Volume 3, Chapter 4, The British Army and the Grand Design
The British rulers, during and immediately after the French and Indian War, confronted
the American colonies for the first time in four decades free of the restraints imposed
by the liberal Whigs within the government.
The Whigs were at last out of power, and hence the remaining Imperial and Tory factions were
able to execute a grand design for cracking down on the American colonies.
Spurred by the wise Whig, Walpole, Newcastle, Pelham policy of salutary neglect, and by
the right to levy its own taxes, America had been allowed to flourish with a good measure
of independence.
The extent of salutary neglect is indicated by the complete absence of condemnation proceedings
in the Massachusetts Admiralty Court between 1745 and Spring 1760, and of enforcement
against colonial smuggling between 1743 and mid-1764.
Vital checks had been maintained upon British imperial power.
Not only were trade restrictions unenforced and taxation levied only by consent of the
the colonial assemblies, but funds for the colonial executives were supplied only by
the assemblies and thus subject to their power.
Moreover, virtually no British troops had been stationed in America in peacetime.
Troops had been largely confined to colonial militia raised and paid by the colonial legislatures
themselves.
The imperial grand design, hatched during the French and Indian War and put into effect
as soon as it ended, was a comprehensive, many-sided move to subject America to the
British power.
The vast new domains captured from France and Spain were to be occupied and administered
as befitted of mighty imperial power.
The laxity of salutary neglect was to be no more. All the mercantilist laws were to be
strengthened and, above all, vigorously enforced. The British Army was to overhaul the unruly
colonials by being stationed in America in force. The British Army was to keep the French
suppressed, rule the newly won western lands, and help a network of royal bureaucrats enforce
mercantilist restrictions. To pay for all this, the British rulers hit upon a cunning expedient.
The Americans themselves were to be taxed for that purpose. Thus the fractious Americans
were to be forced to pay for their own suffering, to supply the funds to finance soldiers and
customs agents who would enforce restrictions and taxes upon them. And a vast increase in
The Americans would thus be caught in a vicious circle of tyranny. The British Army was to be stationed in America, largely to enforce unwelcome regulations and taxes upon them, while the major excuse for the unpopular taxes was to pay for the self-same army.
It was a clever scheme for the English imperial power, but the American colonists were not
as enchanted with the new dispensation.
Somehow the British argument that it was no more than justice for Americans to support
the army that liberated them from the French threat failed to impress the Americans.
On the contrary, Americans, especially after the first phase of the war for the Ohio Valley,
tended to regard the French and Indian War as a war for Britain and not for themselves.
The crushing of Canada wasted American resources, oppressed and conscripted Americans, and
wrecked their trade with Canada, all to redound to British imperial glory and the profits
of London merchants. Furthermore, Americans reasoned that with the French conquered and
The post-war need for a British standing army was far less, not greater than before. They
could only regard the large new standing army of British regulars as a permanent instrument
of oppression. And the events of the Pontiac Rebellion and the Proclamation Line only convinced
the Americans of one, the ineptitude of the British troops as protectors, and two, the
The Use of the Army to Prohibit American Settlement of the Tempting Virgin Lands of the Ohio
Valley The imperial grand design had been formulated
as early as the wartime Pitt administration. Indeed earlier, as can be seen from the truly
ominous dispatch of Massachusetts' London agent Thomas Boland in 1756, that the British
The British intended to govern America as they governed Ireland, specifically to keep a standing army there and to demand the right of prior approval of the acts of colonial assemblies.
During the same year, Lord Loudon wrote from New York, governors here are ciphers.
Their predecessors sold the whole of the king's prerogative to get their salaries.
and until you find a fund independent of the province to pay the governors and new model
the government, you can do nothing with the provinces.
For Pitt, conquest and retention of North America were to be logically accompanied by
the imposition of imperial power, the ending of salutary neglect and the stationing of
an army in America.
Bute, Bedford, and Grenville all had similar designs, and they envisioned Benjamin Franklin
as the head of a new overall central government in America. Pitt ordered enforcement of the
Trade Acts in 1760, and when Newcastle resigned in mid-1761, the latter wisely wrote that
"...I shall certainly in and out of office oppose the continuation of the militia in
In any shape, at least after the war has ended, I shall oppose any alteration that may be
proposed of received usage and practice with regard to our settlements in America. Presumably,
Newcastle was referring to salutary neglect. During the regime of Lord Bute, the imperial
design made further strides. Bute and Parliament made a preliminary decision for a large peacetime
A New Customs Act Pushed by Grenville as First Lord of the Admiralty encouraged British sailors
to harass smuggling by promising them shares of the booty from condemned vessels.
The final decision to station troops in America after the war was made by the imperialist
Earl of Egremont, brother-in-law of George Grenville and Secretary of State for the Southern
Department, and by Welboer Ellis, Secretary of War and a follower of Henry Fox. Egremont
and Ellis decided in December 1762 that 12,000 troops would be stationed in America as a
regular standing army and that the Americans would be forced to pay for its support. The
The decision was based on the model of Ireland, where the Irish parliament had been compelled
by England to pay for the Red Coat Army that kept Ireland in subjection.
As liberals and opponents of strong imperial and royal power, Newcastle and the Whigs strongly
opposed the large army.
The crucial debate on the scheme took place in March 1763, when the army budget was submitted
to Parliament, somewhat reduced to appease the instinctively liberal country gentry who
tended to oppose expansion of government power and of the budget. The Whigs argued for a
huge slash in the Army budget and for withdrawal of all troops from America. They thereby echoed
American sentiment. The French were now conquered and the Indians controllable by the colonists
Newcastle charged that such an extensive plan of power and military influence was never
thought of before in this country. But the edge of Whig opposition was blunted, as so
many times before, by the disruptive influence of Pitt, a maverick out of power whom the
Whigs were anxious to bring into unified opposition against the ministry. Pitt, as usual the ultra-militarist
and Warmonger attacked the government for not providing a bigger American army. Pitt
called for bigger and better military budgets, attacked the permanent disarmament desired
by Walpole and Newcastle, and looked forward with relish to imminent renewal of war with
France, a country displaying the ill grace to continue in existence. As a partial and
With the immediate means to pay for this extra expense, Bute introduced a domestic excise tax on cider, along with his army budget.
The cider tax extended the enforcement of the excise from retail shops to private English homes.
Cider was produced by the West Country, the great center of an instinctively liberal country gentry.
Here was an issue of basic English liberties, both personal and economic, on which the Whigs
could unite with the country gentry in powerful opposition. William Pitt, though happy enough
winning power to impose an excise on beer and general warrants against dissenters, was
now willing to join with the London merchants, Earl Temple, the Whigs and the West Country
The City of London was vehement in opposition, and the Lord Mayor, the Alderman and the Common Council of London vigorously and repeatedly instructed their representatives in Parliament to oppose the tax.
This pressure was characterized by a contemporary observer as a proceeding which, though by no means illegal or blameable, has no precedent that we can recollect.
The tax on cider was able to pass in parliament despite the opposing coalition, but its lasting significance for America was the depth of the popular and ideological opposition that it engendered in England.
Leading the opposition was John Wilkes, North Britain, which distributed widely and popularized the great slogan,
Liberty, Property and No Excise.
Throughout the West Country, the people rose in virtual rebellion, demonstrating, marching, resisting,
and setting a welcome and instructive example eagerly observed by American colonists.
Church bells were stilled.
Thousands marched in bereavement bearing symbols of freedom and mourning.
And Lord Bute, throughout the West Country, was hung in effigy.
Large bonfires consumed effigies of Bute and freeholder meetings at protests were held in towns and counties.
Above all, the people refused to pay the tax and set upon the hated tax collectors.
The government proceeded to send an army to the West Country to subdue the people, but
it was finally forced to repeal the provocative tax two years later.
With the West Country in virtual rebellion, Lord Bute was forced to resign as Prime Minister
at the beginning of April 1763. Bute was succeeded by George Grenville. Grenville's brother-in-law,
The Earl of Egremont continued as Secretary of State and Charles Jenkinson, Secretary
to Lord Bute. The Earl of Halifax and the Earl of Shelburne took prominent roles in
the new administration, the last as President of the Board of Trade. The Crown did no better
with the crucial part of the financing of the troops, the plan to tax the colonies.
For the first time, a tax was to be imposed on the colonists in violation of the ancient
English principle of taxation only when approved by representatives of the public.
Spark plug of the plan was Charles Townsend, a highly conservative Whig who had been Secretary
of War during 1761-62.
In February 1763, Townsend was rewarded by the Crown for deserting the opposition Pelham
Innocence and Rockingham's Whig Club, receiving appointment as President of the Board of Trade.
Inspired by the devotion to royal prerogative by Halifax and Grenville, Townsend introduced
a bill to tax the colonies. But even the King attacked it as hasty and premature, and Parliament
rejected the plan at the end of March. More important, in early March, the Crown, in a
masterful piece of tactical management, drove the plan to station troops in America through
Parliament with a minimum of opposition. The Crown had managed to defuse the opposition
by playing off the Newcastle Whigs against Pitt, his two major groups of opponents, and
by Confusing the Potentially Troublesome West Country Gentry.
Newcastle was muted by a threatened parliamentary inquiry into the financial dealings of his
previous administration, and the Crown counted correctly on William Pitt's devotion to militarism
to win Pitt's charismatic support.
Despite the sometimes vehement opposition, the Crown managed to drive through Parliament
the principle of a standing army in America, as well as a domestic tax on cider in partial
payment thereof. The British decided to station approximately 8,000 troops permanently in
North America. The disposition of these troops refutes the thesis of British apologists
that the huge increase in the post-war army was needed to keep down the Western Indians
and to man the forts of the newly conquered interior.
Of the existing force in America, the British deliberately dissolved every one of the units of rangers
and others established during the war as specialists in Indian fighting.
Rangers, but not forts, were useful in protecting settlers from Indians.
There were many indications that the British intended to use their army to keep the American colonists in line and to enforce restrictions and taxes there.
Maurice Morgan, secretary to Lord Shelburne, along with an associate, wrote during 1763,
I have no idea that we want military establishments against the Indians and no danger is to be
apprehended from the Canadians. On the other hand, troops were needed in order to awe the
British colonies, the lines of fort so much talked of before the war will restrain the
colonies at present as well as formally. The pretenses for this regulation must be the
and the Keeping of the Indians in Subjection.
Another paper by Morgan succinctly summarized the grand design, that the military force
on that continent be increased, so that, with the aid of a naval force, the whole of the
provinces shall be surrounded, that, under pretense of regulating the Indian trade, a
line be suddenly drawn on the back of the provinces and the country beyond that line
The use of the Army to enforce trade restrictions and taxes in America was particularly stressed
by the powerful Lord Halifax, who, after the death of Egremont in August 1763, had become
Secretary of State for both departments.
It did not take the American colonists long to see what was going on. Colonel Eliphelet
Dyer, a member of the Council of Connecticut and the leading lawyer of Eastern Connecticut,
Wrote from London in the spring of 1764 that Parliament seems determined to fix upon us
a large number of regular troops under pretense for our defenses, with the revenues to be
raised from the colonies to support them. Rather than for defense, the army was designed
as a rod and check over us. And a leading young lawyer, John Dickinson of Philadelphia,
condemned the formidable force established in the midst of peace to bleed America into obedience.
Enthusiasm for the British troops among the colonists was hardly strengthened by an incident between General Amherst and the Massachusetts recruits stationed in Halifax, Nova Scotia.
The troops' terms of enlistment were up on May 1, 1763.
Yet the British refused to discharge them. One refusal begat another, and finally the troops refused to serve any longer. The British retaliated by cutting off all provisions to the colonial troops, who were thus forced to buy their own supplies.
General Amherst was responsible for forcing the troops to stay, in violation of the Massachusetts
Charter, which required consent of the General Court before Massachusetts troops could be
forced to serve outside the colony.
Since the beginning of the French and Indian War, there had been an appointed Commander
Commander-in-Chief of the British Armed Forces in America. And now, in mid-1763, the Board
of Trade recommended that the Commander-in-Chief also be made Military Governor of the Western
Territory. The Commander, who after 1763 was General Thomas Gage, was also in charge of
of Western Indian Affairs. To Newcastle, this military regime portended an upheaval in the
colonies which would expect a similar fate to descend upon them. We have seen that Townsend's
premature bill for taxing the colonies was defeated, but the plans continued brewing
in the upper echelons of the British government. English taxation of the colonies to raise
Revenue had been suggested by royal officials in America for half a century but had never
been adopted during the Whig regime. The proponents had largely been governors anxious to secure
their salaries independently of colonial assemblies or royal officials asking for troops to enforce
customs or other regulations. The latter included Colonel Robert Quarry, Chief Customs Officer
and Colonel David Dunbar, Surveyor General of the King's Woods. Among the governors,
the Arch-Imperialist William Shirley and Robert Dinwiddie of Virginia were the most insistent.
During the war, their voices were joined by such military commanders as General Braddock
and Lord Loudon. In England, during the French and Indian War, Lord Halifax was an early
So long as the great new castle remained as prime minister, there was no chance of approving
Halifax suggested a stamp tax, but the most influential and fateful plan for a stamp tax
was proposed in 1761 to Lord Bute by the royal bureaucrat Henry McCullough.
So long as the great New Castle remained as prime minister, there was no chance of approving
taxation of America without its consent. But New Castle's fall completely turned the tables,
and Butte, Halifax and Townsend began to drive toward English taxation of the American colonies.
Henry McCullough, one of the chief theoreticians of a stamp tax, was a London merchant who
for 30 years had been a crown official and a power in North Carolina. He tried to impose
quit-rent payments on the reluctant colonists and participated in large-scale land grants
and speculation in land in North Carolina and across the mountains.
His transmontane land speculation led him to espouse the British acquisition of eastern
Louisiana from the French.
In the autumn of 1763, McCullough, along with a colleague, was assigned to write a draft
for a stamp tax on the North American colonies.
Of the two drafts, McCullough's was the most daring, calling for a broad stamp tax that
would finance not only the cost of colonial troops, but also an entire royal civil bureaucracy
in America. McCullough's draft was rejected, however, and the competing bill, which confined
the stamp money to financing the standing army, was selected by the Crown at the end
of 1763. The draft of the bill was completed the following spring. Caution, however, dictated
postponement of the stamp plan for another year.