The Final Phase Coping with the Democratic Ascendancy
The final phase of the drive for a central bank began in January 1911.
At the previous January's meeting of the National Board of Trade,
Paul Warburg had put through a resolution setting aside January 18, 1911,
as a quote, monetary day, devoted to a businessmen's monetary conference.
This conference, run by the National Board of Trade, and featuring delegates from metropolitan, mercantile organizations from all over the country, had C. Stuart Patterson as its chairman.
The New York Chamber of Commerce, the Merchants Association of New York, and the New York Produce Exchange, each of which had been pushing for banking reform for the previous five years,
introduced a joint resolution to the Monetary Conference supporting the Aldrich Plan and proposing the establishment of a new, quote,
Businessmen's Monetary Reform League to lead the public struggle for a central bank.
After a speech in favor of the plan by A.P. at Andrew, the entire conference adopted the resolution.
In response, C. Stewart Patterson appointed none other than Paul M. Warburg to head a
committee of seven to establish the Reform League.
The committee of seven shrewdly decided, following the lead of the old Indianapolis Convention,
to establish the National Citizens League for the creation of a sound banking system
in Chicago rather than in New York, where the control really resided.
The idea was to acquire the bogus patina of a quote, grassroots heartland operation and
to convince the public that the league was free of dreaded Wall Street control.
As a result, the official heads of the league were Chicago businessmen John V. Farwell and
Harry A. Wheeler, president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
The director was University of Chicago monetary economist J. Lawrence Laughlin, assisted by
by his former student, Professor H. Parker Willis.
In keeping with its Midwestern aura, most of the directors of the Citizens League were
Chicago non-banker industrialists.
Men such as B.E.
Sonny of the Chicago Telephone Company, Cyrus McCormick of International Harvester, both
companies in the Morgan-Ambit, John G. Shett of Marshall Fielding Company, Frederick A.
A. Delano of the Wabash Railroad Company, Rockefeller Controlled, and Julius Rosenwald of Sears-Robuck.
Over a decade later, however, H. Parker Willis frankly conceded that the Citizens League had
been a propaganda organ of the nation's bankers.
The Citizens League swung into high gear during the spring and summer of 1911, issuing a periodical,
Banking and Reform, designed to reach newspaper editors and subsidizing pamphlets by such
pro-reform experts as John Perrin, head of the American National Bank of Indianapolis,
and George E. Roberts of the National Citibank of New York.
Consultant on the newspaper campaign was H.H.
Colesot, former executive committee member of the Indianapolis Monetary Convention.
Loughlin himself worked on a book on the Aldrich Plan to be similar to his own report of 1898.
for the Indianapolis Convention.
Meanwhile, a parallel campaign was launched to bring the nation's bankers into camp.
The first step was to convert the banking elite.
For that purpose, the Aldrich Inner Circle organized a closed-door conference of 23 top
bankers in Atlantic City in early February, which included several members of the Currency
Commission of the American Bankers Association, or ABA, along with bank presidents from nine
After making a few minor revisions, the conference warmly endorsed the Aldrich Plan.
After this meeting, Chicago banker James B. Forgan, president of the Rockefeller-dominated
First National Bank of Chicago, emerged as the most effective banker spokesman for the
central bank movement.
Not only was his presentation of the Aldrich Plan before the Executive Council of the ABA
In May, considered particularly impressive, it was especially effective coming from someone
who had been a leading critic, if on relatively minor grounds, of the plan.
As a result, the top bankers managed to get the ABA to violate its own bylaws and make
Forgen chairman of its executive council.
At the Atlantic City Conference, James Forgen had succinctly explained the purpose of the
Aldrich Plan and of the conference itself.
The real purpose of the conference was to discuss winning the banking community over
to government control directly by the bankers for their own ends.
It was generally appreciated that the Aldrich Plan would increase the power of the big national
banks to compete with the rapidly growing state banks, help bring the state banks under control,
and strengthen the position of the national banks in foreign banking activities.
By November 1911, it was easy pickings to have the full American Bankers Association
endorse the Aldrich Plan.
The nation's banking community was now solidly lined up behind the drive for a central bank.
However, 1912 and 1913 were years of some confusion and backing and filling as the Republican
Party split between its insurgents and regulars and the Democrats won increasing control over
The Aldrich Plan, introduced into the Senate by Theodore Burton in January 1912, died a quick death, but the reformers saw that what they had to do was to drop the fiercely Republican, partisan name of Aldrich from the bill, and with a few minor adjustments, rebaptize it as a democratic measure.
Fortunately for the reformers, this process of transformation was eased greatly in early
1912, when H. Parker Willis was appointed administrative assistant to Carter Glass,
the Democrat from Virginia who now headed the House Banking and Currency Committee.
In an accident of history, Willis had taught economics to the two sons of Carter Glass
at Washington and Lee University, and they recommended him to their father when the Democrats
assumed control of the House.
The minutiae of the splits and maneuvers in the banking reform camp during 1912 and 1913,
which have long fascinated historians, are fundamentally trivial to the basic story.
They largely revolved around the successful efforts by Loughlin, Willis and the Democrats
to jettison the name Aldrich.
Moreover, while the bankers had preferred the Federal Reserve Board to be appointed
by the bankers themselves, it was clear to most of the reformers that this was politically
They realized that the same result of a government-coordinated cartel could be achieved by having the president and Congress appoint the board, balanced by the bankers electing most of the officials of the regional Federal Reserve banks, and electing an advisory council to the Fed.
However, much would depend on whom the president would appoint to the board.
The reformers did not have to wait long.
Control was promptly handed to Morgan Men, led by Benjamin Strong of Bankers Trusts as
all-powerful head of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
The reformers had gotten the point by the end of the congressional wrangling over the
Glass Bill, and by the time the Federal Reserve Act was passed in December 1913, the bill
enjoyed overwhelming support from the banking community.
As A. Barton Hepburn of the Chase National Bank persuasively told the American Bankers
Measures Association at its annual meeting of August 1913,
Quote, The measure recognizes and adopts the principles of a central bank.
Indeed, it will make all incorporated banks together joint owners of a central dominating
power.
End quote.
In fact, there was very little substantive difference between the Aldrich and Glass bills.
The goal of the bank reformers had been triumphantly achieved.