WEBVTT NOTE Getting Mises Right: On the Philosophy and Logic of Praxeology 1 00:00:00.000 --> 00:00:05.200 Thank you for having me here. I'm very impressed about this conference and so many fine speakers. 2 00:00:05.200 --> 00:00:12.480 I hope I can live up to that. And today I'm going to present or to add another perspective to 3 00:00:12.480 --> 00:00:19.520 praxeological research, which not many of you might have thought as relevant in the first place, 4 00:00:19.520 --> 00:00:26.400 namely the perspective from philosophy of language or analytical philosophy, actually treating 5 00:00:26.400 --> 00:00:33.880 Taking Mises as a philosopher and a philosopher of action in the first place, I'm going to 6 00:00:33.880 --> 00:00:40.360 present a logical proof, taking seriously what Mises says about the logic of action, 7 00:00:40.360 --> 00:00:47.240 and this requires you to have the handout I'm going, Jev is kindly distributing, because 8 00:00:47.240 --> 00:00:53.480 as with many logical proofs, the essence is in the step-by-step following and in pointing 9 00:00:53.480 --> 00:01:02.840 I hope there is no smuggling, but it's up to you to have control about it, to lay fingers 10 00:01:02.840 --> 00:01:05.240 where some smuggling might occur. 11 00:01:05.240 --> 00:01:11.840 Okay, so the title of my talk is Getting Mises Right, in one sense at least, and it is about 12 00:01:11.840 --> 00:01:17.880 the philosophy and logic of praxeology, and the starting point is that it seems to me 13 00:01:17.880 --> 00:01:31.880 It seems to me, at least, that at the very heart of Misesian methodology lies a focal point which, at least from the perspective of analytic philosophy, very rarely seems to receive proper treatment. 14 00:01:31.880 --> 00:01:42.880 The claim that praxeology is an aprioristic theory. This claim certainly touches on philosophy and logic, but is seldom discussed accordingly. 15 00:01:42.880 --> 00:01:47.200 Looking at that claim now, there are two ways of understanding it. 16 00:01:47.200 --> 00:01:52.520 Eminent Mises scholars like Murray Rothbard, Walter Block and Hans-Hermann Hoppe favor 17 00:01:52.520 --> 00:01:57.960 a reading concerning which the truth of praxeology are synthetic. 18 00:01:57.960 --> 00:02:03.640 In contrast, very few seem to assume that the truth of praxeology are analytic. 19 00:02:03.640 --> 00:02:10.560 Surprisingly, however, Mises himself arguably held this latter view. 20 00:02:10.560 --> 00:02:15.360 Before and over again, he compared the truth of praxeology in the strongest possible sense 21 00:02:15.360 --> 00:02:17.480 to the truth of logic. 22 00:02:17.480 --> 00:02:23.600 And as he was very well aware, and of course all philosophers are, the truth of logic are 23 00:02:23.600 --> 00:02:25.800 the paradigm of analytic truth. 24 00:02:25.800 --> 00:02:31.280 If the truth of logic were not analytic truth, there would be none. 25 00:02:31.280 --> 00:02:38.720 So there is still the fact that so many of Mises' followers felt obliged to go the other 26 00:02:38.720 --> 00:03:00.400 Many Austrians seem prepared to turn the tables here regarding the claim that the truths of 27 00:03:00.400 --> 00:03:07.720 praxeology are synthetic as what separates Austrian economists from the logical positivists. 28 00:03:07.720 --> 00:03:13.200 But it seems to me at least that that might be saving praxeology from one controversy 29 00:03:13.200 --> 00:03:17.160 at the expense of dragging it into another. 30 00:03:17.160 --> 00:03:21.520 Remember that, from a philosophical point of view at least, Essen's scope and application 31 00:03:21.520 --> 00:03:27.400 of the Kantian distinction between the analytic and the synthetic a priori has never gone 32 00:03:27.400 --> 00:03:31.400 unchallenged in philosophy, and not just by positivists. 33 00:03:31.400 --> 00:03:37.080 If that very special Kantian view is what is going to save praxeology from irrelevance, 34 00:03:37.080 --> 00:03:43.520 There is no guarantee it is safe in the first place. So I propose not to resort to the apparent 35 00:03:43.520 --> 00:03:49.200 cure of the synthetic. Instead I propose to take Mises' position at face value and to 36 00:03:49.200 --> 00:03:55.560 go for an analytic approach, and I'm going to present this today. I must add though that 37 00:03:55.560 --> 00:04:01.880 clearly an analytic approach toward praxeology faces two important challenges. The well-known 38 00:04:01.880 --> 00:04:07.680 One epistemological challenge is to explain how praxeology can have any cognitive value 39 00:04:07.680 --> 00:04:10.960 whatsoever if rendered analytic. 40 00:04:10.960 --> 00:04:16.680 However, the impression that this is a daunting question is probably mostly due to confusion. 41 00:04:16.680 --> 00:04:18.640 I'll come back to that later. 42 00:04:18.640 --> 00:04:24.200 A more serious issue is the methodological challenge voiced by Barry Smith. 43 00:04:24.200 --> 00:04:28.640 He raised the suspicion that other, quote, other core notions, in addition to the concept 44 00:04:28.640 --> 00:04:34.360 of Action, might have been smuggled in, he says, have been smuggled in into Mises' theory 45 00:04:34.360 --> 00:04:39.920 on the way, and that his theory therefore is not purely analytic." 46 00:04:39.920 --> 00:04:44.480 This is an important worry, I would say, but it can be accounted for. 47 00:04:44.480 --> 00:04:48.520 In the interest of brevity, however, I shall be happy to address both challenges in discussion 48 00:04:48.520 --> 00:04:49.520 later. 49 00:04:49.520 --> 00:04:56.760 For the time being, I want to focus on developing and defending the analytic approach advertised. 50 00:04:56.760 --> 00:05:02.640 The way I shall proceed is by inquiring into the status of John Locke's uneasiness theorem, 51 00:05:02.640 --> 00:05:06.760 which serves as cornerstone for Mises's praxeology. 52 00:05:06.760 --> 00:05:13.600 In Human Action we read, quote, the incentive to act is always uneasiness, unquote. 53 00:05:13.600 --> 00:05:19.200 In what follows, I shall first give strict and formal proof that this important theorem 54 00:05:19.200 --> 00:05:24.920 of praxeology is an analytical truth, and secondly, prove that the scarcity theorem 55 00:05:24.920 --> 00:05:29.720 can be derived from it using only logical and conceptual means. 56 00:05:29.720 --> 00:05:31.320 Now, what is the scarcity theorem? 57 00:05:31.320 --> 00:05:34.000 It is, of course, the theorem linking the foundations 58 00:05:34.000 --> 00:05:36.400 of economic theory with action theory, 59 00:05:36.400 --> 00:05:38.880 and reading very simple, quote, 60 00:05:38.880 --> 00:05:41.960 action is the manifestation of scarcity, unquote. 61 00:05:41.960 --> 00:05:44.200 This is, of course, from Human Action, page 70. 62 00:05:45.800 --> 00:05:49.680 I turn to my second part, the analytic approach presented. 63 00:05:51.720 --> 00:05:54.120 So, according to Mises, 64 00:05:54.120 --> 00:06:00.720 The incentive to act is always uneasiness and action is always the manifestation of scarcity. 65 00:06:00.720 --> 00:06:05.040 How can the first proposition be shown to be analytical and the second be derived from 66 00:06:05.040 --> 00:06:09.920 the first? We must first turn to the core notions involved, that is, the concept of 67 00:06:09.920 --> 00:06:16.520 uneasiness and the concept of action. It is not necessary, however, to give full analysis 68 00:06:16.520 --> 00:06:23.420 of these vexing notions. Rather, a partial explication of these notions will do, as long 69 00:06:23.420 --> 00:06:28.560 As long as only necessary conceptual ingredients are made use of, and they suffice for establishing 70 00:06:28.560 --> 00:06:31.940 the claims made, everything is quite well. 71 00:06:31.940 --> 00:06:37.600 In the interest of brevity then again, this is where I shall confine myself to. 72 00:06:37.600 --> 00:06:40.600 Now the first notion I want to address is the notion of uneasiness. 73 00:06:40.600 --> 00:06:46.660 It will help to envisage an admittedly counterfactual situation where a subject completely lacks 74 00:06:46.660 --> 00:06:48.460 uneasiness. 75 00:06:48.460 --> 00:06:52.560 Whatever springs to the subject's mind, not the slightest worry comes up. 76 00:06:52.560 --> 00:06:59.480 He is completely and in every respect free from uneasiness, perfectly uneasy or in more 77 00:06:59.480 --> 00:07:02.860 convenient words completely satisfied. 78 00:07:02.860 --> 00:07:08.160 Like John Locke in his essay we may ask, quote, when a man is perfectly without any uneasiness, 79 00:07:08.160 --> 00:07:10.380 what will is there left? 80 00:07:10.380 --> 00:07:16.300 In other words, is it really conceivable that a subject be both in a state of perfect satisfaction 81 00:07:16.300 --> 00:07:21.320 and that there still be something such that the subject wants it? 82 00:07:21.320 --> 00:07:23.840 The answer is hard to avoid, no. 83 00:07:23.840 --> 00:07:30.280 So let us pause to note what amounts to a necessary condition for the lack of uneasiness. 84 00:07:30.280 --> 00:07:35.280 For convenience of exposition, I shall rephrase this in terms of the notion of satisfaction 85 00:07:35.280 --> 00:07:39.320 as indicated and you have it on your handout actually as the first line of the proof. 86 00:07:39.320 --> 00:07:43.820 I'll read it out, it's an explanation, an explanation, partial explanation of the notion 87 00:07:43.820 --> 00:07:45.440 of satisfaction. 88 00:07:45.440 --> 00:07:52.160 In line one, dependent on premise one, reading for all x, if x is satisfied, then it is not 89 00:07:52.160 --> 00:07:57.660 the case that for some p, x wants that p, being an application of the rule of assumption. 90 00:07:57.660 --> 00:08:03.520 So that's like all lines are being, you have to read all lines in this logical manner. 91 00:08:03.520 --> 00:08:10.360 I'm not going to explain it because it takes too much time, but at the very left column 92 00:08:10.360 --> 00:08:17.120 is the premise dependent, then there is a line number, the line content and at the very right 93 00:08:17.120 --> 00:08:22.120 hand side is the rule being applied and the lines to which it has been applied. 94 00:08:22.120 --> 00:08:23.120 Okay. 95 00:08:23.120 --> 00:08:28.160 So, as it happens, we have already embarked in the enterprise of proving that the uneasiness 96 00:08:28.160 --> 00:08:32.680 theorem is analytic and this then is the first line of the proof. 97 00:08:32.680 --> 00:08:36.680 Technically speaking, it is an assumption resting on a partial conceptual explication of the 98 00:08:36.680 --> 00:08:53.680 The notion of uneasiness, as I indicated, and of course much more could be said about that concept, and yes, theorists did say a lot more from at least Plato onwards, but in our case, however, less is more. Only the necessary condition in one will do duty in the proof. 99 00:08:53.680 --> 00:08:57.680 The second notion to turn to is the notion of action. 100 00:08:57.680 --> 00:09:03.680 As you may know, the notion of action is not a basic concept in action theory. 101 00:09:03.680 --> 00:09:09.680 It is taken to be reducible in some way or other to the notions of doing, believing and wanting. 102 00:09:09.680 --> 00:09:14.680 Let us make a quick digression into action theory and to look at how this could be conceived of. 103 00:09:14.680 --> 00:09:18.680 Let us ask, for example, why did Socrates drink the hemlock? 104 00:09:18.680 --> 00:09:19.680 The Hemlock 105 00:09:19.680 --> 00:09:25.440 Well, Socrates drank the hemlock, we might say, because he wanted to abide by the principle 106 00:09:25.440 --> 00:09:30.280 he held dearest, and believed that drinking the hemlock was required in order to do so. 107 00:09:30.280 --> 00:09:35.240 Of course, we also might have given a different answer, but there is a purely general point 108 00:09:35.240 --> 00:09:41.920 to be noted here, namely the fact that whoever subscribes to an answer of this general kind 109 00:09:41.920 --> 00:09:46.760 thereby portrays Socrates as an agent. 110 00:09:46.760 --> 00:09:51.460 The general feature responsible for this is describing somebody as doing something because 111 00:09:51.460 --> 00:09:54.960 he wanted something and believed something. 112 00:09:54.960 --> 00:09:57.600 That is precisely what acting is. 113 00:09:57.600 --> 00:10:06.040 Doing X because wanting that P and believing that Q for some adequate X, P and Q of course. 114 00:10:06.040 --> 00:10:11.280 It is true that among action theorists opinions vary on what exactly it means to do something 115 00:10:11.280 --> 00:10:13.600 or to want something or to believe something. 116 00:10:13.600 --> 00:10:18.160 Until the general format of the modern explanation of action is as described. 117 00:10:18.160 --> 00:10:22.880 It is characterized on the one hand by some sort of adaptation of the model of motivation 118 00:10:22.880 --> 00:10:28.120 present in David Hume's theory, where action is triggered in some way by the agents finding 119 00:10:28.120 --> 00:10:32.360 himself in a state of believing something and of wanting something. 120 00:10:32.360 --> 00:10:37.440 And on the other hand, by some sort of adaptation, however critical, of a causal model of action 121 00:10:37.440 --> 00:10:42.800 typically originating in Donald Davidson's work, where the relation between the hybrid 122 00:10:42.800 --> 00:10:47.420 Motivational State and the doing is that of course an effect. 123 00:10:47.420 --> 00:10:51.000 There is no need however, so don't worry, to analyze the Hemlock example in greater 124 00:10:51.000 --> 00:10:56.680 detail or to dig ourselves deeper into action theory since we already have all we need in 125 00:10:56.680 --> 00:11:01.600 order to note at least some necessary conditions of action we are going to use. 126 00:11:01.600 --> 00:11:06.080 And this is the second line on your handout and partial explication of the notion of action 127 00:11:06.080 --> 00:11:08.200 reading. 128 00:11:08.200 --> 00:11:16.080 For all x, if x acts, sorry the inconvenience in the pronunciation, then for some p, first 129 00:11:16.080 --> 00:11:23.200 x does something and secondly x believes something and thirdly x wants that p. 130 00:11:23.200 --> 00:11:27.400 All this result will serve as the second line of the proof underway. 131 00:11:27.400 --> 00:11:31.280 Technically speaking it is another assumption, this time resting on a partial conceptual 132 00:11:31.280 --> 00:11:35.320 explication of the notion of action. 133 00:11:35.320 --> 00:11:38.860 Then we might have gone more into detail and discussed what is involved by conditions one 134 00:11:38.860 --> 00:11:44.160 and two, but nothing but the third condition will be ultimately relied upon. 135 00:11:44.160 --> 00:11:51.540 So as before, we are well advised to be only as specific as required for demonstration. 136 00:11:51.540 --> 00:11:54.340 Now I turn to the proof. 137 00:11:54.340 --> 00:11:58.200 In order to proceed to the proof, we will state the uneasiness theorem so that it can 138 00:11:58.200 --> 00:12:01.160 be aligned with the premises stated above. 139 00:12:01.160 --> 00:12:05.080 Remember that the theorem was taken to state that there cannot be action without uneasiness. 140 00:12:05.080 --> 00:12:11.080 This amounts to claiming that uneasiness is a necessary condition of acting, just like Mises said. 141 00:12:11.080 --> 00:12:21.080 Again, for convenience of demonstration, we can render this and talk about satisfaction, which gives us the following formulation of the uneasiness theorem, UT. 142 00:12:21.080 --> 00:12:23.080 You have it on your handout. 143 00:12:23.080 --> 00:12:28.080 For all x, if x is satisfied, then it is not the case that x acts. 144 00:12:28.080 --> 00:12:30.080 And this is what I'm going to prove. 145 00:12:30.080 --> 00:12:38.080 The central question now is this, can we derive this theorem logically from the conceptual premises 1 and 2? 146 00:12:38.080 --> 00:12:48.080 Well, in what you have on your handout you can see how it can be done using standard textbook logical rules only, sorry. 147 00:12:48.080 --> 00:12:56.080 I'm going to go through the proof because for once at least it seems important enough to have it step by step. 148 00:12:56.080 --> 00:13:03.320 So, first transform the universal proposition once and two into quasi-singular propositions 149 00:13:03.320 --> 00:13:07.920 by applying the rule of universal quantifier elimination, UE. 150 00:13:07.920 --> 00:13:13.000 This gives us three and four, three reading, if A is satisfied then it is not the case 151 00:13:13.000 --> 00:13:20.720 that for some P, A wants that P and four reading, if A acts then for some P, first A does something 152 00:13:20.720 --> 00:13:23.440 and secondly A believes something and thirdly A wants that P. 153 00:13:23.440 --> 00:13:33.440 Second, apply conjunction elimination to derive line 5, reading if A acts, then for some P, A wants that P. 154 00:13:33.440 --> 00:13:37.440 Next, see that the consequence of 3 is the negation of the consequence of 5. 155 00:13:37.440 --> 00:13:42.440 This makes it clear that once we apply the principle of transposition, TP, to 5, 156 00:13:42.440 --> 00:13:49.440 the principle of transitivity of implication, TY, applies. Thus we have TI applies. 157 00:13:49.440 --> 00:13:56.000 Line 6 reading, if it is not the case that for some P, A wants that P, then it is not 158 00:13:56.000 --> 00:14:03.740 the case that A acts, and 7, if A is satisfied, then it is not the case that A acts. 159 00:14:03.740 --> 00:14:06.580 One final move is needed to complete the proof. 160 00:14:06.580 --> 00:14:10.580 To establish full generality, the rule of universal quantifier introduction must be 161 00:14:10.580 --> 00:14:19.420 applied to 7, leading to line 8 reading, if X is satisfied, then it is not the case that 162 00:14:19.420 --> 00:14:22.820 that X acts, Quart Etat Demonstrandum. 163 00:14:22.820 --> 00:14:24.120 So there you are. 164 00:14:24.120 --> 00:14:28.700 What is derived in 8 is strictly identical with the theorem stated above as UT. 165 00:14:28.700 --> 00:14:34.700 Hence, a proof has been given that the uneasiness theory can be derived logically from 1 and 166 00:14:34.700 --> 00:14:35.700 2. 167 00:14:35.700 --> 00:14:42.340 Now, I turn to my third part, extending the approach. 168 00:14:42.340 --> 00:14:46.260 Given that first proof, we can even further things a bit more. 169 00:14:46.260 --> 00:14:48.060 What about scarcity? 170 00:14:48.060 --> 00:14:52.780 This surely is an important, even defining concept in the theory of economics. 171 00:14:52.780 --> 00:14:57.180 Whoever wanted to shy away from praxeological notions like that of uneasiness could not 172 00:14:57.180 --> 00:15:03.500 possibly dismiss the notion of scarcity as remote, empty or unempirical. 173 00:15:03.500 --> 00:15:05.940 Yet there is an important praxeological link. 174 00:15:05.940 --> 00:15:11.580 The scarcity theorem can be derived from the uneasiness theorem with logical and conceptual 175 00:15:11.580 --> 00:15:13.420 means only. 176 00:15:13.420 --> 00:15:18.020 To begin with, choose any good of your liking, say gold. 177 00:15:18.020 --> 00:15:23.980 Whatever amount is referred to, assuming that there is that very amount of gold, does not 178 00:15:23.980 --> 00:15:27.420 allow for the inference that gold is scarce. 179 00:15:27.420 --> 00:15:29.140 What does this tell us? 180 00:15:29.140 --> 00:15:32.920 It illustrates that scarcity is not, so to speak, out there in the world. 181 00:15:32.920 --> 00:15:38.660 It is brought into it by beings presumably endowed with the capacity of conscious experience 182 00:15:38.660 --> 00:15:41.540 of themselves and the world or what have you. 183 00:15:41.540 --> 00:15:46.360 If such beings did not exist, scarcity would not exist. 184 00:15:46.360 --> 00:15:47.360 But there is more. 185 00:15:47.360 --> 00:15:53.280 are worked with both goods and conscious beings, but where the latter did not at all care for 186 00:15:53.280 --> 00:15:59.080 the former, would leave no room for scarcity either. 187 00:15:59.080 --> 00:16:04.480 So the least that that shows is that the scarcity is implicitly relational, just like your being 188 00:16:04.480 --> 00:16:09.240 married implies that there is someone to whom you are married, a goods being scarce implies 189 00:16:09.240 --> 00:16:12.920 that there is someone for whom it is scarce. 190 00:16:12.920 --> 00:16:16.400 Let us use these findings to rephrase the theorem that action is the manifestation of 191 00:16:16.400 --> 00:16:21.560 of Scarcity, in a fashion similar to the reasoning implied above, what we get is the following 192 00:16:21.560 --> 00:16:26.160 formulation of the scarcity theorem S.T., which you have on your handout, reading, for 193 00:16:26.160 --> 00:16:31.200 all x, if it is not the case that for some y, y is scarce for x, then it is not the case 194 00:16:31.200 --> 00:16:33.360 that x acts. 195 00:16:33.360 --> 00:16:38.720 Now, try to conceive of a situation where the antecedent of the embedded conditional 196 00:16:38.720 --> 00:16:40.400 holds. 197 00:16:40.400 --> 00:16:43.560 Nothing at all is scarce for x. 198 00:16:43.560 --> 00:16:48.560 We surely cannot fail to note that this is the very same thought experiment we already alluded to before. 199 00:16:48.560 --> 00:16:53.560 This just is the situation in which through X there is nothing left to ask for, 200 00:16:53.560 --> 00:16:56.560 a situation in which he completely lacks uneasiness. 201 00:16:56.560 --> 00:17:01.560 So it allows for the following partial explication, line 9, reading, 202 00:17:01.560 --> 00:17:08.560 for all X, if it is not the case that for some Y, Y is scarce for X, then X is satisfied. 203 00:17:08.560 --> 00:17:14.560 Given this conceptual explication, can we derive ST logically from 9 and 8? 204 00:17:14.560 --> 00:17:19.560 Yes, but in order not to bore you, I shall spare you the details. We have the proof on the handout. 205 00:17:19.560 --> 00:17:25.560 As you can see for yourself, I'm happy to go through this if you want to, 206 00:17:25.560 --> 00:17:31.560 what is derived in line 15 now is strictly identical with the theorem stated above as ST. 207 00:17:31.560 --> 00:17:37.260 and ST. Hence, the scarcity theorem can be derived from the uneasiness theorem with logical 208 00:17:37.260 --> 00:17:44.760 and conceptual means only. I come to my conclusion. As promised, I have provided strict and formal 209 00:17:44.760 --> 00:17:50.540 proof that the uneasiness theorem is an analytical truth and that the scarcity theorem can be 210 00:17:50.540 --> 00:17:56.540 derived from it using only logical and conceptual means. Thus, the question of how to correctly 211 00:17:56.540 --> 00:18:02.900 The concept of Mises A priorism is settled. The truth of praxeology, at least these important 212 00:18:02.900 --> 00:18:08.460 and foundational truths, are analytic, not synthetic, and you have a proof for that. 213 00:18:08.460 --> 00:18:14.320 Also, as you may have witnessed, since the approach presented made use of conceptual 214 00:18:14.320 --> 00:18:21.880 analysis and logical derivations only, it is aptly called analytic, but it is not axiomatic. 215 00:18:21.880 --> 00:18:24.280 Does this make a difference then? 216 00:18:24.280 --> 00:18:29.960 For instance, if you see Rothbard's claim that all praxeological truth are derived from 217 00:18:29.960 --> 00:18:37.120 a fundamental axiom, namely the action axiom, well, it does, but to explain the scope and 218 00:18:37.120 --> 00:18:42.160 the impact of that difference exceeds my time and space, so I must leave that as well as 219 00:18:42.160 --> 00:18:44.920 the many other implications of my talk for later discussion. 220 00:18:44.920 --> 00:18:45.440 Thank you very much.