Volume 2, Chapter 16, The Virginia Political Structure
The political structure of 18th century Virginia featured the form of democracy, except of course for slaves and servants,
predefined the hard reality of oligarchic rule by the large planters.
Accordingly, the hierarchy of officialdom was continuously permeated by the scions of a handful of leading planter families.
As Prof. Sidnor states,
At the peak of the official hierarchy were the members of the Council,
who were chosen from the top families of the Planned Aristocracy,
and they were in a favorable position,
which they did not hesitate to use to secure large grants of land.
Good family helped to put a man in the Council.
In turn, membership in the Council enabled a man to improve the fortunes of his family.
The advantages of the office were enjoyed by a rather small number of families interrelated
by blood and marriage. One kind of relationship is indicated by the fact that only fifty-seven
family names appear on a list of the ninety-one men appointed to the council from 1680 to
the revolution. Nine family names account for almost a third of the councillors during
in the Century, and fourteen other names for almost another third. Five counselors bore
the name of Page, three each the name of Burwell, Bird, Carter, Custis, Harrison, Lee, Ludwell,
and Wormley. A similar, though necessarily broader social structure held for the distribution
of the powerful appointive county offices headed by local county judges, who performed
Executive and Legislative, as well as Judicial Functions. It held, also, for the elective
house of Burgesses, especially in the positions of power in that chamber.
As Sidnor concludes, birth into one of the ruling families was almost essential to the
making of a political career in 18th century Virginia. A man inherited local prominence
is from his father or uncle in much the same way that he inherited land and slaves and
social position. It is difficult to recall the name of any Virginian of the revolutionary
generation who rose to high office without the aid of influential relatives. In contrast
to the other offices that were appointive, the powerful House of Burgesses was elected
democratically by the citizens. But various not too subtle devices were employed to ensure
oligarchic control of the results. For one thing, the voting, as was usual in that era,
was by open oral declaration, in front of the oligarchically selected sheriff and not
by secret ballot. One common device was for the leading planters of the locality to be
He called upon first to declare their votes. The lesser folk of the county well understood
their role. In addition, the sheriff, an appointee of the oligarchic county court, had complete
power to set the dates and times of the poll, and to open or close it at his whim. Furthermore,
he had the power to decide which voter was properly qualified. As an extra lanyard for
In addition to these devices, which wrapped the rule of oligarchy in a cloak of democratic procedure, there applied the general truths of the rule of oligarchy within the democratic form. Such truths, as were analyzed by the great political theorist, Gaetano Mosca, as Mosca wrote,
These two classes of people appear, a class that rules and a class that is ruled.
The first class always is the less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolizes
power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the second, the more numerous
class, is directed and controlled by the first in a manner that is now more or less legal,
are now more or less arbitrary and violent, and supplies the first, in appearance at least,
with material means of subsistence, and with the instrumentalities that are essential to
the vitality of the political organism.
What happens in other forms of government, namely that an organized minority imposes
its will on the disorganized majority happens also and to perfection but under the appearances
of the contrary under a representative system. When we say that the voters choose their representatives,
we are using a language that is very inexact. The truth is that the representative has himself
Joseph has himself elected by the voters, and if that phrase should seem too inflexible
and too harsh to fit some cases, we might qualify it by saying that his friends have
him elected.
The political mandate has been likened to the power of attorney that is familiar in
private law, but in private relationships delegations of power and capacities always
Please presuppose that the principal has the broadest freedom in choosing his representative.
Now, in practice, in popular elections, that freedom of choice, though complete theoretically,
necessarily becomes null, not to say ludicrous. If each voter gave his vote to the candidate
of his heart, we may be sure that in almost all cases the only result would be a wide
Scattering of Votes. When very many wills are involved, choice is determined by the
most various criteria, almost all of them subjective. And if such wills were not coordinated
and organized, it would be virtually impossible for them to coincide in the spontaneous choice
of one individual. If his vote were to have any efficacy at all, therefore, each voter
There is force to limit his choice to a very narrow field, in other words, to a choice
among the two or three persons who have some chance of succeeding.
And the only ones who have any chance of succeeding are those whose candidacies are championed
by groups, by committees, by organized minorities.