WEBVTT NOTE Why Not Take All of Me? 1 00:00:00.000 --> 00:00:09.000 So, here's the title of the paper, but on reflection I thought that might be a little enigmatic, so here's what it's really about. 2 00:00:09.000 --> 00:00:15.000 Why you should keep a firm grip on your kidneys in your eyes in the company of certain people. 3 00:00:15.000 --> 00:00:28.000 This paper actually, if I was to leave out all the filling, would take about two minutes, but I figured, hey, you've got to get value for money, so there's 18 minutes of nonsense stuck in between. 4 00:00:28.000 --> 00:00:56.000 Under discussion in a seminar was Jonathan Swift's modest proposal for preventing the children of poor people in Ireland from being a burden to their parents or country and for making them beneficial to the public. 5 00:00:56.000 --> 00:01:01.000 There we are. There's Swift's modest proposal in action. 6 00:01:01.000 --> 00:01:06.000 This is actually a statue in Bern. I can't imagine what they were thinking of. 7 00:01:06.000 --> 00:01:13.000 One of the students asked a comment on Swift's suggestion that eating babies might simultaneously solve the overpopulation problem 8 00:01:13.000 --> 00:01:16.000 while providing a nutritious source of food to those left alive. 9 00:01:16.000 --> 00:01:25.000 He said, well, that might have been alright in Mr. Swift's day, but I don't think we could do that now. 10 00:01:25.000 --> 00:01:35.000 Talking with an acquaintance about some of the funniest opening lines in literature, I instance the first sentence in Jane Austen's Pride and Prejudice. 11 00:01:35.000 --> 00:01:44.000 It is a truth universally acknowledged that a single man in possession of a good fortune must be in want of a wife. 12 00:01:44.000 --> 00:01:53.000 Well, it's a truth universally acknowledged. I met with a sort of funny stare, with a blank stare. What's funny about that, my acquaintance asked, or puzzled. 13 00:01:53.000 --> 00:02:22.000 The moral of these stories is be careful in your use of irony. Some idiot with a defective irony gland is bound to take you literally and what can seem the height of absurdity to you can present itself as a reasonable option to some others. 14 00:02:22.000 --> 00:02:25.000 So here's a quick overview of my presentation then. 15 00:02:25.000 --> 00:02:31.000 A perennial topic in political philosophy is the nature, extent and limits of property. 16 00:02:31.000 --> 00:02:39.000 An aspect of this of particular interest to libertarians is the relationship between self-ownership and the ownership of external resources. 17 00:02:39.000 --> 00:02:48.000 Libertarians tend to take the position that self-ownership is relatively unproblematic. 18 00:02:48.000 --> 00:03:05.000 What needs to be explained is how self-ownership is, as it were, to be projected into the world to permit the private ownership of external resources. 19 00:03:05.000 --> 00:03:09.000 Left Libertarians, and now there's different uses of the term Left Libertarians, 20 00:03:09.000 --> 00:03:15.000 by Left Libertarians in the context of this paper I mean people like Michael Atsuka, Peter Valentine, Hilal Steiner and so on, 21 00:03:15.000 --> 00:03:19.000 and there's another branch, if you like, of Left Libertarians, which I'm not talking about. 22 00:03:19.000 --> 00:03:28.000 Anyway, these Left Libertarians defend self-ownership while at the same time being prepared to countenance significant restriction on the ownership of external resources. 23 00:03:30.000 --> 00:03:34.000 Oops, sorry about that, so there we are, Michael Atsuka, Peter Valentine, Hilal Steiner. 24 00:03:34.000 --> 00:03:38.000 So there we are, there's the left libertarian position. 25 00:03:38.000 --> 00:03:41.000 Ultra-live prizes, ultra-live property. 26 00:03:41.000 --> 00:03:47.000 The analytical Marxist, G. A. Cohen, who is, according to David Gordon himself, his favourite Marxist, 27 00:03:47.000 --> 00:03:59.000 affirms the antecedent plausibility of self-ownership, noting that leftists who disparage Nusick's essentially unargued affirmation of each person's rights over himself 28 00:03:59.000 --> 00:04:03.520 lose confidence in their unqualified denial of the thesis of self-ownership 29 00:04:03.520 --> 00:04:07.400 when they are asked to consider who has the right to decide what should happen, 30 00:04:07.400 --> 00:04:12.940 for example, to their own eyes. 31 00:04:12.940 --> 00:04:19.560 So, to whom do your eyes belong? 32 00:04:19.560 --> 00:04:21.440 Well, I suspect 33 00:04:21.440 --> 00:04:23.940 how many people think they belong to you? 34 00:04:23.940 --> 00:04:26.520 Let's have hands up on this one. 35 00:04:26.520 --> 00:04:32.960 I don't see your hand absurd. Don't you think you own your eyes? 36 00:04:32.960 --> 00:04:39.720 You, without doubt, you say. Well, perhaps. 37 00:04:39.720 --> 00:04:44.320 So we come to the thesis of body exceptionalism. 38 00:04:44.320 --> 00:04:48.080 So much for the overview. Let's take things just a wee bit more slowly. 39 00:04:48.080 --> 00:04:51.640 The claim that if I own anything at all, I own myself is one of those that divides people. 40 00:04:51.640 --> 00:04:54.920 To some it seems nonsensical, to others more or less self-evident. 41 00:04:54.920 --> 00:04:59.760 As already mentioned, G. A. Cohen is one of those who takes the notion of self-ownership seriously, 42 00:04:59.760 --> 00:05:01.840 finding it intuitively plausible. 43 00:05:01.840 --> 00:05:06.120 In his influential book, Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality, he writes, 44 00:05:06.120 --> 00:05:13.040 The thesis of self-ownership has plenty of appeal. 45 00:05:13.040 --> 00:05:18.080 That wasn't meant to be funny, actually, but it's antecedent that his pre-philosophical appeal 46 00:05:18.080 --> 00:05:23.720 rivals that of whatever principles of equality it is thought to contradict. 47 00:05:23.720 --> 00:05:28.320 Responding to his own musings read the shakiness of the opposition to self-ownership when those 48 00:05:28.320 --> 00:05:34.520 who oppose it are confronted with the possibility of having their eyes reallocated, he continues, 49 00:05:34.520 --> 00:05:39.300 they do not immediately agree that were eye transplants easy to achieve it would then 50 00:05:39.300 --> 00:05:45.440 be acceptable for the state to conscribe down here, I don't know what that means, I obviously 51 00:05:45.440 --> 00:05:51.720 miswrote that, anyway, some verb meaning potential eye donors into a lottery, conscript, potential 52 00:05:51.720 --> 00:05:59.200 who would otherwise be not one-eyed but blind. 53 00:05:59.200 --> 00:06:05.480 The fact that they do not deserve their good eyes, that they do not need two good eyes 54 00:06:05.480 --> 00:06:11.720 more than blind people and so forth, the fact in a word that they are merely lucky to have 55 00:06:11.720 --> 00:06:16.260 two good eyes does not convince them that their claim on their own eyes is not stronger 56 00:06:16.260 --> 00:06:19.120 than that of some unlucky blind person. 57 00:06:19.120 --> 00:06:23.520 What he says, and I emphasise this, is that if the standard leftist objection to inequality 58 00:06:23.520 --> 00:06:29.160 of resources, private property and ultimate condition are taken quite literally, then the 59 00:06:29.160 --> 00:06:35.300 fact that it is sheer luck that these relatively good eyes are mine should deprive me of special 60 00:06:35.300 --> 00:06:45.440 privilege in them. This is Cohen talking. Cohen, it would seem then, intends this last 61 00:06:45.440 --> 00:07:15.360 The contemporary political philosopher, Cécile Fabre, denies that the claim of self-ownership 62 00:07:15.360 --> 00:07:21.600 is unproblematic. She argues that if one thinks that the needy have a right to the material 63 00:07:21.600 --> 00:07:26.080 resources they need in order to lead decent lives, one must be committed to conferring 64 00:07:26.080 --> 00:07:31.280 on the sick a right that the healthy give them some of the body parts they need to lead 65 00:07:31.280 --> 00:07:40.840 such a life. She is the author of a paper ominously entitled, Justice and the Compulsory 66 00:07:40.840 --> 00:08:00.840 I believe that Fabre is correct in thinking that the principles that allow for the restriction of our interference with the ownership of external resources must, if one would be consistent, be extendable to self-ownership. 67 00:08:00.840 --> 00:08:07.840 However, I believe that what her argument really shows is the incoherence of any form of left libertarianism, a la Asuka Valentine Steiner, 68 00:08:07.840 --> 00:08:13.080 Steiner, leaving the choice between her moral cannibalism and those who defend robust versions 69 00:08:13.080 --> 00:08:17.160 of both self-ownership and the ownership of external resources. 70 00:08:17.160 --> 00:08:19.120 Fabra believes that... 71 00:08:19.120 --> 00:08:20.840 So there's some more of her stuff, right? 72 00:08:20.840 --> 00:08:23.920 So this is not just a once-off, this is not just an aberration, she's been doing this 73 00:08:23.920 --> 00:08:29.440 stuff since 2002. 74 00:08:29.440 --> 00:08:33.600 So she believes that most contemporary theories of justice hold that those who are badly off 75 00:08:33.600 --> 00:08:37.600 Well-off have a right to some of the resources of the well-off in order to live a decent life. 76 00:08:37.600 --> 00:08:40.600 Let's just pause here for a moment. 77 00:08:40.600 --> 00:08:45.600 Even if it were true that most contemporary theories of justice held this, and just how many theories of justice are there, 78 00:08:45.600 --> 00:08:48.600 why should this be of any significance? 79 00:08:48.600 --> 00:08:52.600 It is also held, she believes, that people should have a considerable degree of self-ownership or autonomy. 80 00:08:52.600 --> 00:08:55.600 She uses the two terms interchangeably. 81 00:08:55.600 --> 00:08:59.600 Farber sees the right to a decent life and the right to autonomy as being in competition 82 00:08:59.600 --> 00:09:03.600 and the problem of political philosophy being how to reconcile them. 83 00:09:08.600 --> 00:09:13.600 So she starts from two ordered principles of substantive justice which embody these competing rights. 84 00:09:13.600 --> 00:09:21.600 According to Favre, we have a principle of sufficiency, which is that people have a right to the resources they need in order to lead a decent life 85 00:09:21.600 --> 00:09:27.600 and secondly, a principle of autonomy, which is that once the principle of sufficiency is satisfied for everyone, 86 00:09:27.600 --> 00:09:32.600 Then everyone should be permitted to follow their ideas of the good and enjoy the fruits of their labour. 87 00:09:32.600 --> 00:09:35.600 Now, note that these principles are ordered. 88 00:09:35.600 --> 00:09:39.600 The principle of sufficiency must be satisfied before the principle of autonomy. 89 00:09:39.600 --> 00:09:42.600 Very few libertarians would be willing even to start down this path. 90 00:09:42.600 --> 00:09:44.600 So we could probably stop the conversation right there. 91 00:09:44.600 --> 00:09:49.600 But anyway, once again, we might pause for some reflection. 92 00:09:49.600 --> 00:09:52.600 All sorts of questions might be asked about the principle of sufficiency. 93 00:09:52.600 --> 00:09:54.600 Where does it come from? 94 00:09:54.600 --> 00:09:56.600 What is its justification? 95 00:09:56.600 --> 00:10:13.600 What is meant to be self-evident? As right is used in this principle, is it a claim right? If so, against whom is the claim to be made? Me? You? The state? If the state, why the state? What if there is no state, as actually has been the case for most of human existence? And so on. Lots of questions. 96 00:10:13.600 --> 00:10:19.600 Now, Farber argues that everyone has an interest in living a decent life. 97 00:10:19.600 --> 00:10:36.600 She argues that everyone has an interest in living a decent life and, in order to do so, must have access to an adequate amount of resources, food, clothing, shelter, health, care, as well as being minimally autonomous. 98 00:10:36.600 --> 00:10:48.600 She notes that the provision of sufficiency for some may require the curtailment of autonomy for others, but, she believes, once everyone has sufficiency, then everyone should be allowed to maximise his autonomy as a matter of right. 99 00:10:48.600 --> 00:10:52.440 Once again, time for reflection. How is this supposed to work? 100 00:10:52.440 --> 00:10:56.360 How does one determine what is or what is not a level of decency? 101 00:10:56.360 --> 00:10:59.160 Who makes decisions? Whom does it range over? 102 00:10:59.160 --> 00:11:03.880 The notion of basic decency is so vague as to make it practically impossible to allow 103 00:11:03.880 --> 00:11:09.160 for any autonomy at all. There are some questions. 104 00:11:09.160 --> 00:11:13.560 What is the effect of these principles then of justice on property rights? 105 00:11:13.560 --> 00:11:18.040 Well, she claims that neither collective ownership nor unrestricted private ownership 106 00:11:18.600 --> 00:11:28.600 Collective ownership violates the principle of autonomy, while unrestricted private ownership violates the principle of sufficiency. 107 00:11:28.600 --> 00:11:35.600 She is going to argue for a combination of both kinds of ownership or rights as a way of satisfying her principles. 108 00:11:35.600 --> 00:11:40.600 Under her proposal, principle of sufficiency, all would get equal shares in natural resources. 109 00:11:40.600 --> 00:11:45.600 In the event that Peter Pan has insufficient resources, he has a right against Captain Hook. 110 00:11:45.600 --> 00:11:49.880 David Hooke cultivates his share in certain ways or allowed Peter to do so. 111 00:11:49.880 --> 00:11:56.000 The sufficiency principle requires that neither of us, singly, has the rights to decide by 112 00:11:56.000 --> 00:11:59.680 whom, whether and how the world would be used and to enjoy the whole of the income derived 113 00:11:59.680 --> 00:12:00.720 from it. 114 00:12:00.720 --> 00:12:05.080 We both have these rights only if our life is not decent under the status quo and if the 115 00:12:05.080 --> 00:12:10.480 other's life is better than ours, or more than decent, or already decent, and who would 116 00:12:10.480 --> 00:12:14.040 not get less than decent after the decisions are made. 117 00:12:14.040 --> 00:12:16.960 Again, shades of the sort of standard left libertarian line here. 118 00:12:16.960 --> 00:12:21.000 Let's imagine a situation in which some people need housing and others have more than one property. 119 00:12:21.000 --> 00:12:25.000 In such circumstances, if for example taxation wouldn't do the job, quote, 120 00:12:25.000 --> 00:12:30.400 justice requires that those houses be requisitioned. 121 00:12:30.400 --> 00:12:33.600 In the film Shenandoah, a boy asks his father what requisition means 122 00:12:33.600 --> 00:12:40.200 and he gets the following answer. 123 00:12:40.200 --> 00:12:45.920 I love that film, requisition, it's a fancy word for stealing. 124 00:12:45.920 --> 00:12:48.200 On the face of it then, 125 00:12:48.200 --> 00:12:52.600 it looks as if the composite set of private and collective rights 126 00:12:52.600 --> 00:12:54.960 might impinge negatively on autonomy, 127 00:12:54.960 --> 00:12:58.800 but individuals can use the world as they wish, provided they do so in a way 128 00:12:58.800 --> 00:13:02.920 that the luckless are provided for, and any way they choose after that. 129 00:13:02.920 --> 00:13:06.200 Suppose somebody were to object that requiring the lucky to work for the unlucky 130 00:13:06.200 --> 00:13:08.360 is an infringement of their autonomy. 131 00:13:08.360 --> 00:13:14.160 If the lucky have to work more, let alone all of their time for the unlucky, 132 00:13:14.160 --> 00:13:21.360 my Dworkinian opponent would argue they cannot implement those identity conferring choices of theirs 133 00:13:21.360 --> 00:13:25.160 which do not revolve around work, and they do not therefore have a decent life. 134 00:13:25.160 --> 00:13:31.080 This, one would think, is a pretty potent objection, but it doesn't bother Barbara. 135 00:13:31.080 --> 00:13:34.920 With a straight face, she denies that being forced to do work you don't want to do 136 00:13:34.920 --> 00:13:38.360 is not a form of slavery, provided your life is still decent. 137 00:13:38.360 --> 00:13:41.840 One might wonder whether or not this is in the contradiction in terms, but anyway, 138 00:13:41.840 --> 00:13:45.560 she finally admits that even in such a case, her composite theory of property rights 139 00:13:45.560 --> 00:13:49.480 does in fact infringe on the autonomy of the lucky, but not, she says, 140 00:13:49.480 --> 00:13:52.320 to an unacceptable degree. 141 00:13:52.320 --> 00:13:56.240 I wonder if everybody would agree with her. At which point a libertarian might rudely respond, 142 00:13:56.240 --> 00:13:58.920 says who? 143 00:13:58.920 --> 00:14:01.520 The criticism that it does 144 00:14:01.520 --> 00:14:14.520 Half-Force only if one focuses on the situation of the lucky and overlooks the fact that if they don't work for the unlucky, the latter are not autonomous either, since they lack the material resources necessary for them to enjoy the opportunities society offers them. 145 00:14:14.520 --> 00:14:25.520 Such focus unacceptably fails to live up to what motivates justice in the first instance. Clearly the lucky will suffer a loss of autonomy, but this is an unavoidable condition of securing minimal autonomy for all. 146 00:14:25.520 --> 00:14:31.560 So that's all right then. We're all happy with that. You couldn't make this stuff up. 147 00:14:31.560 --> 00:14:34.480 You might even begin to think here we have a conflation of autonomy and sufficiency in 148 00:14:34.480 --> 00:14:43.480 a way which pulls the rug out completely from her enterprise. But anyway, let's move on. 149 00:14:43.480 --> 00:14:47.760 Once again she mentions to her acceptability of taxation and its onerousness in a bid to 150 00:14:47.760 --> 00:14:53.200 make her proposals seem less appealing. She says, I quote, conceptions of ownership which 151 00:14:53.200 --> 00:15:21.200 For justice may very well require that the income owners derived from their property be taxed to such an extent that they would have to work and do nothing but work in order to meet the needs of the unlucky, which would render their life, as she says, with no indication of irony, less than decent. 152 00:15:21.200 --> 00:15:35.720 Finally, and I would think brazenly, she rejects the applicability of the objection that her 153 00:15:35.720 --> 00:15:39.360 proposal is simply unworkable. 154 00:15:39.360 --> 00:15:43.760 Constantly checking, she says, that the allocation of ownership rights at any given time does 155 00:15:43.760 --> 00:15:47.720 not fall foul of justice and fairness, and modifying that allocation as necessary are 156 00:15:47.720 --> 00:15:51.720 They are likely, she says, to be very costly and difficult. 157 00:15:51.720 --> 00:15:53.720 Masterpiece of understatement here. 158 00:15:53.720 --> 00:15:59.720 Perhaps these considerations provide good reasons not to implement my proposal. 159 00:15:59.720 --> 00:16:02.720 Surely not, however she thinks. 160 00:16:02.720 --> 00:16:06.720 They cannot disqualify it as that ownership which best satisfies both justice and fairness. 161 00:16:06.720 --> 00:16:08.720 Now listen to this. 162 00:16:08.720 --> 00:16:13.720 My proposals are completely unworkable, but they're still the right principles. 163 00:16:13.720 --> 00:16:17.720 Okay, all right. Only in universities can you get away with this. 164 00:16:17.720 --> 00:16:19.720 Now we come to the really interesting part. 165 00:16:19.720 --> 00:16:24.720 The standard libertarian left and right view is that our body is beyond the reach of legitimate demands from others, 166 00:16:24.720 --> 00:16:27.720 whereas our personal possessions and our money are not. 167 00:16:27.720 --> 00:16:31.720 Moreover, on the liberal view, we are not at liberty to use our bodies in ways we ourselves desire, 168 00:16:31.720 --> 00:16:35.720 even if in so doing we do not necessarily harm others and may in fact benefit them, 169 00:16:35.720 --> 00:16:38.720 for example as in prostitution and the sale of organs. 170 00:16:38.720 --> 00:16:44.720 The position that holds that people's bodies must not be interfered with, Faber calls, body exceptionalism. 171 00:16:53.720 --> 00:16:59.720 Faber argues that if it is the case that we are susceptible to legitimate claims on our material resources from those who would appear to need them, 172 00:16:59.720 --> 00:17:04.720 we are also susceptible to legitimate claims on the use of our bodies and our body parts from those who need them. 173 00:17:04.720 --> 00:17:17.040 Effectively, she argues that taxation, to which she thinks we have no objections, negatively 174 00:17:17.040 --> 00:17:23.480 affects her life plans more extensively than, say, the forcible extraction of one of her 175 00:17:23.480 --> 00:17:24.480 kidneys. 176 00:17:24.480 --> 00:17:26.480 Why kidneys, by the way? 177 00:17:26.480 --> 00:17:27.480 Why not an eye? 178 00:17:27.480 --> 00:17:29.120 After all, I have two and you have none. 179 00:17:29.120 --> 00:17:33.120 You're much better off with gaining one than I am worse off with being reduced to one. 180 00:17:33.120 --> 00:17:38.520 Therefore, she thinks, we shouldn't object to the forcible extraction of our kidneys. 181 00:17:38.520 --> 00:17:41.040 I would run the argument, of course, precisely in the opposite direction. 182 00:17:41.040 --> 00:17:45.120 We do object to others interfering in our bodies without license, the level of objection 183 00:17:45.120 --> 00:17:47.560 rising with the level of intrusion. 184 00:17:47.560 --> 00:17:51.040 Kidney extraction ranks pretty high. 185 00:17:51.040 --> 00:17:54.560 That being so, if the reason for the rejection of kidney extraction were based on interference 186 00:17:54.560 --> 00:17:58.640 with life plans and taxation is more devastating from the point of view, then, of course, as 187 00:17:58.640 --> 00:18:09.480 This brings us back to our starting point, which is that there is no position so absurd 188 00:18:09.480 --> 00:18:14.080 that some philosopher has not held it, and I instance the case in point. 189 00:18:14.080 --> 00:18:15.440 Farber's account then is the case in point. 190 00:18:15.440 --> 00:18:19.960 Her position, while consistent, is in fact a reduxio of the standard liberal position. 191 00:18:19.960 --> 00:18:23.360 She is right to see a connection between the body and material resources, and right to 192 00:18:23.360 --> 00:18:26.640 accuse the liberal position of inconsistency. 193 00:18:26.640 --> 00:18:30.000 These would run, as I said, the argument in the other direction. If conceding the legitimacy 194 00:18:30.000 --> 00:18:33.840 of taxation and such like leads to having to concede the rights of others to use our 195 00:18:33.840 --> 00:18:37.400 bodies without our consent, this turning the argument around shows us that in protecting 196 00:18:37.400 --> 00:18:42.240 the autonomy of our bodies we are also committed to a protection of our ownership of external 197 00:18:42.240 --> 00:18:47.920 and material resources. So Faber's position then has at least the merit of consistency 198 00:18:47.920 --> 00:18:55.400 even if it's the consistency of the crazy. The libertarian position is likewise consistent. 199 00:18:55.400 --> 00:18:59.440 The liberal position is incoherent. 200 00:18:59.440 --> 00:19:01.960 Her view is radically challenging in some respects, but not in others. 201 00:19:01.960 --> 00:19:05.520 She has the merit of showing that the standard is a liberal view is incoherent and that the 202 00:19:05.520 --> 00:19:07.760 issue then is between her and libertarians. 203 00:19:07.760 --> 00:19:11.320 I don't see how the standard liberal or left libertarian can resist her argument, so that 204 00:19:11.320 --> 00:19:14.480 leaves only the libertarian position standing. 205 00:19:14.480 --> 00:19:15.480 So we get this. 206 00:19:15.480 --> 00:19:17.520 So there's a summary of the positions. 207 00:19:17.520 --> 00:19:21.480 So here you have, number one, the left libertarian liberal position, so you have non-voluntary 208 00:19:21.480 --> 00:19:25.640 Redistribution Possible of Natural Resources but not of the bodies and 209 00:19:25.640 --> 00:19:28.680 phabras which is everything can be redistributed including your kidneys and 210 00:19:28.680 --> 00:19:32.200 your eyes and the libertarian position says get your hands off my kidneys and my 211 00:19:32.200 --> 00:19:42.320 eyes to put a bloody, all right, yeah sorry well maybe we I'm sure David 212 00:19:42.320 --> 00:19:45.040 would probably wait to have questions after it and so on I'll just finish my 213 00:19:45.040 --> 00:19:50.120 presentation then allow the other speakers so there we are so the last 214 00:19:50.120 --> 00:19:53.680 The last word, let's leave the last word as well as the first word, Cicero. 215 00:19:53.680 --> 00:19:59.080 Sednescio quadmodo nihil tamen absurdi dichi potus quadnum decatur ab alico filociforum 216 00:19:59.080 --> 00:20:00.080 Cicero. 217 00:20:00.080 --> 00:20:06.360 There's no position so dumb, right, that some philosopher hasn't held it. 218 00:20:06.360 --> 00:20:11.560 And here's a shame of subversion, okay. 219 00:20:11.560 --> 00:20:15.560 My book on Murray Rothbard came out a couple of years ago, which has been read by me, the 220 00:20:15.560 --> 00:20:19.720 editor, and the cat, and I'm not so sure about me. 221 00:20:19.720 --> 00:20:29.720 was available at some ridiculous price and is actually going to be available on the 1st of August at a price that won't make your nose bleed. 222 00:20:29.720 --> 00:20:35.720 If anybody wants a copy of this presentation, send me an email at jerry.casey at ucd.ie. Thank you very much.