Thank you for having me here. I'm very impressed about this conference and so many fine speakers.
I hope I can live up to that. And today I'm going to present or to add another perspective to
praxeological research, which not many of you might have thought as relevant in the first place,
namely the perspective from philosophy of language or analytical philosophy, actually treating
Taking Mises as a philosopher and a philosopher of action in the first place, I'm going to
present a logical proof, taking seriously what Mises says about the logic of action,
and this requires you to have the handout I'm going, Jev is kindly distributing, because
as with many logical proofs, the essence is in the step-by-step following and in pointing
I hope there is no smuggling, but it's up to you to have control about it, to lay fingers
where some smuggling might occur.
Okay, so the title of my talk is Getting Mises Right, in one sense at least, and it is about
the philosophy and logic of praxeology, and the starting point is that it seems to me
It seems to me, at least, that at the very heart of Misesian methodology lies a focal point which, at least from the perspective of analytic philosophy, very rarely seems to receive proper treatment.
The claim that praxeology is an aprioristic theory. This claim certainly touches on philosophy and logic, but is seldom discussed accordingly.
Looking at that claim now, there are two ways of understanding it.
Eminent Mises scholars like Murray Rothbard, Walter Block and Hans-Hermann Hoppe favor
a reading concerning which the truth of praxeology are synthetic.
In contrast, very few seem to assume that the truth of praxeology are analytic.
Surprisingly, however, Mises himself arguably held this latter view.
Before and over again, he compared the truth of praxeology in the strongest possible sense
to the truth of logic.
And as he was very well aware, and of course all philosophers are, the truth of logic are
the paradigm of analytic truth.
If the truth of logic were not analytic truth, there would be none.
So there is still the fact that so many of Mises' followers felt obliged to go the other
Many Austrians seem prepared to turn the tables here regarding the claim that the truths of
praxeology are synthetic as what separates Austrian economists from the logical positivists.
But it seems to me at least that that might be saving praxeology from one controversy
at the expense of dragging it into another.
Remember that, from a philosophical point of view at least, Essen's scope and application
of the Kantian distinction between the analytic and the synthetic a priori has never gone
unchallenged in philosophy, and not just by positivists.
If that very special Kantian view is what is going to save praxeology from irrelevance,
There is no guarantee it is safe in the first place. So I propose not to resort to the apparent
cure of the synthetic. Instead I propose to take Mises' position at face value and to
go for an analytic approach, and I'm going to present this today. I must add though that
clearly an analytic approach toward praxeology faces two important challenges. The well-known
One epistemological challenge is to explain how praxeology can have any cognitive value
whatsoever if rendered analytic.
However, the impression that this is a daunting question is probably mostly due to confusion.
I'll come back to that later.
A more serious issue is the methodological challenge voiced by Barry Smith.
He raised the suspicion that other, quote, other core notions, in addition to the concept
of Action, might have been smuggled in, he says, have been smuggled in into Mises' theory
on the way, and that his theory therefore is not purely analytic."
This is an important worry, I would say, but it can be accounted for.
In the interest of brevity, however, I shall be happy to address both challenges in discussion
later.
For the time being, I want to focus on developing and defending the analytic approach advertised.
The way I shall proceed is by inquiring into the status of John Locke's uneasiness theorem,
which serves as cornerstone for Mises's praxeology.
In Human Action we read, quote, the incentive to act is always uneasiness, unquote.
In what follows, I shall first give strict and formal proof that this important theorem
of praxeology is an analytical truth, and secondly, prove that the scarcity theorem
can be derived from it using only logical and conceptual means.
Now, what is the scarcity theorem?
It is, of course, the theorem linking the foundations
of economic theory with action theory,
and reading very simple, quote,
action is the manifestation of scarcity, unquote.
This is, of course, from Human Action, page 70.
I turn to my second part, the analytic approach presented.
So, according to Mises,
The incentive to act is always uneasiness and action is always the manifestation of scarcity.
How can the first proposition be shown to be analytical and the second be derived from
the first? We must first turn to the core notions involved, that is, the concept of
uneasiness and the concept of action. It is not necessary, however, to give full analysis
of these vexing notions. Rather, a partial explication of these notions will do, as long
As long as only necessary conceptual ingredients are made use of, and they suffice for establishing
the claims made, everything is quite well.
In the interest of brevity then again, this is where I shall confine myself to.
Now the first notion I want to address is the notion of uneasiness.
It will help to envisage an admittedly counterfactual situation where a subject completely lacks
uneasiness.
Whatever springs to the subject's mind, not the slightest worry comes up.
He is completely and in every respect free from uneasiness, perfectly uneasy or in more
convenient words completely satisfied.
Like John Locke in his essay we may ask, quote, when a man is perfectly without any uneasiness,
what will is there left?
In other words, is it really conceivable that a subject be both in a state of perfect satisfaction
and that there still be something such that the subject wants it?
The answer is hard to avoid, no.
So let us pause to note what amounts to a necessary condition for the lack of uneasiness.
For convenience of exposition, I shall rephrase this in terms of the notion of satisfaction
as indicated and you have it on your handout actually as the first line of the proof.
I'll read it out, it's an explanation, an explanation, partial explanation of the notion
of satisfaction.
In line one, dependent on premise one, reading for all x, if x is satisfied, then it is not
the case that for some p, x wants that p, being an application of the rule of assumption.
So that's like all lines are being, you have to read all lines in this logical manner.
I'm not going to explain it because it takes too much time, but at the very left column
is the premise dependent, then there is a line number, the line content and at the very right
hand side is the rule being applied and the lines to which it has been applied.
Okay.
So, as it happens, we have already embarked in the enterprise of proving that the uneasiness
theorem is analytic and this then is the first line of the proof.
Technically speaking, it is an assumption resting on a partial conceptual explication of the
The notion of uneasiness, as I indicated, and of course much more could be said about that concept, and yes, theorists did say a lot more from at least Plato onwards, but in our case, however, less is more. Only the necessary condition in one will do duty in the proof.
The second notion to turn to is the notion of action.
As you may know, the notion of action is not a basic concept in action theory.
It is taken to be reducible in some way or other to the notions of doing, believing and wanting.
Let us make a quick digression into action theory and to look at how this could be conceived of.
Let us ask, for example, why did Socrates drink the hemlock?
The Hemlock
Well, Socrates drank the hemlock, we might say, because he wanted to abide by the principle
he held dearest, and believed that drinking the hemlock was required in order to do so.
Of course, we also might have given a different answer, but there is a purely general point
to be noted here, namely the fact that whoever subscribes to an answer of this general kind
thereby portrays Socrates as an agent.
The general feature responsible for this is describing somebody as doing something because
he wanted something and believed something.
That is precisely what acting is.
Doing X because wanting that P and believing that Q for some adequate X, P and Q of course.
It is true that among action theorists opinions vary on what exactly it means to do something
or to want something or to believe something.
Until the general format of the modern explanation of action is as described.
It is characterized on the one hand by some sort of adaptation of the model of motivation
present in David Hume's theory, where action is triggered in some way by the agents finding
himself in a state of believing something and of wanting something.
And on the other hand, by some sort of adaptation, however critical, of a causal model of action
typically originating in Donald Davidson's work, where the relation between the hybrid
Motivational State and the doing is that of course an effect.
There is no need however, so don't worry, to analyze the Hemlock example in greater
detail or to dig ourselves deeper into action theory since we already have all we need in
order to note at least some necessary conditions of action we are going to use.
And this is the second line on your handout and partial explication of the notion of action
reading.
For all x, if x acts, sorry the inconvenience in the pronunciation, then for some p, first
x does something and secondly x believes something and thirdly x wants that p.
All this result will serve as the second line of the proof underway.
Technically speaking it is another assumption, this time resting on a partial conceptual
explication of the notion of action.
Then we might have gone more into detail and discussed what is involved by conditions one
and two, but nothing but the third condition will be ultimately relied upon.
So as before, we are well advised to be only as specific as required for demonstration.
Now I turn to the proof.
In order to proceed to the proof, we will state the uneasiness theorem so that it can
be aligned with the premises stated above.
Remember that the theorem was taken to state that there cannot be action without uneasiness.
This amounts to claiming that uneasiness is a necessary condition of acting, just like Mises said.
Again, for convenience of demonstration, we can render this and talk about satisfaction, which gives us the following formulation of the uneasiness theorem, UT.
You have it on your handout.
For all x, if x is satisfied, then it is not the case that x acts.
And this is what I'm going to prove.
The central question now is this, can we derive this theorem logically from the conceptual premises 1 and 2?
Well, in what you have on your handout you can see how it can be done using standard textbook logical rules only, sorry.
I'm going to go through the proof because for once at least it seems important enough to have it step by step.
So, first transform the universal proposition once and two into quasi-singular propositions
by applying the rule of universal quantifier elimination, UE.
This gives us three and four, three reading, if A is satisfied then it is not the case
that for some P, A wants that P and four reading, if A acts then for some P, first A does something
and secondly A believes something and thirdly A wants that P.
Second, apply conjunction elimination to derive line 5, reading if A acts, then for some P, A wants that P.
Next, see that the consequence of 3 is the negation of the consequence of 5.
This makes it clear that once we apply the principle of transposition, TP, to 5,
the principle of transitivity of implication, TY, applies. Thus we have TI applies.
Line 6 reading, if it is not the case that for some P, A wants that P, then it is not
the case that A acts, and 7, if A is satisfied, then it is not the case that A acts.
One final move is needed to complete the proof.
To establish full generality, the rule of universal quantifier introduction must be
applied to 7, leading to line 8 reading, if X is satisfied, then it is not the case that
that X acts, Quart Etat Demonstrandum.
So there you are.
What is derived in 8 is strictly identical with the theorem stated above as UT.
Hence, a proof has been given that the uneasiness theory can be derived logically from 1 and
2.
Now, I turn to my third part, extending the approach.
Given that first proof, we can even further things a bit more.
What about scarcity?
This surely is an important, even defining concept in the theory of economics.
Whoever wanted to shy away from praxeological notions like that of uneasiness could not
possibly dismiss the notion of scarcity as remote, empty or unempirical.
Yet there is an important praxeological link.
The scarcity theorem can be derived from the uneasiness theorem with logical and conceptual
means only.
To begin with, choose any good of your liking, say gold.
Whatever amount is referred to, assuming that there is that very amount of gold, does not
allow for the inference that gold is scarce.
What does this tell us?
It illustrates that scarcity is not, so to speak, out there in the world.
It is brought into it by beings presumably endowed with the capacity of conscious experience
of themselves and the world or what have you.
If such beings did not exist, scarcity would not exist.
But there is more.
are worked with both goods and conscious beings, but where the latter did not at all care for
the former, would leave no room for scarcity either.
So the least that that shows is that the scarcity is implicitly relational, just like your being
married implies that there is someone to whom you are married, a goods being scarce implies
that there is someone for whom it is scarce.
Let us use these findings to rephrase the theorem that action is the manifestation of
of Scarcity, in a fashion similar to the reasoning implied above, what we get is the following
formulation of the scarcity theorem S.T., which you have on your handout, reading, for
all x, if it is not the case that for some y, y is scarce for x, then it is not the case
that x acts.
Now, try to conceive of a situation where the antecedent of the embedded conditional
holds.
Nothing at all is scarce for x.
We surely cannot fail to note that this is the very same thought experiment we already alluded to before.
This just is the situation in which through X there is nothing left to ask for,
a situation in which he completely lacks uneasiness.
So it allows for the following partial explication, line 9, reading,
for all X, if it is not the case that for some Y, Y is scarce for X, then X is satisfied.
Given this conceptual explication, can we derive ST logically from 9 and 8?
Yes, but in order not to bore you, I shall spare you the details. We have the proof on the handout.
As you can see for yourself, I'm happy to go through this if you want to,
what is derived in line 15 now is strictly identical with the theorem stated above as ST.
and ST. Hence, the scarcity theorem can be derived from the uneasiness theorem with logical
and conceptual means only. I come to my conclusion. As promised, I have provided strict and formal
proof that the uneasiness theorem is an analytical truth and that the scarcity theorem can be
derived from it using only logical and conceptual means. Thus, the question of how to correctly
The concept of Mises A priorism is settled. The truth of praxeology, at least these important
and foundational truths, are analytic, not synthetic, and you have a proof for that.
Also, as you may have witnessed, since the approach presented made use of conceptual
analysis and logical derivations only, it is aptly called analytic, but it is not axiomatic.
Does this make a difference then?
For instance, if you see Rothbard's claim that all praxeological truth are derived from
a fundamental axiom, namely the action axiom, well, it does, but to explain the scope and
the impact of that difference exceeds my time and space, so I must leave that as well as
the many other implications of my talk for later discussion.
Thank you very much.