Adam Smith's old Canons, but will abundantly satisfy the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh of the new ones, just formulated above; while as to the Eighth-the consciousness of taxa tion created by taxing only ultimate Retail Sales would tend to exalt the importance, and amplify the acceptance, of the most vital and basic principle of all, that of "Least Taxation."

Let me verify the foregoing statement by consider ing the actual working out of Retail-Sales Taxation in some detail. To begin with, precisely the same principles should apply to every tax, whether paid to the United States, the state, or the municipality. It follows, therefore, that, if Visible or Sales Taxation is advisable at all, it should as rapidly as possible be made our sole method and applied to the collection of all public revenues, whether national, state, or municipal. Taxation is merely the accepted means of fairly dis tributing cost of government; and the total amount of taxes is the total cost of government, no more and no less. The latter is not altered much by the [ 351 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation mere method adopted for tax collection; therefore rates of sales taxation would easily be determined for nation, state, and municipality, by the proportion that total cost of each government bears to total retail sales within its jurisdiction. It would be necessary at the outset to make a survey of total retail sales for former years, from which to estimate probable gross sales for the future. This estimate used as a denominator, with the total revenues re spectively required by the different governments for the coming year as numerators, would give as quo tients separate uniform taxation rates-or percentage of retail sales for the nation, the state, and the muni cipality. These three rates added together would give a total rate, to be assessed and collected local~y and preferably monthly-upon retail sales.

There would from time to time arise, of course, the difficulty experienced in all taxation, of overesti mating revenue and underestimating expenditure. Fluctuations in prices and consequent money value of total sales are certain to occur; as, for instance, in the year 192 I. The gross figures of retail sales may easily be from 30 to 40 per cent. less than those of 1919. Like fluctuation, however, occurs in most existing taxable values, as the current shrinkage in customs and internal revenue abundantly proves. I Unfortunately, there is no workable method of shrinking governmental expenses so' as closely to anticipate or even follow unforeseen shrink age of governmental income. Like overhead ·ex pense in private business, the cost of government is not elastic; and it must run on, substantially uni form in good and bad times alike. The customary remedy would still be applicable; viz., to offset mis calculations by deficiency appropriations for the last year, added to regular estimates for the next [ 352 ] Simplification and risibility of Taxation year. There should be, however, the same advan tage realized by the daily intrusion intp life of sales taxation, in calling public attention to deficiency ap propriations, as in the case of regular appropriations.

It would become politically more important than it now is that those who make up our budgets and levy our taxes should' also make' accurate and eco nomical estimates, and live up to them! It needs but brief thought to show that only final retail sales to the consumer need or should be taxed; as all other sales are but intermediate succes sive steps in the process of production and distribu tion of the thing consumed,' and would if taxed in volve "pyramiding." Application of this principle would also wipe out at one stroke all taxation of standing values; of real estate--which is never con sumed-of buildings, or raw materials, factories, railways, mines, machines, etc., in short, of all means of production and distribution; and would restrict it to the simple daily toll of retail or ultimate sales and rents; covering shelter, food, clothing, luxuries, and recreations of personal consumption or enjoyment. Some of these, even, might present difficulties and have to be cut out; although not very many. (One such instance which occurs to my mind, in hasty review, is that of personal transporta tion for pleasure; such as railway or steamboat travel on vacation or for social purposes. Such journey-' ing constitutes an item of ultimate personal con sumption, and should logically be taxed. But the difficulty of differentiating at the ticketseller's win dow between business and pleasure trips, in collection of the tax, would probably make it more convenient to leave that item, with other such, altogether out of consideration. On the other hand, transportation by motor-such as joy-riding, as distinguished from [ 353 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation motor trucking-should logically pay sales tax; and differentiation in record thereof on the sales ticket kept by the gasolene salesman could be arranged without difficulty. Another difficulty would be to tax farmers or bakers, for instance, for food produced and consumed by themselves; and to tax itinerant peddlers, newsboys, and the like on their sales. But such sales are small in comparative total amount and could probably be ignored without doing great injustice to anybody. In general, it may be said that modern methods of retail accounting, certainly in the United States, have developed to the point where very few retail sales are made without being recorded either upon a charge ticket or a cash-sales register, even in the smallest retail establishments.

No accounting machines or methods worth mention ing need be added to those now in actual daily use throughout the country in order to furnish complete and accurate record of taxation, if levied upon the great mass of retail sales, no matter ho,v small. Our whole business system is ready, in short, for the quick and frictionless adoption of Retail-Sales Taxation. As I have just said, the evolution of the cash register and of the sales ticket, has provided in advance the means for assessing and registering such taxation, without imposing a serious burden upon either buyer or seller. Offhand, I can think of no merchant, except perhaps the banana peddler and the newsboy, who is not nowadays provided with a cash register. There should be no difficulty whatever (so the cash-register men tell me) in providing each cash register with a tax-adding mechanism so that the vendor can ring up the sale and the tax also for each cash transaction. The cash-register manufac turers already make just such machines for specific sales, such as at soda fountains. For credit trans[ 354 ] Simplification and Visibility of Taxation actions, the modern practice is to make out duplicate purchase tickets and subsequently charge same to the buyer's account. It would again impose no great burden upon the salesman to figure the tax on amount of sale and add it on the sales ticket at the· moment of sale, exactly as is now done upon patent medi cines. These sales tickets go to bookkeepers, who charge them to the customers' accounts from day to day. There are various systems of entry; for the most part such that classified total sales of the· day or second day before are placed upon the manager's desk every morning. Many sales tickets are made and totaled at the same time by adding-register ma chines. Here again there would be no difficulty in entering in parallel column each sale and the tax thereon; so that total taxes for the day might be reported back to the manager together with the total sales. There would, of course, be a little more labor required for each sales ticket and each entry, but I think most practised bookkeepers will agree with me that the time required for keeping records of sales taxation would not increase the work of bookkeeping more than one fourth. If so, I imagine that mer chants and other proprietors would willingly accept this additional cost of labor, in lieu of undergoing the annoyance of existing methods of assessment and taxation of their business; to say nothing of thus contributing to eventual reduction of aggregate tax ation.

It would, however, certainly remove all cause for complaint on the part of retailers, and make them cordial co-operators in ensuring collection of taxation on all retail turnover, to allow them a small com mission for doing the work of figuring, collecting, and transmitting to the proper local collecting officer, each concern for itself, the entire taxation on its own [ 355 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation sales, from month to month. To allow them such a commission would be entirely fair as between them and other tax payers, the latter being at no trouble whatever in regard to tax returns; and equally fair to government, which would thus be relieved of enor mous labor and expense. A uniform commission of a fraction of one per cent. should be sufficient to com pensate proprietors for buying cash registers and installing standardized accounting blanks; the latter suited to tabulation and entry en bloc at the Tax Collector's office, in the quickest and simplest way.

As to payment of taxes, here again great conven~ ience and economy should result. There would be no material difficulty caused by requiring each proprietor to report, upon the same day of the month for all concerns in the same vicinity, the total of taxation taken from the cash-register "counters," or the tax column of the sales journals for the previ ous 30 days. There should be no more difficulty in this than in settling with merchandise creditors for purchase accounts ,due each month: Merely one more statement, to render, and one more check to draw, for money already taken in or charged to customers' accounts. Thirty days' delay might be allowed the proprietor for collecting the latter, and he might be refunded taxes paid on bad-debt ac counts never paid him. But in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred the Government would get in its money from the merchants without ever having to send a collector after it. Taxes draw penalties for non-payment, and are promptly taken care of!

There would be, of course, as many returns to verify and collect for as there are merchants; but the number would be far smaller than the present number of assessments. It is possible to make a guess at the economies resulting from the universal [ 356 ] Simplification and risibility of Taxation adoption of Retail-Sales Taxes as sole mode of taxa tion, as follows: According to the Department of Commerce Statis tical Abstract for 1919, the cost of the internal revenue service was $3°,45°,000. against collection of $3,840,000,000; and of customs service $10,200,000, with collections of $I83,4z8,ooo-together costing forty million six hundred thousand dollars and yield ing, say four billions. Probably at least thirty mil lions of this cost was for salaries; although the abstract quoted does not give them separately. If those sal ari~s averaged $2,400 a year, as nowadays they easIly would, there would be some twelve thousand five hundred employees in the two bureaus of cus toms and internal revenue alone. The Statistical Abstracts of the Department of Commerce also give total state levi~s of ad-valorem· taxes by the 48 states of the Union, for the year 1912, as thirteen hundred and fifty million dollars. If we allow the same proportionate salary-cost for collection of this state revenue, as is indicated by the cost of collect ing internal revenue and· customs tax shown above (namely three fourths of I%) the 48 states would have disbursed for salaries in assessing and collecting the aforesaid revenue at least ten millions of dollars.

That·would represent the payment of some forty-one hundred salaries at twenty-four hundred· dollars each per annum. In a preceding chapter I have es timated the municipal employees in the assessment and collection of city and county taxes throughout the 48 states of the Union as more (municipalities included) than twenty.;.one thousand in number. All these total a small army of thirty-seven thousand five hundred employees, at a very conservative estimate, engaged in the work of assessing and col lecting national, state, and local taxes. (This is, of [ 357 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation course, the roughest kind of guess, as the Statistical Tables which I have been able to dig up do not give the precise information wanted; and it is necessary to work out the numbers given from tables of gross receipts and expenditures given in dollars.) Now, what should be the force required for levying and collecting all taxes, national, state, and local, if laid solely as suggested upon retail sales, and col lected at one and the same time, by one and the same machinery, for all three governments?

The World Almanac for 1920 gives from the Cen sus Bulletin the total number of retail dealers in the United States for the year 1910 as eleven hundred and ninety-five thousand, as against twenty and one quarter million families. That would be one retail establishment for every seventeen families. Off hand that figure looks ample. (At the same time there were two hundred and seventy thousand manu facturers; or about one fourth as· many manufactur ers as retailers.) By now (1920) there may well be thirteen hundred thousand retailers; but not to skimp it let us call their number fifteen hundred thousand. How large should be the organization necessary to keep the very simple accounts and make the very easy collections required for retail-sales taxation re ported by fifteen hundred thousand retailers? An answer to this question may be hazarded from the experience of the great department stores with their numerous customers' accounts. A leading store in Boston informs me that there are upon its books over one hundred thousand open accounts; out of which sixty thousand are active every month, the bills rendered averaging about fifty-eight thou sand a month. The entire accounting and collecting force required to make and collect these bills (many of which consist of numerous items charged and [ 358 ] Simplification and T7isibilityof Taxation many credits for goods-returned, from day to day) is but 63 persons; or about one employee to each one thousand accounts-and it is ample.

The precedent now established by most lighting companies might be followed. They avoid con gestion in rendering and collecting of all bills at the end of each month by distributing this labor-that is, by reading the meters in one neighborhood on the I st of each month and rendering bills accordingly doing the same in the next block say on the 2nd of the month, rendering bills accordingly, and so on through the month. A small number of experts can handle a surprisingly large number of accounts without inconvenience or delay. The head of the gas company here tells me that his inspectors can comfortably read 275 meters per day; in all six, men read about 40,000 meters every month. A total force of twenty-one inspectors, bookkeepers, and collectors get in the entire revenue from forty thousand customers; or say one employee to each two thousand gas users. This more than con firms the department-store experience cited above.

Applying the former ratio to the fifteen hundred thousand retail dealers taken above as a basis of calculation, the entire clerical and collecting force > required should not exceed fifteen hundred persons. Compare this small force with the thirty-seven thou sand five hundred who must, upon the foregoing con servative estimate, be employed in the various taxing offices throughout the United States; and remember always that the total work imposed upon it would be the mere reception from each 'merchant and verification of cash and report; and the entry, once a month, of but two items, namely: the aggregate sales made, and ~he gross sales taxes remitted by each concern report Ing. [ 359 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation It might well be necessary to verify the honesty of the returns by checking gross. sales against gross purchases; for which purpose the merchant might be required to submit recapitulation of purchases as well as sales and taxation, and be prepared to support same by original purchase invoices accompanying the return. This again would be no hardship; for every merchant nowadays keeps track of details and totals of purchases in the ordinary course of business. It might, however, require a visit of an inspector from the tax office every month to each merchant to make the verification on the spot. If so the force em ployed at the tax office might. even be doubled, raising the foregoing estimate from 1,500 to 3,000 though far smaller increase than should be needed which would still be out of all comparison smaller than the forces now employed.

To sum up, it is reasonable to assume that a force of 3,000 persons, working from the 250 cities of more than 25,000 population, as basis· of operation, could adeq uately and satisfactorily cover the United States; and collect and divide between national, state, and local treasuries the great sum now assessed and col lected by 37,500 employees if the foregoing calcula tions are anywhere near right. Meantime, there would be no possibility of uncertainty or arbitrariness in the important matters of valuation and assessment. The monthly bills, actually paid by everyone of us for everything we consume, would automatically fix values for taxation. Tne sum of the sales tickets, the total from the cash-register wheels, would be absolutely and without shadow of doubt the true valuation sought for. The whole complex mass of tax laws and the vast establishments for assessment would pass at once into "innocuous desuetude." No possibility of fraud or graft can be imagined; that is [ 36o ] Simplification and Visibility of Taxation to say, no practical method of collusion between buyers and retail sellers, that could possibly be fixed up, occurs to my mind~especially when We consider that every retailer could be made to verify valuation reported in gross sales by submitting returns of gross purchases, properly attested by vouchers. The prac tical difficulty of falsifying countless sales tickets and cash registers, and the danger of discovery thereof, would be so great that such falsification is unbeliev able. In short, it seems to me that the whole matter of taxation would resolve itself down to one single point of concentrated public attention, namely: that of the tax rate· and its three constituent factors: na tional, state, and municipal expenditures. * Taxation of Rents. Before passing on I am re minded of the subject of taxation of rent of dwellings as a large part of every consumer's current expendi tures, and logically taxable along with retail sales.

Rents certainly should be taxed. Man eats and drinks food, wears clothing, lives in houses, and moves himself or other things about. These four broad categories sum up life. Taxation of retail sales (including sales of tickets to theatres and other amusements; and cost of personal. service of many kinds, such as house wages, laundry and garage charges) would cover pretty much all of our ex penditures for ultimate consumption except cost of shelter. Taxation of rents would complete *1 may remark in passing that the much-advertised "Single Tax" on real estate or rents-has the same advantages of simplicity and certainty; and of ad vertising and emphasizing changes in rate, and in public expenditure; and to that extent always has appealed to my judgment. It has, on the other hand, the great disadvantage of being levied primarily on a limited class, the land owners; with the result of being lost to the view of the crowd, in rents paid, especially in cities. It could not so force itself on the notice of every voter as the retail-sales tax certainly would do. "

[361 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation the list, though requiring a slightly different proc ess of handling and collection. Where rent is paid the landlord could be obliged to file with the collector copies of leases; and to collect and pass over a sales tax on monthly rents at the same rate as upon other sales. As rents are so fixed as to return interest on capital, and provide for deprecia tion and maintenance, and finally for renewals, it follows that by the time a dwelling is worn out and has to be pulled down, the Government will have col lected taxes upon its entire cost, as an article of human consumption. If the owner should occupy it himself, he should pay tax upon an upset rental rate based upon the value of the ground and the first cost of building-with regard to material and construction, and consequent durability. Standard rules for determining this rental rate could easily be worked out, and applied once for all to each dwelling when built; upon the principle that a definite part of the cost of the dwelling, not the whole of it-as in the case of food, for instance-is consumed each year; and that tax should be paid only on that part each year. The rule would relate, of course, only to the cost of the building, not of the ground on which it stands, which is never consumed. The landlord himself would be taxed on his own expendi tures; not on his receipts, like others.

The collection of taxes on monthly rents presents, I think, the only problem requiring change of busi ness methods to introduce sales taxation. There were some 20,000,000 "homes" in 1910 according to the Census ; and half of them must be rented. It might become necessary, for convenience, to require filing of all leases, and payment of all rents, at central collecting offices together of course with the rental sales tax. These central offices, which would be, [ 362 ] Simplification and risibility of Taxation naturally, at the tax-collector's bureau, would pass along the rents to their owners and retain the taxes. No especial hardship would be entailed on either landlord or tenant; but merely a visit to the central collecting office once a month. It would often help the landlord to collect rent, that the taxes would also be in arrears; and Government would get after the delinquent. A simple form of tax-and-rent receipt could be devised, with three coupons: one for the tenant, one for the landlord, and one for the collecting office in the form of a card-index card (3 x 5 in.) which would make the task of keeping track of collections very easy. That of chasing up tax delinquents, however, would be serious; and in practice would probably be thrown into the discard, as costing more than worth; on the principle that if the landlord has to lose his rent the Government should lose·its taxes, and leave it to the landlord to oust the tenant who pays neither.

Another alternative would be to discard taxation of rents altogether by reason of complexity, and in crease proportionately. the tax rate on other retail sales, as simpler and easier of collection. In most cases the results in amounts paid by the individual taxpayers would not differ greatly. If, however, rents were taxed, and delinquents followed up, it would probably be necessary to in crease the small force of 3,OCO tax-gatherers above estimated by one employee for every thousand tax payers on rents, say by 10,000 employees for ten million renters. Even so, the force would still be small in comparison with present forces. Of course, the whole vexed question (under present systems) of the proper taxation of unused or un cultivated land would disappear with the disappear ance of land taxes. . [ 363 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation Local Government To Collect All Taxes. In or..

der to realize full measure of convenience and econ... omy" the handling of all retail-sales taxation should eventually be given to the local government, urban or rural, as the case might be. The local gov ernment must always maintain a tax establish ment for its own revenue; and, for every rea son of convenience and simplification, the same office should deal with the same citizen at the same time; or, rather, with the landlords and retail ers, who would automatically deal with and collect from the citizen, for all taxation on the same rent or sale. Of course delay in getting all the states into line on this .should be forecast, as in all cases of change in state and national relations. If Sales Taxation comes, it may easily begin at Washington before reaching many of the state capitals. In that case, the existing Internal Revenue offices of the United States could easily undertake their own col lection job at the start, turning it over to local tax offices as fast as the latter begin it for themselves.

It would be too optimistic to expect unanimity of national and state action, or to plan for simultaneous reorganization of all taxing bodies at once. It would not be hard, however, to start national methods of receiving tax returns and payments from retailers, with an eye to eventual adoption of the same meth ods by state and local governments; so as in due time merely to add the state and the local rate to the national rate, in order to assess and collect all three taxes at the same moment and by the same calcula tion. The cumbrous machinery and personnel for annual collection of assessed taxes on property, as well as the great establishments now maintained for internal revenue and customs imposts, could for the most part be abandoned as fast as the local [ 364] Simplification and risibility of Taxation sales-tax offices came into line. Offhand, the possi ble saving of cost and increase of revenue seem enormous.

And the detail would be so simple! The rates of taxa'tion required to produce the respective neces sary revenue for the coming year having been fixed by the nation, the state, and the local government, would of course be publicly announced by each. The total of all three would be the rate for use by the salesman in ringing up each sale and its tax upon the cash register, or figuring both upon the charge ticket. Thence they would go, .both sales and tax totals, each day to the sales journal, just as sales go now in every well-ordered house. The total tax collections due every month, say from the retailer to the local tax office, as taken from the sales journal, would check with the total sales of each merchant multiplied by the total tax rate; and the total sum taxed to the region would be the total of regional retail sales multiplied by the total rate. The shares of this total belonging· to each (the na tion, the state, and the city or town), would of course be pro rata to their respective tax rates; and the local tax office would have no trouble in reporting to and settling with the national and state treasurers by mOhthly check accordingly.

Another minor, but yet important, advantage gained would be the monthly collection of taxes in arrears, instead of annually in advance. The present method involves temporary disturbance of the money market in anticipation of vast collections at a given date; also the carrying, over certain sea sons, of large treasury balances; which in practice have to be distributed widely among the banks through out the country. There is always the chance of scandalous favoritism and loss, as lately in Massachu[ 365 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation setts, and South Dakota, and of temptation to offi cials to misuse large amounts not immediately required. On the other hand, there are often large governmental expenditures in anticipation of coming collections, with temporary financing thereof by short-time borrowings-always a bad practice. It seems to me that, after a few years of Sales Taxa tion, it should be possible, with income coming in regularly throughout the year, for governments to reach the simple, healthy practice of paying as they go; monthly receipts taking care of monthly ex penses, with only moderate working balances carried over. That should tend to minimize deficiencies and obviate belated taxation to make them good.

Another marked advantage would be gained by permitting each local government to. handle all sales taxation, in eliminating the tax jealousy be tween states and between state and nation now shown in vexatious discrimination and taxation, by states and municipalities against corporations of other states or municipalities, which for good com mercial reasons do large business or hold much prop erty in the former. Many states require of foreign corporations payment for licenses to do business, or of capital stock or corporation taxes, upon the capi tal supposed to be employed; or on business supposed to be done within their borders. Many require elaborate reports to be filed annually, and the ap pointment of attorneys on whom process may be served, the neglect of which invalidates debts due the delinquent. Hundreds of tons of such reports are filed away at state capitols all over the country, which are never looked at from one year's end to another; as useless and absurd a burden to be laid on business, and passed along in prices to the unlucky inhabitants of these jealous states, as can be [ 366 ] Simplification andJ/isibility of Taxation found in all the· repertoire of demagogy. "There is a reason" for them, however; a "little joker" always hidden under the mask of protection for the citizen of the state enacting such laws; to wit, a fee for filing the reports, which usually goes to some bureaucrat, who fills an office created for that purpose. Nothing appeals to your bureaucrat like a fee! Therein lies one great charm of office., But, were all taxation laid squarely upon Retail Sales and were each local government to collect all taxes upon all sales within its own borders-(no matter whether made by foreign or domestic corpora tions or citizens) who, then, except the bureaucrats deprived of fees or jobs by this simple method of do ing justice in taxation-who, I say, could com plain? Before long it might well be that a man could incorporate his business in his own state instead of going to New Jersey, or Maine, or' ,Delaware, for freedom from compound-commi nuted taxation and restriction. Before long, indeed, there might be National Incorporation, under act of Congress; though not then so needed as now. Mean time, the· states would see that the more sales the more revenue. Why should any state shut out any vendor, even the foreigner?

Estimated Sales Tax Rates Required for Present Budgets. Naturally, while pondering over Sales Taxation, the first question to suggest itself is: "What would the tax rate have to be-how much would be added to the cost of all we buy-say to meet present expenditures? At this moment we are facing abnormal cost of government, and may have to do so again. The question of tax rates is a crucial one, and involves a veritable revelation of hidden burden to most of us, if answered without evasion. [ 367 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation Adam Smith's Canon of "Certainty"-lack of arbitrary imposition-involves the idea of reasonable regularity in government expenditure from year to year. But disturbances like the recent war can, of course, never be foreseen. To that extent Adam Smith's principle of Certainty, or freedom from arbitrary change, will always remain impossible. But the substitution of simple retail sales taxation for the many taxes now imposed would normally go far to establish Certainty. Except for extra bulges in tax rates, caused by wars and the like, current ex penditures of government ought to run fairly even from year to year. The amounts to be raised ought not to increase arbitrarily, or out of proportion to increased population. The rate per capita should tend to decrease. If, as argued above, the attention of voters were to be concentrated by sales taxation upon governmental expenditures; and if candidates for office had to feel themselves accountable ac cordingly, the result should be a gradual increase of efficiency and decrease of cost of government, with steadily decreasing taxation.

According to the rough estimates given in a former chapter of national, state, and local expenditures for cost of government, and upon the assumption that retail sales absorb the greater part of our collective annual income, placed as above at fifty billion dol lars, the rates of taxation required to meet present expenditures would be about as follows: The National rate would be 8.42 per cent. of Retail Sales State do 1.80 do do Local do 8.53 do do The Total rate would be 18.75 per cent. of Retail Sales. This total is indeed staggering; and no matter what the mode of taxation may be, we have got to face at [ 368 ] Simplification and risibility of Taxation least the national portion of it without much reduc tion, until such time as we can liquidate a consider~ able part of national indebtedness and minimize military expenses; which would cut off say one half. Perhaps we might hope to reduce the national tax rate upon retail sales during the next ten years to 4 per cent.

This reduction would not, however, affect state and local taxation, and there is nothing by which to figure the definite reduction of either. In former years the writer was at the head of some large public utilities in Chicago, and was able to make direct comparisons of costs; for instance, of street lighting, paid by his own corporations with those paid by the city. Not all items could be compared; but those that could be showed that municipal operation cost just about double private operation. Though much distorted by war exigencies, recent operation upon a large scale by the general government of railways, shipping, telegraph, and telephones, closely parallels this little experience. Most men of large private affairs, with whom I talk, think that if local govern ment could be carried on as economically as private busines§ its cost could be reduced at least one third. If so we might start out with the thought of reducing total taxation say to 10 per cent. of retail sales, as a mark to try for.

Certainly the foregoing revelation of 18.75 per cent., now paid without realizing it, is frightful enough. I have spoken of our average income per capita as about $475 per annum; but we us ually consider family income rather than per-capita income. According to the 1910 Census, America , averaged 4! persons to the family; so that family income would average say $2,100 per annum (more than one earning member to each family) out [ 369 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation of which therefore about $400 is absorbed in taxa tion. At present the average head of a family is entirely unconscious of this heavy burden which is lost in the high cost of living, or "H.C.L." Does it not stand to reason that· if it were being hammered into his own and his wife's consciousness, in the con spicuous form of a 19 per cent. addition to the cost of everything they buy, their attention at coming elections would concentrate very keenly upon good government, management, and economy-especially in local affairs transacted directly under their own eyes and noses?

Is it not indeed high time to make taxation visibly universal and universally visible? Does not Retail Sales Taxation, offhand, seem likely to satisfy not only all four of Adam Smith's Four old Canons, but also my four new ones? All in all, is it not a fascinating task to study the application of what might be called good business engineering to our huge governmental establishment? And should not intelligent and patriotic American voters decree that selfish and outworn methods and crystallized bureaucracy must stand out of the way of such application? Obstacles to Sales Taxation. I see by the papers that Secretary Mellon in his recent recom mendations for tax revisions turns down the Smoot suggestion of Sales Taxation-though of course, as made, it was not nearly so sweeping as my own as at present unadvisable. Probably the Secretary is right, as far as immediate consideration goes, for public opinion has not yet been clarified on this matter of taxation, which indeed is in its present condition quite beyond the compre hension of the average voter. That is why I am down on present methods.

[ 37°] Simplification and risibility of Taxation It seems to me a self-evident proposition, admit ting of no dispute, that, to a democracy, second only to the supreme question of war·or peace comes that of taxation; that it vitally affects every voter; and, finally, that methods and rates of taxation that are too complex and too blind for the enlightenment of the average man-that fool him into voting unin telligently-are unfit for use by free government, and should be discarded without delay or hesitation if better can be found. What, then, are the obstacles that Secretary Mellon sees to the consideration of Sales Taxation? The most conspicuous of them is probably the established Protective Tariff. "Protection" has been for many years a fetish of the Republican party; and "Free Trade" has been an opposition slogan, though not apparently a matter of deep conviction with the Democratic party. Socialists and "long hairs" gen erally are, of course, entirely at sea upon every economic question, taxation included. Between all parties and their conflicting ar'guments the average voter throws up his hands in despair when he tries to discern the merits underlying Congressional de bates upon the intricacies of taxation; or the discus sions in State Legislatures of capital~stock and in come taxes, and the like. The only clear-cut popular attitude toward just or unjust ~axation might be stated at present in the slang expression, "Soak it to the rich fellows." I have already indicated the mischief to the average man and the community growing out of that conception.

That, however, is another story; we are talking of obstacles just now. The immediate inauguration of retail-sales taxation as a sole method would, of course, do away with taxation upon imports along with other complex and unsatisfactory methods. [ 371 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation Its abolition-unle.ss accomplished very gradually, as it should be-would, of course, seriously disturb and cause heavy temporary loss to many industries, which have been built up upon the faith of a na tional protective policy. The newly created aniline industry may be cited as the most conspicuous in stance. The manufacture of dyes, high explosives, and other products of the distillation of coal, was a peculiarly German industry; and the interruption of commerce with Germany by the Great War left the United States substantially without supply of these important products, as I found by personal experience in buying certain chemicals. In consequence, pa triotism as well as scarcity, and the high prices at once demanded for aniline dyes, stimulated American capitalists to the wholesale erection of aniline plants and the development during the war of an enormous producing capacity; despite the fact that our finan ciers and captains of industry had both eyes open to the competition with Germany, which would cer tainly result upon the termination of the war. They thoroughly realized that, as in the past German state policy had backed, so probably in the future it would back, the German dye manufacturers; already for midably equipped for, and firmly entrenched in the world trade in chemicals. A Democratic administra tion then reigned at Washington; nevertheless, more or less formal assurance was given to those undertaking the aniline venture, that at the proper time the new plants would be protected by an ample tariff upon foreign dyes, etc; in spite of party belief in free trade.

As was natural under such circumstances-and as had already happened in the case of the tin-plate industry, developed in the '90S under protection of the McKinley Tariff-a trust or combination was [ 372 ] Simplification and risibility of Taxation promptly formed by the principal American exploit ers of this aniline field. In order further to solidify their position-and perhaps (as in the case of the Panama Canal) to take national advantage of an unparalleled foreign situation-all United States pat ents upon chemical processes, which stood upon the records of the Patent Office in the names of German holders, and which had, during the war, been· con fiscated as enemy-alien property, were sold by the United States Government in April, 1919 (of course after the armistice, and before the peace), to theChem ical Foundation, Inc.; a corporation formed, I believe, under the laws of the State of New York. * This ac tion was taken, I surmise, not to create a monopoly for the Chemical Foundation Corporation is obliged to license all comers upon equal terms under all pat ents so acquired-but rather to forestall the develop ment in this country, after the war, by the foreign owners of those patents, of overshadowing chemical manufacturing power. Whether this policy was as wise industrially and economically as it then seemed to be politically is yet to be determined. I know nothing of the chemical business, and have therefore not attempted to form a· personal opinion; but a single instance, which has come to my notice, inclines me to believe that, as usually happens, our big pioneer American concerns already in the busi ness will reap the main advantage, the advantage to the general public remaining uncertain.

However, what treatment should, in justice, be given to the great works so recently built, upon the faith of government protection? Both the free trader and protectionist should, it seems to me, reply that, in good faith, the American aniline pro*Since the foregoing was written, the Harding Administration has com menced suit in the United States Courts to set aside this sale. [ 373 J Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation ducers ought not to lose their money, nor a hand- ' some profit thereon. The rooted protectionist will say that a practical shut-out of the foreign products ought to go on forever. The reasonable free-trader will say that shut-out ought to be limited to such time for development as will enable the American Aniline Combination to meet German or Belgian or British competition either in home or foreign markets with little or no protection. But either answer would mean inevitably further Congressional pulling and hauling in due course of time; to deter mine whether or when the big baby has grown to youth's or man's estate, able to walk without leading strings, and even to carry weight. Either way, the aniline products will have to be counted out as a present factor in import trade, for restoring the normal course of exchanges between the nations; which last is the vital thing for American trade and industry just now.

Harking further back, what treatment should be given say to the tin-plate industry, thirty years ago created by the McKinley Bill; which between the years 1891 and 1898 expanded and developed domes tic competition, and evolved a trust, which now forms a part of the great United States Steel Cor poration ? No tin mines worth mentioning are found in the United States, and block tin must be imported. It does not, I fancy, weigh as much as the sheet-steel which it covers in the manufacture of tin plate; and, as far as domestic consumption is concerned, it is probably quite as economical to pay freight on the block tin, and spread it upon sheets manufactured in the United States-that is, bring the tin to the steel-as it would be to import both tin and steel in the form of tin plate. When it comes to foreign consumption, to exporting tin plate, however, the [ 374] Simplification and Visibility of Taxation British manufacturer both pays lower wages and has a short haul upon both materials in bringing the tin and the steel together. He has Cl natural ad vantage, which can be overcome only to the extent that American manufacturing skill can surpass Brit ish; which last reminds me of a little story.

Just before the passage of the McKinley Bill, I found myself in a parlor car on the way to a summer resort near Chicago, sitting next to one of the Nor ton brothers, then the largest manufacturers of tin cans in the United States. I said to Mr. Norton, "What are you going to do if this McKinley Bill passes, raising the price of tin from thirty to forty per cent?" He answered, in effect, "I shall be all right. In the first place, .I have laid in a big stock of tin plate; and in the second, I am going to manu facture it myself. You know that I am an inventor, and the can-manufacturing machinery which I have devised is the foundation of our success. Some years ago I was in England, and investigated the process of making tin plate. I found six or seven men en gaged in dipping the sheets one by one. as they pass through the various solutions. I designed a ma chine which has now passed through its experimental stages. With it one man can do the work of the six in Cornwall. We can make tin plate to-day quite as cheap as they make it in England, though we have to import the block tin. If the tariff bill is passed and a duty of 30 to 40 per cent. is put on tin plate, the amount of that duty will be 'pure velvet' for us; so you see we have no cause to worry."

Well, the McKinley Bill was passed, and the Nortons went into the manufacture of tin plate. A few years later their plant went into the Tin Plate Trust. The Nortons, who were most estimable men, retired with large fortunes. But-just to what [ 3751 Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation extent did the American people profit by the develop ment of that industry in the United States? The price of tin plate in New York has never from before the McKinley Bill to the present day been as low as in Swansea; that is, the American people have always paid more for their tin than the English paid. The United States is now, nevertheless, a large ex porter of tin plate; though not so large as England, ex cepting during the war. Friends of mine in the trade cannot forecast the eventual outcome of world com petition, but they think the United States will al ways retain a fair proportion of the world trade. If they do, they must probably rely upon "dumping"

American tin upon the foreign market at prices less than sold for here at home. Such has always been the German practice; which we in America have fiercely condemned. Indeed, when we come to apply it to our own export trade, here we meet again one of these concealments of taxation which are so vicious in their effect. It is certainly most unjust that the American buyer of tin plate or steel should pay artificially higher prices, in order that the Amer ican manufacturer may be enabled to make lower prices to foreign buyers. That is no argument for protection, certainly of a fully matured industry. As things are, the workingman who buys a tin din ner-pail never dreams that he is paying part of the cost of the Brazilian's or the Chinaman's dinner-pail, let us say . Yet such is the case. The immediate question is: Should we continue to protect our tin-plate industry as well as the chemi cals; or should we say to their owners-"You now are big enough, old enough, and strong enough to take care of yourselves; if you cannot, with all the natural resources, aggregated capital, and engineer ing genius of the United States behind you, compete [ 376 ] _4 Simplification and Pisibility of Taxation for the trade of the world with countries exhausted by the Great War, it is high time that we all should accept the limitations of trade imposed by natural conditions, too strong for a protective tariff to over- .

come." Of course, that brings up again the whole old ques tion of war, and preparation for war; of the necessity of industrial and commercial autonomy, to great nations. Economically, the question presents but a single answer, viz. : "Do away with wars, and inaugurate worldwide free trade." Politically, however, human nature and racial difference stand before us, as eternal and .perhaps immovable obi stacles to universal peace and untrammeled com merce. At this moment we can go no further than existing conditions permit. Until universal disarma ment and International Courts, with power to enforce their decree, have become world-accomplished facts, our protective tariffs on chemicals and tin plate, etc. (though no higher and for no longer than necessary to countervail subsidies and like. political aids to foreign competition), may well be continued in force, as measures of preparedness for possible war.

But after the coming of general disarmament, in my conviction, our slogan should be, "A fair field and an open door for everybody; no favors for anybody; and let the best merchant and manufac turer win." That battle cry, if adopted, would herald swift and certain American supremacy, both in foreign and domestic trade. As Calvin Coolidge might say, let us "Have Faith in America!" Other Political Obstacles. Perhaps yet more formidable, in practice, is the obstacle of a lot of well established bureaucracies, engaged in the assessment and collection of customs and internal revenue, and of state and local revenues, throughout the country, I [ 377 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation with their enormous personnel. Good, comfortable jobs are involved, to the number as guessed at above of 37,500; and everyone of the job holders is a live and more or less energetic opponent of any change involving his place and wage. Congressmen and the state legislators are most responsive to the ap peals of these job holders, everyone of whom is a constituent of some law-maker or executive and a possible .factor for his re-election or defeat. The strong bond of politics, patronage, and of sticking like glue to a comfortable living, cements together the entire legislative and executive personnel, from the highest to the lowest. In the old European day of autocratic and hereditary government, now pretty much passed away, this solidarity of the ruling and officeholding class (relatively small yet actually numerous) was an abiding cause of jealousy and hostility to the common people. From time im memorial the masses have resented the existence of a bureaucratic, largely parisitic, class, sucking the life blood of the community.

Of course that resentment was often unjust, for government is not necessarily parasitic-but vital to the community; and if good is worth far more than its cost. There should be no hatred or jealousy of our governors as such; and as the affairs of the community are larger than private affairs, those who handle them wisely and honestly should fare better than their compeers in private life. They do fare somewhat better-as things are here in the United States-in publicity and personal importance, though not often as well in earning power-that is, among those above the rank and file-which, how ever, is beside the question. The main thing is that we Americans should be as thoroughly awake and on guard against growing bureaucracy as ever. were our [ 378 ] Simplification and risibility of Taxation forefathers against autocracy . We entrust to our elected representatives the power to limit cost of government, and the growth of a governing class; and consequently there is a natural tendency to take it comfortably for granted that those representatives are doing the right thing by-us, and are actually limiting taxation and bureaucracy instead of use lessly enlarging them. In general, however, quite the contrary is the sad fact; for it is the dangerous weakness of representative government that it does not always represent. There are only two main stays of free government: first, good political engin eering-that is, so to frame free institutions as to put the smallest strain upon the human material of which they are built; second, and all the time, to remember that "Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty."

At present there exists everywhere in the United States, it seems to me, far too large a bureaucracy, far too much government, too many offices .and officeholders;* especially as already roughly shown in our bureaus of assessment and collection of taxes. We should first redesign our system so as to reduce personnel to a minimum, and then cut down without hesitation to that limit; hewing to the line no matter where the chips may fall. Politically, that is a very difficult task indeed, especially here in the United States. Not only is there the solidarity of govern ment and bureaucracy referred to above, but that solidarity includes, of course, the extra governmental organizations of the great political parties-namely, several hundred thousand working politicians; not all of them in office, but professionals whose livelihood depends upon their influence with officeholders. *Thomas Jefferson complained that there were toO many officeholders already in his day.

[379 ] Too' Much Government-Too Much Taxation Just as happened during the early years of the fight for Civil Service Reform, when the whole working force of the great political parties was arrayed against that movement, so must opposition be expected to any attempt to minimize bureaucracy by the re duction of taxation. The serious conviction that such minimizing is due, and highly necessary, must first germinate and grow until it masters public opinion, before our. politicians and legislators can be expected to respond. That is the reason for my attempt to influence public opinion by this book. Resume. In closing this short and I hope not too shallow study on, a huge subject, let me once more deprecate the giving of any impression of "know ing it all," or of undue haste to change the estab lished order of things. I am well aware that such a fundamental upturn of the whole great business of revenue getting, split up as it must be between na tional, state, and local government, involves discus sion, conviction, and ultimate legislation of the most serious and deliberative nature. I am writing as a plain citizen, to the great, mass of my fellow plain citizens; who like myself, I am sure, without knowing much about the subject, would gladly inaugurate any common-sense plan of taxation that would give them in clear and concise form from year to year the knowl edge of how much they are taxed, whether they are fairly taxed, and whether they and the whole com munity get their taxes' worth. I hope these few pages will give them, as writing them seems to me to have given myself, a broad, simple, comprehensible idea of the way in which taxes· should be laid; in order best to force home that knowledge upon us all.

If there is a better way, I dearly hope that it may be brought forward. So far I have been unable to find one. [ 380 ] Simplification and Visibility of Taxation I could go on indefinitely multiplying instances of injustice, confusion, and evasion, in our present taxa.tion; but would that strengthen my case? Which one of my readers that owns real estate does not know how it is taxed and re-taxed by city and state for general. purposes, .for special improvements, paving, grading, sewering, park and boulevard ex tension, drainage; how its rents are taxed as income, and even its mortgage-incumbrance as property or source of income or both; how its assessments swing from year to year upward-seldom downward-no matter what its actual yield or carrying costs may be. Who has not felt bitter injustice in' comparing his tax with his next-door neighbor's? What corporation manager, especially if he does interstate or international business, does not squirm under the lash of multiplex taxation? His corpora tion is taxed for the privilege of being born; some states being less rapacious than others, so that to them flock the rash men who would risk cash for stock in new ventures. It is taxed every year on its capital stock for the privilege of staying alive; in some states it is taxed every year on the market value of its capital stock. in excess of its tangible property in its home state, and on the share of its capital employed in other states, where found; it is in many assessed a license tax for the privilege of doing business in the state; in many it is compelled to make returns of condition, of business done, etc., and to pay a fee for filing the returns .away in dark fastnesses, where no human eye ever sees them; every time its shares are sold they must pay a transfer tax and a stockbrok er's tax, if sold through one; when the poor thing finally dies, it must pay a burial tax for the privilege of giving up the ghost.

While it lives, it must pay license taxes where it [ 381 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation opens stores, peddlers, taxes where it employs sales wagons or trucks, import taxes when it buys abroad, many kinds of inspection fees, property taxes, income taxes, excess profits taxes, surtaxes. Is the forego ing list complete, I wonder? Verily, I do not know; but when I was a manufacturer I well remember all of the above. Who that has paid an income tax does not know the temptation and ofttimes the effort to understate and evade taxation? What man of the older generation does not remember the Whiskey Ring tax frauds in the days of Grant's Administration; or anyone of a dozen conspicuous undervaluation frauds at the New York Custom House? Need I cite the present burning question whether to value invoices for in stance in German marks as sold ahroad, or in American dollars at current exchange rates, for import duties at home? Must I spin out the sad recital forever, to convict our existing taxation of violation of every canon of convenience and good practice laid down not only by the old Scotsman, Adam Smith, but byour sound Yankee common sense?

No; short as this discussion is, I have said enough. There remains little more to say, except to voice a robust optimistic belief in the honesty and good will of the American voter. In the matter of taxation, the winning appeal to the men and women of Amer ica will not be: "Vote for us; we will make the rich men pay all the taxes and let you off tax free." It will be, in my belief, something like this: "Vote for us and we will see that every single voter pays taxes; spending for his country in proportion to.his spending for himself." I am confident that this broad, sim ple, clear, and just idea of taxation will find few Amer icans so mean and selfish as not to accept it with enthusiasm.

·Simplification and risibility of Taxation And I am equally sure that politicians who say) "Taxation should be blind and indirect. What the voters don't know about they can't grumble about" - I am sure, I say, that· they will fool themselves, not the voter. Once it is brought to his attention, as the present exigencies are bringing it, he will de mand to· know his taxation. He will take keenest interest in it. Imagine, if you can, that universal sales taxation were to-day the rule; and that the voter paid on every purchase as estimated above 8! per cent. additional to the Nation, as much more to the City, and 2 per cent. to the State; and that Secretary Mellon in announcing the total budget for next year were to say that the amount named meant a national tax rate of but 7!per cent. Suppose, too, that the Mayor were to follow suit, and announce a total budget carrying the city tax rate down to 7!

per cent.; and the Governor, catching the idea, in his turn should announce a state· budget reducing the state rate to I! per cent. Verily, such experiences have in the lifetime of the writer been so unknown as to require the wildest stretch of imagination to suppose them; but-if they materialized, would not those three administrations go to the voters at the next election with solid ground for, and.·confidence in, popular approval? If, on the other hand, they were to announce increased tax rates, would they not be at once upon the defensive, and need some such powerful motive as war menace, and prepared ness against it, to escape political disaster? Would it not soon be possible to the everyday citizen to visualize the relation of taxation to good government; and to realize what he was getting for his money? Would not ere long standards of cost of government, the legitimate charge for many fac tors in governmental functions and budgets, begin to [ 383 ] Too Much Government-' Too Much Taxation establish themselves, in the course of justifying to the voters the totals of taxes levied? Such standard ization under such conditions seems to me simple, practical, certain to come at no distant day, and to be eminently desirable from every point of view.

For government is nothing but a great big business organization for accomplishing certain ends. Like other businesses it must acquire plant and create personnel. Li'ke them it can be wise and economical or foolish and wasteful. Like themit may be robbed. Good government for the most part is not a political affair, hut rather an industrial or cooperative prop osition, whose aim ought to be the achievement of the greatest results at the least cost. It operates under the great economic handicap that in the nature of its functions (which are seldom money-makers, and ought never to .be) it cannot be run for profit. Hence· cost becomes a secondary consideration. In war, for instance, "Co~t is nothing, time is every thing" is one of the great strategic maxims. So in police protection, sanitation, education, etc., the object to be achieved for the public good, once de termined on, becomes the first consideration, and the cost-whatever it is-must simply be taxed upon the people benefited. In commerce or industry, on the contrary, cost must come within selling price, or bankruptcy ensues, and cessation of the entire affair.

But no such danger threatens public service when it costs more than the provision made for it. Defi ciency taxes are levied and the service goes on. This easy escape from disaster tends always to demoralize public officers, as it makes them quite irresponsible for extravagance. Add to this irresponsibility the normal indifference of the people to extravagance and overgrowth of bureaucracy-so well expressed by the old saw, "What is everybody's business is 384 Simplification and Visibility of Taxation nobody's business" -and aggravate this indifference by taxation so blind and complex that ninety-nine voters out of a hundred are, as a matter of fact, totally ignorant not only of what they pay in taxes, but of what they get as compared with what they ought to get for them-top off the whole with wars and rumors of wars of unparalleled wastefulness· and deadliness-and we have the ghastly showing of to-day, in this wonderful country; that is to say, over one sixth of its whole earning power swallowed up in non-productive cost of government!

Well, the Great War is ended, and please God the world will so reorganize that all war may some time be ended for good, for very great good~ But taxation will go on, as government must go on; and will continue to. be unproductive, as government must and should always be unproductive. (For production comes cheaper and better in private hands.) Wherefore taxation, that is, the cost of government, must be minimized. But for so doing, the first essential is knowledge. The voter must know three things: First, how much he is taxed. Second, whether he is taxed his fair share. Third, whether he gets his money's worth. I submit that universal Retail-Sales Taxation is the shortest cut to that knowledge. And I appeal with entire confidence to the patriot ism, the honesty, and the common sense of the Amer ican people (which has never failed when supremely tested) to see to it that every voter pays his share of the taxes. Just as slavery failed to make us brutes in 1861; as repudiation and fiat-money could not make us cheats in the days of the green-bac~ craze; as free silver and talk of crosses of gold and crowns of thorns could not make us cranks in 1896; as paci[ 385 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation fism could not make us cowards in 1917; even so the new-fangled forms of popular selfishness preached to us to-day by politicians who "know exactly what they want" will not make us tax-dodgers now.

Lord Nelson said at Trafalgar, "England expects every man to do his duty"-and every man did it. A clever friend of mine coming back from Europe one day, and somewhat vexed at declaring her new stock ings for custom.s tax at the Port of New York, paro died Nelson as follows: "America expects every woman to pay her duty." Our beloved country certainly expects every voter to shoulder his or her share of the cost of the best government ever known; and I am proud to believe that every lover of our country and that means most of us-honestly wants.to do so, and willingly will. ( 386 ] CHAPTER XXII REMEDIES WORSE THAN THE DISEASES I COULD go on forever illustrating the foregoing various theses, but why do so? As I have said be fore, 1 am a pragmatist, one who believes that uni versal and age-old facts, such, for instance, as "Capi talism" and the so-called "Wage System" in industry, exist because they are in general right, and conform to human nature and natural law. If they did not, they would have gone into the discard centuries ago.

I freely grant that there are some men more selfish, more able, and more crooked than others; and that there is constant temptation to us all to lay the strong hand of government on business, in order to make less unequal distribution of this world's goods. There is, of course, nothing morally wrong in the dream of equal distribution, or in such an attempt of "Society" to order that business between man and man be done on "Christian" or unselfish principles; but practically and economically there is everything wrong. The actual experience of many centuries and peoples shows that human nature and natural law make the task of wisely controlling the conflicting currents and innumerable transactions of daily trade simply impossible; that control means greater or less destruction of trade, reacting worst of all on the very unfortunates, whom Society meant to aid. I have in this book, as it seems to me, conclusively proved from conspicuous instances in our own recent [ 387 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation history that governmental remedies are far worse than their diseases, in destruction of trade and injury to the poorer classes; and work still worse for us all in poisoning and corrupting our American political and moral fibre. Nothing could be worse for our citizens than to get into the habit of looking to the state for a good living instead of to their own hard work and thrift. Nothing. could be worse for American politicians or public officials than the growing, if not full-grown, habit of promising this or that citizen or class an easy job at public expense in return for a vote at the polls.

American home politics has become, like European home politics, largely an affair of fierce attack on private wealth, opposed by a timid and furtive de fence on the part of the wealthy, with the great mass of those who are not destitute, yet have not much, watching the conflict from the side-lines; rather indifferent, yet of the general impression that the rich have too much and the destitute too little and that if the rich had less, all the rest, including themselves, would probably, somehow or other, have more. The· last named do not realize that those who have much are those who create and save much; and if they quit so doing nobody would get much of anything. They do not reflect that private wealth is and has always been the foundation of general prosperity, and of the well being of that enormous part of every population which never saves; which consumes all it produces from day to day; and which has always been, and until human nature radically changes always will be, dependent for a living on those who produce and save a surplus, and risk their savings in employing others.

These last, the savers, the capitalists, have always, to say the least, caused to be created and accumu[ 388 ] Remedies Worse Than Diseases ~ lated all the wealth there is, of all the nations. Those nations are richest and strongest, with the best-fed working classes, where these creative men are most numerous, and best protected, by stable government, by freedom of contract, and by security of private property. Centuries of history have proved that these three elements are the pillars of prosperity. To weaken them, to undermine them, to pull them down, as blind Samson pulled down the pillars of the temple upon the heads of the three thousand Philis tines told of in the Book of Judges,. is the daily task of the Bolshevist, the labor leader, the merchant of discontent generally; with the difference that Sam son pulled down the roof on his enemies, while they would destroy their own unhappy friends and fol lowers.

These agitators would forbid those, who have so far created and saved all the wealth of the nations, to create and save any more. They propose instead that government, which in all history has done noth ing but tax and waste the wealth created by the few, shall suddenly so change human nature and its own long habit as to create and save for the commQn good of all! Well; the common sense of all-at least of the American people, of whom Lin-eoln said that you can't fool all of them all the time-will probably be content at present with the costly experiments just made by their own government; for instance, with shipping, and railway operation; and will let Soviet Russia play out to a finish for the benefit of the watching world the gamble on change of human na ture, and the mental power of the ~'proletariat," in which that vast and wonderfully rich country is now engaged. If within a reasonable length of time the Russian peasantry are happier and better off [ 389 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation than our American farmers; or if under Soviet Gov ernment control the Baku Oil Fields, to put a con crete case, turn out to be successful competitors with the Standard Oil, or the Sinclair, or the Texas or the Shell Oil companies, in supplying the world's growing demand for light and heat and power; it will then be time enough for Mr. LaFollette and his new "bloc"

to get after the stock dividends of the Standard Oil subsidiaries-or to inaugurate, with the kind per mission, and for the benefit, of the organized farmer a~d laborer, the nationalization of our railways and mInes. Until that day the American people can, and probably will, safely "sit tight," and let the Standard Oil go on growing. Nothing but more oil companies, more gallons of oil, and cheaper gasoline and kerosene for all the world, can possibly result meantime. Also Mr. LaFollette, who has never produced anything else, can joyfully continue, as always, to produce huge volumes of "hot air." [ 390 J CHAPTER XXIII GENERAL CONCLUSIONS IN CONCLUSION, let me repeat my conviction, ex pressed in the first lines of this book, that democ racy must simplify and minimize government and taxation, or go down under their burden. This is true not only of the United States, but of the whole world.

There is little in democratic institutions to change human nature, little to alter human selfishness and ambition; little to enlarge human mentality. The worldwide and age-old experience of humanity con stantly repeats the same lesson: that man should not attempt too much! All organic life repeats the same old cycle of birth, growth, maturity, decay and death; with the significant variant, that· overgrowth invariably begets structural weakness, hastens dis integration, and brings existence to premature end. No patriot wishes a premature end of his country. Let me sum up by once more saying that the business of modern government, with its numerous indispensable activities, must be, at the very best, so complex as to overtax the mentality and physical powers ofthe human beings who must constitute it. All that democracy can do, in self-preservation, is to minimize the activities of government and reduce them to their very lowest terms.

This, however, is but the logical expression of that utmost liberty of the individual, which lies at the [ 391 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation very foundation of democracy. Least government must mean greatest liberty. Here in America, as in Europe, popular government is the resultant of two great opposing currents of thought-radical and con servative; the former discontented with, and the latter believing in, things as they are. In the long run, the conservatives have, and probably always will have, the best of it; because things as they are have already survived the test of time; and have actually proved themselves to be in accordance with natural law and human nature-otherwise they would not persist. Government itself is one of those things that are; and its continued existence has demonstrated throughout all history that it is a necessary factor in social life. Nevertheless, it is but a very small part thereof; and the smaller it is the better. Most of us come but rarely· in conscious contact with government; the greater part of our lives being spent in our daily vocations and private concerns. We are not one hundredth part as con scious of it as of the clothes we carelessly wear and the air we heedlessly breathe; and all that most of us ask of government is that it shall unobtrusively enable us to live, and work, and save, and enjoy, in peace and quietness.

Such, however, is seldom the limit of the intent of those who govern, whether in the form of democ racy or autocracy. The love of place and power, and the love of money, always will inspire those who govern to enlarge their own bailiwick, complicate government function, and swell taxation. Such is markedly the case in America to-day. Not only our Socialist politicians, but our Republicans and Demo crats as well, vie with each other in overloading free government with bureaucracy and taxation; while the masses of our people are as yet confused by the [ 392 ] General Conclusions collectivist projects, and proriIises of all the parties. Nevertheless, we are beginning to rebel against class coercion and excessive taxation. Writers here and there are pointing out the decadence of the two great parties in virility and principle and their substantial identity of political purpose; which last seems to be simply to seize government, to enlarge government, and to multiply taxes.

As the writers referred to convincingly point out, the time is ripe for the appearance of a new political party. I, for one, devoutly hope that the popular disgust with all three of the great existing parties, Republican, Democratic, and Socialist, in these United States will beget a new and enduring majority whose simple and eternal slogan shall be "Least Government, Least Taxation; Greatest Liberty, Greatest Prosperity." For I love my country and its free institutions; and would fain have them endure for more thousands of years than history yet records of all the empires of the past. The simpler they are, the longer they are likely to last. Their greatest danger is from the demagogue and his gospel of envy and jealousy of the rich; his eternal preachment that numbers and muscle must be arrayed against brains, instead of using them and rewarding them. Some cynic has said "democracy is the most monstrous of all jokes., it is power without thought." , But, thank God, most of us Americans are not so dense or so petty as to be afraid or jealous· of trusting with power the few among our number who show themselves able to think and do great things, or even those who inherit great opportunity and tradition from .able and industrious parents. It is natural and right, we admit, for a man to work and save for his children. Indeed it· is well for us all that the few [ 393] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation who can and will save should do so. There are none too many of them. If my neighbor can do greater service for the community than I can, and earn far more in return than I can, God bless him!

Let me not be so contemptible as to stand in his way. Let him grow rich, and enlarge his works, and pay more poor men for honest toil. He does more for them than I, and deserves greater reward than mine. Nor do thinking Americans believe in "power with out thought." If my neighbor shows ability to build and manage great private business, let him by my free election be my public representative, to build and manage the greater public business that is mine and his as well. Give him and men like him legisla tive power, concentrate it in few and able hands. Load full responsibility also on the same broad shoulders, able to bear; with most to lose when held responsible. In short, use human nature in politics instead of trying to alter it; remembering that men are the material of government. Do not use that material if poor, nor overstrain it if good; and waste neither material nor motion not needed for the work in hand.

Such is the simple law of good engineering. As for governments, they are merely the banks that retain, and the bridges that cross, or the boats that float on, the great streams of national life and industry. The better they conform to natural flow, the less they cross or divert it, the longer they last. Per contra, the more tortuous their course, the. greater their resistance to the current, the faster and more deadly the erosion that ensues. If dams are built and spill ways not provided, overflow and burst barriers and devastation is inevitable. Once more let me plead for good political engineering. As this book goes.to press come out the "Letters [ 3941 GeneralConclusions of a High Minded Man," the late Franklin K. Lane; the most illuminating review or moving picture of contemporary American political thought that I, at least, have been so fortunate as to see. All through the book shows the gold of unselfish idealism, the copper of common sense, and the steel of courage.

At first, during his early professional career as publisher, lawyer, and politician-in the best sense shows also that inexperience in big business, that unfamiliarity with the laws and the limitations of trade, which has led so many of our purely political leaders astray-men like Roosevelt and, to give him the benefit of every doubt, Woodrow Wilson. Lane was a Democrat, a California Progressive, a friend of Organized Labor in his day as newspaper publisher. For a few years he was active in California local poli tics; then was Interstate Commerce Commissioner under Roosevelt; and finally Secretary of the Interior under Wilson. He reflects the mental color of his crowd. As late as 1909 he writes of the Money Power as prone to bring on panic and depression for Wall Street selfish benefit; although that same year his growing experience as I.C.C. Commissioner leads him to call railroad rate-fixing a "matter of politics,"

and to say that Courts,. knowing nothing about rail rates, should pass merely on their constitution,ality, and leave their economics to "experienced men." By I 91 I, he writes of the vain struggle with express rates, to which with a large corps of assistants he had given "some year or two of more or less pro fane contemplation" -seeking a way out of· the in extricable maze of figures presented by the express companies, but doubting whether he will find one before the Infinite Hand shall cut the cord of life. Meantime, he reflects that our people are likely to come to use the machine called Government as a [ 3951 Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation cooperative institution; holding nothing political to be sacred, except as it expresses general sentiment and proves workable. "If we have," he says, "made tremendous fortunes out of privileges granted by the whole people, we can correct this by change of law."

In 1912, less radical, he calls democracy an experi ment to find more equitable distribution of wealth, "without destroying individual initiative or blasting individual capacity and imagination." By 1913 he writes with some discouragement of the poor results of reclamation work done by his own Department; and deprecates the Government's "gold bricking" the settler on reclaimed lands. In 1917, his anxiety to win the war seems to affect his judgment, and he proposes to the President to establish the "Closed Shop" throughout· all industry, pending the war; also a method for nursing into life the patriotism of the union leaders, which was dying of strike fever, by frequent conference ,with them which course would have suited Mr. Gompers down to the ground. After that, throughout the strain of the conflict, he grows more and more conscious of the weakness of collectivism, of government ownership and operation, of bureaucracy. In his notes· on Cabinet Meetings and letters to Ambassa dor Page, in 1918, he rages at six months wasted in merely trying to let a contract for a cyanide plant; at stupid delay in settling to which department war-gas produc;tion should belong; at demagogic handling of Labor by the Shipping Board and the Railway Ad ministration; at a Hoover list of 800 cars left un heeded on McAdoo's desk for a week while Europe was crying for food. "Politics, politics, curse of the country," he groans; "the thing that democracy is short on is foresight."

By July he loses faith in Collective Bargaining. [396 ] General Conclusions "Every man in an industry ought to be tie<;l up in some way, by profit-sharing or stock-owning arrange ments; and we should get as large a proportion of our people on small farms as possible. . . . The man who has something is the man that will save the country. . .. The one thing that the Bolsheviks do not understand is that the world is not divided be tween Capital and Labor; but there is a great class unrepresented in these two divisions, the managing class that furnishes brains and direction. No Social isticscheme provides for the selection and reward of these men." By September, 1918, he decides, "I am against a standardized world; an ordered Prussianized world. I am for a world in which personal initiative is kept at work." In 1919 he goes further: "Progress means the discovery of the capable. They are our natural masters. They lead because they have the right.

Everything done to keep them from rising is a blow to what we call civilization." In 1920, advising the re-election of Senator Phelan, "These are to be most momentous times. Just where we are going no one knows; but clearly the people here~ as elsewhere, are bent upon testing the value of democracy, as a cooperative organization of men and women, and are determined to make it a fuller expression of human capacities and hopes. We must feel our way carefully • • . sympathy must be checked by wisdom-that we do not take on burdens we cannot ·safely carry-What can this democracy do for men and women-that is the super question. The answer must be wrought out of the sober though~ and the proved experience of our statesmen." A little rhetorical, this last; and written evidently for publication. Lane's failing health and death in [397 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation 1921 ended a life of growing power and usefulness.

He was fast, in "proved experience" and "sober thought," heading, it seems to me, for the true democratic go~l of "Least Government." At first he was powerfully influenced, by, the "Square Deal" slogan of Roosevelt and the "New freedom" of Wilson, toward rather vague collectivism; to regard democracy as the aforesaid cooperative organization for the expression of human capacities and hopes; to ask what it can do for men and women. Then he saw his chief, the "greatWilson"-whom he came later to distinguish from the "little Wilson" -make the hugest experiment, and failure, of gov ernment in business known to history; loading the na tion with useless ships, idle war plants, needless debt; loading administration with bureaucracy, and in dustry with an impossible labor situation; appar ently merely to prevent the conspicuous captains of trade and finance from putting their means and skill at the service of their country lest they should "profiteer." By and by he saw his President obliged, by ghastly failure all about him, to "discover the capable," and call in Schwab, Ryan, Willard, Morgan, to build ships and airplanes, run railroads, and sell Liberty Bonds. Lane did not live to see the coal and railway strikes of 1922; but he clearly saw the betrayal of manufacture and transportation to Organized Labor, "by the Shipping Board and the Federal Railway Control of 1918 and 1920. Toward the end he was evidently about ready to ask, not what democracy could do for 'men and women, but what it could stand out of the way of, and let them do for themselves.

Just so, it seems to me, the whole world is slowly learning to cut industry loose from demagogy. Even in Soviet Russia, though all is foggy and uncertain, [ 398 ] General Conclusions there seems. to loom up growing organization of the peasantry, as after the French Revolution, for in dividual ownership and cultivation of the land. Even at Moscow, collectivism as yet shows no sign of permanent success in government. In Germany, the great Stinnes has cut loose from politics and ad ministrations, and has gone to direct dealing with Frenchmen entitled to Reparations, proposing to furnish labor and material to .devastated France, as a business proposition, without waiting the end less delays of either government. In England, the conservative factions have consolidated in the face of threatened Labor domination of Parliament, creating a strong majority against radical departures. In Ireland, even the Catholic masses ask rest from civil war, and a chance to work out their own salva tion in peace. In France, still obsessed with fear of Germany, and hunger for Reparations, militarism perhaps still holds first place in popular purpose. In Japan and China, everywhere indeed but in Turkey and France, the sound medicine of work for wages seems to be taken with avidity by sick nations.

In this enumeration let me not overlook Italy, whose Fascisti movement is the most powerful and unexpected reaction against the Marxian gospel of envy and jealousy of riches that can well beimag ined. To me, so far as one may judge him by the cabled translations of his words, Benito Mussolini, leader of the Fascisti, is to-day the dominating figure of the world's political stage. "I am not afraid of words," he says, "so I pro nounce myself the prince of reaction. Yet I would not oppress the proletariat, but enrich it materially and spiritually. Great nations can be built only of well-fed and contented workingmen. I am not drunk with success. The rudder of the Italian ship [ 399 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation of state is strongly in my hand, and I will not yield it to anyone. I have no fetiches, even the fetich of liberty. People forget that liberty is a duty, not a right." What a magnificent conception of true democracy lies in those few pregnant phrases t Historians often note that from the womb of time and strenuous cir cumstance leaps out the man that voices the in articulate conviction of the multitude, forthwith to shape the event. May we of this fortunate country, we loyal, generous, patriotic Americans, be so fortu nate, in the years of engulfing demagogy that lie immediately before us, as to find a Mussolini of our own-a man not afraid of words, willing to call him self a prince. of reactiona Leader who will swing our heart and conscience back to the honest gospel of our fathers; back to the Constitution; back to the Jeffersonian doctrine of Least Government and its faithful application; and with this last (if we can judiciously mix brain with heart and conscience) not back .but forward, to Least Taxation and Greatest Prosperity.

{4OO ] APPENDIX I THE VOLSTEAD ACT. TOO MUCH REGULATION THE President's Message to Congress on Prohibi tion suggests an afterthought. Undoubtedly, the hardest line to draw between Too Much and Too Little Government is that which the 18th Amend ment and the Volstead Act attempt to lay down. It is perhaps too soon yet to submit conclusive proof that what we call Prohibition is a failure. "All signs fail in dry time," says the old Yankee farmer proverb; subject to which aphorism I may remark that all signs certainly point to substantial failure of the intention of the dry law (to stop drunkenness and save drunkards and their families from the curse of liquor) very much as on the daily weather maps the wind-arrows all vortex about and point toward the area of low barometric pressure. The strain put upon human nature, and the money premium offered for violation of the law in bootlegging, are too great for the average man and ·the machinery of govern ment to resist; it is morally certain, indeed is already in evidence, that corruption and demoralization of the officials charged with enforcement of the Volstead Act must be as widespread as in General Grant's Administration; when, as the elderly reader will re member, the United States Bench was tainted, and the President's official family disgraced by the frauds of the Whiskey Ring. As for our so-called upper classes, our better element, the fibre of our educated [4° 1 ] Appendix citizenship, it has never in our history, in spite of perhaps a majority acceptance of the principle of Prohibition, been so contemptuously defiant of the law. More of this hereafter.

I myself have on principle been inclined to obey the law, and give it a fair chance to prove its moral and economic value, though not at all a teetotaler. My reasons for so doing date back many years to an interesting experience in Chicago, in the early 80'S. I was young, and ·then general manager of the Telephone Company there. I became one of the Board of the "Citizens League for the Suppression of the Sale of Liquor to Minors and Inebriates"; whose job was to insure the enforcement of the City Ordi nance, forbidding saloons to sell drinks to boys under eighteen and men already drunk. We employed four detectives, who followed such persons into saloons, and prosecuted those who sold them liquor. The League cost little and did some good. Its head detective once figured out Chicago's drink-bill, and we published it, as a temperance tract. Its rough accuracy was easily verified, for some 5,3°0 saloons then licensed in Chicago, from the following minimum costs per diem per saloon: Rent, $75 per month, per day Fresh keg of beer, daily ...

Liquors and cigars, cost say, daily. Light, heat, and sundries, do. do. . Barkeeper, $75 per month, per day Saloonkeeper and family, cost say, Profit, say 10 per cent., Total per saloon, per day . . $2.50 4.00 1.5° 1.00 2.50 3.50 $15.00 1.50 $16.50 Chicago's drink-bill, then, would total for 5,3°0 saloons, 365 days in the year, at above $16.50, say [4°2 ] The r olstead Act $3 2,000,000. Chicago's City Budget was then some thing over $16,000,000 and its County Budget some thing over $4,000,000; or in all about $21,000,000. for public expenditures against $32,000,000 spent in the saloons! This last amount was paid out by per haps 250,000 adult men, out of a total population then 1.,125,000. These men were thus spending about $125 apiece per annum in the saloons out of an average earning of say $40 per month, or $480. That is, it was costing them over a quarter of all they earned, for an absolute waste· of money and health.

. But few of these men were drunkards; probably not over one per cent. of them. I realized that the saloon was their club, their social centre; and that the workingman has the same right to spend a quar ter of his income for purely social pleasures, for gre gariousness, as his employer has. We all spend that much on our pleasures, while our earnings are mod erate; but as they rise, and we reach the so-called upper class, what we thus waste does not cut so deep into our savings. We can accumulate, notwith standing; and grow a little or much better off each year as our income grows. The very rich can spend but a small portion of their revenues, and are the great accumulators of fixed capital. The working man, on the contrary, if quarter of his income goes to waste, has practically nothing left. That is one reason why at that time, say in 188o, there were only 2,335,000 savings bank depositors, averaging $35 0 each, out·· of over 50,000,000 people in the .United States. In 1920, the record was better. There were over 11,000,000 savings depositors,. averaging $600 apiece, out of 106,000,000 people. Wages to-day more than double those of 188o, while the cost of living is hardly double, and the saving habit has grown. A lot [4°3 ] Appendix of working people,own Liberty Bonds and homes, too.

It may easily be that two, instead of one out of five workingmen, as in 1880, are savers to-day. But at the time I speak of I was appalled at the enormous economic waste of the saloon habit; and at its byproducts, though in comparatively few cases, of crime, pauperism, insanity, full jails, and asylums. The saloons in Chicago, as everywhere, were financed and controlled mainly by the great breweries and distilleries; who used all the machinery of finance, intensive production, distribution, and advertising, to waste the money, and often the life, usefulness, and morality of the workingman. It seemed to me then, and does still, that the community has a right to protect itself against such predatory citizens, who would thus injure their fellowmen, for their own sor did profit. On the other hand, light wines, beer, and even liquors are all natural products; traditional foods, with dietary values, harmful only when used to ex cess. It is to most of us a distinct encroachment on our constitutional individual liberties that the law should forbid reasonable use of any traditional food or drink; a stretching to the breaking-point of the police power, or the power to r~gulate interstate commerce, such as neither history nor good sense ascribe to the intent of the makers of the Constitution of the United States. The true sphere of governmen tal action on the drink-evil seems to me rather that of regulation than of prohibition; of the exercise of the power of the community to prevent organized poison ing of the more ignorant classes, organized demorali zation of politics, organized economic waste, by the manufacturers of alcoholics, in some practical way.

The conundrum seems to me one of ways and means, rather than of principles; namely, how to [4°4 ] The Polstead Act array the mass of the people against intemperance, rather than to build up an already formidable mi nority against arbitrary prohibition and the gov ernment that would enforce it; as is the lamentable situation to-day. It seemed to me years ago, and it does still, that the foundation of the difficulty lies in that· gregarious instinct which makes a man love hospitality and the company oEhis friends. Be fore Volstead days the workingman enjoyed ,his pet saloon as the rich man his club; with one essential difference between saloon and club. It was the saloonkeeper's business, the foundation· of his profit, to sell his customers as many drinks as their slender purses could pay for; hence the "American~' custom of "treating the crowd," carefully fostered by the etiquette of the saloon in this country.

The rich man's club, on the contrary, was not run for profit, but for the common pleasure of its mem bers. Excessive drinking ,seriously marred that pleasure; and long before the Volstead Act had led to the practice of empowering the governing com mittees of clubs to refuse to serve drunken members, to discipline, and if need be expel them, for the com fort of fellow members generally. In :tJlost such clubs grew up a public opinion strongly opposed to excessive use of liquor; with standards of quality, quantity, and appropriateness, that with rare excep tions did away with intemperance and its whole train of evils. The rich man's club, in my own ob servation, has been on the whole a distinct elevat or of social standards in American life, both in city and country; that is, up to the present time of the enforcement of the Volstead Act. To-day, it is not too much to say, I think, that, while the clubs themselves almost without exception officially observe the letter of the law, a very large [4°5 ] Appendix proportion, perhaps a majority, of that trained and temperate membership of well-off' men which they had produced is now unhesitatingly and unashamedly hand-in-glove with the. boot legging fraternity; is unconvinced of the wisdom of prohibition, entirely sceptical of its success, and candidly, if secretly, defiant of the law. If these men, leaders in educa tion, finance, industry, charity, and public spirit ofttimes, whose well-stocked cellars tide many of them over the bar of crooked buying of things to drink, thus ignore moral responsibility, what can we expect of the poor fellow who no longer can go to the corner for his glass of beer?

Now that three years' time has permitted comple tion of that vast organization for boot legging which a fantastic profit was bound to call into being, and the utter demoralization of the manufacture of pure wines and liquors, we are beginning to recognize another case of "Too Much Government"; one more attempt of· our collectivists to bite off more than they can masticate; one more failure to change human nature by law. The decrease of crime and the emptying of jails and asylums which was greeted with joy at the outset, before the trade of rum-run" ning could be put into working order, is said (though I have not seen verified statistics yet) to be on the wane. On the other hand, the bureaucracy indis pensable for enforcement of the law is already too small; and must enormously increase. The Presi dent has just confessed to Congress his doubts of the possibility of keeping the United States, with our immense frontier and coast line, even reasonably "dry." Smuggling is a trade as old as history and wide as the world; while never in human experience has there been hung up so vast and immediate a re ward for breaking the law as is offered by the VoI[ 406 ] The Volstead Act stead Act. Its worst consequence is bound to be political; in the inevitable wholesale corruption not only of the integrity of the revenue officers on guard . but of the morality of that important, almost domi nating upper class, which reads and thinks, and or ganizes the life and industries of the nation. That such men should openly despise· and secretly and successfully disobey the law, is to instil the worst conceivable poison into government of, by, and for the people. Only the saving consolation remains, that the same men are likely faithfully to obey every law that they do not despise. But how about their less educated imitators? Will they, too, discriminate between law and law?

It seems tome, pondering these .things, that ab.... solute prohibition-though for my own part· I would endure it for the sake of the crowd, if valid-must al ways be a matter of "Too Much Government," if indeed practicable at all; while, on the other hand, temperance and thrift, which all of us, even the in temperate and thriftless, cordially desire, are largely matters of habit or fashion in the crowd to which each man belongs. He does as his friends do, us ually. In 1880 I discussed with friends at Chicago a project, never attempted to my knowledge, but which seemed to us to have merit; namely, that Neighborhood Clubs, or Social Centres, enough in number to serve the whole working population, should gradually be built (perhaps by philanthropic or proprietary investors at first-perhaps eventually by the municipality as public properties, as might prove practicable in each case), located at central points, on streetcar lines, and fitted up for social rec reation in leisure hours; with cafe, bar, smoking room, music room, dance Hoor, movie stage, reading, writing, and card rooms, to be operated at cost plus [4°7 ] Appendix a profit sufficient to provide for rent, upkeep, and improvement; for the common benefit of all reputable residents of the neighborhood, under direct control of a Board of Managers chosen annually by the membership, empowered to make house rules and enforce discipline by expulsion or suspension, as in private clubs. Membership to be open to all neighborhood residents, on payment of dues, subject to discipline or expulsion by the Board, for cause.

Such clubs, if now organized (and the Volstead Act repealed, or its definitions modified so as to permit of light wines, beer, etc.), might be made, each for its own territory, the sole agencies for the sale of such intoxicants as might be thus legalized; their Boards of Managers to be charged with personal responsi bility for the establishmen,t and maintenance of reasonable restrictions upon sale of alcoholics, and for the inculcation of thrift. If properly managed, and made attractive, as they easily could be, they should be profitable from the outset, and earn a surplus available only for and by the clubs them selves, for their own continuous improvement and enlargement, or for the reduction of cost of admis sions, service, etc.; so that every member would be zealous to protect the business of the club, as his own, and see to it that bootleggers should not estab lish surreptitious competition with it.

It would, of course, ... be necessary to tryout this club method of controlling the sale of intoxicants by providing and operating a few clubs long enough to work up equipment and regime meeting actual popular need and approval. My Chicago experience above referred to long antedated the great modern Y. M. C. A. and Y. W. C. A. establishments and the social side of modern church work. It was then hard to get the average young man into quasi-religious [408 ] The PolsteadAct social organizations; and the young woman was hot taken into account at all. Then as now, however, the little homes of the working classes· did not offer much attraction to the father, or the children oVer fifteen, after working hours. He went off to his pet saloon while the wife washed up the dishes and put the young ones to bed; and the older boys and girls went out into the streets for each others' company. Now the dance halls and the movies gather in the latter, and a good many of their fathers and mothers in due time.

My theory is, that ample and agreeable clubs, common meeting-places for social life, .analogous to the German beer-garden-where both sexes, whole families, young and old, of the same neighborhood, might conveniently gather during play hours; offer ing standard refreshments and amusements at rea sonable cost and of good quality, under the restraint of dissipation and wastefulness by publicity and the force of neighborhood opinion, rather than by the rude and prying coercion of the policeman. and the spy-such clubs ought to be popular and prosperous. They should constitute a. far more effective check upon the liquor evil than our present huge pro hibition machinery, according to common sense and the President, is likely to prove itself. For membership of the clubs would certainly in clude the large majority of the population, and fur thermore it would be to the direct personal interest of every member to develop his own club, and shut out competition in its territory. If such should prove to be the case, it would he very hard for surreptitious "joints" to start or live off the non-members. A healthy competition would be pretty sure to develop I between the hoards of managers of clubs in neigh boring districts or towns, in developing the most [4°9 ] Appendix beautiful and attractive establishments. At first it would be well that planning of buildings and organ ization of. service should be under friendly advice of men and women experienced in private or rich men's clubs; but they should be turned over at the earliest moment to entire control of the best neighbor hood board of managers that the membership can offer.

In brief, the essence of this slight study of the great temperance question is consistent with the whole drift of my convictions-toward DECENTRALIZATION, voluntary popular action, absence of coercion; and as always I am solidly, absolutely against our country's besetting evil of TOO MUCH GOVERNMENT.

APPENDIX II OUR MERCHANT MARINE TANGLE WHEN I was a boy, my uncle was a country neigh bor of Mr. John M. Forbes, one of that sturdy group of Boston and Salem world merchants whose clipper ships carried the Stars and Stripes to every port of the seven seas in the old days before the Civil War, when our merchant marine was second only to that of England. I listened to Mr. Forbes talk with my uncle one evening after dinner, not long subsequent to the close of the war. The latter had asked when a new fleet was going to replace the famous ships that had been swept from the face of ocean by the Con federate privateers Alabama and Tennessee. "Never again," answered that uncompromising New Englander. "The iron ship has forced the wooden ship into the discard; and wooden ships are all .we can build here. The protective tariff has raised the price of iron, and a depreciated currency has raised wages, so that we can neither build in our own yards nor buy on the Clyde without costing us a quarter more than our competitors pay for ships. Moreover, our navigation laws handicap us in cost of operation, so that. we cannot run ships in competition with the British and Norwegians. There is no future for American ship-owners. Our rail road builders, on the other hand, can make good money building right here at home; and there are our enormous north and southwest territories [ 411 ] Appendix to develop. From henceforward I am a railroad man."

So indeed he was. During two or three decades his cash and courage, and that of other Bostonians, vigorously and colossally pushed across the continent the Michigan Central, the Burlington, the Union Pacific,the Santa Fe, railroads; until by and by the dead hand of government was laid on the railroads, too, as on the merchant marine before them, to chill their life blood and check their growth also. Some thirty years after the above conversation took place the great Morgan Banking House financed the combination of ocean steamship lines known as "The International Merchant Marine." Soon after it commenced business I crossed on the steamship St. Paul, one of the former American Line ships which had gone into the "combine." My seat at meals was at the left of the ship's purser, and at his right sat a well-known ocean forwarding-agent, Mr. George W. Sheldon, with whom the purser talked freely. The conversation turned one day upon the new combination, and in my innocence of the subject I ventured the prophecy that it would be a vast financial success; with its great fleet, choice terminals, established relations with· railways on both sides of the water, experienced staff, and the economies pos sible in shutting up numerous competing selling of fices, in. routing freights, etc. To my great surprise the purser replied that the combination in his judg mentwas bound to prove a great disappointment. The ocean, he said, was an absolutely free road for every tramp to travel; an open fieldfor universal and ruthless competition, where the fittest would survive. An American steamship, heavily handicapped in first cost by the protective tariff, whether built in the United States or bought abroad; and again by our navigation [ 412 ] Our Merchant Marine laws in cost of operation and repairs; could not hope to compete for world traffic with foreign vessels, nor to run at a profit unless in the coastwise trade, from which our laws shut out the foreigner. He had been purser of the St. Paul for years, he said, and had never been able to make the ship pay. What was true of it would be true in general; and the Interna tional Mercantile Marine Co. was likely to prove it.

He was entirely right. But for the great \Vorld War, that made a gold mine of everything that floated for two or three' years, the I. M. M. Co. would have gone nobody knows where. To-day it is again, like all owners of American sea-going craft (notably our Government Shipping Board), between the devil· and several deep seas; once more wonder ing "where it is at," as the Texan said. Not long after this experience I attended a Reci procity Convention, called by a conspicuous group of New York business men, to influence Congress to make treaties of reciprocity with other nations; so at least it was understood. I was then vice president for Illinois of the National Association of Manufacturers; and went as delegate from that body and also as Governor's delegate from the State of Illinois. When the· Convention assembled there was far more talk of Ship Subsidies than of Recipro city; and the Western delegates suspected that· the whole affair was engineered by Eastern shipping men, and was in fact a camouflaged subsidy convention.

However, the subsidy programme was finally carried through in somewhat reduced dimension; but in the course of the debate Mr. Lewis Nixon, head of the N. Y. Shipbuilding combination, was forced into the open, and came out frankly somewhat as follows (I have not his exact words) : "If you Western men will abolish the protective ( 41 3 ] Appendix tariff, which makes our cost of building ships 20 to 25 per cent. higher than British or German cost, my company will be only too glad to go out after its share of the ship-building trade of the entire world. We have the plant, the material, the labor, and the skill, to engage to advantage· in that competition. And if you will furthermore annul the navigation laws which make it impossible to operate our ships in competition with ships manned by Scandinavians, Lascars, and other seafaring races, then American ship-owners will hold their own ,against the world.

But if you persist in taxing and regulating us out of business, and yet wish the American flag to remain upon the high seas, the only thing to do is to sub sidize us back into the running." Mr. Nixon's argument was unanswerable then, and is still more so now; as meantime, if I am not mistaken, the LaFollette Seaman's Act has made it still more impossible to run an American ship at a profit. It may have been in force then, however, but that does not alter the present situation. These three utterances of Mr. Forbes, the purser, and Mr. Nixon, so many years apart, yet so consis tent in argument, long ago convinced me that we ourselves have wiped the flag off the high seas simply by too much government and too much taxation. It is my equally definite belief that, given a fair field and no favor, the brain and brawn, the capital and courage, of American seafaring men and merchants would in a few short years put the flag back where it was in the days of the Forbeses, the Welds, the Sears, the Rotches, Bryant and Sturgis, the Aspin walls, and all their free company; and restore our country to her rightful place as mother of mariners.

To-day, thanks to the rather bizarre combination of the "Pirate" Semmes of the Alabama and his con[414 ] Our Merchant 1tfarine frere of the Tennessee with our tariff-makers, Ding ley, McKinley, et al., and last but not least with those able landsmen, Senat!or LaFollette and super Senator Gompers, I realize that ample ship subsidies from reluctant taxpayers ave absolutely necessary to keep our cargoless fleet (a: melancholy reminder of how our President put us into the war) afloat at all. Yet even subsidies will never make it great or domi nant as our old-time fleet once was and still should be. On the contrary, they are sure to be, as they already rightfully are, continual breeders· of .suspicion and political corruption; of taxation of the many for the benefit of the few. Why should we thus, as a nation supposed to be endowed with reasonable common sense, first de liberately scuttle our great ocean industry, and then tax ourselves to pay for constant pumping to keep it afloat? Why should we not simply close the sea cocks, and let the craft first rid herself of water in the hold and then go off high and dry and rejoicing, under her own steam?

Incidentally, I may remark, that recent cursory inquiry at the Sailors' Snug Harbor and the Seamen's Union, not far from each other in South Street, New York, indicated that, apart from its effect in killing the American ocean shipping business,the LaFollette Seaman's Act does not seem to accomplish much. I expected to find a strong drift of foreign seamen' toward .American naturalization, by reason of the better conditions attending American seamanship, under the LaFollette Act. This did not seem to be the case. The head of the Seamen's Union, or his assistant, a strongly Red or Bolshevistic young man, damned all American ship:-owners as capitalistic eva ders of the Act; and the Act itself as a fake. When Mr. LaFollette is President, if· ever that comes to [ 415] Appendix pass, he should look into this denunciation of his work. Meantime, I submit that during the pregnant years since the Civil War, this great country of ours has had unrivalled growth, and taken its place as the richest and most powerful region on earth, without any ocean-going merchant marine worth mention.

Even .the drastic experience of the World War and the submarine destruction involved could not stop our rush to the front of things. We have now built a useless fleet by main strength and awkwardness. We have pretty conclusively proved that trade does not follow the flag, but thrives between peoples that have something to sell and something to buy at the same time; such as England and Germany had be fore the war. They were most absolutely out from under our flag yet carried our freights and were our largest customers and vendors of all the world. The point of this remark is not to deny the advantage of a merchant marine, but to remove sentimental argu ment for creating one by taxation and subsidy, in stead of the natural stimulant of free commercial op portunity. Enable our merchants to do business with foreign lands, and our flag will follow our cargoes fast enough. Less government and less taxation will set them free as will nothing else under the sun.

THE END [ 416 1

About this edition

This EPUB was produced automatically from the PDF named below. The text is the publisher's; the layout was reflowed for screen reading, so page breaks, line breaks and hyphenation differ from the original.

Title: Too Much Government, Too Much Taxation

Author: Charles Normon Fay

First published: 1923

Publisher: Doubleday, Page & Company, Garden City, NY

Source file: Too Much Government, Too Much Taxation.pdf

Source page: https://freecapitalists.org/books/too-much-government-too-much-taxation/

Converted: 2026-08-09 by The Liberty Archive (freecapitalists.org), converter v6

Table of Contents

- Cover
- Preface
- Contents

- Chapter I - Our Present Overload of Government

- Chapter II - Government Meddling with Big Business

- Chapter III - Government War Control of Sugar

- Chapter IV - Government Attitude Toward Labor

- Chatper V - Useless U.S. Boards and Commissions

- Chapter VI - Useless State and Local Boards

- Chapter VII - Too Many Overlapping Local Governments and Taxing Bodies

- Chapter VIII - Too Many Elective Offices, Checks and Balances

- Chapter IX - Too Long Ballots, Complexity of Initiative and Referendum

- Chapter X - Too Many Elections-Too Short Terms

- Chapter XI - Principles That Should Limit Legislation

- Chapter XII - Legislation On Labor

- Chapter XIII - Legislation on Profiteering

- Chapter XIV - Remedies Suggested-Political Apathy

- Chapter XV - Outline of Project for Simplified State and Local Politics

- Chapter XVI - Candidates and Qualifications for Office

- XVII - Short Ballots

- Chapter XVIII - Simplification of Nomination and Election

- Chapter XIX - Efficiency and Compensation of Governmental Personnel

- Chapter XX - Too Much and Too Complex Taxation

- Chapter XXI - Simplification and Visibility of Taxation

- Chapter XXII - Remedies Worse Than the Diseases

- Chapter XIII - General Conclusion
- Appendix I
- Appendix II
- About this edition