===== PAGE 1 =====

A Conflict of Visions: Ideological Origins
of Political Struggles. By Thomas Sowell.
New York: William Morrow, 1987.

Thomas Sowell has achieved an enviable reputation in many different
areas of economics. His many works on the economics of immigration,
culminating in Ethnic America, have won him an eminent place in
this field. His Knowledge and Decisions applies in a comprehensive
way the insights of Friedrich A. Hayek to a vast number of social
phenomena. As if this were not enough, Sowell has also published
widely in the history of economic thought.

It is with no little anticipation, then, that one turns to Sowell’s
venture into the history of ideas. Will the insight and imagination
displayed in his previous work enable him to contribute a new way
of looking at intellectual history? Admittedly, perusal of his Marxism:
Philosophy and Economics dims one’s enthusiasm. That book offered
little but a tired rehash of elementary Marxist economics, presented
as a major piece of scholarship.’ Further, except for in the final
chapter Sowell manifested a surprising sympathy for Marxism.

Sowell has made the work of analysis of his book as straightfor-
ward as possible, since he has carefully constructed it around a
central thesis which the title adumbrates. What does Sowell mean by
a vision? He informs us that “a vision is a sense of causation.” It is
more like a hunch or a “gut feeling” than it is like an exercise in logical
or factual verification. “These things come later, and feed on the raw
material provided by the vision” (p. 16). The “hunches” that Sowell
concerns himself with do not primarily involve moral judgments.
“People with the same moral values readily reach different political
conclusions. ... Labeling beliefs ‘value premises’ can readily become
one more means by which conclusions insulate themselves from
confrontation with evidence or logic” (p. 217).

Before plunging into Sowell’s distinction between “constrained”
and “unconstrained” visions, the principal subject of the book, a pause
over “vision” seems necessary. Sowell may mean by this an innocuous
truism: theorists rarely arrive at a total system at once but rather
extend and shape an initial conjecture as evidence turns up and as

"In support of my assessment, see the review by David Ramsay Steele in Interna-
tional Philosophical Quarterly 26, no. 2 (June 1986): 201-03.

The Review of Austrian Economics, Vol. 4, 1990, pp. 223-33
ISSN 0889-3047

223


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224 Co The Review of Austrian Economics, Volume 4

consequences of their initial insight occur to them. Even interpreted this
way, Sowell’s explanation of “vision” can be challenged, as he seems later
in the book to rule out, without consideration, the development of a
theory by a priori reasoning, in the style of Mises’s praxeology, instead
of by empirical testing.

But this issue hardly concerns him, and it would be wrong to read
too much into his brief remarks about method. The controversial part
of his remarks arises from the fact that, as the citation above shows,
he almost certainly intends more by the use of “vision” than the
commonplace that theorists begin from conjectures. He offers no
evidence whatever that any theorist has in fact begun from a “gut
feeling” about social causation. He also gives no support for his view that
moral judgments are not part of the visions from which theories start.

To avert misunderstanding, I do not claim that it is false that
theories stem from visions of Sowell’s sort, He may well be right; as
guesses go, his seems better than’ many. But this is just the point. In
the absence of evidence as to how particular thinkers have arrived at
their theories, Sowell’s “visions” are just a shot in the dark. Even if
one finds the two types of visions into which Sowell divides theories
of society to be a dichotomy of surpassing excellence, this would in
itself indicate a fact about theories that already exist. To say that

theories can-be grouped in a certain way tells us nothing about how
the theories came into existence.’

Another instance of Sowell’s penchant for confusing conjecture with
historical .fact occurs, ironically enough, in a section of Chapter $
entitled “Paradigms and Evidence.” To illustrate the danger that one’s
vision may lead to refusal to acknowledge evidence that falsifies a
theory, Sowell instances the case of the British psychologist Cyril Burt.
Since Burt's death, examination of his use of statistics in his studies of
mental ability has strongly suggested that he “faked” some of the data.

Concerning Burt's misuse of data, Sowell remarks: “The issue
here is not heredity versus environment but evidence versus visions.
Clearly, Burtt [sic] had little to gain personally from falsifying the
data. In fact, he had much to lose, including a reputation and a painful

setback for the cause he espoused. That he would risk such a gamble
is one measure of his commitment to his vision ... Sir Cyril Burtt [sic]
thus represented one extreme in the: relationship of evidence tc
visions—the total subordination of evidence to conclusions based on
a vision or the theories derived from it” (pp. 207-08).

- Sowell’s conjecture about the reasons for Burt’s misuse of data
may be correct. But Sowell offers no evidence whatever on the matter.
Has Sowell done any research on Burt? Has he as much as opened
any biographical studies of Burt? Has he considered other hypothe:
ses, e.g., “kinks” in Burt’s personality? Somehow Sowell just knows
what happened. Incidentally,’ Sowell states that eventually, even


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Book Reviews 225

Burt's supporter Arthur Jensen had to admit that Burt’s statistics were
unacceptable. In point of fact, Jensen was one of the first to call attention
to the difficulty. But perhaps Sowell’s vision has transmitted Jensen's
thoughts to him as well as Burt's.

Sowell’s reason for excluding moral judgments from his visions
seems unconvincing. Granted that there are “visions,” will not their
contents depend very much on the idiosyncracies of individual theorists?
Why should one exclude someone’s development of a theory because of
a “gut feeling” about morality? No doubt Sowell is right that people with
different moral views often have similar policy conclusions. But is this
always the case? People who believe that certain ethnic groups ought to
be killed sometimes have quite different policy conclusions from those
who do not share this position.

Suppose, however, that people’s moral views never determine their
policy conclusions. It still does not follow that moral judgments cannot form
part of the initial vision from which a theory begins. Perhaps, on the
implausible assumption stated, moral judgments “drop out” at some point.
This once more appears entirely a question of “what makes people tick.”

Regardless of whether anyone has ever had a close encounter of
the Sowell kind, his visions can, as suggested earlier, be looked at as
ways of classifying actually existing theories. Sowell contends that
social theories fall into two main kinds: “constrained” and “uncon-
strained” visions.

One further preliminary matter needs to be addressed before we at
last examine the visions. Sowell, in accord with his views about the
limited role of value judgments in social science, maintains that his two
visions are, as a matter of fact, a useful tool for analyzing social theories.
His statement of the two visions does not express a value preference of
his own; in particular, in his presentation he does not argue that the
constrained vision is correct. Sowell has reacted with sharpness to
reviewers who take him to be praising one vision while condemning the
other, and his grievance has considerable merit. Examination of Sowell’s
other work will disclose without difficulty that Sowell is a prime in-
stance of the constrained vision. But it hardly follows from this that his
present book is a work of advocacy rather than neutral assessment.
There is, however, excuse for the reviewers, as we shall later see.

What, then, are the two visions? Our author places prime emphasis
on the attitude toward human nature characteristic of each one. The
two visions differ mainly over what human beings can become, not what
they now are like. “In the unconstrained vision, human nature is itself
a variable and in fact the central variable to be changed” (p. 87). People
may now be as selfish and shortsighted as you please; but given the
‘right” conditions, usually involving direction by an elite, a veritable
metamorphosis will occur. Persons will now work happily together in
harmony: all will be for the best in this best of all possible worlds. A


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296 The Review of Austrian Economics, Volume 4

change in human nature, one assumes, means that human beings will
acquire traits they do not now have. Unfortunately, Sowell does not
offer a definition of “human nature.” The problems this omissior
generates will be discussed below.

The constrained vision looks at human beings as basically unalter-
able in their nature. Adam Smith, a key exponent of this outlook.
believed that “moral or socially beneficial behavior could be evoked from
man only by incentives ... ” (p. 23). Rather than a futile attempt to make
people “better” than nature has designed them, one can accomplish more
by acknowledging the limits within which people function.

Together with contrasting approaches to human nature goes dif
fering concepts of reason. For the unconstrained vision, reason is 3
direct and explicit matter. If one desires social change, the agenda is
clear: one must devise a suitable plan, and carry it out. Explicit
principles are the order of the day, rather than reliance on custom. I
the usual way of doing things fails at the bar of reason, away with it.

The proponent of constraint rejects this fast and furious policy. He
does not deny the value of what Sowell terms “articulate reason’
when social conditions allow exactly formulated measures. But muck
of the operation of society takes place by means of customary rules
that cannot be fully specified. Too much information exists for any
person or group to have at their conscious command. Instead, one
needs to rely on “the unintended consequences of human action’
which will succeed in generating an order beyond the capacity oi
anyone to grasp in comprehensive fashion. The free market stands as
the foremost example of a “spontaneous order.” The task of the
government, in this view, lies rather in providing a general frame
work of rules which permits unplanned social institutions to functior
than in enacting plans of its own.

The position just sketched will be familiar to anyone who has
encountered the works of Friedrich Hayek; and the frequent references
the book contains to him lead one strongly to suspect that Hayek is the
principal model of the person of constrained vision. Since Sowell’s mair
work of theory, Knowledge and Decisions, sedulously follows in Hayek’
footsteps, perhaps our author should not protest too loudly when review:
ers of A Conflict of Visions ascribe to him the identical constrained view
he has elsewhere explicitly taken over as his own.

Again following Hayek, Sowell maintains that the constrainec
vision offers little scope for the application of moral theory. It displays
but slight concern for moral rights when these do not operate for the
general benefit. People cannot “stand on their rights” if doing sc
proves overly inconvenient to society. Law concerns itself with wha
works best in general and often cannot be fine tuned to handle claims
that particular persons have been unjustly treated. “This is a proces:
conception of rights—the legal ability of people to carry on certair


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Book Reviews 227

processes without regard to the desirability of the particular results
...” (pp. 185-86).

In brief, the constrained vision stresses the “primacy of social
interests over those of the individual ... ” (p. 187). By contrast,
unconstrained visionaries place much more emphasis on what is
right, apart from its social consequences. To a holder of this view, e.g.,
someone does not lose his right to free speech even if his exercise of
that right is liable to foment disorder. Rights arise not from their
usefulness as a tool to oil the social mechanism; they are owed to their
possessors. It is morally wrong to refuse them their due recognition.
Similarly, if an unconstrained visionary thinks that the poor ought
to receive welfare, he will tend to regard this as a matter of justice.
Like John Rawls, he will endorse a moral theory obligating people to
transfer income to the needy. The person of constraint will tend to
eschew altogether arguments based purely on moral theory. In his
view, the working of society allows no room for these speculative
ventures to operate. This attitude receives its clearest encapsulation
in the title of the second volume of Hayek’s Law, Legislation, and
Liberty: The Mirage of Social Justice.

To reiterate an earlier point, the differing importance each vision
accords to moral theory does not indicate conflicting value judgments.
Quite the contrary, the advocate of constrained vision shares the
same desires to aid the needy of his more freewheeling opposite
number. It is not that he is an Ebenezer Scrooge disdaining any
concern for the unfortunate. Rather, he believes that the spontaneous
order of the market best helps the poor. The concept of “social justice”
leads exactly to the abstract rationalism he wishes to confine within
rigid limits.

Sowell includes substantially more in the book, including an
application of his social visions to various policy issues and a discus-
sion of evidence. But what has been said so far gives enough of a basis
for an analysis of his thesis.

The difficulties begin with the first of the characteristics of the
visions, i.e., each one’s attitude toward human nature. Many people
have thought that changes in institutions can produce radical changes
in people’s behavior, but it is not clear that this involves belief in a
change in human nature. Instead, it may be that the same human
nature is held to be capable of quite different forms of life under various
conditions.

If, like Shelley, one believes that “Power, like a desolating pestilence,
pollutes whate’er it touches; / And obedience, bane of all freedom, virtue,
justice, truth, / Makes slaves of men; / And of the human frame, a
mechanized automaton,” one may think that the abolition of govern-
ment will have beneficial effects. But these need not come about
through changes in human nature: philosophical anarchism of Shelley’s


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228 The Review of Austrian Economics, Volume 4

kind may be based on liberating potential held already present ir
human beings.

1 do not argue that Sowell incorrectly attributes to anyone in
particular a belief that human nature is alterable. Rather, he fails
altogether to draw the distinction just mentioned, making his analy-
sis of the unconstrained visionaries difficult to assess. Even if one
takes William Godwin, the ubiquitous example Sowell offers of some
one whose vision was stratospherically unconstrained, one stil
wishes to ask: did Godwin think that the abolition of government anc
of false doctrines of morality would change human nature? It is nof
clear that he did. In a passage that Sowell cites, Godwin advocates
attempting to appeal to “the generous and magnanimous sentiments
of our natures” (pp. 2-5, quoting Godwin, Enquiry Concerning Polit.
ical Justice). This hardly supports the. view that Godwin wished tc
alter human nature. Here he seems to be saying that treatment of
certain kind will elicit a response from traits already present.

Admittedly, some passages in Godwin require considerable strain
ing if one denies that Godwin did indeed contemplate a change ir
human nature. When, for example, he speculates that the future may
bring an end to death, one can but gape in astonishment. But, once
more, the point at issue is not whether Sowell has rightly or wrongly
appraised Godwin; it is that he does not distinguish changes ir
human nature from changes in the environment which manifes
traits that people have now. For a change in human nature, certair
traits not currently present would have to emerge.

In defense of Sowell, it might be argued that we have been making
too heavy weather of a distinction of minor importance. Is not the
vital core of Sowell’s argument that some theorists believe that people
will always be largely self interested, with at most a tincture o
altruism; while others think that in changed circumstances ‘people
can become devoted to one another’s welfare? As Marx put the latte:
viewpoint, in a “higher stage” of socialism, “the free development 0
each will be the condition for the free development of all.”

Here, as it seems to me, the suggested difference does not do quite
the job Sowell has in mind for it. Presumably, the difference betweer
what the two visions expect from human beings is supposed to emerge
in action. The day when “the secrets of all hearts shall be revealed

. does not, after all, belong to human history. If behavior, then, is the
visible manifestation of what traits people have, does not the distinc
. tion Sowell has in mind reduce to one between those who expec
different conditions to bring about substantial changes in humar
action and those who deny this?
The difficulty for Sowell, if he accepts this reconstruction of hi
distinction, is that many advocates of the constrained vision com
down on the wrong side. Persons who criticize unconstrained visionarie:


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Book Reviews 229

usually think that their radical plans for a new social order will
worsen things. If, instead, one supports institutions that accord with
human nature as it actually is, they think that much better results
will ensue. If, e.g., one relies on the market to channel self-interested
businessmen to fulfill the preferences of consumers, success appears
far more likely than if one attempts a Procrustean policy of remolding
people. No doubt; but looked at from an external point of view, both
‘constrained” and “unconstrained” visionaries believe that institu-.
tional change will make a vast difference to the sort of behavior
prevalent in society. Once one puts some pressure on the idea of a
thange in human nature, the difference between the visions, as
Sowell presents them, seems entirely a matter of varying approaches
lo policy and morality. The alleged difference in views on human
nature “does no work”; it adds nothing to the visions.

Sowell might try to escape this argument by strengthening the
view of human nature characteristic of the constrained vision. On the
revised view, “constraint” would really mean constraint. A proponent
of this version of the position would claim that little or no change in
he condition of society is possible, regardless of what people do. We
are just “stuck with” human beings as they are and that is that. A
new problem arises here, however. On what grounds can the policies
)f the unconstrained vision be opposed? True, they will leave human
rature as it is, but so will everything else. Why is any policy better
or worse than another, if none affects the way people act?

‘Perhaps Sowell’s best chance for escape is to attribute to the
onstrained vision the view that things can get worse than they now
ire but not much better. This gives both a reason to oppose certain
neasures—they will cause harm—yet at the same time the “not much
etter” provision distinguishes the position from its rival vision. The
>bvious difficulty here is that of the baseline. Worse or better than
~vhat? The economic system now prevalent in the United States? But
lo not those who fall within the constrained camp often think that
some economic changes produce a great improvement? Hayek himself
1ardly takes the line, “Capitalism is the best we can hope for, and it
s not very good.”

Sowell’s analysis of reason also gets him into some dubious areas.
As he presents matters, advocates of the constrained point of view
‘avor the market system. Those in the enemy camp find the market's
-eliance on inarticulate reason uncongenial. Favoring explicit plan-
ing as they do, they naturally incline to support central direction.
Jere Sowell’s portrayal fits perfectly, if his aim is to sum up in brief
‘he essential doctrines professed by F. A. Hayek. If, as seems appar-
:ntly the case, he has a more ambitious goal and wishes to character-
ze major approaches to society in a way that “cuts at the joints,” the
inalysis Sowell offers is more open to objection. Many free market


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230 The Review of Austrian Economics, Volume «

advocates think that people can consciously decide to establish a marke
society. Although of course the market itself operates without centra
planning, it by no means follows that establishing a market order require:
that one rely on a supposed “inarticulate reason.” To think otherwise is t«
adopt a too exclusively Hayekian outlook. Ludwig von Mises, Hayek’
teacher, was much more “rationalistic’ than Hayek. Yet, contrary tc
what Sowell’s classification system would lead one to expect, Mises mor
strongly supported reliance on the market than Hayek does. The nine
teenth-century Continental liberals, whom Hayek spurns as overls
rationalistic, again were firm defenders of the market—the prime ex
ample, in Sowell’s opinion, of a constrained social policy. To avert :
possible misunderstanding, Sowell does not say that all on the con
strained vision team must support the free market. Marx, whose visio:
Sowell thinks was in good part constrained, of course did not. Neverthe
less, the free market is supposed to be a prime instance of a socia
institution that operates by inarticulate reason. As such, it fits into the
constrained model.

In brief, my criticism is that both constrained and unconstrainec
figures have defended an institution Sowell thinks a criterion for ons
(but not the other) of the visions. Another criticism arises when on
looks at a different connection, that supposedly present betwee:
emphasis on process and a pessimistic view of human beings. Thoma:
Hobbes certainly qualifies as taking a low view of human nature: t
him, the dominant passion controlling human beings was the fear o
violent death. Much controversial ink has been spilled over the issu
of whether he was a psychological egoist; but even if he was not, ther:
is little place in his system for actions done out of regard for others
Nevertheless, Hobbes’s account of the origins of the state fall
squarely within the “constructivist rationalist” camp. Thus, a stron;
“constrained” position on one issue combines with an equally power
ful “unconstrained” account of another.

Many of the nineteenth-century classical liberals painted glowin;
pictures of the future of society that placed them outside the bound
of the constrained. But just what in their opinion would lead to sucl
happy results was complete reliance on the market mechanism. Thei
adherence to a constrained theory of how society works led then
directly to an unconstrained picture of human potential. Had Sowel
examined the Economic Harmonies of Bastiat, instead of concentrat
ing with such singleminded attention on William Godwin, his vision
might have had quite other contents.

The examples just given cannot be dismissed as aberrations. Wha
is supposed to be the logical connection between a pessimistic viev
of human beings and a reliance on process as opposed to “articulat:
reason?” The two areas appear entirely distinct. Someone with :
pessimistic position, e.g., will not think that people can achieve ver;


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300k Reviews 231

nuch of value; but this does not tell us the role he accords to articulate
‘eason. Similarly, an optimist will adopt a roseate view of whatever
1e thinks the best method of running society.

Perhaps the relation between the two areas is supposed to be this.
[f someone takes a “low” view of human beings, he will not rate highly
‘heir reasoning ability. Thus, he will fear to place much confidence in
’lanning and will think reliance on custom and institutions which have
risen through evolution to be essential. Further, he will be very dubious
Of the bona fides of social reformers who promise wonders if power is
1anded to them. His suspicions will extend to self-anointed Platonic
zuardians as well. A pessimist will indeed be skeptical about abstract
-eason and its acolytes, but the conclusion that he will seek refuge in
‘inarticulate reason” does not follow. He may think that owing to the
lefects of human beings, however bad the results of planning, this is
still “the best we've got.” Once more, one’s assessment of the best method
)f dealing with social problems is distinct from how much success one
:hinks it possible for human beings to attain. (For the past few para-
sraphs, I have put to one side the criticisms advanced against Sowell’s
account of human nature and assumed that we know in a rough-and-
-eady way what he has in mind.)

Although I have directed some criticism toward Sowell’s account
f the constrained attitude to reason, his presentation of the way the
narket works has considerable importance. Many social theorists
gnore the “economic point of view.” They fail to realize that the choice
f one goal entails costs elsewhere and that not all “good things” can
se achieved at once. Sowell’s brief presentation of the free market
nay give some of them pause, should they chance to come upon it.

Our evaluation of Sowell’s remarks on morality must be much more
‘constrained” in its enthusiasm. Sowell deprecates the importance of
‘value preferences”: as he sees it, people have quite similar preferences
ut differ sharply on the best means to achieve their goals.

Sowell radically underestimates the significance of differences in
noral outlook. Some people, e.g., presented with the elementary
argument that shows why minimum wages will result in unemploy-
nent, will continue to support this measure. Unemployment of some
nay help particular groups to raise their income, and these latter
nay not care about the ill effects on others.

Nor are cases of conflict restricted to clashes between morality
ind “selfishness.” Ronald Dworkin, a leading political and legal
shilosopher, favors egalitarianism even though it may involve some
Jegree of lessened economic efficiency. To a large extent, Dworkin
would concede to Sowell the importance of the market. He would
jemur from the “constrained vision” view that since “everyone” wants
srosperity, considerations of justice must “get out of the way” if they
nterfere with the processes by which society operates.


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i

939 Co | The Review of Austrian Economics, Volume 4

Although Dworkin’ Ss substantive account of justice seems to me wrong
his view that morality is relevant to social theory makes much more sense
than the view Sowell attributes to the constrained visionaries.

It may well be true that most people want an efficient economy
but it is a far cry from this to thinking that morality has nothing t«
do with the market. For one thing, how can one acceptably delimil
the property rights people possess without reference to rights? The
constrained visionary, as Sowell presents him, would no doubt reply
~ that people should simply accept whatever system of property evolu
tion has been served up to them: But why should they? Their doing
so surely is not needed for the. working of the market, since the
market can operate with any generally acceptable scheme of rights
Why then need anyone who acknowledges the importance of the
market avoid the notion of justice? Of course, some theories of justice
are inimical to the market order, such as Rawls’s system as usually
interpreted. But even the constrained visionary and his ventriloquis:
Sowell should be aware that other moral theories support the free
market. What is wrong with libertarian natural rights?

The argument is not altered if one takes account, of Hume's point
that since any private property system is better than none, people
ought to avoid changing a conventionally established system lest they
bring about disorder. The effects of particular changes are an empir
ical matter: will any alteration of what exists upset everything? How
much disorder one is willing to tolerate, if necessary, to institute ¢
morally appropriate system seems a matter for discussion, not one tc
be settled by reference to a. spurious dichotomy of types of vision.

* Once more, then, the items in Sowell’s visions manifest no coher
ence. Someone who favors. the free market need not adopt the mora
skepticism that Sowell. thinks appropriate to someone of constrainec
vision. Unless, like Sowell and his mentor Hayek, one is already :
moral skeptic, one will not at all find that the operation of the marke
makes nugatory appeals to moral theory. Even if one thinks tha
social reason is largely inarticulate, moral theory can still remain
Why cannot a moral theory. operate by inarticulate means? (I do no
myself favor this approach but wish only to appoint that Sowell’
presentation of inarticulate reason leaves it open to acceptance.)

A defender of Sowell might contend that we have misunderstood the
point of his visions. He need not be taken as claiming that the variou
points of each vision are logically connected. Rather, the visions are «
useful tool in looking at intellectual history: many thinkers can in fac
be grouped in the way Sowell has set forward. Nor is the value of the
scheme much affected by the fact that some thinkers—Sowell instance:
Karl Marx and John Stuart Mill—do not fall completely within eithe
~ of the categories. No system of classification is perfect.

It seems to me wrong to say that Sowell thinks it a pure matte:


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Book Reviews 233

of fact that the elements of each vision go together, just as it happens to
be the case that no state of the United States has the letter “Q” in its
name. On the contrary, Sowell thinks that the positions included in his
visions do fit together, and it is this claim I have been principally
concerned to challenge.

Considered just as a method of classification, little can be said
apart from a detailed consideration of its application to particular
theorists. One more general problem with the scheme, however, is
that few important writers seem to fit comfortably within the uncon-
strained camp. Sowell continually has to discuss Godwin—an under-
estimated but not that significant a figure—in order to have a case of
someone who fits this side of his system.

Sowell’s unconstrained vision accurately characterizes a number
of twentieth-century “leftists” whom he mentions, such as Gunnar
Myrdal. But apart from passing mention of Condorcet, Fourier, Paine,
etc., he does not discuss any supposedly unconstrained visionary who
lived before the twentieth century except Godwin. The only major
contemporary theorist he deals with in this group is John Rawls; and
Sowell grievously misunderstands him. Sowell thinks that Rawls’s
theory of justice uses abstract principles to ride roughshod over the
processes by which the market functions efficiently. Contrary to
Sowell, Rawls’s difference principle does make provision for economic
efficiency, since inequalities that are to the benefit of the worst-off
are allowed. Someone who agrees with Sowell that the free market
works to the advantage of the poor need have no trouble with the
difference principle. Rawls himself does not share this view of the
free market, but this is a factual issue, not an issue of the theory
itself. Hayek thinks Rawls’s theory largely compatible with his own
views. Nothing in the preceding remarks is intended as an endorse-
ment of Rawls’s theory; but even a wrong theory does not justify the
use of bad arguments to criticize it.

Further, if in fact the elements of Sowell’s visions do not fit
together logically, it may be that his system “works” only to the extent
that it is parasitic on divisions of genuine intellectual importance.
Two that come to mind are that between supporters and opponents
of the free market and another between moral skeptics and
“cognitivists.” Also, though even a good classification will not fit
everyone, even a useless scheme will fit some people.

Like all of Sowell’s books, A Conflict of Visions is composed in a
style that is easy to read, if at times boring in its unvarying and
nondescript tone. Unlike much of his previous work, it is lacking in
intellectual substance.

David Gordon
The Ludwig von Mises Institute