Date: 1962-01-01T07:00:00+00:00
Description: Helmut Schoek and James W. Wiggins Psychiatry and Responsibility
Publisher: Van Nostrand, Princeton

Psychiatry and Responsibility

Helmut Schoeck

Psychiatryand Responsibility l"'he William Volker Fund Series In the Humane Studies EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF ECONOMICS by Ludwig von Mises THE ECONOMIC POINT OF VIEW by Israel M. Kirzner ESSAYS IN EUROPEAN ECONOMIC THOUGHT Edited by Louise Sommer SCIENTISM AND VALUES Edited by Helmut Schoeck and James W. Wiggins A SOCIALIST EMPIRE: THE INCAS OF PERU by Louis Baudin RELATIVISM AND THE STUDY OF MAN Edited by Helmut Schoeck and James W. Wiggins FREEDOM AND THE LAW by Bruno Leoni MAN, ECONOMY, AND STATE-2 vols. by Murray N. Rothbard THE ULTIMATE FOUNDATION OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE by Ludwig von Mises PSYCHIATRY AND RESPONSIBILITY Edited by Helmut Schoeck and James W. Wiggins THE FREE AND PROSPEROUS COMMONWEALTH by Ludwig von Mises SCIENCE AND HISTORY: A CRITIQUE OF POSITIVIST EPISTEMOLOGY by Heinrich Rickert Psychiatryand Responsibility Edited by HELMUT SCHOECK AND JAMES W. WIGGINS Papers by THOMAS S. SZASZ GEORGE P. GRANT D. ELTON TRUEBLOOD HENRY S. KARIEL O. HOBART MOWRER ALAN KEITH-LuCAS RICHARD T. LAPIERE DAVID McCORD WRIGHT HERVEY M. CLECKLEY DAVID SPRING JAMES W. WIGGINS D. VAN NOSTRAND COMPANY, INC.

PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY TORONTO NEW YORK LONDON D. VAN NOSTRAND COMPANY, INC. 120 Alexander St., Princeton, New Jersey (Principal office) 24 West 40 Street, New York 18, New York D. VAN NOSTRAND COMPANY, LTD. 358, Kensington High Street, London, W.14, England D. VAN NOSTRAND COl\IPANY (Canada), LTD. 25 Hollinget Road, Toronto 16, Canada Copyright, © 1962 by WILLIAM VOLKER FUND Published simultaneously in Canada by D. VAN NOSTRAND COMPANY (Canada), LTD. No reproduction in any form of this book, in whole or in part (except for b,'ief quotation in critical articles or reviews), may be made without written authorization from the publishers. PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Contributors HERVEyM. CLECKLEY, M.D., is Clinical Professor of Psychiatry in the Medical School of the University of Georgia. Dr. Cleckley, who also holds a degree from Oxford University (Rhodes Scholar), after several years of psychiatric practice in the Veterans Administration, became a Professor of Psychiatry and Neurology at the University of Georgia.

He is a Diplomate of the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology, a Fellow of both the American Psychiatric Association and the American College of Physicians, and, a member of the editorial board of the Journal of Clinical and Experimental Psychopathology. Among his publications are The Mask of Sanity: An A ltempt to Clarify Some Issues about the So-called Psychopathic Personality (1955); The Caricature of Love: A Discussion of Social) Psychiatric and Literary Manifes tations of Pathologic Sexuality (1957). Together with Dr. Thigpen, he wrote The Three Faces of Eve (1957). GEORGE P. GRANT, formerly Professor and Head of the Depart ment of Philosophy, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Can ada (1947-1960), has been Associate Professor of Religion at McMaster University since 1961. He has served for severalyears as secretaryto the adult education movement in Canada. His chief interests are the study of Greek philosophy and Biblical religion. He was a Rhodes Scholar in 1939. Among his publications are Philosophy in the v VI Contributors Mass Age (1959) and numerous articles in Canadian jour nals on religious and and political philosophy.

HENRY S. KARIEL, by training and vocation a political scientist, taught at the University of California (Berkeley) and Harvard before joining the Division of Social Sciences at Bennington College in Vermont. He is author oJ The Decline of A merican Pluralism (1961) and numerous articles in professional journals. A study of his on con temporary political philosophy is scheduled for publica tion in 1962. ALAN KEITH-LuCAS is Alumni Professor of Social Work and Director of the Group Child Care Project at the Univer sity of North Carolina. He has degrees in English, social work, and political science. He has contributed numerous articles to professional journals. His best-known book is Decisions about People in Need. RICHARD T. LAPIERE is Professor of Sociology at Stanford Uni versity. As editor of the McGraw ..Hill Series in Sociology and Anthropology, Dr. LaPiere has guided into print some thirty books for other authors. Among his own books are A Theory of Social Control) Collective Behavior) and The Freudian Ethic (1959). He co-authored a text on Social Psychology and has written novels based on socio logical research.

o. HOBART MOWRER, Research Professor of Psychology, Univer sity of Illinois, was President of the American Psychologi cal Association in 1954. Currently he is a consultant at the Galesburg (Illinois) State Research Hospital and Di rector of the Lilly Endowment Fellowship Program at the University of Illinois. He has written numerous tech nical articles and monographs on the psychology of learn ing, language, personality theory, and psychotherapy. His Contributors vii most recent books are Learning Theory and Behavior (1960), Learning Theory and the Symbolic Processes (1960), and The Crisis in Psychiatry .and Religion (1961). HELMUT SCHOECK is Associate Professor of Sociology at Emory University. B!2.!.~jn Austria J, he studied at the Universi ~ies of Munich and Tiibingen in West Germany. After, (~ur ye~~SOf concurrent training in medkine andexperi. J L;~:~ ..~~~:~~~~~~~:~~~..~;I;;;~~::~..~~;;~:;~~ Dr. Schoeck came to America following World War II.

During 1953.-54 he was a Visiting Research Fellow in Sociology at Yale. In addition to numerous essays and research papers in professional journals, Dr. Schoeck has written, translated, or contributed to some sixteen books, including Financing Medical Care (1962), Was heisst politisch unmoeglich? (1959), U.S.A.: Motive und Strukturen (1958), and Nie tzsches Philosophie des Menschlich-Allzumenschlichen (1948). DAVID SPRING is Associate Professor of History at Johns Hopkins University. Dr. Spring, who had his training as a historian in Canada and at Harvard, specializes in modern English history. Among his many articles in professional journals are: "History and Sociology: A Plea for Humility," "Eng lish Landownership in the Nineteenth Century," and "The English Landed Estate in the Age of Coal and Iron." THOMAS S. SZASZ, M.D., is a professor in the Department of Psychiatry at the State University of New York, Upstate Medical Center, in Syracuse. He took his psychoanalytic rtraining at the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis and lfor the next five years was a member of its staff, Dr. Szasz has published frequently in leading medical, psychiatric, psychological, and psychoanalytic journals. He is the viii Contributors author of Pain and Pleasure (1957) and The Myth of Mental Illness (1961). He has also been a contributor to several books, including Dynamic Psychiatry (1952), Twenty Years of Psychoanalysis (1953), American Hand book of Psychiatry (1959), and Legal and Criminal Psychology (1961). He is a member of the editorial board of The Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases) a mem ber of the board of consultants of Psychoanalysis and the Psychoanalytic Review) and a consultant to the Committee on Mental Hygiene of the New York State Bar Association.

DAVID ELTON TRUEBLOOD is Professor of Philosophy at Earlham College. He has written and published nineteen books. Selected titles include Philosophy of Religion) The Pre dicament of Modern Man) The Recovery of Family Life) and The Life We Prize. In 1954-55, Dr. Trueblood served as Chief, Religious Information, United States Informa tion Agency. JAMES W. WIGGINS is Professor of Sociology and former Chair man of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Emory University, where he developed the doctoral program in sociology. He received his B.S. from Georgia Southern College in 1934, an M.A. from Duke University in 1943, and his Ph.D. from Duke in 1956. Professor Wiggins served as chairman of symposia on "Culture Contact in Underdeveloped Countries," "Scien tism and the Study of Man," and "Relativism and the Study of Man." He is director of the national study A Profile of the Aging: U.S.A.} to be published in 1962.

Dr. Wiggins seIVed as co-editor of Foreign Aid Re examined and has had articles published in many scholarly journals. He has served as research and professional con sultant to various national and regional organizations. DAVID MCCORD WRIGHT is William Dow Professor of Economic and Political Science at McGill University. Dr. Wright is Contributors ix a member of the Royal Economic Society and a former president of the Southern Economic Association. His books include A Key to Modern Economics) Democracy and Progress) the Economics of Disturbance) and The Crea tion of Purchasing Pow-er. His newest book, The Key nesian System~ has been published by the Fordham University Press in 1962.

Preface The authors who joined the discussions from which this volume resulted were invited on the basis of their earlier work, which had shown an awareness of the consequences of modern pl$ychiatry for the character, values, and future form of our society. ., 12~plid~ in a free society is the idea of personal resE(:msibi!ity1 1on the part of its members. Exceptions, of course, have to be J made for chIldren, for the physically handicapped, the mentally. ~eficient, and the insane. In--K~n~o~~ve~e ~~!!~ctuaIJ ¢li!nate should. encourage a maximum. of self.reliance. ~nd indi, vi(i"~"ir-re~P?~~-FOiili7>se who -seem' t;~p~~f~~;~;'''''';ociety in w IC " ;. "'~ily' every act that is not compulsory is fo~n, ol:iFprobiem understandably does not_~,!st. -In recent decades the values supporting individual respotlsi- \ bilIty~"have become somewhat su~merged. Several authors have ) ootena drIft toward an ethICof overdepenaenc_~, .and certanl aspects of cont~~p~~~rIME~y~hiatr.1 have apparently provided a rationale--if not 'an"'i'~petus~for the drift. -- '\' ·-t· ~OTtliea~~~~!yj~..our r~ 2%~i~~:' \ ....~,~p,::.!<~.~~!.r".~,~~,,~~g:.,~.!b:~,w.~.~,~g.~E:.,,12~ul'). tiQn~.oup. For instance, ."

. it certaIn type of psychIatrIC thInkIng has challenged the concept of authority. It has attacked the father in his role as head of a family. At a professional meeting in Syracuse in November, 1959, Dr. Earl A. Loomis, a child psychiatrist, said: "In contemporary SQa~:~~",,!~,!.h,~!.~!S too often regardeCfaSthe'hully, tlie'='s~ip:'="'or the absenteelancl,l~rd. This stereotyping coiifuse(f1)offi-Father and "-]ii's"''"lam1Iy:"'''F~r today's psychiatrist and social worker there seems to be no concept of the father that could be taken as right." -"w"'Each chapter in this book was written in response to an invitation asking the contributor to consider from his particular area of competence the problem stated in the preceding para· ~ aPhs, The editors and all the contributors except two met for . one week to discuss preliminary versions of the manuscripts. ~Every contributor had an opportunity to read the essays of every xi xii Preface """other. Following the conference, considerable correspondence between the contributors and the editors took place in an effort to, rewrite and edit the manuscripts for publication. Nearly every author received, and took into consideration to a varying extent, ~riticisms and suggestions from other participants. On some points of perspective, however, several authors exercised their privilege 'of interpreting connections and phenomena as they saw fit, re gardless of differing points of view within the group. In the final analysis, therefore, each author is solely responsible for his interpretations and facts. '-,.~~_~ , Some readers, relatively unfamiliar with the literature, may feel that the positions examined in the following chapters are "straw men." Unfo!tqJl~.t~1~J,,~.itj,~_~1!!!9~.Lj!!lEossible to cre...~!~.

,j, th~~'''''~'~Mw~:~~~,.,~~,;:,~~"~_!~_~_2:~~,!!:-~Y~_~!L2.~!$~~.,,~~y fiction. The m~n I If,/'''' f wIiose propos Itlons are examined and crl tICI~~~",,!?Y ..,,!!!,~,,~~,~!~2E~M"~~ J ~~~~~~~~~~s~~~~~~~). certainly not representing all of their colleagu~~t..",..QQ.",~.!!2"~.,,,,,,,~Yen rel?r~§~J1.t,~..lh~,w!!!.2~M~,,,~~,;XtrS!!!£._RQ.~iti.<;P,!, which c<>'uld be found i~. the Iiter .n-this.Jield. --' Quite possibly much of the controversy is due to a tactical: {:7t~o:::~~:~t~Iti~o~:;~~;a;: Xt:C~::~li' ~e~;'~~;;~~~~ ) "scieiiHfiE'~'}""'''As"'''aMconseqUe'irce''''soffie~"'psycIiiatilsts·Stake""'tiieciaims·'~<.. ~, of their field on criteria chosen by others. For psychiatry the '\ (submission to the validity of the canons of strict science was,J ~f course, unnecessary. However, the alternative, declaring psychi- " atry to be an art, would have its hazards too, because then the results of the work of practitioners in this field ",vould have to be judged according to canons of craftsmanship or aesthetics.

f At the present time, paradoxically, som~"'"~:~'~~?"~~"<0~~,_~~..Jc.,."...~i'!~ \ deel!}_,!-~!!!!~~lves qualified to judge and interpret ~~~.~!l,tn.ing In.) ;''''&.Qciety-fromart to religion, from sociaT....iIiSITflitlons to inter.<' muional politics, from the treatment of babjes to the treatmen~ .cl criminals-while at the same time ~!!!.~<.?!!sly protesti~rty\ 1l~!.~ look at psychiatry itself except by the anojnted insider wh~,j) can scarcely be considered unbiased,. May, 1962 HELMUT SCHOECK JAMES W. WIGGINS Contents PAGE Contributors Preface by HELMUT SCHOECK CHAPTER v xi PSYCHIATRY AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION 1 by THOMAS S. SZAsZ 2 CONTEMPORARY PSYCHIATRY AND THE CONCEPT OF RESPONSIBILITY 19 by D. ELTON TRUEBLOOD 3 GUILT IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 38 by O. HOBART MOWRER 4 THE INDIVIDUAL AND HIS SOCIETY: DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN SOCIOLOGY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 68 by RICHARD T. LAPIERE 5 PSYCHIATRY: SCIENCE, ART, AND SCIENTISM 83 by HERVEY M. CLECKLEY 6 CONCEPTIONS OF HEALTH 117 by GEORGE P. GRANT 7 SOCIETY AS CRUCIBLE 135 by HENRY S. KARIEL 8 PSYCHOANALYTIC THINKING AND THE RELIEF OF THE POOR 157 by ALAN KEITH-LuCAS 9 PSYCHIATRY AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 176 by DAVID MCCORD WRIGHT xiii xiv CHAPTER Contents PAGE 10 PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE WRITING OF HISTORY by DAVID SPRING 11 CRIMINOLOGY AND THE SICK SOCIETY . by JAMES W. WIGGINS INDEX OF AUTHORS INDEX OF SUBJECTS 194 211 231 235 1 Psychiatry as a Social Institution THOMAS S. SZASZ The effects of psychiatric theories on modern society may be inferred in several ways. One is to observe the impact that psychiatry has had on specific social or scientific endeavors~for example, on the writing of history, on social work, or on the concepts of health and responsibility. Another approach is to describe and analyze what could be regarded as the effect of psychiatry upon itself--.that is, the development of psychiatry as a social institution.

The term "social institution" is used here in its conventional sociological sense, to refer to ITIore or less stable patterns of group behavior, usually pertaining to the regulation of one of the functional prerequisites of society (e.g., socialization of new mem bers, maintenance of biologic adequacy, Iuaintenance of internal or external order, etc.). As organizations, social institutions con stitute a part ofa larger system of social controls. Strictly speaking, of course, no such thing as a social institution exists, but only individuals or groups of individuals acting in a certain manner. The dichotomy that will be drawn at various points in this chapter is therefore not between institutional and individual ac tion, but rather between the behavior of one group of individuals as opposed to the behavior of some other individuals. Institutions cannot, of course, do anything except in so far as individuals take certain ki.nds of actions.

1 2 Psychiatry and Responsibility The operation of social institutions depends in part on the generation of certain sentiments and ideas, an effect achieved through the utilization of a cluster of partly symbolic and partly utilitarian regulations. The family, religion, and the state are universally known examples of virtually timeless social institu tions. Labor unions, organized American medicine, and the Supreme Court are social institutions specifically rooted in a given culture at a particular period in its history. We can show that psychiatry is an institution of modern Western societies (especially well developed in the United States), comparable to the function ally and temporally restricted institutions mentioned above. Psychiatry as a Social Institution In certain respects psychiatry and medicine are similar institutions. The primary aim of each is to promote the health of the members of society. Medicine's task is to safeguard and promote the biological well-being of the human organism, psychi atry's to safeguard and promote the mental or spiritual well-being of persons, and even of society as a whole.

Examining the structure of psychiatry as an institution, one may discern the following principal components. First, one finds psychiatrists and psychiatric patients. Taking the family as a model, psychiatrists and patients are seen to occupy roles similar to those of parents and children. As in the family, the role-be havior of the members-for example, with respect to power or autonomy of action-may vary greatly. Beyond the immediate members of the "psychiatric family," one finds psychiatric hospitals (public and private), Departments of Mental Hygiene (in the United States), and complex judicial codes concerning what mayor may not be done with and to persons officially diagnosed as "mentally ill." Two further struc tural components of this system deserve mention: the para psychiatric professions and occupations, for example, clinical psychology, social work, and psychiatric nursing; and the pro fessional organizations of psychiatrists.

One of the main functions of organized psychiatry, and hisPsychiatry as a Social Institution 3 torically the oldest, is the segregation of certain members of society. This social control is exercised through operations that are partly rational and scientific and partly symbolic. The very concept of mental illness (or mental health) is of this twofold variety. But more specifically and more pervasively, psychiatric diagnoses constitute the principal codifications through which the operations of this institution are performed. Some psychiatric diagnoses describe a specific type of behavior -for example, conversion hysteria. In so far as this is true, psychiatric diagnoses are utilitarian in character. At the same time, many psychiatric diagnoses-the terms "psychopath" and "paranoid" are illustrative-seem to have predominantly a sym bolic, in the sense of affect-and action-promotive, function. Thus, to some extent psychiatric diagnoses fulfill the same sorts of function as do flags, emblems, and monuments: they generate appropriate emotions, which, in this case, are usually awe, fear, and mystification. The result, if not the purpose, is to elevate the institution and its practitioners and to debase all others, especially the patients. The following example is illustrative.

(Examples cited in this essay are based either on newspaper ac counts of antisocial acts involving psychiatric participation or on my personal observations.) A man charged with homicide is declared mentally unfit to stand trial and incarcerated in a hospital,£or the criminally insane. He is neither placed on trial nor release,d, even though he would prefer either alternative to indefinite mental hospitalization. The psychiatrists have labeled him a "dangerous paranoid'" words that strike terror in the hearts of most people, and the victim finds it impossible to obtain the help of either lawyers or psychiatrists, for they are reluctant to take on such cases. To argue that all men, even those labeled "paranoid," should be treated seriously, as responsible human beings, is like desecrating the psychiatric flag. It flies in the face of one of the major tenets of psychiatry as a social institution, namely, that the actions of some so-called mentally ill persons need not be taken seriously in the sense of their being held responsible for what they do.

More precisely, such acts will not he "taken seriously" from a 4 Psychiatry and Responsibility socioethical and legal point of view, but instead will be "taken seriously" only from a psychiatric point of view. In so far as mental illnesses are considered to be excusing conditions in Anglo-American law, psychiatry is legally defined and enlisted as an institution interlocking and cooperating with other insti tutions concerned with maintaining the internal order of society (e.g., the police, legal profession, legislators, etc.). In addition to psychiatric. diagnoses, another important symbol by means of which psychiatry as an institution operates is the M.D. degree. The psychiatrist's medical qualification is crucial, for while many persons may wish to define others as mentally ill, only the psychiatrist has the social power to make his declara tion carry weight. This power to define and redefine social reality is crucial in all phases of social life. Just as the Roman Catholic clergy may define eating meat on Friday as "sin," but as "nota sin" on the other six days of the week, so the psychia trist is often permitted to define one type of antisocial action as "crime" and another as "mental illness."

The principal sentiments generated by the institutional sym bols of psychiatry are aversive with regard to psychiatric patients. In this respect psychiatry and penology have much in common, a fact which, considering their intertwined origin, is not surprising. This contention is illustrated by the language of state-hospital psychiatry: well.behaved patients have "ground privileges" and may be allowed to go home on "parole"; those who leave the hospital without permission are called "escapees" and "fugitives"; and so forth. As an institution, psychiatry may be no more clearly aware of its values than, for example, is the modern family. Indeed, it may be more reasonable to infer the· values of an institution from its operation than to look for them in the verbal professions of its members. There are two principal values of psychiatry as an institution: first, to insure the status quo and to promote the prevailing interests of society at any given time; second, to enhance its own status and power. More specifically, as a social institution, psychiatry has been enlisted as a force to curb Psychiatryas a Social Institution deviance in opinion as well as in action. As such it may be re'"

garded as an extension of the police powers of the state. How psychiatry as an institutional force operates may be seen most clearly in instances in which psychiatric intervention occurs in the context of political action. On September 27, 1960, the New York Times reported that David B. Pratt, the 52·year old gentleman farmer who, on April 9, tried to assassinate South African Prime Minister Hendrik F. Verwoerd, was declared mentally unfit to stand trial on a charge of attempted murder. Testifying in Supreme Court in Pretoria, South Africa's administra tive capital, a state-appointed psychiatrist said Pratt's mental condition had deteriorated because of epilepsy and that he was a danger to him .. self and others. The court ruled that Pratt would be detained in prison until Governor General Charles R. Swart formally committed him to a mental institution. To say that Mr. Pratt was a "danger to himself and [especially to some] others" is, in view of his act, a masterpiece of under ..

statement. I submit that the South African state-appointed psychia.. trist performed a function essentially similar to a priest's when he ex.communicates a sinner. Institutional psychiatry is most clearly distinguished frotn what may be called rational psychiatry, in this instance, by the fact that apparently no psychiatrist was retained by the defense to rebut the opinion of his state-appointed colleague. The fortner could, conceivably, have argued that Mr. Pratt was "sane" and that he shot the Prime Minister because he did not approve of the latter's anti-Negro policies. Under .. standably, psychiatrists are not especially eager to play such a role. Although psychiatry in fact functions as a social institution, this is often not recognized. Thus, institutional functioning may be mistaken for descriptive fact-finding or rational ..scientific ex· planation.Sometimespsychiatricactivityconsistsof a complicated mixture of both types of functioning. Besides, there is a dis..

crepancy between the ostensible and the empirically observable 6 Psychiatry and Responsibility operations of psychiatry as an institution. Its ostensible function pertains to the maintenance of health, in this case, so-called mental health. If we attempt, however, to impart an operational meaning to the concept of mental health, we find that it cannot be separated from three other basic functional prerequisites of society: the socialization of members, the maintenance of internal order, and the maintenance of meaning and motivation. The Origins of Psychiatry as a Social Institution A glance at the history of psychiatry as a social institution should prove enlightening. This is especially true today when the everyday work of psychiatrists is often regarded as a species of medical action. Unti! well into the nineteenth century, both in Europe and in the United States, much of psychiatric practice was indis tinguishable, from a sociological point of view, from the operation of prisons. To some extent this is true even today. Insane asylums, as the forerunners of mental hospitals were commonly called, usually were combined with, or were parts of, places of detention for all types of socially undesirable persons (e.g., the aged, the poor, the incurably sick, the petty criminal, etc.).

For example, Pinel, who worked only a century and a half ago, is widely celebrated in psychiatric history for having struck the chains off mental patients. Indeed, modern neuropsychiatry, originating in Paris during the second half of the nineteenth century, developed in institu tions to which all types of socially decompensated individuals were confined, usually against their will. It is out of this undiffer entiated prototypal "prison"-combining the functions of jail, poorhouse, nursing home, and hospital-that the modern prison and mental hospital arose. Present-day hospital psychiatry, espe cially state hospital psychiatry, still fulfills some of the same functions that were fulfilled by its predecessors. I t is a form of social control, analogous to, and deeply intertwined with, the police powers of the state. As such, it is a part-and in modern Psychiatry as a Social Institution 7 society apparently a very important part-of one of the basic types of social institutions common to all societies, namely, those pertaining to the regulation of internal order in society.

The practice of psychiatry in the private offices of psychiatrists and in mental hygiene and child guidance clinics is a much more recent development and forms a part of a different institutional structure. As a rule, the patients involved in these psychiatric activities are less disabled socially than those in hospitals; and, more significantly, they are legally unrestrained. Phenomenologi cally, this type of psychiatry is characterized mainly by the prac tice of psychotherapy, in which patients seek help in conducting their lives effectively. Historically, while hospital psychiatry can readily be traced back to the eighteenth century and earlier, psychotherapy as a social institution-in other words, as some thing more than a sporadic and unorganized activity-is a twenti eth-century phenomenon. It was set in motion by Freud's early psychoanalytic work and gained momentum in England, and especially in the United States, with the transplantation of the seed of psychoanalysis into new soil. Through a process of enthusiastic hybridization, "psychoanalytic psychiatry" and "psy choanalytic psychotherapies" became social phenomena with major economic, moral, medical, and political consequences. This type of psychiatric activity, as a social institution, is akin to reli gion, for both are concerned with defining and providing motiva tional and meaning patterns in order that men may find values and rules by which to orient themselve's in their daily lives.

The Bible, as the prototypal guidebook telling man how to live, has been largely replaced by such works as those of Spock on how babies should be raised and by those of Gesell and IIg on how children should develop. Similarly, Freud, Adler, and, more recently, Fromm have provided psychiatric-psychological directives on such things as desirable sexual attitudes, cooperative ness in human life, and the "sane society." Summing up this brief inquiry into the historical antecedents of modern psychiatry, we may re-emphasize the dual origin of two relatively independent aspects of modern psychiatry. Hospital 8 Psychiatry and Responsibility psychiatry originates from the prison and is still concerned with enforcing a type of paralegal social control. Office psychiatry (psychotherapy) originates from the physician's consulting room and, as an institution, has become what may well be called a secular religion--if by religion is meant the furnishing of life values and rules of personal conduct.

Varieties of Psychiatric Perforlnance: Scientific) Therapeutic) Professional) and Institutional It seems necessary, at this point, to comment on the ambigui ties that often attend the use of the term "psychiatry." To begin with, in some instances there is insufficient appreciation of the differences between neurology and psychiatry. Neurology is con cerned with the study of the structure and function of the human nervous system and, by extension, with its diseases and cures. Psychiatry (as here defined) is concerned principally with the study of learned or social behavior-that is, with personality development in various societies and, again by extension, with the breakdown and reintegration of such behavior. Many workers prefer, however, not to make such a sharp distinction between these two disciplines, and either define their activity as "neuro psychiatry" or simply use the term "psychiatry" more broadly to encompass both the biological and the sociopsychological as pects of behavior. The main weakness of the latter position, as I see it, is that if extended even slightly, it readily leads to encom passing virtually everything from anatomy and chemistry, on the one hand, to economics and sociology, on the other, within the scope of psychiatry.

Another, perhaps even more important, difficulty in the use of the term "psychiatry" stems not from the question of exactly what is its scope, but rather from a failure to distinguish among four logically and empirically different activities, each of which may simply be called "psychiatry." I shall use the more restricted term "psychoanalysis" rather than ~'psychiatry" in what follows. This will afford greater precision, but the reader should feel free to substitute "psychiatry" for "psychoanalysis" wherever he wishes, Psychiatryas a Social Institution 9 provided the broader scope and methodological operations of psychiatry are kept in mind. The following four types of psychoanalytic activities must be distinguished: L Psychoanalysis as a pure or theoretical science. By this is meant psychoanalysis as a method of observation (e.g., free association, the 'psychoanalytic situation), as a method of drawing inferences (e.g., to unconscious motivation, childhood experi ences), and as a body of data. Psychoanalysis as a theory of per sonality development and social hehavior also belongs in this category.

2. Psychoanalysis as applied science or therapy. A privately arranged psychoanalysis, consisting of a patient seeking analytic help and of an analyst offering it, with the two coming together for the purpose of conducting an analysIs" is the classic paradigm. 3. Psychoanalysis as an occupation, and a profession. It is evi dent that, like any socially useful activity, psychoanalysis too may be an occupation and a profession. While the distinction between occupations and professions need not cOncern uSi it must be noted that they mayor may not be institutionalized. For example, neither watch-repairing (an occupation), nor com puter-engineering (a profession) are institutions. Historically, psy choanalysis has been aU three: in Vienna in 1910, it was an occupation; in London and New York after the first World War, it was a profession.; in America today, it is an institution. 4. Psychoanalysis as an institution. When an important activity penetrates deeply into the: fabric of society and partakes of its ongoing activities----instead of standing aside: as an outcast or as an aloof onlooker----it gradually becomes a social institution.

This happened to psychoanalysis (psychiatry) in the United States, especially during the past two to three decades. In most other Western countries psychoanalysis is not a social institution of any consequence, while in some (e.g., Mexico) it is barely in the process of becoming a profession. In .conttast to psychoanalysis, psychiatry, and especially forensic psychiatry, is a social institu tion in most c;:ontemporary Western s'ocieties.

10 Psychiatry and Responsibility It follows from these four different meanings of the term "psychoanalysis" that unless one specifies how he wishes to use the term, confusion will result. Psychoanalysis as an institution differs from psychoanalysis as a science or therapy in about the same way that an American labor union differs from the science of automotive engineering or the technology of automobile manu facturing. The union may "represent"-for certain social, legal, or symbolic purposes-the individual worker, but the one is not identical with the other. The former is a collective, the latter an individual. Obviously, each has its functions and values. Nor are we concerned here with adjudicating the value conflicts that are bound to arise between the individual and the institution. The point of this discussion is simply to stress the need to distinguish institutional from instrumental roles. Union leaders as union leaders cannot build cars, although as workers they may be able to do so. Similarly, psychoanalysts and psychiatrists as spokesmen for their institutions must be distinguished from psychoanalysts and psychiatrists as scientists or therapists. This distinction, that is, between institutional and instrumental roles and criteria for status, is familiar, especially to sociologists, and hence will not be elaborated here. Instead, another example will be cited to throw further light on psychiatry as a social institution.

It is common knowledge that in highly differentiated modern organizations, the administrators and the workers need not have the same qualifications or skills. Since the two are required to do different types of work, it would often be unreasonable to expect that the administrator should he able to do everything the workers could and, in addition, that he could also "administer." Illustrative of this principle is the fact that many modern hospital administrators are not physicians, but trained hospital adminis trators. Similarly, professors of biochemistry need not be physi cians, and even the deans of medical schools may have Ph.D. rather than M.D. degrees. Accordingly, these "medical" positions may be filled by nonphysicians. The implication is that only those who actually examine and treat patients need be doctors of medicine. Contrast this with the situation in psychiatry. The top adminPsychiatryas a SocialInstitution 11 istrative positions in the state hospitals, mental hygiene clinics, and state and federal agencies concerned with "mental health"

are all filled by psychiatrists. Medical and psychiatric qualifica tions are generally considered to be essential for these posts. At the same time, the personnel engaged in the actual task of caring for the so-called patients are often nonmedical, being composed frequently of psychologists and social workers. This caretaking function, it should be emphasized, is not limited to nursing or other paramedical activities, but includes "psychological diagnosis and treatment." We are thus confronted by an instrumentally paradoxical but institutionally consistent situation, in that psychi atrists hold jobs requiring administrative or organizational per formances" whereas nonpsychiatrists hold jobs requiring skills said to be specific for psychiatry. When the institutional and instrumental definitions of psychiatry are pitted against each other, the former, being older and more firmly established, seems invariably to overshadow the latter. This is clearly unde sirable socially, and hence the efforts of social scientists may profitably be directed toward the clarification and eventual correction of this imbalance between scientism and science in psychiatry.

The Conflict Between Institutional and Instrum.ental Values in Psychiatry and in Psychoanalysis I t is not surprising that modern psychiatry as a social insti tution has become oriented principally toward values important for the group rather than for the individual. The tension between the conflicting tendencies toward individuation, on the one hand, and toward conformity with the collective values of the group, on the other hand, common to most phases of modern life, is here encountered in relation to psychiatry. As such, the tension be tween psychiatry as an institution and as a science must be regarded as a special instance of a larger trend. Consider, in this connection, the often discussed conflict between science and scient ism, genetics and geneticism, or history and historicism. In each of these, the first term of the pair is used to designate a 12 P$y~hiat-ry and Responsibility rational-scientific enterprise whose aim is the increase of knowl edge, even if that knowledge conflicts with the prevailing values of the group. The second term, in contrast, refers to certain types of socia-political applications of knowledge, in order that the power, prestige, and well-being of a given group be enhanced.

Accordingly, three of the characteristic features of science~ namely, a critical frame of mind, novelty, and openness of com munication, are either completely absent in institutionalized science or are present only in so far as they do not seriously threaten the integrity of the institution. A striking example of this is found in contemporary psychoanalysis. Much of the institutional power of present-day psychoanalysis is contained in the regulations that govern training for this profession. There is a highly complex social machinery govern ing psychoanalytic education, a machinery even more complex than that found in general medicine and the medical specialties. In addition-and this is the point of this example---problems concerning training in psychoanalysis tend to be shielded in secrecy. In other words, they tend to be discussed in committees and by special groups---composed usually of persons occupying high positions within the institutional organization itself~rather than in forums open to all those interested in and concerned with the problem. For example, in psychoanalytic society meet~ ings (both local and national), the presentation of certain papers or panel discussions may be limited to training analysts or to members of the society. Thus, candidates in training, who them selves are men of mature years and fully qualified psychiatrists, as well as others, may be ,excluded from such meetings. Further~ more, the proceedings of these meetings may be withheld from publication. This phenomenon seems analogous to institutional secrecies of other types, such as the keeping of atomic secrets from other nations by the Uoited States or the keeping of re search on anew fiber by one chemical firm secret from its com petitors. This strategy, while it may be advantageous to those in .charge of the operation, cannot be said to be advantageous also for science (as an idealized abstraction), nor for the persons deprived of the information available to others.

Psychiatryas a SocialInstitution 13 The foregoing example was presented to illustrate that, at least in some instances in which the institutional and scientific values of psychoanalysis conflict, the group has bestowed primacy on the institutional aspiration. Another important area in psychoanalysis in which this has occurred is in relation to the confidential character of the p~y" choanalytic situation. While most analysts agree that the patient'S information should be kept secret from others; and especiallY from those who may use such information to hinder the patient in his real life aspirations, this principle is violated in the train .. ing requirements of the American Psychoanalytic Association which require that training analysts communicate to the training organization information obtained from candidates in analysis. The welfare of psychoanalytic institutions is thus given official preference over the welfare of individual trainees and also over the scientific integrity of analysis as a special method of psychotherapy.

Some Consequences of the Institutionalization of Psychiatry The institutionalization of any activity, whether it be a sport, gambling; or religion, has certain consequences that to some extent are predictable. I believe that the single most significant effect of psychiatry as a modern social institution is that it has encouraged and has lent political power to the vast potentialities for using psychiatry as a social force opposed to reason, personal responsibility, and human dignity. It is, of course, banal to repeat that any human activity, from agriculture to mathematics; may be used in the service of varied ethical goals. The original aim of psychoanalysis, as I understand it; was to help people to gain more power over their own destinies-----in other words, to enable them to see what they wanted in life, why, and how they could best achieve their goals. In order to accomplish this Htherapeutic" effect, it is usually necessary to link the patient's present behavior with his past experiences. It is inherent in this process that one's focus may shift from the 14 Psychiatry and Responsibility present to the past, and that the latter may then seem more important than the former. As a rule, however, the patient can readily protect himself against this hazard, as can also the analyst, for it is evident that this very inquiry into the past is in the service of the present and the future, and not an exercise in its own right. In other words, neither patient nor therapist will become a historian to the neglect of current realities, unless he wants to hide from life. If that is what either one wants to do, psychoanalysis, as an abstraction, cannot prevent him from doing so.

This problem of using historical reductionism or motivational reinterpretation to evade current or future problems becomes especially acute in many social situations. In these, psychiatry (or psychoanalysis) as an institution may perhaps be more readily enlisted as an irrational than as a rational force. Thus, legal and ethical problems may easily be transformed into pseudo medical problems by means of psychiatry. We know of numerous instances in which persons who commit ethically and politically highly charged crimes are nowadays not tried before a court of law-a process accompanied by the ventilation of all the passions that people seem all too eager to repress-but instead are spirited away into mental institutions. The cases of such men as Ezra Pound, Earl Long, and the assailants of the Reverend Martin Luther King and Prime Minister Verwoerd come immediately to mind. For each of these well-publicized cases there are literally thou sands of others which involve small, unimportant people in trouble. In these cases too the problems-that is, the sufferer's economic, religious, and social conflicts-are evaded by means of psychiatric subterfuges rather than met head on and dealt with rationally. The latter would necessitate coming to closer grips with the psychosocial implications of modern family, eco nomic, and religious life-that is, with the very institutions that are, in part, the causes of the human breakdowns called "crime"

and "insanity" -than many people seem to desire or are prepared to do. This effect may be called the "psychiatrization" of law, politics, and morality.

Psychiatry as a Social Institution 15 The second major effect, working mainly through nonhospital psychiatry and especially through the writings of psychiatrists, consists of what may be called the "religionizing" of psychiatry, psychoanalysis, and psychotherapy. Here we encounter the famil iar case of the "institution" altering, and indeed ruining, the very endeavors for which it was originally created. A classic example is the often repeated statement that organized Christian ity leaves no room for Christ's beliefs and teachings. Applied to modern psychiatry, this principle simply means that while psychi atrists originally· intended to elucidate how people felt, thought and lived, and to help them to live as they, the patients) wanted to live, psychiatry as a modern social institution has turned this around: it wants to "understand" people only in so far as they do not disturb the prevalent image of society; and it wants to "help" people only in so far as doing so will contribute to the greater glory and stability of the group. Thus, psychiatry as an institution has become a servant of the society of which it is a part. And yet, perhaps this need not be the case. Or, should it prove to be unavoidable, better appreciation of this phenomenon might be instrumental in bringing certain correctives into play, to insure the checks and balances on which the welfare of demo cratic society so heavily depends.

Conclusions The purpose of this essay has been to outline the develop ment and operation of psychiatry as a social institution. The term "social institution" has been used to refer to more or less stable patterns of group behavior, usually pertaining to the regulation of one or another of the functional prerequisites of society (e.g., socialization of new members, maintenance of biologic adequacy, etc.). Institutional behavior, directed toward institutional goals and governed by institutional rules, is most readily contrasted with individual behavior, the latter being directed toward personal goals and being less strictly governed by conventionalized rules. To make these abstractions come to life, one may consider the example of religion as a matter of 16 Psychiatryand Responsibility private belief, in a. Jeffersonian sense, in contrast to organi~ed religion, composed of a clergy and a body of public religious opinion and con~tituting a locu~ of political power.

Since no society js possible without social institutions, it would be false to sugge~t, as js often done, that institutions are somehow "bad," because they frllstrate individual creativity and initiative; and that rational and skilled individual behavior is Hgood," becallse it is the source of cultural progress. Obviously, the reverse may also be true. While individual and group actions differ, each may be as good or bad as people make theIIl~ The main thesis of this essay is to highlight the differences between p~ychiatry as an individual enterprise and as an institution. The history of modern psychiatry mirrors, in a very brief span of time, the history of political action. In the latter sphere, the relationship of leaders to followers-for example, of chieftains or kings to their sllbjects--presumably existed for millennia before more complex organized political structures (e.g., constitutional monarchies, parlialllentary republics, etc.) came into being. Such political structures express attempts on the part of people to regulate the relationship between the governing and the governed and are often speci:6c::allyintended to prevent certain types of imbalances from developing between these two interacting fac~ tions of society. Similarly, psychiatry, especially modern psychia try, has consisted largely of an interplay between psychiatric healers and sufferers. Historically, this would correspond to the early periods in the life of political institutions~ In other words, at first social regulations governing the relationship of psychia trists and p4tients were either nonexistent or poor. In the next phase, the regulations have guaranteed absolute dominance by the psychiatrist over the patient; this has been the <:haracter of state hospital psychiatry during the past century, and, more recently, institutional psychiatry affecting other areas of life.,... particlliarly, politics, criminology, and civil law.,...-hasalso been so characterized.

I hope that this type of analysis will stimlliate increased interest in the problems posed by psychiatry a~ an institutional force in modern society and hence will accelerate progress toward estabPsychiatryas a S()'cialInstitution 17 Hshing some types of checks and balances between the potentially, and often actually, antagonistic elements in the psychiatric social system. As a social institution, psychiatry is now in its infancy. Perhaps, like an infa.nts, it is better at dominating than at cooperating with or serving others. Institutions, nd less than persons, may need to be "socialized./' 1£ so, the question that we :must confront and answer is:, Which social values should we like psychiatrists to further while they ate defining their oWn institu tionalized roles and statuses? Personally, I .believe that psychiatry as an institution should aim at striking a balance between serving the interests and needs of groups and the interests and needs of individuals. We should keep in mind, moreover, that the interests of the group and of the individual may not-and, indeed, perhaps should not -coincide. In the history of the Anglo-American democracies, the principle of liberty from) and even against) government has been a central issue. If as persons-that is as human beings, irrespective of whether we are psychiatrists, patients, or individ uals not specifically involved with psychiatry-we wish to enlarge, rather than to constrict, the area within which man is politically free, then, I submit, our central concern at present should be to insure the people's liberty from, and indeed against, psychiatry as a social institution.

BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTE The reader interested in bibliographic documentation of the observa tions and views cited in this chapter may wish to consult the following sources. For the concept of social institution and its uses in social analysis: JAMES K. FEIBLEMAN. The Institutions of Society. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1956. For a wealth of observations on the comp,~~~sg,~,~~q!1~'!!~'~~"d2t,,~!!~t.EIQ,Qlems po~~~ by the intet:E~,!!~>t!~liQIl.~oLp.S.¥.~t~l andjuri~p~~dence: --_.···BARii"Aif£~1J~oci~1r.S~ie~~6~ana~t·rjl!lIotlJg'J;··· LonQon: -'George Allen & Unwiii, t., . For fuller exposition of my views on some of the issues raised and discussed in this chapter: THOMAS S. SZASZ. "Some Observations on the Relationship Between 18 Psychiatry and Responsibility Psychiatry and the Law," A.M.A. Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry, LXXV (1956), 297-315. ---. "The Classification of 'Mental Illness,' " Psychiatric Quarterly, XXXIII (1959), 77-101.

--. "Moral Conflict and Psychiatry," Yale Review, XLIX (1960), 555-566. ~. "Civil Liberties and the Mentally Ill," Cleveland-Marshall Law Review, IX (1960), 399-416. --. The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations of a Theory of Personal Conduct. New York: Paul B. Hoeber, Inc., 1961.

2 Contemporary Psychiatry and the Concept of Responsibility D. ELTON TRUEBLOOD 1. The Influence of Psychiatry Psychiatry is, by any valid standard of measurement, a highly important feature of contemporary culture. It affects not only those who are mentally ill and the families concerned with illness, but all who try to keep abreast of thought. It is an important fact that "Freudian" has become a household word. The work of Sigmund Freud and his school, including those who were in it and later separated from it, has been widely com pared to that of Copernicus and Galileo in earlier generations. l Though most of our people naturally get their ideas about psychiatric practices and theories at second hand, the permeation of the popular mentality has been amazingly rapid and wide spread. Thus, Dr. Karl Menninger can truthfully say, "For not only medical science and psychological science and sociological science, but literature, art, anthropolgy, pedagogy, and even popular speech show the influence of Freud's discoveries and show them in unmistakable terms." 2 Every thoughtful person is· gratefUl to individual psychiatrists and psychoanalysts who have helped people to recover normal 19 20 Psychiatry and Responsibility powers and to continue with normal living. Psychiatry, at its best, is a ministry J an effort to serve in making life happier and fuller. Sometimes it fails, but at other times it brings immense relief. Macbeth's famous question, addressed to the physician, has been, in many cases, answered in the affirmative. We cannot, of course, prove that the healing has come as a result of what the psychiatrist has done. There is a final sense in which the skeptic cannot be answered, for we cannot be absolutely sure that the patient would not have become well anyway, without the attentions of the psychiatrist, but most of us are not that skeptical. We accept humbly the probability that some men and women are today functioning in normal life, when, without psychiatric assistance, they would still be mentally ill. It must be noted in the beginning of this paper, therefore, that all that is said about the profound danger of some psychiatric teachings is said against a background of gratitude for actual service that has been rendered in a demanding and disciplined profession. The multiplicity of psychiatric jokes does not obscure the reality of the debt.

It is no denial of the sense of gratitude to go on to say that many thoughtful people have strong misgivings about the cul tural and moral effects of some of the ideological aspects of some teachings by psychiatrists. The most common form that the mis giving takes is the suggestion that the popular understanding of certain alleged teachings of psychiatry has served to undermine a sense of moral responsibility. The common expression is, "I am not to blame; I couldn't help what I did; my actions were the necessary result of the events that occurred when I was two or three years old." The area in which this argument has been most dramatically considered is that of jurisprudence. When there is a popular cry for understanding or even for absolute leniency toward the rapist or the kidnapper, the major basis of the appeal is that the recognition of childhood influence takes away all rational possibility of blame. It is an easy step to move from such tolerance toward others to tolerance toward oneself.

What is needed at this juncture is a careful examination, con ducted in the spirit of philosophic inquiry, of the accuracy or Contemporary Psychiatry 21 inaccuracy· of the popular conclusion to the effect that psychiatry undermines the sense of responsibility. Is the popular conclusion a completely unfair perversion of psychiatric teachings or is it possibly based on something that gives a species of validity to the inference? Since it is impossible in the scope of one paper to deal with a great many psychiatric systems, and since, as Dr. Menninger has told us, Freud's system is the one that still has the major influence, it is reasonable to emphasize Freud's work. 3 But we cannot make a serious· study of the cultural effect of Freudian psy chiatry unless we distinguish three markedly different elements in the system. The total work of Freud may be seen as (1) therapy, (2) psychoanalytic theory and (3) metaphysics. We may rightly conclude, as lay people, that the first of these has been and is essentially beneficent. The present author does not claim to be competent to deal with the second. But his entire training and professional interest give him some reason to deal ,vith the third. In so far as Freudian psychiatry is not merely the practice and theory of how to heal the mentally sick, but is, in addition, a philosophical world view concerned with the normal as well as the abnormal, it is only fair that it be judged by philosophic standards. Since a number of well-known modern psychiatrists have set up speculative systems that go far beyond the particu larities of their· science, these systems must be judged not only in terms of their inner consistency and factual reliability, but also in terms of their logical consequences and necessary impli cations. The authors must be ready to defend, not only their original positions, but the subsequent positions to which these necessarily lead.

Perhaps the most surprising fact about the disciples of Freud has been their relative freedom from concern about the ethical implications of their central positions. 4 Sometimes this lack of concern arises from the failure to recognize that they have a philosophy at all. It is often said that they are dealing in purely scientific terms. Some feel that, since, in their estimation, they are presenting the objective truth about human life, they need not be concerned about the consequences in the public mind.

22 Psychiatry and Responsibility The whole point of this paper is the contention that such unconcern for implications is not adequate. Every science is based on philosophical presuppositions and every position entails intellectual consequences. Though this is true even of a physical science, it is even more evidently true of a science that is con-' cerned with human behavior. 2. The Hypothesis of Psychological Determinism We can distinguish today between Sigmund Freud's work as a doctor and his work as a philosopher, but this was something that he was unable to do. Many of his' metaphysical assumptions were so truly unconscious, and therefore, unstated, that he apparently did not even realize that he was making them. This is vividly clear in The Future of an Illusion) in which all the illustrations of religious experience are taken from the infantile, the primitive, and the abnormal, upon the assumption that the fundamental features are thereby made more clear. 5 It is easy for us today to see that this is merely an illustration of the genetic fallacy, the notion, which is far from self-evident, that a thing is really what it has come from. There is just as much logic, and far more common sense, in Aristotle's conviction that the true nature of anything is seen in the light of what it becomes} in full maturity. The end may be far more adequately understood by attention to developed science than by concentration on the magic from which it originally arose.6 The glory of Freud's method of psychoanalysis lay largely in the way in which he convinced all who would listen that the full understanding of any life depends on knowing what is under neath the surface of consciousness. "All that Freud did," says a prominent psychiatrist quoted earlier, "stems from one simple discovery, a discovery based on knowledge which many had possessed before him. This was the knowledge that beneath the surface manifestations of human life there are deeper motives and feelings and purposes which the individual conceals not only from others but even from himself." 7 Freud's originality Contemporary Psychiatry 23 lay in discovering a method of ascertaining and revealing much of this hidden material. He found, as did many of his students, that relief often came when the hidden material was brought out into the open and boldly encountered by the patient.

The philosophic system with which this relatively novel insight was associated, that of reductive naturalism, was by no means novel and by no means necessary, even though many have accepted it uncritically on the assumption that it is simply an integral part of science. At the heart of this world view is a doctrine of deter .. minism which, in psychiatry and especially in the popular con~ ception of psychiatry, has often involved the conviction that all later events in a person's life are the inevitable result of events in earliest childhood. Ira Progoff has put the point in one vivid sentence by saying, "Freud's most obvious weakness lies in the determinism that underlies his work." 8 When a scholar of the character of Progoff wri tes of Freud's determinism, he is not being, in any sense, unfair to the founder of psychoanalysis. Though Freud was not a systematic philosopher and did not always realize that he had a philosophy, his assertions of complete psychological determinism are amazingly unquali fied. An example of his assertion is the following, an assertion which, so far as known, was never renounced: I have already taken the liberty of pointing out to you that there is within you a deeply rooted belief in psychic freedom and choice, that this belief is quite unscientific, and that it must give ground before the claims of a determinism which governs even mentallife. 9 Freud realized, of course, that his doctrine was at variance with the universal experience of freedom, but his loyalty to the world view of reductive naturalism was such that he felt he had to choose between the doctrine and experience, and he had no doubt on which side his choice would fall. Of course, he would have had to maintain, in strict consistency, that he actually did not choose between them, but that even his world view was already determined, but either he did not see 24 Psychiatry and Responsibility this or, if he saw it, did not say it. His rejection of the experi mental evidence of personal free choice is clear and explicit, as follows: Many persons argue against the assumption of an absolute psychic determinism by referring to an intense feeling of conviction that there is free will. This feeling of conviction exists, but is not incompatible with the belief in determinism. lO Freud accepted determinism resolutely and perhaps sadly, because it seemed to him an intrinsic element in the scientific world view, and what we now know as "scientism" was his creed, adopted with almost evangelical zeal. He saw no way to conduct the scientific enterprise without the concept of causality and, partly because he knew so little philosophy, he identified causality with external determinism. This is the significance of the follow ing crucial passage: Does he mean to maintain that there are any occurrences so small that they fail to come within the causal sequence of things, that they might as well be other than they are? Anyone thus breaking away from the determination of natural phenomena, at any single point, has thrown over the whole scientific outlook on the world (Weltanschauung.) 11 Freud failed to realize that he was espousing a philo~ophy, because he believed, uncritically, that he was merely being a scientist and nothing more. Thus, he could say, in all sincerity, that psychoanalysis has no need to create a Weltans.chauung) "for it is a branch of science, and can subscribe to the scientific Weltanschauung." 12 He did not mind being criticized by theologians or men of letters, but criticism by scientists hurt him terribly. Science was his religion, and determinism was a cardinal tenet in the creed. Though Freud has been criticized by psychia trists in the decades since his philosophy first appeared, there has been surprisingly little criticism of the bearing of his determinism on responsibility.

Contemporary Psychiatry 25 What seems so strange to us now is the fact that Freud did not see clearly the logical consequence of his basic assumption. I t is easy for us to see now that, whether psychological deter minism is true or false, if it is true, the entire basis of human responsibility is undermined. Superficially, determinism appears to be a beneficent doctrine, in that it makes planning possible. We can, so the argument runs, set the conditions in the develop ment of character and thereby be sure of the results. Determinism thus seems to be the philosophy that makes human progress possible. A more careful scrutiny, however, makes us realize that the doctrine, if taken seriously and in full consistency, undercuts itself. Planning is indeed possible, if the planner is free, while the subjects of the planning are necessitated, but there is no reason whatever to make this exception. What the planner under takes has itself been necessitated. Therefore, on the basis of determinism, genuine planning is impossible. Each does what he must, and that is the end of the matter. The physician does what he must, and the patient does what he must.

What is highly important to say is that, in so far as the popular reaction has been one of irresponsibility, it is the result of a sound logical deduction, and in no sense a perversion. If my actions can be explained reductively by reference to the events of early childhood, then I am certainly not to blame for what I do. There is no possible escape from the fundamental insight of Immanuel Kant to the effect that there is no "ought" where there is no "possibility." "Should" implies both "can" and "cannot." People, Kant pointed out, are never responsible for failure to do what they cannot do. 13 The stone which rolls down the mountain may cause the death of a man on the road below, but no person in his senses would make a moral judgment on the stone. The action is amoral) and it is amoral because it is exter nally necessitated. If the adult person is equally necessitated, there is no freedom, and consequently there is no responsibility.

Such a position, if taken to its logical conclusion, utterly destroys any rational basis of moral judgment, either about our selves or about others. If determinism is accepted, not only am I not to blame for what I do to my children; neither are my 26 Psychiatry and Responsibility parents responsible for what they did to me, because they had to do it, being determined by their own childhood events. The state is not to blame, for the state is made up of persons, all of whom are in the same amoral predicament. Thus, responsibility may be avoided completely by the simple device of infinite regression. If the Freudian system is true, then Freud and his disciples were predetermined to create or to adopt it, just as their critics were predetermined to adopt their criticism. Truth, under these circumstances, loses its august significance. That which under mines everything really undermines nothing, because it has already undermined itself. A world without either truth or respon sibility would be a world in which great human enterprises, including psychiatry, would be no longer possible. If men are not responsible, i.e., if they are moral automatons, we must eliminate from our speech both praise and blame, including self-blame. It is not intellectually honest to take a position and then be unwilling to take the necessary implications of that position. The basic logical formula, in this regard, is that the denial of the consequent necessitates the denial of the antecedent.

If PJ then q. Not q; therefore, not p. If complete determinism, then irresponsibility: I cannot accept irresponsibility; therefore, I cannot accept determinism. One of the most harmful results· of the popular conception of psychiatric teaching is the undermining of a sense of guilt. "Why," the popular question goes, "should I be penitent when I was conditioned to become the way I am?" The rapist or the kidnapper may actually contend that he is not blameworthy, because he was brought up in a broken home. What seems like confused sentimen tali ty toward the criminal is really common sense, if determinism is accepted as true. Thus, an element in human life which has been almost universally honored would be removed. Much of our literature has celebrated the moral grandeur of the person who criticizes his own act, saying, "I did it, but I ought not to have done it. I am ashamed of myself." Otto Rank points out that psychoanalysis sought to remove guilt by calling it "neurotic." Thus, the sense of guilt tended to Contemporary Psychiatry 27 be seen, not as one of the noblest of human experiences, but as something to be removed as harmful. Now it is undoubtedly true that there is neurotic guilt, sometimes with no basis in fact, and anyone who cares about human welfare hopes to see it removed,14 but to attempt to eradicate all guilt would effect a terrible reduction in human experience. In our great tradition of Western philosophy the sense of shame has. been seen as some thing of which men should not be deprived. In Plato's Symposium we reach a very high point when Alcibiades bears witness that Socrates is the only man who has ever made him feel ashamed.

It was his noblest experience. For he makes me confess that I ought not to live as I do.... And he is the only person who ever makes me feel ashamed, which you might not think to be in my nature, and there is no one else who does the same. For I know that I cannot answer him.I 5 What needs to be made clear at this point, though it is not frequently said, is that the full acceptance of the implications of psychological determinism makes for a remarkable sense of comfort. It allows a man to look upon his own acts with a mood of detachment, in which he can be as tolerant of himself as of others, because the acts are literally not his, inasmuch as they are caused by outside events. Even his character has been formed by anterior influences. Thus, he can look at himself with as much freedom from remorse as he would at another. In short, he has a device that frees him from ethical concern altogether.

He may say, in the light of what he knows now, that he would not have done the same thing then, but this is a perfect way to save the ego, for he did not know the same thing then and con sequently was not guilty. True remorse involves a careful recogni tion of the temporal reference. The deed I criticize in myself occurred then) not now. If I am truly penitent, I mean that I abhor what I did then) in the light of what, I then was and what I then knew. A fully deterministic view of human actions renders forgiveness both unnecessary and foolish. If the person does what he must, 28 Psychiatry and Responsibility there is nothing to forgive. Naturally, many people love such a doctrine and wish that it were true, because it brings so much comfort. It is, therefore, a prime example of wish fulfillment. We all know that the conscious mind really loves to escape responsi ... bility. The easiest way to escape is to claim the innocence of the automaton.

The strength of psychological determinism, as a logical case, always lies in presenting the alternative as a system devoid of causation and therefore unacceptable to natural science. What ever in our world is completely undetermined, in the sense that there is no causal order, obviously cannot be fruitfully studied. The determinist makes plausible his particular theory of order by reference to the confusion of disorder, which we are bound to reject. But the fallacy of this approach is the fallacy of assum ing that there is only one possible alternative. The alternative presented, in order to be summarily rejected, is often referred to in what is little better than caricature, that of the capricious ness that follows from the complete absence of causality. What is important to say is that no philosopher of any stature has ever espoused a conception of psychological freedom as wholly un caused. What the great tradition has taught is that there is a third possibility, which is as far from capriciousness, on the one hand, as it is from absolute determinism, on the other. We need, in each succeeding generation, to give our most careful thought to the elaboration of this third possibility as something that is com patible with human experience when it is critically examined, without the obscuring effects of dogmatism.

One of the most helpful of contemporary thinkers in regard to this particular problem is Albert Outler, who follows many great philosophers in rejecting both determinism and indeter .. minism as popularly understood. In regard to determinism he writes: There are admirable motives for maintaining this general view-all except the final contention that this outlook is self-sufficient.One of the good motives is to deny the antithesis of indeterminism and to affirm that human events belong to an orderly and intelligible process. An· Contemporary Psychiatry 29 other valid motive is to deny that human willing could; under any circumstances, effect an increase in the fixed quantum of the world's energy system-and also to affirm that all human actions operate in the same energy system as do all other determinate events. One may readily agree to all this and still be far from being persua~ed that determinism-even a soft determinism-gives us an account of the experience of responsibility which we know as an essential aspect of sel£hood.16 What contemporary psychiatry needs is ihelp on the philosophi"

cal leveL It is fair to assume that men deeply concerned with their patients do not really want to espouse a doctrine that is harm" ful to our general culture and hurts those who are not their patients. The problem· is that they see one side of a dilemma so vividly that they are unable to see the other, or, more precisely, that they do not see how to construct a world view in which both a measure of freedom and a measure of determinism can be included without contradiction. The philosophical task, for the psychiatrist or for any serious thinker; is how to state the in" evitable paradox without transgressing the logical law of non .. contradiction. We need the introduction of creative ideas, two of which are eminently clarifying. 3. The Idea of Personality The first of these is the conception of what it means to be a person. The common mistake; particularly among positivists and all who have made a dogma of "scientism," is to fall into the oversimplification of confusing person and thing. We know some"

thing very important about the world when we know that it has persons in it; and this we know at first hand rather than by specu lation because we are persons ourselves. The significant fact is that there is a radical difference between persons and things. Hegel was followinga logical order when, in his Phenomenology, he introduced the conception of thing before he introduced the conception of person, for thinghood is comparatively simple. A thing is fundamentally an object rather than a subject. We are 30 Psychiatry and Responsibility deeply indebted to Blaise Pascal for showing the staggering dis proportion between the reality that man knows directly within himself and that which he finds in the world that surrounds him. The world consists of things, but man is a subject. "Therefore he cannot hope to comprehend his own nature by means of the sort of knowledge whereby he apprehends the external world." 17 To apply to man the same kind of causation that is observed in the external world is to be guilty of a manifest non sequitur.

It is more reasonable to expect a new kind of causation where there is a new kind of reality. No one has stated better than has Pascal the fundamental discontinuity in reality as experienced. "From all bodies together," he writes, "we cannot obtain one little thought; this is impossible, and of another order. From all bodies and minds, we cannot produce a feeling of true charity; this is impossible, and of another and supernatural order." 18 Since the orders are different, it does not follow from the fact that actions of things are necessitated that the actions of persons are similarly necessitated. Whereas a thing is essentially passive, dependent upon outside forces for changes in its movement, a person is essentially active. The category of necessity need not apply to personal decision, because, though the prior conditions may set limits, they do not provide all the factors. The extra factors arise from the person's ability to initiate true novelty. Only man, says Kierkegaard, makes history, and this he makes precisely because, being personal, his decisions become active and hitherto nonexistent factors in the producing of events. Man cannot make any machine that is free, but he himself is free, in that he challenges rather than merely accepts and obeys the dictates of conditions. Man's true role is that of an actor.l 9 Therefore, though he is never entirely free of conditions and conditioning, he is more than the sum of condi tions. He is the creature who can say no to his temptations, and this he does, whenever he does it, in the light of a personally accepted standard that may not be identical with any standard handed down to him.

A person is most truly a person in moments of decisions, par.. ticularly those in which he makes decisions that lead to subse ..

Contemporary Psychiatry 31 quent decisions, both for his own future and the future of others. Many decisions are extremely difficult because they are fraught with danger, whether the danger of commission or of omission. Such a decision was that of President Truman, when, in the summer of 1950, he decided to resist aggression in Korea. If anyone wants to say that such decisions are Ulere resultant~ o£ prior forces, he is free to do so, but, in doing so, he contradicts nearly all conscious human experience. What he is really doing is to prefer a dogma to well-attested experience and experience at the deepest level. It is easy to say that two persons with identical prior influences would perform exactly the same act, which is what orthodox psychological determinism says, but this is to introduce a purely hypothetical situation that never, in fact, occurs. Identical situa tions are purely fictitious. The only serious way to pass from dogma to empirical verification would be to engage in predic tion, but this is an enterprise in which the staunchest devotees of the doctrine are slow to engage, and understandably so.

We cannot speak truly of what it means to be a person without recognizing that freedom, in the sense that the very act of decision makes a difference, is not a speculation, but the factual base from which we start. The tree is just what it is, but man is never that. For man and for man alone, so far as our experience goes, ours is an open universe. This is both his danger and his hope. Conversion occurs, and it frequently occurs in maturity. A man sometimes starts a really new chapter, pointing his life in a new direction, and this he does by the magic of thought. That this occurs is much stressed by Dr. C. G. lung, who has shown us the phenomenon of a man getting a new picture of his own life, which becomes a dynamic factor in the determination of future events. This is far from indeterminism, but it is also far from the determinism of reductive naturalism. Freedom does not mean an absence of causation; freedom means that the person is a creature who can have a hand in making himself what he is to become. This often makes for anxiety, but it is better to be anxious than to be irresponsible.

32 Psychiatry and Responsibility 4. The Reality of Time Another conception that helps to produce an acceptable third possibility is that of temporalistic realism, a conception associated especially with the thinking of Professor A. O. Lovejoy, of Johns Hopkins University.20 If the factor of time could be neglected, there would be a certain plausibility in the kind of positivism that denies freedom. The forces and stresses would be similar to those studied in physics. But the moment we take time seriously, we have a striking emancipation from such a pattern of necessity. The present is not merely the sum total of the past, or the accumulated past in disguise; it is something truly novel. Every moment is actually new and therefore full of new possibilities. This is why the idea of emergence can be defended logically. The present emerges out of the past, but is not the past. It may be freely admitted that there is an element of mystery about time, but this is true of any significant feature of expe rience. We cannot really conceive, for example, what the con nection between body and mind is, though we know from experience that they are connected. We do not know how that which has mass can give rise to thought or awareness, in which the conception of mass is strictly meaningless, but we know, in fact, that the one leads to the other. Similarly we do not know how thought, which has coherence, but not weight, can lead to the change in circumstance of that which does have weight.

We do not know what it is to be merely corporeal, but we do not doubt that some objects are in this state. Thus, when we assert the reality of time and the radical distinction between the present and the past, we ought not to be diverted by the fact that we do not fully understand what time is. There is great merit, as T. H. Huxley suggested, in sitting down before the fact as a Iittle child. What do we reply, to the critic who says that freedom is simply not a fact? We can, ih the first place, ask him how he knows this to be true. When he tries to answer this question, he can hardly Contemporary Psychiatry 33 avoid noting that he is speculating and extrapolating. He is, in reality, denying an experience of his own in deference to what is only a doctrine. We are not likely to forget the wisdom of Dr. Samuel Johnson when he said, in discussing freedom, "Sir, no man believes himself to be impelled irresistibly; we know that he who says he believes it, lies." 21 When anyone says that a man's decision to act is the exact outcome of prior psychological forces, he is, often without know ing it, engaging in an analogy. He has some reason to think that the progress of a billiard ball depends exactly on prior forces, including the thrust of the cue, the resilience of the walls, etc.

But there is no self-evident reason for supposing the same situa tion will obtain in thought. To argue, on this basis, for psycho logical determinism is to make a mere analogy carry a logical burden for which it is not adequate. In the realm of thought, there are) of course, prior considera tions that are influences, but there is something else that is not a factor in the experience of the billiard ball. There is thought itself. Often a man waits, considers, defers action, thinks, and then finally acts. There is every reason to suppose that the new think ing is an actual component of the total cause. It is here that true novelty occurs. It is here, accordingly, that the sense of respon .. sibility has a rational basis. The second thing to say to the person who denies freedom as a fact is to demand that he follow rigorously the consequences of his own announced position. He must, accordingly, give up all use of praise or blame, either in regard to himself or to others.

It follows, if all apparent decisions are deceptive in that they are really necessitated, that no act in the world is more creditable than any other, for all are inevitable. This makes all the vast liter ature of moral judgment mere nonsense. We can have a certain respect for a person who will thus rigorously accept B when he says A) but we cannot honor him at all if he takes a position and tries to evade or avoid the logical consequences which that position entails. The fundamental form of the philosophical criticism of psychological determinism is thus a· reductio ad absurdum} based on the demand for intellectual consistency.

34 Psychiatry and Responsibility The defender of determinism has only two alternatives: either he must accept the unsavory consequences, or he must find some way of showing that these consequences do not really follow. If he tries the latter, he is going against the main historical stream of philosophical thought. 5. The Existential Contribution A new element has come into the public debate about psychiatry and responsibility in the work of contemporary existen tialists. Particularly valuable is the work of Karl Jaspers, who, in his long and eventful life, has been both a practicing psychiatrist and a philosopher of the front rank. The problems we are dealing with in this paper, which are fundamentally philosophical rather than psychological, help us to understand why Jaspers felt that he had to move over into philosophy. He early saw that he had to reject the monistic simplicity that is the hallmark of positivism, because "even if all phenomenal knowledge could be drawn together into a single, consistent system, man would not fall wholly within that system." Man would be outside the system, not because of temporary ignorance of conditions, to be removed by later refinements of method, but because he is fundamentally a subject, not an object, and therefore free. This makes a dis tinction of kind and not of degree. It opens the possibility of order, yet order of another kind than that of natural necessity.

No living existentialist has been more insistent on the impor tance and centrality of responsibility than has Jean-Paul Sartre. 22 Though with a theological conviction diametrically opposed to that of Pascal, he stresses, almost as much as Pascal did, the combined fact of man's littleness and grandeur. Sartre, like Pascal, knows that man is both bestial and the owner of some thing that beasts do not know. There are dark recesses, he realizes, in the human heart, but there is also the ability to recognize them for what they are and to oppose them. There is a strong tendency in con ternporary thought for man to be "deper sonalized," but Sartre notes with satisfaction that a man can Contemporary Psychiatry 35 resist this tendency, and he resists it by accepting his freedom. The task is to use nature so that it facilitates rather than engulfs , a man's freedoln of decision and action. Sartre really makes responsibility his philosophical fulcrum, on which all else depends. If any philosophical system is incom patible with the validity of the sense of responsibility, that is just too bad for the system, for responsibility, he holds, is the inner core of the indubitable. This seems to be one reason for his celebrated atheism. He is sorry, he says, that God is not, but his conviction that there is no God only strengthens his sense of being personally responsible for his decisions. Just as he cannot blame his present actions on his heredity or environment or on his childhood influences, so also he cannot blame them on Almighty God. If he goes wrong, he has himself to blame, and he hopes he has the manhood to accept the burden rather than to take one of the more fashionable ways of escape, including the religious escape of belief in divine determinism.

J aspers, who is more nearly agnostic than atheist, agrees with Sartre on the prime importance of a sense of responsibility, which he says psychotherapy should take as its basic category. In short, instead of encouraging people to believe that they are not respon sible, as some psychiatry does, the therapist must make it his purpose to build up the noble posture of nonescape. When a man can say, HI did it; I am ashalned; I shall try to do better," he is already on the road to genuine h~alth. A sense of responsibility can be lost, says Jaspers, but only pathologically. For the deeply ill person, liberation from a neurotic sense of responsibility may be highly desirable, but this is not the situa tion of the average man. The ordinary person, who is neither wholly well nor wholly ill, needs a philosophy of life which will strengthen his will and prevent the luxury of escape from respon sibility. In so far as psychiatric thinking can include such an approach, it will not only be better philosophically; it will also be better psychologically, because it will be closer to the truth about the human mind. The· best psychiatry will make the con cept of responsibility central, and it will accept a world view 36 Psychiatry and Responsibility in which responsibility makes sense. Even though it accepts the therapy of Freud, it must therefore reject, at a crucial point, the philosophy of Freud.

It has been the boast of psychiatry, including that kind of psychiatry that is conscious of its debt to Sigmund Freud as one of the revolutionary thinkers of the modern world, that it has been able to set men free. Men have sometimes been set free from burdens that they have been unable to lift alone. But psychiatry cannot succeed in its task of liberation unless it has a philosophical structure that makes responsibility a rational pos sibility. The danger is that it will espouse a system that finally undermines all that good men, including the psychiatrists them selves, hold dear. If persons are cured of some ills, but lose their sense of responsibility, the price paid in our general culture is unacceptably high. The good news is that a more careful atten tion to our philosophical heritage, both ancient and modern, renders the paying of this unacceptable price unnecessary. NOTES 1. Though the comparison of the work of Freud to that of Copernicus and Galileo is familiar to many, it may be a surprise to some to realize that Freud himself was apparently the first to make the comparison. See the essay by Alfred Kazin, ''The Freudian Revolution Analyzed," Freud and the Twentieth Century, edited by Benjamin Nelson (Meridian Books, 1957), pp. 13-21.

2. Karl Menninger, A Psychiatrist's World (New York: The Viking Press, 1959), p. 821. Dr. Menninger points to the paradox that the United States, of which Freud had a very low opinion, is "the country in which his theories are best known and most widely accepted," not merely by the public but by medical scientists as well. 3. Dr. Menninger's judgment in such matters is one that we are forced to take seriously, in view of the national reputation that the Menninger Clinic of Topeka, Kansas, now enjoys. 4. One of the few attempts,. on the part of those favorable to Freud's general philosophy, to face the consequences so far as responsibility is concerned is that of Abraham Kaplan in Freud and the Twentieth Century, chap. XIII. The chapter is called "Freud and Modern Philos ophy." Unfortunately, the author devotes only four pages to the subject and treats it lightly.

Contemporary Psychiatry 37 5. In another connection, in 1 'he Philosophy of Religion (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), chap. XIII, I have gone into this point in detail. 6. Note the pertinent remarks in the new book The Phenomenon of Man, by Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959), p. 89: "It is not in their germinal state that beings manifest themselves but in their florescence." 7. Menninger, Ope cit., p. 821. 8. Ira Progoff, The Death and Birth of Psychology (New York: The Julian Press, 1956), p. 197. 9. Introduction Lectures on Psychoanalysis (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1923), pp. 87, 88. 10. Psychopathology in Daily Life (Basic Writings [The Modern Library, Random House, 1938]), chap. XII, p. 161. 11. Introduction Lectures on Psychoanalysis, p. 21. 12. New Introduction Lectures on Psychoanalysis (New York: Carlton House, 1933), p. 248. 13. A Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental Dialectic, Bk. II, chap. ii, sec. 9, iii. "There is in man," says Kant, "a faculty of determination independent of necessitation through sensuous impulses."

14. Note Christ's removal of harmful guilt feeling in the cure of the paralytic. (Mark 2:9.) 15. Symposium, 216. 16. Albert Outler, Psychotherapy and the Christian Message (New York: Harper, 1954), p. 90. 17. David Roberts, Existentialism and Religious Belief (Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 36. 18. Pensees, No. 792. 19. This insight received its classic expression in Plato's Phaedo, 80a and 94b, particularly in the reply to Simmias. 20. See Professor Lovejoy's essay, "A Temporalistic Realism," Contemporary American Philosophy, edited by George P. Adams and William P. Montague (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1930), II, 85-104. 21. James Boswell, Life of Samuel Johnson, IV, 230. 22. See especially "Existential Psychoanalysis." This is available in Jean Paul Sarte, Existentialism and Human Emotions (New York: The Wisdom Library, 1957).

3 Guilt in the Social Sciences O. HOBART MOWRER Some years ago, when I still thought that protracted personal counseling and psychotherapy were more effective than I pres ently do, psychology graduate students in my own department sometimes came to me with their personal problems; and not infrequently, during the course of our interviews, these students would confess-often with considerable embarrassment-that one of the main reasons they had gone into psychology was that they had suffered acutely from guilt and saw psychology, with its emphasis upon scientific determinism, as a "way out." If all our actions and attitudes are strictly determined by our heredity and our environment, with no element of personal freedom or choice in the equation, then, they had reasoned, the whole notion of guilt, accountability, responsibility is meaningless and quite unjustified. Yet, as these students themselves clearly realized, the very fact that they were now "in therapy" meant that this maneuver had not saved them.

The fact that psychology students have sometimes found them selves in this predicament, while suggestive, does not, to be sure, constitute a major problem in and of itself. But this dilemma, in one form or another, is actually very common in our society and therefore calls for the best thought and attention that can be given to it. It constitutes a major challenge to both academic 38 Guilt in the Social Sciences 39 and clinical psychology and to the social sciences in general. The present paper therefore represents an attempt to come to grips with certain aspects of this problem and, hopefully, to find ways of thinking about and dealing with it that are both logically defensible and practically useful. 1. Cross.-Culturallnductions Concerning Social Morality If one examines the monumental four-volume work, The Science of Society) by Yale Professors William Graham Sumner and Albert Galloway Keller, which was published in 1927, one discovers that the entire second volume is devoted to moral and religious concerns and controls. With enormous erudition, these authors, drawing from a great wealth of both historical and cross-cultural materials which they had assembled over a lifetime, came to the conclusion that, despite their not infrequent arbi trariness and error, religious and moral concerns are not only found in all human societies but are, in the long run, functional and adaptive. In the last chapter of the second volume of their work, Sumner and Keller summarize this argument as follows: An evolutionist [which is the authors' term for a person who takes both a long and a broad approach to the understanding of social insti tutions and cultural mores], viewing the universal existence of religion throughout the races of mankind, cannot but believe that it has pos sessed survival-value, for there must once have been races without it and it must on a time have risen as a variation that has withstood selec tion and has persisted. If one considers, further, that it is precisely the most advanced races that have suffered most and longest under the cult-burdens and other alleged disadvantages accruing from religion, he comes unavoidably to the conclusion that religion constitutes for society an adjustment with high survival-value. Along with the family, property, and government, religion has taken its place as one of the major institutional adjustments in the evolution of society. (P. 1475.) And then, with equal clarity and eloquence, these writers continue their analysis thus: 40 Psychiatry and Responsibility There is always reason behind the success of a persisting adjustment, whether in the organic or the social realm; in fact, our very idea of reason is derived from observation of the constitution and operation of things that "work." Adjustments do not survive selection and last only when they are wrong-headed and contrary to reason or despite the fact that they are whimsical, capricious, and unamenable to law. If one looks dispassionately into the charges against religion and admits all of them, either wholly or in some degree, and then surveys and ac knowledges the costs in capital, effort, and pain that religious systems have imposed cold-bloodedly and offensively upon mankind, he is yet, in the end, constrained to believe that the article was worth the cost.

Exceedingly expensive, it has also been incomparably effective. (P. 1475.) Writing, as they did, at the beginning of the twentieth century, Sumner and Keller were, of course, aware of the growing conflict in our particular culture and era between science and religion. Science, they contend, is a useful and necessary correction for the essentially conservative character of religion; and, far from being inherently opposed, both operate in a dialectical way, for the continued adaptation and evolution of society. Religion does not, like science, look to its own correction and readjust ment. In science man can advance in a straight line indefinitely, while in religion he has had to revolve around certain fixed points from which he could not depart far. It is next to impossible with the weapon of reason to attack and carry a position held by religion; for religion can at any juncture fall back upon its characteristic "doctrine of mystery." (P. 1440.) It is possible to make out a strong prima facie case against religion, since its apparent disservices are concrete and evident, while to appre ciate its services to society one must have done enough reflection to realize that methods of indirection may be quite as effective as those which are direct and obvious. Short-sighted preoccupation with the obvious has convinced not a few emotional people that religion must be uprooted, along with private property, the monogamic family, and government. It is needless to say that such persons are not intelligent Guilt in the Social Sciences 41 evolutionists, accustomed to discounting incidentals in favor of a long perspective. (P. 1468.) No other agency has purged religous conceptions of their gross ele ments as has science. It has been the prime instrument in securing society's adjustments to its material life-conditions; the mores have followed upon its trail; and religion has fallen in behind the mores.

If the conferring of refinement is a friendly function, even though it involves faithful wounds, then science is the best friend religion has ever had. (P. 1481.) As events have actually moved in our society in the three or four decades since the foregoing statements were written, the validity thereof is not immediately apparent. But presently we shall be able to demonstrate their exceptional pertinence. In the meantime it will be useful to indicate more precisely just how Sumner and Keller develop their position regarding the over-all social value of religion and moral concern. Here a longer quotation will be necessary to carry the exact flavor and full force of their thinking: If anyone recalls that the sanction of religion tends to preserve the old and to oppose the new, let it be said, first, that tradition is as im portant in societal evolution as the corresponding factor, heredity, is in the organic process. If all were variation, life would be an unrelated chaos, just as, if all were tradition, it would take on the immobility of death. This is no apology for the discreditable view that has been harbored by not a few of the orthodox as to their function in the world, which they have interpreted to be that of brakemen, but merely the suggestion that religion has a distinct function and one useful to society in connection with the upholding of tradition. Such conserv atism cannot continue to be indiscriminate nor can important services to society any longer be discharged by an agency that is not adjustable to the spirit of its age.

Not to prolong a discussion of relatively minor matters, much less try to combat the detailed complaints about religion and the priesthood, let us consider what is, after all, the first and last service of religion to 42 Psychiatry and Responsibility a society, namely, the discipline it exercises. Not without justice has it been written that fear is the beginning of knowledge. It is certainly the beginning of that discipline through which alone wisdom arrives. Discipline was precisely what men needed in the childhood of the race and have continued to require ever since. Men must learn to control themselves. Though the regulative organization exercised considerable discipline, its agents were merely human; the chief had to sleep occa sionally, could not be everywhere at once, and might be deceived and evaded. Not so the ghosts and spirits. The all-seeing daimonic eye was sleepless; no time or place was immune from its surveillance. Detection was sure. Further, the penalty inflicted was awesome. Granted that the chief might beat or maim or fine or kill, there were yet limits to what he could do. The spirits, on the other hand, could inflict strange agonies and frightful malformations and transformations. Their powers extended even beyond the grave and their resources for harm outran the liveliest imaginings. In short, they inspired, not a daylight-fear but a grisly, gruesome terror-ghost-fear. Consider the threat of the taboo, and its effectiveness. It is beneath this unearthly whip of scorpions that humanity has cringed for long ages and there is no doubt that its disciplinary value has superseded all other compulsions to which man kind has ever been subject. (Pp. 1478-1479.) I apologize to the reader for quoting at such length from an analysis which was published more than thirty years ago. But these are strangely prophetic words, which have special relevance for our time. Under the impact of forces that we shall consider shortly, the Sumner-Keller argument concerning the basic social value of discipline, morality, and religion fell, by and large, upon a generation of deaf ears. In 1927, when The Science of Society made its appearance, the lnovement to "debunk" religion, moral ity, tradition, and history itself was in full swing; and a major economic depression and a second world-wide war were yet to leave their scars upon the human mind and soul. But now, as we end the first decade of the second half of this century, we cannot look back upon the work of Sumner and Keller without being impressed by its deep insight and perspicacity.

For a long time, these writers had no direct descendants among social scientists. Many picked up and elaborated upon their com ments concerning what they were frank to call the "disservices Guilt in the Social Sciences 43 of religion" (p. 1467); but very few writers continued to argue the main Sumner-Keller thesis concerning the long-term necessity for a stable, undergirding value system. Now, however, a .reac tion has set in, and social scientists are beginning, once more, to consider what may be loosely called "the value problem." Here, as illustrative of this new trend, I would call attention to the following: Helen Lynd's 1958 book, On Shame and the Search for Identityj the chapter on conscience in Patterns of Child Rear ing by Sears, Maccoby and Levin (1957); John Whiting's 1959 paper on "Sorcery, Sin, and the Superego"; an article, also pub lished in 1959, on "Pride and Shame in Children" by Levin and Baldwin; Richard LaPiere's 1959 book, The Freudian Ethic; and an article by Hill (1960) on "Learning Theory and the Acquisi tion of Values." Here one sees, once again, a tendency on the part of social scientists to take morality seriously, in both individual personality and in society, along lines clearly adumbrated in the passages that have here been quoted from Sumner and Keller.!

2. Creativity) Conscience) and Coercion Three features of the Sumner-Keller analysis invite our special attention. Recall first of all, if you will, the point that religious and moral traditions are to a society what physical heredity is to an individual organism. Without heredity an organism has no identity, biologically speaking; without it we would not know what an organism is. And the same is true of social tradition: without it we lack personal identity and do not know who we are. Social tradition and values give form and definition, without which organization is impossible; and society is an organization, an established, agreed-upon way of doing things, particularly very vital things of a personal and interper sonal nature. "If all were variation," Sumner and Keller say, "life would be an unrelated chaos, just as, if all were tradition, it would take on the immobility of death." In our time, the first danger is obviously more immediate and real than the second. Certainly there is no prospect of our stag nating as a race of stodgy, sodden conformists. But we are, it 44 Psychiatry and Responsibility seems, threatened by a form of chaos as a result of the fetish we have made of so-called creativity. Recently I spent a very illuminating day in company with a group of highly placed and able professional educators in southern California; and although there were some persons in the group who were willing to stand up for such old-fashioned virtues as personal integrity and char acter in children, the greater emphasis was upon education for spontaneity, variation, creativity. To what extent is this latter position empirically based, and to what extent is it a projection of a personal philosophy, which is today very widespread, to the effect that moral restraint and self-discipline are indeed Hthe bunk" and that Hself-expression" is the measure of all things?

It is perhaps not without significance that in southern Califor nia one also meets so many persons who are "in therapy." Can it be that there is a connection between this philosophy of personal freedom, spontaneity, and "creativity" and the personal disorgani zation and crisis that We ambiguously refer to as "neurosis"? The dominant emphasis in psychotherapy has been in the direction of pushing the individual toward the belief that his difficulty lies in overrestraint, too much character, too much self-discipline; but now it looks very much as if, in trying to move toward greater personal freedom and spontaneity, we are making matters worse rather than better. Sumner and Keller insisted-and the more recent writers cited are also again holding-that the capacity for self-discipline is personally and socially indispensable. One cannot, I think, escape the feeling that many persons who are today the devotees of The New Freedom have become "spon taneous" and "creative" without first attaining the balance and wisdom and perspective that comes from restraint and self control. Someone once said of Christopher Morley that he "got mellow before he got ripe." Something of the same unfortunate type of development seems to have occurred in many of the apostles of so-called spontaneity and creativity. Let us have change, yes, but seasoned, ripened change, and not change merely for the sake of change. If one has never given a traditional, established way of life an extended trial, how can one argue convincingly against it? Inexperience hardly qualifies one as an Guilt in the Social Sciences 45 expert in other areas; and it is not immediately apparent that it should do so in the moral realm. If a person has devoted a considerable piece of his life to a given moral principle and found it invalid and void of sense, and if he can obtain con sensual support from others, both historically and contemporane ously, then he is perhaps in a position to speak out in favor of a different and supposedly better way of dealing with the problem.

But ignorance must not be mistaken for evidence. Someone has said, uHe who finds pleasure in vice or pain in virtue is inexpe rienced in both." Vice is what works and seems rewarding and attractive immediately; and virtue, as Sumner and Keller say, is what works and rewards us in the long run. Before we follow the prophets of the new personal liberty and of psychological and moral emancipation, we need to be sure that they have long-term rather than mere short-term support for their views. The second conception put forward by Sumner and Keller in the passages quoted to which I wish particularly to call attention is this. Social controls, they say, cannot be adequate if they are entirely external and objective. By one means or another, the norms of the culture and the penalties for violating them must be internalized; and this, these authors hold, is the essence of morality and of religion. "Discipline)" they say, "was precisely what men needed in the childhood of the race and have con tinued to require ever since. Men must learn to control them selv'es." This, obviously, is the function of character, of con science, to replace external supervision and sanctions by internal ones. "The chief," these writers say metaphorically and yet quite literally, "had to sleep occasionally, could not be everywhere at once, and might be deceived and evaded." Therefore, some sys tem of beliefs and emotional forces had to be devised that would work toward the enforcement of morality even though the chief did indeed sleep.

For a generation now, we have been pummeled by the perverse argument that conscience is an impostor and morality a super stition, and that in combination they produce those states which we call mental illness. In one sense, this is, of course, true: as Sumner and Keller point out, conscience can indeed "inflict 46 Psychiatry and Responsibility strange agonies and frightful malformations and transformations" upon us. But it does so for socially necessary and functional reasons; and we are at last waking up to the fact that we cannot solve the problem of "neurosis" by the naive expedient of abolish ing conscience and moral principle. We are now realizing that such a procedure is tantamount to dehumanization and reverses the long social evolution that we call history and progress. In an article entitled "Relationships benveen Shame and Guilt in the Socializing Process," which D. P. Ausubel published in the Psychological Review in 1955, this argument is put forward with special cogency as follows: Guilt is one of the most important psychological mechanisms through which an individual becomes socialized in the ways of his culture. It is also an important instrument for cultural survival since it constitutes a most efficient watchdog within each individual, serving to keep his behavior compatible with the moral values of the society in which he lives. Without the aid rendered by guilt feelings, child rearing would be a difficult matter indeed. If children felt no sense of accountability or moral obligations to their hedonistic and irresponsible impulses, to conform to accepted social norms, or to acquire self-control, the social izing process would be slow, arduous, and incomplete ... And since it is plainly evident that the maintenance of perpetual vigilance is impractical, that fear alone is never an effective deterrent against anti social behavior, and that the interests of personal expediency are not always in agreement with prescribed ethical norms, a social order un buttressed by a sense of moral obligation in its members would enjoy precious little stability. (P. 378.) Here, three decades later, is a revival of the Sumner-Keller argument, which is made all the more impressive by the fact that Ausubel at the time of writing was apparently not aware of that argument; at least there is no specific reference in his paper to The Science of Society. It is, of course, true that Ausubel does not relate personal morality and self-control to explicitly religious forces and concepts. Instead of stressing the socializing role of ghosts and daimons and gods, Ausubel speaks of conscience and the capacity for guilt in purely naturalistic and psychological Guilt in the Social Sciences 47 terms; but conscience and the concept of a spirit world are mani festly related. Sumner and Keller suggest that ghosts and spirits came first and were used to create and enforce personal responsi bility; whereas Ausubel, writing in midtwentieth century, might well hold that conscience is the primal fact and that ghosts and gods are the projected, externalized transformations thereof.

But what is important for our purposes is that all the writers thus far cited acknowledge, in one way or another, the social ne cessity of internalized moral standards and of the capacity for self-punishment when these standards are disregarded and in fringed. Much of our erstwhile effort in the field of psychotherapy has been directed toward "reducing the severity of the superego," as if conscience, morality, and guilt were the villains of the piece. Now we are realizing that they are, instead, socially and person ... ally indispensable and that we must not only inculcate conscience in our children but also teach them, as they grow into healthy adulthood, to respect and trust it, rather than to try to outwit, defy, and neutralize it. We have been the victims of a strange misconception in recent decades, namely, the view that conscience is bent upon taking the joy out of life and imposing quite unnecessary and crippling limitations upon us. Anyone who has seen Walt Disney's "Seal Island" will recall that here, during the breeding season, a few powerful bull seals, in the height of their physical vigor, main tain large harems of females, whereas. the young males, fallen monarchs, and males that have never made the grade even during the prime of life live together at one end of the island in what the makers of the film refer to as "bachelor quarters." It is not hard to imagine a similar state of affairs among human, or at least protohuman, beings forty or fifty thousand years ago. And why have we moved, evolved toward monogamy? Because it was a way of circumscribing and inhibiting sexuality? Not at all! It was rather because allotment of one woman to one man not only assured optimal care and training of the young, but also provided maximal sexual satisfaction for the greatest number of individuals and thus greatest social stability. George Bernard Shaw, with his acute sense of paradox, displays shrewd insight in this connection 48 Psychiatry and Responsibility when he refers, in one of his plays, to marriage "as the most li centious of institutions." And yet we have had a spate of self styled "therapists" and would-be social reformers literally selling us the pernicious notion that society and conscience are sexually repressive and must be fought back if one is to escape the neu ..

roticstate that such repression supposedly produces. 2 This is not, of course, to deny that society is in certain respects "repressive" as far as sexuality is concerned. For example, in our particular culture, we ask the young to forgo marriage during the second decade of life, until after, as we say, they get their education. 3 But what must be remembered is that this restraint is imposed, not for the sake of restraint as such, but for much larger and more far-reaching reasons. Finally, I would call attention to the quite unabashed and un apologetic way in which Sumner and Keller recognize the neces sity of force, coercion, and punishment in the socialization process. Fear) they remind us, is the beginning, not of neurosis, but of knowledge. It is true, of course, that without discipline and "fear of the Lord" a child never develops those inner conflicts and crises that we call mental illness; but neither does he become a complete, wise human being.

In the Chicago papers there was recently an account of the hearings that were held concerning the right of the Chicago School Board to dismiss Marie G. Thomas from her position as a teacher because of a failure to maintain classroom order and discipline. Mrs. Thomas' defense was that teachers are so circum scribed and delimited in what they can today do to enforce order that the task has become quite impossible and hopeless. Mrs. Thomas is probably going to lose her job, and there may be special, undisclosed reasons why she should; but on the face of it, the situation is one that makes a great deal of sense as she presented it.4 We seem to have become completely unrealistic in our assumptions concerning the socialization of children and are in process of reaping the practical consequences of our folly. A few days ago my wife, who is a specialist in child develop ment and family relations, told me of a book she had been read ing which makes the point that the reaction that is today setting Guilt in the Social Sciences 49 in against the Freudian philosophy of permissiveness is coming very largely from individuals who themselves welcomed it in their earlier years but who now, as parents and teachers, are beginning to see the whole matter in a very different light.

It therefore looks as if Sumner and Keller were right; as indi viduals we do need discipline froln those around us, discipline that must eventually be internalized as the capacity for self discipline; and it now appears that this course of development presupposes some, perhaps a very considerable, element of coer cion and force, or what political scientists commonly term power. Paradoxically, it is not the self-indulgent but the disciplined who, with a clear conscience, are genuinely free and soundly cre ative. And "neurosis" is the end result of systematic (and secret) efforts to avoid being subject to this power (also often called Law or God).5 3. Learning and Freedon'l) or from Reflex to Feedback Now that we are returning, once· again, to the historically derived and empirically confirmed view of morality so clearly described and documented by Sumner and Keller, it is not with out relevance to ask why the impulse to deny and deviate from it reached such remarkable proportions during the past three or four decades. Many factors were undoubtedly involved. First of all, it should be observed that we human beings always wear the mantle of morality uneasily. We live in perennial tension between the long-run, disciplined way of doing things and the temptation to take short-cuts, to find easier, more direct routes to pleasure and comfort; and anything that seems to make reward for virtue less certain or its disregard less hazardous encourages doubt and deviation. Many persons now living have gone through two world wars; and war always makes the future uncertain and contracts the moral perspective. Moreover, the rise of an economy of abundance, yea excess, in this and at least a few other coun tries of the world has intensified advertising, with its emphasis upon the importance of pleasure and comfort,· 'without much regard for moral considerations. When a well-known brand of 50 Psychiatry and Responsibility beer admonishes us to "know the real joy of good living," the accent is hardly upon morality or virtue.

But I have also been intrigued recently by another historical circumstance which is not ordinarily considered in this context and which may well have been a decisive factor in the situation. I refer to that strain of Reformation theology which has insisted that whereas man is responsible for his evil actions and thus sus ceptible to personal guilt, he can do nothing, unaided, to help or save himself and is left in uncertainty and despair, pending the action of a capricious divine dispensation and grace. It 1vas this doctrine that caused S~ren Kierkegaard, as a Lutheran, to write his book Sickness unto Death) in which he voiced his own Christian anxiety; and it was also this doctrine that caused Fried rich Nietzsche to shout angrily that, as far as he was concerned, God was dead; for he and many others of his time and since felt that they wanted to have nothing to do with a God who was so one-sided as to condemn men for their faul ts and failures and yet give them no credit for their efforts at restitution and reform.

Freudian psychoanalysis, I have argued elsewhere (Mowrer, 1961), arose and achieved its strange success because it holds out a perverse but very subtle promise of deliverance from this Protestant dilemma. The straightforward way to deal with the Calvinist misinterpretation of human nature and moral justice was to reject it. Freud did something equally audacious, but thor oughly destructive rather than healthily corrective. In essence, he agreed with that strain of Protestant theology which holds that sin ful (neurotic) man is practically unable to save (cure) himself; but he took the momentous further step of affirming that neither is man responsible for his neurosis, sickness, sin in the first place. Here was a doctrine that seemed to extend rather than refute Reformation theology; and we thus see why so many Protestants, laymen and clergymen alike, 'have been attracted to psychoanalysis, both as personal therapy and as impersonal theory. Not infre quently one today hears it argued in Protestant circles that Freud ian psychoanalysis, while admittedly antireligious, is nevertheless necessary to free a person so that he can become truly reli gious, fully Christian. Analysis is thus perceived as a form of Guilt in the Social Sciences 51 salvation within the Protestant framework that Protestantism itself has not been able to provide.

Having already elaborated this argument, I have no wish to pursue it here. But in this context I do want to point to yet another cultural development that, again, has not ordinarily been linked with the personal despair into which Calvinist theology can plunge us, but with which I believe there is, actually, a very intimate and important connection. I refer to the rise of the movement within academic and, indeed, popular psychology known as behaviorism. Ostensibly in revolt against nineteenth century structuralism and introspectionism, this movement ac tually gained much of its deeper energy from the fact that it too, like psychoanalysis, denied the reality of moral accountability and thus, in a negative sense, also promised to deliver us, where as introspectionism, with its emphasis on internal states and faculties that could presumably be best studied by means of self-examination, held that our essential nature is to be found on the inside, within us, and that our psychological inquiries should therefore have an introspective cast. But this approach also implied a kind of personal autonomy and capacity for self direction and independent decision and action that conformed with the Calvinist doctrine of accountability for evil without corresponding provision for self-liberation and redemption.

Behaviorism, at one fell swoop, obliterated all this. Nothing within the organism, it maintained, is of any consequence. All that matters is behavior: external, observable stimulation and equally objective, verifiable response. John B. Watson, as the formal founder of behaviorism, took Pavlov's conception of the reflex as the functional unit for all behavior and also followed Pavlov in his hypothesis as to how behavior is modified. Fig. 1 indicates schematically the familiar notion of the conditioning of a reflex response, i.e., the process whereby a response that initially is elicitable only by a so-called unconditioned stimulus Su becomes capable of being called forth by a formerly neutral stimulus, or conditioned stiw.ulus Se' Thus, all behavioral adapta tion was supposed to occur on the basis of this type of "associative shifting" or "stimulus substitution," without any reference what52 Su Fig. 1.

Psychiatryand Responsibility Sc If, Schematic representation of conditioning as conceived by Pavlov. ever to internal states, consciousness, or a self of any kind; and in such a frame of reference the notion of personal accountability or responsibility is, of course, a patent absurdity. E. L. Thorndike, with his emphasis upon the Law of Effect, put fOrward a logically different interpretation of behavior adaptation, but one that was equally reflexological. He spoke of neural bonds or connections, rather than of reflexes, but the intent and practical implications were much the same. If some stimulus or drive Sd produced some response Rb and if Ri were followed by reward, the connection between Sd and Ri was pre sumably strengthened (see Fig. 2); whereas if Sd produced Ri and was followed by punishment, the result was a "stamping out" of Sd---..- ...................-Ri :punishment Fig. 2. Thorndike's Law of Effect.

this bond and a diminished tendency for Sd to produce Ri on future occasions. Adaptation and intelligence were thus assumed to be built into this mechanism; but mechanism it waS, pure and simple. There was no personality, no self within the organisIll (between the Sd and the R1); and here, again, the notion of personal accountability was logically excluded. Although both the conditioned reflexology of Pavlov and Watson and the bond or connection theory of Thorndike had great appeal and considerable conceptual power, neither has proved scientifically adequate. And during the last twenty ..five or thirty years, a series of developments has transformed both theories almost beyond recognition. During the 1930's and early Guilt in the Social Sciences 53 1940's, a great deal of animal research was carried out on what is called avoidance learning, which is best explained by the assump tion that when a formerly neutral stimulus,· such as a buzzer or blinking light, is paired with an inherently noxious stimulus for example~ an electric shock-the shock arouses the response of fear) which is then conditioned to the formerly neutral stimulus or, as we now are likely to say, the danger signal. Under the impulsion of the secondary drive or motive of fear thus aroused, the subject will engage in a sequence of actions, one of which may succeed in getting rid of the danger signal. If this happens, we find that when the danger signal subsequeIl1ly recurs, the organ ism-understandably enough-will show a greater and greater tendency to make the response that is thus effective in eliminating it-and avoiding the noxious event of which the signal is premoni tory.

In the light of the observations just reported, it was not long before a new theory of punishment emerged. If fear could be conditioned to an external, environmentally produced stimulus of some kind as a result of the temporal conjunction of this stim ulus with a painful, fear-arousing event of some sort, it followed that if a bit of behavior occurs and is followed by such an event, which we would not call "punishment," the fear aroused by this event will be conditioned, not to an external danger signal, but to the proprioceptive and other types of stimulation associated with the occurrence of the act itself. Therefore, when the organ ism subsequently starts to repeat this action, these response-cor related stimuli will be aroused, which, in turn, will call forth fear; and the only way for the subject to get rid of the stimulation producing the fear is to stop or radically modify the response in question.

Thus, there emerged around 1940 what may be termed a feed back theory of punishment, in opposition to the stamping-out conception previously advocated by Thorndike. This idea that punishment achieves its effect, not by weakening or obliterating direct stimulus-response connections, but by conditioning fear to response-produced stimuli is represented diagramatically at the right in Fig. 3. On the left is shown Thorndike's original con ception of how habits are established. For a time many workers in 54 Psychiatry and Responsibility Sd-----R i : reward "Sfi-----Ri: s _~, B ---.:::(rt) Sp-Rp Fig. 3. I~ Sd-----R j Sd Ri : s--rt s~ Schematic representation of the second version of two factor learning theory. this field continued thus to accept the positive half of the Law of Effect, even though they had rejected the negative half in favor of the more complicated but conceptually more adequate scheme shown on the right. This new theory of the way punishment operates has proved to have many strengths and to be capable of resolving any number of paradoxes into which the original Thorndikian hypothesis inevitably led. But the scheme is mani festly asymmetrical, in that it continued to accept, essentially un modified, Thorndike's notion of how habits are formed while positing a quite different way of thinking about how they are eliminated.

In the last twenty years, a radical change has now likewise occurred in our understanding of the way in which habits are established and of what habits inherently are. This new concep tion of habit formation is the counterpart of the explanation just given of how habits are eliminated. Now it is believed that a habit is not a thickened S-R bond, but is instead the more complex phenomenon shown in Fig. 4. It has long been known that if an external, independent stimulus is associated, not with the inflic8" " S -----R · s...... S -----R·· s ...',d i· ---~ d 1· S _::::::.~ (r.t)8----(rh) Sr-·-' Rr Sp-R p s~ s~ R S r S R·· 8--1':£Sd----- i: 8~ h d 1° 8~ Fig. 4. Schematic representation of revised two-factor theory.

Guilt in the Social Sciences 55 tion of pain, but with a satisfying, rewarding state of affairs, such as hunger reduction mediated by the ingestion of food, such a stimulus takes on the capacity to arouse positive interest, or hope} and to attract rather than repel the subject; and approach rather than avoidance behavior results. Now suppose that the stimula don assoc~ated w~th drive reduction is response-dependent .. rather than independent. What would one then expect to happen? In order to get more of this type of stimulation, the best thing for the organism to do is to make or intensify the response with which such stimulation, or sensory feedback, is associated; and when this occurs, one has, obviously, that facilitation of response which we call habit. This is the gist of the argument implied in the schematization shown in Fig.· 4, which now provides an exact counterpart of the conception of the way punishment operates that is shown in the same diagram.

4. Response Selection and Responsibility This new, revised way of thinking about habit formation and inhibition is proving extremely successful in resolving many para doxes that previously dogged learning theory; it is also suggestive of numerous new and powerful practical applications. For a long time it has been known that the motor pathways between the central nervous system and a given set of muscles, e.g., those involved in the act of walking, may be completely normal, yet the individual will be rendered incapable of carrying out this type of behavior if the sensory feedback from the lower extrem ities is, for any reason, cut off. Such a condition exists in tabes dorsalis. And now we see why the cutting off of the sensory return from a muscle system destroys voluntary action or a so-called habit involving this system. The learning that is important here has to do, not with the connection between Sand R (in Figs. 2 and 3), but with the connection or connections between the stimuli produced by the occurrence of R and the anticipation of reward or satisfaction, i.e., hope} which has become conditioned to these stimuli (Fig. 4).

Or let us consider the paradox of imitative learning, especially 56 Psychiatryand Responsibility as it is exemplified in the first speech responses of a human infant or a pet parrot or myna bird. It has long been recognized that neither babies nor birds become capable of uttering words on the basis of trial-and-error learning, as Thorndike conceived of it; and neither can such behavior be explained in classical Pavlovian terms. When, on the other hand, we examine the new paradigm for habit formation, we see that imitation follows as a matter of course. In ordinary habit formation, the subject himself makes the response that produces the constellation of stimuli which, as a result of being associated with reward, takes on the capacity to arouse the hope or secondary reinforcement that is the essence of habit. But now, in imitation, the pattern of stimulation to which we wish to condition hope is produced, not by the sUbject's own action, but by the action of someone else. This stimulation is nonetheless associated with the experience of reward and so acquires, for the subject, the capacity to arouse hope. Now, when the subject himself is eager for the hoped-for reward to material ize and the constellation of stimulation that has previously heralded the approach of reward is not forthcoming from the environment, the subject, if he can, will reproduce that constel lation of stimulation himself. This, I realize, is a highly ab breviated account of the mechanism involved in imitation, but the reader wishing a fuller account thereof may easily find it in more specialized works (Mowrer, 1960a, 1960b).6 And so one might continue to apply this new conception of habit formation to explain many other important phenomena-- the psychology of skill, place versus response learning, extinction, intermittent reinforcement, latent learning, insight, and so on-- for its power and scope are very broad indeed. There is, how ever, also a complication. The feedback conception of both habit and inhibition that has been summarily set forth here works extraordinarily well once a response is in progress and producing sensory feedback. Now, depending upon what the organism's prior experience has been, such stimulation arouses hope or fear; and the behavior that is in progress will be facilitated or inhibited accordingly. But this view of the matter leaves completely un answered the prior question of how a particular response is Guilt in the Social Sciences 57 selected and initiated in the first place. This, of course, was not a problem in either the connectionism of Thorndike or the reflex ology of Pavlov: a stimulus, once it occurred in either of these systems, automatically and mechanically produced a given re sponse by reason of the neurological bond between that stimulus and that response. If we now assume, as the evidence seems to require, that this is not the essence of habit, we are thrown into a seemingly unresolvable dilemma. If habit formation does not involve the strengthening of S-R bonds, then why is an organ ism, when exposed to a given stimulus, any ,more likely to start to make one response than any of hundreds ~r even thousands of other responses? i Allow me to by-pass an enormous amount of empirical research and logical analysis that has been carried out in the last decade or so and merely give you the net outcome. Primitive behaviorism tried to build a science of psychology on the notion of the S-R bond, without any reference to the organism that is manifestly in between the S and the R and, by the same token, without reference to anything that goes on inside the organism. This strategy simply did not work. First, we found we had to reintro ..

duce the concept of fear and certain other emotions; and now we are finding it equally necessary to reintroduce the notion of purely cognitive learnings, in the form of images) ideas) memories. Once we have done this, a further insight then dawns upon us: ,ve find that the automatic, involuntary, "reflexological" principle that we tried unsuccessfully to attribute to behavior itself (thus abolishing the whole idea of volition and responsibility) does, in fact, hold for cognitive responses, as well as the emotions. Here ,ve find that the association of ideas--to reintroduce another older term-occurs more or less automatically and thus provides a key to the dilemma concerning response initiation previously posed. Given the situation in which a particular response has previously worked, we think--automatically, mechanically, re... flexly-of that response. But thinking about or imagining an act and overtly performing it are two very different orders of events.

And it is in b,etween thought and deed that the element of deci. sion, choice, and responsibility most meaningfully enters .. AI..

58 Psychiatry and Responsibility though we cannot perhaps keep from imagining some specific action, we can and must hold ourselves accountable as to whether or not we perform it. Recently I heard a fable that is pertinent at this juncture. A king summoned the court magician and ordered him, on pain of death, to produce within three days a formula whereby the king could make gold. The magician, knowing that he could not pro duce such a formula, spent the three days instead thinking, very hard, how he could save his life. When again summoned before the king and asked if he had the desired formula, the magician soberly replied that he did have such a formula and proceeded to explain it to the king. But when he had finished his recitation, he said there was just one additional stipulation he must make: that in carrying out the procedure the king must not think of a hip popotamus. During the procedure the king simply m.ust not think of a hippopotamus, or the procedure would not work.

One can, of course, complete the story himself. The king found that the very words of the magician forced him to think, auto matically, of a hippopotamus while carrying out the prescribed procedure, which vitiated the alleged effect; and although the king was foiled in his effort to make gold, neither could he be head the magician, because he could not prove that the formula, if properly executed, would be ineffective. Here, manifestly, we have a folk recognition of the inevitability of certain mental associations, or conditionings, being established on the basis of sheer contiguity. An idea, image, memory occurs automatically, once the appropriate stimulus for it is present. Therefore, we are not, strictly speaking, "responsible" for our thoughts; but the causal coupling between idea and action, while sufficient to suggest action, is extremely loose and flexible, and it is here that the concept and fact of responsibility enter the picture. It is here that prior experience with reward and punishment "become operative and the whole logic of discipline, pertinent. Duplicity is so destructive of character precisely because it is a device for avoiding discipline. Ego strength or character, we now know, is primarily a social product, which comes from openness and com munity and from the ordering of our behavior that social experiGuilt in the Social Sciences 59 ence and awareness impose. Otherwise, we behave irresponsibly, against the rules and regulations of society, and ultimately to our own detriment and destruction.

As I have suggested elsewhere (Mowrer, 1953), the very fact of learning, even when conceptualized in the oversimplified manner of Pavlov and Thorndike, gives an organism some degree of free dom, "responsibility," and indetertninism. That is to say, learn ing means that an individual can change and need not continue indefinitely to make the same ineffective, stupid responses, pro vided he does not deliberately insulate himself against such change. But now, as we see, the situation is even more flexible, at least in higher organisms: although ideas themselves apparently occur to us more or less automatically, behavior is by no means automatic or mechanical. In between the idea or image of an act and the act itself, there is ample room for the operation of pru dence, judgment, wisdom-which are the residues of hopes and fears that we have acquired not only from our past experience but also from observation and knowledge of the experience of others.

This is not, of course, to deny that these processes all obey orderly principles or laws; but within the scope of their operation, there is ample room for a self and the phenomenon of responsibility (cf. Mowrer, 1960b). 5. Behavior Theory and the Concept of Guilt For a variety of reasons, behavior theorists have not given much attention to the concept of guil t, but they seem likely to do so increasingly in the future. Fear (and relief), hope (and dis appointment), courage (and timidity), and certain other emo tional and cognitive states are now formally recognized and operationally definable; but there has been relatively little effort to consider and conceptualize guilt in the same way. Recently, however, Mr. A. A. Salama has suggested an ingenious type of experiment that usefully identifies some of the parameters of the problem (see also preliminary research carried out by Solo mon, Whiting and Black and described in Mowrer, 1960b, chap. X).

60 Psychiatry and Responsibility Suppose we have a hungry laboratory rat that has learned to press a small lever as a means of causing a pellet of food to drop into a nearby trough. But now, after this behavior has become thoroughly "habitual," we decide that it is "wrong" and that we are going to try to induce the rat to abandon it. Naturally, we think of punishment as a method of achieving this end, which we introduce in the form of an electric shock applied to the feet of the rat through the floor grill of the box-like compartment in which the experiment is being carried out. However, instead of applying the shock immediately after the ~'forbidden" act is per formed, we delay it for a few seconds. Moreover, once the shock is on, we leave it on until the rat finds and revolves a little wheel in the wall of the apparatus opposite the bar. Now, after a few repetitions of this sequence-bar pressing, shock, and wheel turning--will the rat, upon pressing the bar, run over and tUrn the wheel, before the shock itself comes on? If so, argues Mr.

Salama, we have operational evidence that the rat "feels guilty" because of having performed the bar-pressing act. The beauty of this laboratory paradigm is that it neatly iden tifies the guilt situation) Le., the period or state intervening be tween the performance of a proscribed act and the occurrence of an impending punishment. At once, of course, we see that the problem has both an objective and a subjective aspect: in the objective sense, we would say that the rat "is guilty" as soon as it presses the bar and that it now "deserves punishment"; whereas, subjectively, we see that guilt is a special form of fear, the fear that is experienced after a previously punished act is performed, in contrast to the fear ("temptation" fear) that is experienced in advance of such an act. Psychologists have, of course, given a good deal of attention to the latter kind of fear and know, as does everyone else, that the most direct and obvious way for an indi vidual experiencing such fear to deal with it is simply to renounce (inhibit) the act in question. But 'what can one do about guilty fear, the fear of punishment that is experienced, not before, but after a forbidden act is performed? One possibility is to "leave the field" ("hit and run"). But in the Salama experiment this is not a live option (as it frequently is not for human beings); and Guilt in the Social Sciences 61 it would not be in the least surprising if the subject in this situation did indeed react by turning the wheel. This, however, might or might not be effective, depending upon how the experi menter chose to interpret it.

It may, of course, be asked: But is this really "guilt" or only a "fear of punishment" that is experienced in the circumstances described? Objectively, the "guilt" is about as real, I suppose, as guilt ever is: there is a rule or regulation that has been violated, and punishment is imminent. But, subjectively, one might well argue that guilt is real, authentic, only if it is accompanied by remorse J regardless of whether external punishment is impending or not. A person might well do something to which others ob jected and retaliated without, however, having any regrets or reservations whatever: "Given the circumstances, I'd do it again." Yet the "punishment" might still be strongly feared. Here, mani festly is a subtle but highly important factor having to do with whether the individual "accepts" the prohibition he has violated and therefore feels that he "deserves" the punishment or rejects and is agains.t the whole situation. In order to feel "real" guilt, it seems that the deviating individual must be, in some sense, "identified" with the group whose rule he has violated~although we cannot say very precisely what identification here means. Prob ably it has to do, basically, with a feeling of dependence upon the group; but it is not clear why dependence leads to loyalty ("identification") in some instances and mere exploitativeness in others. Can animals have guilt in the more refined sense of the term? Some observers believe that it occurs in dogs, whereas others hold that it is a distinctively human phenomenon (cf.

Mowrer, 1960b, chap. X). In any case, guilt is real enough at the human level; but we are by no means entirely clear how to deal with it. Divine for giveness, psychiatric insight, and tranquilizers have all been widely tried, but without conspicuous success. Perhaps the time has come for a form of action ~Itherapy:' If we act ourselves into neurosis, it would not seem unreasonable ~hat we may have to act ourselves out of it as well.

62 Psychiatry and Responsibility 6. Summary-and Some Objections Considered In this, the concluding section of this paper, let us return now to the problem of accountability in so-called neurosis or personality disorder. Once we are in a state of sin or disgrace, Calvin insisted that we are quite beyond helping ourselves; and Freud, as we have seen, carried the argument still further with the suggestion that we are also not responsible for having got into our difficulties in the first place. Empirically, the Calvinist doctrine has not worked; and Freudianism, instead of helping, has only made matters worse. So it would appear that our only alternative is to reverse the whole approach and make man far more responsible, both for his sins and for his salvation, than either Freud or Calvin was prepared to do. The specific virus of neurosis, it appears, is duplicity; and no one is beyond speaking the truth about himself if he is so disposed. Sumner and Keller have given us sociological grounds for holding the individual responsible; and in the inlmediately preceding pages we have reviewed evidence for thinking that man is also complicated enough, psychologically, to be capable of that form of self-criti cism and self-control which we call accountability. In other words, there are no longer grounds for assuming that "science" neces sarily requires us to take a narrowly deterministic view of human conduct and to turn our back upon the whole moral enterprise.

However, as soon as one begins to entertain the possibility that mental illness is a moral rather than a medical problem, i.e., a matter of true rather than false or "neurotic" guilt, a number of basic questions have to be faced and answered. One of the commonest of these has to do with personality disturbance in children. Granted that it is perhaps justifiable to regard adult neurotic and psychotic individuals as sinful rather than as sick, how,· it is asked, can one hold children equally accountable? This, admittedly, is an important and difficult issue; and I am not at all confident I know how to handle it adequately. But we should surely begin by observing that children are, indeed, not free moral agents. For roughly the first two decades of their lives, Guilt in the' Social Sciences 63 they are subject to the will and authority of their parents (or parent surrogates). And if the parents of a child are confused, hostile, and inconsistent, the development of the child is almost sure to suffer. In the beginning, the infant is little more than a lump of almost infinitely malleable protoplasm; and if he is born to psychologically and socially inadequate parents, it goes without saying that he can be misshaped by his experience at their hands.

Once one has granted that the individual is not a free moral agent as a child, it is then tempting to argue th~t one is never free and accountable. We can always maintain, after parents are no longer about, that it is our environment, society, heredity, or the shadow of childhood memories that keeps us enslaved, unfree, and thus not responsible or accountable. But we have now dis covered that it is absolutely fatal to permit adults to persist in this belief, fatal in terms of their citizenship and in terms of their own personal happiness and effectiveness. At some time there has to be a transition from the dependence of childhood to the independence and dependability of adulthood; and it is our great loss that today we put so little emphasis upon such a transi tion. When I was a child, growing up in a small Middle-West Protestant church, forty years ago, I heard a good deal about the age of discretion, of discernment, of accountability; and later, in college, I discovered that virtually all primitive societies have or at least once had pubertal initiation rites to mark the individual's passage from childhood to full adult privileges and obligations.

Recently I read A. Powell Davies' book, The First Christian) which is a kind of biography of the apostle Paul; and here we learn that "down to the thirteenth year, the guilt for a Jewish boy's 'sins' was borne by his father; thereafter he himself was responsible." And to this day, in the confirmation ceremony or Bar-Mitzva, the orthodox Jewish boy declares, "Today I am a man." "Hereafter," he says in effect, "don't blame my father if I conduct myself badly; blame me) for I am responsible." But somehow the whole notion of personal responsibility seems to have become very old-fashioned, "unscientific." Now, if a boy or a girl misbehaves, we feel we have to call in an expert to "understand" the youngster and to tell us what the "cause" of 64 Psychiatry and Responsibility the difficulty is, which will probably turn out to be that the parents have "unconsciously rejected" the child and must in the future be more "accepting" of him. Chances are, rather, that they have already "accepted" far more from the child than was gen uinely good for him and have indeed "rejected" him in the deeper sense of not having let their genuine love and concern lead to the kind of discipline that he has sorely needed.

Recently at a PTA meeting I heard a mother say that she had just read an article in one of our national magazines in which the author took the position that if you have a child who steals, the boy is "sick" and needs "treatment." How long will we per.. petuate this illusion? There is not a particle of evidence that the "treatment" approach to delinquency is effective; yet we keep talking and writing as if it were completely so. I personally can see no alternative but to return to the time-honored view that youth needs firm guidance and discipline and that no amount of pseudoscientific "understanding" and "treatment" will take their place. J. Edgar Hoover has recently suggested that we ought to rein .. state something like initiation rites for adolescents, at which point they would declare their maturity and accountability. Granted that accountability is not something that is suddenly or magically acquired----it manifestly develops, by degrees, over a period of many years----yetthere is a point to solemniZing the fact of personal accountability and maturity at some time in early or middle adolescence. This used to occur, after a fashion, when young people "joined the church." Now this aspect of church affiliation is little stressed; and many youth are not involved in church life anyway_ Also, along with the argument about personality disturbance in childhood, one frequently encounters a question about the personality breakdowns that occur in soldiers and other members of our armed services during war. Here it might seem that the difficulty is purely situational, externally induced, and has nothing to do with lack of responsibility or personal adequacy.

Again I make no claim to knowing the whole answer, but one way Guilt in the Social Sciences 65 of thinking about the problem that goes a long way is this. The rigors of war certainly put unusual strains upon a man, in the sense of making unusually severe moral demands upon him. And the fact seems to be that many of us simply do not "measure up" to the requirements of the situation. Personal stability in combat calls for unusual capacity for altruism and unselfishness. And one can, therefore, argue either way, holding that it is the situa tion that causes the breakdown or a lack of sufficient moral fiber to meet it. Then too, I have repeatedly encountered the argument that big business is now of such a nature as to force the individual into quite impossible and destructive ethical dilemmas. Perhaps those of us in academic life are singularly blessed in this respect and do not appreciate the dilemmas and "binds" of the marketplace.

But I cannot escape the impression that personal integrity is more available to most of us than we sometimes wish to think and that many of us are disposed to hold the external situa don more responsible than we should for the moral ambiguity in our lives. This, of course, is not to deny that today we face broad social and philosophical issues, rather than mere personal "troubles" or "problems," and that much of our malaise comes from dislocation and confusion at this more general level (Mowrer, 1961). How ever, one of these issues surely has to do, quite specifically, with this matter of moral accountability; and many of our individual difficulties appear to come from our attempting to resolve it by means of denial rather than affirmation. The plain fact is that we cannot survive, either as individuals or as a society, unless, at an early point in our lives, we are willing to stop blaming others and take full·time responsibility for our selves. Despite much pseudoscientific talk to the contrary, we must, it seems, return to the simple wisdom of an old spiritual, which says: 'Taint my father, 'taint my mother, but it's me, Oh Lord, Standin' in the need of prayer.

66 Psychiatry and Responsibility But our concept of "prayer" needs to be considerably en larged so as to open up possibilities for human initiative as well as divine grace in redirecting and redeeming our lives and re storing our souls. NOTES 1. For indications of growing interest in this area on the part of psycho analysis, see Hartman (1960) and Masserman (1960); also earlier volumes by Hadfield (1936) and Flugel (1945). 2. Cf. the fact that unmarried persons in our society are often termed "old maids" and "bachelors" and viewed with mingled scorn and pity. Note also that marriage is an occasion for ceremony and celebration. 3. Professor William Cole has recently phrased the problem thus: "Man is the only animal that achieves sexual maturity before he achieves social maturity." 4. For further details, see Chicago Daily News) March 23, 1960. 5. I am indebted to Dr. Camilla Anderson (psychiatrist) for the observa tion that all psychopathology involves an attitude of "grandiosity," i.e., an assumption that the rules of society that apply to common men do not apply "to me." "/ am an exception!"

6. The common procedure for teaching a dog to "shake hands," being intermediate between ordinary habit-formation and imitation, may further illuminate and clarify the principle with which we are here concerned. In this situation the stimulation that is associated with re ward is provided, not by anything that the dog does nor by anything that another organism does, but rather by something which is done to the dog: i.e., the passive flexion of the right forelimb. This produces a distinctive pattern of stimulation that the dog comes to associate with food, petting, or some other reward; and when the dog again wants such a reward and no one flexes his leg for him as a means of producing the premonitory stimulus, he is very likely to produce the stimulation by flexing his leg himself. This is but one instance of a type of training that psychologists call "putting through" and is manifestly the "missing link" between imitation and ordinary habit-formation. Also, it suggests the greater element of "volition" that we now associate with "habitual"

behavior. References ANDERSON, CAMILLA. Personal Communication (1960). AUSUBEL, D. P. "Relationships between Shame and Guilt in the Socializing Process," Psychol. Rev.) LXII (1955), 378-390. COLE, W. G. Sex in Christianity and Psychoanalysis. New York: Oxford University Press, 1955.

Guilt in the Social Sciences 67 FLUGEL, J. C. Man~ Morals~ and Society: A Psychoanalytic Study. New York: International Universities Press, 1945. HADFIELD, J. A. Psychology and Morals. New York: McBride &: Co., 1936. HARTMANN, H. Psychoanalysis and Moral Values. New York: International Universities Press, 1960. HILL, W. F. "Learning Theory and the Acquisition of Values," Psychol. Rev.~ LXVII (1960), ~17-~~1. KIERKEGAARD, S. Sickness unto Death (1849), Walter Lowrie translation. New York: Doubleday & Co., 1955. LAPIERE, R. The Freudian Ethic. New York: Duell, Sloan &: Pearce, 1959. LEVIN, H. AND BALDWIN, A. L. "Pride and Shame in Children," Nebraska Symposium on Motivation (M. R. Jones, ed.). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1959. LVND, HELEN M. On Shame and the Search for Identity. New York: Harcourt, Brace &: Co., 1958. MASSERMAN, J. H. Psychoanalysis and Human Values. New York: Grune &: Stratton, 1960.

MOWRER, O. H. "Freedom and Responsibility: A Psychological Analysis," Jour. Legal Educ.~ VI (1953), 60-78. -'--. (1960a) Learning Theory and Behavior. New York: John Wiley &: Sons, Inc. ---. (1960b) Learning Theory and the Symbolic Processes. New York: John Wiley &: Sons, Inc. --. (1961) The Crisis in Psychiatry and Religion; An Analysis of the Moral Issues in Mental Illness. Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand CO. SEARS, R. R., MACCOBY, ELEANOR E., AND LEVIN, H. Patterns of Child Rearing. Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson &: Co., 1957. SUMNER, W. G. AND KELLER, A. G. The Science of Society. Vol. II~ Self Maintenance: Religion. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1927. WHITING, J. W. M. "Sorcery, Sin and the Superego: A Cross-Cultural Study of Some ~lechanisms of Social Control," Nebraska Symposium on Moti vation (M. R. Jones, ed.). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1959.

4 The Individual and His Society: DisagreementsBetween Sociology and Psychoanalysis RICHARD T. LAPIERE I Early in this century, Charles Horton Cooley observed that the individual and society are but two aspects of the same thing and that any attempt to understand the one apart from the other is artificial and certain to result in false conceptions. His view of the interaction between individual and society was at variance with the simple cause-and-effect theory then prevalent, especially in regard to human affairs. Consequently, Cooley's idea was generally ignored in favor of less complex and more doctrinaire ideas. Reflecting, no doubt, their ameliorative bent, sociologists tended for a time to favor the view that society is, on the one hand, designed for man's convenience and, on the other, designed by man, and thus subject to revision in the interests of man's welfare. They were usually rather vague concerning the nature of man himself, but they were inclined to accept uncritically a some what watered-down version of nineteenth-century rational psy chology. So, of course, did some psychologists, especially those who were interested in education. Nevertheless, many psycholo68 The Individual and His Society 69 gists and a host of pseudo psychologists clung to versions of biological determinism. The divine ..will concept of the origins of society had long since gone out of fashion in secular circles; but it had to a large extent been replaced by a naturalistic concept that was equally fatalistic.

The essence of biological determinism is that society is but a collective manifestation of the inherent characteristics of the members thereof. The various modern versions range from the simple racism of De Gobineau and his many successors, by which differences between societies were explained, to the explanation of specific aspects of a society in terms of the differential natures of the individuals involved (e.g., that class differences were social manifestations of differences in innate abilities, that the inferior status of women was a social consequence of their biological in.. feriority, and that criminals were born to crime). Although not all of them were forthright biological determinists, the psycholo gists tended to seek in the nature of the individual the explana tion for his conduct; few of them thought to turn their attention to the context in which the individual behaved.

It was a psychologist, William McDougall, who resolved the considerable confusion that prevailed early in the century by offering a simple doctrine of instinctivism by which everything-the conduct of the individual and the existence of society-could be explained. From the publication of his Social Psychology in 1908 until well after World War I, both psychological and socio.. logical thought was profoundly influenced by this metapsycho logical interpretation. Many versions of the central thesis were evolved: but whatever the instincts were called and however few (and generalized) or many (and specialized) of them were assumed, there was wide agreement that individual conduct stems from innate forces and that society is but the collective manifestation of such forces---that, in sum, the instincts of man are social. This simple and gratifying version of the relation between the individual and society was considerably weakened here in America by the infusion of Freudian theory in the early 1920's.

To some sociologists, the Freudian notion that the instincts of man are primordial rather than social provided a solution to the 70 Psychiatry and Responsibility difficulties that they were experiencing with the social-instinct interpretation (e.g., that if an instinct of mother love is the cause of maternal care, why do so lnany mothers neglect their children?). That this notion also left them with no explanation at aU· for the existence of society did not immediately become apparent. They became preoccupied, in a distinctly amateurish way, with the problem of how the socially repressed individual can make peace with himself without at the same time rebelling against society. And for a time there was mnch talk abou t the value of art, music, and literature as socially acceptable channels for the discharge of libidinous forces-an idea derived, perhaps, from the old cliche about music soothing the savage breast.

Not all the psychologists and sociologists of the early 1920's succumbed to instinctivism; in both fields there were men who, like R. E. Park, remained aloof from the pseudoscientific fashion of the day. By 1924, the vogue for instinctivist explanations had passed its apogee; psychology was taking off on a behavioristic spree, and sociology ,vas beginning to rediscover and then to refine the idea, long since so clearly expounded by Cooley, that the individual and society are but two aspects of the saIne thing. Contemporary sociologists come, of course, in many models. They have quite varying interests and, like all scientists, are prone to see the whole in terms of their particular speciality. It would, therefore, be quite unrealistic to state that modern sociologists believe this or that. There is, however, some consensus among sociologists regarding the nature of the individual, the nature of society, and the relations of the one to the other; and these I shall hereafter designate as the current sociological perspective.

In the first place, sociology has not been significantly influenced by the post-World War II revival of Freudian ideas. Few sociol ogists became enamored of the culture-and-personality cult that swept the ranks of the anthropologists; in fact, it has been evi dences advanced by sociologists that have in the main been responsible for the tempering of anthropological enthusiasm for this bit of dogma. 1 Even in the special field of criminology where concern with the antisocial individual tends to predispose the investigator to see society in individual terms-many socioloThe Individual and His Society 71 gists have held aloof from the easy answers provided by Freudian, neo-Freudian, and quasi-Freudian theorists. 2 As a consequence, the idea that the individual is an aspect of society-rather than a force counter to it-has persisted and has been both reinforced and refined by studies of many kinds. Any brief statement of the present sociological understanding of the nature and role of the individual will necessarily understate the complexity involved. Perhaps, however, the general nature of that understanding can be suggested. It has only an historical relation to early environmentalism. While sociology incorporates the idea that the personality (the sum total of the individual's predispositions to behave) is a product of experiences, it recog nizes that experiences may be widely varied within a common social context. Moreover, the effect on personality of any ex perience is a "product" rather than a simple consequence. Sociol ogy does not, therefore, perceive the individual as being a simple, passive recipient of socialization and as operating in society as an equally simple and passive functionary.

In the current sociological view, most members of any society are in most respects fairly well adapted by social training to the performance of their social roles. But society is not a machine. Individuals are not even faintly analogous to the tubes and other electronic devices from which computers are constructed. There fore, we needed the qualifiers "most" and "fairly well" in the preceding statement. Perhaps some members of any society, and certainly some members of our own, are very badly prepared in many respects by social training to perform as society requires them; they are the gross failures of the society, the individuals who contribute to the population of our penitentiaries and luna tic asylums. Some others, probably many others, are poorly pre pared in some respect or other to accept passively one or another of their social roles; from among these come our neurotics, our geniuses, and, one may suspect, our inventors, discoverers, and other men of enterprise-men who may contribute creatively to the society of which they are a part.

Moreover-and this is derived from current sociological under standing of the nature of society-it is now recognized that the 72 Psychiatry and Responsibility social roles of the members of society are, through a complex inter action of both social and individual factors, widely varied and subject to shift and change. We no longer see it as incongruous that a man should be kind and gentle with his children and yet harsh and demanding with his employees or that one slum boy should grow into an habitual criminal while his brother becomes a priest. Contemporary sociology accepts the idea that society is a can.. struct of man; it assumes, and not without considerable reason, that society functions toward the survival of the group and, hence, if only indirectly, toward the fulfillment of individual needs; but it perceives society as a vast and as yet largely incom prehensible system of interdependent structures, no one of which will function independently of the whole.

The idea that society is man-made need hardly be defended in this enlightened age. Indeed, what this idea most needs is rigorous qualification; for modern men are far too prone to believe that anything that they wish can be brought about by the enactment of laws and the establishment of a new governmental agency. Some few sociologists may subscribe to this popular view; but sociology as such does not lend support to it. We are not very clear about the actual processes by which social changes are achieved; there is, however, fair agreement among sociologists that forced changes-:-i.e., those imposed through government are of indeterminate and probably also transitory significance. The view that society is a functioning whole is both very old and fairly new; for convenience, if nothing else, the new version is usually accredited to the anthropologist Malinowski. 3 Neverthe .. less, American sociologists have-perhaps as a reflection of the American ethos--always been more rather than less functional in their outlook. Most sociologists are fully aware of the fact that functional equilibrium is an intellectual construct comparable to organic good health. The various forms of any given society will be more and less functionally integrated. We recognize that all societies are subject to change; that change may produce dysfunctions as well as functional improvements in the system; and that the components of any society, like the personality The Individual and His Society 73 attributes of any individual, are something of a hodgepodge in which functionally effective and dysfunctional elements may be equally cherished by the members.

II It is no doubt audacious for any sociologist to attempt to ascertain and to characterize the current perspectives of psychiatry regarding the individual and society. Psychiatrists come in even more varied sizes and more diverse qualities than sociologists; and, to a far greater degree than sociologists, they are inclined to be long to mutually exclusive and highly antagonistic schools. More over, their interest is therapeutic, and their focus is upon the individual; hence, their concern with society, if any, is quite incidental. It is often necessary, therefore, to infer either from their therapeutic techniques, their therapeutic goals; or their concept of the nature of the individual how they would conceive society were they to do so. Finally, many of those who belong to one or another wing of the Freudian persuasion will disparage anything a sociologist might say about them on the principle that "nobody can really understand what it [psychoanalysis] is all about without having been psychoanalyzed." 4 American, like English, psychiatry is dominated by psycho analysts of the Freudian and neo-Freudian (Horney, Fromm, Sul livan, et al.) orientation. Neither Adler nor Jung has much of a following here; and while there are many nonanalytical psy chiatrists, their contra-analytical views have been given limited attention within the profession and even less by the general public. On the other hand, Freudian and neo-Freudian concepts of the individual and-somewhat incidentally-of society have been widely publicized, have been Inore or less incorporated into American folklore, and have been adopted in some form or other by the clinical wing of psychology, by many anthropologists, and by most of the so-called "helping" professions.

There is little difficulty in ascertaining Freud's own ideas of the individual, of society, and of the relations between the two, even though Freud wrote so much over so many years, during 74 Psychiatry and Responsibility which his general theory underwent constant evolution, that it is always possible to quibble over matters of detail. One thing, at any event, held constant: concerned with individuals per seJ Freud derived most of his notions about the nature of the individual from observation of a very limited class of them who came to him as patients because they had failed to make adequate adjust .. ments to their life circumstances. Had he been content to limit his generalizations to persons of this special category, he might have advanced scientific knowledge of certain kinds of psychopathology, though he would not have become one of the major ideological figures of the century. It was in large part because he violated one of the major principles of the scientific method-that the findings derived from one "universe" must not be taken to be representa ..

tive of the universe-that he was able to come up with a meta psychology (some would say a "theology") that has been widely and persistently acclaimed as true or, at the very least, as a close approximation to the truth. Perhaps quite understandably, Freud-and this seems to be characteristic of psychiatrists of the psychoanalytic persuasion felt committed to the kinds of persons who came to him for help. He may have believed that their psychic well-being was the highest value and that society should be subordinated to it. Very recently, Jacques Barzun also pointed to the link between psy choanalysis and misplaced futile philanthropy: The talk of "education" where none is wanted or needed, or where something else is meant, is characteristic of our time. But even more illuminating is the identity suggested between education and psy· chology or psychiatry, two demisciences ridden by philanthropic moral· ism. The doctrine of pity and help, originating in the church, the settlement house, and the clinic, has found in the modern psychologies a convenient means of carrying abroad the war against Intellect.

Though the genius of Freud was unswervingly intellectual, it has given birth to a large progeny of adapters who, from generous as well as selfish motives, put philanthropy first. They mean to cure, or at least to "help," at any cost. They respect, certainly, no intellectual limits or principles, and one by one the chief elements of our culture have fallen within the area of their devastation. Thus, the school is not to teach, The Individual and His Society 75 but to cure; body and mind are not to use for self-forgetful ends, but to dwell on with Narcissus' adoring anxiety; the arts, not to give joy and light, but to be scanned for a "diagnosis" of some trouble, a solu tion of some "problem," or else exploited for the common good in occupational therapy.5 To Freud and to all his disciples, man is by nature presocial; and while man's primordial drives may be constrained by society, they never atrophy. The orthodox Freudian interpretation and therapy is based upon this premise; and the premise itself is an inference derived from the observation and examination of mentally disturbed individuals. It may generously be described as the universalization of an ad hoc assumption; but it was, and it remains, an assumption that is beyond empirical validation and must be accepted, if at all, on faith alone. Granted the premise, all else follows quite logically: the individual and society are dis crete, dissimilar, and, indeed, unalterably opposed; the individual may be kept throughout his life subordinated to social con straints and may even internalize them to a degree, but his libido -become manifest as his Id-remains at war with society and also, to a degree, with his Ego.

A remarkably acute rationalization of this general postulate re garding the inevitable and inescapable opposition between the individual and society is provided by Ruth L. Monroe in the con cluding paragraphs of her widely acclaimed Schools of Ps:ycho analytical Thought. She says, in part, "... it does seem probable that no significant evolutionary change in the biological structure of the human species has occurred within historical times. In historical times, the adaptive process has been mainly cultural, and we must firmly recognize that the biological equipment we inherit was functionally designed for a very different way of life." 6 Other students, however, will point out that if man is bio logicallyequipped for presocial(or precultural)life, how are we then to explain the existence of society and the patent inability of any human organism to survive without the supportive care of a society?

76 Psychiatry and Responsibility Freud did not, in fact, attempt to explain the existence of society; he accepted it as something that comes to us from out of the past and is transmitted from generation to generation through the mechanism of cowed but inherently presocial individuals. He did speak, in connection with some specific social patterns, of "phylogenetic memories of prehistory." Occasionally he referred to "the primal horde," which suggests that he did conceive of a time when man existed apart from society. But why-in view of the presocial nature of man-society came into being he never seems to have inquired. For him society was simply a given condi tion that the individual must somehow endure. There appears in various of Freud's writings the implication that society may be necessary for the survival of the human species; but very explicit throughout his writings is the view that this collective biological value is fulfilled only by the sacrificing of the psychic welfare of the individual members of society. From the individual point of view, which Freud invariably takes, society is nought but a system of frustrating restraints upon the biological imperatives which throughout life strive for fulfillment. Thus, Freud sees the individual engaged from birth until death in an unending and unresolved conflict with the society of which he is a captive member. Freud recognized that the individual acquires social attributes from social participation; but since these attributes conflict with his natural drives, they serve only to internalize his conflict with society.

Those psychoanalysts who explicitly reject the libido premise in Freud's system of interpretation~o£ten described as a class as "neo-Freudians" -have made a sort of unilateral truce with sociology. Or perhaps their revisions of the orthodox doctrine might be better described as a theoretical compromise with the evidences concerning the actual relation between the individual and society that have been advanced by anthropologists and so ciologists. Thus, Malinowski's report (1924) on the matrilinear family system among the Trobrianders, which cast considerable doubt on the universality of Freud's Oedipus complex, set off a long and tedious controversy over this particular Freudian conThe Individual and His Society 77 cept; and once the universality of the Oedipus complex came into doubt, the way was opened for critical examination of the libido premise itself.7 Perhaps the best known of the many American revisionists are Horney, Fromm, and Sullivan. Of these three, Sullivan seems to have had the greatest influence on practicing psychoanalysts .. while Horney seems to have been most instrumental in popUlarizing the psychoanalytic outlook. At any rate, Horney's concept of the need for security has become central in the thinking of clinical and child psychologists, and psychoanalytically oriented anthropolo gists, educators, and members of the helping professions. Horney explicitly denies the importance of specific libidinous needs in bringing the individual into conflict with his society. She con siders her interpretation of the nature of the individual less pes simistic than Freud's. Nevertheless, her individual is by nature an exceedingly delicate organism. He may not be, in the ortho ..

dox Freudian manner, unalterably opposed to life in society; but he is somehow so constituted that he takes to social life in fear and trembling, and, unless his society treats him with the utmost consideration, his sel1se of security is jeopardized, a basic anxiety becomes manifest, and he becomes neurotic. The sense of security, one gathers, is what the individual feels when no social demands are made upon him and society satisfies his every need-most particularly the need (presumably in her view, biological) for favorable social attention. "Basic anxiety" is the term by which she describes the consequences of this need. It is, she says, "the feeling a child has of being isolated and helpless in a potentially hostile world." 8 Horney does not accept the Freudian idea of libidinous im· pulses being repressed in the unconscious by the constraints of society. Nevertheless, she makes much of such concepts as hostility and conflict; and there runs through her writings an impression of the individual as constantly and fearfully cringing in the face of a world which he-neurotically, no doubt-conceives as essen tially opposed to his personal welfare. Society, in her view, may in reality be desirable as wen as necessary; she does not consider 78 Psychiatry and Responsibility it as inherently hostile to the individual. But all too often invariably, one might infer from her stress on insecurity-the individual has impressed on him in infancy that society, in the person of mother or other agent, is not favorably disposed toward him, thus arousing a basic anxiety from which he will never be entirely free during the course of his life.

The theoretical differences between Freud's and Horney's con cepts of the individual and society are considerable; but the implications are very much the same-so much so that some critics of psychoanalysis consider it and all other neo-Freudian conceptualizations as no more than quibbling variants on a com mon theme. 9 At any event, for Horney, as for Freud, the psychic welfare of the individual is always precarious; and while Horney may grant to the individual more chance for equanimity than does Freud, she considers him incapable of enduring stoically the presumed stresses and strains of ordinary social life. Only, one gathers, under the most favorable circumstances will he pro gress through life with that blithe spirit which some earlier philosophers considered to be the normal condition of man. Erich Fromm, with his somewhat different perspective, attempts to sketch the social conditions that would be favorable to the in dividual's psyche-a sort of psychoanalytic utopia. Like Horney and others who have taken their lead from Freudianism, he con ceives the individual as psychically weak and incompetent; but for him the conflict arises from the fact that the evolutionary individuation of the organism-which freed man from the shackles of nature-runs counter to his historical and individually ac quired dependence upon society. The individual would be free but cannot accept freedom. Modern society forces him into an order of freedom that is especially inimical to his psychic wel fare, for it demands of him self-reliance and personal fulfillment of his responsibilities but offers little in the way of social support.

Society makes man personally responsible for his own welfare and impresses ·upon him his "aloneness." The "sane society" would be one that would give the individual scope for free action but at the same time provide him with protective and reassuring The Individual and His Society 79 social support. 10 In such a society, the individual could, it would seem, eat his cake and have it, too: he could enjoy his freedom without jeopardizing his security. In sum, everything would be given to him, and nothing demanded of him in return. III That psychoanalytic concepts of the nature of the individual and of society and of the relation between the individual and society are completely at odds with those of sociology and with empirical evidences should now be obvious. They are the stuff of which ideologies are made, not the intellectual constructs of a science. There can be, of course, no objection to them simply on the grounds that they are not scientifically valid. Most of what men have believed and still do believe about themselves and the world in which they live is contrascientific, and their myths and other social definitions often serve socially desirable ends. It is possible, although the evidence is not impressive, that psychoanalytic interpretations of the individual and society are useful in the treatment of mentally disturbed persons.

Unfortunately, however, psychoanalytic ideas have not re mained the special province of the mental healer. They have been widely and persistently publicized; and in capsule form they have been incorporated into our folklore. Moreover, they have been made-especially the ideas of Horney-the basis for a variety of applied pseudo sciences. And finally, they have pro vided a ready rationale for those politicians, social reformers, and ordinary citizens who are bent on reducing our society to one grand "security" -dispensing system. The popularity of psychoanalytic notions here in America is obvious. Art, literature, the drama, and even music reflect or pretend to reflect psychoanalytic concepts and sentiments. The undergoing of analysis is a far more impressive status symbol than is the ownership of a Cadillac; and every really smart cocktail party resounds with complexes, fixations, insecurities, transfer ences, etc. All this might be passed off as just a vogue of the 80 Psychiatry and Responsibility moment, were there not also a great deal of very serious and no doubt well-meant effort to put psychoanalytical ideas into general social practice. Child psychologists have been teaching and preach ...

ing the gospel of the "permissive" home, warning against the psychically scarifying consequences of "authori tarian" treatment of infant and child, urging the utmost care and patience in such critical matters as weaning and bathroom training, prescribing for infant and child constant love and attention and complete freedom from discipline of any sort. ll Otherwise, it is said, the child's security will be shattered, and he will grow up to be a neurotic adult. The most progressive of the progressive educators have been advocating something called "the child-centered school," in which teachers will not attempt to teach but will, rather, concentrate upon the maintenance in the classroom of a "democratic atmosphere." On close examination, what they advo cate seems to be a continuation, on an institutional basis, of the same permissive and undemanding treatment that child psycholo gists ask of the home.

For a decade and more, sentimentalists-.-many of them profes sional psychiatrists..--have been trying, and with considerable success, to dull, if not actually extract, the teeth of the law-.-and this on the distinctly Freudian assumption that it is entirely natural for the criminal to act as he does and quite unreasonable for society to make him stand trial for being his antisocial self.I2 Many of the spokesmen for, and almost all of the teachers of, social work--as well as youth counselors, probation officers, etc. -have been propagating the view that the client is always right and should be treated accordingly. For the client is the unhappy and unwilling victim of a society that has failed to give him what he needs and has demanded of him what he cannot possibly do; for to their minds, as to the minds of all who accept as valid the psychoanalytic ideology, society should give and give and demand no reci proci ty.

Father Furfey, head of the sociology department at the Catholic University, repeatedly has called attention to this psychoanalyti cally supported prescientific "humanitarianism" in the scientific treatment of criminal conduct.

The Individual and His Society 81 Not all writers give exactly the same explanation, but all their ac counts do have one striking characteristic in common. All of them tend to shift the blame ftorn the offender himself. A poor home environment may be invoked to explain one case. Bad adjustment in school may be used to explain another. In a third instance the causation may be found deep in the offender's unconscious ...• Seldom is it admitted that the offender decided freely and in told blood to commit the crime. In this case, also, it is not obvious that the sociological view of crime is incorrect. Conceivably, it may be entirely justified. Yet it is worth noting that among those who disagree sharply with sociologists are a good many experienced police officers, judges, and attorneys who are familiar with criminals and their ways. It is worth noting, also, that sociological theories of crime and delinquency have not scored particu larly brilliantly on the pragmatic test when they have been applied by law...enforcement agencies.I 3 The enlightened psychoanalyst believes, unlike Freud, that society could be adapted to satisfy the needs of the individual members and So to lessen, if not entirely eliminate, conflict and suffering. Could it? Could a social system be evolved that would fulfill the needs of members who are made in the psychoanalytic image of the individual, men dependent, incapable of assuming responsibility, and enduring only under protest the presumed stresses and strains of active and fruitful social participation? It could only if we assume also, as psychoanalysts seem to do, that a society is something distinct from the individual; that, contrary to sociological understanding, the individual and society are not two aspects of the same thing but are two things, and that the latter-society-is independent of the former. For only if this were true could society provide a flow of goods and services to each of the individual members without securing in return con tributions from them.

NOTES 1. W. H. Sewell, "Infant Training and the Personality of the Child," American Journal of Sociology, LVIII (1952), 150-159, and "The Effects of Feeding, Weaning, and Scheduling Procedures on Childhood Adjustment and the Formation of Oral Symptoms," Child Development, XXIII (1952), 185-191.

82 Psychiatry and Responsibility 2. P. W. Tappan, Crime, Justice and Correction (New York, 1960), pp. 112-168. 3. B. Malinowski, Argonauts of the Western Pacific (London, 1922). 4. G. Roheim, ed., Psychoanalysis and the Social Sciences (New York, 1948), p. 32. 5. Jacques Barzun, The House of Intellect (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), pp. 23 £. 6. Ruth L. Munroe, Schools of Psychoanalytic Thought (New York: Dryden, 1955), p. 644. 7. R. Munroe, ibid., p. 138. 8. K. Horney, Our Inner Conflicts (New York: Norton, 1945), p. 41. 9. A. Green, "Sociological Analysis of Horney and Fromm," American Journal of Sociology, LI (1946), 533-554. 10. E. Fromm, The Sane Society (New York, 1955). 11. E. Erikson, Childhood and Society (New York, 1950). 12. F. Alexander and H. Staub, The Criminal, the Judge, and the Public (Glencoe, Illinois, 1957). 13. Paul Hanly Furfey, "Sociological Science and the Problem of Values" in Symposium on Sociological Theory, ed. by L. Gross (Evanston: Row, Peterson and Company, 1959), p. 523, and Furfey, "The Humanitarian Philosophy and the Acceptance of Sociological Generalizations," Ameri can Catholic Sociological Review, XV aune, 1955), 120.

5 Psychiatry:Science,Art, and Scientism HERVEY M. CLECKLEY Hardly anyone can deny that medical knowledge and practice have made more progress in the last forty years than in all the prior centuries of recorded history. I would estimate that in the last twenty years our methods of effective therapy have advanced at least as much as they did between the days of the Pharaohs and the attack on Pearl Harbor. The net effect on society of this vastly increased security of life and of well-being is difficult to gauge. So, too, it is difficul t to express numerically the effect of public health programs. They have eradicated or at least con trolled many dread diseases that only a few decades ago could ravage large areas of the earth. Only an eccentric could regard as trivial these relatively direct influences of medicine on society. Despite these undoubtedly substantial effects on the life and well-being of mankind, leaders of general medicine (and of surgery) have shown little inclination to set themselves up as arbiters of law or government, to present humanity with fresh and reputedly superior spiritual goals and values, to demolish 'cher ished but allegedly outworn institutions, or to offer new and "scientific" explanations of man's "true nature." In only one branch of medicine, psychiatry, we find that precisely the opposite holds true. With tremendous confidence, with what perhaps may 83 84 Psychiatry and Responsibility impress some observers as blithe audacity, some leading figures in our field, and in ancillary areas, have all but proclaimed a millenium, proffering enlightenment to experts in nearly all fields of endeavor and to all mankind a new orientation and new horizons.

It is perhaps natural that psychiatry, being concerned with the "mind," or the human entity as a functioning unit, should also, more than other branches of medicine, concern itself with these complex and lofty matters. But has psychiatry during the present century made progress comparable with that of general medicine in discovering the origin and effecting the cure of mental disorders? Has psychiatry also achieved a profound new and scientific understanding of the human personality? If so, one might logically argue that psychiatry has something of substantial, even of unique, value to offer in extramedical areas. Even greater progress than this would, however, scarcely justify some of the assumptions made by our spokesmen. Freud and His Public Both in the lay press and in our professional journals appear an endless barrage of claims urging those outside our field to be lieve that psychiatric progress since the beginning of this century has been spectacular. About thirty years ago there was wide ..

spread applause when Karl Menninger and others 1 called psy chiatry the Cinderella of Medicine, a long unrecognized princess who had at last, after decades of neglect, assumed her rightful place of glory and of predominance in medical circles. Apparently assuming that the regal touch of therapy had been amply and undeniably demonstrated within her long-established province (that of the psychoneuroses and the psychoses), many zealous knights at arms and ambassadors of the new princess began to carry her triumphant banner on into far fields. Over the last several decades this evangelistic movement has continued at an ever accelerating pace. These remarkable territorial claims are usually staked out in the broad name of psychiatry. Nearly always, however, the asPsychiatry: Science, Art and Scientism 85 serted magical insight, the revolutionary enlightenment, is said to have come primarily through the discoveries of Freud. In 1953, Oberndorf tells us that "psychoanalysis began to revolutionize psychiatry fifty years ago." 2 Literary historians give us vivid glimpses of young novelists, poets, and assorted bohemians in Greenwich Village shortly after World War I happily ffdiscover ing" in themselves hitherto unrecognized "natural impulses" to ward sodomy, incest, sadism, and other perverse aspirations. 3 These they flaunted under the aegis of science in the hope of shocking the bourgeois public. At this time relatively few psychia trists had been much impressed or influenced by the new psychology.4 An interesting volume, Freud on Broadway,5discusses in min ute detail the influence of "dynamic psychiatry" on the efforts of playwrights to portray human relations and explain the under ..

lying and basic motivations that determine human fate. Some of these products, it must be said, do not fairly represent Freud's actual teachings or discoveries. For instance, Robert Sherwood in his popular play, Reunion in Vienna,6 portrays a psychoanalyst who bows to his scientific faith and, without protest, allows his wife to be taken out for a night of sexual diversion by a Hapsburg Grand Duke. The Duke, who had formerly enjoyed her favors, has returned to Vienna for only a few days. This, I believe, is not a true interpretation of Freud's conclusions, be they right or wrong. It shows, nevertheless, hOlY Freud has been identified by the public with sex in the sense of accepting and applauding natural erotic impulses, and also of proclaiming "sexual freedom" and even a subhuman promiscuity that would render love alto gether meaningless. Such distorted concepts made of psychoanalysis (and conse..

quently of psychiatry, which the public often regards as synony mous with Freud's school) an appealing cause to countless ama teur rebels, angry young men, and other somewhat irresponsible, and, often, sexually aberrant, verbal crusaders for "progress" and a new order. This confused identification of Freudian discoveries ("dynamic" psychiatry) with the very obvious and long..known fact that sexual activities can give great delight was exquisitely 86 Psychiatry and Responsibility illustrated for me only a few months ago by a middle-aged widow who knew little about psychiatry. After I expressed skepticism about some ideas she attributed to Freud, she murmured, with parted lips and almost aghast, "But surely you believe in sex} don't you?" Aside from such popular misconceptions, we find a general belief that "dynamic" psychiatry has achieved a scientific under standing of personality disorder and has adequate means to relieve and even to prevent it.7 In emphasizing the need for more trained psychiatrists, many of our leaders strongly imply, even when they do not specifically assert, that it is chiefly our numerical weakness that stands in the way of virtually wiping out mental illness.

In addition to this asserted power of psychiatry in its traditional field of responsibility, the treatment of patients with neurosis and psychosis, our more ambitious spokesmen seem to be con vincing the public that we not only have the means of preventing these maladies, but also of curing criminals and of curbing de linquency and crime. Some assure us of a scientific solution for marital unhappiness and for the problems that arise in industry, government, social planning, and international relations. Many have insisted that our reputedly new knowledge should be used to implement fundamental changes in the law and have ridiculed particularly the law's methods of determining criminal responsibility.8 A few of our leaders seem to be convinced that our knowledge is so profound, so new, and yet so thoroughly established, that we can and must remold the body politic and bestow collective in sights that will lead to hitherto unknown happiness and to prog tess never before dreamed of. I t is not enough for us to heal those already regarded as ill; let us bring to those who now think themselves well and happy a far more abundant life. Along with all this, some advocate that we must rid society of various preju dices and rigidities that are alnlost universal. Thus, in accordance with our wonderful revelation, psychiatry must help drastically revise social institutions. 9 Authorities in other fields have often been responsive to our Psychiatry: Science) Art and Scientism 87 demands. Distinguished jurists have joined psychiatrists in de manding abolition of the M'Naghten rules. These rules have been repeatedly condemned by both parties as an archaic obstacle to the new scientific light with which psychiatrists are now able to illuminate the old and complex question of criminal responsi bility. Since the Durham case, psychiatrists and jurists have been congratulating one another on the new rules of determining legal responsibility. 10 Fortas speaks of Judge Bazelon's decision thus: "Its importance is that it is a charter, a bill of rights for psychiatry .... " 11 The judge received official honors and a Certificate of Commendation from the American Psychiatric Association for his memorable contribution. Along with other prominent legal scholars, Judge Sobeloff has expressed the conviction that "science," "scientific facts," and "the latest knowledge of human behavior" have made obsolete the M'Naghten rules. He has heartily welcomed the op portunity for this new knowledge· to be applied freely in criminal trials. 12 Hakeem, a skeptical criminologist, scarcely exaggerates when he says, "Judge Bazelon himself could not have been idolized more had he discovered the cause and cure of schizophrenia .... " 13 A few legal scholars have questioned the validity of this step.

Hall asks: What then are this "science," these "scientific facts," and that "latest knowledge of human behavior" to which Judge Sobeloff has access? We shall later examine some of the items Hall questions. After expressing skepticism about the Durham rule, Hall also suggests means by which the old M'Naghten rules can be used so as not to neglect any genuine knowledge that psychiatrists may offer in efforts to determine criminal responsibility. He shows that the attacks on the M'Naghten rules often become "an attack on ex perience and common sense." 14 Both Hall and Cumming develop arguments that illustrate the dangers of leaving such complex value judgments on imponderables as the judgment of crimi nal responsibility solely to any sort of expert known today. Though it is maintained by some that psychiatrists now have a 88 Psychiatry and Responsibility scientific method of arriving at such a decision, the points made by Hall and Cumming raise grave doubts about this assumption and suggest that this is an area not yet proved accessible to methods that are genuinely scientific. Efforts to force the qualifica tion of science upon judgments for which science is not equipped do not endow such. judgments with validity, whatever words we may use.

From Hakeem's extensive, thoroughly documented, and im pressive studies· a vivid picture emerges of psychiatric endeavors in the broad fields of delinquency, predelinquency and crime. Before attempting any estimation of the results of this work, he calls our attention to these points. Psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, and other psychiatrically oriented personnel have been powerfully influential in the work on the prevention of juvenile delinquency. The ideology of the psychiatric approach has had widespread acceptance. Psychiatrists and others who share their persuasion are much sought after for help with the prob lem. Their counsel is attended to eagerly. In turn, these practitioners have been more than generous with their advice.I5 Despite the prevailing optimism, Hakeem 16 shows through abundant documentation from various authorities, our experts do not agree on what constitutes delinquency or predelinquency or on what their causes are. Nor do they agree on whether or not all antisocial conduct should be classed as illness. This lack of consensus among the experts does not seem to disturb the firm convictions of those who urge the public to accept psychiatry as a panacea in this area. 17 The public is exhorted to believe that we have scientifically established the causes of antisocial conduct and have at hand the means of detecting at an early age potential malefactors as well as effective methods of preventing delinquency and crime. These optimistic assumptions are apparently accepted 'without question not only by state organizations and federal bureaus that expend vast sums for social welfare, but also by international groups of experts and by agencies of the lJnited Nations and the World Psychiatry: Science) Art and Scientism 89 Health Organization. Is A typical spokesman for this point of view, Dr. Edward Glover of London, representing the Institute for the Scientific Treatment of Delinquency, thus reported to a Royal Commission on Capital Punishment: HIf sufficient trouble were taken, pathological cases liable to commit murder could be detected during early childhood; in other words, pathological murder is potentially preventable." 19 Few crusades have been so ambitiously planned, so enthusias tically launched as mental health drives, movements, and or ganizations at city, state, national, and international levels. A recent editorial in World Health exhorts us: The battle for mental health is being fought on many fronts. The psychiatrist has ceased to be merely a "doctor for the insane." ...

there is an increasing tendency to introduce mental health concepts into public health practice and to seek the advice of psychiatrists on wider social issues such as community planning and industrial organization. It is impossible to show all these aspects of mental health work in one issue of World Health or to do justice to the quiet and unspectacular toil to prevent mental illness that is being carried out day by day in hundreds of mental health units all over the world. Nevertheless, the following pages assembled for the general public may be able to dem onstrate that rapid progress is taking place in this branch of medical science. Also they may show that we can hope to win our battle and that in the fight that is going on, no one can remain neutral. 20 Statements and proclamations made at international meetings often suggest that psychiatric discoveries can now be relied upon to replace or reshape basic spiritual values and that a vast reor ganization of the world must be confidently and immediately undertaken to implement this transformation. In a statement pre pared for the International Congress on Mental Health in London, we read: Principles of mental health cannot be successfully furthered in any society unless there is progressive acceptance of the concept of world 90 Psychiatry and Responsibility citizenship. World citizenship can be widely extended among all peoples through the applications of the principles of mental health ....

it is evident that we stand on a new threshold of the science of man . . . . The sciences concerned with mental health derive from intensive studies of human beings .... and of the pathology of group functioning. These sciences are said to be based on findings that "have been tested by modern methods of analysis and investigation." 21 Brock Chisholm, a psychiatrist who has been very active and influential in these areas, expresses these opinions: If the race is to be freed from its crippling burden of good and evil, it must be psychiatrists who take the original responsibility .... The reinterpretation and eventual eradication of the concept of right and wrong are the belated objectives of practically all effective psychotherapy most psychiatrists and psychologists and many other respectable people have escaped from these moral chains and are able to observe and think freely." After pointing out eloquently various major defects of society, Dr. Chisholm insists that: With the other human sciences, psychiatry must now decide what is to be the immediate future of the human race. No one else can. And this is the prime responsibility of psychiatry.22 Again he exhorts psychiatrists saying, "Let us accept our own responsibility to remodel the world in bolder, clearer, more honest lines." He compares the reluctance of society to accept psychiatric guidance to the ignorance, prejudice, and supersti tion that still cause some parents to let their children die from diphtheria and smallpox despite the well-known fact that toxoid, antitoxin, or vaccination would have saved their lives. He seems to imply that a general resistance to the application of psychiatric discoveries also lies in "the attitudes of parents who are incapable of accepting and using proven know ledge for the protection of their children."

One who carefully reads Dr. Chisholm's addresses will see that Psychiatry: Science} Art andScientism 91 he means to offer something positive and constructive. Such a reader will not necessarily conclude, despite the impression given by his sweeping statements, that this eloquent advocate of psy chiatry really means to abolish all distinctions between right and wrong. I am concerned primarily with his apparent assumption that psychiatry now possesses special scientific knowledge that can enable us wisely to engineer such a profound and sweeping moral reorientation of mankind. Considering the scope on which he believes psychiatry must be applied, it is not surprising that Dr. Chisholm should insist on the necessity of "one or two or three millions" of traiped psychiatrists and advise that they also "be trained as salesmen and taught all the techniques of breaking down sales resistance." 23 Psy"chiatry and the Criminals Enthusiasm has been expressed for the dynamic psychother apy of criminals carried on over a period of many years. Obvi ously, it would be wise to cure these enemies of society and restore them to useful and happy lives instead of merely punishing them.

Many psychiatrists urge so vehemently treatment instead of pun ishment for the criminal that the reader would certainly be justified in assuming that effective and thoroughly proved meas ures of therapy are available. "Criminology today," Zilboorg and Henry wrote many years ago, "like demonology of yesterday, is a battlefield for the right ful possession of which the psychiatrist is still fighting." 24 Karl Menninger also said with confidence, "The scientific attitude as shown in psychiatry must sooner or later replace existing legal methods." 25 Karpman, in his Criminal Psychodynamics: A Plat form} almost militantly demands that society and the law recog nize that there is "newer light available," accept "well-tested, genuine, scientific psychiatric formulations," and provide means by which "psychogenic cases" can be treated. According to Karpman, "they can be cured, as many have been." Insisting also that "the criminal is more sinned against than sinning," he sends forth in the first issue of his new journal the Archives of Criminal 92 Psychiatry and Responsibility Psychodynam.ics a itclarion call to arms to all psychiatrists in terested in criminality" urging them "to bring forth material that will stimulate advancement in the field." 26 Karpman deplores the reactionary attitude of some psychiatrists who "are as yet unwilling to accept and absorb the more dynamic teachings that are subsumed under the heading of psychody namics." He says, "It is difficult to believe that in this day and age there. are psychiatrists who have missed so completely the import of the more progressive advances in medicine and science ....

who cannot see motives; who have neither grasped nor seemingly are 'constitutionally' able to grasp the meaning of unconscious motivations." 27 In tones like those of Cassandra, many authoritative voices ring out, warning us that we shall perish unless we quickly accept the new and scientific salvation. Dr. Robert Lindner, from his "vast experience" in "psychoanalytic practice" and in criminology, confirms the "theories of modern psychology" and finds them "sound." This sound knowledge, according to a statement on the dust jacket of his latest book, demonstrates "that all Western society is 'neurotic.'" Like so many who exhort us on behalf of mental health in terms of national or world-wide social revolu tion, Lindner speaks as a prophet certain of the truth revealed through Freudian discoveries and serenely confident of their efficacy: Psychology knows beyond question what in the world and in our responses to the world makes for personal unhappiness, waste, and failure; for neuroses, psychoses, and psychosomatic disorder on the personal level; for antagonism, aggression, hostility, and destruction on the person-to-person level; for strife, struggle, conflict, war,. and col lapsing societies on the group level. These things it knows. Diagnosti cally there is little fault to be found with psychology; it has reached a stage of near perfection. It is for its failure to take the next step, for its lack of courage, in short, that it should be criticized. For, knowing these things, knowing why and where the world must be changed-and even, in many cases, knowing how such changes can be wrought-it has done nothing to oversee that what must be done is swiftly done. 28 Psychiatry: Science, Art and Scientism 93 Lindner repeatedly insists that salvation is now within our grasp if only we could be persuaded to accept it: "The corpus of genuine knowledge about ourselves-which is the business of psychology-is immense. . . . it is available and will, it can be predicted, become immediately accessible to eyes that prepare themselves to see and brains no longer fogbound." He names a few of these "significant truths about ourselves, our place in the world and in the Universe:' but not all of them. "The list," he says, "is endless." It adds up, however, to a special orientation which, if adopted, will lead to no less than a "renewed lease for man on a planet that is now apparently mortgaged to death." 29 In contrast to these almost messianic assertions, the material furnished by Hakeem demonstrates clearly the confused and con tradictory concepts that are actually applied in the name of dynamic psychiatry at various mental hygiene clinics and other institutions to the problems of child rearing, to the prevention of delinquency and crime, and to their cure. His thoroughly documented survey illustrates with quotations from influential leaders in this vast area of mental health many conflicting im plausibilities and absurdities that are urged upon the public as a scientific panacea. 30 Some experts in child guidance seem certain they have proved that delinquency is an "acting out" of frustration when the child is thwarted in his normal satisfactions and emotional needs.31 The antisocial conduct is a pathetic "cry for help." Others are equally confident that most if not all the severe emotional disorders of childhood and adolescence can be shown to arise from maternal deprivation, usually during the first year or the first few years of life. This deprivation may result either from absence of the mother or from her inability or unwillingness to meet adequately the infant's emotional needs.32 Another widely recognized authority, Adelaide Johnson, pro fesses to have irrefutable proof that the delinquency of the child Qr teen..ager is caused by the parents' own unconscious im pulses toward antisocial conduct. The child, she tells us, is craftily used as a pawn and unconsciously encouraged in theft, 94 Psychiatry and Responsibility arson, sexual promiscuity, violence, or sexual perversion in order
to fulfill the parents' unconscious emotional needs to carry out such conduct themselves. Furthermore, unwilling to give up their vicarious criminal satisfactions, they actively block the psychia trists' attempts at therapy.33 Under these conditions it is plain that the parents also must have therapy and "the task of treating a delinquent becomes prodigious." One girl and her parents are described as receiving a minimum 'of twelve hours of psycho therapy each week "and this for months and years." 34 There is little wonder that Dr. Brock Chisholm has insisted that we must at once produce three million psychiatristsl Or that our federal government has provided funds to support and amply remunerate physicians if they give up their practices ·in other fields and under take training in psychiatry. An influential therapist, Eissler, accuses society of joining forces with the parents in this deliberate work of corruption. Society, she finds, does not want to rehabilitate the criminal or the de linquent. Through delinquents and criminals, she tells us, it relishes keenly its own criminal satisfactions. Even the authorities in correctional institutions (including psychiatrists), she has dis covered, sometimes work unconsciously to promote crime. This causes them to dismiss superintendents or therapists who attempt to introduce progressive measures. She sadly concludes, "Ap parently the community could not tolerate a future without criminality" and protests against "society's insistence that delin quency and crime be nourished and perpetuated." 35 While Wertham thinks that lurid sex and violence presented in the comic books constitute a major cause of delinquency, other experts ·attack censorship and imply that if obscene or semi obscene literature with plenty of four-letter words were readily available to all adolescents, perverse murder and other shocking acts of violence by teen-agers might be avoided or at least diminished. 36 Some authorities, such as Schmideberg, are less specific, but nevertheless optimistic: "Psychoanalysis, I can say with confidence, shapes up to be the most significant tool for research and treatment of the psychosocial disease called crime." 37 The criminologist, Hakeem, however, carefully examined the Psychiatry·... Science} Art· andScientism 95 effects of therapy reported by many ,mental hygiene clinics and other institutions in which these and other methods have been applied to large numbers of subjects. These reports strongly indi cate "that the number of therapeutic failures or successes is' the same irrespective of the school of thought to which the therapist has allegiance." The statistics so laboriously and expensively com piled were often rendered meaningless through lack of a control group by which delinquents andnondelinquents (and their parents) could be compared. Of one such study Hakeem suggests that a group of the participating social workers who were parents of nondelinquent children might have been utilized for this purpose. "The anal and oral conditions of the social workers could then have been compared with those of the parents of delinquents." When it was possible to make accurate comparisons between these children who had. been under therapy and' others who had not received any treatment or guidance, statistics indi cated approximately the same degree of improvement or worsen ing in each group over similar periods of time. No definite evidence emerged to indicate. that the thousands' of children and adolescents who had participated in these prolonged, extensive, expensive, and supposedly scientific programs received any benefit whatsoever.

Anyone who examines the material reviewed by Hakeem will find it hard to contradict him in his conclusion: "Actually, there is no specific medical or psychiatric treatment for delinquency . . . . at present, advocacy of one or another form of treatment is dictated more by passionate conviction than by scientific evi dence." Yet, as he has amply illustrated, "the zealousness of psychiatrists in making unsubstantiated claims and their success in winning support and in implementing their views seem boundless." 38 So far as I am able to determine, there are no statistical studies that contradict those analyzed by Hakeem, no published reports that furnish reliable evidence of any beneficial results from the operation of all the mental hygiene clinics that are spread over our nation. It is my own opinion that children are sometimes helped by such agencies. This, however, is merely my clinical 96 Psychiatry and Responsibility opinion, not an item of scientific evidence. My modest and tenta tive impression of possible benefits to some is not, let me add, anything comparable to the extravagant claims of the therapists quoted by Hakeem. If substantial benefit does occur, surely it is urgent that evidence be obtained to prove it. Many millions of dollars are expended each year to support this work, here and abroad. Real evidence of its efficacy would be useful to our gov ernment and to international agencies for mental health in determining whether to expand or curtail the present program; or whether, perhaps, to modify the prevalent methods of dealing with such problems.

I would like to suggest, in response to Karpmants vehement clarion call to psychiatrists, urging them to assert themselves in dealing with crime, that no material would stimulate advance ment in this field so much as evidence, even the smallest item of evidence, that psychodynamic measures have met with success. Even Bromberg, who seems to share much of Karpman's faith in dynamic explanations of criminality, frankly admits, "knowledge of psychologic motivation has neither solved nor prevented indi .. vidual crimes nor diminished the number of criminals." 39 UntiI it does, should we not be more modest in urging society to let us, with "our new scientific insight," empty the prisons and abolish crime? Society as the Villain The doctrine, of psychic determinism is regarded by many as one of Freud's most important discoveries. 40 It is a basic tenet of the dynamic psychiatry. Though it is often assumed to be a fact established by psychoanalytic research, we may note that Freud and all his followers have produced no scientific evidence to establish it. A truly logical conclusion from psychic determin ism would, of course, abolish the concept of personal responsibility altogether and along with it all the value judgments .that underlie ethical conduct and even rudimentary civilization. A genuine be lief in this doctrine would make it impossible to distinguish in Psychiatry: Science) Art and Scientism 97 value between the most sadistic unprovoked murder and the most heroic deed of altruism. This point is discussed by True blood in chapter 2 of this volume and we need not elaborate it here.

Let us bear in mind, however, that those who profess allegiance to the doctrine almost never follow it to the inevitable conclu sions it logically demands. There are many, nevertheless, who respond to its influence sufficiently to arrive at peculiar and inter esting assumptions. Some of these are now popularly regarded as the essence of a liberal and scientifically enlightened mind. Going part of the logical way, but not all the way, they conclude that when crimes are committed, the fault (responsibility) is never that of the criminal but, inevitably, of society. Some are less pro gressive and admit that the fault is shared about equally. Those who maintain that the guilt for crime. belongs, not to the malefactor, but to society, also often insist that legal penalties have little or no correctional value and little or no influence as a deterrent. This argument against the efficacy of penalty as a deterrent has been emphasized and reiterated Qve); many decades by those who oppose capital punishment. Despite the sincere conviction of people who hold this belief and their dedicated devotion to their cause, it is notable that none of them have called for the abolition of legal penalties for violations of the income-tax laws. Are we to assume that their convictions, through some subtle statute of limitations, fail to extend into this area?

We have noted that a number of authorities argue that the law is wrong in punishing culprits. As an example of the diverse views that may emerge when dynamic concepts are applied broadly and enter into social issues and value judgments, let us quote another prominent psychiatrist, Foxe, in his thoughts on the sub ject of crime and responsibility: Let us say that a man kills another man because the latter had been involvedin an act of infidelitywith the killer's wife. He readily might be acquitted. One wonders how a single act of sexual infidelity can be equated with a life. It really is perplexing to one who is not dominated 98 Psychiatry and Responsibility by a purely emotional reaction. Even the law is dogmatic in the matter; dogma usually develops where no one really knows the why. Let us look at it in another way. The man who has sexual relations with another man's wife, but is unable to recognize that the husband is a potential killer, is not a very smart person. Nor is the wife very smart to traffic with such a man. Perhaps society does not care very much, in such a case, if the man is deprived of his life and the wife is deprived of her pleasure. Hence, there is no crime. The advantage taken by the lover was minimal, and if he were alive, he might protest, in his own stupid way, that a crime had been committed in the attempt to kill him. Society would not pay much attention to him. "There was no crime!"

Here for once we seem to find a criminal psychodynamicist complaining of the jury's leniency rather than of its severity. Proceeding with his meditations, Foxe expresses the opinion that "obviously, a sex act is no 'great guns' "; but he concludes that the offended husband might logically have stronger grounds for his resentment through suspicions that, along with the act of adultery, his wife. might have more seriously damaged him by "making revelations to her lover of matters of domestic secrecy, dealing with possessions.... [etc.]." Before expressing the judgments just quoted, Foxe has casti gated "psychiatrists who believe the province of crime is not one for psychiatrists to meddle with or to probe for scientific understanding." Such men, he says, "may be professional psy chiatrists, but they are very lay scientists." 41 Do dynamic insights often bleach from the awareness of the specialist so much of what a normal man must naturally and inevitably feel under the circumstances described by Foxe? If so, there is little wonder that Hall and Cumming argue against leaving to such an expert the profound and complex duty of assessing another human being's ultimate guilt or innocence. 42 Most men, whatever their wisdom or scientific qualifications, hesi tate to assume so deep a responsibility, particularly on the basis of possessing proved or final knowledge. Perhaps the law is wise in leaving this to a jury of twelve laymen who, admitting their human frailties and imperfections of judgment, prayerfully do Psychiatry: Science} Art and Scientism 99 their best. It is a traditional belief that only God has true and unquestionable knowledge in such an issue.

Our society is being bitterly condemned by many as being cruel not only to arsonists, thieves, and murderers, but also to those who carry out flagrant acts of sexual perversion. Dr. Albert Ellis is a prolific author. According to information on the dust jacket of one of his books, he holds degrees from one of our most celebrated universities and practices "psychoanalytic therapy and marriage counseling." He has this to say about sex aberrations and society: In summation: sexual "perversion" is so universally condemned and deliberately suppressed in American society that very little frank, sly dog, or ribald undercover enjoyment of it is permitted. When it does express itself, it generally does so in an anxiety-ridden, morbid or ridiculously exaggerated way (e.g., the mincing manners and garish display of Greenwich Village homosexuals). This may be one reason why, while adultery, fornication, whoremongering and other immoral sex outlets are,utilized by millions of fairly normal Americans, homo sexuality, sado-masochism and other abnormal sex practices, when they are habitually and exclusively used as modes of sex participation, are so frequently concomitants of seriously neurotic behavior. It may not be sexually perverted acts which make a society sick or decadent, but society's own mores which, by their expressing unduly' harsh attitudes toward certain sex acts, render the acts "perverted" and "abnormal"

and thereby encourage their habitual or exclusive employment by many of society's neurotic members. 43 Just what is it that Dr. Ellis demands of society? What new attitude does he ask that we take toward, say, the sado-masochism he mentions? Should society tolerate and smile upon the deeds of a sadist who clubs to death and disembowels a seven-year-old child? Certainly he does not ask this. Neither the public nor the law now finds acceptable or respects as normal the act of a man who flagellates little girls moderately, or mildly, until he achieves a sexual orgasm. Is it this alleged popular prejudice and not the perversion itself that we should blame chiefly for the "morbid exaggeration" of milder sadistic enterprises into an act of murder?

100 Psychiatry and Responsibility If so, should we encourage, perhaps even applaud, the expression of sadism in its less drastic forms so that gross felonies and extreme disasters resulting from it may be avoided? In another book, Albert Ellis assures the public that partici pation in homosexual activity, along with heterosexual relations, has been proved by science to be entirely normal. He insists, furthermore, that men who strictly confine themselves to women as sexual partners must be regarded as "fixated," "neurotic," or "abnormal." In comparing exclusive homosexuality and exclusive heterosexuality, he finds them equally "fetishistic," somewhat quaintly insisting that "what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander." 44 If psychiatry has, indeed, produced aU these miracles claimed by some, she deserves to be called not merely Cinderella, as Menninger once did, but also the Fairy Godmother.

The Dynamic Science A technique long known to cause serious confusions of thought and errors of judgment is the "mixed-package concept." If we combine under one term an obvious truth and a ques tionable assumption and insist that they be accepted as a unity and that one verbal label be used to designate them, it is easy to see that rational thought and conduct are not thereby promoted. The basic psychoanalytic practice of using almost any resem blance, or even any symbolic contrast, to establish evidence of identity can scarcely fail to result in anything but a wholesale production of mixed-package concepts. According to dynamic postulates, the orifice of the ear, the anus, the mouth, the vagina, the opening of a milk bottle, and the nostrils are, in the unconscious, symbolically interchangeablE: and equated with one another. If a man inserts a finger tip in his ear to scratch, this act may constitute, not necessarily proof, but one item of evidence that he is anally fixated and wants to masturbate rectally.

Though such terms as "depth psychology" or "the new psy chology" are still occasionally used to designate this panacea, the Psychiatry: Science) Art and Scientism 101 more popular terms are "dynamic psychiatry," "dynamic psycho pathology," "dynamic psychotherapy," or "the psychodynamics." 45 These words "dynamic" and "psychodynamic" are endlessly re· iterated in the psychiatric literature and at our professional meet' ings. The uninitiated observer might wonder whether they serve as an incantation for a trance; or perhaps form part or a tribal ritual, a cabalistic outcry by which professional status seekers maintain or advance their position in a mystic hierarchy.4p Though the term "dynamic" has sometimes been used to indi .. cate more modest propositions, today it nearly always signifies the concepts and methods primarily derived from Freudian theory and discoveries that are said to support it. "Dynamic" is a flexible word with confident implications of force and effectiveness. It is particularly useful for verbally identifying two disparate items in a mixed-package concept. The contributions made by apostates of the strict orthodoxy (Stekel, Adler, Rank, Jung) and by Neo Freudians (Sullivan, Horney, Fromm) are usually accorded some measure of the blessing inherent in the term. Its most funda mental implication today is perhaps to separate the sheep from the goats, to distinguish those who claim (often among many other things) proved knowledge of the real causes of personality disorder and effective scientific methods for its cure from those benighted reactionaries who cannot make such a claim. 47 Let us list a few of the basic discoveries attributed to Freud and alleged to have galvanized psychology and psychiatry from hope less immobility into this dynamic state: That man is largely governed by motivations of which he is unconscious.

That a Royal Road has been made to this arcane region, and its con ten ts charted. That a reliable method of traveling to the unconscious has been devised and that it can be used freely by the elect who have learned its application. That a scientific and effective therapy has been developed for the psychoneuroses; and that this consists in making the patient aware of attitudes and forces in the unconscious so that he can then cope rationally with his conflicts. He must also interact 102 Psychiatry and Responsibility emotionally with the therapist (in "the transference") so that his conflicts may be diminished and his personality be, to some degree, remolded. 48 Let us now consider a few of the truths that have been pro claimed by all those who have traveled the Royal Road. Psychoanalytic expeditions into the unconscious are said to have demonstrated that the infant's ingestion of food and his defecation are really sexual activities and that components of normal adult sexual feeling remain anal and oral. Psychoanalysts believe they have proved that every little girl grows up under the humiliating misconception that she has been genitally mutilated and every little boy under the paralyzing dread that he may be castrated by his father because of his specific incestuous choice of his mother as a sexual mate. It is this dread that keeps him from making more persistent and obvious efforts to seduce the mother. These major ordeals of human childhood mayor may not be known even at the time to those who undergo them, but they occur universally in the unconscious. If the child becomes aware of them during the Oedipal period (age three to six years), they are nearly always repressed later and henceforth cannot be recalled except by dream interpretation and free association under the direction of an analyst, or, at least, of a "dynamic" psycho therapist. These fears continue as important motivational factors in the unconscious all through normal adult life.

The libido (defined as the energy of the sexual instinct-some times as the energy of Eros as a whole) is said to be always and totally masculine. 49 Any erotic initiative or response shown by a female, or any positive or energetic reaction in life, occurs only because of the masculine component of her being. Research along these lines has regularly demonstrated as a fact that all men and all women are bisexual. It has also been revealed that there are two basic drives (in stincts) that motivate the human being, one (Eros), which is creative and constructive, and the other, a death instinct (Than atos), which is aggressive and destructive and which may turn against its possessor and actively promote disaster for him or even his extinction. When either of the two drives seeks expression in Psychiatry: Science} Art and Scientism 103 a socially unacceptable form, the ego (containing the rational and reality-oriented levels of human function) represses the forbidden impulse by various mental mechanisms or dynamisms. The act of repression is unconscious. This strife produces the various mani festations known as psychoneuroses. If the effort is unsuccessful, the ego is shattered or grossly damaged and psychosis occurs. An incompletely successful effort to restrain the unacceptable impulse may result in repetitive delinquent, antisocial, or even criminal behavior through the mechanism termed "acting out." 50 What is the evidence for this current popular system of thought and practice? It has been repeatedly maintained that no one is capable of assaying the validity of Freud's discoveries (or assump tions) unless he himself has been successfully psychoanalyzed. 51 Since the analysis cannot be completed without devout acceptance of the basic doctrines, there is apparently no means recognized by the orthodox psychodynamicist of examining his theory except by agreeing with it. Despite this unusual and somewhat dis quieting obstacle, let us consider a few points.

One of these is Freud's method of investigation and of estab lishing proof for the conclusions he reached. His works contain many examples. Few are more typical than that given in his long paper "From the History of an Infantile Neurosis." 52 Here Freud presents his interpretation of a brief dream reported to him by a male patient (age twenty-six years) which, according to the patient's recollection, occurred when he was a little boy of four. In the dream a window opens before the foot of his bed reveal ing six or seven white wolves with big tails and pricked ears sitting in a large walnut tree. They are still but gaze at him attentively. The dream was accompanied by great terror. By in terpreting this simple dream symbolically, Freud reaches some remarkable conclusions. With a greater elasticity than that allowed the augurs of ancient Rome, Freud identifies various details of the dream on a basis of either similarity or dissimilarity with details of a dramatic scene that he vividly imagines and attributes as an actual experience to an infant eighteen months of age.

Out of this meager dream material Freud constructs a stirring little drama in which the infant watches his mother and father 104 Psychiatry and Responsibility have sexual relations three times in succession. This, however, is not all. The interpreter proves to his satisfaction that the amorous couple chose the a tergo position in which to enjoy themselves and that their infant son deliberately cut short their lively sport by having a bowel movement, which he used as a pretext for an outcry. The number of wolves in the dream (six or seven) indi .. cates to Freud that it was actually two people seen years earlier. The big, long tails of the wolves, according to Freud, indicate (by reversal) taillessness, which in turn reveals the infant's impression that a male genital organ had been amputated from the mother's perineum. The stillness of the wolves demonstrates the parents' vigor in coitus and the attentive faces of the wolves in the dream reveal the keen absorption of the baby boy in what his parents were doing. The fear experienced in the dream is taken by Freud as adequate evidence that, later at age four, his patient suffered great fear about castration at the hands of his father, which he thought would be provoked by an almost overwhelming urge he entertained for the father to carry out acts of sodomy upon him.

Decades later Freud expressed absolute conviction that he had scientifically demonstrated castration fear in this patient. ".... the analysis of his dreams," Freud wrote, "makes any other proof superfluous." ~3 Let us note that Freud, though convinced of his theory by items which he projected into this simple dream, did not ever report success in bringing out into the patient's consciousness any actual memories to confirm it. Nor was any other objective evi.. dence advanced to support the interpretation. No one, to my knowledge, has denied that this is a fair example of Freud's method~ The basic fallacy in reasoning by unsupported analogy, of course, was well known long before Freud lived, and the ab.. surdity of his method has been pointed out repeatedly by many authors, including the present one. Other basic reports on which Freud's doctrines rest have been carefully studied and, so far as I can determine, shown clearly to be the product of obvious and naive fallacies.~4 We have briefly illustrated the method by which castration fear was discovered and the sort of evidence by which it is can ..

Psychiatry: Science) Art and Scientism 105 sidered to be established. If the absence of real evidence for the articles of faith becomes inescapably obvious, an illusion of evi dence can always be obtained by changing the definition of plain words until they include such truisms that they no longer have specific referents. After maintaining that "the threat of castration lies over the pubertal boy," and insisting that this fear is universal earlier in life, Brown, in his popUlar textbook The Psychody namics of A bnormal Behavior, thus defines his term: By the castration complex, psychoanalysts understand much more of infantile behavior than is shown in the fear of actual castration. The castration complex covers fears of all sorts of painful retaliation on the part of the parents because of the sexual and aggressive wishes of child hood .... Possessivelove in the child leads to jealousy, which leads to imagined aggressions, which lead to the fear of punishment (castration as only one form) for these imagined aggressions and fear of the loss of the love of the one who is the object of the aggressions. The castration complex refers to the whole behavioral situation ...55 Let us use Brown's logic for one moment. Suppose I say that in the meadow on which we look I have discovered a piebald uni corn grazing among the dozens of horses, cows and sheep that are in plain view to everyone. Other observers investigate the meadow but cannot find the unlikely creature that I have re ported. I thereupon extend the definition of my piebald unicorn and subsume under that term all horses, cows and sheep, and perhaps all goats as well. If I am allowed this privilege, I can immediately demonstrate not only one but many piebald uni corns in the meadow.

Articles published in our most respected psychiatric journals during the last few years show even further the easy infallibility of that cherished method. In these articles some dare to venture even farther than the master into uncharted and, to most psychiatrists, implausible areas of the dynamic unconscious. 56 Both Peerbolte and Fodor, like Freud confidently relying upon symbolism to establish proof, interpret their patients' dreams and report in detail discoveries of intrauterine experiences that befell them long before birth. 57 106 Psychiatry and Responsibility I should like to consider the possibility that sometimes a method developed on the basis of dubious or even demonstrably false assumptions will show some efficacy in its practical applica tion. For decades it was maintained by many learned men that breathing night air caused malaria ("bad air"). Those who acted in accordance with this false belief often avoided the Anopheles mosquito which is more active at night. And so they escaped malaria. Could the case be similar with the effects of dynamic princi pIes?

The reports we have so far discussed do not indicate success for the dynamic methods in dealing with delinquency or crime. Delinquency and crime are not, to be sure, the original province of dynamic psychiatry. Freud, unlike some of his successors, never pretended that psychoanalysis is an effective therapy for the psychoses. Though various dynamic measures are advocated today as an effective remedy for schizophrenia 58 and for manic-depre.s sive psychosis,59 no statistical validation has been offered to sub stantiate their worth. The method of psychoanalysis was, of course, devised by Freud during his treatment of the neuroses (psychoneuroses), and it was for these conditions that he thought it effective. During a period of more than sixty years psychoanalysis has been available for this purpose. During the last two decades particularly, tens of thou sands of patients have also been treated by various modifications of Freud's orthodox technique. They are dynamic psychotherapy, group therapy, psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapy, and methods developed from the currently popular ego-psychology. If we seek to appraise the effectiveness of dynamic methods, surely it is here that we are most likely to find evidence of convincing success.

A number of statistical studies have been made through which the results of prolonged psychoanalytic therapy can be compared with the results of simpler, much shorter, and less ambitious psychotherapeutic measures such as those often used by a physician in general practice. 60 Other statistics are available that show the progress or lack of progress in comparable groups of people with similar neurotic disorders who received no specific psychiatric Psychiatry: Science) Art and Scientism 107 treatment at all over approximately the same period of time during which treated patients were undergoing psychoanalysis. 61 Eysenck, on the basis of data available to all of us, thus sum marizes the results of these comparative studies: We thus lind that among neurotic patients being treated. by psycho analytic or eclectic psychotherapy, about two out of three recover. Similarly, among neurotics treated by their general practitioners along non psychotherapeutic lines, or obtaining simple custodial care, again two out of three improve. It is difficult to interpret these results as supporting in any way the hypothesis that psychotherapy has a bene ficial effect. These are the facts: It would be easy to take them too seriously and conclude that psychotherapy had no effect at all. It would be equally easy-and equally wrong-to discard them altogether by saying that the data here summarized are too faulty to deserve serious consideration. The data are faulty, but they are the only ones in existence; if we are to look for any justification for mod ern psychotherapeutic practices, it is to them that we must look, and if we do that, the conclusion is inescapable-not that they prove psycho therapy to be valueless, but rather that they fail conspicuously to show any positive consequences to follow its use. It is still possible that more adequate research may disclose such effects, but until such research has been carried out, we must surely conclude with the old Scottish verdict of not proven. 62 The Effects of Dynamic Psychology on Society Who can estimate the impact of this new psychology on the public, on man's conception of himself, on his orientation toward his fellows, on his sense of what he will try to live by and for?

Though the notion of human beings not possessing full insight into their deepest motivations was hardly an entirely new idea, there is no reason to doubt that Freud's concept of the uncon scious has focused more attention on this point than had ever been devoted to it before. 63 One cannot doubt that this has stimulated introspection. But how much did both accurate and inaccurate notions of the allegedly universal Oedipus situation influence the spontaneity 108 Psychiatry and Responsibility of mothers toward their/ young sons? Did these concepts playa small or a large part in the doctrines of infant training almost universally accepted as the gospel of science twenty-five years ago? Those rigid schedules for feeding, precise regulations about immutable discipline, those stern admonitions against going to the infant who began to cry, were emphatically enunciated in a little booklet furnished by the United States Public Health Service and warningly entitled Are You Raising Your Child to Be Happy? Both pediatricians and psychiatrists (including even the most dynamic ones) teach parents today almost directly the oppo site behavior and attitude. The booklet was discontinued long ago.

Even today, however, we occasionally encounter a mother who takes care that her five-year-old son never catch a glimpse of knives or scissors because "every little boy lives under the fear that he is going to be castrated." 64 Despite the inefficacy and even the absurdity that seems plain in some of their applications, those who promote the psychodynamic concepts continue to proclaim them as scientific truths. Their influence on mental health programs in our country and on the world health movement seems to be increasing. Does this indicate that basically the principles are sound, that they will eventually prevail, and, perhaps in a somewhat modified form, rejuvenate society? Perhaps. Let us, however, note several points. The history of medicine shows that the testing of therapeutic agents is not nearly so simple as one might think. Even in the lifetime of our fathers those who developed appendicitis ("acute indigestion") were often fatally purged. It was considered wise to bleed the already virtually exsanguinated patient with pernicious anemia. 65 Where real knowledge is fragmentary at best, it is natural for man to welcome avidly hypotheses that he would ridicule if in troduced into areas where knowledge is established. No sane man with a medical education takes seriously the creed of chiropractic.

It is, however, perfectly logical, once we overlook its faulty prem ise. I think it probable that a hundred years ago this creed might have seemed not only a plausible hypothesis but even a brilliant scientific discovery to some of the best minds in medicine.

Psychiatry: Science} Art and Scientism 109 In areas where the testing of hypotheses is extremely difficult, hypotheses may survive indefinitely and even in time become regarded as factual or largely factual. When some logical system based on an incorrect but inaccessible premise is offered, our feelings prompt us toward accepting it. This is pleasant and seems more promising than to admit freely our ignorance and accept this ignorance with patience. The mere fact that orthodox psychoanalysis usually takes several years to complete makes it extremely unlikely for failure to become apparent, and almost impossible for gross inefficacy to be proved. Though general medical knowledge is by no means complete, it is almost infinite compared to genuinely demonstrable knowl .. edge in psychiatry. The currently popular system of psychody.. namics developed in an area almost entirely barren and has continued to grow in response to an acute need for understanding in what may be the most complex and inaccessible realm of darkness ever to confront mankind.

We seldom recall the fact that during and just after World War I many eminent, sincere, and astute psychiatrists and neurolo gists discovered and proved beyond any reasonable doubt that schizophrenia is caused by specific lesions in the brain. Vast amounts of microscopic evidence supported their discoveries.66 Southard, who was without question one of the most able and revered of all American psychiatrists, could, by merely running his practiced hand over a brain at autopsy, discover with cer.. tainty whether or not the patient had been afflicted with schizo phrenia. He could also determine whether a patient had heard hallucina,tory voices or suffered only from paranoid delusions. Areas of varying density in one lobe of the brain or another re vealed these amazing facts.o7 The cause of these changes in the brain was also discovered and the cure of schizophrenia widely proclaimed. Chief among those who seemed to be emptying the mental hospitals was Cotton who, along with others, had found that a toxin caused by focal infections produced the specific brain damage in this dread ..

ful, widespread, and heretofore mysterious disorder. os The belief that toxins from foci of infection caused psychiatric disorder was 110 Psychiatry and Responsibility not new. It is mentioned by William James just after the turn of the century in his lectures published later as the well-known book Varieties of Religious Experience. The final confirmation of this, however, awaited the work of Cotton and his colleagues, which, in the 1920's, seemed to establish positively the cause of schizophrenia and demonstrate its cure. The psychotic patients examined by Cotton were found "without exception" to have "infected teeth." About fifty per cent of the males showed infec tion of the seminal vesicles. A large percentage of the women impressed these investigators as having an infection of the uterine cervix. There also seemed to be evidence of infection in the colon and the tonsils of both men and women. Foci of infection were also found in many other organs and regions of the body.

A clarion call for surgery rang ou t. Teeth were extracted willy nilly. Tonsils, uteruses, and seminal vesicles were excised without delay. It is difficult to estimate how Inany yards of the human in testinal tract were surgically removed in this tremendous scientific breakthrough. Antitoxins were devised to combat the effects of bacteria lodged in any overlooked or inaccessible organ. The results appeared to be marvelously successful and were thought by many to prove a toxic cause and surgical cure of schizophrenia. It did not take many years to test Cotton's theory and methods and to find them entirely worthless. The results or lack of results from such surgery, unlike those from procedures that extend over years, could be determined in a short period. Even in this short period there were apparently enough spontaneous changes in these patients to convince many intelligent and technically trained observers that the surgery was effective.69 Despite the skepticism expressed about some of our most popular theories and our extraordinarily optimistic efforts to shed light on fields of endeavor not yet within our province of com. petency, I am by no means discouraged about the progress of psychiatry. Apparently most of psychiatry's spokesmen who are well known to the public profess the creed of psychodynamics.

But I still believe that only a minority of our profession attempts rigorously to treat patients in accordance with its basic theories. Today, nearly all the officially qualified psychoanalysts that I Psychiatry:ScienceJ Art and Scientism III know seem to be concerned mote with what is often called ego psychology than with attempts to make patients aware of emo tional traumata sustained when nursing at the breast or while shuddering (unconsciously) at the dangers of genital dismember ment by the father. Even those who seem to accept the remarkable things 14reud is said to have revealed about the unconscious tell me that they find it more effective to work at functional levels of the personality remote from the hypothetical region where these recondite memories are said to lurk in their abode. There are some common and very severe psychiatric disorders for which I believe treatment has improved since my years in medical college fully as much as the treatment of pneumonia and far more than the treatment of tuberculosis. The most effective therapeutic measures that I know in psychiatry are altogether empirical. They are not based on a scientific knowledge of the disorder's cause. It would be a relief to learn the real causes of these common disorders or of any other psychiatric illness. I think, however, that an effective remedy without adequate knowl edge of the cause is far more valuable than knowledge of the cause without the remedy.

Among the therapeutic measures that I consider valuable is psychotherapy. This, too, in my opinion, is still chiefly empirical. I cannot, like some, proclaim it as a scientifically understood process or as a regular Iy effective cure for severe psychiatric ill ness (or for criminals). But, in a more modest sense, it has, I think, earned a worthy place not only in psychiatry but in all of medicine and surgery. Psychotherapy may eventually prove itself of value in the mental hygiene and child guidance clinics that have arisen all over our nation. There is, however, no evidence yet that it will be the messianic force described by its more en thusiastic devotees or that it will accomplish even a small fraction of the miracles that the public has been led to expect of it. It would be difficult for me to prove that any psychotherapy today is appreciably more scientific than psychotherapy as it was sometimes practiced in 1900. It would be hard to convince me, nevertheless, that efforts toward psychotherapy are not far more regularly and persistently made. However nearly correct or fan112 Psychiatry and Responsibility tastically wrong Freud may eventually be proved, there is no doubt that his genuinely sincere efforts have stimulated a search for means of psychotherapy as well as man's attempt to under stand himself and his fellows. Even if his assumptions finally should turn out to be no more accurate than those of Gall and the other phrenologists about cerebral localization, his contribu tion to introspection will make him remembered always, and with honor.

NOTES 1. Karl Menninger, "Fundamentalism and Modernism in Psychiatry, U. s. Naval Bulletin~ XXVII (April, 1929), 291..297. T. W. Salmon, "Psy" chiatry, Cinderella of Medicine: A Modern Fairy Story," Medical Journal and Record~ CXXXIV (September 2, 1931), 253-254. 2. C. P. Oberndorf, A History of Psychoanalysis in America (New York: Grune & Stratton, 1953), p. 7. 3. F. J. Hoffman, Freudianism and the Literary Mind (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1945), p. 208. 4. Arthur Clutton-Brock, "Evil and the New Psychology," Atlantic Monthly~ March, 1923. 5. W. David Sievers, Freud on Broadway (New York: Hermitage House, 1955). 6. Robert E. Sherwood, Reunion in Vienna (New York: Random House, 1936), pp. 759·822. 7. Karl Menninger, The Human Mind (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947); Searchlights on Delinquency; New Psychoanalytic Studies~ ed. by K. R. Eissler (New York: International Universities Press, 1949); Benjamin Karpman, "Criminal Psychodynamics: A Platform," Archives of Criminal Psychodynamics~ I (Winter, 1955), 3-100; Robert Lindner, Prescription for Rebellion (New York: Rinehart & Co., Inc., 1952); "Mental Health and World Citizenship," World Federation for Mental Health (London: ll~ K. Lewis & Co., Ltd., 1948).

8. Michael Hakeem, "A Critique of the Psychiatric Approach to Crime and Correction," Crime and Correction (North Carolina: Duke Uni versity School of Law), XXIII (Autumn, 1958), 650..682. G. Zilboorg, Mind~ Medicine and Man (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., Inc., 1943). 9. Lindner, op. cit. 10. Jerome Hall, "Responsibility and Law: In Defense of the McNaghten Rules," Journal of the American Bar Association~ XLII (October, 1956), 917-919, 984·989; J. B. Cumming, "The Role of the Psychiatrist in Criminal Triab," American Journal of Psychiatry} CXV (December, 1958), 491-497.

Psychiatry: Science) Art and Scientism 113 11. Abe Fortas, "Implications of Durham's Case," American Journal of Psychiatry, CXIII (January, 1957), 575-582. 12. S. E. Sobeloff, "Sanity and the Criminal Law: From M'Naghten to Durham and Beyond," American Bar Association Journal, XLI (Sep tember, 1955), 793. 13. Hakeem, M., Ope cit., p. 652. 14. Jerome, Hall, Ope cit.., p. 918. 15. Michael Hakeem, "A Critique of the Psychiatric Approach to the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency," Social Problems, V (Winter, 1957 1958), 194-206. 16. Michael Hakeem, "A Critique of the Psychiatric Approach to Juvenile Delinquency," Juvenile Delinquency, ed. by Joseph S. Roucek (New York: Philosophical Library, 1950). 17. Ralph S. Banay, Youth in Despair (New York: Coward·McCann, 1948); Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, U. S. Senate, 85th Congress, 1st session (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1957); Lucien Bovet, "Psychiatric Aspects of Juvenile Delinquency," Mono graph Series No.1 (Geneva World Health Organization, 1951); Help ing Children in Trouble (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Children's Bureau, 1947).

18. Report of the International Group of Experts on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Economic and Social Council, United Nations (New York, August 9, 1949); European Social Welfare Seminar, United Nations (New York, 1950); "The Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency" (report prepared by the Secretariat of the U.N.); International Review of Criminal Policy, No. 7-8, United Nations (New York, January-July, 1955). 19. Minutes of Evidence Taken before the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1949). 20. E. Eduardo Krapf, Editorial, World Health, June, 1959. 21. Mental Health and World Citizenship, a statement prepared for the International Congress on Mental Health (London: H. K. Lewis & Co., Ltd., 1948). 22. Brock Chisholm, "The Re-establishment of Peacetime Society," Psychi atry, IX (February, 1946), 3-20. 23. Ibid. 24. G. Zilboorg and George W. Henry, A History of Medical Psychology (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1941).

25. Menninger, The Human Mind (1947), pp. 448-449. 26. Karprnan, see above, note 7. 27. Ibid., p. 5. 28. Lindner, Ope cit., pp. 211-212, see note 7. 29. Ibid. 30. Hakeem, see all his publications cited above. 31. William Healy and Augusta F. Bronner, New Light on Delinquency and Its Treatment (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936); John Dollard et. al., Frustration and Aggression (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939); Herbert A. Bloch and Frank T. Flynn, Delinquency: The 114 Psychiatry and Responsibility Juvenile Offender in America Today (New York: Random House, 1956). 32. John Bowlby, Maternal Care and Mental Health, Geneva World Health Organization, Monograph Series No.2 (1951); Lauretta Bender, Aggres sion, Hostility and Anxiety in Children (Springfield: Charles C. 'rhomas, Publisher, 1953); Margaret A. Ribble, The Rights of Infants: Early Psychological Needs and Their Satisfactions (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953); John Bowlby, Forty-Four Juvenile Thieves: Their Character and Home Life (London: Bailliere, Tindall & Cox, 1946).

33. Adelaide M. Johnson, "Sanctions for Superego Lacunae of Adolescents," Searchlights on Delinquency : New Psychoanalytic Studies, ed. by K. R. Eissler (New York: International Universities Press, 1949); Adelaide M. Johnson and S. A. Szurck, "Etiology of the Antisocial Behavior in Delinquents and Psychopaths," Journal of the American Medical Asso ciation, CLIV (March 6, 1954), 814-817. 34. Mary E. Giffin, Adelaide M. Johnson, and Edward Liten, "Specific Factors Determining Antisodal Acting Out," American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, XXIX (October, 1954), 673. 35. Ruth S. Eissler, "Scapegoats of Society," Searchlights on Delinquency: New Psychoanalytic Studies, ed. by K. R. Eissler (New York: Interna tional Universities Press, 1949). 36. Eberhard and Phyllis Kronhausen, Pornography and the Law (New York: Ballantine Books, Inc., 1959). 37. Melitta Schmideberg, "Psychoanalysis of Delinquency," American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, XXIII (1953), 13-21.

38. Hakeem, see notes 15 and 16 above. 39. Walter Bromberg, "Crime: Is There a Cause or Remedy?" A rchives of Criminal Psychodynamics, I (Spring, 1955), 326-343. 40. Arnold M. Ludwig, "The Other Side of the Coin," The New Physician, IX (August, 1960), 56-58. 41. Arthur N. Foxe, "Crime and Advantage," Archives of Criminal Psychodynamics, I (Spring, 1955), 247-256. 42. See above, note 10. 43. Albert Ellis, The Folklore of Sex (New York: Charles Boni, 1951). 44. Albert Ellis, The American Sexual Tragedy (New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1954). 45. Karpman, op. cit.; see note 7 above. 46. H. M. Cleckley and C. H. Thigpen, "The Dynamics of Illusion," American Journal of Psychiatry, CXII (November, 1955),334-342. 47. Karpman, op. cit.; see note 7 above. 48. Sigmund Freud, Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud (New York: Random House, Inc., 1938). 49. Sigmund Freud, An Outline of Psychoanalysis (New York: W. W.

Norton & Co., Inc., 1949). 50. Franz Alexander, "The Neurotic Character," International Journal of Psychoanalysis, II (1930), 292-311; Otto Fenichel, The Psychoanalytic Theory of NeuTosis (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1945).

Psychiatry: Science) Art and Scientism 115 51. H. J. Eysenck, The Uses and Abuses of Psychology (London: Penguin Books, 1953). 52. Sigmund Freud, Collected Papers, III (London: Hogarth Press, Ltd., 1943), 473-605. 53. Sigmund Freud, The Problem of Anxiety (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1936). 54. Orville S. Walters, "A Methodological Critique of Freud's Schreber Analysis," The Psychiatric Review, XLII (October, 1955), 321-342; Joseph Wolpe and Stanley Rachman, "Psychoanalytic 'Evidence': A Critique Based on Freud's Case of Little Hans," The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, CXXX (August, 1960), 135-148. 55. J. F. Brown, The Psychodynamics of Abnormal Behavior (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1940). 56. D. E. R. Kelsey, "Phantasies of Birth and Prenatal Experiences Re· covered from Patients Undergoing Hypnoanalysis," The Journal of Mental Science, XCIX (April, 1953), 216.,223.

57. M. L. Peerbolte, "Psychotherapeutic Evaluations of Fodor's Birth Trauma Analysis," The Psychiatric Quarterly, XXV (October, 1951), 589-603, and "Some Problems Connected with Fodor's Birth-Trauma Therapy," ibid., XXVI (April, 1952), 294-306; Nandor, Fodor, "Search for the Beloved," Psychiatric Quarterly, XX (October, 1946), 549-603. 58. "Management of Catatonic Schizophrenia" in 'Questions and Answers,' Journal of the American Medical Association, CLXVI (February 22, 1958), 989; Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, Principles of Intensive Psycho therapy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950); John N. Rosen, "The Treatment of Schizophrenic Psychosis by Direct Analytic Therapy," The Psychiatric Quarterly, XXI (1947), 3-37. . 59. 0. Spurgeon English and Stuart M. Finch, Introduction. to Psychiatry (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1954). 60. Clarence O. Cheney and Carney Landis, "A Program for the Determina tion of the Therapeutic Effectiveness of Psychoanalytic Method," The American Journal of Psychiatry, XCI (1935), 1161-1165; Carney Landis, Concepts of Psychotherapy, ed. Leland E. Hinsie (New York: Columbia University Press, 1937), chap. v; Andrew Salter, The Case Against Psychoanalysis (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1952), pp. 149-152.

61. Behavior Therapy and the Neuroses, ed. H. J. Eysenck (New York: Pergamon Press, Inc.), 1960. 62. Eysenck, Ope cit., see note 51. 63. Mark David Altschule, Roots of Modern Psychiatry (New York: Grune & Stratton, 1957). 64. G. R. Forer, "Parlor Psychiatry," The Psychiatric Quarterly, XXVIII (January, 1954), 126-133. 65. Howard W. Haggard, Devils, Drugs and Doctors (New York: Harper Bros., 1929). 66. A. Alzheimer, "Beitrage zur Pathologischen Anatomie cler Dementia Praecox," Psychiat. Neurol. Wochenschr., XV (1913-1914), 30; E. E. Southard, "On the Focality of Microscopic Brain Lesions in Dementia Praecox:' Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry} I (1919), 172-192; 116 Psychiatry and Responsibility Southard, HStratigraphical Analysis of Finer Cortex Changes in Certain Normal-Looking Brains in Dementia Praecox," Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, XLV (February, 1917), 109; Southard, HOn the Topographical Distribution of the Cortex Lesions and Anomalies in Dementia Praecox, with Some Account of Their Functional Signifi cance," American Journal of Insanity, LXXI (October, 1914), 383, LXXI (January, 1915), 603.

67. Jacob H. Conn, HAn Examination of the Clinical Pathological Evidence Offered for the Concept of Dementia Praecox as a Specific Disease Entity," American Journal of Psychiatry, XC (0. S.) (March, 1934), 1039-1082. 68. H. A. Cotton, "The Etiology and Treatment of the So-Called Func tional Psychoses," American Journal of Psychiatry, II (0. S.) (October, 1922), 157, and "The Relation of Chronic Sepsis to the So-Called Functional Mental Disorders," Journal of Mental Science, LXIX (October, 1923), 434. 69. J. H. C<:>nn, op. cit.

6 Conceptions of Health GEORGE P. GRANT To start from a traditional platitude: Health and disease are generally described in relation to each other, and therapy is de fined with emphasis on one or the other. Thus, in the Oxford Dictionary one finds under "therapy" such phrases as "the art of healing" and "the curative treatment of disease." The verbs "to heal" and "to cure" are both defined as "to restore to health." To restore is to give back, and so curing implies the loss of something that is normally present and that now through therapy is given back. We are inclined, however, to look at the matter the other way around when we are being practical. We think of our breath .. ing only when it is obstructed. Health is thought of as the absence of disease. Indeed, in the disease-therapy-health progression, ther .. apy inevitably looks both ways, and in the various moments of its activity fastens its gaze now this way, now that. This is true of all the influential systems of therapy, both in the past and in the present. From the western tradition I single out the two most influential-the Platonic progression, "ignorance--conversion to dialectic-illumination," and the Christian progression of "sin repentance through grace-salvation." These two have often been united; they have often been thought of as one. Without discuss ing this subtle matter, I will for the present purposes distinguish them. From the modern world I single out the medical pattern.

"neurosis-psychotherapy-normality." 117 1.18 Psychiatry and Responsibility In these systems, therapy has its positive and its negative moments. The philosopher must be continually aware of his ignorance if he would persevere in the pursuit of wisdom. If the Christian is to be in true repentance before the Cross, he must face some of his past acts as sins. The patient must admit the unconscious source of some of his acts if the analysis is to be a success. On the other hand, philosophy will be frustrated by mis ologism if its dialectical struggles are not known as leading to the Good. The Christian's repentance will leave him a Stoic or a Pharisee if it is not seen as preparation for the divine love. The modern patient must give some meaning to the idea of normality. Indeed, one aspect of the art of the therapist is to find a rhythm between these positive and negative moments suitable to the indi vid ual case.

As modern psychotherapists have made their art central to North American society and established an institutional frame work appropriate to their social power, two phenomena about their theory and practice become increasingly evident-the cer tainty of their conceptions of disease, the vagueness of their con ceptions of health. To account for this would require a book of social history and is not my purpose here. Some generalizations about it can, however, be made. 1) In the work of the master himself, therapeutic pessimism is continually present. This seems to me to arise above all from Freud's ambiguous relationship to modern science and the modern assumptions about man and civilization which are the framework of that science. He writes of himself as one of the dedicated priesthood of science who have put aside the ancient religious and metaphysical superstitions and who can, therefore, dis tinguish provable knowledge from mythology. Basic to this positivism is the identification of knowledge with human power to change the world. At the same time, one result of his science ,vas an account of the structure of the mind in which reason is viewed both phylogenetically and ontogenetically, as arising from the suppression of the instinctual in man. That suppression of the instinctual is seen as the very cause of personal and social disease. The gaining of power over nature, central to modern Conceptions of Health 119 science, is the very cause of disease when applied by man to himself.

This ambiguous relation toward science is illustrated in the very history of Freud's work and in his account of that work. In his writings before 1919, he is firm in stating the methodological principle that his conceptions are not final, but are hypotheses to be changed readily in the light of observation and practice. Yet even these earlier techniques and conceptions are themselves based on something extrascientific-his own self-analysis of the 1890's. To see that this self-analysis is extrascientific in psycho analytical terms, it is only necessary to state that since Freud's day all professional analysts must themselves be analyzed by somebody else. The very term "self-analysis" is one of ridicule to the orthodox. Yet for psychoanalysis to come to be, there had to be an original self-analysis. It is for this reason that Freud's most loyal disciples, while praising him as the great scientist of the psyche, still write of this self-analysis in language that believers would use about the redemption of the world by the passion of Jesus Christ. According to Edward Glover, there have been two moments in history of crucial significance-the first repression buried deep in primitive times and Freud's recognition of the causes of repression in his self-analysis. That language of unique ness and victory is best found in Ernest Jones' life of Freud on the first page of the chapter on the self-analysis. "Once done, it is done forever," writes Jones as a latterday St. Paul. This is not said to cast ridicule on this great act of Freud by comparing it with the act of acts, but simply to point out that the basis of modern psychotherapy is not a scientific discovery in the proper sense and that there is an ambiguity in the Freudians resulting from their insistence both that they are scientists and yet that they must pay homage to this act.

Indeed, in Freud's later writings (Civilization and Its Discon tents most particularly), he passes completely beyond the scientific into the metaphysical. Eros and Thanatos, which are the final rulers of human existence, are not written about as scientific hypotheses, but as postulated realities from which he deduces a metaphysic of history in terms of which his therapeutic and 120 Psychiatryand Responsibility social pessimism, implicit in his earlier practical works, is lifted to a new level of intelligibility. Civilization is a product of the ego and the superego, which arose as the individual was forced to come to terms with "reality" -that is, to live by the reality prin ciple rather than by the pleasure principle. Freud works out this tragic history, not only in terms of the life of the individual, but of the race as a whole. Sexuality is the basic manifestation of the life instinct, Eros. Civilization is produced by sublimated Eros.

But sublimated Eros is desexualized Eros. Thus, though civiliza tion is built by Eros, constant desexualization is necessary as civilization broadens its sway. Hence, Eros is weakened, and the death instinct is released, with all its potentialities for destruction. In fact, civilization moves to its destruction as it moves to its fulfillment. Here is no optimistic "gnosticism" of progress, but a statement of certain necessary limits to human existence. The earlier insistence by Freud that psychoanalysis is part of the liberating tradition of modern science here openly meets the facts that western civilization's modern mark has been science, that the mark of that science has been the pursuit of power, and that, therefore, modern science is a result of the successful repression that western man has imposed on the free play of his instincts, and this in turn causes the releasing of the death instinct.

Freud's therapeutic pessimism is thus understandable, and it is no wonder that health for man is a very limited state. Therapy does not result in a return of the repressed instincts to full play, but to a sublimation through recognition of what has been re pressed-a sublimation which holds in check the death instinct, but which has inevitable stoical undertones. It is not too much to say that health becomes for Freud the making of the best of a bad job. His metaphysical and tragic sense of life leads him to assumptions about human existence very different from the optimism so characteristic of the science of his day. Such a posi tion could not include any clear or positive account of what constitutes health for human beings. 2) As the psychotherapeutic movement changed from its origins as a minority of secularized Jews living in the alien atmosphere of the Hapsburg Empire to the wielders of social power that they Concep tions of Health 121 are now in North America, it is not surprising that their con ceptions of health should have been modified. Their enormously rapid rise to a position of ascendance ,vas partly made possible by the fact that they remained within the medical profession. In early t\Nentieth-century America the medical profession had un equalled prestige because it combined the power of modern science with the practical "do-goodery" of liberal Protestantism.

And the medical profession itself-particularly its more advanced members, who were held by the religion of science-had a clear interest in accepting psychotherapy. The very arrogance of the modern medical profession saw in the new successes of psycho therapy-assumedly carried out entirely within naturalist as sumptions-the chance for themselves to be the arbiters not only of the body but of the mind. American scientists and doctors were much more practical and immediate than the Europeans from whom psychoanalysis had sprung. Freud may have thought that he had freed his mind from finalist conceptions in the name of positivism, but this for him was mere theory compared to the unphilosophical practicality which was the very fabric of the American Protestant scientist. In accepting psychotherapy, there fore, American medicine was not only influenced by it, but also put its arrogant practical stamp upon it.

Further, as psychotherapy took over the leadership in providing mental health in a mass society, it was inevitably caught even deeper in the dilemmas of responsible success. So psychotherapy was influenced not only by American medicine but by the whole fabric of American culture. Professions do not gain power in any society unless in large measure they do what powerful influences in that society want. Psychotherapists adjusted themselves to the needs, desires, and interests of the industrialized, democratic, capitalist society. Finally, as responsibility for the mass society grows, the very immediacies of practicality push the profession farther and farther away from clarity about its ends. When a physician attends a child with earache, obviously something needs to be done. When the child is better, the doctor has a waiting room full of patients and has little time to define health other than to say that the child can now do what children generally 122 Psychiatry and Responsibility do in our society. Most parents and doctors will settle for such a pragmatic account of health. So equally the office of the psycho therapist is crowded, and beyond is the specter of the mental hospitals. The patient may still be neurotic, but she can now function as a wife and mother and need not come to the office or, worse, go on to the mental hospital.

In this paper I am criticizing the emptiness of modern psycho therapy in terms of ultimate truth. But let me state unequivocally that "getting on with the job" is a necessary moral maxim for all men. What the world tends toward without it is seen in quietist societies, and against this we may thank God for our activist tradition. Any theorist who neglects the circumstances that make the maxim necessary neglects an essential aspect of truth in the name of theoretical pride. This is so even in North America, where the maxim is so often an excuse for idolatry. At the same time, however, it is permissible for the theorist to point out the ambiguity in men who arrogate to themselves more and more social power and then justify their confusion by how much work they have to do. The absence of any definition of health in modern psychotherapy is certainly in part a function of this latter process.

This absence of interest in the meaning of health is seen not only in the everyday work of the clinician, but in the supposedly theoretical books. that influence the practitioner. a) Otto Fenichel's The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neuroses is (I am told) influential among practicing therapists. They use it to pick out a description of some symptom they have met in their work. It is a plumber's manual for the Freudians. It achieves this by eliminating all of Freud except that which concerned the immediately useful to the practicing therapist. It takes Freud's writings (between his self-analysis and 1919) and turns them into clear-cut accounts of a method of therapy written entirely within the assumptions of naturalistic positivism. The result of this "demetaphysicizing" process is six hundred pages of details about techniques of therapy and a few vague lines about the purpose of therapy. Fenichel gives some meaning to that purpose by making a short obeisance to genital primacy, but he does not Conceptions of Health 123 give substance to that term or show what it means within a systematic account of human nature and destiny.

b) Personality and Psychotherapy by Dollard and Miller of Yale is an influential book in the conversations between psycholo~ gists and psychotherapists. It attempts to integrate the "learning theory" of modern experimental psychology with the methods and ideas of the Freudians. Here pragmatic American good sense is right in the picture, so that the metaphysical and aesthetic elements in Freud are further eliminated, and solid American individualism can come more clearly to the fore. Though I am sure that personality cannot be a solely objective category and that we shall not find out much about persons as personalities by limiting ourselves to the observational methods of modern science, there is something to be learned about persons by such methods and no great harm is done as long as the results are not thought of as self-contained. Dollard and Miller, indeed, say some quite interesting things about the learning process. But they also claim to be writing of therapy, and here, of course, their method has greater limitations because therapy is a practical art concerned with realizing goals in human life. The result is that when they write about therapy, they write about its methods, implying that all sensible middle-class Americans know what the goals are. Their assumed goals are the perfectly decent ones of liberal and gentlemanly minded eastern seaboard professors. The assuming rather than the rational examination of such goals obviously implies a reliance on the massive middle-class con~ sensus about such goals. Such an assuming of the consensus always exerts more immediate influence than the attempt at theoretical clarity. But it is bought at the price of that sloppiness which more and more characterizes the social sciences in North America. From it we cannot expect any clear thought about human health.

c) Psychotherapy by Reciprocal Inhibition by J. Wolpe is an account of an attempt to use the findings of Pavlovian behavior ism for the purposes of therapy. In the era of coexistence the Russians are looking more favorably to Freudianism, \vhile the West is looking more favorably to behaviorism. It is to be 124 Psychiatry and Responsibility doubted whether the West has got the best of the bargain. Pro fessor Wolpe has been willing to go in for the systematic manipu lation of cats so that he can discover means by which human beings can be brought to "natural" behavior. As in the case of Dollard and Miller, the meaning of the "natural" is just assumed, and it is a cruder meaning than theirs-the tough and insensitive middle-class life of the British Dominions. Here we have two hundred and twenty pages of technique and one sentence of positive description of the goal of therapy. With Professor Wolpe one cannot avoid the rhetoric of anger and outrage, for he has that staggering blend of inane innocence and arrogance which goes with the social engineers who have been educated only in the physiological and mechanical aspects of the tradition. Freud knew so well what causes men to enjoy manipulating people by stringent techniques.

d) My last example is Current Concepts. of Positive Mental Health-a report to the American Joint Commission on Mental Health and Illness by Dr. Marie Jahoda. After Wolpe, here we return to the human. It is an attempt to describe the content given to the idea of health in the mental health movement. The writer is a civilized American scientist and therefore can present her material systematically. The positive content described, how ever, is an extraordinary amalgam of ideas from the American tradition-Hautonomy," "mastery of environment," Hperception of reality," "attitudes to the self," etc. It is remarkable to find the common-sense platitudes of current American civilization (a mixed bag of many subtle traditions) being put dovvn as the result of objective psychological investigation and thus given status as scientifically established. The truism that America is the only civilization with no history before the age of progress is here brought home by the complete acceptance of the scientific mythology and the disregard of the metaphysical and religious issues that western man has always assumed were involved in the concept of health. One can understand why certain Europeans doubt whether we really belong to that tradition at all, when there seems to be no knowledge of it before 1800. For example, "autonomy" is taken as a criterion (how could it not be in Conceptions of Health 125 democratic, pluralist America with its Protestant traditions?), and yet any systematic account of what is meant by it, or why it is good, is entirely absent. Thus, the attempt to be positive about health only ends up with accepting the general standards and giving them status by disguising them in the jargon of the social SCIences.

In contrast to the growing vagueness about health among psychotherapists, there is one group of Freudians who give a definite and positive content to their concept of health and justify that account within a philosophy of nature and history. They are those who have attempted to unite the thought of Freud and Marx. For the rest of this paper I intend to describe and comment on these thinkers. I do so because in them the assumptions of modern humanism about man and society are enunciated in a most explicit way and also because in them much that is un systematically assumed in official therapy is openly asserted. To put the matter historically: Since 1914 it has surely become obvious that the truth of the assumptions of modernity cannot be taken with quite the uncritical certitude that they were pre viously. (I use "the assumptions of modernity" in the broad sense to distinguish them from those of the antique world and from those of Christianity). Yet modern psychotherapy is essentially a product of that modernity. And in these thinkers this modernity is given its widest scope. Therefore, in them the assumptions of modern psychotherapy are most openly explicit. I am also quite confident that the view of existence of these thinkers is becoming and will become increasingly a popular faith in our society.

Before specifying who these thinkers are, I must give them a common name. "Marxist Freudians" or "Freudian Marxists" only describes their chief teachers. Professor Voegelin uses the term "gnostic" in his political theory to describe those moderns whose chief end is the realizing of the Kingdom of Man on earth. I will, therefore, call these thinkers "orgastic gnostics" because they believe that the liberated life of the instincts will provide the positive glory of that kingdom. In the therapeutic movement itself the chief of these men is Wilhelm Reich. The last years of Reich's life have been so full of personal and functional idiosyn126 Psychiatry and Responsibility crasies (in excommunicating him his orthodox brethren accused him of paranoia) that it is easy to dismiss him simply as a crank. But in such works as Einbruch der Sexualmoral} The Function of the Orgasm and Character Analysis} the relation, between psy choanalysis and modern social theory is worked out compre hensively. The assumptions of gnostic modernity may be false (it is my contention that they are), but in Reich they are put forward honestly and openly rather than in the covert and half hearted way in which they are presented in the general run of psychoanalytical writings. In his later works Reich was clear about the type of sexual actions,that follow from his doctrine, in a way that other modern writers avoid (even if they believe the same) for fear of offending the common-sense traditions of restraint.

Reich's influence may seem to have been dissipated by the last years of his career, but one finds that Norman Mailer (writing as the chief theoretical voice of the "hipsters") takes Reich as the psychoanalytic prophet of the coming liberated world. 1 And let us have no hesitation in recognizing that among the clever and alienated young (of which there are a growing number in our society) Mailer's writings are taken with high seriousness, what ever he may intend by them. Positions close to Reich's have been put forward in two clever books by philosophers-Eros and Civilization by H. Marcuse and Life Against Death by N. Brown. 2 As is to be expected from a Marxist theoretician of the highest order (and many western philosophers have been foolish since 1945 in implying there are none such), Marcuse's work makes the fusion of Freud and Marx in the most brilliant way. In what follows I will rely above all on his account of this position. Brown's Life Against Death has basically the same thesis as that of Marcuse. It is, however, less systematic than the latter's, because, though his philosophic debt is more explicitly to Hegel than to Marx, Brown interprets Hegel in a Marxian way without being seemingly aware of the depth of Marx's criticism of Hegel. Indeed he is incomparably less aware of the modern philosophic tradition than is Marcuse. Brown's book is a worthy supplement to that of Marcuse, however, because it reconciles with Freud many elements from art and religion in Conceptions of Health 127 both the antique and modern traditions to which Marcuse pays insufficient attention.

The concept of health in these thinkers is reached by com bining the progressivist view of history (as found in its most sophisticated expositor, Marx) with Freud's assumption that the alienation of man from his job is caused by .the alienation of man from his instincts. In describing that position, I take the Marxist account of history as given. 3 These men believe, how ever, that Freud's recognition of the alienation of man from his instincts leads him to a therapeutic pessimism (as described above) because it is interpreted within a simple nineteenth-cen tury naturalism. He expresses the relationship of man to nature biologically instead of historically. Scarcity for Freud is, therefore, seen as an ever-present condition, imposing the need for domi nance and therefore repression in any possible society. He does not understand man's relation to nature as an historical process (to be understood dialectically) in which the domination of nature by man overcomes the very conditions that it arose to meet. He cannot conceive a society in which scarcity has been overcome and in which man can turn his full attention to liberating his instincts from repression by the very methods that he himself has discovered. Thus, he is forced to see the struggle between Eros and Thanatos as everlasting (I scorn the use of the word eternal in this debased sense) and one in which there can be no final overcoming of evil.

Marcuse distinguishes between basic and surplus repression. Basic repression is caus~d by the very conditions of our childhood and can be overcome only by the methods of psychoanalysis car ried out in a proper society. Surplus repression has arisen from the necessities of class dominance in the age of scarcity. It is historical and can be removed when it is no longer historically necessary. Now that historical conditions have brought us to the point where our dominance over nature makes prosperity pos sible, men will come to realize that the surplus repression of a class society is no longer necessary and will undertake the social action necessary to that liberation. As surplus repression is elimi nated in society, it will be possible to organize society so that 128 Psychiatry and Responsibility human beings can spend their time liberating themselves from the repressions implicit in the very form of the instincts of birth and of the family.

Here it becomes obvious that the intellectual debt is not only what Freud pays to Marx, but also vice versa. The perennial objection to the end of history has always been that true joy lies in striving and choice and in the presence of tasks to be done and evils to be overcome. A realized human society would be limited and dull. This criticism is a reminder of the eighteenth century idea (found, for example, in Lessing) of the dullness of salvation-an idea that is deeply embedded in all the modern attacks on the traditional religion. And it is indeed true that Marx, as he concentrated his intellectual rage on the overcoming of the evils of his present, gave little attention to the positive content of the Kingdom of Man which he considered lay ahead. To the thinkers I am discussing, Freud has given the answer to what that content will be. It will be an unrepressed polymorphous life of the instincts. According to Brown, man will be concerned with the resurrection of the flesh in the world. Here Reich's conception of object-oriented orgastic satisfaction gives the fullest description of what will be the goal of this unrepressed sexuality.

More than any of these writers, he is unequivocal in stating that man's end is orgastic satisfaction. (Because of his claims to the mantle of the modern scientist, he probably would not like this teleological terminology, but it is unavoidable from the way he writes of the orgasm). At this stage in history the "redeemed" therapist can be concerned only with individuals or a cult, but the organization of society finally will be given over to a priest hood of therapists who will help to move youngsters through the necessarily incomplete stages of sexuality to the achievement of this orgastic state of realized satisfaction. Reich is honestly un equivocal in stating that this requires the full development of the love life proper to children, adolescents, and adults. As Mailer makes clear, those capable of the "good" orgasm are saved; those who have the "bad" orgasm are damned. It must be remarked that Mailer seems at odds here with his masters. He seems to imply that the "good" orgasm can be achieved with either a homoConceptions of Health 129 sexual or a heterosexual partner and with a changing set of partners. Reich and Marcuse seem to assert that this will be achieved only when persons pass through polymorphous perversity and reach an object-oriented love of one partner of the opposite sex. Mailer's views on this point are perhaps not to be taken seriously, as he always tries to combine the role of the prophet with the pseudo sophistication necessary to commercial success among American authors.

According to Hegel, history comes to an end with the dawn of the age of reason (first realized in his thought, which is no longer philo-sophia) but sophia itself). So with these Marxists, true humanity will come to be in this world of realized sexuality, in which the orders of freedom and necessity are at last made one. The ecstatic longing for a free society that has lain as an illicit dream in the history of mankind now arises as a concrete pos sibility before us. ("How're they going to keep him down on the farm, now that he's seen Paree?") In the full tide of gnostic prophecy, Marcuse asserts that in such a society man will be able to conquer his old enemies-time and death. In the world of the instincts, measured time, the very mark of repression, ceases to exist. Reconciled at last in the union of freedom and happiness, persons will choose to go down to the grave when they so desire.

Across this blissful world will fall one shadow-the memory of those in the past who died in alienation. The Kingdom of Man will thus be darkened, but even this darkness will be alleviated by the knowledge that evil was not in vain. On the subject of death, Reich is at odds with Marcuse and Brown in that he denies the existence of the death instinct. There is for him, therefore, no such thing as nonrepressive sublimation. This gives his concept of health a simple objective content--orgastic satisfaction. It is this in turn that leads Reich in his later writing to depart more and more from Marxism and to see man as a simple bio.. logical entity. So when he gets on to the subject of what else people do when they have Hgood" orgasms, he writes of work and thought and art with a naivete worthy of Edward Bellamy. For Mar~llS~ and Brown, on ~be other hand, the acceptance of 130 Psychiatry and Responsibility the death instinct means that the end of history will not be a return to the primitive, because it will take into itself the negative moment of the death instinct and its overcoming. In true Hegelian fashion, Eros must, through struggle, take into itself the over coming of Thanatos. This is such a mystical conception that the only way I can think about it is as an immanentized version of St. Paul's transcendent conception of the spiritual body in Romans. Thus, the conception of health in Marcuse and Brown includes not only the realized orgasm, but also the nonrepressive sublimation of art and nonalienated work. Here they join the general humanist tradition with a great deal of uplifting talk about the therapeutic value of art. Art is more than a poor sub stitute for the "good" orgasm; it is a minor part of polymorphous sexuality.

There is only space for two comments on this orgastic gnosti cism, though many more are required. a) It brings out unequivocally that virtue and vice are not part of the Freudian account of man. This is often slurred over in North America because of the very brilliance of Freud's account of the history of the instincts and the liberating effect the accept ance of that account can have for us personally. Our debt is so great because Freud shows us in detail how the very conditions of our early existence twist and chain us and how we may overcome these distortions of our instincts. Moreover, to speak theologically, Freud's discoveries give content to the doctrines of Providence, Fall, and Redemption by showing ho\v we do not move simply and directly to our end, but must move to it by overcoming the ambiguities and tragedies that are not accidental, but of the very necessity of our existence. He is closer to the Biblical doc trines of the Fall and Providence than to the oversimplified Aristotelian teleology that skirts the question of evil by saying that nature achieves its purposes only in the main. To admit this greatness on the part of Freud, however, must not allow us to forget that his account of man denies the essential practical truth about us-namely, that we are beings who must choose between virtue and vice. Nor must we minimize or sentimentalize this theoretical denial, because society has and will continue to Conceptions of Health 131 pay a steep price for it. That this denial is made by Freud is most easily seen in his account of the structure of the mind as id, ego, and superego. 4 The id is the determinative aspect of us all. The ego and the superego arise from it through historical circumstances. Thus, for Freud, thought is somehow artificial to man, something forced on him by necessity. In his own words 'it is "a detour from the memory of gratification." But even within this assumption, he does not think of thought in a way that would make possible virtue and vice. Thought for him is simply technical reason as conceived by nineteenth-century scientism.

For where the ego is made the seat of reason, the superego is made the seat of morality. Thus, it is not reasonable to be moral, and morality belongs less truly to man than his ability to calculate. If reason is simply a calculating instrument and cannot teach us to choose between virtuous and vicious acts, then there is no objective morality in the public or personal sphere. The orgastic \gnostics bring out this theoretical implication with the greatest clarity, for they openly deny the platitudes of the old rational morality. The traditional morality presented itself in day-to-day practice as two simple statements that were taken as self-evident: (i) men should care not only for themselves but for others; (ii) they should sometimes control their instinctual appetites in the name of some greater good. These great platitudes were the court to which the doctrine of virtue and vice publicly appealed. Of course, the denial of virtue and vice is part of the whole tradition of modernity. One sees its beginnings in the arrogant immanentism of Spinoza (i.e., in his attack on the act Of repentance as unworthy of a rational man). But it has never been made more clearly than in these orgastic gnostics. We may thank them for this lack of equivocation, for it brings out (what is else where often slurred over) that the assumptions of modernity can not consistently include a doctrine of right and wrong.

Of course, these gnostics have an answer to this criticism that is traditional among all gnostics. 5 When people achieve genital primacy or orgastic potency, there will be no need for the idea of virtue, because the activities that the tradition called vicious will just disappear. Just as the Marxists, true to their dogma that 132 Psychiatry and Responsibility the cause of evil lies in property relations, believe, therefore, that· evil will largely disappear when that cause has been elimi nated, so these gnostics unite as the cause of evil bad property relations and sexual repression and believe that the overcoming of both will lead to the good society. Here indeed we come close to the very center of modern man's image of himself. Evil is not in the free will, but arises from the realm of necessity. The most obvious implication of this is that it cannot be called sin. b) Although this account of health must be condemned as having no moral doctrine, it has great religious advantages com pared to the other types of humanism (educated and uneducated) that characterize our society. The chief of these is that it is a doctrine of hope, and Christians must believe that true hope is a virtue even when it has an inadequate object, just as true charity in an atheist is supernatural. There is no doubt that the young who read Mailer or Miller are attracted to this worship of the orgasm because it seems a true affirmation compared to what they have heard elsewhere. The young are, after all, reared in a society avid in its concentration on the mortal and the immanent.

Yet in these days of tightened organization and the possibility of technological nightmare, an immanentism of despair is all too easy. Such an immanentism is the most influential philosophic basis for therapy in Europe today (Daseinsanalyse).Moreover, in the tightened society, sexuality is often the only form of creativity left open to persons and is certainly a more universal foundation of hope than the aestheticism of the culture addict or the worldly .. wise empiricism of the social engineer. This is true even if we take this orgastic gnosticism at the point where it is most horrify ing to the believer: Reich's techniques of overtly sexual therapy (horrifying particularly when applied to children). Is there not more hope even here than in the widespread and indeed indis criminate use of insulin and electric shock treatment carried out by order of the social engineers in the name of short-term adjustment?

Moreover, sexuality is for many not only the road to gratifica tign b!lt t9 ecstasy. "With my body I the~ worship." The object Conceptions of Health 133 of worship among the orgastic may be limited to the immanent and may therefore be justly characterized as idolatry. Neverthe less, in their very worshipping they seem to discover something of the sacred in nature that has been lost by those held by the philosophy of human power and self-confidence. The rediscovery of that sacredness may be a condition for the rediscovery of a worship that is more than natural. For all its dangers, idolatry may be the only road back to worship. To carry this train of thought further, it would be necessary not only to criticize the modern view of nature but also to consider why our North American Christianity was so influenced by that view of nature that it failed to have any adequate theology of human love.

Having praised this concept of health for its hope, I must end by insisting that it fails religiously by placing its hope in life alone. The truism need hardly be supported here that suffering and death are as much facts as life and gratification. Yet this gnosticism cannot include these facts within itself despite all its efforts. The concept of health given us by Him who says, "Take up your gallows tree and follow me" is complete in a way that no modern conception is, because it includes suffering and death in health, recognizing them not simply as the negation of happiness, but as the voluntary shedding of the mortal necessary to the putting on of immortality. Christianity may too often have for gotten a proper affirmation of life and gratification (and modern therapy has done well to remind it of this forgetting); but its incomparable truth has been never to forget that suffering and death must be included in health as much as life and gratification.

Nowhere has modern psychotherapy more mirrored and influ enced our society of progress than in the way it disregards death or looks at it with stoicism. NOTES 1. See Mailer's essay, "The White Negro," Dissent, Winter, 1958, and a discussion in the same journal. 2. See also the controversy between Marcuse and Fromm in Dissent, Summer, 1955, et seq.

134 Psychiatry and Responsibility 3. For my understanding of this account, see my Philosophy in the Mass Age (New York, 1960), chap. v. 4. The full implication of my point can be better seen in the light of the original German es~ ich~ and ilberich. 5. It is not accidental that Plotinus' criticism of antique gnosticism was that it had no place for the discipline of virtue as a necessary means to health.

7 Society as Crucible HENRY S. KARIEL "1 have much to learn, doctor." "Not nearly as much as you suppose. It depends on your attitude to what 1 tell you. What often makes things arduous in my profession is the patient's insistence on arguing about everything... ." Nigel Dennis, Cards of Identity (1955) Is it not possible, I have felt forced to ask myself when haunted by the possibility of being found out, that I am not so much the victim of misunderstanding as of understanding? What troubles me is the possibility that 1 am being slowly and system atically understood-understood as an economic, social, psycho logical, and ultimately physiological specimen. My fear, of course, is an old one: the loss of identity. Nevertheless, there are both historical forces and intellectual assumptions that give this old fear new grounding. The historical forces are technological; the intellectual assumptions are epistemological.

What is puzzling initially is that a loss of personal identity should accompany growth in understanding. Surely it is no neces sary price for scientific knowledge. Why should not increased knowledge of ..man and society lead to an enhanced appreciation of personal uniqueness, to the liberation of individuals from the false miracles, mysteries, and authorities that captivate them? And is a case against increased knowledge not simply one for obscurantism? 135 136 Psychiatry and Responsibility I In the social sciences, more particular Iy in the field of social psychology, we seem to find it imperative today to give credit to but one type of research result: the hypothetical statement that has withstood efforts to invalidate it by attempts to vary relevant data under controlled conditions. We cannot find it proper, within the social sciences, to accept the testimony of those who profess to have insight into the nature of man by passively, sympa thetically reflecting on his condition. We cannot because we know-ever since Kant first distinctly articulated our position that it makes no sense to speak of man's nature. What man's nature "really" is, what constitutes the norm for man's character, we can never genuinely know. Or, more precisely, we can never formulate unequivocal terms by which to communicate such understanding of man's nature as we presume to have.

The conclusions we have drawn from this argument have been various. Originally, it was the artist who could feel emancipated by the doctrine that we may trust only those laws, formulas, or myths that we have ourselves created. He had been confined, prior to Kant, to efforts that might illuminate the natural order of things. When he presented what he beheld, his representation was bound to be orderly-for the universe his works mirrored in concentrated form, like Hamlet's play for the king, was itself assumed to be orderly. But with Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, it could become apparent that whatever order was inherent in the universe, it would remain forever esoteric. Yet this inspired no pessimism. While man could no longer say anything meaningful about the mysterious supernatural world, he could still remain alert to its promptings. And in the natural world, in what now was truly his natural world, he could feel free to make the laws, formulas, or myths that satisfied his needs. His needs no longer had to be harmonized and restricted in reference to the objective laws of a cosmos external to man. As generations of romantics beginning with Rousseau and the Marquis de Sade made plain, his passions moved to the foreground. Thus, the artist found Society as Crucible 137 himself free to express his feelings both in the way he shaped his life and in the way he gave form to his work.

He was generally prevented, however, from enlarging the sphere of his operations. Individual prejudices, social pressures, political traditions-all these blocked the way, confining him to the can.. vas,. the salon) the concert hall, or the theater. But where these checks were weak for historical reasons, the artist's will, as the case of Wagner illustrates, could easily be translated into action.! It became possible for the aesthetics of romanticism to crowd out the ethics that had sustained a tradition of constitutional politics. Language could be transformed, as George Orwell was to report in anguish, from a truth-revealing medium to an action-inducing implement used by those in power to keep society in motion. The dramatist could break down the walls of the theater, can .. verting passive audiences into active performers, removing, as Francis Fergusson has pointed out in his Idea of a Theater (1949), the distinction between art and life. If life could become art, the territory of the state could become the arena in which the inspired statesman could act as the supreme artist. Like Captain Ahab, he could take society into his hands, expose it to his charisma, and proceed to impose his order on an otherwise meaningless, hostile universe.

Thus emerged the artist heroically engaged in rebellious action, subject exclusively to aesthetic criteria posing but one final question: Is his work capable of moving us? The theory of kno1tvledge sanctioning this development was to have a similar consequence in other fields-especially in the impact it made on psychology (and ultimately the social sciences generally).2 Accept ing this theory as a postulate, we were able to conclude, not that a psychology is inlpossible, but that a body of psychological know ledge (or social knowledge) can consist only of propositions derived from the observation of individuals under varying condi tions. To build such a body of knowledge, we seemed initially to have a choice in approach. We could either take advantage of the natural laboratories that human history indulgently offers us, or we could artificially construct the laboratories within which 138 Psychiatryand Responsibility to put our hypotheses to the test. In either case, we had to demand that man, our subject, be acted upon and that we have a measure of control over the forces that act on him.

It is this need for maintaining control that was' to make us ever more dissatisfied with the natural laboratories provided by human history. Thus, our epistemology contributes significantly to our efforts to gain progressively more controtof history. It impels us, as we seek to purify our psychological knowledge, to leave less and less to chance. We consequently find ourselves prompted to enlarge the range of our scientific enterprises. Seeking to gain ever greater understanding of individuals, we know we must act on them in an ever expanding laboratory. There is nothing in tl}e logic or the assumptions of our science that can check a steadily accelerating spread of our efforts to gain empirical knowledge. What checks there are come from a tradition of intellectual speculation that we can make appear increasingly unworthy of enlightened men. We can bring this tradition itself under control by unmasking the beliefs of its adherents as rationalizations, ideologies, or myths, plausible to the extent that they enable us to get on in the world, to master and tame it, to make it express our needs. It thus becomes possible for us to remove the final threat to our treatment of society as a crucible, to our unin hibited acting upon men in order to understand them better.

And to act on them, we readily concede, is to restrict them in their action. II We have not had reason so far to feel that such restrictions creatively legislated by social science might be pernicious. We have come to recognize that freedom, whether social or individual, is no solid block. We may take some of it away only to find the remainder expanding. Thus, in the extreme case, we may deny the members of a whole age group the freedom of their youth by forcing them to fight a battle waged to enhance the freedom of all. We merely have to justify our action on the ground that the selected individuals in fact have the stamina essential to make Society as Crucible 139 them perform effectively. They must, on empirical grounds, deserve to be enlisted. To enable us to reach decisions such as this, we have quite properly made it attractive for psychologists, psychiatrists, sociol ogists, and anthropologists to help us. We have encouraged them in their determination to define appropriate restrictions of freedom and to put their definitions to the test. Those being restricted, manipulated, or indoctrinated have-we widely be lieved-really merited such treatment. And just as we can em ploy the techniques of science to select the deserving, so we can employ them to select the undeserving-those who are, on evidence hard to contest, our misfits, delinquents, under achievers, and noncooperators. A study of them constitutes a curriculum in pathology. In one way or another, they are all sick. They are our potential parole violators, authoritarian per sonalities, and uneducable students. They are the men whom tests stamp unfit for wartime intelligence service, for piloting aircraft, or for balancing bank accounts. Who of sound mind would not want to impose restrictions on them? Science, after all, merely implements the law. It executes, if not formally en acted statutes, then at least those dictates of right reason com manding our spontaneous respect.

By reflecting on the various fields in which we are calling on a behaviorist technology to institute a harmonious social order, we should gain some understanding of the refinements, the ramifica tions, and especially the dynamism of its operations. This should make us aware of how it contributes-gently, casually, almost benignly-to the socialization of political man. Therapy is provoked and legitimated, of course, by the existence of a critical situation, whether it be war, depression, or disease. When a breakdown has occurred, all sorts of efforts to re-establish law and order become justifiable. Thus, a textbook in criminology seems merely to say the obvious when it pro claims: "Crime and delinquency are sufficiently damaging to human beings to justify as much concentrated scientific endeavor as we employ when we fight any devastating disease." S The effort to reintegrate parts that are out of joint may, in the first instance, 140 Psychiatry and Responsibility be purely theoretical, an attempt, whatever its ideologically con servative genesis, to enhance our knowledge by establishing statistical correlations. Only later does it advance from theory to action.

The course taken by the study of crime, that is, the study of . radically disruptive social behavior, illustrates this progression admirably. Cesare Lombroso, in his classic L'uomo delinquente (1876), was the first to offer what he considered evidence showing that there were physical criminal types and that individuals who shared a set of relevant traits-generally apelike ones-were pre disposed to a life of crime. If these conclusions were to be dis credited, as they "rere, this could be done only by Lombroso's own statistical method. In 1928, for example, Max Gustav Schlapp associated glandular dysfunctions with criminality, or at least with the body chemistry of those witless criminals who were caught. 4 In the following year, Johannes Lange published his case for predestined criminality based on a study of identical twins. 5 Body types enabled William H. Sheldon to create an index of delinquency composed of numerically scaled degrees of inter relation. 6 Similarly, Sheldon and Eleanor T. Glueck were able to correlate physique and delinquency, introducing qualifications that led to ever greater precision. 7 A great number of still unco ordinated studies seeking to relate criminality and environmental economic conditions have follo,ved. 8 As these theoretical endeavors began to meet prevailing prac tical needs, laboratories could become available. Thus, David Dressler has reported 9 how at New York's Wallkill State Prison personnel at all levels are trained to note and record such items [of convict behavior] in a central file kept in the Service Unit. The parole board has found this most useful. The institution is a laboratory for observing inmates under all sorts of conditions, studying their reactions and interactions, their personalities and motivations.

Undeniably, such work contributes to the progressive refine .. ment of prediction tables as tools for identifying convicts fit to re-enter the world of the law-abiding. What is of significance for Society as Crucible 141 the moment, however, is the logic that dictates an ever greater intensity of observation "under all sorts of conditions" as the necessary price for an enlarged range of understanding. Still, the price is not high; it raises no embarrassing ethical issues. Though candidates for parole may become most sensitive to the expecta tions that the criminologist builds into indices of behavior, they are by no means being manipulated. They are presumably acting naturally while being observed. The criminologist keeps his distance and does not tell them to what social values to adjust. If convicts are on their own, it is because their disease is not considered as severe as that of psychotics. Here the psychiatric achievements of Harry Stack Sullivan are instructive. When Sullivan learned to see schizophrenia, not as something localized in the patient, but as a manifestation of a larger disorder arising out of unhealthy social relationships, he thought he had become capable of reintroducing his patients into the healthy society. He therefore conceived of the mental hospital as a "school of person ality growth" 10 in which patients could be guided to reorient themselves in reference to group norms carefully formulated by psychiatrists and upheld by hospital attendants. The aim of psychiatry thus became that of helping the individual to bring his feelings into the realm of consensually validated information about the self. The true self, the composite of one's genuine desires, was to become that which is socially valued. ll Because experience showed that psychiatrists were most successful when they enabled the patient to know himself as his group knew him, the role of psychiatry had to be broadened. While psychiatry did not have to act directly on the individual patient (he was scarcely an individual anyway), it now had to create the "inter personal field" that would induce the patient to adjust. The degree of his adjustment to the norms of this field-a field to be gradually established by psychiatry-was an index to his mental health. 12 "As your skill increases," Sullivan lectured a group of aspiring psychiatrists, "you will be able to validate inferences, your provisional hypotheses about the events, by influencing the interpersonal field." 13 The approach by which Sullivan sought to lead his patients 142 Psychiatry and Responsibility back to health was to open "really revolutionary vistas of guided personality change" for those who were eager to come to grips with broade;r social issues.l4 Thus, Kurt Lewin's generous im pulses, in particular his faith in fraternalistic democracy, led him to set up and manipulate groups, for he too perceived how individual perception and behavior are socially conditioned. 15 He experimentally demonstrated-on a scale larger than Sullivan's but immeasurably smaller than more adventurous social re formers might hope for-that "ideology cannot be changed with out changing the actual distribution of power within a group." 16 He saw that when the experimenter is empowered to introduce the kind of relationships that his hypothesis specifies, individuals can be made to behave. Within the group that gives behavior its psychological significance, so Lewin could report during the Second World War,17 the seemingly unpleasant experience can be made palatable: "Under ordinary circumstances an individual will strongly resist an order ... to eat three dozen unsalted soda crackers. As 'subjects' in an experiment, on the other hand, in dividuals were found ready to 'take it' without either hesitation or resistance." Given a functional social system, its components can be counted on to feel constrained to play their assigned roles.

I t should go without saying that social psychologists share a profound distaste for the kind of social system within which a whipper, as in Kafka's Trial} whips because it is his function to whip. Yet they know their preferences to be irrelevant. They are scientifically concerned, after all, not with human purposes, but with how men actually behave under varying conditions. Under standing man's behavior, they hope to be in a position, in the words of Abram Kardiner, to "furnish a critique of social forms in order to enable us to predict their stability." 18 They seek to confirm the correlations that will amplify our capacity to direct the energy of individuals toward productive ends. Knowing what constitutes social failure, they provide the formulas for adjusting to "success." 19 As they correlate a personality profile, ethnic background, economic status, social class, and sexual behavior with future "well-being:' with "success" in college, marriage, Society as Crucible 143 and life, with "adjustment" to well accredited ideals, the guid ance and reform of individuals can confidently proceed on a politics-transcending, scientific basis.

Harold D. Lasswell anticipated, as early as the 1930's, the demotion of politics as a method for allocating individual in terests. 20 He recom.m.ended a m.ethod that would bring the irra tional basis of social conflict out into the open. He expected public administrators and social scientists to be trained to practice what he candidly called "preventive politics." This would sup press the politician's pathological drive for power at the source by curing the social diseases that nourish it. And it would move the rest of us efficiently toward the ends that we, once straightened out, wish for in any case. Following the shock of the Second World War-and some of Lasswell's clues-Bruce Lannes Smith felt moved to collect information on a group he. identified as the world's major propagandists. His data enabled him to show; among other things, that their fathers were very active politically or professionally, or else that they had been exposed to symbols of authority. From this, Smith concluded that the destructive impulses of a propagandist like Goebbels will be frustrated when a specifiable environment is constructed-presumably one without active fathers or authority symbols. What difficulties there were to taking such steps existed because "we still move dimly in the Dawn Age of social integration." 21 In 1948, James G. Miller sought to help us move into the bright noonday of social integration by proposing that we im prove our knowledge of the psychology of man-power utilization.

He wrote: Since many of the specialties required for a future war would be in engineering, scientific, and professional areas, preparation of qualified personnel for the event of war might well become a national educa tional program to exploit our country's human resources .... It might well be in order to keep the nation prepared [by] making higher education available to every person capable of receiving it, so that we may continue to have a thoroughly prepared nation that will conse quently be much more powerful. ...

144 Psychiatry and Responsibility If we can make an analysis of the profile of psychological and physical requirements for certain types of jobs and ways of life and a similar analysis of the profile of personality and physique of each of our citizens, we will have a scientific basis on which to match our popUla tion with the jobs which need to be done. 22 This approach to the mass of men, Miller hoped, would also be used to select their leaders-though, admittedly, "it will be some time before we shall be able to apply such selection to congress men and presidents." Miller's remarks were to be sharpened by the unabated sense of social crisis and urgency in the late 1950's. Today, challenged by the "crisis" of American education and certain that some thing is wrong with American "character," educational adminis trators are steadily improving their skill in designing artificial competitive situations to reveal the student's capacity to conform to the prevailing definition of academic success. The test for which the prospective college student can be coached (because the test is merely a game) is being improved on by trials that, far from being games, are authentic intimations of the life to come. In these trials, only the fully educated, and not the par tially coached, can be expected to excel. They will be unable to hide their flaws and thus, when they attain passing scores, must be far better risks than the hopeful organization men whom William H. Whyte, Jr., has invited to cheat on employment tests.

And as we are confronted by the economic and social need to produce college graduates, we become duty-bound to act on the ever more accurate prediction that certain identifiable high school students are likely to be proficient in college. What goes for school, in particular the school attached to the economy, goes for one's entire occupational and professional life. The methods for the screening of ass personnel during wartime can be employed for the selection of eighteen-year-old "trainee executives" in peacetime. 23 The models for the well-functioning infantry platoon contain "lessons for management." 24 Having analyzed what is wanted, the researcher is· ready, as Alex Inkeles has pointed out, to specify "the distinctive personality characSociety as CrucibIe 145 teristics that should influence recruitment. . . ." As an out standing example of this type of research, Inkeles has cited G. E.

Swanson's study of the differences between the job of the editorial and the sports writer: Basing himself on the theory earlier developed by Lasswell and Rosten, Swanson predicted that as against the sports writers, the editorialists would be markedly more phallic-aspiring, anal-expulsive and oral passive in character .... This study is but one of a series which suggest that we have begun to break ground in a great unexploited field of study of the relation of character types to different aspects of social structure and the functioning of social systems.25 When acted on, such studies cannot help but reduce society's failures. To be sure, they extend the range of the manipulatable; but they also guarantee that individuals play functional roles. They embody no values and can, in principle, be used to achieve any objective whatever. 26 As a probing and sensitive psychology systematically eliminates life's bumps and detours, only unbelievers with a perverse pas sion for catastrophe will resist. After all, a behavioristic thera peutics, so the argument goes, merely makes certain that in our social system no round pegs will move toward square holes, that those who have skill will really slide into positions demanding skill. The science of psychology merely correlates past perform ance with future behavior, using the fullest available history of an individual as index. It makes his future behavior a function of his past, his environment, his reflexes. At the same time, it may, because it is relentlessly watchful, observe and record that he happens to misbehave-spitefully, resentfully, or accidentally doing the unexpected, failing to follow his natural inclinations.

In that case, he might be left alone as harmless, depending, of course, on how critical the crisis we face. But it must, in any case, refine its operating procedures, so that at least his successors win be the duly integrated, well-behaving components of the function ing, hierarchically organized social system.27 146 Psychiatry and Responsibility III Before such a loss of identity within a well-running social system is universalized, before we are all haunted by the pos sibility of being found out, we should remind ourselves that power, including the power to move men, is not unjustly granted because it can, hypothetically, be carried to a logical extreme. The question is not what is possible, but what, under contemporary conditions, i~ likely. Furthermore, power is surely a neutral thing. Whether or not it is abused-it seems too obvious to need stating -depends on the ends sought. We should remember that Chief Justice Marshall's dictum that the power to tax is the power to destroy was properly put in its place by Justice Holmes' taunt that the power to tax is not the power to destroy "as long as this Court sits." We can draw the line.

Yet-and the voice which asks is hard to still-precisely, who are "we"? And, whoever "we" turns out to be, what gives those who draw the line their moral authority? The basis for legitimacy has traditionally been the soundness of our political institutions. Power, at least in liberal-democratic theory, is legitimate when the decisions that call for its exercise are arrived at politically, that is, when the institutions that compel policy-makers to take continuous account of the groups affected by their decisions are in good working order. What is in doubt today is the viability of these traditional institutions. Be cause we have not geared them to the demands of modern in dustrial society, the crucial decisions determining the rhythm and the direction of our work and our leisure tend to be resolved "scientifically" rather than politically. We can see the reasons for the decline of politics and the ascension of' "science" in (1) the character of modern industrialism and bureaucracy (which we seem to consider as irrevocably "given"

without specifying who has made the gift), (2) the nature of modern warfare, and (3) the entry of new groups into politics. These forces have resulted in the decline of legislative assem blies, while lending authority to an instrumental, predictive Society as Crucible 147 science. We today "administer" the political and economic markets in which, during an earlier age, the more privileged orders had made their choices. We permit our choices to be framed by some holy abstraction: the Facts, the Logic of the Situation, the Needs o~ the Economy, or the Dynamism of Industrialism. We leave decisions, must leave decisions, up to qualified adminis trators, experts, and planners-,-those with the knowledge to anticipate· the consequences of behavior. They, our true policy scientists, are invited to make adjustments and produce recon ciliations. This does not mean, however, that no one makes decisions within the depoliticalized realm. Resources continue to be dis tributed; a surplus continues to be allocated; rewards continue to be bestowed. In so far, then, as we do not dispense with dis criminatory action, inequalities remain. But these may be based on a new "rational" basis: the highly variegated skill-demands of the industrial order. An ideal bureaucracy, Max Weber speculated some time ago, insists that older ways of discrimination be re placed; recruitment and promotion, he saw, are based, not on class, but on ability teo perform. Inequalities derived from out acceptance of the "false" distinctions of class, race, color, and sex give way to new inequalities based on aptitude and skill that is, natural inequalities. And these are best specified, of course, by a unified natural science of sociology, psychology, and physiology.

Such a science becomes essential, as Hannah Arendt has bril liantly suggested,28t~ gain knowledge of an adjusted, well behaved society. Th~ proper approach to understanding a society in which purposive action is reduced to non purposive behavior is precisely a naturalistic behaviorism. Hence, in so far as our society is in fact depoliticalized, we should expect sociologists, as opposed to political scientists, to provide us with the most telling accounts. 29 In so doing, they are not, it would appear, making history; they are merely making it explicable. They are facing up to what Edward Shils has seen as the end of ideology.30 They are signaling the invasion of an industrial bureaucracy and a technological discipline into all significant spheres of human 148 Psychiatry and Responsibiltty life. Giving us the straight facts, they are depicting a prevailing limitation of political alternatives.

As democrats, liberals, and humanists, however, they face a dilemma, for it is not possible to stand aloof from a depoliticalized society, fully report on its inner compulsions, and yet not con tribute to its perpetuation. The sociologist who remains con sistently hypothetical and relativistic is constrained to accept as legitimate what happens to exist.~l The most objective of analyses, especially these,become immediately useful to society, obliterat ing the distinction between social action and social study.32 w. Lloyd Warner's insight into the life of Yankee City becomes instantaneously valuable to the merchandiser of industrial prod ucts; the scientific study of The Ineffective Soldier can be frankly subtitled "Lessons for Management and the Nation." The conclusions of analysis feed the very economic and social arrange ments that tnake a naturalistic approach relevant in the first place. All accounts turn into affirmation as even moral dissenters are welcomed because they enable the system to take due account of its "\",eaknessesand thereby to gain in vitality.

The decisions to engage publicly in the naturalistic treatment of society could be traditionally validated only in reference to standards arrived at by a philosophical dialogue or by political techniques. These, and these alone, gave authority, for they assured the tentativeness of all policy. They tolerated no con clusive settlements in the public sphere, frustrating every effort to impose some final rationality on society. They were deemed to precede, and hence con trol, romantic passions in all fields of human activity, including the field of empirical science. Today, however, we are not succeeding in subjecting all public action-whether it be that of the industrialist, the scientist, or the public administrator-to political controls. Our problem, as should be evident, is to involve all policy-makers in the political process. But what institution is available for doing so? How can we curb those determined to act on their understanding of the nature of social justice or communal health? The two pre-eminent institutions Tocqueville celebrated because they might be a bulwark first to the rise of the apathetic masses and then to CaesarSociety as Crucible 149 ism have been thoroughly transformed by technology: federalism is obsolescent in all but name, and our pluralistic system of com petitive voluntary associations has been overshadowed. Govern ment by nationwide, large-scale associations is beginning.to eclipse decentralized, voluntaristic government-and there are few signs that we are meeting the challenge by making our public govern ment unified, strong, and accountable in response. The result is that we permit the public realm to be administered by those who serve a depoliticalized technological order, obeying the supposed functional imperatives of industrial. development.

Commenting on recent methodological trends, Ronald Lippitt has wondered "how hopeful we can be about getting access, for manipulation and measurement, to many of the complex variables of group functioning and individual relationships to the group." 3~ He sympathetically concluded that: We find many groups of all types who are dissatisfied with their present way of functioning. If we are able to offer them a "change-service" in the direction of better functioning, they are ready to share in the re search enterprise to the extent of making controlled experimental designs in the field possible·and of cooperating in all manner of meas urements. At the present moment we have an overabundance of or ganizations, institutions, and groups asking to serve as subjects for field experiments. If Lippitt is correct, social psychologists are experiencing no difficulty in expanding their field of operations. When they detect that the worker is alienated from human purposes, when they diagnose widespread anomy (finding the symptoms in the sluggish performance of the work force), they are called on to design the myths that make the worker cooperate in the task of survival and that protect him against the temptations of liberty.

They thus produce unity, cohesion, and centralization-but not within a tradition of civility and of politics. As the institutions that might keep them in check wither away, and as technology is making us ever more affluent, they govern by default. Thus, utopian thinking, once the property of resentful political groups, 150 Psychiatry and Responsibility is assigned to psychologists and sociologists. It is they who con struct our models for the healthy society.34 And to the extent that their models, in the tradition of the classic utopia, discrimi .. nate against change and conflict, they further reinforce the decline of politics. We have scarcely any cause to anticipate a sustained interest in subjecting social diagnosticians and therapists to control-least of all when they are self-effacing professional scientists. We are unlikely to be concerned not merely because of the sheer com plications introduced by an expert-run technology but also because of the undeniable fact that technology does make life less tedious and more pleasant.

Nor are we likely to be concerned about the impact of the new behaviorism when we assume that "society" has defined what constitutes social health, when we believe that the ends of life toward which we are being moved have been consensually given, and are, as such, simply understood. This notion alone explains the innocent simplicity with which psychologists can allow them selves to speak of the universal desire for self-fulfillment and to applaud all growth toward an undefined freedom. We all agree, B. F. Skinner has intoned,35 that "health is better than illness, wisdom better than ignorance, love better than hate, and pro ductive energy better than neurotic sloth." Supported by the con viction that political groups do not (or no longer should) struggle to make their conflicting definitions of health, wisdom, love, and productivity prevail, behavioral scientists can feel free to insist that their science allows us to plan intelligently for un contested ends. Relying on a unanimous acceptance of social goals, characterizing resistance as perverse, they can cheer one another on to ever renewed efforts. What is more, their conviction about the absence of actual political conflict can slowly be given a factual foundation. For when a behaviorist technology operates with self-confidence because it assumes agreement on ends, it can so concentrate on the perfection of the means as to eliminate the possibility that men will trouble themselves to redefine ends.

Thus, it helps to create the very absence of conflict that it assumes to exist.

Society as Crucible 151 The ascendancy of an unchecked behaviorism is further facili tated by the assumption that no matter how much its practitioners learn to analyze, examine, and "understand," all will turn out for the best. History, at least American history, is kindly. What science institutes by its therapeutic and prophylactic treatment of society will surely be in the long-run interest of society itself. Modern social psychology, at least where it is vigorously experi mental, will ineluctably vindicate the values of liberal democracy. Its every advance reaffirms our values. Why then should Americans resist it? No court that sits, no political tribunal mediating be tween competing claims for justice, can escape being swallowed by the higher rationalism. We shall be found out and, having been understood, absorbed. We shall be classified by our natural capacities, laboring and resting in a hierarchial society within which we have been guided to proper places. What is more, we can acquiesce: our hunger is satisfied. For good or ill, we are appeased within the public arena by autonomous experts who have gained understanding, if not of the nature, then of the behavior of man.

Their credentials for action, furnished by Kant, were initially carried, we may now remember, only by the artist confined to the fringes of civil society. If the artist now moves to the center, it is (1) because we are hard put to assert the primacy of the political, and (2) because we have pushed aside, within scientific discourse, once meaningful distinctions. The former calls for vigorous and responsible public action. The latter calls for re thinking the nature of the quest to enhance understanding. IV A seemingly imperturbable technology, an uncriticized public consensus, a lagging political apparatus, a faith in the beneficence of the application of scientific techniques-these seem to make for a deference to a self-vindicating and self-validating science of social psychology. Science itself appears to be locked into this system of forces so that its every advance nourishes the very order that threatens human freedom. Ignoring, for the moment, 152 Psychiatryand Responsibility the ominous thrust of history, which, at least in my view, calls for public action to restore politics to its high estate,36 what is it we might do to extricate science? How can we keep every scientific gain in understanding from making its unwitting contribution to the loss of personal identity?

We shall have to differentiate again between the quest for speculative knowledge for its own sake and the quest for practical knowledge for the sake of action. Having reintroduced this clas sical distinction, we can properly proceed to inhibit a practical science of means. When a behaviorist social psychology conceives of itself as a problem-solving discipline, it cannot be permitted to operate autonomously. When it presumes to resolve conflict and establish harmony, when it presumes to act on the phenomena under investigation, it must be held in check by goals that have been politically formulated. The danger is that without such a check, a naturalistic science of psychology will actually succeed in its ,value-neutral aspirations. It will systematically destroy the realm within which men, unfulfilled, apprehend their goods and engage in politics to mediate between them. It will do so because the material on which it operates is pliable. While the nature known to the physicist or the chemist will not bend when the technician puts hypotheses to the test, our ideas of what is val uable are far from firm. They can be made to shrivel and vanish altogether.

There may, indeed, be times when we must manipulate the beliefs of men. But this can be justifiable only in the gravest of emergencies, only after a political diagnosis of a state of emer gency has been made. Since all empirical scientists, including social scientists, have a vested interest in crisis situations, arti ficially creating them for testing purposes when they do not naturally exist, their pronouncements about our current "condi tion" should always invite the closest scrutiny. We should make doubly sure that their prescriptions rest on scrupulously accurate observation when they presume to inform us, as Abram Kardiner has,37 that the reform of society is imperative because of an alarming increase in male homosexuality, schizophrenia, juvenile delinquency, and the egocentric techniques of marriage partners.

Society as Crucible 153 While the speedy elimination of racial conflict, labor-manage ment violence, or schizophrenia is certainly desirable, produc tivity, peace, and even health all remain debatable goods. In a liberal society, consensus on them will always be limited by the variety of our visions and loyalties. Only the institution of politics and a science doing justice to both unique and patterned phenomena can preserve this variety. They preserve the capacity of an opposition to oppose, to argue, and thus to keep the future open. They protect us from being reduced and humiliated, from being identified and understood once and for all. For us, in our present stage of development when we are still· denied final knowledge· of our condition, they are our greatest public good. NOTES 1. One might, parenthetically, gain understanding of the new function of the audience by reflecting on both Mario's debased role in Thomas Mann's "Mario and the Magician" (1930) and on the role more recently sketched out for problem children therapeutically exposed to the puppet theater. (See A. G. Woltmann, "Puppetry as a Means of Psycho therapy," Encyclopedia of Child Guidance [New York: Philosophical Library, 1943]).

2. See especially the chapter entitled "Psychology and Epistemology" in Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951). 3. David Dressler, Practice and Theory of Probation and Parole (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 205. 4. The New Criminology: A Consideration of the Chemical Causation of Abnormal Behavior (New York: Boni & Liveright, 1928). 5. Verbrechen als Schicksal (Leipzig: Georg Thieme, 1929). 6. Varieties of Delinquent Youth (New York: Harper & Bros., 1949). 7. Physique and Delinquency (New York: Harper & Bros., 1956). See also their Criminal Careers in Retrospect (New York: Commonwealth Fund, 1942). 8. See especially George B. VoId, Theoretical Criminology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958). 9. Op. cit., p. 110. 10. Harry Stack Sullivan, IISocio-PsychiatricResearch," American Journal of Psychiatry, X (May, 1931), 977-91, 984.

11. See, in this connection, Nelson N. Foote, Hldentification as the Basis for a Theory of Motivation," American Sociological Review, XVI (February, 1951), 14-21, and "Discussion" by Reinhard Bendix, p. 22.

154 Psychiatry and Responsibility 12. The Contributions of Harry Stack Sullivan, ed. Patrick Mullahy (New York: Hermitage House, 1952), p. 203. 13. Sullivan, "The Study of Psychiatry," Psychiatry, X (November, 1947), 355-71, 358. 14. Leonard S. Cottrell and Nelson N. Foote, "Sullivan's Contributions to Social Psychology," The Contributions of Harry Stack Sullivan, p. 193. 15. See Gordon W. Allport's introduction to Lewin's Resolving Social Con flicts (New York: Harper & Bros., 1948), p. vii. See also Ernst Cassirer, "The Concept of Group and the Theory of Perception," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, V (September, 1944), 1-35. 16. Kurt Lewin et al., liThe Practicality of Democracy," Human Nature and Enduring Peace, ed. Gardner Murphy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1945), p. 312. 17. "Time Perspective and Morale," Civilian Morale, ed. Goodwin Watson (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1942), pp. 48-70, 52-53.

18. The Psychological Frontiers of Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945), p. 2; see also The Individual and His Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939), p. xiii. According to Ralph Linton, a science of anthropology will properly seek "to ascertain the processes and continuities involved in the phenomena with which it deals with a view to the prediction of events and ultimately their control." ("The Scope and Aim of Anthropology," The Science of Man in the World Crisis, ed. Linton [New York: Columbia University Press, 1945], pp. 3 18, 17.) 19. See Paul Horst et al., The Predicting of Human Adjustment: A Survey of Logical Problems and Research Techniques, with Illustrative Applica tion to Problems of Vocational Selection, School Success, Marriage, and Crime (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1941). For a useful but extravagant summary of verified manipulative knowledge in social psychology, see Carl R. Rogers, "Implications of Recent Advances in Prediction and Control of Behavior," Outside Readings in Psychology, eds. Eugene L. Hartley and Ruth E. Hartley (New York: Crowell Co., 1957), pp. 3-10.

20. See Psychopathology and Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930), especially pp. 202-203. 21. Bruce Lannes Smith, "The Political Communication Specialist of our Times," Propaganda, Communication, and Public Opinion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946), pp. 31-73, 73. 22. "Psychological Approaches to the Prevention of War," Current Trends in Social Psychology, Wayne Dennis et ale (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1948), pp. 274-88, 291-93. 23. OSS Assessment Staff, Assessment of Men (New York: Rinehart, 1948); Ronald Taft, "Use of the 'Group Situation Observation' Method in the Selection of Trainee Executives," Readings in Experimental Industrial Psychology, ed. Milton L. Blum (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952), pp. 32-37. 24. Eli Ginzberg et al., The Ineffective Soldier: Lessons for Management and the Nation, 3 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

Society as Crucible 155 25. Alex lnkeles, "Psychoanalysis and Sociology," Psychoanalysis, Scientific Method, and Philosophy, ed. Sidney Hook (New York: New York University Press, 1959), pp. 117-29, 121; for Swanson's study, see "Agita tion through the Press," Public Opinion Quarterly, XX (Summer, 1956), 441-56. 26. Else Frenkel-Brunswik has called attention to the research of E. R. Jaensch, a Nazi psychologist, who described the very personality type that the authors of The A uthoritarian Personality (1950) had character ized as prejudiced and intolerant of ambiguity-but he regarded it as praiseworthy. ("Further Explorations by a Contributor," Studies in the Scope and Method of tiThe Authoritarian Personality," eds. Richard Christie and Marie jahoda [Glencoe: Free Press, 1954], pp. 226-75, 252.) 27. F. A. Hayek has recently asked us to consider what would happen if only what is agreed to be the best available knowledge were to be used in action. "If all attempts that seemed wasteful in the light of generally accepted knowledge were prohibited and only such questions asked, or such experiments tried, as seemed significant in the light of ruling opinion, mankind might well reach a point where its knowledge en abled it to predict the consequences of all conventional actions and to avoid all disappointment or failure. Man would then seem to have subjected his surroundings to his reason, for he would attempt only those things which were totally predictable in their results." Because behavior would then be made to conform to the existing state of knowledge, "there would no occasion for new knowledge to appear."

(The Constitution of Liberty [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960], pp. 37-38.) 28. The I-Iuman Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp.43-44. 29. See especially the works of Bendix, Selznick, Riesman, Shils, Mills, Bell, and Lipset. 30. He was reporting on a 1955 conference on "The Future of Freedom" in Encounter, V (November, 1955), 52-8. 31. In Seymour Martin Lipset's definition, the language is soft but the point is clear: "Legitimacy involves the capacity of the system to en gender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for society." (Political l\lan [New York: Doubleday & Co., 1960], p. 76.) 32. The present-day operations of the press offer a vivid parallel: In order to sustain mass circulation, Life magazine, for example, stages and directs SOlne of the very news events on which it makes its objective reports. The fullest report, of course, can be made when journalists gain complete control of a news situation, for then they have indeed total knowledge of all its elements.

33. "A Program of Experimentation on Group Functioning and Group Productivity," Current Trends in Social Psychology, Wayne Dennis et ale (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1948), pp. 14-49, 47. 34. For a searching critique, see Rene J. Dubos, "Medical Utopias," Daedalus, LXXXVIII (SumIner, 1959), 410-24.

156 Psychiatry and Responsibility 35. "Freedom and the Control of Men," A merican Scholar, XXV (Winter, 1956), 47-65, 5L 36. I seek to deal with problems of public action in The Decline of Ameri can Pluralism (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1961). 37. "Social and Cultural Implications of Psychoanalysis," Psychoanalysis and Scientific Method, ed. Sidney Hook (New York: New York Uni versity Press, 1959), pp. 81-103.

8 Psychoanalytic Thinking and the Relief of the Poor ALAN KEITH-LuCAS The test of a free society, writes Delafield Smith, lies not in "the independence and unplanned, unregimented freedom of its rich and powerful members," but in "the scope and privilege reserved to, and· possessed by, its weakest elements, those who are under the greatest pressure to surrender their independence." 1 There are certainly other tests of a. free society and maybe other criteria by which a society should be judged. But the way in which a society treats its unproductive sector is to some extent a test of its dedication to certain ideals. The very existence of a segment of society that is socially, economically, and politically powerless is in fact an invitation to the exercise of personal (that is, politically unsanctioned) power without fear of reprisal, and the need of this group to obtain relief may well tempt them to surrender their independence in order to eat or to be clothed.

Here too may become explicit pretensions, only implicit else where, to control the behavior of others in the name of morality, science, or culture, or disclaimers of any such pretensions. Not so much what society is, or is even likely to become, but what its leaders would like it to be, may be foreshadowed in the relation ship between those who ask and those who give. Psychoanalytic thinking has had an important part to play in 157 158 Psychiatry and Responsibility the development of this relationship as it exists in America today .. The social work profession, which, in general, administers and determines the type of hUlnan relationships in this country's system of public and private relief, was one of the earliest and the most enthusiastic groups to welcome the new knowledge. Since 1928, at least, all social workers have thought more or less in psychiatric terms. The way in which this profession has made use of these concepts, therefore, would seem to have some signifi cance for society as a ·whole. It provides us at least with a chance to see where we may, in fact, all be going.

At the time that psychoanalytic concepts began to spread out into America in the 1920's, the basic assumptions about the nature and purpose of man and his relationship to society, which as always underlie and are tested by a society's treatment of its poor, had already begun to shift from the base on which they had been built for more than two hundred years. In the place of a theo centric vie"v of man, which had, in fact, long ceased to justify this description, so closely had it identified the Will of God with the cultural aims of man, there had developed or was developing a type of thought that, for lack of a better term, I shall call humanist-positivist-utopian, or HPU for short. The basic tenets of this view may be summarized as follows: (1) The primary purpose of society is to fulfill man's needs, both material and emotional. (2) If man's needs were fulfilled, then he would attain a state that is variously described, according to the vocabulary used, as that of goodness, maturity, adjustment, or produc tivity, in which most of his and society's problems would be resolved.

(3) What hampers him from attaining this state is external circumstance, not in general under his individual control. This, in various HPU systems, has been ascribed to lack of education, economic circumstance, his childhood rela tionships, and his social environment. (4) These circumstances are subject to manipulation by those Psychoanalytic Thinking and the Relief of the Poor 159 possessed of sufficient technical and. scientific knowledge, and, consequently, (5) man and society are perfectible. In this milieu psychoanalytic thinking found a ready acceptance. Its basic contribution was to be not so much in its content, in its discoveries, or even in its usefulness as a means of help (although it helped to explain much that had puzzled people until then), but in its compatibility with a view of man and society that was already on the way to being generally accepted. It came as an answer to questions that had already been asked, rather than as a revelation de novo. This can be sho\vn, for instance, by noting how American Freudianism has accepted some of Freud's (gen erally earlier) work and has rejected other parts of it. The Freud whom America adopted was the Freud who believed that repres sion caused anxiety and not the Freud who, recanting, recognized in man a primal anxiety, which, in turn, caused repression. It was the optimistic Freud of the oral-anal-genital progression and not the Freud of the death-wish. 2 Not only did the psychiatrists who went to Europe in the 1920's to study psychoanalysis have "a point of view which must have in many instances modified their approach to Freud's orientation," ~ but those in other professions at home who listened to them did so in terms of their HPU orientation and their need to find something other than the Puritan view of man.

The proces&' by which Calvin's wholly (and utterly Holy) transcendent God, before whom the best of men merited nothing, had become the ally of the successful and the guardian of society's values has been traced most adequately by Weber, Tawney, R. B. Perry, and others. Whether incertitudo salutis J the frontier, or bourgeois economy was the greatest factor in this transformation, the impact on those who had to turn to society for help was to become involved in a relationship in which they were held wholly responsible for their own inadequacy (and, often in directly and by a curious reversal of the relationship between merit and Grace, for their own misfortune as well); in which to 160 Psychiatry and Responsibility ask for help meant to surrender one's control over one's own affairs, one's freedom, one's civic rights 4 and sometimes even one's children;5 in which the" recognized relationship was that of one man judging another's deserts, needs, and potential, pre sumably by some set of commonly accepted standards ultimately derived from Scripture, but often in fact impulsively or from self-interest; and in which the fulfillment of man's legitimate needs or the correction of certain invidious inequalities was entirely subordinate to the principles of correction and deter rence. At its best, such a system was paternalistic-and in fact it became more so during the Nineteenth Century, in its somewhat disguised forms of Christian Socialism and Friendly Visiting. At its worst, it was little short of totalitarian-the "intolerable rule of the saints."

Yet this was not the whole story. The Puritan view of man, although it denied personality, in the sense that it cared little for the ideal of the fulfilled human being, remaining in this respect still theocentric or at least culture-centered, laid a great deal of stress on man's individuality, his difference from his fel lows. The American tradition here is quite different from the British and was so even before the advent of psychoanalytical thinking. Basically this was, at a venture, the difference between a Puritan and an Evangelical tradition. British reformers of the Poor Law, such as Beatrice and Sydney Webb, in denying man's total responsibility for his condition, shifted the blame of personal failure to society as a whole, and in particular to its economic organization, and sought to remedy matters by legislation. 6 American social reformers also shifted the blame onto the environ ment, but concentrated on the individual's condition, his re sources, and his immediate environment and sought to remedy these in each indi vid ual case. Social casework is an American invention. Mary Richmond's Social· Diagnosis) its source book or "Old Testament," published in 1917, called for a minute, indi vidual, scientific, and differential examination of each man's situa tion and prescribed remedies for it. Psychoanalysis, its "New Testament," crowned and fulfilled Miss Richmond's work. It offered a new and deeper method of diagnosis. It explained many Psychoanalytic Thinking and the Relief of the Poor 161 of the discrepancies that had become apparent between the environmental theory of man's growth and what had been ob served in practice. It was acceptably scientific and thereby pro fessional, and it provided a complete rejoinder to the debased Puritan view of man. It freed the poor from personal, impulsive, or moralistic judgments.

But it did more. In its concentration on the individual's inner rather than his outer needs, in its insistence on self-expression, in its permissive techniques, it made possible a change of viewpoint whereby social work and, to some extent, society itself (although the cultural lag was considerable) were able to look at a man's problem through his own eyes, to grant him for the moment at least the status of subject rather than object, to serve him rather than to control him for his own o'r for society's good. Philip Klein expresses this shift of focus and ascribes it to the newly "scientific" and indeed "analytical" character of social work. By virtue of its new scientific character the perspective of all social work shifted from an "external" view previously held by social re formers, theorists and philanthropists alike, in which the poor, the sick, the criminal or the neglected child appeared mainly in contrast to the normal and quantitatively solid mass of the population, to an analytic view as if from the angle of the client himself. The social worker in this new conception was no longer an agent serving the social mechanism so much as an instrument of adjustment manipulated in the interest of the client and upon the physical and social environ ment of the client. 7 This was a tremendous leap of the imagination. It was an act of empathy that put to shame the social. thinkers of the last half millenium. It gave to America's treatment of its poor and to its profession of social casework a quality not found anywhere else in the world. As a writer said as late as 1947: At its best, social casework can make the tenets of democratic living a deeply personal experience. Completely oriented to the individual and his very personal needs, it concentrates on him, trying to serve his purposes only, flexibly and in a nondirecting way.s 162 Psychiatry and Responsibility To psychoanalysis must go luuch of the credit. And yet it must be recognized that there were certain special conditions that enabled it to be used in this way.

The strongest factor in these conditions was the impact of the depression. Quite suddenly millions of people who could not conceivably be thought of as inferior, inadequate, sick, or sinful, carne to be in need. America turned, after a struggle with older concepts that broke down one after the other, first to a system of social insurance and thell, ostensibly as a stopgap, but actually as its main weapon, to a concept of a legally guaranteed right to assistance under prescribed circulnstances. Those who thought in psychoanalytic terms went along. and nurtured this concept. It was consistent with their orientation to man fulfilling his own needs. There are, in fact, three ways in which a man may be judged as entitled or not to relief: (1) in accordance with his deserts, or the judgment of the saint, (2) in accordance with the best interests of either society or hilTIself, or the judgment of the social scientist, and (3) in accordance with his recognized or established rights, or the judgment of the law.

The Puritan had made his decision principally around the first. Congress in 1935, able to identify itself with the needs of man faced ,vith a disaster disproportionate to his deserts, now turned to the third, and in the hands of such leaders as Altmeyer, De Schweinitz, Delafield Smith, and the Abbotts, the principles of the unconditioned money grant and of noninterference in the lives of those in need were given precise form. De Schweinitz speaks of this process as one of relying "first of all upon the identification and use of basic principles of the law," but arriving at a principle that is "consistent with prevalent political, eco nomic and social beliefs." 9 Any tendency that practitioners of the new psychoanalytical knowledge might have had to insist on the second criterion was held in check, both by the acceptability of this new concept of legal Tights and a sense of humility in the face of what this new knowledge was thought to portend.

Psychoanalytic Thinking and the Relief of the Poor 163 Another liberating factor was, curiously enough, the deter minism of the new psychiatry. Modern American psychoanalysis, or that part of it taken over by social work, lays great stress on the culture or environment as the shaper of man's unconscious being.I° But Freud himself laid considerable emphasis on bio logical man-on man that is predetermined, distinct, outside his culture, even opposed to iLLionel Trilling says: Now Freud maybe right or he may be wrong in the place he gives to biology in human fate, but I think we must stop to consider whether this emphasis on biology ... is not so far from being a reactionary idea that it is actually a liberating idea .... It suggests that there is a residue of human quality beyond the reach of cultural control, and that this residue of human quality, elemental as it may be, serves to bring culture itself under criticism and keeps it from being absolute. ll The first social workers to make use of the new psychiatry were closer to Freud than we are today. There was a determinism in their psychiatry which is missing today and which, perhaps, could not survive in the optimistic American culture any more than, as R. B. Perry points out, the concept of God's inscrutable decrees had been able to survive in the self-reliant world of the New England colonist. 12 A typical statement of the early days of psychoanalytically oriented casework is Bertha Reynolds' de duction from what she calls "the illumination which began to trickle into social case work through its contact with dynamic psychiatry." "The futility of coercion," she says, "becomes in creasinglyevident."

... it is no longer a question of whether it is wrong to try to make our fellow beings think and feel as we want them to. In the long run it is simply silly. The vital needs of their being will in the end deter mine what they shall feel and how they shall act. 13 Both politicallyand psychologically,therefore,and indeedboth ethically and pragmatically, protections were placed around the individual's right not to be interfered with without adequate sanc tion. Grace Marcus' well-known words express social work's ethic in this respect and at that time: 164 Psychiatry and Responsibility In administering assistance as a right, the agency is bound not to use the individual's economic helplessness for purposes that have not been generally declared or defined even though these purposes are presum ably inspired by interest in the individual's welfare or the welfare of his dependents. 14 This is what American social work leaders took from psychiatry at this time. It helped make possible by far the most humane and dignified system of relief that America has ever seen. At the same time, in other spheres, it proved its pragmatic worth---in the juvenile court, the family agency, the guidance clinic, the mental hospital, and helped to establish there too a feeling for the dignity of the personality. For a long time, and still in many aspects of social endeavor, those who thought psychoanalytically . were in the forefront of a struggle against what they conceived of as "prescientific" social theories and could profess to value the dignity of the individual to a greater extent than the culture as a whole. 15 They fought and still fight for more adequate relief and against such measures as the forcible sterilization of those with illegitimate children. They have been and still are leaders in the fight against segregation. In the days before World War II, when the rights of labor were a burning social question, they were not infrequently associated with the representatives of an other type of HPU thought-MarxIsm-as in the journal Social Work Today/6 now on the Attorney General's list, but still the source of the clearest statements ever written about the helping process.

A glance at the relief situation today, some twenty-five years later, would suggest at first sight that the battle for the emancipa tion of the relief client was being quietly lost; that older points of view were returning, perhaps in reaction against the tendency of some workers to equate lack of interference with a supposed duty to protect the unwise and unfortunate from the natural conseq uences of their acts. Certainly there has been a change in temper. The purpose of the public assistance titles of the Social Security Act has been restated; public assistance is no longer seen as "social security" guaranteeing to a man something on which to Psychoanalytic Thinking and the Relief of the Poor 165 depend in disaster, but as a means toward a culturally desirable good, the re-establishment of a recipient's ability to be self-sup porting. I7 "Suitable home" provisions in the Aid to Dependent Children category, which were progressively eliminated during the 1940's, have been re-enacted in many states. IS There is grow ing agitation for the appointment of guardians for incompetent families and for methods of controlling the individual's use of his relief. There has been increased pressure on mothers of dependent children to work in spite of the Social Security Act's originally announced intention to relieve them of what was con sidered an intolerable double burden. I9 The newest category of relief, Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled, has, despite its name, included as an eligibility requirement referral to Vocational Rehabilitation and has, in many states, replaced the meeting of more or less clear-cut eligibility requirements with evaluation by a medico-social team of experts.

Part of this change may be simple reaction. Part is undoubtedly due to a change in actual circumstance. Those who are in need in a period of economic boom are likely to be more dependent than those in need in a depression and thus offend more against the cultural norm. Part may be due to actual experience. There are undoubtedly those who appear, at least, to become dependent on relief or 'who have found somewhat unrealistic ways to make themselves eligible for relief although there is no clear evidence that the system of relief, and not other factors in the culture, has led to this dependency.2o But what is much more significant is the growing tendency, in the psychoanalytically oriented social work profession itself, to approve these changes in our relation ship to the poor. There has been a turning away from social work's single-minded effort to help people find their own solutions and a tendency to assume more 'and more willingly the functions of social control.

The beginnings of this change in social work temper can be traced to the middle 1940's, but until recently it has been im plicit rather than explicit. When, in 1953, I tried to show that I believed this was happening, I was accused, not without justice, of "misrepresenting the field" and quoting authors out of context. 21 166 Psychiatry and Responsibility At that time the indications were straws in the wind, more or less unconscious claims to control set within an ethic which said consciously quite the opposite. To some extent this is still true. There are many rationalizations, familiar to anyone who is aware, for instance, of the rationale for colonialism or for white supremacy, that conformity with the culture's values is what the client really wants; that responsible choice is possible only if man can be freed from disabling attitudes, or that influence and per suasion do not involve the imposition of standards in the same way as·do command and exhortation. But recently the trend has become too obvious to be denied. The ethic of the social worker's responsibility is replacing that of the client's rights to his own decisions. The caseworker's "authority" has become a common place. One well-known and respected practitioner has proposed a graded set of relationships between client and worker, some more authoritative and some less so, according to the client's believed capacity for self-direction. 22 In a single number of a widely accepted professional periodical there appear in three successive articles the statements that social workers may need to be authoritative (although not authoritarian),23 that they must act as the instruments of social control and social change,24 and that social work needs to reassert its earlier faith in the plasticity of man. 25 This again would not be significant if it were merely a read justment, a minor movement in response to a former unrealistic permissiveness. What makes it important, however, and pertinent to the discussions of this symposium, is the rationale of this move ment and its similarity with developments in other areas of HPU thought.

The rationale is one of knowledge. It is the equation: Knowl edge equals the right to contro1.26 And this knowledge is psychi atric and sociological-that is, a knowledge about people in their most intimate lives. The knowledge that the social worker of the 1930's took from Freud filled him with humility. He saw in it the likeness of man to man. He reached it with something of the Calvinist's awe in face of the "unchangeable decree" of pre destination. Although hoping to find in it a means of help, he was Psychoanalytic Thinking and the Relief of the Poor 167 impressed with the need not to impose values on a client, believ ing, indeed, that all sets of values were suspect in view of th,e unconscious bias of their possessors, including the social worker himself. To use a phrase from Norman Brown, "The doctrine of the universal neurosis of mankind is the psychological analogue of the theological doctrine of original sin." 27 But at th~ sam~ time the social worker's insistence that the psychiatric knowledge that he was using was "scientific" held within it the temptation to pride.

Three insights drawn from other fields may be of help here. One is Erich Voegelin's concept of what he calls "gnosticism" in the political sphere. A "gnostic," in Voegelin's difficult vocabulary, is one who. believes himself to have an exclusive revelation of truth and who attempts to create the Kingdom of God on earth in accordance with it. This occurs, Voegelin contends, through an immanentization of God-that is, the location of the ultimate power in society rather than outside it.28 In Voegelin's thinking, Freud, Calvin, and Marx were equally "gnostics." The likeness between the judgmentalism of the saint and that of the psychii trist then becomes apparent. But, it might be suggested, "gnosti cism" resides not so much in the system of thought itself as in the claims made for it. It is not psychoanalysis that is at fault, but those who claim for it an ultimate authority. "Gnosticism" begins where Calvinism stops, proclaiming the miracle of unmerited Grace and begins to claim in the name of this miracle that men should live by its deduced morality. It begins when Freud stops treating patients and makes patients of half the world. 29 "Gnosticism" arises, in fact, when a social science fails to recognize its ultimate dependence on a system of values wholly distinct from it and develops a Weltanschaung of which it is itself the base.30 This is why Voegelin's insight about transcendence and immanence is so valuable. Culturally oriented psychiatrists may and do argue that their researches have discovered inman dependency needs that justify a more authoritative approach. But all that this means is that if such needs are fulfilled, this will help man to achieve certain ends that, at the moment, our culture finds acceptable)H Psychiatry cannot say that these are good ends,· 168 Psychiatry and Responsibility although, in giving to them the authority of science, it can help to disguise their relative nature. What those who claim authority in the name of psychiatric knowledge are, in fact, doing is to admit that the tendency of our cultural relationships is to become more authoritative and, under the illusion that they are creating values, to surrender the power of this science to those who would wield authority for quite unscientific reasons.

The second insight is one about the fate of any system that starts by considering man as naturally good. "This buoyant atti tude," says one writer even before World War II, "which built its confidence on belief in Man, that he needed God no longer, has ended in such a disbelief in Man, such radical distrust in human nature, that the world is half-paralyzed by reason of it." 32 The process is well illustrated by the French and Russian revo lutions. Both started with the belief that man, freed froln his chains, would naturally act responsibly, would even, as Lenin held, not need a state to control him. Both, having created utopia, found man as irresponsible as before; each had to find some reason to explain this anomaly and found it in assuming subversion from foreign sources or incorrect ideology. Each re sulted in a system of rigorous control. The answer of the Freudian gnostic, faced with the same problem, is that man must be sicker than he thought. It is therefore not without significance to find, in the same number of the national social-work periodical referred to above, the follow ing statement: Sharper social study methods and increased psychiatric knowledge bring us daily more usable information about the uncontrolled im pulsivity, the impairment in capacity to form relationships, and the ego and superego defectiveness of those whose social and emotional dysfunctioning comes to our attention.~3 Science in the hands of its gnostic enthusiasts must inevitably find man progressively sicker, because it can regard him only as an object-and objectively man is entirely inadequate to the demands made on him both by society and by God. It is only Psychoanalytic Thinking and the Relief of the Poor 169 man as subject who can transcend these limitations. It looks, in fact, paradoxically, that a lively sense of man's limitations, in cluding those of the wielders of power, is necessary before one can recognize man's potential. In theological terms "original sin"

is a necessary prepostulate to Grace. And this prepostulate, para doxically, the Puritan did not have. He saw original sin in the poor, but Grace only in the relation to the saints. And this, again perhaps paradoxically, the "nonjudgmental" social worker of the 1930's had in abundance, not in a theological form, but ina sense of man's common irrationality. But a sense of man's limitations in itself is only half the answer. Without a sense of purpose, this knowledge leads only to despair. And it is this teleological or even eschatological sense that HPU thinking lacks. Our present psychiatry is no exception. Although it believes in man, it offers very little content that makes man or his life worthwhile. Its utopia is hardly worth the effort, consisting largely, in the popular mind at least, of a free dom from tension or struggle reminiscent of the most vapid of Nirvanas, without even the Puritan's joy in finding entirely un merited Grace. Kenneth Keniston has suggested that our present state of "alienation" or lack of purpose is due to the fact that we have repressed into our unconscious all our aspirations. 34 He notes the effort of a number of American psychoanalysts to develop positive terms, including Horney's "real self" and Fromm's "creative personality," but these offer very little beside a concept like that of Berdyaev's "personality," which transcends the limita tions of the natural and social world and gives to man absolute worth.

It may ,veIl be, indeed, that the problem of the 1960's may not be the tensions and anxieties to which we have become accustomed in the 1940's and 1950's. If this is so, psychoanalysis may have little to offer. There is beginning to accumulate evidence in social work, as in other fields, that in one sense man's ego has been working too well, although the phenomenon can also be described as an "ego deficiency." Man may have learned to insulate himself against anxiety, and the rnajor psychological problem of the future may well be the attitude of "what's the use?" The 1960's 170 Psychiatryand Responsibility may be the era of the alienated, the beatnik, the rebel without a cause. It has been recently suggested that, in fact, juvenile de linquency, as it is known in New York, for instance, is an attempt on the part of youngsters to find some code that offers content and 10yalty.35 This may help to explain, for instance, why a helping profes sion, bound by its nature to be pragmatic, is apparently turning again to the concept of the social worker as the "ego-ideal, the personification of the core-culture." ~6 For if the problem is lack of content, and there is no eschatological hope, there is little else to offer but what the worker is, had, and has. The fact that the social worker is himself a product of an increasingly con tentless culture only underlines the hopelessness of the situation.

This leads to the third insight, that of Berdyaev when he says: The error of humanism certainly did not lie in the fact that it laid too great an emphasis upon man ... but in the fact that it did not give sufficient emphasis to man, that it did not carry its affirmation of man through to the end, that it could not guarantee the independ~ ence of man from the world and included within itself a danger of enslaving man to society and nature. 37 It is this affirmation that psychoanalysis, as its concepts are popularly used, '''ould seem to lack, and that may have led, not only to its use as a measure of social control in the name of a not too admirable culture, but to certain attributes in that culture itself, such as its identification of all change, all struggle, with trauma and loss, not only for the sick but for the supposed well. Popularized psychoanalysis, like all forms of HPU thought, it might be suggested, constantly underrates man while pro fessing an unrealistic belief in his worth.

About the specific effects of this kind of hegemony of the social scientist and, even more, about the effects of its content on those on relief-whether, for instance, it has made them more or less self-reliant-a social ,,,orker is not equipped to write. He may believe, as I believe, that psychiatric concepts are more a symptom than a cause of a cultural change. But he is not an applied socioloPsychoanalytic Thinking and the Relief of the Poor 171 gist or any other kind of applied social scientist. The one thing he cannot afford to do is to regard people as objects or to forget that his competence, whatever knowledge he needs or may use, lies not in knowing about people, but in entering into a helping relationship with them. Indeed, the tendency of many modern social workers to behave like social scientists is a sign of the condition with which this paper deals. But about this relation ship a social worker is legitimately concerned and may properly express his concern for what it means for our society.

The present condition of this relationship and the part that psychoanalytic knowledge has played in it may be summarized thus. Psychoanalytic knowledge came to social work, and ulti mately thereby to our relationship with our least powerful and neediest people, as Berdyaev said of humanism as a whole, as "a dialectic movement in the revelation of human personality." 38 It was desperately needed. It made possible a leap of the imagina tion, an outpouring of love, that we cannot afford to neglect. But it was in itself insufficient. In the remarkably short time of twenty-five years 39 it has begun to be used as an instrument of social control. As yet the relationship so created is not as harmful as that which it superseded. It is in the hands of a profession with a great deal of good will but within the framework of which certain tendencies toward the devaluation of man are working, as sin or error always work within the framework of good rather than in opposition to it, so that the judgmentalism of the social scientist and the judgmentalism of the Puritan are seen to be far more alike than they are different. To devaluate a man because he is maladjusted is not essentially different from devaluating him as a sinner. 4o We are faced also by the fact that psychiatry has in many ways a power that religious moralism never had. In the end, religious moralism was bound by its own revelation and could discover, as it has in neo-orthodox thought, the vanity of its pretensions.

But science has no such checks. It may be indicative that extra polations, serious as Brave New World and 1984} or popular as the mass of science-fiction, consistently cast psychiatrist and psychologist in the role of powerful forces for conformity and 172 Psychiatry and Responsibility subservience. There are echoes of this in the popular fear of brain-washing and subliminal advertising. In the testing labora tory that the helping relationship offers there are more than suggestions that under pressure our society may be willing to yield personality to the ideals of adaptation and adjustment and, in doing so, make of psychiatry its tool. The task is not to deny psychoanalysis. A return to moral judgmentalism is unthinkable, even if it were possible to turn the clock back in this way. The task is rather to use psychoanalytic thought in a controlled way, to provide it with a framework and a missing dimension, to recognize its use as a tool and not as the creator of values. It is to find, or prepare the way for, the next step in the dialectic.

In what form this step can or will take place is a moot question. It does seem clear that what is needed is a renewed humility and a sense of awe. It must become clear, somehow, that even to claim the possibility of knowing enough about a man to justify one in assuming, on one's own initiative, power to control his life in its intimate dimensions is both ultra vires and a ridiculous pre tension. Men must, of course, sometimes assume certain powers over their fellows, as parents, warders, judges, or teachers, and it is desirable that these people have psychological knowledge ade quate to their tasks. But there is a great difference between exer cising necessary power to the best of one's always incomplete knowledge and ability, and claiming the right to control others by virtue of a belief that knowledge makes one competent to do so. Even if another's behavior seems· to us childish, a democracy can not afford to treat anyone of its adult citizens as a child until he has been legally-that is, by due process of proof-declared incompetent. Nor, incidentally, can it afford under any circum stances to declare a substantial proportion of its citizens to be incapable of directing themselves. 41 It may be clear that my own personally preferred solution of the problem of rediscovering humility is a theological one. This is not a matter of replacing psychology with theology. The former, particularly I would aver in its psychoanalytic form, offers too many useful insights and is, in any case, of a different order of Psychoanalytic Thinking and the Relief of the Poor 173 expertise. But I do see the need to undergird it with certain prop ositions about men's relationship to one another and to the universe that psychoanalytic thinking cannot in itself supply, and I do, myself, believe that theology offers the clearest exposi tion of what this relationship can be. I therefore welcome what seeIllS to Ille a valuable and iIllportant, although generally un recognized, growth of a social-work practice based on theological tenets but making use of psychoanalytic knowledge. Others who distrust theology or have unhelpful associations with its termi nology may arrive at the same conclusions in some other way.

What does seem to me indisputable is that some moral reorganiza tion, political, philosophical or procedural, is necessary if psycho analytic theory is to become again an ally rather than an enemy of our common desire to preserve human personality. NOTES 1. A. Delafield Smith, "Community Prerogative and the Legal Rights and Freedom of the Individual," Social Security Bulletin~ IX (August, 1946), 8. 2. This point is made very forcibly in regard to psychiatrists by Norman O. Brown, Life Against Death (New York, 1959), p. 112, and in D. W. Harding's review of Philip Rieff's "Freud: The Mind of a Moralist" in the Spectator~ February 12, 1960, p. 226, and in regard to social work by Gisela Konopka, Eduard C. Lindeman and Social Work Philosophy (Minneapolis, 1958), p. 185. The "recantation" can be found in New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (London, 1933), p. 159. 3. Clara Thompson, Psychoanalysis: Evolution and Development New York, 1957), p. 192.

4. As late as 1940 there were fourteen states that deprived persons re ceiving public aid of the right to vote. See Edith Abbott, Public Assistance: American Principles and Policies (Chicago, 1940), I, 127, 220-1. 5. The classic case in which a farmer receiving disaster relief after a drought lost title to his children on this ground alone is ]. H. E. Ackley vs. A. A. Tinker~ 26 Kan. 485 (1881). 6. See Beatrice Webb, My Apprenticeship (London, 1926), pp. 173-4. 7. Philip Klein, "Social Work," Encyclopediaof the Social Sciences, XIV, 168. 8. Hertha Kraus, "The Role of Social Casework in American Social Work," in Cora Kasius (ed.), Principles and Techniques in Social Casework, Selected Articles 1940-50 (New York, 1950), p. 139.

174 Psychiatry and Responsibility 9. Karl de Schweinitz, People and Process in Social Security (Washington, 1948), p. 25. 10. Particularly by Karen Horney, The Neurotic Personality of Our Time (New York, 1937). II. Lionel Trilling, Freud and the Crisis of Our Culture (Boston, 1935), p.48. 12. R. B. Perry, Puritanism and Democracy (New York, 1944), p. 95. 13. Bertha Reynolds, Re-Thinking Social Case Work (San Diego, 1938), p. 15. 14. Grace Marcus, The Nature of Service in Public Assistance Administra tion (Public Assistance Report No. 10 [Washington, 1947]), p. 29. 15. Herbert Bisno, The Philosophy of Social Work (Washington, 1953), p.5. 16. Published by the National Co-ordinating Committee of Social Service Employee Groups, 1934-42. 17. 1956 Amendments to the Act. The Act as it now stands is quite ambiguous. It retains many of its "rights" features and at the same time enunciates a purpose that seems to contradict its content.

18. "Suitable home" provisions require that a parent maintain a "suitable home" before assistance is given. They should be clearly distinguished from general measures to protect neglected children, since they permit, in many cases, assistance to be withdrawn without legal action to remove the child from the home or, alternatively, lead to the removal of children from conditions that would not have this result if the family had not asked for assistance. 19. See, for instance, Report to the President of the President's Committee on Economic Security (Washington, 1935), p. 36. There is, of course, some change here in cultural expectancy. 20. There does not seem to be any clear evidence that restrictive measures have in any way dealt with this problem. What reaction there has been is, on the whole, most unrealistic and has sought to control through relief what is in fact a symptom of a progressive lack of content in our society. Thus, for instance, the sudden rise in illegitimate births in the last few years is hardly attributable to relief policies that have been constant for the past twenty years, but is likely to be much more related to the absence of father persons in the early years of a war generation and to a progressive lack of meaning in a somewhat rudder less age.

21. Alan Keith-Lucas, "The Political Theory Implicit in Social Casework Practice," American Political Science Review, LXVII (December, 1953), 1079-91, and Notes and Comments by the editor, "Casework Labelled Undemocratic," Social Science Review) XXVIII (June, 1954), 205-6. 22. Elliott Studt, "Worker-Client Authority Relationships in Social Work," Social Work) Vol. IV, No.1 (January, 1959), p. 23. 23. Berta Fantl, "Integrating Psychological, Social, and Cultural Factors in Assertive Casework," Social Work) Vol. III, No. 4 (October, 1958), p. 32. 24. Kermit Wiltse, "The 'Hopeless' Family," ibid.} p. 19.

Psychoanalytic Thinking and the Relief of the Poor 175 25. Ruth Ellen Lindenburg, "Hard to Reach: Client or Casework Agency?" ibid.~ p. 29. 26. This claim, almost in these words, is made by Jeannette Regensburg when s4e upholds the right of the social worker to intervene in people's lives in a way that had been considered improper since predepression days because "the ethic of responsibility is set within a framework of know ledge and skills unknown to those who worked many years before us:' (Regensburg, "Reaching Children Before the Crisis Comes," Social Casework~ XXXV [March, 1954], 106.) 27. Norman O. Brown, Life Against Death, p. 6. 28. Erich Voegelin, The New Science of Politics (Chicago, 1952), spe cifically pp. 129 and 147. 29. Freud himself criticized Adler for attempting to do this (Collected Papers [London, 1924], I, 388), but later seems to have yielded to the same temptation.

30. Fromm's insistence that Freud was a pioneer in ethics and that the "genital character" is in itself moral is a case in point. Erich Fromm, Man for Himself: An Enquiry into the Psychology of Ethics (New York, 1947), p. 36. 31. Fromm's distinction between "rational" and "irrational" authority has been helpful in rationalizing the social worker's assumption of author ity here. 32. F. R. Barry, The Relevance of Christianity (London, 1933), pp. 111-112. 33. Lindenburg, "Hard to Reach," p. 25. 34. Kenneth Keniston, "Alienation and the Decline of Utopia," American Scholar, XXIX (Spring, 1960), 191. 35. Joseph Margolis, "Juvenile Delinquents: The LatterDay Knights," American Scholar, XXIX (Spring, 1960), 211-18. 36. Wiltse, "The 'Hopeless' Family," p. 19. 37. Nicholas Berdyaev, Slavery and Progress (New York, 1944), p. 44. 38. See Berdyaev, Ope cit., p. 44. 39. Counting from the passage of the Social Security Act to the date of writing this paper.

40. Clara Thompson wrote of this danger in her discussion of the culturally oriented psychoanalysis, specifically Fromm, Psychoanalysis: Evolution and Development, p. 211. 41. Lest this argument be used to advocate the reduction of relief rolls by the simple expedient of refusing relief to those in need, let me point out that in order for man to act in an independent manner he must have the means to do so. Genuine need is, in fact, a far greater producer of dependency than adequate relief.

9 Psychiatry and Economic Organization DAVID MCCORD WRIGHT There is a story about a landscape gardener who became an architect-not because he originally planned to be one-but be· cause people "would keep building houses in his gardens." My psychological and psychiatric knowledge, such as it is, has the same sort of derivation. Many students of those disciplines do keep building houses in my garden. I mean they keep advancing ideas either avowedly about economics or of profound im· portance to economics and the organization of economic life. It is particularly in the case of economic growth and of the transi· tion to effective political democracy that one finds oneself con fronted with precisely the basic aspects of phenomena with which the psychologist and the psychiatrist concern themselves. And, in my opinion, it is just not possible to reach real understanding of the political and of the growth problem unless one is prepared to cope with psychological and psychiatric ideas. As I find this relationship of economic growth to psychiatry far from self· evident to many people, particularly those untrained in economics, it may be well to stop here for a brief explanation.

176 Psychiatry and Economic Organization 177 I One of the most widely accepted and noncontroversial ideas in economics is the "law of diminishing returns." More a tech nological than an economic principle? "diminishing returns" means that, if we hold methods of production unchanged and increase the supply of anyone aid to production, the rest remain ing unchanged, the increments of resulting output eventually will decline. Some fertilizer, for example, stimulates a plant, more has little effect, still more kills it! Malthus felt that laws of this sort applied to economic growth generally. Hence his prediction that population would constantly tend to outstrip wealth, keeping man in "misery" or at a subsistence level. Now, one of the main factors that has prevented Malthus' pre dictions from· being fulfilled in the West has been the activity of the inventors. "Diminishing returns" still holds as a general principle, but each time an important new invention is made, we move on to a higher technical plane and a new area of expansion appears before the "diminishing" begins to take effect. Thus, scientific change lies at the base of economic growth.

But the area of change is much greater than simple invention. Even if no new technique is involved, mere expansion neverthe less implies some venture into the unknown. For the techno logical relationships alter as the scale of a project is increased. For example, if we took a blueprint of a yacht and simply doubled every dimension, it is quite possible that the yacht, upon being launched, would immediately capsize. The historical record is full of failures of this kind, from factories to boats, where mere size was increased without adequate forethought. An especially telling case of this occurred with the introduction of the Salk vaccine. It had been found safe when applied to large population groups, but still from batches of vaccine produced in relatively small lots. The formula and margin for safety, however, unex pectedly no longer were true when the vaccine, without being checked in the intermediate steps, had to be produced for the whole United States population, this time in larger units. Several 178 Psychiatry and Responsibility deaths occurred. In Canada, by contrast, with a much smaller population, the original method for production of the vaccine could be retained, and no adverse cases were reported. l Finally, as output rises, the pattern of consumers' wants will change. The man who lives in one small house will not necessarily live in two small houses. He may want a bigger house. The man who drinks a bottle of beer a day will not often drink a barrel of beer a day. He will try something else. Thus, in any growing society in which any effort is made to satisfy the consumer to any degree, the directors of production will be confronted from time to time with shifts in wants, quite often unforeseeable. Hence, economic growth under any type of social organization is, to a considerable degree, always a risky venture into the unknown, for frequently the full impact of a change is only discoverable by changing. If, therefore, the individuals composing a nation lack the personal self-confidence to run risks and venture into the unknown, if the rank and file are too frightened to tolerate change, the nation will not develop. It will be evident, however, that a man's personal self-confidence is related to how he views life and how he sees hims.elf. What sort of life-view he derives from psychiatric ideas, among others, can thus be an important influence upon the general rate of economic progress.

Politically, too, as later explained in this paper, the individual's psychiatric balance is important. The satisfactory voter would be neither gullible, terrified, irrationally envious, intolerant, nor mentally dependent. I submit that if men cannot rule themselves to· some degree, they can scarcely be left free from external com pulsion, if society is to endure. The ultimate base of successful democracy is character. And again the individual's range of self control is, in considerable degree, a function of the ideas he entertains about himself and his place in the world. Thus, we reach the conclusion that to analyze the achievements of a civiliza tion we must first begin with the culture concept, or the Zeitgeist -frequently a function of a nation's religion (as well as its psychiatry)-and then build out to its institutions, laws, and eco nomic structure. Also, A. N. Whitehead has shown that even a nation's science has similar roots in its cosmology.2 Psychiatry and Economic Organization 179 The suggested techniques involve a discussion of religious ideas, which may be distasteful. But surely no one can deny that, on a purely scientific plane, religion has been an important factor in culture. We must therefore allow for it and examine it, whether we happen to be believers or not. References to religious concepts appearing in the remainder of this paper, therefore, should be read in that light. They are important ideas, practically speaking, whether one considers them objectively true or not.

It will also be helpful, before we return to the main stream of our analysis, to explain just what we are trying to evaluate here in connection with psychoanalysis and psychiatry. The therapeutic value of the confessional technique has been realized for ages" particularly, in more recent times, by the Christian church. Freudian emphasis upon various sources of maladjustments-the Oedipus complex, etc.--eertainly brings out one source of possible dislocation that no scientifically minded person could deny, al.. though the degree of· novelty involved in the "discovery" can be easily overemphasized. But when the psychoanalyst or psychiatrist, particularly the Freudian, goes beyond individual therapy or counseling and attempts to generalize his doctrines as the sale or nearly sole source of social disease, or when he asserts that a particular social taboo is irrational or evil, or when he lays down schemes for social reconstruction based more or less unilaterally upon his ideas, then he has ventured into the field of general social science. And it is at this point that we are justified in beginning our evaluation and criticism. With these qualifications in mind, we may proceed to the main stream of our analysis.

II In one of the classic treatises upon the nature and significance of economic science, one finds the subject defined as "the science dealing with the allocation of scarce means among alternative ends." The economist generally holds that the wants of "free" men are "insatiable"-not that the want for anyone good is in satiable, but that history shows that, in a reasonably "open" cul ture, new wants appear about as fast, on the average, as new 180 Psychiatry and Responsibility means of production. The economist, therefore, holds that "scar city," in the sense that everybody cannot have all he wants of everything, is, again on the average, a permanent characteristic of social life. Economics is therefore built around the need for choice. The author of the treatise mentioned above-Professor Lord Robbins-points out how all-embracing the choice problem is in the real world. One can be an architect or a lawyer, a great painter or a great scientist. I have known a vocational guidance expert who told me that the hardest type for him to advise (and the person who often found it hardest to succeed, in any worldly sense anyhow) was the "well-rounded" person with many apti tudes. The only way to deal with such a person, he said, was to give him so demanding a career that he would not spend too much time thinking about the other things he might be doing. If such a person were not so fortunate as to hit reasonably early upon an adequate challenge, he might well scatter his efforts in too many directions and accomplish far less than other much less gifted men. "Your economist," again quoting our economic treatise, "is a true tragedian." 3 Now with this outlook on life, how do psychology and psychiatry appear?

With great respect I cannot help feeling that the three char acteristics of much I now read in, say, the mental-health literature are (a) innocence, (b) ignorance, (c) narrowness .. Let me explain. By "innocence" I mean a happy unawareness of the tragic aspects inherent in existence. By "ignorance" I mean a failure to explore thoroughly the objective range of social choices. By "narrowness" I mean that a few important, but limited, aspects of human per sonality are seized upon for intense overdevelopment. The part, in other words, is mistaken for the whole. But psychiatry and allied fields are not alone in this tendency toward one-sidedness. Many writers in my own field of economics are also just now recovering from a similar attack of one-sidedness. Let me explain. In our society inequality of money income and of wealth has been so outstandingly a source of other kinds of in equality, and conflicts over income and wealth have been such a source of friction, ~hat around the middle of the nineteenth cen tury the view developed that if only we got rid of those forms of Psychiatry and Economic Organization 181 inequality and conflict, we would get rid of all inequality and conflict. In the same way, if we got rid of economic insecurity, we could get rid of all insecurity. The history of European socialism, and not only of socialism, in the last hundred years is very largely the history of the slow (but now rapid) crumbling of these beliefs under the lessons of ex.perience. Yet may I suggest that what inequality of income was to the social view of, say, Bernard Shaw or G. D. H. Cole, sex has been to many psychia trists-an undoubtedly important factor and source of disturb ance, but magnified out of all proportion as ~pe sole or nearly sole factor and source of disturbance.

Coming to more practical problems, how do I, as a "growth" economist and hence unavoidably (as e,xplained above) a student of comparative 'cultures, see human nature and the human mind~ Well, the first aspect that impresses me is a very great variety and plasticity. I mean that human life has a wide range of possibilities and that, in consequence, various cultures have picked a varying series of attributes to develop. But the really basic point to recognize is that development means specialization. Some societies specialize in ritual orgasms; some specialize in sociability; some in oratory and elaborate status-seeking; some in war; some in hunting; some in art; some in contemplation; some in work; and so on. But always the excellence in a particular attribute is ob tained by some neglect of other attributes. There is (or was) a school of thought at Columbia College and elsewhere to the effect that capitalism was the result of "sexual frustration." This always seemed to me a good example of how one can be very nearly right and yet entirely wrong. I mean that it is true that our society is more "work-valuing" (if I may coin a phrase) than orgiastic. We do stress one set of human poten tialities more than another. But it seems to me a complete non sequitur to treat the achievements in the (culturally) preferred line as merely a pathological manifestation of a "frustrated"

natural urge, which by a tacit (albeit often not quite recognized) normative judgment one says ought to be more satisfied. Might one not equally infer that at some earlier period of tribal history particular experiences led a group to come to prefer the total 182 Psychiatry and Responsibility pattern of existence (feelings) of a work-centered culture to the total pattern of existence (feelings) of a sex-centered culture? In a nutshell, if one must use this language, all cultures "frustrate" some urges and encourage others. The real question is, then, what is the best way to be frustrated? Or, putting it more construc tively (and accurately) what is the best line in which to be overdeveloped? III One of the great limitations of social thought is our highly restricted capacity for vicarious experience. We know and feel the uncomfortable aspects of our own culture, but we cannot really evaluate, comparatively, save through pale intellectual copies, the uncomfortable aspects of alternative cultures. Now modern man knows, first hand, the inconvenient side of an individualistic culture, in which there is usually plenty to eat, but where status and wealth are both insecure, needing to be worked for, and promiscuity is frowned upon. He does not kno,v first hand the inconvenient side of a family-type, static, tribal society, in which status is inherited and protected, sex receives wide liberty, but where frequently there is neither health nor enough to eat and hardly any opportunity for creative thought.

It is thus easy to get out on twigs in our social judgment. We are told by some mental health experts that the desire to make money is responsible for mental illness in our society, or that the "strain" of modern living is responsible. Here I have to stop for a moment to reverse my emphasis. All cultures, I have said, stress some aspects of personality and 'play .down others, and this is necessary for achievement. On the other hand, I must now admit that any aspect can be overstressed, any incentive can be overdone. But the problem of balance in life is a different prob lem from that of choosing incentives. There is a' naive notion that "unselfish" ambition is mentally healthier and less liable to distortion than private ambition. "Pecuniary ambition," it may be thought, is ignoble, but the ambition to serve the state is noble and mentally healthy.

Psychiatry and Economic Organization 183 In my books I have shown that some type of incentive is (a) unavoidable and (b) desirable and that all types of incentives can be sources of neurosis and, in theological language, occasions for sin.4 The reason that incentive is unavoidable is that authority is unavoidable. Even the sophisticated communist admits the need for technological authority, though he tries to deny the need for political authority in his eventually fully conditioned society. But, if authority is unavoidable, incentive is unavoidable, for to many people it is pleasant (an incentive) to have authority. Furthermore, incentive is often desirable since, by supplementing the pure instinct of workmanship, it increases the supply of effort in whatever happens to be the socially desired direction. Yet the incentive can also and always be a source of neurosis. The man lvho aims too high, say for office, I have pointed out in my books, can drive himself "crazy" just as easily as the man who becomes too obsessed with the money urge. I have said in other lectures that I a,vait a new play, "The Death of a Com missar," in which the happy farm boy determines to become a conspicuous state servant and drives himself mad, or to death, in pursuit of this aitn. And a very little research in literature will produce any number of books about men driven over the edge by "good" ambitions-to be bishops or prime ministers or what have you. One can start out, also, seeking power to do good and then unconsciously work over merely to wanting power. As to "occasions for sin," the record of mankind both in history and in literature is simply overwhelming as to what can be done once a man has allowed himself to be overpossessed of a noble ambition.

The civil servant can steal his subordinate's ideas, lie about his rivals, prostitute himself personally-all in pursuit of nonpecuni~ ary power. "To do good," he tells himself, but often really just for the sake of exercising power. I do not mean to imply that civil servants are any less moral than others; I merely want to point out that their incentives have accompanying dangers and tempta tions too. And the "Piltdown man" hoax, as C. P. Snow has reminded us quite recently, is a sufficient indication of what can happen even in the case of pure science.5 But shall we, therefore, say that it is wrong to try to achieve 184 Psychiatry and Responsibility or accomplish anything at all? Thorstein Veblen comes close to saying so. Particularly in the Instinct of Workmanship he very nearly identifies achievement with aggression. He there holds up, as the model for society, the smooth monotony of unin terrupted routine-an ideal which he was clear-sighted enough to realize was opposed to technical progress. Veblen, for example, regarded the invention of the telephone as a social disaster.

Yet in Veblen we have a particularly outstanding example of a good brain lacking an adequate sense of social balance. He did not realize that his ideal society would not have the one thing that made his own life bearable (it was not a very happy life, I might say, and not for lack of sex)-namely, the chance to use one's brain creatively. War is often attributed to hunger. But my guess is that, among primitive peoples at least, an equal source of war was boredom ! For war can be a highly intellectual exercise and, save for a very limited field of art and ritual, it is almost the only field open for an intellectual man, in a primitive tribe, to use his talents. The oriental myth that attributes the invention of chess to a pacific prime minister who wished to give his bel licose master some other way of passing his time thus expresses a profound truth. Many of us can no more be happy without using our brains than without using our other organs.

As for the "strain" of modern life, when was life not a strain? Our pioneer ancestors, say on the Oregon trail, in the Yemassee War, and during the Deerfield Massacre were certainly not leading lives of quiet contemplation. Mediaeval life is seen as peaceful and quiet only in stained glass windows. Go back to prehistoric man wending his way between mammoths and sabre toothed tigers just to get each bite to eat. Was he free from strain? Nonsense. Modern life is not physically or objectively a greater strain, I submit. The trouble is a less effective mental outlook for bearing strain. But we must postpone for a while discussing the full implications of this point. What all the world wants, of course, is to eat its cake and have it too. Here in fact is a practical issue that may well blow us and all our works quite literally off the earth. For what the "unde veloped" nations want today is not economic growth on any terms, Psychiatry and Economic Organization 185 but economic growth on impossible terms. 1 mean that they want not just a Western standard of living, but to be "magicked" into a Western standard of living while retaining the sociability and the status and the "feasts" and the family relations of all sorts that they now have. But this is just the one combination that is impossible. 6 There is not enough wealth in the world to do it on doles, even if we left aside the Malthusian dilemma. What is needed is a tremendous increase in production. But Western pro duction, 1 have shown elsewhere, is rooted in the culture concepts and politico-economic patterns of Western society. And not so much in present concepts and patterns as in those formerly pre vailing. (I wonder in fact if part of the success of Japan in in dustrializing itself was not due to the fact that Samuel Smiles rather than Kenneth Galbraith was the best seller when they returned to large-scale contact with the Occident. Self-Help rather than The Affluent Society. But this is a secondary point.) The basic issue is that growth, as we have comm,enced by ex plaining, comes through change and causes change, and that it can easily be shown that continued effective growth requires a radical readjustment of the whole pattern of culture. Now the undeveloped nations do not know the real choice before them, and we are not telling them, partly because many of us no longer know what it is, and partly because it upsets too many United States interest groups to say it. The social chaos that may emerge when a people who think they are being let into a candy store discover what the price of economic growth really is, is something 1 hesitate to think of.

IV Returning now to the main line of our thought, the basic point I am trying to make is that all achievement involves selec tion and that all selection has a price in forgone alternatives. We should not, therefore, ask merely whether there is a price and weep over it as Hfrustration," which is what much psychiatric thought tacitly does, but we should ask whether the final pattern is worth the effort involved in producing it. The Christian ideal 186 Psychiatry and Responsibility of marriage is in no sense a denial of the difficulties involved and the failures risked. The assumption is that, by channeling the sex instinct into a deeper groove, one achieves a more satisfying total ultimate pattern of existence. True, family life can some· times be Mauriac's Noeud de viperes and Freud's family "ro· mance," but it can also be many other things. We know the emotional complications involved in monogamy. Our literature has no comparable dissection of the emotional complications in· volved in polygamy (though the Old Testament and a study of Muslim dynastic history would furnish a wide field for the corn..

parative psychologist) nor in polyandry. At some point some group came to prefer our pattern. I sometimes wonder if much of our reference to primitive cultures were not a little like our try ing to rebreed the Eohippus. I mean that these various arrested cultures are in the same position as anatomical "missing links." They are the discarded, unsuccessful social experiments. To hold them up as relevant patterns for today is much as if one were to substitute the ape man of Java for the Hermes of Praxiteles as an anatomical model. But, in talking so much of alternatives and total products, we are sidestepping what is, perhaps, the basic question: Is man a rational, self-determining being, and what are the consequences upon political life of a negative answer to this question? So much of discovery is terminology and "projection"! As I watch the Id, the Ego, and the Superego, and "Eros" and "Thanatos" chasing one another through the jungle of modern literature, I cannot help feeling that here are the products of a brilliant imagination being unconsciously projected into the data, much as Charcot is said to have unconsciously projected his triad into his subjects.

The psychiatrist often reads his "facts" into the data, and from lack of effective scientific controls he frequently deceives himself in so doing. 7 I have encountered some egregious examples of this kind of thing. I thus doubt the scientific factual base of a good deal of psychoanalytic analysis and theory. On the other hand, as we began by saying, Freud does develop some of the possible sources of maladjustment. The existence of the subconscious, for example, of the deeply irrational drives, of distorting obsessions Psychiatry and Economic Organization 187 would have been no "news" to the authors of the New Testament. But they felt that that was not the whole story. The real question is: Shall 'we go beyond the recognition of some conditioning to view man simply as a determined mechanism, capa~le of being taken to pieces like the nuts and bolts of a machine. Here, however, language catches us in a curious trap. When ,ve say that Joe did something because he preferred X to Y) all we are actually doing is recording the tact of choice. But the use of the word because brings in the (often unrealized) inference that Joe had to choose X-the psychic pull of X was greater than that of Y. Joe is treated as a passive agent-a needle pulled by magnets of varying strength. The whole delicate process of reflexive self-criticism, imaginative reconstruction of the problem, weighing of hypotheses, and so on is erased in a bland tautology.s If we are not careful, we will find that what we "explain" we illicitly determine.

There is no profit in my following this problem into its technical literature. 1 am dealing here pragmatically. However difficult it may be to explain (there goes that word again), I hold that the existence of conscience and a measure of free will and self-determination should be treated as an empirically given fact. I, personally, derive great conviction from the generally ad mitted fact that people who believe they are responsible tend, on average, to behave differently-more responsibly-than those who do not so believe. I am, of course, familiar with the argu ment that, when we tell a child he has a conscience, we create the conscience, which previously did not exist. But (a) I do not believe that all conscience has to be intruded from outside-one can have some conscience JUSt as one can talk prose, without knowing the label-and (b) even if our telling him does fortify the activity, would it do so if the fact were not already essentially true?

Russian history, of all things, furnishes us with relevant source material. There is an excellent little book, The New Man in Soviet Psychology) by R. A. Bauer. 9 In it he points out that the Russians began, after the Bolshevik Revolution, in logical Marxist style, to treat people as mere products of social conditioning. The 188 Psychiatry and Responsibility word "crime" was abolished and people spoke instead of "social disease," to be remedied by changing environment. But all that is now discarded-not merely because the change in environment did not soon change behavior, but also because it was found that insistence upon environment produced an undesirably passive outlook. Today, Russian psychology stresses individual responsi bility in every possible way. The Russians have discarded Freud -explicitly-because they say that he has a man spending his life battling the past-that he can give no help in shaping the futureJo And I wonder if this psychological shift may not turn out to be one of the Russians' greatest sources of strength. I mean, if a tough-minded, self-reliant, responsible group comes up against an effete, irresponsible leave-it-to-society group-who 'will win? It does not matter that this emphasis on personal responsi bility is difficult to square with Leninist-Marxist ideas of social predestination. Inconsistency has seldom bothered a social gospel that has emotional appeal. Like Calvinism and Mohammedanism before it, abstract belief in predestination and stress on individual responsibility-combined-produce a wonderful mixture for active achievement.

In a pending study of the "Transition to Democracy," I point out that one of the elements of character needed in a good voter is a certain psychological independence. He should feel more responsible for the state than to the state. Deriving the meaning and purpose of life from personal, extrapolitical standards, he can criticize state behavior, not draw his own self-reassurance from reliance upon the state. This is the psychological fact behind the Catholic doctrine of the "two swords." But the modern man who believes himself to be merel y the hel plessly conditioned result of his family and social past-who has no private (non government) sources of conviction-such an individual makes a very poor citizen, all too easily prone to look toward the state as a supermother or father who will give him all the qualities, psychological and economic, that he believes he cannot give himself. But yet once more we have to reverse our emphasis. Man is not ,vholly rational. Man is not wholly free. Man is deeply shaped Psychiatry and Economic Organization 189 by the obsessions of the subconscious. And I have recently read various writings which maintained that this disproved the old fashioned liberal political point of view. This is an extraordinary misunderstanding. Classical liberalism of the Whig type, as distingushed from Rousseau's perfectionism, is expreSSly founded on a recognition of the irrational, the cruel, the evil elements in man's nature. Liberalism of the classical type seeks to confine these elements by limiting individual power, relying, on the one hand, upon the market to limit economic power and, on the other, upon the diffusion of political authority. Thus, our American orthodoxy, on the one hand, constantly appealed to and encouraged man's conscience and rational nature, and, on the other, sought to contain the cruel and irrational by allowing no man too great a control over others. Finally, it did not expect to do a perfect job in any respect, but, by a firmly realistic pessimism, thought that more would be accomplished, in practice, by aiming for a reachable, albeit imperfect, goal than the romantic goal of "all or nothing." But this leads us to our final point.

v Earlier in this essay I said that the real difference in modern life was not so much that it had more objective strain in it as that we were less prepared in our mental outlook for bearing strain. We have, in short, less peace in the ultimate meaning of the word. What, then, do I mean by "peace"? I will follow White head's definition: "A quality of mind steady in its reliance that fine action is treasured in the nature of things" (italics added).l1 According to my outlook on life, there are only three things man can be sure of in life: work, pain, and death. Even the very rich create work for themselves to escape boredom. Life is for everyone and always bound to be at some point a grim and pain ful business. We can remove some pains, ameliorate others, but there will be new disappointments, new stresses coming. The Freudian or neo-Freudian idea that, if everyone has "good" orgasms, all will be well is either tautologous or incredibly naive, springing from a disregard of all factors save one. What is good in 190 Psychiatry and Responsibility life we must largely make for ourselves. The qualities most worth having all have to be worked for-and paid for. Of course the rich find life easier, but only if they have the moral wisdom to make it that way. Living in society too is often a grim, silly, cruel business. We make it also bearable to the extent that many of us force ourselves to live up to a different standard from what innate ego would produce.

Now, if each time the ·shoe pinches, we run around like chickens with our heads cut off, convinced that if we only change society or make better use of "science" or something like that, all will be well, we will have no peace. But if, on the other hand, we go ahead, realizing that pains of some sort are bound to come, but being thankful for the good that does come, then we do find real happiness. If we realize that following our ideas of right will not necessarily make us rich or successful or "happy" in the obvious sense, but will help to give us a little more self-respect, then when evil comes we are not surprised, we are not· thrown into a panic, we are not overwhelmed. This is the only manly, strong outlook that will carry us through. In short, psychiatry may possibly tell us the sources of frustration, more or less accurately, but 'will not give us the assurance that pain too has its purpose and value, which is the real source of mental health in a world in which pain is from time to time inescapable.

Here we encounter the weakest point in the usual Freudian psychoanalytic technique. Let us suppose that, by confession on the part of the patient and by analysis on the part of the therapist, the root of the trouble has been discovered-we will suppose accurately. Say, next, that the patient has been brought to an admission and confrontation of the urge or maladjustment that is troubling him. What next? In many cases the analyst may have no real conviction that the patient is on an intrinsically wrong track. He may well. think that it is society that is wrong. All, then, that he can say is that it is inconvenient, society being organized as it now is, to violate the particular rule involved. We have here confession without either absolution or a decalogue. The nearest thing to absolution is to assure the patient that what he does is not really his fault anyhow, and the only positive sane..

Psychiatry and Economic Organization 191 tion is mere prudence. Is it any wonder, then, that, as Dr. Mowrer points out in this symposium, the therapy often either fails, or the patient develops a "character disorder" and starts "acting out"? In other words, being told, or inferring, that he is "sick" merely because of a bad society, and assured that there is no rational basis for the prohibition troubling him, he says, llThe hell with society!" and goes his own way. Of course, I realize that I am putting the matter extremely, but I do not think the descrip tion is far wrong as an account of psychiatric thought as it is interpreted by the general public-and acted upon. Contrast now a similar process of confession, analysis, and con frontation in, say, an explicitly Christian setting. The objective value of, and reason for, the restraint may be explained, while the denial is seen as a moral opportunity) rather than an unreasonable taboo. "Take up your cross and follow Me." There is repentance and compassion, on the one hand; insistence upon the value of righteousness, on the other. It is easy to dismiss all this as "super stition." But if the objective, scientific analysis of the first part of this paper is correct, do not these ideas meet the problem, while Freudianism in essence runs away from it?

The basic Freudian critique of religion is that it is an attempt to return to the womb, or to a mother or father image. But an alternative account is that it is an attempt to press forward to a basic understanding. Man, it can be said, is born with a funda mental drive toward intellectual understanding and reassurance, just as he is born with a need to eat. His parents are the first to feed him, and his parents are usually the first people to explain and interpret the world to him. But would anyone maintain that a man eats today only because his parents fed him forty years ago? 12 Why, then, should we say that he seeks ultimate understanding only because his parents were his first instructors? For all these reasons I cannot avoid the conclusion that the true basis of the achievements of the West lies in its metaphysical ideas -in a happy combination of beyond-world reassurance with eluphasis upon worldly activity. The pious did not forsake the world. On the contrary, the slave trade was abolished and the 192 Psychiatry and Responsibility prisons rendered more humane by precisely the people one would have expected to have been most hampered by the "opiate" of an otherworldly religion. The fact that they did not expect to make the world perfect did not keep them from trying to make bits of it better. If man has hope only in this life, he will tend either to cling desperately to whatever little shred of stability he has, in what seems fundamentally a vast, changing meaninglessness, or else he becomes a barbarian egotist, concealing his essential cos mic fright in a ruthless search for thrills and power.

NOTES 1. See Paul Meier, "Safety Testing of Poliomyelitis Vaccine," Science~ Vol. CXXV (May 31, 1957), pp. 1067-1071. 2. Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: Macmillan, 1925), chap. I; cf. David McCord Wright, "True Growth Must Come through Freedom," Fortune, December, 1959, and "The Open Secret of Economic Growth," Fortune} February, 1957. 3. Professor Lord Robbins, Essay on the Nature and Significance of Eco nomic Science (London: Macmillan, 2nd ed., 1949), p. 30. 4. David McCord Wright, "Moral, Psychological, and Political Aspects of Economic Growth," Ekonomisk Tidskrift~ October, 1954. 5. Cf. Science, Vol. CXXXIII, pp. 256 fE. 6. David McCord Wright, "Community, Mobility, Security-A Footnote on Economic Growth," Journal of Business of the University of Chicago} January, 1959. 7. When the psychologist deals with substantially controllable objective situations-rats running through mazes, fatigue studies, etc.-he is operating within the field of scientific research. In the psychoanalyst'S cubicle also, the diagnostician is at least hearing the patients' side however misconceived or misunderstood it may be. In what might be called observational or applied psychology, and human relations, how ever, such controls are often lacking. Many of the techniques used were evolved in intelligence and psychological warfare work and have little of pure science in them.

As Professor McNair of the Harvard Business School has said, a "sneaky love of power" may be involved. For example, if the attention of the subject is drawn by a rationally surprising object, no conclusion can be drawn unless the subject reacts "unduly." But what is undue? Can we trust the intuitive judgment of an unchecked observer eager to "prove" a theory (his) or to eliminate unsympathetic colleagues? The "unconfronted contradiction" casually elicited in conversation is equally deceptive. Perhaps there is a higher level of factual synthesis possible, which the subject could give-if asked. In the field of historical Psychiatry and Economic Organization 193 research he may have sources not known. Or there may be errors in his sources that are unknown to him. All of this would appear if the rules of fair play-which happen to be also the rules of scientific proof were evoked. These are only samples.

The fact is that psychological theories grow in such lush profusion that, given a small amount of biographical information on any indi vidual, I will guarantee, in ten minutes, to produce a plausible theory of "mental illness" to cover that individual's case. And if provided with the weapons often used, and the sort of post hoc reasoning often allowed, the chances are such a theory could be easily "proved" particularly if the subject is both normal and honest. 8. The essential point to grasp here is that an individual's ultimate choice is not a mere function of relative external pressures, but of how he imaginatively reconstructs or envisages the situation-including his assessment of consequences. A strong, powerfully logical brain can carry this much further than others. Yet the process is not just a chess game. Beliefs and emotion enter in, as well as past habits. But here too there is a feedback from the logical mechanism that can reverse beliefs and evoke off-setting emotions. I mean that a good logic "machine" can confront the emotive "apparatus" with an unexpected possibility pro ducing a strong "emotive" response. Vice versa, it would seem that sometimes a strong subconscious emotion can cut off the logic "machine."

Thus, each decision has ~n objectively indeterminate subjective element, sometimes negligible, sometimes important. 9. The New Man in Soviet Psychology (Cambridge: Harvard Press, 1952). 10. Bauer, ibid., p. 99. II. Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas (New York: Macmillan, 1933), p. 353. 12. Of course there is an area of conditioning here: "Pies like the ones mother used to make," "The same causes that made him a Christian in London would have made him a Buddhist in Peking." But the problems raised by comparative religion (manifestly impossible to be handled in this footnote) are not the same thing as the basic problem of the reasons for and rationality of the drive toward religions in general.

10 Psychoanalysis and the Writing of History DAVID SPRING I On the centenary of Freud's birthday Lionel Trilling ob served that Freud's ideas (which this essay will look to for the meaning of psychoanalysis) "have become an integral part of our modern intellectual apparatus ..• they are of prime importance to anthropology, to sociology, to literary criticism; even theology must take account of them." 1 This catalogue makes no mention of the writing of history. Is this an oversight on Trilling's part, or is it a deliberate omission? Has the writing of history gone untouched by what Trilling elsewhere described as "the only systematic account of the human mind which, in point of subtlety and complexity, of interest and tragic power, deserves to stand beside the chaotic mass of psychological insights which literature has accumulated through the centuries?" 2 In recent years a distinguished historian chose the occasion of his presidential address to the American Historical Association to answer this question in the affirmative. Professor William Langer urged historians to make themselves knowledgeable about psychoanalysis. This task, he declared, was their "next assign ment." His tone was reproachful. Their ignorance was "truly regrettable," evidence of a tendency "to become buried in their 194 Psychoanalysis and the Writing of History 195 own conservatism" ... indifferent to that opening of "new hori zons" which "our cousins in the natural sciences are constantly doing." 3 This is a formidable indictment. It is perhaps pitched too shrilly. Unfortunately presidential addresses are often solemn and hortatory, providing the professional m.an with a vicarious sense of sin-or virtue. Nonetheless, it would seem unwise to dismiss the admonitions of an historian who has not only served his craft well, but has devoted his life to its most austere branch, the history of diplomacy. It might therefore be profitable to scrutinize -more closely than Professor Langer does-what would seem to be an idiosyncrasy of historical writing.

It may be best to state at the outset that the truth of the Inatter is not simple. The writing of history has not, in fact, gone alto gether untouched by psychoanalysis; but a case might well be made that its influence should be extended. At the same time, if historians have shown less interest in psychoanalysis than, let us say, anthropologists have, they have had their reasons. This essay will seek to examine these reasons and to decide how far they go to forbid the consorting of historians and psychoanalysts. It might also be said by way of preface that this essay will take the writing of history to mean simply what the vast majority of professional historians do. They seek to answer a relatively modest question: What happened (and, less hopefully, why did it hap pen) in a particular society at a particular juncture of time? And their profession is so organized as to provide a great number of highly detailed answers to this question. They do not, however, (in the main) seek to answer that less modest question to which philosophers of history address themselves: Whither man? What is the ultimate meaning of human existence? As it is defined here, therefore, the writing of history will not include such works as Arnold Toynbee's A Study of History or Spengler's Decline of the West.

196 Psychiatry and Responsibility II It would seem to be a commonplace opinion among those psychoanalysts who have thought about the relation between his tory and psychoanalysis that their discipline bears a marked resemblance to the historian's. Not only (they say) do both disciplines share the same subject matter-the nature of man but they share the same method, the historical method. 4 Each seeks to reconstruct the past, the psychoanalyst being especially concerned to reconstruct the individual's childhood past. Dr. Erik Erikson, the well-known child analyst-and biographer of Martin Luther-has thus declared that "the psychoanalytic method is essentially a historical method." He adds, however, unlike his colleagues, that "the psychoanalyst is an odd, maybe a new kind of historian"; for (as he puts it), "in committing himself to influencing what he observes, he becomes part of the historical process which he studies." 5 This may strike the historian as less of an oddity than Dr.

Erikson thinks. If he is suggesting that the professional historian is altogether separated from the object of his study, historians themselves are likely to remind him that they are not in fact so remote from their subject matter-so objective-as he seems to imply. Historians may not set themselves up as therapists, as healers of the soul, seeking to cure the ills of a sick society. But they are often concerned-consciously or otherwise--to set society right, to put it back on the tracks, to renew its sense of direction by making clear the direction of its movement in the past. Nonetheless, the historian is likely to agree with Dr. Erikson that the psychoanalyst as historian is something of an oddity. Indeed he may state this very emphatically; for at bottom he finds lacking in the psychoanalyst the proper historical spirit-by ,vhich is meant that anxious concern and patience to unravel the past as accurately as possible in its full and everchanging par ticularity. Freud lacked this concern, although he did not lack a lively interest in the past. In the midst of an arduous and immensely fruitful profes~i9nal {:areer he never lQ~t his enthu ..

Psychoanalysis and the Writing of History 197 siasm for the literature and history of the Near Eastern and Greco-Roman civilizations~an enthusiasm which in specialist historians is often wanting. As a youth he had kept a personal diary in Greek; in maturity his much-needed holidays were often spent somewhat feverishly ransacking the great museums of Europe, Rome being always a kind of magic city for him. 6 This admirable enthusiasm, however, did not make Freud into a proper historian-as his method of dream analysis and his approach to the study of man in society reveal. In a certain sense Freud's method of dream analysis might be called historical; it is :meant to provide the analyst with much of the data by which he reconstructs the individual's past, es pecially the vital past of his early childhood. Nonetheless, it strikes the historian as essentially unhistorical. This is not only because the analysisas Philip Rieff puts it-"always follows, often at great distance, the event";7 but because Freud was not much put off by the patient's remembering little of the dream, and, worse still, because Freud was content to 'accept the patient's associations-evoked by the memory of his dream-as the asso ciations which originally produced the dream and which were therefore important in reconstructing his childhood past. s Now the historian may well admit that such evidence helps to disclose something of the workings of the patient's mind and emotions at the time of his analysis. He may well be skeptical, however, that such evidence discloses much of the origin and evolution of these workings. It is Freud's certainty here that sets the historian's teeth on edge. The historian is likely to know only too well that reports of the past, by participants in the same historical situation, are often significantly different, even when delivered in circumstances vastly happier than those which may surround the analyst's couch. In short, it is Freud's credulity that offends the historian.

Freud's lack of the historical spirit reveals itself even more plainly in his approach to the study of man in society, past or present. Broadly speaking, there are H¥o approaches to such a study. One is by making detailed accounts of people in actual relationships in particular societies. This is the typical way of 198 Psychiatry and Responsibility the professional historian. He acquires a great mass of data, which he seeks to limit and reduce to some kind of order with the help of certain organizing concepts or generalizations. It is some times said that the hallmark of the historian is his avoidance of generalizations. If this were true, however, if the historian simply recorded his particular observations, the result would be chaos and confusion, a bewildering mass of detail. In fact the historian must employ generalizations, if for nothing else than to select and arrange the meaningful. His generalizations may come from other disciplines: economics or political science; anthropology and even psychoanalysis; but more often from the multifold common-sense experience that life has afforded him. 9 It is not that the historian avoids generalizations, but rather that he sub ordinates them to the detailed narrative that is the prime object of his endeavors. For the historian, generalizations are in a sense muffled voices offstage.

The other way of approaching the study of man in society is to begin with a theoretical scheme of concepts or generalizations -explicitly elaborated-and to apply them to certain historical situations. This is the way that Freud chose. It is not, of course, a procedure distinctive to Freud or to psychoanalysis; some social scientists, or, as they might now wish to be called, behavioral scientists, even some historians, resort to it. Their chief aim, however, unlike that of most historians, is not to construct a narrative or exposition of some particular historical situation, but to show how a particular historical situation or situations illus trate their generalizations. As Miss Emmet has put it, their aim "is to invite us to say whether the concepts so illustrated help us to understand better some aspect of human relationships." 10 At bottom, then, their chief concern is to frame and possibly refine general concepts, not to sift and arrange particulars.

Since we are seeking here to adduce the differences between history and psychoanalysis-as historical disciplines-it would be pointless to arbitrate between these two ways of looking at man in society. It would probably be pointless in any case. Neither is more legitimate or (if you wish) more scientific than the other, unPsychoanalysis and the Writing of History 199 less science is narrowly defined; neither is even more useful than the other, unless usefulness is also narrowly defined. This last may indeed be the heart of the matter. The historian's uses are less spectacular than the psychoanalyst's, less concerned to get at the "hidden machinery" of the historical or social process. For what is useful to the psychoanalyst is knowledge that is by its nature manipulative, knowledge that will do decisive work in the world. What is useful to the historian is often knowledge that is descriptive, knowledge that is less directly operative. If one insists on choosing between one kind of know ledge and the other, in all likelihood the choice will ultimately depend on one's temperament and aspirations. In a world that feels itself insecure, and yet believes that it holds destiny in its own hands, the psycho analyst's knowledge-and his kind of usefulness-is likely to get a wide hearing.

It is, however, fair to say that Freud has gone to extremes-as a startling admission in his Moses and Monotheism clearly reveals. Moses and Monotheism was Freud's most ambitious essay on the nature and history of religion; it relied heavily on his earlier work in social anthropology, Totem and Taboo. This essay ex pounded the theory of the primal horde: that the primitive form of human society was that of a horde ruled over despotically by the all-powerful father, and that this patriarchal system was ended by the sons' murdering the father, consuming his body, and setting up in his place an animal totem. This totem worship perpetuated the sons' ambivalence toward the father: on the one hand, the totem stood for the father and was the object of wor ship; on the other hand, at the annual totem feast the sons as sembled to tear the totem animal to pieces. This was, as Freud put· it, "the solemn repetition of the father-murder, in which social order, moral laws and religion had had their beginnings." 11 Freud pieced together his social theory from hints and sugges tions admittedly borrowed from Darwin, J. J. Atkinson, and Robertson Smith. It is doubtful that ethnologists and anthropolo gists today would give it serious attention. 12 Freud himself, at the end of his life, when he published his Moses and Monotheism~ 200 .Psychiatry and Responsibility was aware that this was so and that Robertson Smith's ideas, in particular, were no longer acceptable. To his critics, however, he replied as follows: I would reply that these alleged advances in science are well known to me. Yet I have not been convinced either of their correctness or of Robertson Smith's errors. Contradiction is not always refutation; a new theory does not necessarily denote progress. Above all, however, I am not an ethnologist, but a psychoanalyst. It was my good right to select from ethnological data what would serve me for my analytic work.

The writings of the highly gifted Robertson Smith provided me with valuable points of contact with the psychological material of analysis and suggestions for the use of it. I cannot say the same of the work of his opponents.t 3 Plainly enough, when Freud wrote history or prehistory, it was his psychoanalytical work, his generalizations derived from that science, that came first. Rarely did this lead him, it should be added, to entertain deliberately a false history; but it did lead him to entertain, as a matter of course, a notion of historical reality that the professional historian is bound to find uninstruc tive, if not patronizing. It was Freud's notion that there is a psychic reality which stands to most, if not all, of the rest of historical experience in the relation that the wish stands to the dream it generates, and from which it is somehow separate. 14 It is this psychic reality that produces the rest of history.

Inevitably, then, Freud was led to present history as an eternal recapitulation of certain prototypal events that embodied this psychic reality-for example, the murder of the primal Father, the murder of Moses, the murder of Jesus Christ. This amounts, as Rieff has put it, to "a denial of social and historical changes in their own right," 15 to a reduction of problems that the his torian views as genuine problems to the status of pseudo problems. As Freud saw it, the historical process is not really subject to change: the more things change the more they are the same, since the underlying reality is always the same. 16 It followed that, when Freud got down to writing history, the results seemed strange to historians. The inevitable psychoanalytic Psychoanalysisand the Writing of History 201 theme drove out much that the historian would normally wish to keep, and drew in not a little that the historian would nor mally find irrelevant or untenable. Freud the historian dealt mainly with the history of religion. Here he was content to account for the form that Judaism took by tracing Jewish history back to the conjectural IDurder of Moses in the wilderness and to the feelings of guilt produced by that event and somehow kept alive in the folk memory of the Jews. This prototypal event sufficed for Freud's reconstruction of Jewish religious history. In a briefer compass he provided a similar reconstruction of the history of Christianity, centering on the murder of Christ, whom Freud declares to have been "the resurrected Moses and the returned primeval father of the primitive horde as well." 17 In a still briefer compass, although confessing to unfamiliarity with the subject, Freud brought Mohammedanism and Far Eastern religion up to the same touchstone, characterizing the one as lacking in vigor, "perhaps because it lacked the profundity which in the Jewish religion resulted from the murder of its founder," 18 and dismissing the other as an ancestor cult that stopped short "at an early stage of the reconstruction of the past." 19 Freud once spoke~as a historian might~of the "rich phenomenology of religions"; 20 but in fact he managed to reduce the historic religions to a bleak sameness.

Religion, past and present, Western and Eastern, was for Freud essentially an expression of neurosis. Religious symbols were a dramatization of those early relations with parents which were the most important factors in an individual's development. Those relations, in so far as they were shaped by the Oedipus complex, were inevitably ambivalent, productive of love and hate for the father, together with a sense of guilt; apart from the Oedipus complex they left a craving for security and protec tion that could be satisfied only as the individual matured by the image of an all-protective father. God ,vas thus a projection of this father image, and religion a means of assuaging guilt and affording a sense of security. Religion was a kind of mass delusion that helped people avoid individual neuroses by providing a socially accepted form of fantasy. As Freud saw it, religion was 202 Psychiatry and Responsibility conservative and regressive, capable of bringing relief to man, but at the cost of fixing him in a state of childishness.

The historian need not be religious to find this account of religious experience-in part at least-uninstructive. The history of religion has encompassed far more than the efforts of men who sought security and the relief of anxiety. If not, what is to be made of the long procession of saints, prophets, and heretics? If there was one quality shared by all of them, it was an aversion to comfort and security. They were not only prone to flail society, both lay and ecclesiastical, but they were equally prone to scourge themselves. The historian cannot help but tax Freud with ignor~ ing the plain truth that religion in the past has been the matrix out of which has emerged a wide variety of personality and aspiration. Religion may embrace the infantile, the regressive and the routine; it may equally embrace the mature, the dynamic and the exceptional. 21 For the historian, it may therefore seem that the exceptional religious personality suffers at Freud's hands-or for that matter at the hands of a psychoanalytical biographer like Dr. Erikson. 22 The historian may welcome as suggestive the idea that the great ness of Moses lay in providing an effective father image: "it must have been a tremendous father image," Freud wrote, "that stooped in the person of l\10ses to tell the poor Jewish laborers that they were his dear children" ;23 but the historian is likely to ask for further demonstration of that greatness at work in the world-as religious thinker and leader. This, in fact, is ,vhat is altogether lacking in Dr. Erikson's portrait of Martin Luther, for ,\Thorn (unlike Moses) there is no scarcity of historical evidence.

Dr. Erikson leaves us in no doubt that he regards Luther as a great man and a great theologian. But the Luther he portrays, torn by an "identity crisis" rooted in his childhood, reveals few qualities of greatness. "He becomes a chance figure who, afflicted most heavily with the nightmare of his times, stumbled, after infinite psychological strain, upon a new myth." 24 With this we may end the survey of those reactions which render psychoanalysis as an historical discipline suspect to his torians. It may well seem from this account that the historian has Psychoanalysis and the Writing of History 203 very little to learn from psychoanalysis; neither Freud's method of dream analysis nor his approach to the study of man in society nor his actual writing of history seems especially illuminating for historians. Yet it would be wrong to stop here. For there are, in fact, valuable things that the historian may learn from psy choanalysis; they are to be found, however, not in what Freud wrote about the past, but in his general conception of the mind and the self.

III Psychoanalysis may well instruct us about moral posture about attitudes to moral judgmenta matter that concerns the historian deeply. Curiously enough, it has been at Cambridge reputedly the home of science and rationalism-that the subject has in recent years received a good deal of attention. It is not a new one, but Professor Butterfield has had us look at it in the light of this century's stormy experience. And his colleague, Professor Knowles, chose it as the theme of his inaugural lecture as Regius Professor of Modern History. This illuminating address, if it does nothing else, takes us quickly and firmly to the heart of the matter. 25 Professor Knowles sharply contrasts his own attitude to moral judgment with that of Lord Acton. He quotes the latter's exhorta tion to historians: "nevet to debase the moral currency or to lower the standard of rectitude, but to try others by the final maxim that governs your own lives, and to suffer no man and no cause to escape the undying penalty which history has the power to inflict on ·WTong."2'6 So to sit in judgment on the character of the dead is, according to Professor Knowles, both inappropriate and pointless; it embodies a conception of the historian's func tion-that of acting as a judge in a court of law-which is "radically false." The dead, after all, are not on trial. And such judicial pronouncements as are made on them are not likely to stand: they are easy to revise because they deal with elusive things.

"The degree of ignorance, the degree of malice, the degree of weakness, the degree of guilt, must always elude us." 27 204 Psychiatry and Responsibility For Professor Knowles, the historian's function is quite dif ferent. It is essentially contemplative: the historian "contemplates the whole of his world; he does not apportion guilt; he considers the quality of the whole man, seen, it may be, during the passage of many years .... He neither condemns nor acquits, he neither censures nor praises, but he presents what he sees." Professor Knowles presumably understands by "contemplation" something more than mere description. He insists on evaluating: the histor ian must, he believes, look to see whether a man, by and large during his life, shows any evidence of acting according to a divine or moral law outside himself, whether he ever sacrifices his own profit or pleasure for the sake of a person or a principle; whether he shows evidence of loving other men, where by love we understand the classical definition of wishing them well and doing well to them; whether he puts justice before expediency; whether he is sincere and truthful. In so doing the historian is not trying the men and women of the past: he is contemplating them; he has to see them as in truth they were and to present them as such to others, and a man, as a man, cannot be seen truly unless his moral worth, his loveworthiness, is seen.

How different is this from Lord Acton's way of dealing with the character of the dead? One is compelled to conclude that it is not so different as the word "contemplate" would suggest. Both Lord Acton and Professor Knowles deal in moral judgment; and both are immensely serious about it. Yet there is an appreciable difference in the way they go about it. Professor Knowles pro ceeds more cautiously, more aware of the subtleties involved, more aware of the pitfalls, above all concerned to see accurately and disinterestedly. His cautionary words about the traps that lie in wait for the historian as moralist are valuable. Failing to know the meaning of words used for moral categories, using these words without proper care, is one trap. Professor Knowles pro vides a frightening example of the slovenly use of moral language from the writing of so eminent an historian as J. L. Motley. Mis taking a natural gift or ability for ethical excellence, or confusing a man's religion or party with his character, is another trap. Still Psychoanalysis and the Writing of History 205 another is forgetting that a man's character is never fixed fOl, life: that "a life is not a bundle of facts; it is a stream or land scape; it is the manifestation ofa single mind and personality that may grow more deformed or more beautiful to the end."

The historian, then, must resort to moral judgment, for the Uloral realm is both real and significant. But how is he to do it without falling into that kind of moral excess which may well blur his sight? Unfortunately, it is especially difficult to pre scribe for the historian as moralist, since what he does is both difficult and egotistical, being the resumption by a single mind of the doings and thoughts of thousands or millions. Plainly there is no simple prescription for him to follow. It may help, however, to enjoin caution and point to the pitfalls. It may help to pre scribe, as Professor Butterfield does, Christian humility; it is the Christian, according to Professor Butterfield, who best under stands what is a fitting moral posture, "understands it as one who feels himself a partner in man's universal sin." 28 Perhaps it could be said that the Freudian also understands it. He understands it as one who entertains a vision of man-more remote from the Christian vision than some religious thinkers seem prepared to acknowledge-but no less stern. 29 The Freudian vision-rightly understood-portrays man as the carrier "of a kind of hell within him from which rise everlastingly the impulses which threaten civilization." 30 As such, the Freudian vision may help to curb that moral excess which prompts the historian to sit in judgment on the dead.

Psychoanalysis may also instruct the historian about human motivation, both on the individual and the mass level; it is in struction that he greatly needs. Compared with the novelist, for example, in the treatment of human nature, the historian seems often to be so lacking in subtlety as to prompt the observation (offered by an historian) that "a visitor from another planet would think that they were talking about two different kinds of sub stance." 31 It was the novelist, Virginia Woolf, who remarked that "it is no use trying to sum people up. One must follow hints, not exactly what is said, nor yet entirely what is done." 32 Too few historians entertain such scruples. This may be why we speak, on 206 Psychiatry and Responsibility the one hand, of the novelist's art, and on the other, of the historian's craft. Is it implied that the historian's efforts to re create life are, by comparison, rude and primitive-something many may do without any special endowment of talent or imagi nation? Even so gentle and undemonstrative a person as the novelist, E. M. Forster, has raised his voice in protest against the historian's crudities: "The past," he once wrote, "must be left to its own dead who knew that it was alive." 33 As much as anything, it is the bald abridgment of motive and purpose, the lack of imaginative insight, which creates the sense of lifelessness and unreality in so much historical writing, espe cially in that vast underworld of textbook history. How dreary it tends to become; how scanty the supply of stereotyped motives called on again and again: the will to power, ambition, economic interest, idealism. One looks so often in vain for some touch of irony, of paradox; for some suggestion that men usually are unaware from moment to moment where they are going, that the depths of the mind and human nature are not neatly com partmented. Freudian psychoanalysis might persuade the historian that fear, conscious or otherwise, may prompt the most ill-assorted actions and pursuits, from overeating to philanthropy; that ideal ism is not without vanity or pride or aggression; that the material istic entrepreneur may entertain the most fanciful of utopias. 34 In short, Freud may teach the historian something of the ambiv alence of individual human nature and of the obscure workings of the unconscious.

One can, however, play fast and loose with the unconscious. Mr. Gordon Rattray Taylor, for example, the author of Sex in History and of The Angel Makers (a study of the Evangelical Revival in England in the early nineteenth century) goes much too far, ending with a picture of human motivation as naive and barren as that of any textbook. The "various changes and con trasts in European sexual behavior," he writes, "can be system atically accounted for in terms of these two identifications-that at certain periods there was a predominating tendency for male children to model themselves on their fathers, and so to produce an authoritarian and restrictive attitude in society as a whole, Psychoanalysis and the Writing of History 207 while at others there was a tendency to model on the mother, producing a very different attitude." ~5 These two attitudes Mr. Taylor called patrist and matrist respectively. The patrist is given to authoritarianism in public life and asceticism in private; the matrist is given to democracy in public life and hedonism in private.

This caricature of human motivation might serve to remind us that the historian's normal strategy of explanation-by which he gives primacy to the conscious, rational thoughts of his indi vidual characters-has its wisdom. 36 Such thoughts often enough have a pragmatic validity: they are related to what men do, and what men do has an. unmistakable reality. What is unfortunate, however, is the historian's excessive reliance on such thoughts, almost as if they marked the limits of the distinctively historical and beyond which lay something to be called psychologica1.37 The historian must not shrink from looking into the depths, or-to change the metaphor-he must not close his ears to the music that underlies men's actions-that music, as Sir l ..ewis Namier has reminded us, to which ideas are a kind of libretto.~8 Whether the underlying music is the same on the level of mass psychology as on that of individual psychology presents the his torian with a difficult problem. According to Freud, it is, for all practical purposes, the same. He demonstrated this in his Moses, and M onotheism J where he treated the Jews as he might an individual neurotic. His example has already had its imitators among historians. Noteworthy is Norman Cohn's Pursuit of the Millenium J which, like Freud's Moses and Monotheism, is a study of the social psychology of religious movements, making much use of certain concepts taken from psychoanalysis. In particular it treats the history of revolutionary chiliasm in Europe from the eleventh to the sixteenth centuries, and, although admitting the danger of using concepts from the psychology of the individual, it boldly applies them. Revolutionary chiliasm is presented as a paranoid fantasy, generated by the collapse of a way of life. A grave breakdown in society, according to Mr. Cohn, not only arouses adult anxiety but also creates "that sense of helpless ex posure, disorientation and guilt-and thereby reactivates the 208 Psychiatry and Responsibility infantile complex and sets in motion, as it were, that fatal se quence of mortal anxiety, murderous rage and unconscious pro jection which is the genesis of paranoia. And it does this to many individuals at the same time." 39 Despite this highly plausible exposition-more plausible indeed than Freud's account of Judaism and Christianity-one doubts that it settles the question of the relationship between individual and mass psychology. Perhaps the most that can be done at present is to raise the question. Does collective behavior differ qualita tively from individual behavior? Or does the difference consist in nothing more than "a greater suggestibility of individuals when they find themselves to be part of a crowd, a mob, a nation?" 40 If the latter is true, then one will agree with Professor Potter, who, in his study of American character, declared that "group character ... is but a composite of individual character." 41 There may, however, be more truth than historians like to think there is in Sir Charles Snow's observation that "groups of men, even small groups, act strangely different from individuals" 42_a theme that he has suggestively explored in his novels. It may be the path of wisdom for historians to confess how much they are in the dark about the behavior of large and small groups, and if, like Mr.

Cohn, they apply psychoanalytical concepts to mass behavior, to follow his example of tentativeness. Whether the underlying music of individual and mass psychology be the same or not, historians will be wise to listen for it. It may be that they are already doing so-for example, in their concern to find the style of a civilization or a society, or the pattern of a climate of opinion. We may therefore conclude that the most valuable thing that historians can learn from psychoanalysis is a heightened awareness not only of the depths of individual and mass emotion but of the significance of what Professor Riesman has called "underprivileged data." 43 Just as the psychoanalyst seeks for meaning in such curious places as dreams, weaning habits, and family relations, so the historian too is turning his attention to phenomena that once signified nothing to him. Some of these have, in fact, been brought to his attention by psychoanalysis; others he has found for himself, like third-rate novels and bad art. It may be a sign of Freud's Psychoanalysis and the Writing of History 209 growing influence on historians that a growing number of them now look on their neglect of the history of the family as both serious and odd. 44 NOTES 1. L. Trilling, Freud and the Crisis of Our Culture (New York, 1955), pp. 11-12.

2. L. Trilling, The Liberal Imagination: Essays on Literature and Society (New York, 1951), p. 34. 3. W. L. Langer, "The Next Assignment," The American Historical Re view, January, 1958. 4. G. Roheim (ed.), Psychoanalysis and the Social Sciences (New York, 1950), Vol. II, article by R. de Saussure, "Psychoanalysis and History." 5. E. H. Erikson, Childhood and Society (New York, 1950), p. 12. 6. E. Jones, Sigmund Freud: Life and Work (London, 1953-1957), 3 vols., passim. 7. P. RielI, Freud: The Mind of the Moralist (New York, 1959), p. 113. 8. Ibid., pp. 113-114. See also J. Strachey (ed.), The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (London, 1953), V, 516. "In analyzing a dream," Freud writes, "I insist that the whole scale of estimates of certainty shall be abandoned and that the faintest possibility that something of this or that sort may have occurred in the dream shall be treated as complete certainty."

9. For an excellent account of the importance of common sense to the historian, see ~ir Isaiah Berlin, "History and Theory: The Concept of Scientific History," History and Theory: Studies in the Philosophy of History, Vol. I, No.1 (1960). Sir Isaiah remarks: "A man who lacks com mon intelligence can be a physicist of genius, but not even a mediocre historian." 10. D. M. Emmet, Function, Purpose and Powers: Some Concepts in the Study of Individuals and Societies (London, 1958), p. 13. II. S. Freud, Moses and Monotheism (New York: Vintage Books, 1959), p. 168. 12. See E. E. Evans-Pritchard et al., The Institutions of Primitive Society (Glencoe, Illinois, 1959), p. 3. 13. Freud, Moses and Monotheism, p. 169. 14. See Trilling, The Liberal Imagination, p. 52. 15. Rieff, Freud, p. 207. 16. Ibid., p. 213. 17. Freud, Moses and Monotheism, p. 114. 18. Ibid.) p. 118. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid., p. 117.

21. What is perhaps most baffiing is that religion may do all these things at the same time in the same person.

210 Psychiatry and Responsibility 22. E. H. Erikson, Young Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and His tory (New York, 1958). 23. Freud, Moses and Monotheism, p. 140. 24. The Times Literary Supplement (December 18, 1959), review of E. H. Erikson, Young Man Luther. 25. D. Knowles, The Historian and Character (Cambridge, 1955). 26. Lord Acton, The Study of History (London, 1895), quoted in Knowles, T he Historian· and Character. 27. Knowles, The Historian and Character. 28. H. Butterfield, History and Human Relations (New York, 1952), p. 110. 29. A most helpful account of the relations between religion and psychoanalysis is D. Cox, Jung and St. Paul (New York, 1955). 30. Trilling, The Liberal Imagination, p. 57. 31. Butterfield, History and Human Relations, p. 170. 32. V. Woolf, Jacob's Room, p. 29. 33. E. M. Forster, Hill of Devi, p. 266. 34. Sir L. B. Namier, Personalities and Powers (London, 1955), the essay entitled "Human Nature and Politics."

35. G. Rattray Taylor, Sex in History (New York, 1955), pp. 76-77. 36. See W. Dray, Laws and Explanation in History (London, 1957), chap. V. 37. Ibid., pp. 138-139. 38. Namier, Personalities and Powers, p. 4. Sir Lewis gives this point an emphasis which I should hesitate to give it. 39. N. Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium (London, 1957), p. 311. 40. G. J. Renier, History: Its Purpose and Method (Boston, 1950), p. 204. 41. D. M. Potter, People of Plenty: Economic Abundance and the American Character (Chicago, 1954), p. 33. I am not convinced that Professor Potter proves his poin t. 42. Sir C. Snow, The Masters, p. 107. 43. D. Riesman, "The Study of National Character: Some Observations on the American Case," Harvard Library Bulletin, Winter, 1959. 44. See, for example, the articles by Peter Laslett on the family in seven teenth-cel)tury English society: The Listener, April 7, 14, 21, 1960.

See also the review of P. Aries, L'enfant et la vie familiale sous ['ancien regime, in Times Literary Supplement, September 30, 1960.

11 Criminologyand the Sick Society JAMES W. WIGGINS Psychoanalysis is more than a system of therapy ... it is a scientific discipline dealing with the psychological dynamic forces within the human being, whatever the manifestations of the forces may be: mental disease, artistic endeavor, religious thought, literary expression, or social psychology and behavior.! The persistent and increasing efforts of mental health pro fessionals and their ancillaries to move out into the community at large, prescribing generally procedures yet unproven even in personality disaster, has been noted by a number of observers. 2 If a tangible product were advertised with such enthusiastic claims, it might lead to an investigation by the Federal Trade Commission and an order to cease and desist. The invasion of major institutions and value systems by psychiatric and quasi psychiatric theories-often in untested or untestable forms apparently springs from an optimism not sobered by a sense of great responsibility. This invasion is not a passive entry into a vacuum, but rather an active attempt at displacement of elements both in society and the human personality. Would it not be logical for public and governmental concern about the unadver tised side effects qf drugs and about the unproved claims of their manufacturers to extend itself to the kind of "medicine" dis pensed by the psychoanalyst?

The present analysis is focused on the intensive and.continuing 211 212 Psychiatry and Responsibility efforts to substitute the psychiatrist and his cohorts for present systems of crime control. While these efforts are more than a century old, they seem to be gaining ground increasingly. It is not argued here that the more or less established and traditional methods of crime control have attained perfection or contributed to the ideal society. The main argument of this paper is that psychoanalytical psychiatry has yet to prove-scientifically and pragrnaticaJly~that its invasion of the process of crime control will result in greater benefits to society and those of its members who are not engaged in criminal behavior than the former methods. The appearance in 1960 of The Psychology of Crime)3 by David Abrahamsen, M.D., merely reinforces an approach to crime also suggested, e.g., in Franz Alexander and Hugo Staub's The Crim inal) The Judge) and the Public. 4 It is probably fair to select these spokesmen for the group which currently seems most energetic in the area. McCorkle states that the school of psychiatric thinking most directly identified with this effort has been the psycho analytic school, represented by such writers as Abrahamsen, Zil boorg, Alexander, and Lindner, among others. 5 A few quotations will present the position: It is through m.edicine that psychoanalysis was born as scientific dis cipline, and the greatest majority of scientific analysts still consist of medical men. The pal'ticular field of criminology could not be studied in sufficient depth without medical men .... 6 It is no longer necessary to try to justify the claims psychoanalysis makes in understanding the mentally sick and in extending to them therapeutic help.7 We thus try to justify our interest in the criminal by means of an assertion~ the COl'rectnessof which is ... not yet proved. 8 The combination of medic:al and psychoanalytical attitudes is the most favorable for a tolerant and unemotional study of human. behavi(j:r~ especially. social behavior. 9 Criminology and the Sick Society 213 The main question whether or not a given act is to be considered criminal depends entirely upon the psychological diagnosis we make.lO Alexander reserves· to the psychiatrist the right to decide whether a crime has been committed; Abrahamsen suggests that the person who commits the act may not be the criminal even if a criminal act is committed. In his treatment of rape, Abrahamsen suggests that the married rapist has been "seduced" by his wife into committing the crime, and she is thus the real "criminaL"

The unmarried rapist may be understood as engaged in a dis placed attempt to force his seductive but rejecting mother into submission. l1 Abrahamsen also declares that only the psychiatrist can determine when an offender should be released. 12 The point has been made that contemporary psychoanalysis seeks to enter the law enforcement system at least to the extent of determining whether the accused is guilty or not and deter ... mining what----if any'"---"actionis to be taken toward the guilty and by whom the action is to be taken. This is considered essential, not only for the reasons indicated in the quotations above, but also because the psychoanalyst alone can make judgments which H may be just beyond question." This is taken to be a social value because, the position con tinues, "any disturbance of the common sense of justice has a destructive effect on society." "When the Sense of justice is dis turbed, then that part of our Ego which Was called by Freud the Superego and which is yet in a rather weak state of organization, loses its power over the asocial impulses of the average indi vidua1." 13 The· "average individual," then, cannot be trusted to recognize justice, but is rather asked to turn it over to psycho...

analysts, who can administer justice with uncommon sense. It is perhaps unfortunate that the writer's Contacts with pris.. oners have led to the conclusion that the convicted have a sense of justice which is reassured by equal punishment for equal violations. I have found no enthusiasm for sentencing pro cedures that allocate penalties erratically. The analyst might well treat one imprisoned petty thief for life, and another for a week. Since these psychoanalytical infiltrations of traditional systems 214 Psychiatry and Responsibility of crime control prosper in considerable degree because of the invocation of "science," as contrasted with the "unscientific" at torneys, courts, juries, and prison officials, the "science" itself deserves careful scrutiny. A standard basis of scientific procedure is the requirement that concepts be rigorously discriminating and exclusive. The transformation of concepts during the course of scientific investigation vitiates and makes incomprehensible the results of the study. In this regard, Robert M. MacIver offers four caveats.14 The first caveat warns (sic) that a social phenomenon defined by law or other institutional procedure cannot be referred to a set of causes lying outside the institutional system itself. Since crime is defined by law, a considerable share of the fluctuations in crime rates is produced by variations in the law itself.

Donald R. Taft points out, as do other criminologists, that legal definitions of crime have expanded tremendously in the past generation. 15 With no changes in behavior, no changes in per sonality, there has been a marked increase in "exposure" to definitions of actions as criminal. The adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution produced a whole new range of possible crimes, quite independently of personality. The adoption and later repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment first extended, .then contracted the list of activities defined as criminal. The Prohibition Amendment made Al C'!pone's career possible, while it took the Income Tax Amendment to make his imprison ment possible. The burgeoning of administrative law and its bureaucratic creation (and administration) have produced new points of referente and new settings for the determination of crime. MacIver's second warning is most direct for psychiatry and criminology. "We should beware of identifying, for purposes of causal derivation, the phenomena we are seeking to explain with any category narrower or broader than that constituted by the phenomena themselves." Even admitting for the moment the validity of the categories of lawful behavior and mental health, there is an implicit violation of the caveat in the customary interCriminology and the Sick Society 215 change of these categories. To find occasionally the same person with both sets of relevant properties by no means protects the confuser.

The category "crime" is clearly and by definition relative to the law, while the category of mental illness varies independently of the law. The behavioral patterns taken to reflect mental illness at best would depend on consensus among psychiatrists-but even this is presently unlikely. The frequent use of "boards" or "com missions" of psychiatrists in the determination of mental illness and the disagreements among the professionals themselves indi cate considerable uncertainty. If the decision is to be made by vote, it is difficult to understand why anyone set of voters has a particular claim to the power of decision. While MacIver's third caveat is more general in its application, the fourth again refers to psychiatric or quasi-psychiatric theories of crime. "We should not assume that when a number of condi tions are together operative in the production or emergence of any phenomenon each of these conditions can be assigned a specific weight, influence, or percentage of contribution toward the resultant phenomenon." One might almost believe that the fourth caveat was designed specifically with Sheldon Glueck in mind. But the Gluecks are not the only criminologists who tend to allocate weights (hopefully totaling one hundred per cent) to various causative factors found associated with certain types of crime (and particularly youthful crime) in certain types of people in certain circumstances. "Dynamic" psychiatry would hardly make this error, since Glueck's theories and predictive tables tend to exclude the modification of probabilities arising from the "interaction" of the contributors to human action, legal or illegal.

The violation of the fourth caveat leads to segmental handling of personal and environmental components so that the inter .. relationships may not appear. It is unfortunate that the situation is even more confused than has been suggested so far. The assumption that the goal of the psychiatric enterprise can be a stable referent-mental health is doubtful. The content or the properties of mental health must 216 Psychiatry and Responsibility be communicable if it is to be a subject of meaningful discussion. The content is elusive, not to say illusory. Marie Jahoda states: Perhaps the greatest handicap for the systematic study of the social conditons conducive to mental health is the very elusiveness of this concept. As far as we could discover, there exists no psychologically meaningful and, from the point of view of-research, operational de scription of what is commonly considered to constitute mental health. 16 After extensive analysis of the question, Joseph Eaton concluded: A frank recognition of the relativity of mental health will do much to improve research and its application .... It is a value judgment, with all the potentialities for variation and change implicit in such a rela tivistic entity ... Mental Health as a scientific concept does not now exist.l7 More recently, HarryC. Solomon, M. D., introduced a sym posium volume, Rehabilitation of the Mentally Ill) by stating that "The phrase rehabilitation of the mentally ill, although widely used, is not readily defined." 18 The rather heavy volume, Mental Health and Mental Disorder) edited by Arnold Rose, does not include an analysis of either of the concepts-possibly on the brave assumption that all of the contributors were writing about the same things. 19 It is unnecessary to document further the am bigui ty in the referent.

Despite the conceptual confusion, it is appropriate to examine the practical consequences of the application of the procedures offered society and its law enforcement agencies. In the first place, the psychiatric enterprise may be viewed as a social institution. In the second place, it may be examined as a set of procedures in tended to modify behavior and applied to individuals (or groups). From the institutional point of view, evaluation procedures may determine the degree to which societal or community alarm in the presence of bizarre and unpredictable behavior is reduced or eliminated. There may be considerable reassurance for society Criminology and the Sick Society 217 in having someone do something, preferably ritualistic, when the society is faced with an incomprehensible disaster. Anthropologists have described such ritualistic procedures in scores of nonliterate societies. Burial rituals, which reassure the living that death can be assimilated by the community, are perhaps universal. It seems to follow, however, that burial rites for the living as well as the dead will tend to reduce the efficiency of the ritual. From the standpoint of reassurance to the society or the community, it might be suggested that psychiatry is effective to the degree that the society ignores, or faces without alarm, ·its few members who cannOt acquire, or who are cut off from, the commonalities of the society.

This particular function of psychiatry may be most effectively performed if the cost of the performance is high. There seems to be a rather direct relationship between the restoration of equanimity and the cost of its restoration. There are psychiatric grounds for this statement, as well as more time-honored religious grounds--since the concept of expiation antedates the origins of modern psychiatry. Even in our "advanced" United States the more costly funeral seems most reassuring, and at various levels of our own society the ostentatious economic wastage of flowers and gleaming, single-purpose Cadillacs may be commonly ob served. It should be noted that from the societal standpoint it is not required that the dead be restored to life as a consequence of this costly ritual; it may be the very fact that restoration is not expected or guaranteed which makes the ritual necessary and worth the economic resources devoted to it. The fact that eventual revival may be assured as a part of the ritual appears not to be an invariable requirement for its efficiency.

In respect to this primary function, mental health specialists cannot get high marks through agitation which produces alarm in society over the handling of its seriously disturbed members. There is no "peace" to be derived from public statements that the ritual being used is not effective, particularly if they are made by the ritualists themselves. It seems rather obvious; also, that threatening statements of inadequacy unavoidably raise ques tions about the qualifications of the "anointed·' ritualists. In 218 Psychiatry and Responsibility any case, the techniques for evaluation of the efficiency of psy chiatryas-ritual are widely used under the label of market re search, and this ritualistic function may be effectively performed without any knowledge of either personality formation or reform ation in patients. If nothing were promised beyond reassurance to society, further analysis would be redundant.

Many outspoken mental health professionals claim considera ble efficiency in the modification of behavior, whether criminal or otherwise undesirable. 20 Acting in the name of science, they can not defer recovery to the hereafter and must be exposed to evaluation in this life. It is the measurement of the results of psychotherapeutic procedures in this life that presents nearly insuperable difficulties. The pretensions to therapeutic success are easily documented. Dr. Harry R. Brickman in 1960 assumed the direction of a $1,000,000 per year public mental health program to assist Los Angeles County's more than 500,000 potentially disturbed indi viduals before they become disturbed. The task will be under taken with the aid of three administrative assistants and ten private psychiatrists, who will serve as part-time consultants. Dr. Brickman was quoted as saying that he will "emphasize a broad preventive approach, since the problems of mental illness must be met before psychoses and severe character disturbances develop." 21 Dr. William Rottersman, citing the case of a young woman "on the verge of suicide," said that there are "probably more pre ventable suicides each year in metropolitan Atlanta (Georgia) than there are deaths caused by polio, tuberculosis, and a number of other publicized illnesses put together." He professed to be able to prevent one hundred suicides per year-if eighteen more public psychiatric hospital beds were made available!22 It is a matter of record, however, that there were fifty-nine suicides in the county which includes Atlanta, and fifty-five deaths from tuberculosis alone in the year 1959.23 It is not clear which "other"

illnesses are to be compared, but it would seem difficult to prevent more suicides than occur, even if the causes of suicide were certainly known.

Criminology and the Sick Society 219 A simple model of measurement of change requires an input with accurately described relevant characteristics, a process, and an output with accurately described characteristics. The before and-after comparison is the index to change. Several special difficulties interfere with the use of this simple model in psy chiatry. The conceptual probl~m.. treated above .. makes it ex tremely difficult to decide which properties of input and output should be described, and this underlies the broader question of description itself. One psychiatrist described to the writer a patient who was thoroughly disliked by his fellow workers until, under therapy, the patient became psychotic. The psychotic patient became a favorite of the same people who had previously loathed him, but was ineffective in other areas. It was difficult, at the least, to say whether the patient was better or worse although from the point of view of his psychiatrist he was worse because his intrapersonal organization had deteriorated. 24 Additional difficulty in evaluation arises from the tendency of guidance clinics and quasi-psychiatric counseling centers to accept only the "easy" cases. Such procedures, in settings which could furnish relatively large numbers of evaluative situations, unavoid ably bias the observations in favor of success. There may well be some "patients" adm~tted who are suffering, for example, real neurosis, and whose recovery is produced by the removal of a real environmental threat over which the therapist had no control.

It is difficult indeed, as physicians have often reported, to determine which "successes" are basically spontaneous recoveries and which are the result of therapy. The problem of remissions in psychotherapy may present much greater difficulty. A special obstacle to the evaluation of psychiatric work is a consequence of the limited training in research methods included in the medical school curriculum. This gap in training leaves no alternative to generalizations based on clinical observations, in which the clinician is properly involved personally. W. Horsley Gantt, M. D., of Johns Hopkins University, writes: "Unfortu nately, in the U. S. A. it is possible to go through a psych@tric residency without performing a single piece of research or an experiment . . . often no one except the student who makes the 220 Psychiatryand Responsibility formulation can recognize the patient by his description." Gantt continues: "A recognition of what is scientific investigation and what is therapeutic obligation would remove much confusion from our field." 25 Dr. Melitta Schmideberg concurs: Psychiatry has allowed itself to be built up without checking extrava gant therapeutic and scientific claims, as would be a matter of course in other specialties .... Much psychiatric literature is repetitive and unproved while important areas are neglected.

So many psychiatrists naively assume that their observations are neces sarily valid, encouraged by Freud's ambitious notion that the psycho analyst becomes an objective instrument of science merely by removing his emotional bias by being analyzed. His was a revolutionary concept. Unfortunately, however, it proved wrong. By now, most analysts agree, as did Freud at the conclusion of his life, that training analysis fails to achieve its objectives; indeed, Glover thinks the longer the analysis, the greater the element of suggestion. But the conclusion that the analyst is not entitled to scientific license merely by virtue of having been analyzed, has not yet been drawn. 26 It cannot, of course, be said that all psychologists and sociol ogists produce research that is beyond criticism. It is probable, however, that the professional sociologist or psychologist is likely to be somewhat more sophisticated in research techniques than the psychiatrist. The assumption of the role of evaluator in the field of psychiatry, however, by either psychologist or sociologist produces a social structural strain. This may be especially true of the psychologist. The division of labor between psychiatry and psychology has not yet reached the point of mutual agreement.

Each profession feels that it has areas of superior competence, but the areas claimed overlap. The sociologist, on the other hand, does not usually compete for therapeutic responsibility, and may more easily "accept" a division of labor that allows him to measure change. In view of the general and special problems outlined above, it Criminology and the Sick Society 221 is not surprising that rigorous systematic measurements have been few. Carl Rogers introduced in 1954 his Psychotherapy and Personality Change with the statement: "It isn't good research in psychotherapy; it's just the best there is." This statement is so significant because it was the first full-scale effort to measure the results of two types of psychotherapy. Rogers reported, with qualifications, some change in hypothesized directions in a sub~ stantial proportion of the experimental group that remained to be evaluated until the end of the study. His study was based on thirty cases.27 An extensive survey of evaluative studies in mental health, published in 1955, was prefaced by R. H. Felix, M. D., director of the National Institute of Mental Health. 28 The survey identi fied 984 articles and books that seemed directly or tangentially related to evaluation. A concluding statement by the Working Committee that produced the study reads, not hopefully, as follows: In the process of reviewing various studies reported in the literature the Committee has been impressed with the .number of studies which neither fulfill the role of exploring new leads nor serve to adequately validate earlier established leads.29 Since the Rogers study found it necessary to discard the con cept of "success" as a therapeutic outcome, it may be worthwhile to report briefly on the new survey volume, Americans View Their M ental Health. In this nationwide survey, respondents who had sought help in the solution of their problems were asked to state the amount of "help" they had received from the specific sources they used. The percentages of those using specific sources who said they had been helped" (unconditionally) or "helped a lot"

were as follows: Clergy 65% Doctor 65% Psychiatrist 46% Lawyer 62% (N-130) (N-89) (N-46) (N-13) Again, the authors report that when respondents were asked how they were helped, "most of our respondents could not describe 222 Psychiatry and Respons.ibility explicitly how therapy had helped them, [but] they gave responses generally relevant to this question." so (Italics added.) Liza P. Holt makes the following comment about evaluation: In view of the quite considerable disproportion which does currently exist between enthusiasm for propagating mental health on the one hand, and scientifically verified conclusions about the effects of various means taken toward this end on the other hand, I rather imagine that many workers in the field would be satisfied with what seems a far simpler and less demanding form of evaluation. The criterion of suc cess which might seem sufficient to such people can be called the criterion of subjective conviction .... Something can be said in favor of this criterion, scientifically indefensible though it may seem... )H This is an interesting evaluation of patient change through examination of feeling tones of the therapist. It may well be "scientifically indefensible," but, as George VoId has shown, it is hard to go any further .

. . . A methodology under which only the patient knows the Ufacts" of the case, and only the analyst understands the meaning of these Ufacts" as revealed to him by the patient, does not lend itself to external, third person, impersonal verification, or to generalization beyond the limits of any particular case.32 Having examined some of the claims, the concepts, and evalu ative efforts in the area of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy, we may appropriately consider directly how these ideas interfere with control of crime. While the layman has recognized for centuries that some humans are so different that they cannot be held responsible, and while mistakes have no doubt been made, he has for millennia managed to keep crime under reasonable control in most circumstances. This layman, in his many roles and manifestations, has been able to maintain sufficient order in society to give most citizens overextended periods of time free dom of serious threat to life, property, and person. Even despite a c'ontinuing increase in the areas of life restricted by state action, constituting ever more opportunities to break a law, there Criminology and the Sick Society 223 is some evidence that' crime rates have declined in the United States, at least.

Laymen could be given some responsibility for the sensible modifications of the French Code of 1810, which allowed exemp tion from criminal· responsibility for certain classes of the insane and for children. The classical reference for the British and American concepts of legal insanity is the M'Naghten Rule (1843). This test for criminal irresponsibility required that it be "clearly proved that at the time of the act the accused was laboring under such a defect of reasoning as not to know the nature and quality of his act, or, if he did, that he did not know that what he was doing was wrong." 33 The Rule has been under attack increas ingly, because it does not excuse enough criminals of their responsibility for violation of law. It should be noted that not all psychiatrists have attacked the M'Naghten Rule. Nevertheless, Abrahamsen does complain that a supporter of the M'Naghten Rule, psychiatrist Percival Bailey, "does not seem to have special ized experience in the field .of criminal psychopathology." 34 Obviously, then, Bailey cannot know what he is talking about!

Abrahamsen complains also because Jerome Hall, a legal scholar who has cogently supported the M'Naghten Rule, "does not cite opinions of psychiatrists who constantly deal with these specific problems." 35 Hall might have quoted Melitta Schmideberg, Chairman, Executive Committee, Association for Psychiatric Treatment of Offenders. Reporting on a conference on the psy chiatric treatment of juveniles, Schmideberg wrote: "The chief impression shared by the participants was how little we know on this important subject .... In trying to arrange the conference, I was impressed that several well-known psychiatrists refused to speak because, although they had examined or treated juvenile murderers, they had learned so little that they did not feel jus tified in speaking." 36 An enthusiastic professional group rewarded Judge David Bazelon for contriving the Durham Decision of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. This decision extended crim inal irresponsibility tremendously, and Judge Bazelon was granted the Isaac Ray Award for his service to psychiatry. The distin224 Psychiatryand Responsibility guished Mr. Justice Douglas of the United States Supreme Court called the opinion "imaginative," no doubt intending a compli ment. 37 A brief examination of the decision certainly confirms its imaginative quality.

Judge Bazelon decided: "An accused is not criminally respon sible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect." 38 Brickman stated (above) that a half million people in Los Angeles, in addition to those who were really dis turbed, had the seeds of disturbance already in them. Abraham sen cites the studies of the Gluecks, and of Drs. Healy and Bron ner, showing respectively that 51.4% and 91 % of delinquents had deep emotional disturbances. 39 The latter figure means, under the Durham Rule, that 91 % of delinquents cannot be held respon sible for their criminal actions. A third exercise in irresponsibility is found in the plea of "irresistible impulse." The offender with a "character disorder" just cannot control himself when he feels the impulse to commit crime. Only persons who have committed crimes can report an irresistible impulse. It is obvious that any criminal act, by its very commission, was not controlled} and hence was a response to "irresistible impulse."

It is not surprising, in view of the foregoing, that Dr. Manfred S. Guttmacher quotes with approval the following satirically re signed statement by Lady Wootton: ... The only solution, as I see it, is to give up trying to draw the line between the responsible and the irresponsible, and to recognize that once we have departed from the comparative security of the M'N aghten formula there is no logical resting place short of abandon .. ing the questions of responsibility altogether .... In that case every.. thing except treatment--guilt, responsibility, and all the rest of it would become irrelevant. 4o It is now appropriate to give some attention to the theory of treatment. The examination of the outcomes of treatment (above) is not encouraging. Theories of treatment may nevertheless promCriminology and the Sick Society 225 ise modification of criminal behavior. Two general basic objec tives are apparently sought in the psychoanalytic therapies. The first objective may be characterized as the reduction of the power of the Superego. The second, and currently popular, goal is to increase Ego strength. 41 In the effort to control criminal behavior, certain consequences fo1101'v the destruction of the Superego. There are many defini tions of the Superego, but they seem to vary around the central idea of an internalized system of external authority. This is the part of the personality which contains social norms, including legal norms, and which "punishes" the violator of norms. If this reading of Freud and neo-Freudians is approximately correct, the conclusion becomes obvious. The reduction of the force of the Superego reduces internal controls and frees the personality of inhibitions to exactly the degree that therapy (with this object) is successful. The rapist who is encouraged to feel "good" about his crime is in effect told to "go and sin some more." The psycho..

pathic personality is devoid of Superego, incapable of remorse. Where else does the reduction of Superego lead but to the psycho.. pathic personality? The support of the Ego may be viewed as complementary to Superego reduction. If, as Abrahamsen states, the juvenile delin .. quent is "generally speaking .... much more demanding than the nondelinquent," 42 it is difficult to comprehend a theoretical reduction in "demanding" behavior through adding strength to the Ego which "does" the demanding. The Ego can hardly gain strength at the expense of the Id, since instincts cannot be modi fied. It must therefore grow at the expense of the Superego and further reduce the power of conscience to "punish" unlawful be.. havior. So both objectives, even if achieved, reduce controls on the behavior of the violator. 4s The further encouragement of irresponsibility comes clear through a sociological analysis. The criminal is classified as "sick"

if he shows any of the "symptoms" that satisfy the psychiatrist, and it is even urged that the terms "mental disease or defect" jn~h.ldc "!J.l>n9rm!J.litie~" manj£e~ted only by repeated criminal or 226 Psychiatry and Responsibility otherwise antisocial conduct. If symptoms cannot otherwise be identified, the crime itself serves-as with the irresistible impulse (above).44 Statuses in societies universally involve reciprocal rights and duties, and one person's rights may be another's duties. The infant, the senile, and the insane in American society are given additional rights and are excused from many duties. It is also true that the person with physical illness, with observable symp toms, is given additional rights-to be cared for, to have special foods, special coddling, to be served food in bed-and is excused from normal duties-going to work or completing household chores or paying bills. The sick have a special status, very closely resembling that of the infant. The status is "approved" by general consent.

Even the temporary movement of an adult into the status, "sick," interrupts the ongoing social relationships. The sick father cannot function as father: and, in effect, there is no father. Some one else must assume father's duties. This change can, of course, be generalized to any other status. If all violators of social norms, including legal norms, are to be added to the "sick," the criminal and other violators not only have the assurance of therapists that they have no responsibility, but also have the warm blanket of approval of their irresponsi bility from the bulk of society. The ultimate in the support of irresponsibility, going far be yond destruction of the Superego, the aggrandisement of the Ego, or the release from duties for sickness, is the concept of the sick society. Following the precedent of Freud, Horney seems to think that patients [read "criminals"] are always looking for some one to blame for their difficulties. Sullivan and Fromm believe that blaming others has its place. 45 Clara Thompson is not alone when she states flatly, "We live in a sick society with which we must make some compromise." 46 The idea of the sick society, positing various types of sickness, has been expressed many times. K.arl Marx noted and attacked the sick society. Enrico Ferri, W. A. Bonger, and many others who have identified uncontrolled determinants of criminal beCriminology and the Sick Society 227 havior have taken similar positions. There is an implicit con tempt for the human personality, for man himself, in statements which describe him as a leaf on a turbulent ocean. Certainly if society is sick, man cannot be expected to accept its erratic, nor mative frustrations, and the whole notion of violative behavior is irrelevant to human action.

The final outcome of such explanations as that of the sick society and the irresponsible criminal is described by George VoId: [This one history] highlights ... the ease with which [this theory] fits into totalitarian patterns of government. It is centered on the core idea of the superior knowledge and wisdom of the scientific expert, who, on the basis of his studies, decides what kind of human beings his fellow men are who commit crime, and who, on the basis of this knowledge and scientific insight, prescribes appropriate treatment without concern for public opinion and without consent from the person so diagnosed. 47 The power struggle will continue. This brief analysis of the claims to power of one set of antagonists has referred to garbled concepts, inadequate or negative evaluations of results, and theo retical weaknesses underlying the anticipated results. The case for the substitution of psychiatric and quasi-psychiatric procedur~s for the relatively effective if equally unscientific, democratic sys tems of crime control is far from adequate. For the protection of the criminal from his own excesses, for the protection of the genuinely ill, and even for the protection of the relatively well if such there be-better results must be shown before jails can be emptied or even converted to open-ward hospitals.48 NOTES 1. Franz Alexander, M.D., and Hugo Staub, The Criminal" The Judge" and The Public (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1956), p. vi. The quota tion is from Gregory Zilboorg, the translator of the work, which was originally published in Germany. The first American edition appeared in 1931.· 2. For extended documentation see Michael Hakeem, "A. Critique of the 228 Psychiatry and Responsibility Psychiatric Approach to Crime and Correction," Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. XXIII, No. 4 (Autumn, 1958), pp. 650-682. Also see A. H. Chapman, M.D., "Psychiatrogenic Illness," The American Journal of Psychiatry) Vol. CXVI, No. 10 (April, 1960), p. 873.

3. New York: Columbia University Press, 1960. 4. Alexander, op. cit. 5. Richard R. Korn and Lloyd W. McCorkle, Criminology and Penology (New York: Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1959), p. 442. 6. Zilboorg, in Alexander and Staub, Ope cit.} pp. vii..viii. 7. Alexander, Ope cit.} p. xvii. 8. Ope cit.} p. xix. 9. Zilboorg, in Alexander, op. cit.} p. viii. 10. Alexander, Ope cit.} p. xviii. 11. David Abrahamsen, M.D., The Psychology of Crime (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), p. 165. 12. Abrahamsen, Ope cit.} pp.. 276 £. 13. Alexander, Ope cit.} p. xix 14. Social Causation (New York: Ginn and Company, 1942), pp. 77-95. 15. Criminology (3rd ed.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1956), pp. 387·90. 16. Quoted in U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Public Health Service, Evaluation in Mental Health (Washington, 1955), p. 6. 17. Ope cit. p. 9. 18. Publication No. 58 of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (Washington, 1959), pp. iii, iv.

19. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1955. 20. See Hakeem for elaboration, Ope cit. 21. New York Times) April 10, 1960. 22. Atlanta Journal} February 11, 1961. 23. Georgia State Department of Public Health, Vital Statistics} 1959, p. 46. 24. See} in this connection, A. H. Chapman, Ope cit. 25. "Objectivity in Psychiatry," The American Journal of Psychiatry} Vol. CXIV, No. 12 (June, 1958), p. 1046. 26. "Psychiatry and its Methods," The American Journal of Psychiatry, Vol. CXVII, No.7 (January, 1961), p. 664. 27. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954, p. 5. 28. See note 15. 29. Ope cit.} p. 28. 30. Gerald Gurin, Joseph Veroff, and Sheila Ford, Americans View Their Mental Health (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1960), p. 319. 31. Quoted in Evaluation in Mental Health} p. 19. 32. Theoretical Criminology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p.125. 33. Abrahamsen, Ope cit.} p. 247. 34. Ope cit., p. 249.

35. Ibid. 36. "Murder by Adolescents," (Correspondence), The American ]o,#rnaj pI P~ychiatr:y, Vol.. eX-IV! No.. 12 (June, 1958), p. 1045: Criminology and the Sick Society 229 37. Manfred S. Guttmacher, M.D., "Current Trends in Regard to Criminal Responsibility," The American Journal of Psychiatry~ Vol. CXVII, No.8 (February, 1961), p. 684. 38. Abrahamsen, Ope cit.~ p. 250. 39. Ope cit., pp. 82-83. 40. Guttmacher, Ope cit.~ p. 691. The reader is urged, however, to acquaint himself with the full interpretation Barbara Wootton has devoted to the subject in chapter VIII, "Mental Disorder and the Problem of Moral and Criminal Responsibility," in her Social Science and Social Pathology (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1959). 41. For various approaches to the problem, see Clara Thompson, Psycho analysis: Evolution and Development (New York: Hermitage House, 1950). Also see O. Hobart Mowrer, The Crisis in Psychiatry and Re ligion (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1961), especially chaps.

2 and 13. 42. Abrahamsen, Ope cit.~ p. 68. 43. Ope cit., p. 72. 44. Guttmacher, Ope cit., p. 690. 45. Thompson, Ope cit., p. 202. 46. Ope cit., p. 242. 47. VoId, Ope cit., p. 35. 48. For a more extended analysis and a broader coverage, see Arnold W. Green, Crime and Its Defenders (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Com pany, Inc., 1962).

Index of Authors ABBOTT, EDITH, 173 Abrahamsen, David, 212 f., 223 if. Acton, Lord, 204 Alexander, Franz, 82, 212 f. Altschule, Mark David, 115 Alzheimer, A., 115 Anderson, Camilla, 66 Arendt, Hannah, 147 Ausubel, D. P., 66 BALDWIN, A. L., 67 Barry, F. R., 175 Barzun, Jacques, 74, 82 Bauer, R. A., 187 Bazelon, David, 87, 223 f. Bendix, Reinhard, 153, 155 Berdyaev, Nicolas, 169 If. Berlin, Isaiah, 209 Bisno, Herbert, 174 Bonger, W. A~, 226 Boswell, James, 37 Brickman, Harry R.,218 Brown, J. F., 105, 115 Brown, Norman 0., 126, 167, 173, 175 Butterfield, H., 205 CALVIN, JOHN, 62, 159 Cassirer, Ernst, 153 Chapman, A. H., 228 Chardin, Pierre Teilhard de, 37 Cheney, Clarence 0., 115 Chisholm, Brock., 90 Cohn, Norman, 207 Cole, G. D. H., 181 Cole, W. G., 66 Conn, Jacob H., 116 Cooley, Charles Horton, 68 Cotton, H. A., 110, 116 Cottrell, Leonard S., 154 Cumming, J. B., 87 DAVIES, A. POWELL, 63 Dennis, Wayne,· 154 f.

Dollard, John, 123 Dray, W., 210 Dressler, David, 140, 153 Dubos, Rene J., 155 EATON, JOSEPH, 216 Eissler, Ruth S., 94 Ellis, Albert, 99 f. Emmet, D. M., 209 English, O. Spurgeon, 115 Erikson, Erik, 196, 202, 209 f. Erikson, F., 82 Evans-Pritchard, E. E., 209 Eysenck, H. J., 107, 115 FANTL, BERTA, 174 Feibleman, James K., 17 Felix, R. H., 221 Fenichel, Otto, 122 Fergusson, Francis, 137 Ferri, Enrico, 226 Finch, Stuart M., 115 Flugel, J. C., 67 Foote, Nelson N., 153 f. Ford, Sheila, 228 Forer, G. R., 115 Forster, E. M., 206 Fortas, Abe, 87 Foxe, Arthur N., 97 f. Frenkel-Brunswik, Else, 155 231 MACIVER, ROBERT M., 214 f. McCorkle, Lloyd W., 212, 228 McDougall, William, 69 LANDIS, CARNEY, 115 Lange, Johannes, 140 Langer, William, 194 f. LaPiere, Richard, 43 Laslett, Peter, 210 Lasswell, Harold D., 143 Levin, H., 67 Lewin, Kurt, 142, 154 Lindenburg, Ruth Ellen, 175 Lindner, Robert, 92 f. Lin ton, Ralph, 154 Lippi tt, Ronald, 149 Lipset, Seymour Martin, 155 Lombroso, Cesare, 140 Long, Earl, 14 Lovejoy, Arthur 0., 32, 37 Luther, Martin, 202 Lynd, Helen, 43, 67 140, GALBRAITH, KENNETH, 185 Gantt, W. Horsley, 219 Ginzberg, Eli, 154 Glover, Edward, 89, 119 Glueck, Sheldon and Eleanor, 215 Green, A., 82 Gurin, Gerald, 228 Guttmacher, Manfred S., 224 HADFIELD, J. A., 67 Haggard, Howard W., 115 Hakeem, Michael, 87 f., 94, 227 Hall, Jerome, 87, 223 Harding, D. W.~ 173 Hartley, Eugene L., 154 Hartmann, H., 67 Hayek, Friedrich August, 155 Hegel, W., 29, 126, 129 Henry, George W., 91 Hill, W. F., 67 Holt, Liza P., 222 Horney, Karen, 77 f., 82, 169, 174 Horst, Paul, 154 Huxley, Thomas Henry, 32 INKELES, ALEX, 155 232 Index of Authors Freud, Sigmund, 19, 21, 62, 76 fI., Keller, Albert Galloway, 39 103, 115, 120 f., 127 f., 175, Kelsey, D. E. R., 115 209 Keniston, Kenneth, 169, 175 Fromm, Erich, 77 f., 82, 169, 175 Kierkegaard, S¢ren, 30, 50 Furfey, Paul Hanly, 80, 82 King, Martin Luther, 14 Klein, Philip, 161, 173 Knowles, D., 203 £.

Konopka, Gisela, 173 Korn, Richard R., 228 Kraus, Hertha, 173 JAENSCH, E. R.j 155 Jahoda, Marie, 124, 155, 216 James, William, 110 Jaspers, Karl, 34 f. Johnson, Adelaide M., 93 Johnson, Samuel, 33 Jones, Ernest, 119,209 Jung, C. G., 31 KANT, IMMANUEL, 25, 37, 136 Kaplan, Abraham, 36 Kardiner, Abram, 142, 152 Karpman, Benjamin, 91 Kazin, Alfred, 36 MAILER, NORMAN~ 126, 128 f.· Malinowski, Bronislaw, 76 Malthus, Thomas Robert, 177 Mann, Thomas, 153 Marcus, Grace, 174 Marcuse, H., 126 f. Margolis, Joseph, 175 Marx, Karl, 125 f., 128, 226 Masserman, J. H., 67 Menninger, Karl, 19, 86 f., 84, 91 Miller, James G., 143 f. Miller, Neal E., 123 Morley, Christopher, 44 Motley, J. L., 204 233 VEBLEN, THORSTEIN, 184 Veroff, Joseph, 228 Verwoerd, Hendrik F., 5, 14 Voegelin, Erich, 167, 175 VoId, George B., 153, 222, 227 TAFT, DONALD R., 214 Taft, Ronald, 154 Tappan, P. W., 82 Taylor, Gordon Rattray, 206 f.

Thompson, Clara, 173, 175, 226 Thorndike, E. L., 52 f., 56 Toynbee, Arnold, 195 Trilling, Lionel, 163, 174, 194, 209 ZILBOORG, GREGORY, 91, 228 WALTERS, ORVILLE S., 115 Warner, W. Lloyd, 148 Watson, Goodwin, 154 Watson, John B., 51 Webb, Beatrice, 173 Weber, Max, 147 Wertham, Frederic, 94 Whi tehead, Alfred North, 178 Whiting, j. W. M., 43, 67 Whyte, William H., Jr., 144 Wiltse, Kermit, 174 £. Wolpe, j., 115, 123 Woltmann, A. G., 153 W 001£, Virginia, 205 Wootton, Barbara, 17, 224 Index of Authors Smith, A. Delafield, 157, 173 Smith, Bruce Lannes, 143, 154 Smith, Robertson, 199 f. Snow, C. P., 183, 208 Sobeloff, S. E., 87 Solomon, Harry C., 216 Southard, E. E., 115 f. Spengler, Oswald, 195 Spinoza, Benedictus de, 131 Staub, Hugo, 82, 212 Studt, Elliott, 174 Sullivan, Harry Stack, 77, 141, 153 f. Sumner, William Graham, 39 Mullahy, Patrick, 154 Munroe, Ruth L., 75, 82 NAMIER, L. B., 210 Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 50 ORWELL, GEORGE, 137 Outler, Albert, 28, 37 PASCAL, BLAISE, 30, 34 Pavlov, I. P., 51 Peerbolte, M. L., 115 Perry, Ralph Barton, 163, 174 Plato, 27, 37 Potter, D. M., 210 Pound, Ezra, 14 Pratt, David B., 5 Progoff, Ira, 23, 37 RANK, OTTO, 26 Regensburg, Jeannette, 175 Reich, Wilhelm, 125 f., 128 f.

Renier, G. J., 210 Reynolds, Bertha, 163, 174 Richmond, Mary, 163 Rieff, Philip, 173, 197, 209 Riesman, D., 155, 210 Roberts, David, 37 Rogers, Carl R., 154, 221 Roheim, G., 82, 209 Rose, Arnold, 216 Rottersman, William, 218 SALTER, ANDREW, 115 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 34, 37 Schlapp, Max Gustav, 140 Schmideberg, Melitta, 94, 220, 223 Schweinitz, Karl de, 162, 174 Sears, R. R., 67 Sewell, W. H., 81 Shaw, George Bernard, 47, 181 Sheldon, William H., 140 Sherwood, Robert, 85 Shils, Edward, 147, 155 Skinner, B. F., 150 Index of Subjects absolution, 190 accountability, 62, 64 for evil, 51 adaptation, 52 adjustments, 40 Aid to the Pennanently and Totally Disabled, 165 American Psychoanalytic Associa tion, 13 Americans View Their Mental Health, 221 antisocial conduct, 88, 93 ascendance, 12I associative shifting, 51 autonomy, 124 constellation of stimuli, 56 consumer, 178 creativity, 44 crime, 88, 97, 188 control, 212, 214, 222 definitions of, 214 sociological theories of, 81 criminal conduct, 80 criminali ty, 140 criminally responsible, 224 criminals, 94 criminology, 70, 91 f., 211 cross-cultural inductions concerning social morality, 39 Bar-Mitzva, 63 behaviorism, 51, 57, 147, 150 f.

behavioristic therapeutics, 145 biological imperatives, 76 Bolshevik Revolution, 187 boredom, 184 brain-washing, 172 Calvinism, 50 f., 166 f., 188 capitalism, 181 causation, 30 child, 46,63 -centered school, 80 psychologists, 80 childhood memories, 6~ confession, 190 conflict, 181 connection theory, 52 conscience, 46 £I., 187 death-wish, 159 decisions, 31, 33 dehumanization, 46 delinquency, 88, 106 juvenile, 88 psychiatric treatment for, 95 sociological theories of, 81 delinquents, 94 dependency, 165 depersonalized, 34 determinism, 24 f., 34 biological, 69 psychological, 25 of reductive naturalism, 31 determinist, fallacy of this approach, 28 discipline, 45, 49 discontinuity in reality as experi enced, 30 dream analysis, 103, 197 235 236 Index of Subjects duplicity, 62 Durham Decision, 223 f. dynamic, 101 economic growth, 185 insecurity, 181 organization, 175 ego, 103 strength, 225 emergence, the idea of, 32 environmentalism, 71 Eros, 102, 119, 127 evaluation, 222 of psychiatric work, 219 existentialists, 34 fear, 48, 57 of castration, 104 Federal Trade Commission, 211 feedback, 49 conception of habits, 56 freedom, ·31 ff.

experience of, 23 and learning, 49 Freud on Broadway J 85 Freud and his lack of the historical spirit, 197 and his public, 84 Freudian Ethic, 43 gnostic, 168 Marxists, 125 philosophy of permissiveness, 49 psychiatry, a philosophical world view, 21 f. psychoanalysis, 50 Freudianism, American, 159 frustration, 186, 190 gnosticism, 120, 167 government, liberty from, 17 guilt, 38, 46, 59, 61 capacity for, 46 feelings in children, 46 neurotic, 62 personal, 50 situation, 60 habits, 53 formation of, 55 health, 117, 125, 127 heredity, 43 historical reductionism, 14 history, writing of, 194 f. homicide, 3 homosexuality, 100 humanism, 170 f. hunger reduction, 55 immanentism, 132 imitative learning, 55 incentives, 182 f. indeterminism, 59 individual, 68 neo-Freudian concept of, 73 psychoanalytic concepts of the nature of, 79 inequality, 181 inhibi tion, 55 initiation rites for adolescents, 64 instinctivism, 69 instincts of man, 69 introspection, 107 judgmentalism, 172 knowledge and right to control, 166 law of diminishing· returns, 177 Law of Effect, 52 f.

law enforcement, 213 legitimacy, 146, 155 leniency, 98 Leninist, Marxist, 188 liberalism, 189 libido, 76, 102 M'Naghten rules, 87, 223 M.D. degree, 4, 10 maladjustment, 190 Malthusian dilemma, 185 marriage, 48, 186 Marxist Freudians, 125 maternal deprivation, 93 Index of Subjects 237 medical knowledge, 83, 109 profession, 121 mental health, 89, 124, 190, 216 literature, 180 programs, 108 Mental Hygiene, Department of, 2 clinics of, 7 mental illness, 45, 48, 62 mixed-package concept, 100 modification of criminal behavior, 225 Mohammedanism, 188 monogamy, 47 moral emancipation, 45 judgment, 205 principle, 46 moral standards internalized, 47 Moses and Monotheism, 199 motor pathways, 55 neurology, 8 neurosis, 44, 46, 62, 183 New Freedom, 44 The New Man in Soviet Psychology, 187 Oedipal period, 102 Oedipus complex, 76 f. orgastic gnostics, 125, 131 pain, 55 paranoid, 3 parents, 63, 94 pecuniary ambition, 182 perfectionism, 189 permissiveness, 166 person, 29 f.

personal integrity, 44, 65 and character in children, 44 personality, 71 philanthropy, 74 planning, 25 political controls, 148 positivism, 32, 118 positivists, 29 prescientific humanitarianism, 80 primal horde, 76 progress, 84 Protestant dilemma, 50 theology, 51 f. Protestantism, 121 pseudomedical problems, 14 psychiatric teaching a sense of guil t, 26 psychiatrization of law, politics, and morality, 14 psychiatry, 82 cultural and moral effects of, 20 defined, 8 dynamic, 101 history of, 6 hospital, 7 as an institution, 2 H. modern, as an institution, 11 and political power, 13 the sense of responsibility, 63 psychoanalysis, 8 defined, 9 popularized, 170 psychoanalytic situation, confiden .. tial character, 13 psychoanalytic ideas, 79 utopia, 78 psychodynamics, 92, 101 psychology, depth, 100 Russian, 188 Psychology of Crime, 212 psychotherapy, 221 and American culture, 121 tests of its effectiveness, 107 punishment, 54, 61 capital, 89 Puritan view of man, 160, 169 reciprocal rights, 226 reflex to feedback, 49 response, 51 Reformation theology, 50 rehabilitation, 216 relief, 162 religion, 39 ff., 202 238 Index of Subjects repression, 127 responsibility, 29 legal, 87 personal, 63 response selection, 55 therapeutic, 220 Reunion in Vienna, 85 scarcity, 127, 180 schizophrenia, 141 scientism, 11, 29 security, 77 self-analysis, 119 self-confidence, 178 self-control, 46 self-discipline, 44 self-expression, 44 self-punishment, 47 sensory feedback, 55 sex-centered culture, 182 sexual perversipn, 99 frustration, 181 sexuality, 47 f.

shame, 46 sense of, 27 social casework, 160 caseworker's authority, 165 social change, 166 conditioning, 187 control, 3, 45, 166 disease, 188 evolution, 46 reformers, 48 tradition, 43 social-instinct interpretation, 70 social institution, defined, 1 ff. Social Securi ty Act, 165 social work profession, 158 ethics, 163 worker, 161, 166, 169 socialism, 181 socializing process, 46 if. society, 72, 76 evolution of, 39 healthy, 50 is neurotic, 92 responsible for crime, 96 f. sick, 211, 226 sociologist, 220 specialization, 181 speech responses, 56 stimulus substitution, 51 strain, 184, 189 of modern life, 184 subliminal advertising, 172 suicide, 218 suitable home, 174 superego, 47, 131, 213, 225 f. teaching analysis, 103 technological authority, 183 Thanatos, 102, 119, 127 theory of treatment, 224 thera peu tic pessimism, 118, 120 therapy, 75, 123 thinking, 57 utopian, 149 time, 31 Totem -and Taboo, 199 totem worship, 199 training analysis, 12 truth, 26 unconditioned stimulus, 51 undergirding value system, long.

term necessity for, 43 verification, 222 Vocational Rehabilitation, 165 wish fulfillment, 28 work-centered culture, 182 workmanship, 183 £.

About this edition

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Title: Psychiatry and Responsibility

Author: Helmut Schoeck

First published: 1962

Publisher: Van Nostrand, Princeton

Source file: Psychiatry and Responsibility.pdf

Source page: https://freecapitalists.org/books/psychiatry-and-responsibility/

Converted: 2026-08-09 by The Liberty Archive (freecapitalists.org), converter v6

Table of Contents

- Title page
- Contributors
- Preface
- Contents

- 2. Contemporary Psychiatry and the Concept of Responsibility

- 3. Guilt in the Social Science
- 4. The Individual and His Society
- 5. Psychiatry: Science, Art, and Scientism
- 6. Conceptions of Health
- 7. Society as Crucible

- 8. Psychoanalytic Thinking and the Relief of the Poor

- 9. Psychiatry and Economic Organization

- 10. Psychoanalysis and the Writing of History

- 11. Criminology and the Sick Society
- Index of Authors
- Index of Subjects
- About this edition