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NOTE The Ethics of the U.S. Monetary Policy in Response to the Financial Crisis

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As the title of my paper suggests, my paper is a moral analysis of the Federal Reserve's

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policy since the crisis began in August 2007, although a more acute phase started in September

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2008. Needless to say, there's been a lot of analysis of the Fed's actions over the

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last year and a half, but much of it has revolved around the question whether or not the Fed

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will actually succeed whether or not its policies will work in reviving the economy.

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Very little, except perhaps implicitly, but very little has been said about the ethics,

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the moral dimensions of monetary policy.

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And indeed, this is nothing new, as Guido Huelsman, I hope I'm pronouncing that correctly,

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Hulsman, as he mentioned in his recent work on the ethics of money production at the beginning,

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he surveys the moral discussion of monetary policy and finds that there's very little

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unless you go way back to the late scholastics.

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So this is nothing new.

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Monetary policy for various reasons has become a part, something that a technical clique

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This elite is viewed as having some special knowledge because of their knowledge of mathematics

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and models and their jobs to manipulate various aggregates, M1, M2, GDP, CPI and no one else

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really can talk about the ethics of what they're doing because they know what's going on.

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So my paper is designed to fill this gap, this absence of a moral dimension to the discussion

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of monetary policy.

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Now anytime you start talking about morality, you start running into the question, who's

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to say what is moral?

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That is a question I always hear from undergraduate students every time I teach a class in ethics.

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And beneath that question, of course, is this skepticism, relativism even, that says that

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unlike questions of natural science or mathematics where objective truth seems to be generated,

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ethics is a place where it's just a matter of opinion and that's it.

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And there's really not much more we can do about it except to clarify our respective

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of Opinions and perhaps tolerate each other.

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Behind this skepticism or relativism, whatever you want to call it, ultimately it's rooted

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in the idea that there is no agreement among moral philosophers.

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In the natural sciences, in math, they seem to produce agreement, therefore we feel confident

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in referring to their conclusions as objective truths, but in moral philosophy, because you

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You've got people who are utilitarian, some are Kantians, some are Sotelians, and all

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the rest, all the other perspectives.

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People conclude that there's no objectivity there.

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So to deal with this problem here in evaluating monetary policy, I propose that we select

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four major moral theories that are diversified in the sense that they have varying perspectives

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on what counts as a moral action and see if they can produce agreement.

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If they can produce agreement, then while we may not have the objectivity of Einstein's

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theories or Newton's theories, we can at least reach a point on the continuum where we're

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making statements where there's arguably at least compelling to a neutral observer.

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So that's my approach in the paper.

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I pick four moral theories, apply them to US monetary policy. If there is unanimity or

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a strong majority in favor of a particular view, I conclude then that with some reasonable

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assurance that our conclusions are binding on neutral observers.

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Now the four moral philosophies that I choose are Aristotle's Virtue Theory, Locke's Natural

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Cultural Rights Philosophy, Kant's deontological vision of morality, and utilitarianism.

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And on utilitarianism, because there's many varieties of utilitarianism, I decided to

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just go with Jeremy Bentham's view A, because his view on the subjectivity of happiness,

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because he argues that happiness is really just a positive balance of pleasure over pain,

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and pleasure is whatever the person thinks it is, and same with pain, and there's no

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There's no objective way to evaluate pleasure and pain, which John Stuart Mill, another

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utilitarian actually argued for.

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So I decided to go with Bentham, also because Bentham's views actually are ensconced within

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the economics profession, or at least the orthodox understandings of economics.

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So those are the four theories.

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They're very different in the sense that some emphasize duty, some emphasize rights, some

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Some emphasize happiness, guiding one's actions by the good, others emphasize the notion of

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guiding one's actions by moral principle, by the right.

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Some focus on the individual, some focus on society.

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So my thinking is that if we can get unanimity out of this sample of four theories, each

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with very different fundamental starting points, different assumptions about human nature and

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and the Nature of Morality, then maybe we've got a sound basis upon which to evaluate the

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Bernanke Fed's actions.

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Now, in my paper, I summarize Bernanke's monetary policy.

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I do so on the basis of various speeches he's given over the last year.

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He's done a number of them and usually he repeats the same analysis.

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He usually organizes the Fed's actions into three different prongs, if you will.

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One is that they lowered rates, we all know about that, if I remember it started at 5.25%

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before the whole thing started and progressively came down and now we're down practically at

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zero.

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It's really the most dramatic lowering of rates in the history of the Fed.

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The second prong of the Fed's monetary policy response to the crisis has been the provision

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of liquidity.

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Here the Fed has been following the playbook set out by Walter Badgett in Lombard Street,

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a 19th century book.

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And in that book, Badgett argued that if you have a crisis, you're just supposed to throw

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liquidity into the system so that people have an assurance that if they need it, they can

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get money.

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Assurance, then they'll be less likely to seek liquidity. And there have been

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various measures here. They've extended the discount window in terms of the

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amount of time that they provide loans to institutions. They've accepted a wide

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variety of securities. They've taken action to support the commercial

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paper market, the money market funds. So that's the second prong. And then the

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The third prong, harder to categorize, the best way of putting it is that here the Fed

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is trying to deal with the systemic issues, the overall structure of the financial system

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and in this part of the policy response, the Fed, for example, guaranteed $29 billion of

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securities that Bear Stearns had on its balance sheet to facilitate the takeover of its takeover,

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by Barry Stern's Takeover by J.P. Morgan. You got the AIG money here, which now I think

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goes up to 150 billion last week. They got another injection. And they've also sought

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to support the mortgage security market, trying to get mortgage rates down, buying Fannie Mae

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and Freddie Mac mortgages. And there's talk, but my understanding that it hasn't become

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The Federal Reserve, fiat money, fractional reserve banking, Human Action, Man Economy and State, The Theory of Money and Credit

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The Federal Reserve, fiat money, fractional reserve banking, Human Action, Man Economy and State, The Theory of Money and Credit

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PowerPoint, but I wanted to show you an image of, it's not even a hockey stick, the way

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Al Gore shows the famous hockey stick, it's essentially vertical, the monetary based move

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and most of that since the fall of 2008.

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Now so far it really hasn't percolated into the system, M2 is starting to percolate a

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bit, M2 is a broader definition of money supply, includes checking deposits and savings deposits,

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And the reason why it hasn't flowed into the financial system as of yet is because commercial

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banks are very nervous about their capital asset ratios, so they're very wary of lending.

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Also, there isn't a lot of loan demand out there.

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It's not like many people are actually going in and asking for money.

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People are generally retrenching.

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So but if once the economy does revive and one hope it does and banks start using some

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of this money on reserve and we go from 110 or 120% reserve system, whatever we have now

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to the more normal situation, then this whole thing is the money will, the money supply

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will could literally explode.

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I mean, given the move in the monetary base, the implications for the broader aggregates

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of money are actually quite scary.

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Now, the Fed assures us, i.e. Ben Bernanke assures us that they'll mop up this liquidity

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as soon as the signs emerge that the economy is doing better.

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But I would argue that it's unlikely that they'll do so.

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Politically, it'll be very difficult for them to do so because once the economy starts

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Reviving and they take money out of the system, they're going to get complaints from Congress

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and Wall Street that they're nipping or recovering the bud.

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Their record of doing so isn't good.

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In 2001, 2002, they were making the same sort of argument that we're going to take money

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out of the system, but they didn't, at least not quickly enough, and that led to the real

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estate boom.

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And then there's also the point, too, that Peter Bernholz makes in his book on inflation

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on monetary regimes, which he points out that all inflation is ultimately rooted in huge

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huge budget deficits which political officials feel compelled to monetize and of course we're

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looking at, given the budget projections of the current Obama administration, we're looking

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at huge deficits, percentage of GDP, something we haven't seen since World War II.

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So given that we're looking at inflation, that's the assumption I work with in applying

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the Four Moral Theories.

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Let me quickly go through the application of the Four Theories.

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Aristotle argued that morality is best evaluated by looking at the virtues. Morality is about

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cultivating a good character, developing certain virtues. There are many virtues that Aristotle

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talks about in the Nicomachean Ethics, but two are especially germane. One is liberality,

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which has to do with the giving and receiving of money. Basically, Aristotle had sort of

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Aristotle has two definitions of justice, commutative and distributive. Commutative

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has to do with reciprocity in transactions.

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If you add money to the system, what will happen is that it doesn't all come in at once.

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The people who get the money first have an advantage in transactions because they'll

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be able to use the money at prices that don't fully reflect the inflation and they'll get

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the better in transactions.

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So the inflation will create a lack of reciprocity in transactions.

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Not to mention that inflation will cause redistribution of income and wealth.

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People who are on fixed incomes who have most of their assets in paper will lose out to

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those who have money and hard assets or who have ways of indexing their income.

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So this redistribution takes place without any reference to merit, which violates Aristotle's

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theory.

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Locke, this one's a fairly simple one to apply.

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Locke was a proponent of property rights.

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I won't go into the full story of how he backs that up, although it actually has a lot to

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do with the invention of money, and clearly inflation undermines our property rights insofar

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as the government is taking part of our wealth away.

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With Kant, Immanuel Kant, his theory of morality is based on the categorical imperative.

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This has two parts.

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One part is, before you do anything, conceive whether it could be universalized, i.e. made

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into a universal rule, and could it still be logical in making it universal.

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And I would argue no with inflation.

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If you were to universalize the rule, which the Fed is applying here, whenever there's

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a crisis, whenever there's economic difficulties, we're going to pump up the money supply dramatically.

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I would argue that that's logically contradictory because in doing so, you're effectively undermining

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the meaning of money.

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Money has a significance because the government artificially restricts its scarcity, but once

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you universalize this rule that the government, whenever it feels that there's a crisis, then

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you're undermining money no longer is something with a command over goods and services, but

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now becomes something that just a piece of paper.

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Finally, utilitarianism, this I would argue is really what the Fed is operating under

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though they're not fully conscious of it.

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They're worried about deflation and I won't go into the full story about how they see

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why they're so concerned about deflation.

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They would argue ultimately that deflation will lead into this sort of vicious spiral

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where prices go down, layoffs occur, prices go down further.

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I point out that by adding money to the system, you are avoiding the economy from doing the

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and Necessary Restructuring.

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I would also argue that you're probably going to make the economy much more cyclical, much

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more volatile, because at some point the Fed is going to have to come in.

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And finally, deflation, historically speaking, is not as bad as people think, so that's basically

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my paper.
