===== PAGE 1 ===== Vol 48 9 | Austrian Economics Newsletter The Justice of Economic Efficiency by Hans-Hermann Hoppe The central problem of political economy is how to organize society so as to promote the production of wealth. The central problem of political philosophy is how to arrange society so as to make it a just social order. The first question is a question regarding matters of efficiency: what meansare appropriate forachievinga specific result--in this case: wealth, The second question falls outside the realm of the so- called positive sciences. It asks whether or not the goal which political economy assumes to be given can be justified as a goal, and whether or not, then, the means which political economy recommends can be regarded as efficient means for just ends. In the following I will present an a priori justification for the thesis that those means recommended by political econ- omy are indeed efficient means for just ends. Professor Hans-Hermann Hoppe I will begin by describing the means recommended by political economy and explain systematically all the produc- this set of rules implies, by definition, a redistribution of tion of wealth attained by adopting them is greater than that property titles, and hence of income, away from user-produc- produced by choosing any other means. Since my main task ers and contractors of goods and onto non-user-producers is to demonstrate the justice of these means of producing and non-contractors. As a consequence, any such deviation wealth, my description and explanation of economic effi- implies that there will be relatively less original appropria- ciency will be extremely brief, tion of resources whose scarcity is realized, there will be less Political economy begins by recognizing scarcity. Ii is production of new goods, less maintenance of existing goods, only because we do not live inthe Garden of Eden that we are and less mutually beneficial contracting and trading. And concerned about the problem of economic efficiency. Accord- thisnaturally implies a lower standard of living in terms of ex- ing to political economy, the most efficient means of at least changeable goods and services. Further, the provision that alleviating, if not overcoming, scarcity is the institution of only the first user (not a later one) of a good acquires private property. The rules underlying this institution have ownership assures that productive efforts will be as high as been correctly identified for the most part by John Locke. possible at all times. And the provision that only the physical They are as follows: Every person owns his own body as well integrity of property (not property values) be protected guar- as all scarce goods which he puts to use with the help of his antees that every owner will undertake the greatest possible body before anyone else does. This ownership implies the value-productive efforts, i.e., efforts to promote favorable right to employ these scarce goods however one seesfit solong changesin property values and also to prevent or counter any as in so doing one does not aggress against anyone else’s (Continued on page 2) property, i.e., so long as one does not uninvitedly change the AHO TATAHIAAI {{T7T TTT I physical integrity of another’s property or delimits another's i Ii i i: tn i his i iH Ars DE i i 0 i i hn control over it without his consent. In particular, once a good LEGS SR Sh sir BR EE has first been appropriated or homesteaded by mixing one’s Ethical Foundation of Public Policy .................. 4 can only be acquired by means of a contractual transfer of Southern Economic Association ..........coeveeennn. 11 property title from a previous to a later owner. Fertig Center Seminar .........cccccevecriecnenenreans, 11 The reasons this institution leads to the greatest possible Menger’s Personal Papers .........cccoevvccncncecens. 12 production of wealth is straightforward: Any deviation from ===== PAGE 2 ===== unfavorable changes in property values (as they might result from another person’sactions regarding his property). Thus, any deviation from these rules also implies reduced levels of value productive efforts at all times. Now on to my main task of demonstrating that the institution of private property as just characterized isjust. In fact, that only this institution is just and that any deviation from it is not only economically inefficient but unethical as well. First, however, let me clarify an essential similarity between the problem facing political economy and that facing political philosophy--a similarity that political philosophers in their widespread ignorance of economics generally over- look only to wind up in endless ad hoceries. The recognition of scarcity is not only the starting point for political economy; it is the starting point of political philosophy as well. Obvi- ously, if there were a superabundarice of goods, no economic problem whatsoever could exist, And with asuperabundance of goods such that my present use of them would neither reduce my own future supply, nor the present or future supply of them for any other person, ethical problems of right or wrong, just or unjust, would not emerge either, since no conflict over the use of such goods could possibly arise. Only insofar as goods are scarce, then, are economics and ethics required. And in the same way, just as the answer to the problem of political economy must be formulated in terms of rules constraining the possible uses of resources qua scarce resources, political philosophy, too, must answer in terms of property rights. In order to avoid inescapable conflicts, it must formulate a set of rules assigning rights of exclusive control over scarce goods. (Note, by the way, that even in the Garden of Eden, a person’s body, the space occupied by that body, and timewould still bescarce and tothat extent political economy and philosophy would still have some--however limited--task to fulfill.) Now to the actual proof of the thesis that out of the infinitely conceivable ways of assigning rights of exclusive ownership to people, only the previously described rules of private property are actually justifiable. I will present my arguntent in a step-hy-step fashion: (1) First, while scarcity is a necessary condition for the emergence of the problem of political philosophy, it is not sufficient. For obviously, we could have conflicts regarding the use of scarce resources with, let us say, an elephant or a mosquito, and yet we would not consider it possible to resolve these conflicts by means of proposing property norms, The avoidance of possible conflicts, in such cases, is merely a technological, not an ethical problem. For it to turn intoan ethical problem, it is also necessary that the conflicting actors be capable, in principle, of argumentation. In fact, this is undeniably so because we are also engaged in argumentation here. Denying that political philosophy presupposes argu- mentation is contradictory, as the very denial would itself be an argument. Only with argumentation does the idea of validity and truth--and by no means only the idea of truth in ethical matters but of truth in general--emerge. Only within argumentation are truth claims of any kind made; and it is only in the course of an argumentation that truth claims are decided upon. And this proposition, it turns out, is itself undeniably true: onecannot argue that onecannot argue; and one cannot dispute knowing what it means to make a truth claim without implicitly claiming atleast the very negation of this proposition to be true. My very first step in the following chain of reasoning, then, has been called “the a priori of argumentation” by such philosophers as Juergen Habermas * and K.QO. Apel.! (2) In the same way as it is undeniably true that ethics requires argumentation, it is also undeniably true that any argument requires an arguing person. Arguing does not consist of free-floating propositions. It is an activity. But if aside from whatever is said in its course, argumentation is also a practical affair, and if argumentation is the presup- position of truth-claiming and possibly true propositions, then it follows thatintersubjectively meaningful norms must exist--namely thosewhich make anaction an argumentation- which must havea special cognitive statusin thatthey are the practical preconditions of truth. And once more, this is true a priori, so that anyone, like an empiricist-positivist-emotiv- ist, who denied the possibility of a rational ethics and who declared the acceptance or rejection of norms an arbitrary affair, would invariably get caught in a practical contradic- tion. For, contrary towhat he would say, he would in fact have to presuppose the norms which underlay any argumentation whatsoever as valid simply in order to say anything at all. (3) With this step I lose, once and for all, the company of philosophers like Habermas and Apel? And yet, as will become clear immediately, it is directly implied in the previ- ous step. That Habermas and Apel are unable to take this step, I submit, is due to the fact that they, too, suffer, as do many other philosophers, from a complete ignorance of economics, and a corresponding blindness towards the fact of ,& nd . H h scarcity. The step is simply this: To recognize that Boating | J tation is a form of action and does not consist of free-floating sounds, implies the recognition ofthe fact that any argumen- tation whatsoever requires that a person must have exclusive control over the scarce resource of his body. Aslong as there is argumentation, there is a mutual recognition of each other's property right in his own body. It is this recognition of each other’s exclusive control over one’s own body, presup- posed by any argumentation, which explains the unique feature of verbal communication that, while one may dis- agree about what has been said, it is still possible to agree at least on the fact that there is such disagreement. And again, such a property right in one’s own body must be said to be justified a priori: for anyone who would try to justify any norm whatsoever would already have to presuppose an exclusive right to control over hisbody asa valid norm simply in order to say “I propose such and such.” And any person who would try to dispute the property right in hisbody would ‘become caught up in a practical contradiction, since arguing in this way would already implicitly have to accept the very norm which he was disputing. He would not even open his mouth if he were right. (4) The final argument extends the idea of private prop- erty asjustified, and justified apriori, from the very prototype ofa scarce good, i.e. a person’sbody, to other goods. It consists of two parts. I will first demonstrate that argumentation, and argumentative justification of anything, presupposes not only the right to exclusively control one’s body but the right to control other scarce goods as well, For if no one had the | 5 ===== PAGE 3 ===== right to control anything except his own body, then we would cause the physical integrity of something to change, control all cease to exist and the problem of justifying norms--as well over whether or not one’s actions affect the value of as all other human problems--simply would not exist. We do someone’s property to change rests with other people and not live on air alone, and hence, simply by virtue of the fact of their evaluations. One would have to interrogate and come *_ being alive, property rights to other things must be presup- to an agreement with the entire world population to make W posed to be valid, too. No one who is alive could argue sure that one’s planned actions would not change another otherwise. person’sevaluations regarding his property. Everyonewould The second part of the argument demonstrates that only be long dead before this was even accomplished. Moreover, the Lockean idea of establishing property claims through the idea that property value should be protected is argumen- homesteading is a just principle of property acquisition, The tatively indefensible: For even in order to argue, it must be proof employs a simple argumentum a contrario: If a person presupposed that actions must be allowed prior toany actual did not acquire the right of exclusive control over other, agreement, because ifthey were not, one could not even argue nature-given goods by his own work, that is, if other people, so. - Yet if one can, then this is only possible because of who had not previously used such goods, had the right to objective borders of property, i.e., borderswhich every person dispute the homesteader’s ownership claim, then this would can recognize assuch on his own, without havingto agree first only be possible if one would acquire property titles not with anyone else with respect to one’s system of values and through lahor, i.e., by establishing some objective link be- evaluations. Rawls and Nozick could not even open their tween a particular person and a particular scarce resource, mouths ifit were otherwise. The very fact, then, thatthey do but simply by means of verbal declaration. Yet this solution- open them proves what they say is wrong, apart from the obvious fact that it would not even qualify as (2) The second popular deviation, equally absurd and a solution in a purely technical sense in that it would not indefensible, is this: Instead of recognizing the vital impor- provide a basis for deciding between rivaling declarative tance of the prior-later distinction in deciding between con- claims--is incompatible with the already justified ownership flicting property claims--as the private property ethics do, of a person over hishody. For if one could indeed appropriate thereby, as indicated, assuring value productive efforts to be property by decree, this would imply that it would also be as high as possible at all times--the claim is made, in essence, possilile for one to simply declare another person’s body tobe that priority is irrelevant and that late-comers have rights to one’s own. Yet, as we have already seen, to say that property ownership just as first comers. Again, Rawls with his belief is acquired not through homesteading action but through intherights of future generations, just savings ratesand such declaration involves a practical contradiction: nobody could things, may be cited as an example. However, if late-comers say and declare anything, unless his right to use his body was indeed had legitimate ownership claims to things, then liter- - | already assumed to be valid simply because of the very fact ally no one would be allowed to do anything with anything as w that regardless of what he said, it was he, and nobody else, one would have to have all of the later-comers’ consent prior who had homesteaded it as his instrument of saying any- to ever doing what one wanted to do. Neither we, our thing. forefathers, nor our progeny could, do or will survive if one With this, my. a priori justification of the institution of were to follow this rule. Yet in order for any person--past, private property is essentially complete, Only two supple- present, or future--to argue anything it must evidently be mentary arguments may be needed in order to point out why possible to survive then and now. And inorder todo just this- and where all other ethical proposals, let me call them -and even people behind a Rawlsian “veil of ignorance” would socialist, turn out to be argumentatively indefensible. have to be able to survive--property rights cannot be con- (1) According to the private property ethics, scarce re- ceived of as being timeless and non-specific regarding the sources that are under the exclusive control of their owners number of people concerned. Rather, they must necessarily aredefined in physical terms, and, mutatis mutandis, aggres- be thought of as originating through acting at specific points - sion is also defined as an invasion of the physical integrity of in time for specific actingindividuals. Otherwise, it would be another person’s prop erty. As indicated, the economic effect impossible for anyone to first say anything at a definite point of this provision is that of maximizing value productive in time and for someone else to be able to reply. Simply efforts. A popular. deviation from this is the idea of defining saying, then, that the prior-later distinction can be ignored, aggression as an invasion of the value or psychic integrity of implies a contradiction, as one’s being able to say so must | another person’s property instead. This idea underlies, for presuppose one’s existence as an independent decision- instance, John Rawls’ “difference principle” that allinequali- making unit at a given point in time, ties have to be expected to be to everyone’s advantage regard- Hence, I conclude that any socialist ethic is a complete less of how such inequalities have come about;? and also failure. Only the institution of private property, which also Robert Nozick’s claim that a “dominant protection agency” assures the greatest possible production of wealth, can be has the right to outlaw competitors regardless of their actual argumentatively justified, because itis the very precondition actions, and his related claim that “non-productive ex- of argumentation. changes” in which one party would be better off if the other one did not exist may. be outlawed, ‘again regardless of - | Notes Ay hicther or not such exchange involved any physical aggres- DK.O. Apel, “Das Apriori der Kommunikationsgemeinschaft und | sion.* die Grundlagen der Ethik,” in: the same, Transformation der ‘Such proposals are absurd as well as indefensible. While Philosophie, Vol. II ,Frankfurt/M. 1973; Juergen Habermas, Moral- every person can have control over whether or not his actions bewusstsein und Kommunikatives Handeln, 7, Frankfurt/ M. 1983. ===== PAGE 4 ===== 2)Apel and Habermas are essentially silent on the all-decisive question of what ethical prescription actually follows from the recognition of the “a priori of argumentation.” However, there are remarks indicating that they both seem to believe some sort of participatory social democracy to be implied in this a priori. The following explains why hardly anything could be farther from the truth. 3)John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge 1971, p. 60, pp. 751, 4)Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York 1974, pp. 55f, pp. 83-86. Hans-Hermann Hoppe is associate professor of economics at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, and a senior fellow of the Mises Institute. [| On the Ethical Foundation of Public Policy: Utilitarianism, Natural Rights, or Argumentation Ethics? by Parth Shah At the Ludwig von Mises Institute’s fifth anniversary conference held at Pace University in New York, October 1987, there was a remarkably candid and informative panel discussion on ethics, public policy, and the papers by Profes- sor Leland Yeager (“Mises and His Critics on Ethics, Rights, and Law”) and Professor Hans-Hermann Hoppe (“The Praxeological Foundations of Epistemology and Ethics”). In his presentation, Professor Yeager upheld utilitarian- ism, in the tradition of Ludwig von Mises and Henry Hazlitt, as “a particular approach to ethics in personal life and public affairs.” Social cooperation, he said, is the crucial means by which individuals attain their own varied ends. Itisalsothe ultimate standard by which institutions, laws, traditions, ethical precepts, rules of behavior, and personal character traits should be judged. The test is: do they serve or subvert social cooperation? Professor Yeager first presented his case that Mises was a utilitarian by quoting extensively from various works of Mises. He argued that criticisms of Mises’s utilitarianism, especially those provided by Professors Murray Rothbard -and Karen Vaughn, were either self-inconsistently utilitar- ian or misdirected, because the critics only challenged act- utilitarianism, a straw man in which Mises never believed. According to Professor Yeager, any theory that takes into account consequences of any action or public policy in terms of human happiness would be considered a utilitarian theory. He then took on the axiomatic natural rights theory of Professor Murray Rothbard in order to demonstrate the superiority of “rule” or “indirect” utilitarianism. Yeager chosenotto criticize Rothbard’s axioms of self-ownership and property rights through homesteading, but instead directed his arguments against the axiomatic(a priori) method per se. As a utilitarian he declared the axiomatic method faulty by pointing out the consequences of that method, that is, by describing Rothbard’s axiomatically deduced position on crime, extortion, blackmail, contracts, and bankruptcy laws. |. - Professor Yeager concluded that although Mises did not articulate the distinction between the act and rule versions of utilitarianism, and although he did not explicitly address the axiomatic natural rights approach, Mises nonetheless was on the right track. Professor Hoppe, in addition to defending the a priori method of deduction, put forward a novel and ingenious defense of private property rights called “argumentation ethics” or “the a priori of argumentation.” He argued that since every truth claim about either natural phenomena or moral norms must be decided upon in the course of an argu- mentation, the norm which permits argumentation must be considered valid. This norm is the mutual recognition of each arguer’s ownership over his mind and body. Simply put, it would be a contradiction even to engage in an argument in order to deny the validity of the self-owner- ship norm. The mere act of argumentation presupposes that the other individual is distinct, separate, and sovereign over his mind and body. In addition, because argumentation isa special form of action, the status of “argumentation ethics” is similar to that of the axiom of human action, i.e. the point from which Austrian economics begins. Once ownership over one’s mind and body is validated, property rights over other scarce resources appropriated through one’slabor canbe established by logical extension, by means of an gargumentum a contrario, Professor Hoppe’s a priori justification of private prop- erty is quite distinct from that of natural rights theory or utilitarianism. The axioms of natural rights theory ulti- mately rely on the nature of man, and utilitarianism depends on the beneficial consequences of, say, the “rule” of private property. Argumentation ethics, on the other hand, relies on the integrity of deduction to establish ethical principles. There is, though, a similarity between natural rights theory and argumentation ethics in that both accept the Lockean homesteading principle, Panel Members: Dr. David Gordon, Professor Murray Rothbard, Professor Leland Yeager, Professor Hans Hoppe and moderator Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr. 3 3 ===== PAGE 5 ===== The following is adapted from the panel discussion. The QUESTION: I accept that as a perfectly valid conclusion, panel members were: Dr. David Gordon, senior fellow of the but how as a utilitarian can you arrive at that kind of answer? Ludwig von Mises Institute; Professor Hans-Hermann : | Hoppe, associate professor of economics at the University of YEAGER: My practical norm is social cooperation, that Nevada, Las Vegas; Professor Murray N. Rothbard, S.J, Hall is, what makes for a good society. As Hazlitt and Mises distinguished professor of economics at the University of explain, social cooperation is the one means necessary to all Nevada, Las Vegas; and Professor Leland B. Yeager, Ludwig the different ends people have. If people try to latch onto von Mises professor of economics at Auburn University. coercive power to take advantage of others, it makes fora dog- Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr., was the moderator, eat-dog, predatory society. Activities that serve cooperation should be praised and activities that subvert it should be condemned. QUESTION: Professor Yeager, I noticed that in your talk and also in an article in the Cato Journal (1985) you implied that certain sets of rules necessarily bring happiness for the society at large. You don’t really say much about how such sets of rules should be chosen, or what criteria should be used, or who should choose them? QUESTION: Professor Yeager, a consequence of insider trading is that some people are harmed by it while others benefit, Asa utilitarian, what would be your view on insider trading? YEAGER: An answer to your question doesn’t seem to follow merely from the philosophical position I discussed. I YEAGER: How dowe decide whether to approve of some can’t state a firm position for or against insider trading, If I X . : . . sets of rules and disapprove of others? Who decides? It is were to study the actual factual details of particular cases, I decided through a decentralized process of discussions don’t know whether I would come out condemning it or not. among people, private conversations, personal negotiations, er g1nv g 8. vay, ‘the benefit of centuries of experience and discussion. for example, someone hasaccepted, and is being paid for, a job that requires his keeping certain information confidential for Aprocessof eliminationis goingon. Itispartly deliberate, his employer's use. If, then, he steals the information for his as in discussion. It is partly the kind of natural selection that own benefit, that is clearly wrong. | Hayek writes about. Societies practicing rules that subvert social cooperation tend to--though there is no guarantee-- ROTHBARD: I think that Professor Yeager’s answer shrivel up; societies that tend to survive are the ones that shows the difference between viewing liberty and the free practice rules that promote social cooperation and give their market as an organic tendency versus holding it as an abso- members opportunities to make good lives for themselves. lute principle. I am in favor of saying that there is nothing The process is two-stranded because it works both through wrong with insider trading except for breach of contract. -unarticulated natural selection and through actual discus- Moreover, insider trading laws eliminate trading by the most sion continuing over the ages, discussions in which we our- knowledgeable peoplein the market: the insiders. The people selves are taking part. The outcome of this two-stranded who are left tobenefit are the brokerage houses, the ones who process is always tentative, and in a free society the existing actually lobby to outlaw insider trading, rules are always open to reexamination and criticism, Some- times we do change our judgments about them. - QUESTION: The question’s minor premise was left unanswered, namely, what does utilitarianism say about situations in which some people are alleged to benefit and other people are harmed. Let me giveyou different examples: — ¢ what do you think about tariffs, minimum wage laws, or rent their fellows and thus promotes cooperation as opposed to control laws? In each case some people are alleged to be clashes. But factual information changes, circumstances harmed and other people are alleged tobenefit. How doesthe change, and so do the details of the rules that are generally utilitarian analyze these questions where we know a lot more accepted. These changes need not necessarily come through about the facts than for insider trading? | legislation. There has been considerable change in sexual morals, forexample; now unmarried people can live together, ‘YEAGER: Repealing any tariff is going to harm some which mighthave been condemned inthe past. Thereis more people. James Buchanan would say that therefore it recognition than before of what kinds of behavior victimize shouldn’t be done, unless you get the consent, or at least third parties and what kinds do not. There is a necessity for continuity in the rules that are generally accepted. And yet they are open to modification. Continuity in the rules helps people predict the behavior of conceptual consent, of the people harmed. I don’t like that I would give a similar answer to the question of how we mode of argument. | | come to accept scientific propositions. No particular author- Tariffs are an example of the private drafting of the ity decides what we must believe in the realm of science; coercive power of government into serving special interests. similarly, none decides what we should believe in the realm That makes for a bad kind of society, one where people latch of ethics. Butat any given time, thereis a generally prevailing ontocoercion to servetheir owninterests. A good society does opinion, and experience and reasoning do have some influ- not have that sort of fing going on. ence on the evolution of beliefs. ===== PAGE 6 ===== ~ ROTHBARD: Hayekian evolution has received an the ultimate criterion of ethics is “happiness is better than overly good press. What the “survival doctrine” implies misery.” Professor Yeager said that it would be startling if depends largely on the time slot we're talking about. If this someone wanted to argue on some other basis than well- were 1937, it would look as if Fascism were sweeping Europe. being. Even if one cannot argue for something entirely You could have very well said that Fascism is obviously the separate, it does not follow that one must base one’s argu- ,! ° doctrine that is surviving and democracies are falling apart. ment on well-being, The point is that our choice is nol Thirty years later, of course, it’s different. between using well-being as the ultimate criterion or just Evil also survives. Many dictatorial, totalitarian regimes ignoring it altogether, as Professor Yeager has characterized survived for a long time, sometimes thousands of years. A it. look back at the Roman Empire and Greek civilization shows Finally, Professor Yeager made an excellent case that that the same trends were going on then that are going on Mises held the views that Yeager attributed, but that is far now: dictatorships, special privileges, liberty, and all the rest from showing that Mises’s view is what defines utilitarian- of it, battling each other. Thus, survival is a very shaky ism. And he charges that people come up with some rather ‘ground for talking about ethics or anything else. And just tricky examples of act utilitarianism, thus setting up a straw talking about physical survival doesn’t establish an ethical man, when no one really believes in act utilitarianism. That system or ethical rules. is not my reading of the philosophical literature at all. Infact, Second, I think Yeager misinterprets the doctrine of act utilitarianism seems to be the favored form of utilitarian- natural rights. We don’tignore utility, and neither does any ism, see for example David Lyons. And rule utilitarians are ethical doctrineignore utility altogether. The social-coopera- moving toward the contractarian version of rule utilitarian- tion test comes out pretty well, in general. Butthere is more ism. Mises held a utilitarian position but it is setting up a involved than simple consequences. straw man to say to the people who are arguing against act Say, for example, we have a society where redheads are utilitarianism that they are setting up straw men. considered demonic, evil, possessive of bad spirits, etc. There are very few redheads in this society, and they pop up only YEAGER: You asked how can it be all right to postulate - once in a while. Everybody hates them and thinks they are happiness as an ultimate value but not all right simply to evil and destructive of life. With this scenario one can make postulate natural rights. Well, when I postulate happiness as a strong utilitarian case for public execution of these red- an ultimate value, [ am frankly making a value judgment. - heads. And because there are so few redheads, there would When people postulate rights, though, they seem to be be no severe economic consequences. I don’t see how a attributing an ontological status to them, which makes the utilitarian could argue against this. It seems to me that the proposition about them appear not as a value judgment but only way to escape this dilemma is to observe that redheads asastatementthat these thingsactually exist. We objectively .}. have natural rights, namely the absolute right to life. perceive, supposedly, that rights exist and that they impose ® There are many cases where broad or laissez-faire utili- certain compulsions and restrictions on our behavior, I find tarians and the natural-rights theorists can agree. But they it unacceptable just to postulate rights as if they possessed an would not agree on things like the absolute rights of redheads objective existence. If, instead, you were to say, “I postulate to survive even though they might be hated and despised by certain listed rights in the sense that make a value judgment everyone. And of course, there are other cases, not just in favor of them,” then Iwould not be able to object, for you redheads, which are historically important, for example slav- would be making a value judgment the same as I am making ery in the South. one, Weall have to make at least one valuejudgment ifweare : goingto approve or disapprove of anything at all about public YEAGER: I don’t want to be misunderstood on my policy. I think Murray would agree with this last remark. attitude toward Hayekian natural selection. There is some- thing to it: some selection process goes on. But I agree ROTHBARD: I agree, but with this amendment. Pro- wholeheartedly with Professor Rothbard that we don’t want fessor Hoppe has worked out for the first time a derivation of to make survival a test of whether something is good or not. the libertarian ethics without using any value premises. I | | | : think it isan unusual breakthrough. I wrote my article before GORDON: On the subject of social cooperation, Profes- Professor Hoppe’s derivation. sor Yeager comments that happiness is better than misery | EE and social cooperation is the best way to attain happiness. QUESTION: Professor Hoppe, you make a distinction Moreover, he says that if someone wants to deny that happi- between a priori and a posteriori propositions. You argued ness is better than misery, they wouldn't know how to argue further that a priori propositions, the foundation of your againstit. Thatseems tobe quite right. But can’t people who axiomatic method, must have some content of experience. support natural rights say that they find happiness when ‘Sincehoth types of propositions involve experience, could you people have natural rights? Why is it all right to say that you explain to me how, then, you make this distinction? can’t really make arguments for the proposition that happi- ness ig better than misery, and at the same time say that itis HOPPE: The rationalist philosophers didn’t claim that | arbitrary to postulate natural rights in an axiomatic fashion? a priori knowledge was knowledge that does not make use of fly Secondly, it doesn’t follow that happiness is the only “observations. What they claimed was that in order to prove : thing better than misery even if we grant that happiness is the validity of the statement it is not necessary to rely on better than misery. It is a separate proposition to claim that observation. Of course, I must have some sort of experience. ===== PAGE 7 ===== But once these experiences are given, certain propositions Ido not doubt that Professor Yeager correctly described can be defended without having to go out and test them, Mises’s position as utilitarianism, but that doesn’t make the simply by pointing out that you can’t deny them without position right. In my impression, if this position is carried contradiction, through it’s nothing but plain relativism. Cg Thus a priori knowledge does not mean that it does not Let me point out what I consider to be the essential » rely on the use of observations, and it does not mean that it problems with utilitarianism. Te simply say that we choose does not rely on observations in order for somebody to come that set of rules which is conducive to social welfare or the up with that knowledge. But a priori knowledge can be happiness of society, doesn’t dispense us from then defining validated without having to go out and confront a proposition a criterion which we can use in order to decide which of the with contingent observations. And here is the test of twoalternative rulesis capable of yielding a higher happiness $ whether knowledge can be classified as a posteriori or a and which one is not. Ihave to hear what that criterion may priori. Everything that cannot be proven at the pain of self- be. contradiction must be classified as a posteriori knowledge, Evidently we must be able to solve two problems if meaning would have to acquire additional information of the utilitarianism is to work. It must be possible, even though empirical kind in order to find out whether or not it is true. Professor Yeager thinks that it is not necessary, that we can And everything that can be verified independently of thatis aggregate utilities of people, Otherwise Idon’t see how we can called q priori. say this or that is more conducive to the welfare or to the happiness of society. We must be ableto aggregate happiness. QUESTION: My question is directed toward Professor I also don’t see how that aggregation could be done. But Yeager. How would the norm of social cooperation make me apart from that, even if it could be done, then thereis still the behave honestly? : problem of defining the units in which you measure this utility. This unit evidently must be defined in physical terms. YEAGER: Your question indicates a useful distinction. Idonotseehow elsewecan defineit, Ifyou defineit in physical On the one hand utilitarianism develops criteria for judg- terms, you must already presuppose some sort of property ments about public policy. On the other hand it bears on rights. If a utilitarian and a natural rights person were to personal ethics and on how--not in detail but in general--one argue over who is right in this respect, simply by virtue of the ought to run one’s own life. fact of engaging in this sort of discussion it must be presup- What incentives does a person have to behave asa decent posed that one owns one’s body, otherwise one could not human being, by and large abiding by generally accepted present one’s natural rights position, and Professor Yeager ethical precepts? That is a difficult question. Henry Hazlitt could not offer his utilitarian position. But by the factthat he | has a pretty good treatment of it in his Foundations of offers his position heis already refuting himself because if he 4 Morality. 1also like Problems of Ethics by Moritz Schlick, did not have an absolute right in his body, if he would not pre- who doesn’t really come across as a positivist in that book. suppose it, I donot see how he can argue anything. He could Mortimer Adler’s the Time of Our Lives isalso good. Schlick not even present his utilitarian arguments. puts the point nicely: being a decent person in the ordinary My final remark concernsthe kind of method that Profes- sense of the word and observing the usual ethical precepts sor Yeager uses to refute the axiomaticapproach. You might does tend to be conducive to a happier life than if you werea have noticed that he did not undertake a clear-cut refutation. scoundrel. It isa question of what kind of person you want to Instead, he presented the axioms, then he listed the conclu- be--an ordinary decent person as conceived by Mises, Roth- sions that Rothbard derivesfrom all these axioms; he does not bard, and Hazlitt, or, instead, someone like Richard Selden. like these derivations and because he does not like them, he Examples like this sometimes do help clear things up. thinks there must be something wrong with the axioms and Do we honestly recommend that people cultivate the the axiomatic method. Now this, of course, is not the way character of a Richard Selden on the grounds that doing so things are to be done. One must, to make that point, first would contribute to their own interest, at least their own prove that the axioms are Bot right. He did not do that. narrow self-interest? I don’t think we can. As Hazlitt, Adler, Schlick, and others explain, it is in one’s own interest tobe a YEAGER: What criterion do we have for choosing decent person in the ordinary sense of the word. among alternative sets of rules? The criterion iswhether the rules are likely to serve or subvert social cooperation and QUESTION: I have a question for Professor Hoppe. = thereby serve or subvert happiness. A greatrange of empiri- Does the idea of personal sovereignty extend to knowledge? cal research that we might do bears on this question. The Am [| sovereign over my thoughts, ideas, and theories? I subject matter includes psychology, political science, the would also like you to comment on Professor Yeager’ 8 views theory. of bureaucracy, sociology, and economics, We can on utiliiztaniem. -address a great many factual questions to each other before reaching a position of simply disagreeing about ultimate - HOPPE: To answer the first question, in order to have value judgments, } athoughtyou must have property rightsover yourbody. That We should not prematurely give up our discussion and doesn’t imply that you own your thoughts. The thoughts can say, “Well, it’s just a matter of value judgments; you think be used by anybody whois capable of understanding them. In. thisway and I think that way.” Let me give you an example any case, to even open your mouth and say anything you must of what I mean by giving up prematurely. Years ago, back in assume the norm that you have property rights in your body. the 1950s, I was having a discussion with a colleague, who ===== PAGE 8 ===== finally said, “Well, I see we’re not getting anywhere in this QUESTION: I’d like to direct the question to Professor discussion, You are one of those people who believe in Hoppe or Rothbard, whoever would like to pickit up. Isthere monetary policy and I am one of those who believe in fiscal a presumption here that if you take the absolute natural policy. There is no room for discussion. We just have rights position you can always spin out immediately the different beliefs." correct solution to any particular problem? Or does there ..! This of courseis the opposite of a sensible way to deal with need to be the kind of discussion that Professor Yeageryyy disagreements. Whether one believes in fiscal or monetary probably refers to? - Just take two contemporary issues, | policy is poles apart from an ultimate value judgment, All surrogate motherhood and how does society deal with people sorts of empirical considerations can be brought into the who have AIDS. There you have all kinds of conflicting discussion before we have to give up and say we just disagree. considerations that might be taken into account. Which ones We are in the same position as scientists disagreeing about do we ignore and which ones do we pick up? the interpretation of some natural phenomenon. Thereisno ultimate authority. We investigate, we reason, we discuss. HOPPE: Taking the axiomatic or a priori approach that Our criterion, in matters of policy, as in physical science, is I utilize doesn’t mean that one doesn’t have to carefully think very largely empirical reality, as manifested, for example, in ethical problems through. But at least in principle, the laws of economics, characteristi cs of bureaucracy, and expe- axiomatic theorist must be able to give an answer on the spot. rience with different political systems. Fundamental value Now you have seen from Professor Yeager that he is not going . Judgments, about which I doubt we would disagree, also enter todo anything like that. On the problem of insidertrading he into our discussions. Co favors a position that we do not know. He says we have to _ I pass over questions of how we measure individual acquire this knowledge, and that knowledge, and three days utilities and calculate aggregate utility. Of course we don’t from today somebody else might come up with some knowl- measure and calculate them. edge, and then opinions might change again. If it is your Professor Hoppe said that I didn’t refute the axiomatic position that you cannot decide once and for all what is the approach, which would have required showing that the right solution to a moral problem then I do not see what else axioms are wrong. don’t necessarily believe that the propo- we can call it but relativism. Itis an approach that relegates sitions about self-ownership and about Lockean homestead- decisions about ethical problems to the status of waiting for ingare wrong. I do not agree, however, that these are the two pillars from which our positions even on specificissues can be spun out. What I really disagree with is the endeavor to put any utilitarian considerations aside that may get in the way ROTHBARD: Contraryto Professor Yeager, thenatural of these two Lockean propositions, with social philosophers rights position doesn’t rely on values different from that of hemlines to go up and down, ‘blinding themselves from then on to the way things work--to utilitarianism. Besides, facts and values are not totally consequences, to utilitarian considerations. That is what I separate, and thus we don’t have to believe in the fact-valu find wrong with the axiomatic approach. I doubt that the dichotomy. In the doctrine of natural law, values are ulti- Lockean propositions can serve as decisive axioms, but I do mately based on the fact of human nature and the nature of not necessarily reject them. We might well discuss how close the universe. CL . or how far apart we are on them, Political ethics, which is my specialty, deals with the Professor Hoppe’s solution here appears to appeal to analysis of what the proper role of violence is, that is, the what is presupposed in any discussion. IfI am to take partin question of what is the proper role of defensive violence and a discussion with him about anything, then I am somehow ~~ a8gressiveviolence? When you are dealing with what should bound to accept property rights. 1 hardly know how to refute be legal or illegal, you are dealing with should this thing be thatargument. Itisn’t an argument atall, I can well imagine prohibited bythe use of violence or not. In this areaevery case discussions and arguments on all sorts of topics--the relation can be resolved with the use of basic principles: no initiative between the sides and hypotenuse of a right triangle, the violence should be used against the person or property of desirable provisions of bankruptcy laws, and the issue of ~~ anybodyelse. Takesurrogate motherhood, for example. Isee whether slavery should be abolished, and if sowith or without nothing wrong with surrogate motherhood froma legal point compensation to slave-owners--going on between, say, two of view. You can argue on some sort of moral position that it slaves, or between two slave-owners, or between a slave- shouldn’t be done. But certainly from the legal point of view owner and his slave. I would not necessarily accuse these it should not be illegal. people of contradicting themselves. The AIDS situation is a difficult one, Do you outlaw somebody with a cold? If somebody is walking around with . aold, shouldn’t he or she be quarantined coercively? You can' make a case for it but it would be anti-liberty. It seems tome that in fuzzy and cumbersome cases, one should lean over backward towards liberty. : In the case of somebody, for example, whois deliberately putting germsin thereservoiror. in somebody’s back yard, an obvious act of aggression committed, Similarly, for example, it is a criminal act for :, - people with AIDS to deliberately infect other people, and it. YEAGER: I'm not far away from my own brand of it, should’ a treated as such. QUESTION: If youn are going to base utilitarianism not on what is best for the aggregate but on some argument making reference tothe nature of the individual then it seems like you are coming close to the natural rights position. You may call it utilitarianism but you are rather far away from most other people who call themselves utilitarians. ===== PAGE 9 ===== YEAGER: think the question raised isrelevant. Canwe Mises Institute’s Fifth Anniversary really spin out positions on surrogate motherhood and AIDS Hon Hen Hazlitt from first principles alone? I don’t know whether my posi- onors Henry tions on these issues are from first principles, but on surro- b gate motherhood I am inclined to agree with Murray. The John Mo Callie JP question of AIDS victims is an agonizingly difficult one. Ijust don’t know what position to take. . . . . i Resounding applause greeted Henry Hazlitt as he rose to I Susiigns, tut about this one p articular sue but 1h speak tothe audience atthe Fifth Anniversary Dinner held in general, towhat Professor Hoppe accuses me of. 1don'tknow his honor on October 17. Over 150 of Hazlitt’s friends and for Sure wh at positions to take on things. I don's have an admirers attended the dinner in New York City to pay infallible pipeline tothe truth, If that meansrelativism, make homage to Mr. Hazlitt’s seven decades of work to advance the most of it. Misesian economics and the ideas of liberty. His prodigious Professor Rothbard doesn’t believe in the fact-value distinction. In a way I would agree with him depending on just what we understand by that distinction. If we mean not brushing aside discussion or terminating discussion prema- turely on the grounds of having reached an impasse over values, I agree. Questions of value can indeed be discussed. All sorts of factual evidence bear on value propositions. Only when we come to disputing over fundamental value judg- ments, which, by their very meaning, are value judgments for which people can give no further reasons--only then have we reached an impasse. But that rarely if ever occurs. So asa practical matter the fact-value distinction is not very opera- tive. QUESTION: This is for Professor Hoppe. I enjoyed your talk about the axiomatic nature of argument and that it does : ”y o presuppose the idea of property rights in your own body. But : ee — ’ . how do you deduce that property rights are something that I Astanding ovation was given to Hi enry Hazlitt as he receiveed awell- noua value? earned award for life-time accomplishments. efforts include 25 books, including the immensely popular Economics in One Lesson, plus thousands of articles. In a characteristically witty and charming talk, Henry HOPPE: Itis impossible to claim that you will not argue. You cannot say “I’m not arguing with you anymore,” because by saying that, you already presuppose what I'm going to ) EY , prove. Itis thus completely out of the question that anybody Hazlitt recounted many fascinating and humorous eventsin can refute this sort of defense of private property. Any hislife. Prior to Hazlitt stalk, encomiums and messages were attempt to refute it would have to take for granted what he presented by Margit von Mises, Mark Skousen, Ron Paul, tries to refute. John V. Denson, Leland Yeager, Murray N. Rothbard, John Fund, Kenneth Auchincloss, William F. Buckley Jr., F.A. If we couldn’t engage in argumentation then we would Hayek, Ronald Reagan, and Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr. not have ethical problems at all. If we were all stones, and we In conjunction with the dinner, the Mises Institute spon- couldn’t actively talk to each other, evidently we would have sored a fifth anniversary conference on “The Meaning of no ethical problems. And because we can engagein argumen- Ludwig von Mises” at Pace University. Guest speakers tation, we automatically have the point from which we must included: Dr, Walter Block, Fraser Institute; Professor Rich- start our process of deduction for establishing any truth ard Ebeling, University of Dallas; Professor Roger Garrison, claim. [| Auburn University; Dr. David Gordon, senior fellow of the Ludwig von Mises Institute; Professor Hans-Hermann Hoppe, University of Nevada, Las Vegas; Professor Murray N. Rothbard, University of Nevada, Las Vegas; Dr. Mark Skousen, Rollins College; Professor Leland B. Yeager, Au- Correction: burn University. “Adam Smith Reconsidered” by Murray Rothbard, AEN Walter Block in “Mises on Money vs. Friedman, Green- vol. 9, no. 1, Fall 1987, p. 8, read: while Smith was away span, Hayek, and Mundell,” contrasted Mises’s views on * to help the rebellion. Correction: while Smith was away money with those of other allegedly free-market advocates. WW studyingin Oxford, all of his Moderate friends enlisted in Block tackled Friedman's age-old argument that the gold the army to help crush the rebellion. standard costs more resources than the fiat paper standard. And even if it were true that the gold standard was more costly, Friedman ignores the primary virtue of the gold ===== PAGE 10 ===== standard: it keeps politicians away from money manipula- identify causal links between the actions and choices of tion. Robert Mundell’s position on the gold standard repre- individuals and their consequences in the market. He re- sents an unusual departure from other reforms that call for jected mathematics on the basis that it was blind to causality. - some tenuous tie to gold, but falls short of a pure gold On the other hand, Garrison observes that economists like standard. Hayek opposes all attempts toward restoring the George Stigler ignore causality altogether and see no problem gold standard and instead hopes that the elimination of legal in doing so. In other respects, causality has been redefined by v tender laws will be sufficient to provide conditions for the the profession as that which comes first:-called Granger emergence of new free-market money. But Block noted that Causality--a sophisticated version of the post hocergo propter the market has grown accustomed to using the fiat dollar, and hoc fallacy. Garrison also provided some useful hints for it is unlikely under normal conditions that a new money will handling assumptions in economic science. emergein the market. Legal tender laws should be repealed, Saturday morning, Professor Hans-Hermann Hoppe but Block argued that such a step will be largely irrelevant to spoke on “The Praxeological Foundation of Epistemology the development of sound money. As for Alan Greenspan-- and Ethics.” In a similar stance to Mises, Hoppe spelled out recently elected chairman of the Federal Reserve--Block what is implied in the concept of human action. Once suggested that he favors the gold standard only on a high understanding and reflection establishes the a priori propo- philosophical level, butin practice heisa conservative Keyne- sition of human action, a proposition that cannot be denied sian. without contradiction, we can then deduce costs, profits, and ‘In “Economic Calculation under Socialism; Mises and losses. With auxiliary assumptions in place economic science His Predecessors,” Professor Richard Ebeling pointed out can proceed by means of formal logic. This is praxeology, that Mises’s calculation argument relied on thinking of the underwhich Hoppe proposes theinclusion ofa second apriori market as a process of rivalrous competition hetween actors axiom, the a priori of argumentation, which has epistemo- with imperfect knowledge. The socialists with whom he logical implications and also implies the validity of the con- debated were working within the framework of static equilib- cepts of self ownership and private property. rium and perfect knowledge, and thus were assuming the Professor Leland Yeager’s paper on “Mises and His central planners could acquire, digest, and useall the relevant Critics on Ethics, Rights, and Law,” defended utilitarianism knowledge to plan effectively. Ebeling also discussed five pre- against the theory of natural rights. Happiness, Yeager says, Austrians who anticipated Mises by writing critically of denotes in a single word what constitutes the good life: socialist planning, calculation, and money prices, and their happiness for the majority being the end, and social coopera- arguments were remarkably similar to those developed by tion being the means to attain it. the Austrians. Dr. David Gordon makes a distinction between two L Professor Murray Rothbard lectured on “Ludwig von meanings of history in his paper “The Misesian Theory of Mises as Hero,” uncovering interesting episodes in the life History. ” One is the theory behind the history of the events and work of Mises. Even though Mises’s Theory of Money in time and the otheristhe discipline of writing about it. Both and Credit was considered a seminal work on the subject, meanings have to recognize the problems introduced by the Mises received no paid academic post until he emigrated to observation that mental events are unobservable and are Switzerland. Even the position at New York University’s dependent on individual values. Gordon discussed Mises’s Business School in the 1940s was supported by a caucus of view of individual action against the view of Hegel and Marx friendly businessmen, not the University. Prior to the pub- thatentitiesother than individualsact and that therearelaws lication of Human Action, several of Rothbard’s colleagues of history based on the correlation of events. Nor did Mises announced Mises’s forthcoming work. When Rothbard hold that different people in different contexts have different asked what the book was about, they declared, “Everything!” logics, as in, Marxist polylogism. Many others were influenced by Socialism, but, Rothbard ~All the papers presented at the conference will be pub- recalls, it was Human Action that made Rothbard a Misesian. lished by Lexington Books under the title the Meaning of As the stock market tumbled a few blocks from the Ludwig von Mises. The large volume will also include lecture hall at Pace University, Professor Mark Skousen contributions by: Professor Israel Kirzner, New York Univer- discussed “The Theory and Practice of Misesian Economic sity, who has written on Mises’s theory of interest; Professor Forecasting.” Skousen alsowritesaninvestment letter called Joseph Salerno, Pace University, who has written on Mises’s “Forecasts and Strategies” and he had advised his subserib- view of equilibrium and evolution; and Professor Roger ers to sell all stocks on September 8th. Skousen also spoke Arnold, the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, whose paper about the 1929 crash and who had predicted it. The econo- discusses Mises and the public choice school. B mists who failed were Irving Fisher, “the premier quantity theorist,” Wicksell, Cassell, Keynes, Haberler, and Wesley Mitchell (an authority on business cycles). Mises and Hayek, “along with Roger Babson, were the economic dissenters who Conference Tapes Available had forecast the crash. Hayek was more precise than Mises, who warned of the crash in 1924, = = If you would like a complete set of "The Meaning of PR Professor Roger Garrison discussed “Mises and His Ludwig von Mises"conference tapes (11 audio tapes) ) oe Method” which centered on Mises’s work-a-day methods and please mark the enclosed card along with your check for avoided the “black hale” of the more intricate epistemologi- $65.00. cal issues. Regarding mathematics, Mises was trying to 10 ===== PAGE 11 ===== The Southern Economic Association Fertig Center Holds First Seminar 57th Annual Conference N y @ Co Mark D. Hughes and Jeffrey A. Tucker by . . . The Mises Institute celebrated the opening of the Law- Mark Thornton rence Fertig Student Center, near George Mason University, The 57th annual conference of the Southern Economic vith a two-day lecture series by Professor Hans-Hermann Association convened in Washington, D.C., November 22- Hoppe, associate professor of economics at the University of 24th. Austrian economists had an active presencein present- Nevada, Las Vegas, and senior fellow at the Mises Institute. ing papers and serving as discussants. The lectures, which were held on November 22-23, were The opening session, “Topics in Economic Calculation,” ho fpadty audiences. er"s Ser: —— was organized by professor Robert Ekelund of Auburn Uni- (NCIS) Clute wasa Member's Seminar on “Socialism: versity, a board member of the Review of Austrian Econom- A Misesian View at which Professor Hoppe discussed t he ics. Mark Thornton of Auburn University presented his honey of socialism, proving through fo process of ogieal paper “New World Utopias and the Socialist Calculation ¢ potion t € PN action. Dromios cizhts od 1p Debate,” which illustrated the impossibility of organizing ~~ ©f the means of production. Drawing insights from Ludwig society with voluntary socialism. Don Boudreaux of George von Mises s Socialism (1936), Professor Hoppe said that es- Mason University and Roger Koppl of Auburn University tablishing common ownership of the means of production presented “The Dimensions of Marginalism,” demonstrat- redistributes property titles, favors norn-savers over savers, ing some benefits of a broader conception of competition. reduces output and its quality, leads to safeniation problems Austrians also participated in the session on “Counter- and thus misdirects resources, and politicizes society. He Methodologyand Applications”. Econometrics was criticized cited the differences between East and West Germany asa by Steven Caudill of Auburn University in “Econometrics in case In polnt. . . Theory and Practice,” as well as by discussant Samuel The second lecture, a graduate Seminar, dealt with the Bostaph, University of Dallas. Papers presented by David fundamental matters of economic science: “On Praxeology — d the Praxeological Foundations of Epistemology and Tuerck, Suffolk University, and Leland Yeager, Auburn and ir . . Lon University, were critical of aspects of Austrian methodology Ethics.” In his talk, Hoppe applied the Misesian theory of the ce . logic of action, deduced from synthetic a priori propositions j and drew sharp criticism from discussants Don Boudreaux ’ Co) @ and Bruce Caldwell, University of North Carolina at Greens- tothe theory of knowledge and the theory of prop erty rights, boro. Hoppe's approach helps assuage the tension in Austrian In a session on Monetary Theory, Michael M ontgomery economics between the value-neutrality of theory and the of Auburn University presented “Unanticipated Mon ey value-orientation of free-market policy prescriptions. Growth, Time to Build’ and Persistence Under Rational Hoppe’s exposition of praxeology may provide a means for Expectati ons,” an attempt to broaden the rational expecta- complete wertfreiheit inall spheres of economicinquiry. The tions model to include Austrian notions of capital and time. significance of praxeology as a tool of analysis, and Professor Clifford Thies, University of Baltimore, cited recent develop- ~~ 1L0PPe’s work in praxeology, should prove tobe enormous as ments in banking and finance as consistent with Menger’s ‘Austrian economics continues to develop and build on the NP « ee . } foundations provided by Mises himself, theories in his paper “The Continuing Evolution of Money: » . . . An Austrian Perspective.” Both meetings were followed by lively discussions and : i I receptions at which Hoppe fielded additional questions. The ol voy mnt rast, Don Be ey di Fertig Center will continue to offer lectures in Austrian developed an Austrian critique of labor legislation; Jennifer economics to scholars and Institute Members in the George Roback (George Mason University), “The Work of W.H, Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia area. = Hutt” with Mr. Hutt serving as discussant; Randall Holcombe (Auburn University), “Tax Incentives for Privati- zation.” Karen Vaughn (George Mason University), Paul Heyne (University of Washington), Karl Brunner (Univer- (Continued from previous column) sity of Rochester), and Richard Wagner (Florida State Uni- Tlutes.” The presidential address “Anarchy, the Market, and versity) participated in an interesting session “Economics the State,” given by Dennis Mueller, University of Maryland, and Religion.” Mark Thornton (Auburn University), pre- viewed recent deregulation as positive movement toward the sented “Ballot Access Requirements as a Barrier to Entry.” market and anarchy. David Collander (Duke University) continued his crusade The Southern Economics Association’s meetings con- 4. against ‘mainstream’ economics and alternative schools of tinue tobe a viable outlet for research in Austrian economics. hought, in “Howto Tear Down Economists’ World: The Role Suggestions for the 1988 program may be submitted to of the Heterodox Economist.” : : President-Elect: V. Kerry Smith, Department of Economics Thedistinguished guestlecture was given hy 1986 Nobel and Business, North Carolina State University, P.O. Box Laureate James Buchanan on “Relatively ‘Absolute Abso- ~~ 8109, Raleigh, North Carolina 27695-8109. | 11 ===== PAGE 12 ===== Duke University Acquires Microeconomics: Carl Menger’s Personal Papers From an Austrian Viewpoint by : This unique series of 10 audio tapes on microecon- Mark D. Hughes omictheory and application--an actual classroom presen- tation to undergraduate students--was recorded in 1985 Carl Menger’s personal paperswere recently acquired by at New York Polytechnic University where Professor Duke University at Durham, North Carolina. The University Rothbard taught for many years. The Austrian perspec- has been actively collecting the personal papers of many tive taken by Professor Rothbard makesthe principles of important and prominent economists. These acquisitions are microeconomics intuitive, interesting, and understand- largely due to the efforts of E. Roy Weintraub, professor of able. economics and Craufurd D. Goodwin, professor of political history and editor of the journal History of Political Econ- omy. During December Duke University will also take B possession of the personal papers of Austrian fellow traveler D, and Mises student Oscar Morgenstern. Professor Goodwin and Duke University curator Robert Bird are working closely on restoration and translation of the Menger papers. At this time the Menger collection is only partially indexed, but according to Professor Weintraub, it is available for graduate students to examine. Most of the INSTITUTE material has never been read otherthan by those close to Carl Presents Menger, so it represents an exciting dissertation topic for an enterprising graduate student. Microeconomics: A conference on Carl Menger is being organized by Professor Goodwin for 1989 at Duke to coincide with the publication of the restored Menger papers, and it should From an Austrian Viewpoint i further create new interestin early Austrian ideas. A similar | conference on Oscar Morgenstern is being considered for the by pi ¥ following year. nm Professor Murray N. Rothbard rn Fall 1985 Ings | Summer Conferences in Austrian Economics The lecturesbegin with a unique explanation of what i The O.P. Alford III Center of the Ludwig von Mises the “micro” in microeconomics means and after listening i Institute will present two week-long conferencen in to the introduction one finds that microeconomics will ] Austrian economics this summer. The fee of $595 take on a whole new meaning. Principles and theories $ ($95 for full-time students) includes: dormitory hous- - discussed in these 15 hours are: human action, scarcity, ing; 3 meals a day; study materials; library privileges; subjective evaluation, uncertainty and risk, time prefer- and extensive recreational and athletic facilities. For | ence, means/ends analysis, supply and demand, con- more information please write or call the Ludwig von sumer goods, prices and exchange, an uncommonly clear 1 Mises Institute, Auburn University, Auburn, Ala- explanation of product relationships, government inter- i bama 36849 (205) 826-2500. ference, price controls, and minimum wage controls, i : “profit incentive,” the “theory of the firm,” market Introduction to Austrian Economics process, competition and monopoly, “structure of pro- 1 Dartmouth College duction” and prices of the factors of production. 3 Hanover, New Hampshire The Ludwig von Mises Institute is proud to offer this August 13-19, 1988 set of tapes to the readers of the AEN for $65.00. If you would like to order a set of tapes, mark the Advanced Austrian Economics appropriate box on your return card, and enclose your Stanford University : check for $65.00 (this includes postage), plus any tax- Stanford, California | deductible contribution for the Institute's work, in the June 25-July 1, 1988 | enclosed postage-paid envelope.