WEBVTT

NOTE The State as an Organization

1
00:00:00.000 --> 00:00:03.000
I'm really grateful and honored to be here.

2
00:00:03.000 --> 00:00:05.000
I'm not Austrian.

3
00:00:05.000 --> 00:00:08.000
I may be an Austrian, but I'm not Austrian.

4
00:00:08.000 --> 00:00:10.000
And I'm not an economist.

5
00:00:10.000 --> 00:00:12.000
I'm in finance.

6
00:00:12.000 --> 00:00:15.000
So some of what I have to say will probably be,

7
00:00:15.000 --> 00:00:19.000
undoubtedly will be old wine to many of you,

8
00:00:19.000 --> 00:00:24.000
but it may come in new bottles with a finance slant to it.

9
00:00:24.000 --> 00:00:27.000
And I find it helps me understand things,

10
00:00:27.000 --> 00:00:35.000
I hope it will help you understand things, put the concepts into a different framework.

11
00:00:35.000 --> 00:00:42.000
Franz Oppenheimer called the state the organization of the political means.

12
00:00:42.000 --> 00:00:53.000
Murray Rothbard defined the state as that organization in society which attempts to maintain a monopoly of the use of force and violence in a given territorial area.

13
00:00:53.000 --> 00:00:58.000
What they have in common is they both call the state an organization.

14
00:00:58.000 --> 00:01:01.000
And that's where I begin.

15
00:01:01.000 --> 00:01:06.000
I think since it's an organization, we should analyze it as an organization.

16
00:01:06.000 --> 00:01:13.000
There is theory of organizations, so why not apply theory of organizations to the state?

17
00:01:13.000 --> 00:01:16.000
It might help clarify how we think about it.

18
00:01:16.000 --> 00:01:20.000
First off, it's somewhat difficult to define an organization.

19
00:01:20.000 --> 00:01:25.000
By the way, what I'm going to say is work in progress.

20
00:01:25.000 --> 00:01:28.000
Some of it is off the top of my head.

21
00:01:28.000 --> 00:01:31.000
All the errors in here, all the omissions are solely mine.

22
00:01:31.000 --> 00:01:36.000
The only person who read this doesn't want to have any culpability at all.

23
00:01:36.000 --> 00:01:47.000
Anyway, so I define an organization as simply a group of individuals who order their acts together.

24
00:01:47.000 --> 00:01:55.000
They do that through understandings, agreements, sometimes contracts. They are either explicit or implicit.

25
00:01:55.000 --> 00:02:05.000
They may come into the organization with personal aims, but somehow in the organization they constrain their aims and they act jointly.

26
00:02:05.000 --> 00:02:12.000
They agree to act jointly. So therefore, all organizations have a few things in common.

27
00:02:12.000 --> 00:02:25.000
First of all, every organization has aims, even though sometimes we say well society doesn't exist or this organization doesn't literally exist, yet the organization has aims.

28
00:02:25.000 --> 00:02:36.000
The Ludwig von Mises Institute has aims and the people working for it have somehow gotten together and agreed to work in certain ways such that it has aims.

29
00:02:36.000 --> 00:02:46.000
There will be goals. They may not be stated. They may be unstated. They may not be understood. They may be dimly known, but nevertheless they're coordinated.

30
00:02:46.000 --> 00:02:57.000
Secondly, all organizations will have boundaries. Some people are in it, some people are not in it. So some people are in the state and some people are not in the state.

31
00:02:57.000 --> 00:03:06.000
Third, often times there will be capital in the organization and then there will be ownership of the capital.

32
00:03:06.000 --> 00:03:08.000
There will be people who own the capital.

33
00:03:08.000 --> 00:03:11.000
I will call those people the principles.

34
00:03:11.000 --> 00:03:14.000
They bear the risks of owning the capital.

35
00:03:14.000 --> 00:03:19.000
They often contract with other people who work with the capital.

36
00:03:19.000 --> 00:03:21.000
Those we will call agents.

37
00:03:21.000 --> 00:03:29.000
I'm going to be using, I'm going to bring in principal agent theory here and try to apply it to the state.

38
00:03:29.000 --> 00:03:38.000
Now fourth, in organizations there is always some kind of contracting going on.

39
00:03:38.000 --> 00:03:47.000
These will be the agreements or understandings, explicit or implicit, such that people will order their behavior.

40
00:03:47.000 --> 00:03:52.000
So the contracts will have principles and agents involved in them.

41
00:03:52.000 --> 00:03:55.000
And then there will be incentives.

42
00:03:55.000 --> 00:03:57.000
Every organization will have an incentive structure.

43
00:03:57.000 --> 00:04:00.000
It arises from the contracting.

44
00:04:00.000 --> 00:04:03.000
Now, most of that you've probably all heard of.

45
00:04:03.000 --> 00:04:14.000
The new element that came in 1976 was due to Michael C. Jensen and William Meckley.

46
00:04:14.000 --> 00:04:18.000
They pioneered the theory of agency costs.

47
00:04:18.000 --> 00:04:26.000
The way they describe agency costs are a composition of three elements.

48
00:04:26.000 --> 00:04:35.000
In order to reach understandings, there are costs of getting people together to reach agreements and contracts.

49
00:04:35.000 --> 00:04:37.000
So that's one agency cost.

50
00:04:37.000 --> 00:04:43.000
Secondly, inside an organization, people agree to do different things.

51
00:04:43.000 --> 00:04:50.000
That means that you have to monitor what they're doing and make sure they live up to their contract.

52
00:04:50.000 --> 00:04:53.000
So there are costs of monitoring them.

53
00:04:53.000 --> 00:05:05.000
Third, and most important of all, in organizations, human beings acting as agents, they do not fully live up to what they agree to do.

54
00:05:05.000 --> 00:05:12.000
Therefore, the failure to live up to their obligations leads to some more costs.

55
00:05:12.000 --> 00:05:15.000
and those are very important costs.

56
00:05:15.000 --> 00:05:20.000
I'll give some examples of these as we go along to make it clear.

57
00:05:20.000 --> 00:05:27.000
Now, it is impossible if there's a principal and the principal says to an agent,

58
00:05:27.000 --> 00:05:33.000
I want you to do something for me and the agent agrees and they have some sort of understanding or agreement.

59
00:05:33.000 --> 00:05:40.000
It's impossible to get the agent to work fully and to do what the principal wants them to do.

60
00:05:40.000 --> 00:05:48.000
There's always some slippage in there, some shirking or some inability of the agent to fully carry out what the principal wants.

61
00:05:48.000 --> 00:06:02.000
For example, in a firm owned by stockholders and managed by managers, we could say the managers are agents and the stockholders are the principals.

62
00:06:02.000 --> 00:06:07.000
We will see that the same person can be both a principal and an agent.

63
00:06:07.000 --> 00:06:13.880
So, for example, in a corporation, the stockholders are the principals, they supply the capital.

64
00:06:13.880 --> 00:06:18.260
The managers are supposed to do what for the stockholders, they're supposed to maximize

65
00:06:18.260 --> 00:06:22.680
the value of the firm, invest in good things and so on and so on.

66
00:06:22.680 --> 00:06:29.880
The managers also allocate capital to employees and in that role, the managers are the principals

67
00:06:29.880 --> 00:06:32.340
and the employees are the agents.

68
00:06:32.340 --> 00:06:41.340
So there are always levels of this principal agent problem where the agents do not live up to the expectations of the principles.

69
00:06:41.340 --> 00:06:52.340
So right now I'm saying the stockholders will experience perhaps some agency cost because they can't monitor the managers perfectly.

70
00:06:52.340 --> 00:06:56.340
The managers will waste resources inside a corporation.

71
00:06:56.340 --> 00:07:07.340
The reasons for this are that if they waste a dollar of assets, which is a one dollar loss to the shareholders, the managers personally lose less than a dollar.

72
00:07:07.340 --> 00:07:25.340
So to them it's not as important. The managers may get some gratification or utility basically from wasting that dollar, from having a fancy office, from having nice carpets, from having nice automobiles, jets and so on.

73
00:07:25.340 --> 00:07:30.340
and so on. So this is where your agency cost partly comes in.

74
00:07:30.340 --> 00:07:37.340
But the worst part of the agency cost there is that the managers will fail to make good investments.

75
00:07:37.340 --> 00:07:41.340
They may, why should they always risk their jobs?

76
00:07:41.340 --> 00:07:46.340
There may be some really good thing that comes along, but they decide not to do it.

77
00:07:46.340 --> 00:07:52.340
And that will also lower shareholder wealth. So there will be costs there.

78
00:07:52.340 --> 00:08:04.340
So, you have all these losses. The shareholders try to monitor the managers, try to get them to behave, but the managers don't act perfectly in the shareholder interest, and you have agency costs.

79
00:08:04.340 --> 00:08:15.340
Now, who bears those costs? This is the interesting thing. The shareholders actually do not bear these agency costs, if they have any brains in their head.

80
00:08:15.340 --> 00:08:19.840
Because this economics says people are rational.

81
00:08:19.840 --> 00:08:25.840
So if you're going to supply capital to somebody and if you think they're going to waste a certain amount of it,

82
00:08:25.840 --> 00:08:28.840
you exact a price at the outset.

83
00:08:28.840 --> 00:08:36.840
You want a higher return on your money before you give them the capital to compensate you for your prospective losses.

84
00:08:36.840 --> 00:08:41.840
But maybe the easiest way to see this is just think of bondholders,

85
00:08:41.840 --> 00:08:46.840
bondholders who lend money to corporations that are at risk.

86
00:08:46.840 --> 00:08:49.840
Say there's a higher risk of bankruptcy.

87
00:08:49.840 --> 00:08:53.840
You'll find that the bonds of that firm will pay a higher yield.

88
00:08:53.840 --> 00:08:58.840
That's to compensate the bondholders for the chance of bankruptcy.

89
00:08:58.840 --> 00:09:03.840
They price it in to begin with, knowing that there is a higher risk.

90
00:09:03.840 --> 00:09:14.340
So the reason people can sell bonds for firms that are very risky and micro-bankrupt is because they pay a higher rate of interest.

91
00:09:14.340 --> 00:09:21.340
So the bondholders do not bear the cost of bankruptcy. The borrower bears the cost of bankruptcy.

92
00:09:21.340 --> 00:09:31.340
And in the same way, the shareholders do not bear the agency cost. It's the entrepreneurs who want the money and who might waste it once they get it.

93
00:09:31.340 --> 00:09:40.340
or the managers who might want it, they bear the agency cost, the company basically bears the agency cost, not the capital, suppliers.

94
00:09:40.340 --> 00:09:48.340
Now, coming to the state, there are people who think about the state in the same terms as a corporation.

95
00:09:48.340 --> 00:09:55.340
I'll talk about a spectrum of possible states here.

96
00:09:55.340 --> 00:10:03.240
And at one end will be anarchy, and at the other end will be totalitarianism.

97
00:10:03.240 --> 00:10:08.640
And for those who are interested in these things, anarchy will be on the left, okay?

98
00:10:08.640 --> 00:10:13.240
Totalitarianism will be on the right.

99
00:10:13.240 --> 00:10:21.340
And somewhere as we go in from the left, we have the contractual state.

100
00:10:21.340 --> 00:10:25.380
and then we go further we have the predatory state

101
00:10:25.380 --> 00:10:30.340
and then more and more predatory we get to totalitarianism

102
00:10:30.340 --> 00:10:33.840
so the contractual state, it's a model

103
00:10:33.840 --> 00:10:37.100
conceptually it's like a publicly owned corporation

104
00:10:37.100 --> 00:10:40.380
the taxpayers are supposed to own the state

105
00:10:40.380 --> 00:10:44.720
they are in the state so to speak, they are members

106
00:10:44.720 --> 00:10:48.800
what they do is they engage the government to produce security

107
00:10:48.800 --> 00:10:55.320
and the state specializes in law, justice, and the taxpayers supply the capital.

108
00:10:55.320 --> 00:10:58.240
So the taxpayers are the principals, you see.

109
00:10:58.240 --> 00:11:02.680
The government employees and the officials, they're the agents.

110
00:11:02.680 --> 00:11:07.000
There will be agency costs now, the minute you set up anything like this, because the

111
00:11:07.000 --> 00:11:12.000
agents will not necessarily act on behalf of the principals.

112
00:11:12.000 --> 00:11:16.200
The principals are going to have to monitor them to make sure they behave, so there will

113
00:11:16.200 --> 00:11:26.200
Now, remember, the corporation, what happens is, the people who supply the capital, they don't bear the agency costs, the stockholders.

114
00:11:26.200 --> 00:11:30.200
It falls upon the entrepreneur who gets hands on the capital.

115
00:11:30.200 --> 00:11:38.200
But I say, when you have a state, what happens is, the state should be bearing the agency costs, but it doesn't.

116
00:11:38.200 --> 00:11:42.200
It's the taxpayers who bear the agency costs.

117
00:11:42.200 --> 00:12:00.200
And the reason is the state is able to impose taxes, so whatever costs happen within the state, whatever the state does that's bad, whatever bad investments it makes, the costs all fall back on the taxpayer.

118
00:12:00.200 --> 00:12:06.200
If a company makes bad investments, eventually the company is going to go broke.

119
00:12:06.200 --> 00:12:14.200
It's cost of capital will go up, the managers will get thrown out of their jobs, various things will happen.

120
00:12:14.200 --> 00:12:18.200
They can't simply push the cost back onto the shareholders.

121
00:12:18.200 --> 00:12:25.200
But in this case, the state will impose taxes, which makes up for all this misuse of capital.

122
00:12:25.200 --> 00:12:28.200
So it's perverse.

123
00:12:28.200 --> 00:12:34.200
Now, I mentioned you have also internal agency costs.

124
00:12:34.200 --> 00:12:48.200
This happens inside a company. The managers delegate decisions, the workers will shirk perhaps, you have to monitor them and so on and so forth.

125
00:12:48.200 --> 00:13:02.200
And for the same reason that the top managers don't behave perfectly, their employees don't behave perfectly either, the reasons are they don't receive fully the benefit of doing a good job.

126
00:13:02.200 --> 00:13:08.200
You get a salary, let's say. No matter whether you have a good idea or a bad idea, you get a salary.

127
00:13:08.200 --> 00:13:13.200
So, therefore, you don't necessarily come up with a lot of good ideas.

128
00:13:13.200 --> 00:13:21.200
The bosses can't constantly monitor their employees, so they will tend to goof off, do various things.

129
00:13:21.200 --> 00:13:27.200
You try to align their incentives, you see, with the shareholders, but it's not always possible.

130
00:13:27.200 --> 00:13:37.200
Now there are methods to reduce these agency costs. Human beings are not dumb. We know what's going on. So we try to reduce these costs.

131
00:13:37.200 --> 00:13:52.200
Inside companies what happens is you have budgeting, auditing, procedures, work procedures, orders, incentive plans and so on and so on that reduce the costs.

132
00:13:52.200 --> 00:14:07.200
And that way, actually, the employees can get paid a higher wage, because if it were known that they were going to steal stuff, walk off with stuff, shirk and so on, the managers would end up paying them a lower wage.

133
00:14:07.200 --> 00:14:17.200
In other words, the managers, knowing, we're going to have some agency costs from these employees, what they would then do would be pay a lower wage.

134
00:14:17.200 --> 00:14:26.200
and the cost of stealing and theft and shirking and inactivity and laziness and so on would fall upon the employees.

135
00:14:26.200 --> 00:14:35.200
Just as in the case where the managers were the agents, the cost fell on them too if they did badly.

136
00:14:35.200 --> 00:14:41.200
Now within the state, what I'm saying here is that the same things go on.

137
00:14:41.200 --> 00:15:11.200
and so on, you've got hierarchies of various kinds, legislators, they delegate funds to the executive branch, the top officials there, they delegate to the FEMA's and the HUD's, they delegate to lower level employees, so you've got layers and layers and layers of agency costs, all inside government, you have bureaus there, they're not profit seeking, they don't have the proper incentives,

138
00:15:11.200 --> 00:15:34.200
The tax payers don't control their agents. I often tell with my classes, just think about the situation here. I'm providing, I'm supposed to give you a good lecture. Supposing I don't. What are you going to do about it?

139
00:15:34.200 --> 00:15:38.200
What are you going to do about it?

140
00:15:38.200 --> 00:15:41.200
Look at the layers that are involved.

141
00:15:41.200 --> 00:15:44.200
They have my chairman or the chairman of the department.

142
00:15:44.200 --> 00:15:45.200
Then there's the dean.

143
00:15:45.200 --> 00:15:48.200
Then it goes to the provost and the president.

144
00:15:48.200 --> 00:15:53.200
Then it goes back to the legislatures, the legislator,

145
00:15:53.200 --> 00:15:57.200
SUNY system, and eventually the taxpayer.

146
00:15:57.200 --> 00:15:59.200
See, the taxpayer is footing the bill,

147
00:15:59.200 --> 00:16:03.200
but they have no control over what I do, basically.

148
00:16:03.200 --> 00:16:14.200
It's because I'm an agent, there are very high possible agency costs, only if I, you know, because of Mother Rosef, so I'm conscientious, right?

149
00:16:14.200 --> 00:16:22.200
But how about all the other people who are not so, but this temptation, you know, after a while maybe you're not so conscientious as you'd like to be.

150
00:16:22.200 --> 00:16:26.200
So you get lax and slack.

151
00:16:26.200 --> 00:16:40.200
In government I'm saying it's even worse because I'm saying the taxpayers don't control their agents, but what's worse is the state is able to shovel all the cost back on the taxpayer.

152
00:16:40.200 --> 00:16:55.200
So the fact that the taxpayers bear the agency cost of actually supplying the capital to the government, as far as I can see, is absolutely a fatal flaw in the taxpayer state arrangement.

153
00:16:55.200 --> 00:17:18.200
In other words, no taxpayer would rationally agree to fork over money in this situation unless they thought these costs would be either low or controllable or they thought the state would produce benefits for them that would offset the massive costs that they actually experience.

154
00:17:18.200 --> 00:17:38.200
Now, I don't know what taxpayers are thinking, but I do know this. We can go through and compare the state's institutions with the corporation and see that these agency costs are not well controlled.

155
00:17:38.200 --> 00:17:50.200
Now, so I'm going to do this one by one. For corporations, we know there are sometimes bad situations that arise even there.

156
00:17:50.200 --> 00:17:56.200
This morning there was a seminar on General Motors and very high agency costs inside a company like that.

157
00:17:56.200 --> 00:18:03.200
A lot of waste and bad decision making was made. Or we have Enron as another example of what can happen.

158
00:18:03.200 --> 00:18:15.200
But there are institutions that have been devised to lower these costs and control the behavior of the managers so that they do act in the interest of the capital suppliers.

159
00:18:15.200 --> 00:18:32.200
The first one is there's a product market, okay, product market. If the firm's prices are too high, if the quality of the product is too low, consumers simply quit, they exit their interaction with the firm.

160
00:18:32.200 --> 00:18:34.200
They lower their purchases.

161
00:18:34.200 --> 00:18:38.200
There is no comparable sanction against the state.

162
00:18:38.200 --> 00:18:48.200
If the state's product is lousy, I say voters cannot routinely or at low cost simply exit the state.

163
00:18:48.200 --> 00:18:57.200
You can do a lot of things, which may help some of these other things that will go on, but you can't exit at low cost.

164
00:18:57.200 --> 00:19:04.200
It's impossible for you and me to exit the Social Security program or Medicare program.

165
00:19:04.200 --> 00:19:07.200
What are we going to do? We're going to leave the country?

166
00:19:07.200 --> 00:19:11.200
That's not a low-cost method of controlling the product market.

167
00:19:11.200 --> 00:19:14.200
So if you don't like the product, there's nothing you can do about it.

168
00:19:14.200 --> 00:19:16.200
You take it or leave it, basically.

169
00:19:16.200 --> 00:19:21.200
So there's a doctrine called tacit consent, right?

170
00:19:21.200 --> 00:19:24.200
I think it's a totally false doctrine.

171
00:19:24.200 --> 00:19:40.200
It just tries to cover up this fault in the contractual state, it says basically, you all know what it says, it says basically if you don't like the product and you still stay in the country, that you are tacitly consenting to the product.

172
00:19:40.200 --> 00:19:48.200
Well you're not, the costs of exiting are very, very high, so it really isn't consent.

173
00:19:48.200 --> 00:19:53.200
The second thing in firms is there's a takeover market.

174
00:19:53.200 --> 00:19:58.200
If the company does badly, the stock goes down.

175
00:19:58.200 --> 00:20:04.200
Then entrepreneurs can come in and take over that company and put it right.

176
00:20:04.200 --> 00:20:09.200
This doesn't happen with states.

177
00:20:09.200 --> 00:20:12.200
When states are badly run, what happens?

178
00:20:12.200 --> 00:20:17.200
The only takeovers I can think of are invasions by other states

179
00:20:17.200 --> 00:20:29.200
Rebellions within the country, revolutions within the country, in other words, very high costs and difficult maneuvers comparable to a takeover.

180
00:20:29.200 --> 00:20:38.200
The third thing is, if companies do badly, have high agency costs, the financial markets provide sanctions.

181
00:20:38.200 --> 00:20:43.200
Investors raise the capital cost for firms that have high agency costs.

182
00:20:43.200 --> 00:20:49.200
Cost. Now, states, they have that sanction too. They borrow money and they could find

183
00:20:49.200 --> 00:20:56.200
their cost of borrowing going up. But they circumvent it. They have taxation and they

184
00:20:56.360 --> 00:21:03.360
have inflation. So they have ways of getting around this financial market constraint.

185
00:21:04.480 --> 00:21:11.480
The next thing is decision control. What stockholders and bondholders do is directly try to control

186
00:21:11.480 --> 00:21:15.480
Managers cannot simply try to control the manager's menu of decisions.

187
00:21:15.480 --> 00:21:19.480
Managers cannot simply say, we're going to take over some big firm,

188
00:21:19.480 --> 00:21:23.480
we're going to have a major investment some place.

189
00:21:23.480 --> 00:21:27.480
They have to meet certain covenants that are in the bonds.

190
00:21:27.480 --> 00:21:31.480
Bond covenants run hundreds of pages.

191
00:21:31.480 --> 00:21:35.480
So they are controlled. Bank lending agreements have many, many

192
00:21:35.480 --> 00:21:39.480
controls in them about what the managers can invest in,

193
00:21:39.480 --> 00:21:55.480
How much they can invest in, so things are very much controlled, even the corporate charter, which calls for votes on certain important matters such as mergers and require proxy statements and voting and so on and so on,

194
00:21:55.480 --> 00:21:59.480
There are ways of controlling the behavior of the management.

195
00:21:59.480 --> 00:22:03.480
Now, what do we have in the case of the state?

196
00:22:03.480 --> 00:22:09.480
Enumerated powers in the Constitution, at least in the United States.

197
00:22:09.480 --> 00:22:11.480
This is a superb idea.

198
00:22:11.480 --> 00:22:17.480
You see, it's exactly analogous to controlling the behavior of the corporate managers.

199
00:22:17.480 --> 00:22:21.480
We'll enumerate the powers, and that way we control their decisions.

200
00:22:21.480 --> 00:22:28.980
The problem is, the Supreme Court is part of the state, it interprets the Constitution.

201
00:22:28.980 --> 00:22:35.480
The Constitution has loopholes big enough to drive a truck through, such as the welfare clause.

202
00:22:35.480 --> 00:22:42.480
So the state is able to circumvent the enumerated powers by interpreting the powers itself.

203
00:22:42.480 --> 00:22:50.980
So therefore I'm saying that method of control over the years has proven to be not very good.

204
00:22:50.980 --> 00:23:02.980
All right, I can go on with more of these. Another one is companies actually bond themselves, bonding.

205
00:23:02.980 --> 00:23:09.980
What I mean by bonding is they pay dividends and they pay out interest on debt.

206
00:23:09.980 --> 00:23:14.980
And by doing that, they show they actually are generating the cash flows.

207
00:23:14.980 --> 00:23:19.980
And they're showing we're not just saying we have earnings, but we actually have money in the bank.

208
00:23:19.980 --> 00:23:25.300
in the Bank, we can afford to pay you dividends, we can pay off interest on our debt, this

209
00:23:25.300 --> 00:23:30.540
is a bonding mechanism which shows that we're doing something for real.

210
00:23:30.540 --> 00:23:39.840
States, well, states don't pay dividends, right, unless, well, they pay negative dividends,

211
00:23:39.840 --> 00:23:46.020
they pay interest, but I say they avoid the discipline because they can float debt and

212
00:23:46.020 --> 00:23:52.300
and the Federal Reserve will buy the debt, and they can just raise money by taxation.

213
00:23:52.300 --> 00:23:55.620
So the discipline is much lower.

214
00:23:55.620 --> 00:24:01.380
It's not that they're completely free to do anything, but it's lower than in a company.

215
00:24:01.380 --> 00:24:04.540
Monitoring.

216
00:24:04.540 --> 00:24:11.260
You have noticed that there are auditors who audit financial statements of corporations.

217
00:24:11.260 --> 00:24:15.460
There are security analysts who write about the corporations.

218
00:24:15.460 --> 00:24:26.460
There are credit rating agencies who talk about the debts of the corporations, they're all monitoring them and finding out what the characteristics are and how risky they are and so on.

219
00:24:26.460 --> 00:24:39.460
What do we have with regard to the state? We have citizen watchdog groups, we have the press, heaven help us, that's our equivalent of security analysts.

220
00:24:39.460 --> 00:25:09.460
The Federal Government audits itself. The GAO sometimes does some good stuff. But really they audit themselves. They hide as much information as they can. They understate costs. They overstate benefits. They don't have an incentive to monitor themselves. Why should they? If they do something bad, they just shift the cost to the taxpayer. They actually have an incentive to have a new program.

221
00:25:09.460 --> 00:25:13.460
We'll make it better now and cover up whatever mess occurred.

222
00:25:13.460 --> 00:25:17.460
So the monitoring process, that doesn't work well.

223
00:25:17.460 --> 00:25:23.460
Stock prices. Well, stock prices are a way to monitor companies

224
00:25:23.460 --> 00:25:27.460
because information gets reflected in the price.

225
00:25:27.460 --> 00:25:34.460
So a shareholder can look at the stock price and know something about how well the company is doing.

226
00:25:34.460 --> 00:25:38.460
They can compare it to other stock prices and see if they're doing better or worse.

227
00:25:38.460 --> 00:25:42.460
Taxpayers, what do they have?

228
00:25:42.460 --> 00:25:47.460
Well, they can sort of, some idea of how well am I doing?

229
00:25:47.460 --> 00:25:52.460
Am I standard of living going up or is it going down and so on?

230
00:25:52.460 --> 00:25:56.460
It's not quite as sharp.

231
00:25:56.460 --> 00:26:01.460
And furthermore, when that happens, they don't know whether the state is responsible or not.

232
00:26:01.460 --> 00:26:08.460
They can't discern whether the state is doing something that's affecting their welfare or not.

233
00:26:08.460 --> 00:26:15.460
Where the stockholder knows, if the stock goes down, chances are, sure, there's noise in the stock price.

234
00:26:15.460 --> 00:26:21.460
But you can compare it to some other stock prices and see, is my stock doing better or worse than somebody else?

235
00:26:21.460 --> 00:26:28.460
But when you're looking at the federal government, you have tremendous amount of noise in knowing what's going on.

236
00:26:28.460 --> 00:26:58.460
So, that's a monitoring mechanism that's absent. Now notice, when there is the ability to compare, when you can compare Texas to New York State, and you see, well, prices are cheaper in Texas, and work conditions are better, or whatever the case may be, that taxpayers will move from one area to another when they are capable of monitoring, or they'll move from one country to another.

237
00:26:58.460 --> 00:26:59.960
to the United States.

238
00:26:59.960 --> 00:27:02.280
So they do make these comparisons,

239
00:27:02.280 --> 00:27:04.880
but I'm saying it's not as good as it could be.

240
00:27:08.220 --> 00:27:12.820
All right, last I might mention the labor market.

241
00:27:13.780 --> 00:27:16.940
In a company, if the managers perform badly,

242
00:27:16.940 --> 00:27:19.900
the board of directors can fire the top managers.

243
00:27:20.740 --> 00:27:23.260
So there's a labor market sanction.

244
00:27:23.260 --> 00:27:25.940
And there's research showing that if you lose your job

245
00:27:25.940 --> 00:27:31.940
As a top manager, you have a hard time getting another comparable job. It's not so easy.

246
00:27:31.940 --> 00:27:38.940
What do we have with respect to the state? The voters can remove the politicians from office.

247
00:27:38.940 --> 00:27:48.940
That's basically what we have. And so that's supposed to be the ultimate controller of their bad behavior or the agency costs.

248
00:27:48.940 --> 00:28:01.940
However, the effectiveness of voting is really quite limited, that's my opinion, and it's been brought out of a number of presentations here,

249
00:28:01.940 --> 00:28:09.940
so I'm going to skip one large section where we can go through all the arguments why voting really doesn't work.

250
00:28:09.940 --> 00:28:14.940
It's not what it's cracked up to be.

251
00:28:14.940 --> 00:28:17.940
If you want to see a complete treatment, eventually I'll publish this.

252
00:28:17.940 --> 00:28:23.940
Maybe I'll break it up into sections and put it on LRC, if Lew will accept it.

253
00:28:23.940 --> 00:28:33.940
Anyway, to sum up so far, the contractual state, the voters are supposed to control their agents and control these agency costs,

254
00:28:33.940 --> 00:28:38.940
but they don't, for four reasons, and I have discussed two so far.

255
00:28:38.940 --> 00:28:50.940
The state can extract capital by force from the taxpayer, and secondly, there are institutional deficiencies in the methods to control the agency costs.

256
00:28:50.940 --> 00:28:57.940
We the taxpayer really have a lot of problems controlling our agents in government.

257
00:28:57.940 --> 00:29:04.940
Now, there are more than this. There are more problems here that I'll discuss further on.

258
00:29:04.940 --> 00:29:15.940
One is that there's an incentive for the state to destroy whatever institutions exist to control its behavior and agency costs.

259
00:29:15.940 --> 00:29:24.940
And fourth, there are weaknesses in the people and their incentives to prevent the state from gaining strength.

260
00:29:24.940 --> 00:29:37.940
Okay, now to get a broad perspective we should talk about society also and distinguish society from the state.

261
00:29:37.940 --> 00:29:44.940
I'll do that extremely briefly, just mention that basically society is not the state.

262
00:29:44.940 --> 00:29:48.940
Society, in my view, precedes the state.

263
00:29:48.940 --> 00:29:56.940
It's the society that creates the governance, not vice versa.

264
00:29:56.940 --> 00:30:02.940
And then, so society is really the principle, the governance organization is its agent.

265
00:30:02.940 --> 00:30:08.940
That's the idea in this contractual state.

266
00:30:08.940 --> 00:30:14.940
For those of you who might think maybe it would be nice to have a contractual state

267
00:30:14.940 --> 00:30:22.940
In a natural state where we firmly control our agents, it might be possible, for example,

268
00:30:22.940 --> 00:30:29.940
although I don't really think so, but a couple of things occur to me.

269
00:30:29.940 --> 00:30:33.940
You might have a state that has a monopoly on legal coercion,

270
00:30:33.940 --> 00:30:41.940
and then have a two-year sunset provision on all laws.

271
00:30:41.940 --> 00:30:43.940
So, you might build that into the Constitution.

272
00:30:43.940 --> 00:30:48.940
We'll have a sunset provision on every law you pass, it stops after a year or two.

273
00:30:48.940 --> 00:30:55.940
Or you might have it stop unless a super majority of the people approve of it, like three quarters, something like that.

274
00:30:55.940 --> 00:31:02.940
Something large, so that only if it really were in the public interest could it ever get passed again.

275
00:31:02.940 --> 00:31:09.940
Anyway, that's at one end of the spectrum, that's the watchman state, let us say.

276
00:31:09.940 --> 00:31:16.940
But, if the controls over your agents get weak enough, you then get the predatory state.

277
00:31:16.940 --> 00:31:22.940
The predatory state is a little different. Here, the citizens are no longer in the state.

278
00:31:22.940 --> 00:31:28.940
The predatory state, that's an autonomous organization. You think of it just as an autonomous group of people.

279
00:31:28.940 --> 00:31:36.940
It's like an owner-managed firm. There are no stockholders, okay? The owners own it and manage it.

280
00:31:36.940 --> 00:31:48.940
and the citizens don't own it. The citizens are the prey. So the state is a gang and it just preys on those under its control. That's the predatory state.

281
00:31:48.940 --> 00:32:02.940
And the totalitarian state is simply an extreme predatory state. The other end of the spectrum, anarchy or an anarchic society, there's no single governance organization.

282
00:32:02.940 --> 00:32:12.940
There's decentralized governance organizations, private justice, private enforcement of judgments, in other words, the defense agencies.

283
00:32:12.940 --> 00:32:18.940
Once you have that, companies that are supplying defense and they're competing with one another,

284
00:32:18.940 --> 00:32:27.940
then what happens is the agency costs shifts back onto those companies,

285
00:32:27.940 --> 00:32:35.940
Because if they misbehave, you can immediately move your business to some other company, some other defense agency.

286
00:32:35.940 --> 00:32:41.940
If somebody develops a bad reputation, some defense agency does something really horrendous,

287
00:32:41.940 --> 00:32:50.940
so starts passing bad judgments or itself becoming predatory, people will move their business elsewhere.

288
00:32:50.940 --> 00:32:55.940
So that's the product market sanction that's acting on those companies.

289
00:32:55.940 --> 00:33:09.940
I'm saying all the sanctions that act to lower agency costs for corporations, they will all work when you have multiple suppliers of law and order.

290
00:33:09.940 --> 00:33:17.940
That's why that will work, why you can't have an anarchic society.

291
00:33:17.940 --> 00:33:31.940
But once you move off that extreme, you start to get more and more agency costs and more and more inability of the agents to control their, their principles, the principles to control the agents.

292
00:33:31.940 --> 00:33:39.940
All right, I'll do some examples now. The third thing I said that goes wrong with the state is this.

293
00:33:39.940 --> 00:33:45.940
It has the incentive to destroy any institutions that are controlling the agency costs.

294
00:33:45.940 --> 00:33:48.940
It would like to shift them elsewhere.

295
00:33:48.940 --> 00:33:50.940
That's a destructive process.

296
00:33:50.940 --> 00:33:53.940
It's happened in America and it's still happening in America.

297
00:33:53.940 --> 00:33:55.940
It's happening right now in America.

298
00:33:55.940 --> 00:33:59.940
If a company tries to do that, it will fail.

299
00:33:59.940 --> 00:34:01.940
It can't do it.

300
00:34:01.940 --> 00:34:06.940
The competition will prevent it from doing it and all these other checks and balances.

301
00:34:06.940 --> 00:34:08.940
But states can do this.

302
00:34:08.940 --> 00:34:13.940
They can destroy the institutions that are put in place to control them.

303
00:34:13.940 --> 00:34:18.940
They can do it because they have the monopoly on making laws.

304
00:34:18.940 --> 00:34:21.940
So it gives them a one-sided advantage.

305
00:34:21.940 --> 00:34:23.940
They're the apex of society.

306
00:34:23.940 --> 00:34:24.940
They make the laws.

307
00:34:24.940 --> 00:34:27.940
Therefore, you'll see.

308
00:34:27.940 --> 00:34:30.940
So here's how I'm going to go through this.

309
00:34:30.940 --> 00:34:37.940
I'll just say that our founding fathers were well aware of agency costs.

310
00:34:37.940 --> 00:34:44.940
You could read the Federalist papers and reinterpret everything in terms of principal agent problems.

311
00:34:44.940 --> 00:34:48.940
They knew that there were these problems there. They tried to prevent these problems.

312
00:34:48.940 --> 00:34:56.940
That's why we have the checks and balances, or have them, excuse me.

313
00:34:56.940 --> 00:35:03.940
We could review U.S. history, and at each instance we'll see there was some institution there

314
00:35:03.940 --> 00:35:13.940
The first one, I would say for the first 85 years of its existence, the U.S. was more a contractual state and less of a predatory state.

315
00:35:13.940 --> 00:35:23.940
I would say it could not avoid being predatory, even at the outset it was predatory, by the structure and nature of the Constitution.

316
00:35:23.940 --> 00:35:32.940
I would say it could not avoid being predatory, even at the outset it was predatory, by the structure and nature of the Constitution.

317
00:35:32.940 --> 00:35:40.940
Shay's Rebellion showed you the predatory nature immediately, or the Alien and Sedition Acts.

318
00:35:40.940 --> 00:35:46.940
However, that predation was rather low compared to later on.

319
00:35:46.940 --> 00:35:57.580
Later on, and the reason it was low, maybe it was partly ideology, Professor Higgs, but

320
00:35:57.580 --> 00:35:59.740
also it was because of institution.

321
00:35:59.740 --> 00:36:08.660
It was partly ideology because the people understood what was going on and they agreed

322
00:36:08.660 --> 00:36:15.060
with the constitution and the people in government at first interpreted it according to a certain

323
00:36:15.060 --> 00:36:16.060
and Philosophy.

324
00:36:16.060 --> 00:36:21.740
Anyway, now the war between the states, what did that do?

325
00:36:21.740 --> 00:36:26.980
There was one important agency control device that the principals thought was available

326
00:36:26.980 --> 00:36:29.740
to them and that was secession.

327
00:36:29.740 --> 00:36:35.500
The U.S. was set up as, in theory, the sovereignty was in the people, then you have the states,

328
00:36:35.500 --> 00:36:38.620
the individual states set up the United States.

329
00:36:38.620 --> 00:36:45.620
Now, just like a stockholder can exit a publicly held corporation by selling his stock, the

330
00:36:45.780 --> 00:36:52.000
state could considerably have exited the union by secession. That could have been a device

331
00:36:52.000 --> 00:36:58.760
to control agency costs. If the central state made decisions that imposed excessive costs

332
00:36:58.760 --> 00:37:03.380
on its member states or on the public, they might have exited the union. You know, if

333
00:37:03.380 --> 00:37:08.280
the tariffs were too high, exit the union. Therefore, you control the misbehavior of

334
00:37:08.280 --> 00:37:10.520
of Your Agents.

335
00:37:10.520 --> 00:37:14.280
So that threat restrained the actions of the central state.

336
00:37:14.280 --> 00:37:20.720
However, the Civil War, I don't want to insult anybody, but whatever you want to call it,

337
00:37:20.720 --> 00:37:32.200
the War of Northern Aggression, it wasn't actually a civil war, I understand.

338
00:37:32.200 --> 00:37:34.520
That became null and void.

339
00:37:34.520 --> 00:37:40.320
So within a generation, it only took a generation, the US accreted a lot more power and became

340
00:37:40.320 --> 00:37:43.200
more and more predatory.

341
00:37:43.200 --> 00:37:49.340
Lincoln did not save the Union, he destroyed the contract and the contractual state.

342
00:37:49.340 --> 00:37:53.160
What he did was save and augment the predatory state.

343
00:37:53.160 --> 00:37:58.800
Another control device was the election of senators by the state legislatures.

344
00:37:58.800 --> 00:38:03.480
That ended in 1913, replaced by direct election by the people.

345
00:38:03.480 --> 00:38:14.480
Now, just imagine that the stockholders of a company, suppose the managers of a company had various proposals they put in front of the stockholders,

346
00:38:14.480 --> 00:38:22.480
and then the stockholders directly elected those managers, okay? That's what direct election corresponds to.

347
00:38:22.480 --> 00:38:28.480
I say the companies would actually be worse off than the system we have now.

348
00:38:28.480 --> 00:38:32.480
What they do now is we elect the board of directors.

349
00:38:32.480 --> 00:38:41.480
The board of directors hires and fires the managers and says yes or no to the important managerial decisions.

350
00:38:41.480 --> 00:38:43.480
Why does that work?

351
00:38:43.480 --> 00:38:50.480
It's because the board of directors has special knowledge, a lot more knowledge than the stockholders do,

352
00:38:50.480 --> 00:38:53.480
about the affairs of that company.

353
00:38:53.480 --> 00:38:58.920
Furthermore, the board of directors often own large blocks of stock themselves, so they

354
00:38:58.920 --> 00:39:04.360
have an incentive to monitor these managers.

355
00:39:04.360 --> 00:39:05.360
That works.

356
00:39:05.360 --> 00:39:08.880
That's how the corporations actually work.

357
00:39:08.880 --> 00:39:15.080
So in an analogous way, citizens elected the state legislatures.

358
00:39:15.080 --> 00:39:17.060
That's like electing the board of directors.

359
00:39:17.060 --> 00:39:21.160
They elected the senators or selected the senators.

360
00:39:21.160 --> 00:39:33.160
The senators were beholden to the state legislatures, so there was a degree of control over their voting from the state legislatures who are somewhat specialized.

361
00:39:33.160 --> 00:39:38.160
They understand the politics, what's going on, better than the people do.

362
00:39:38.160 --> 00:39:45.160
Let's face it, the voters are rationally ignorant and they don't know half of what's going on,

363
00:39:45.160 --> 00:40:15.160
So, the minute you get rid of this procedure, it may direct election, you now have a diffuse electorate, very diffuse, all kinds of people, the control and the monitoring actually go down, what now happens is an interest group can get to the senator, the interest group can also try to sway the public, propagandize the public, so the system does not work as well

364
00:40:15.160 --> 00:40:21.160
Because when you have state legislatures electing the senators, the agency costs actually go up.

365
00:40:21.160 --> 00:40:26.160
What happens then is the senators become part of the central state.

366
00:40:26.160 --> 00:40:34.160
Instead of the senators being beholden to the state legislatures, they become more identified with the federal state.

367
00:40:34.160 --> 00:40:41.160
Alright, so that has been perverted, that mechanism has been lost.

368
00:40:41.160 --> 00:40:56.160
What else? Well, the civil service system, we used to have a sporial system and that's gone.

369
00:40:56.160 --> 00:41:04.160
What now happens is you have the important arms of the state, the bureaucracies have tenure basically.

370
00:41:04.160 --> 00:41:34.160
So, you used to be able to turn the employees over at an election, that's a device to control costs too, the misbehavior of the agents, the people could elect somebody, they would then get rid of all these underlings and put in a new crop, this no longer happens, so you lost another device to control your agents, they're ensconced right there, the bureaucracy, and whether it's Republican or Democrat, they're still there, and after a while they begin to

371
00:41:34.160 --> 00:41:48.160
Limited Taxation is actually a significant method of controlling agents behavior.

372
00:41:48.160 --> 00:41:53.160
If you only give them so much money, there's only so much they can waste.

373
00:41:53.160 --> 00:41:56.160
So, hey, that's good.

374
00:41:56.160 --> 00:42:10.160
The income tax undermined that, because now the revenues exploded, so the agency costs rose dramatically, and again, they're paid for by the public.

375
00:42:10.160 --> 00:42:26.160
So, we can continue onividely. The notion I'm putting forward here is that basically the mechanisms to control the agency costs have been systematically ravaged.

376
00:42:26.160 --> 00:42:33.160
Another one I would say would be the war-making power. It was lodged in Congress.

377
00:42:33.160 --> 00:42:39.840
That's like having the board of directors decide on an important investment.

378
00:42:39.840 --> 00:42:43.320
Shall we go ahead with it or should we not go ahead with it?

379
00:42:43.320 --> 00:42:49.320
The managers say, well, we'd like to build a new plan in Pakistan and put it right on

380
00:42:49.320 --> 00:42:51.720
the Afghanistan border, okay?

381
00:42:51.720 --> 00:42:56.240
And the board of directors say, no, I don't think this is really a good idea right now.

382
00:42:56.240 --> 00:43:02.080
Okay, now, Congress was given this job to do, decide whether war should be undertaken

383
00:43:02.080 --> 00:43:03.080
or not.

384
00:43:03.080 --> 00:43:08.080
It's like an important investment project, whether you have a war.

385
00:43:08.080 --> 00:43:13.080
But it apparently has abandoned that in the last 40, 50 years.

386
00:43:13.080 --> 00:43:15.080
Basically, why?

387
00:43:15.080 --> 00:43:21.080
Congress seems to actually want to consolidate power with the executive branch.

388
00:43:21.080 --> 00:43:24.080
That removes a check and a balance, you see?

389
00:43:24.080 --> 00:43:29.080
That consolidation, now we're facing one team against us.

390
00:43:29.080 --> 00:43:38.080
The Congress is no longer acting on behalf of we the people, or us the people, but now it's more consolidated with the President.

391
00:43:38.080 --> 00:43:41.080
This is not good. We lose that.

392
00:43:41.080 --> 00:43:51.080
Or if the President says that he wants plenary power, he wants to be beyond the judicial reach, what is he saying?

393
00:43:51.080 --> 00:43:57.080
Basically, he wants to overcome the check and balance and consolidate the separate branches.

394
00:43:57.080 --> 00:44:02.680
The more you see the consolidation of the separate branches, the worse things obviously get,

395
00:44:02.680 --> 00:44:09.080
because the agents, you have less and less control over your agents in government.

396
00:44:13.080 --> 00:44:19.080
So the outcome of all this is predictable, if you destroy the institutions that control agency costs,

397
00:44:19.080 --> 00:44:24.680
which is what we have done in America, then you move toward totalitarianism,

398
00:44:24.680 --> 00:44:28.920
You move more to a predatory behavior on the part of the state.

399
00:44:28.920 --> 00:44:36.360
So we, the people, we were supposed to control the behavior of our agents, we didn't do it.

400
00:44:36.360 --> 00:44:39.240
For various reasons, a lot of different reasons for this.

401
00:44:39.240 --> 00:44:43.280
But one reason is we had a blame, the American people had a blame.

402
00:44:43.280 --> 00:44:51.120
Each generation has come along, more ignorant, more weak, more suggestible,

403
00:44:51.120 --> 00:44:57.520
more drift from philosophic foundations, sound philosophic foundations, and they've blessed

404
00:44:57.520 --> 00:44:59.920
these changes actually.

405
00:44:59.920 --> 00:45:07.820
On the other hand, the state has outflanked and outmaneuvered the population because it

406
00:45:07.820 --> 00:45:12.360
has that lawmaking power at the apex of society.

407
00:45:12.360 --> 00:45:20.280
So that process actually is institutionalized now and it's so deep and it's affected the

408
00:45:20.280 --> 00:45:26.800
The ideology of so many Americans that I don't think it can be reversed by anything less.

409
00:45:26.800 --> 00:45:32.520
We would have to have revolutions in thought and deed in order to overcome that.

410
00:45:32.520 --> 00:45:38.240
There's no simple way to overcome this at the moment.

411
00:45:38.240 --> 00:45:44.940
So the predominance of the state, it seems to me, follows logically from its relationship

412
00:45:44.940 --> 00:45:45.940
with society.

413
00:45:45.940 --> 00:45:48.800
This is why I'm an anarchist for many, many reasons.

414
00:45:48.800 --> 00:45:56.800
The logic of it shows me that the state will win in most of these battles.

415
00:45:56.800 --> 00:46:01.800
So why is it that the state will overcome society?

416
00:46:01.800 --> 00:46:05.800
First of all, it has a monopoly over law and justice.

417
00:46:05.800 --> 00:46:08.800
Okay, fine. What does that do?

418
00:46:08.800 --> 00:46:12.800
That immediately, critically weakens society

419
00:46:12.800 --> 00:46:15.800
because what happens when injustice is done?

420
00:46:15.800 --> 00:46:17.800
What do you do?

421
00:46:17.800 --> 00:46:30.800
You don't have recourse to each other through private institutions, so the horizontal communication or ability to organize yourself and rectify some injustice is lessened.

422
00:46:30.800 --> 00:46:38.800
You have to go along with the rule of law, because that's the law-making organ and that's what you've made it.

423
00:46:38.800 --> 00:46:44.800
So therefore society no longer can overcome these issues easily.

424
00:46:44.800 --> 00:46:53.800
The state is strong, united and focused. Individuals, we're rather weak as individuals and isolated.

425
00:46:53.800 --> 00:47:02.800
In order to fight the state, hey, Hans spent a year just trying to fight University of Nevada, Las Vegas.

426
00:47:02.800 --> 00:47:08.800
It's very, very difficult to do this. And most of us, most people give in.

427
00:47:08.800 --> 00:47:23.800
Secondly, obviously, law is a very, very fundamental thing, and if it is so fundamental that if you're able to make law, you can twist society in a direction, move it in a direction you want to.

428
00:47:23.800 --> 00:47:31.800
And then if you control one part of society, then it gives you a wedge to control another part of society.

429
00:47:31.800 --> 00:47:41.800
So, third, I would say, once there is any state at all, then there are opportunities for gain.

430
00:47:41.800 --> 00:47:50.800
The members of the state will see that they can gain in various ways by making law or not making law.

431
00:47:50.800 --> 00:47:58.800
So they have an incentive to increase their domination over society because they can personally gain from it.

432
00:47:58.800 --> 00:48:08.800
Therefore, over time, economics will tell you they will exploit these gains, and therefore the state's power will grow.

433
00:48:08.800 --> 00:48:22.800
Fourth, in order to increase their domination, the states have an incentive to encourage society to deviate from the paths of righteousness.

434
00:48:22.800 --> 00:48:33.800
And society deviates on its own to begin with. So it's not that difficult to incentivize society to deviate.

435
00:48:33.800 --> 00:48:41.800
What do I mean by that? Failing to take responsibility for one's own life.

436
00:48:41.800 --> 00:48:46.800
Shifting burdens to other people. Extracting benefits you don't deserve.

437
00:48:46.800 --> 00:49:16.800
If people in society are excessively fearful, or if they're greedy, if they're ignorant, if they have any incapacity, if they want revenge, if they want to dominate other peoples, if they have prejudices, all the human weaknesses are just lying there on the table, and you've given the state all this power, what are they going to do? They're going to try to exploit these weaknesses that are inherent in all of us, because they gain from it, the members of the state will gain from it.

438
00:49:16.800 --> 00:49:46.800
I see this as a two-way street, a simultaneous process, the weakness of the people is always there, but if the state is powerful, it will try to exploit it, but then also once you get tyranny, it fosters societal weakness, once you have a social security program, or Medicare program, all kinds of programs where people become dependent, then the people become dependent.

439
00:49:46.800 --> 00:49:52.640
Some weak and they lose their ability, you know, the whole philosophy changes.

440
00:49:52.640 --> 00:49:55.640
So the tyranny fosters societal weakness.

441
00:49:55.640 --> 00:50:01.880
On the other hand, freedom fosters societal strength because you have to take responsibility

442
00:50:01.880 --> 00:50:06.840
for your acts.

443
00:50:06.840 --> 00:50:13.000
So the aims of the state are subject unto themselves.

444
00:50:13.000 --> 00:50:23.000
When you do have a state, what is it like when it's a predatory organization, for example, what happens within that organization?

445
00:50:23.000 --> 00:50:29.000
And running short of time, so let me skip.

446
00:50:29.000 --> 00:50:35.000
Another interesting topic is how the state maintains its power.

447
00:50:35.000 --> 00:50:40.000
And as I said, one way is to remove a lot of checks and balances.

448
00:50:40.000 --> 00:50:48.000
In doing that, the state is very clever, the members of the state are very clever.

449
00:50:48.000 --> 00:50:57.000
They are always enacting laws or undertaking projects that must harm society economically.

450
00:50:57.000 --> 00:51:01.000
They are not things that we would choose if we were free to choose them.

451
00:51:01.000 --> 00:51:04.000
They are not products, they are imposed on us.

452
00:51:04.000 --> 00:51:11.000
So, we only get to vote on them and that's not an efficient or effective way to say we like them or not.

453
00:51:11.000 --> 00:51:15.000
So, laws generally harm society.

454
00:51:15.000 --> 00:51:18.000
In other words, the state is always aggressing on us.

455
00:51:18.000 --> 00:51:25.000
And that means that it's lowering our standard of living, basically.

456
00:51:25.000 --> 00:51:31.000
So, people more or less realize this in one way or another.

457
00:51:31.000 --> 00:51:39.000
So the state has to therefore control, or tries to control, the population's resistance to these laws.

458
00:51:39.000 --> 00:51:44.000
In order to do that, they basically have to fool the people.

459
00:51:44.000 --> 00:51:49.000
That's the one method. Or use fear, another method.

460
00:51:49.000 --> 00:52:00.000
But the state will use many, many, many means in order to reduce the rebelliousness or the resistance of society to what it's doing.

461
00:52:00.000 --> 00:52:15.000
What are you doing? Violence? It'll stress them. Be law-abiding. Make examples out of law-breakers with long sentences. Imprison people. Imprison innocent people so that people will know you're powerful.

462
00:52:15.000 --> 00:52:29.000
Don't rehabilitate people. Spread propaganda, lies, sentience. Conceal your true aims. Conceal even what you're doing, what your actions are. Conceal the effects of your actions.

463
00:52:29.000 --> 00:52:39.080
blame others, blame businessmen, blame the rich, control education, break up families,

464
00:52:39.080 --> 00:52:48.720
spy on dissidents, inculcate values like obedience, raise fears, appeal to popular values like

465
00:52:48.720 --> 00:52:58.160
equality, I think that in my opinion one of the major things that has happened in America

466
00:52:58.160 --> 00:53:08.000
is that the doctrine of equality has firmly taken hold and that people identify equality

467
00:53:08.000 --> 00:53:10.760
as being a just thing.

468
00:53:10.760 --> 00:53:17.120
And obviously, if they believe that's just, then they want the state to enforce equality

469
00:53:17.120 --> 00:53:22.880
and therefore the state will do this, which is really unjust.

470
00:53:22.880 --> 00:53:26.500
So this is right in line with what the state wants, I believe.

471
00:53:26.500 --> 00:53:33.580
So, I could go on and on. The state has many, many, many tools. Disarming the population,

472
00:53:33.580 --> 00:53:43.260
portraying itself as crucial to law and order, society and order. They'll say things like

473
00:53:43.260 --> 00:53:49.640
this. Majority rule, voting, look, you've got to go along with what happens. Sometimes

474
00:53:49.640 --> 00:53:54.780
you get your way, sometimes the other gets his way, but we're all Americans, we're all

475
00:53:54.780 --> 00:54:09.780
I think it's worthwhile to look at the totalitarian state, because it's an extreme predatory state, and everything is very clear in a totalitarian state.

476
00:54:09.780 --> 00:54:22.780
I think it's worthwhile to look at the totalitarian state because it's an extreme predatory state and everything is very clear in a totalitarian state.

477
00:54:22.780 --> 00:54:33.780
The owners of the state, the clique who run it, they value control over the personal lives of their prey, not just their wealth but control, power per se.

478
00:54:33.780 --> 00:54:41.780
If they can educate them, feed them, give them welfare, they can turn them into compliant subjects.

479
00:54:41.780 --> 00:54:51.780
As time goes on, if you can control health education and welfare, that's a big foot in the door.

480
00:54:51.780 --> 00:54:59.780
After that, the totalitarian state likes to control employment, entertainment, art, expression and speech.

481
00:54:59.780 --> 00:55:07.780
But, the state does have some kind of natural limitations.

482
00:55:07.780 --> 00:55:10.780
I don't want to leave the impression that states are all powerful.

483
00:55:10.780 --> 00:55:17.780
Because, the more they control society, there are two things that happens.

484
00:55:17.780 --> 00:55:22.780
One is, there are more and more inefficiencies introduced into the system.

485
00:55:22.780 --> 00:55:28.780
So the population then will tend to go more and more resistance to what's happening.

486
00:55:28.780 --> 00:55:34.780
At the same time, the state has to control the population.

487
00:55:34.780 --> 00:55:40.780
The more things it tries to control, the higher its cost of control go.

488
00:55:40.780 --> 00:55:49.780
So what I'm saying is there's basically a demand curve for control and a cost curve for control.

489
00:55:49.780 --> 00:55:58.780
If the cost of control was zero, we would see totalitarian states everywhere, but we don't see them.

490
00:55:58.780 --> 00:56:05.780
So the cost at some point is substantial enough that the states cannot go any further.

491
00:56:05.780 --> 00:56:14.780
States make mistakes. Hitler went too far and that was the end of the Third Reich.

492
00:56:14.780 --> 00:56:26.780
Mao went too far, his successors couldn't continue what he did, Mussolini went too far, Stalin went too far, his successors couldn't continue controlling what he did.

493
00:56:26.780 --> 00:56:34.780
They do make mistakes. The more you try to control, the more you're raising your own costs of control.

494
00:56:34.780 --> 00:56:40.780
And then you're also providing incentives to your subjects to find ways around your regulations and rebel.

495
00:56:40.780 --> 00:57:01.780
The totalitarian state, in my view, helps us understand all states, because it's extreme.

496
00:57:01.780 --> 00:57:07.780
It's an organization in the state that always competes with society.

497
00:57:07.780 --> 00:57:12.780
It's always either the choices of the subjects versus the choices of the rulers.

498
00:57:12.780 --> 00:57:15.780
The state always seeks to suppress freedom.

499
00:57:15.780 --> 00:57:18.780
It always seeks control and domination.

500
00:57:18.780 --> 00:57:22.780
The rulers always try to impose their values, fulfill their values.

501
00:57:22.780 --> 00:57:26.780
The state is always opposed to society.

502
00:57:26.780 --> 00:57:35.780
Meanwhile, the characterization of the states, it depends on the institutions that society has in place

503
00:57:35.780 --> 00:57:49.780
to control their agents. There are large agency costs here. The power to tax is the exact opposite of an institution that will help control agency costs.

504
00:57:49.780 --> 00:58:00.780
It just plays right into the hands of the controllers. In other words, that's why I cannot see you can have a state and at the same time allow taxation.

505
00:58:00.780 --> 00:58:09.780
People end up not being able to control the level of taxation effectively and the state ends up being the master.

506
00:58:09.780 --> 00:58:23.780
So, in finance, what we would say is that totalitarian states are obviously negative net present value projects.

507
00:58:23.780 --> 00:58:32.780
A negative net present value project is an investment that destroys wealth or it destroys utility.

508
00:58:32.780 --> 00:58:37.780
But I would say all states are negative net present value projects.

509
00:58:37.780 --> 00:58:48.780
What that implies is that the difference between the current level of where we are and where we could be,

510
00:58:48.780 --> 00:58:51.780
there is unexploited gain to be made.

511
00:58:51.780 --> 00:59:00.780
If we could simply stop the state's policies, we would suddenly see a big gain in welfare and utility of the population.

512
00:59:00.780 --> 00:59:11.780
So that provides a pervasive, long-run incentive for states to be shrunk and eliminated.

513
00:59:11.780 --> 00:59:17.780
I'm actually a long-run optimist because I see, look, this is an arbitrage opportunity here.

514
00:59:17.780 --> 00:59:23.780
If we get rid of the states, if states were business firms,

515
00:59:23.780 --> 00:59:34.780
supposing they were corporations, they'd long ago have been taken over, sold off, spun off, restructured, cut back, merged, liquidated or dismantled.

516
00:59:34.780 --> 00:59:42.780
But we haven't done that. We the people haven't done that to our states for a variety of reasons mentioned earlier.

517
00:59:42.780 --> 00:59:46.780
I'll mention another one. There are cost barriers.

518
00:59:46.780 --> 00:59:58.780
One of the costs of getting rid of a state is the renegotiation of the contracts that have been made already.

519
00:59:58.780 --> 01:00:03.780
And that arises also when you have bankrupt companies.

520
01:00:03.780 --> 01:00:11.780
To redo the company, somebody has to decide how to renegotiate, change the contracts and pay off the debt holders and stockholders.

521
01:00:11.780 --> 01:00:41.780
Stockholders. Here's what I mean. Right now we have one third of all seniors receive all their income from Social Security. One third. Two thirds of all seniors receive 50 to 100 percent of their income from Social Security. They are going to resist shrinking the state until their income is secured. In other words, that's a big barrier. Now there are many other programs like that. So you see the state's programs have inherently

522
01:00:41.780 --> 01:00:46.780
There are certainly erected obstacles that discourage the restructuring.

523
01:00:46.780 --> 01:00:54.780
We'd like to restructure this situation, cut it back, get rid of it all together if we could,

524
01:00:54.780 --> 01:00:58.780
but that's not going to happen very quickly.

525
01:00:58.780 --> 01:01:04.780
But there are some clear obstacles here in that the population is going to resist this,

526
01:01:04.780 --> 01:01:13.180
If they like the idea, even if they think all the anarcho-capitalists are the New Kansians,

527
01:01:13.180 --> 01:01:16.980
so these guys really know what they're doing, let's do what they say, you're still going

528
01:01:16.980 --> 01:01:24.980
to have to figure out a way to compensate people or get them to go along, basically.

529
01:01:24.980 --> 01:01:48.980
All right, I'll conclude by briefly a section called The Fault, Dear Brutus, by saying that the contest, in my opinion, state is always in a contest with society, against society, but the outcome depends on society.

530
01:01:48.980 --> 01:01:56.980
If we show weakness, it presents an opportunity for the state to exploit, and they will try to exploit weaknesses.

531
01:01:56.980 --> 01:02:05.980
What is preferred to that is that we cooperate to ensure each other against violations of rights.

532
01:02:05.980 --> 01:02:13.980
That is our best chance of holding on to freedom, not to rely on the state to do this, but to do it for ourselves.

533
01:02:13.980 --> 01:02:18.980
In order to do that, we have to know what rights and justice actually are.

534
01:02:18.980 --> 01:02:23.980
So we need ethical codes as a bulwark against tyranny.

535
01:02:23.980 --> 01:02:31.980
Going beyond having multiple defense agencies, beyond vigilance or beyond an armed public, we need more than that.

536
01:02:31.980 --> 01:02:33.980
We need the right philosophy.

537
01:02:33.980 --> 01:02:37.980
The philosophy of relativism has spread too far.

538
01:02:37.980 --> 01:02:46.980
The American people no longer have the ability or the will to support natural right against natural wrong.

539
01:02:46.980 --> 01:02:50.980
I don't think they even know the difference between right and wrong,

540
01:02:50.980 --> 01:02:53.980
never mind natural right and natural wrong.

541
01:02:53.980 --> 01:02:59.980
Relativism, that gives a rationale for unethical and immoral behavior.

542
01:02:59.980 --> 01:03:04.980
And the doctrine of equality covers it up.

543
01:03:04.980 --> 01:03:12.620
up. If justice is defined as equality and if the state dispenses justice, then the state's

544
01:03:12.620 --> 01:03:19.020
aggressions become valid. So unlawfulness and furtherance of equality, that becomes

545
01:03:19.020 --> 01:03:25.460
right and praiseworthy. In other words, wrong becomes right. And people get very confused

546
01:03:25.460 --> 01:03:31.380
then about, they don't know the difference between right and wrong anymore. So in order

547
01:03:31.380 --> 01:03:36.880
In order to rescue society from tyranny, we need a lot of things.

548
01:03:36.880 --> 01:03:43.060
One revolution we need, we need to recover the ability simply to understand and distinguish

549
01:03:43.060 --> 01:03:45.940
right from wrong.

550
01:03:45.940 --> 01:03:54.940
Then we also need an understanding that it's the right behavior that brings peace and happiness.

551
01:03:54.940 --> 01:04:00.940
So, sooner or later, the American state will fail, just as the Soviet Empire failed.

552
01:04:00.940 --> 01:04:06.940
And I don't think we're prepared for it. We need a lot of preparation.

553
01:04:06.940 --> 01:04:12.940
When it happens, we will need to know the right remedies so we don't repeat the mistakes of the past.

554
01:04:12.940 --> 01:04:17.940
I think we will need a very strong understanding of why the state is defective.

555
01:04:17.940 --> 01:04:23.940
We will need to know exactly what went wrong so we don't make the same mistakes again.

556
01:04:23.940 --> 01:04:28.940
Society as the principle cannot control the state as the agent.

557
01:04:28.940 --> 01:04:35.940
If it grants the state irrevocable law-making power, including taxing power,

558
01:04:35.940 --> 01:04:38.940
we will bear the cost rather than the state.

559
01:04:38.940 --> 01:04:43.940
And no matter what institutions we devise to control the cost,

560
01:04:43.940 --> 01:04:48.940
the state will have the incentive to tear them down and tear society down.

561
01:04:48.940 --> 01:04:53.940
The state, very simply, is the enemy of society.

562
01:05:09.940 --> 01:05:10.940
Sure, questions?

563
01:05:10.940 --> 01:05:11.940
Take a few questions.

564
01:05:11.940 --> 01:05:12.940
Anybody wants to hang around?

565
01:05:12.940 --> 01:05:13.940
Right here.

566
01:05:13.940 --> 01:05:36.940
I would add one more institutional change to the list that you gave that included the income tax and the social security administration that was an extremely important empowerment of the state, and that was the Federal Reserve Act of 1930, which made it possible to tax without actually people knowing it.

567
01:05:36.940 --> 01:05:38.940
I totally agree.

568
01:05:38.940 --> 01:05:40.940
Yes.

569
01:05:40.940 --> 01:05:56.940
I would like for you to consider an alternative to your sub-setting idea of legislation dying after two years, because I can see that becoming standard practice in what you've done before.

570
01:05:56.940 --> 01:06:08.940
I think we'd be better off to say that new legislation requires a supermajority of two-thirds, 75%, but could be repealed with a simple majority.

571
01:06:08.940 --> 01:06:15.940
That one meant a small majority from enacting a great hardship on a sizeable majority.

572
01:06:15.940 --> 01:06:17.940
A good idea.

573
01:06:17.940 --> 01:06:20.940
Yes, it's further back behind.

574
01:06:20.940 --> 01:06:24.940
Michael, I think the first half of your speech was great.

575
01:06:24.940 --> 01:06:28.940
I love the theme of examining government as an organization,

576
01:06:28.940 --> 01:06:32.940
but you seem to veer into what I mean, maybe it's the optimism of youth,

577
01:06:32.940 --> 01:06:37.940
but little sentimentality, I think, saying that each generation is excessively ignorant.

578
01:06:37.940 --> 01:07:02.940
If you're at a starting point and each generation takes one successive step, I mean you can get to a pretty terrible spot and each generation is equally fault, but I tend to think that what we're really seeing is both the state and the people are actually getting more sophisticated over time.

579
01:07:02.940 --> 01:07:16.940
The State is doing some things now that it hadn't thought of a hundred years ago, but there's some things the State used to try to get away with a hundred years ago when it did, and now it doesn't get away with them.

580
01:07:16.940 --> 01:07:28.940
I think some of the foreign aggression might take a look at the Philippines, then take a look at Vietnam, then take a look at Iraq, and I think the public response to those has been a lot sharper and a lot sooner than the more recent ones.

581
01:07:32.940 --> 01:08:01.940
Why can't we go back to more contractual issues and contract with states who only provide a service and voluntarily join that service, or you don't, such as water, electric, gas, roads?

582
01:08:01.940 --> 01:08:09.940
Well, a more localized situation would be better. It would be much, much better.

583
01:08:09.940 --> 01:08:24.940
I just like the extreme left viewpoint because it's clear and it gives a good benchmark for thinking about all the problems and analyzing what's going on.

584
01:08:24.940 --> 01:08:35.940
Look, if we started even moving in that direction, I'd be happy, and if we got down to what you're saying, I'd be quite happy.

585
01:08:35.940 --> 01:08:36.940
Harry?

586
01:08:36.940 --> 01:08:37.940
Yeah.

587
01:08:37.940 --> 01:08:42.940
Professor, I think one other thing you could add is the establishment of the Federal Reserve.

588
01:08:42.940 --> 01:08:44.940
We don't really print money without gold.

589
01:08:44.940 --> 01:08:45.940
Yes.

590
01:08:45.940 --> 01:08:51.940
It's just one extra breaking the curve of the state of politics.

591
01:08:51.940 --> 01:08:53.940
I totally agree with that, sure.

592
01:08:53.940 --> 01:09:23.940
It seems like you presented us with two different models of the state, where at the end of your talk you had a monolithic state that you personified, sometimes with actual names like Stalin and Hitler and so forth, that's trying to do all this stuff to us, but at the beginning, when you talk about agency costs, you suggest that these agency problems are worse in the state than they are in the private sector, which would sort of lead you to believe that the state really couldn't accomplish these ends.

593
01:09:23.940 --> 01:09:52.940
I have one model of the state in my mind, which is, you can think of it as being, we're the principals, they're the agents, but the mechanisms to control their behavior varies significantly from state to state.

594
01:09:52.940 --> 01:10:15.940
So, if you have very good mechanisms to control what they are doing, then you'll have what I call a contractual state, but at some point, the members of the state begin to act on their own behalf, impose strictures and measures upon the public, and then I call that a predatory state.

595
01:10:15.940 --> 01:10:20.740
Any given state will have a kind of a mixture of these things in practice.

596
01:10:20.740 --> 01:10:27.740
So it's going to be, once you turn predatory, it will depend on how badly they are behaving.

597
01:10:27.740 --> 01:10:33.240
And as you continue on, you eventually come to a totalitarian state,

598
01:10:33.240 --> 01:10:36.940
which has extreme control over the population.

599
01:10:36.940 --> 01:10:41.440
They are no longer, the population is no longer the principles at all.

600
01:10:41.440 --> 01:10:43.140
They've basically lost control.

601
01:10:43.140 --> 01:10:51.140
But let me rephrase that. Because of these agency problems, if Stalin is the state, how can he accomplish anything?

602
01:10:51.140 --> 01:10:57.140
How can he get the people under him to accomplish his head, given the agency problems you cited at the beginning?

603
01:10:57.140 --> 01:11:03.140
The agency problem is that the principals cannot control their agents.

604
01:11:03.140 --> 01:11:09.140
So that meant the Russian population couldn't control Stalin. Stalin controlled them.

605
01:11:09.140 --> 01:11:13.140
And then he imposed costs on them.

606
01:11:13.140 --> 01:11:21.140
In the United States what happens is the costs are imposed on us through taxation, the draft, and various other things.

607
01:11:21.140 --> 01:11:31.140
He had his ways of imposing costs, which were the gulag and withholding food from peasants and so on.

608
01:11:31.140 --> 01:11:35.140
There's no agency problem in getting Stalin to control the gulag.

609
01:11:35.140 --> 01:11:48.140
No, he has agency problems too. Absolutely right. He did. There are many documentation where he didn't know what was going on during World War II and so on.

610
01:11:48.140 --> 01:11:52.140
Or even in the gulag sometimes. He didn't know.

611
01:11:52.140 --> 01:11:57.140
One last question.

612
01:11:57.140 --> 01:12:13.140
You mentioned that when the American state collapses, we have to be prepared in our next step, assuming for our vocabulary or something that doesn't repeat 1776.

613
01:12:13.140 --> 01:12:27.140
Would you mind elaborating on that because I feel that people who have this traditional mindset of going back to what we were have learned from the failures of the past.

614
01:12:43.140 --> 01:12:51.140
We shouldn't be cutting-edge. We are the scholars. We're focusing on these problems full-time or with a lot of brain power.

615
01:12:51.140 --> 01:13:03.140
We shouldn't be engaged in peripheral matters too much or get diverted, but we should try to focus on really building up a body of knowledge

616
01:13:03.140 --> 01:13:09.140
about what has happened, why it's happened, and then what to do about it.

617
01:13:09.140 --> 01:13:17.140
That alone is extremely challenging, you know, if you like, my prescription, I can't give you one really, how can I give you one?

618
01:13:17.140 --> 01:13:29.140
But I think the more widespread the understanding is of what has happened, why it has happened, what went wrong, the better off we are.

619
01:13:29.140 --> 01:13:38.140
And I'm just trying to contribute my little part to it, simply to understand, for example, the destruction of checks and balances.

620
01:13:38.140 --> 01:13:47.140
or the inherent problems in controlling layers and layers and layers of agents in government

621
01:13:47.140 --> 01:13:54.140
or the fact that they measure up poorly compared to controlling corporations.

622
01:13:54.140 --> 01:14:02.140
So maybe it will make an easier pathway for people to say, let's try...

623
01:14:02.140 --> 01:14:05.140
My own favorite thing is what we should do.

624
01:14:05.140 --> 01:14:11.740
My own prescription basically is privatize as many things as possible.

625
01:14:11.740 --> 01:14:19.220
We already have a big private police contingent, and we have some private courts, just keep

626
01:14:19.220 --> 01:14:28.200
pushing that more and more and more so that it goes into the fabric of society basically.

627
01:14:28.200 --> 01:14:34.000
But you know, it's very difficult because we're fighting against the expansion.

628
01:14:34.000 --> 01:14:44.000
The groups constantly try to expand the powers of government and so it's really an uphill battle as far as I can see.
