WEBVTT NOTE 35. The Invasion of New York 1 00:00:00.000 --> 00:00:16.000 Volume 4, Part 5, The Military History of the Revolution, 1776 through 1778, Volume 4, Chapter 35, The Invasion of New York 2 00:00:16.000 --> 00:00:24.000 The decision of the Colonies for Independence came at the beginning of a severe military crisis. 3 00:00:24.000 --> 00:00:34.000 Until then, there had been no organized or regularized fighting on the soil of the thirteen states other than the siege of Boston. 4 00:00:34.000 --> 00:00:42.000 By the end of June, Lee and the Army of the Southern Department had beaten off the invasion of Charleston by General Clinton, 5 00:00:42.000 --> 00:00:47.000 but in July the main British Army was ready to invade New York. 6 00:00:47.000 --> 00:00:53.920 The long-range British strategy was to invade friendly New York City and then conquer the 7 00:00:53.920 --> 00:01:01.560 Hudson Valley in a two-pronged thrust from Canada and the city, isolating radical New 8 00:01:01.560 --> 00:01:06.320 England from the softer and more pliable Middle Colonies. 9 00:01:06.320 --> 00:01:11.160 This strategy posed a formidable threat to the American cause. 10 00:01:11.160 --> 00:01:19.600 The mighty British invasion force began to assemble off New York City in late June 1776. 11 00:01:19.600 --> 00:01:25.600 It was headed by the Howe brothers, General Sir William Howe in charge of land forces, 12 00:01:25.600 --> 00:01:31.480 and his brother, Admiral Richard Lord Howe, newly appointed overall commander-in-chief 13 00:01:31.480 --> 00:01:33.880 of the American theater. 14 00:01:33.880 --> 00:01:40.440 By the end of June, 130 British ships were stationed in New York Bay, and General Howe 15 00:01:40.440 --> 00:01:46.800 The Army quickly seized an undefended and strongly pro-Tory Staten Island to use as 16 00:01:46.800 --> 00:01:49.200 his base of operations. 17 00:01:49.200 --> 00:01:56.920 By mid-August, a truly formidable force of over 32,000 regular soldiers, including 8,000 18 00:01:56.920 --> 00:02:00.480 Hessians, was poised on Staten Island. 19 00:02:00.480 --> 00:02:06.440 It was the greatest expeditionary force that the world's strongest military power, Great 20 00:02:06.440 --> 00:02:09.040 Britain, had ever mounted. 21 00:02:09.040 --> 00:02:14.720 The army was supported by a fleet of 30 warships and hundreds of transports manned by more 22 00:02:14.720 --> 00:02:16.960 than 10,000 seamen. 23 00:02:16.960 --> 00:02:25.320 Floating the expedition had cost the British Treasury the vast sum of 850,000 pounds. 24 00:02:25.320 --> 00:02:34.080 To oppose this vast force, Washington had a largely untrained army of 19,000 men. 25 00:02:34.080 --> 00:02:40.200 Surely the prime necessity for the American force was to pursue guerrilla war and avoid 26 00:02:40.200 --> 00:02:47.200 open contact with the British. Yet Washington decided on conventional resistance from fixed 27 00:02:47.240 --> 00:02:53.600 positions and elected to hold a city that Charles Lee had correctly warned could not 28 00:02:53.600 --> 00:03:00.600 be defended. First to urge Washington to abandon New York and to irritate him in the process 29 00:03:00.600 --> 00:03:07.280 One of those was the brilliant young Major Aaron Burr, a decamp to General Putnam. Compounding 30 00:03:07.280 --> 00:03:14.000 his blunders, Washington chose to divide his forces between Manhattan and the southwestern 31 00:03:14.000 --> 00:03:19.600 tip of Long Island. The idea was to fortify Brooklyn Heights, commanding the city from 32 00:03:19.600 --> 00:03:26.960 the East River. But both Long Island and Manhattan were death traps. The mighty British fleet 33 00:03:26.960 --> 00:03:32.560 need only have sailed up the East River to cut off the force on Long Island and up the 34 00:03:32.560 --> 00:03:38.600 Hudson to land troops in northern Manhattan to surround and annihilate the American force 35 00:03:38.600 --> 00:03:39.600 there. 36 00:03:39.600 --> 00:03:44.760 If the British commanders had applied even moderate intelligence or devotion to their 37 00:03:44.760 --> 00:03:53.080 task, they could probably have wiped out Washington's army then and there, and perhaps have won 38 00:03:53.080 --> 00:03:55.040 the war on the spot. 39 00:03:55.040 --> 00:04:00.440 The British, including General Howe, realized that to win on land, they would have to mobilize 40 00:04:00.440 --> 00:04:06.080 their superior armed forces quickly and destroy the American army in one blow. 41 00:04:06.080 --> 00:04:08.400 Speed was of the essence. 42 00:04:08.400 --> 00:04:13.600 The strike had to come before the Americans had a chance to mobilize their resources and 43 00:04:13.600 --> 00:04:17.680 before France and Spain could send full-scale aid. 44 00:04:17.680 --> 00:04:23.240 Furthermore, the Howes and their commanders realized that the key, especially in conducting 45 00:04:23.240 --> 00:04:30.800 counter-revolutionary warfare against a hostile populace was not so much to gain territory, 46 00:04:30.800 --> 00:04:36.680 which could turn out to be futile, but to destroy the enemy army. 47 00:04:36.680 --> 00:04:44.520 Washington's absurd decision to dig in at New York provided the House a golden opportunity 48 00:04:44.520 --> 00:04:46.560 for smashing victory. 49 00:04:46.560 --> 00:04:53.720 Yet they failed notably to take up this opportunity to crush the American forces. 50 00:04:53.720 --> 00:05:00.920 This and later failures were so enormous as not to be put down as mere blunders. 51 00:05:00.920 --> 00:05:05.900 Historians have generally recognized that a deliberate policy must have been involved 52 00:05:05.900 --> 00:05:12.780 and have concluded it was based upon a general British desire to avoid annihilating the American 53 00:05:12.780 --> 00:05:21.300 and Forces so as not to preclude a peaceful political reconciliation. Yet it should be 54 00:05:21.300 --> 00:05:28.100 clear that the government, especially King George and Lord Germain, the colonial secretary, 55 00:05:28.100 --> 00:05:34.560 were out to crush the Americans militarily and as quickly as possible. They put no stock 56 00:05:34.560 --> 00:05:40.780 in peaceful negotiations or political solution. The deliberate policy, it appears, was the 57 00:05:40.780 --> 00:05:47.780 of Choice, not of Great Britain, but of the Howe brothers themselves, both ardent Whigs 58 00:05:47.780 --> 00:05:53.380 and both strongly opposed to the war with America. The Howes took it upon themselves, 59 00:05:53.380 --> 00:05:59.860 in a move tantamount to treason, to avoid crushing the Americans and to hold out the 60 00:05:59.860 --> 00:06:06.100 olive branch of peace. Admiral Howe apparently convinced his brother of this policy upon 61 00:06:06.100 --> 00:06:13.480 on his arrival off New York in mid-July. And from then on, General Howe pursued continuous 62 00:06:13.480 --> 00:06:20.140 acquisition and possession of territory rather than decisive blows against the Continental 63 00:06:20.140 --> 00:06:28.480 Army. Happily, Washington's stupidity was partially offset by the Howe's virtual treason 64 00:06:28.480 --> 00:06:34.760 to the British counterrevolution. On arriving off New York, Lord Howe delayed military action 65 00:06:34.760 --> 00:06:59.480 General Howe was finally ready to launch his attack against New York in late August, but 66 00:06:59.480 --> 00:07:06.080 But the important failure by the Howes was not the delay which was used to build up British 67 00:07:06.080 --> 00:07:11.340 forces but the strategy employed in the attack itself. 68 00:07:11.340 --> 00:07:16.940 General Sir Henry Clinton sensibly urged landing in northern Manhattan to cut off nearly 69 00:07:16.940 --> 00:07:22.640 the entire American army, yet Clinton's suggestion was ignored. 70 00:07:22.640 --> 00:07:29.280 Instead, General Howe virtually refused to entrap and decimate the American troops, electing 71 00:07:29.280 --> 00:07:32.520 only to push them out of New York City. 72 00:07:32.520 --> 00:07:39.880 On August 22, Howe and a force of 20,000 landed on Long Island across the narrows from Staten 73 00:07:39.880 --> 00:07:41.420 Island. 74 00:07:41.420 --> 00:07:47.720 Their landing was unopposed, and the Americans sensibly taking their stand behind a ridge, 75 00:07:47.720 --> 00:07:53.220 the Heights of Guam, defending the approaches to the fortifications at Brooklyn Heights 76 00:07:53.220 --> 00:07:55.000 on the East River. 77 00:07:55.000 --> 00:08:01.600 The only competent American general in the area, Nathaniel Green, had fallen ill and 78 00:08:01.600 --> 00:08:08.520 could not command the 8,000 or so troops stationed on Long Island. Washington had replaced Green 79 00:08:08.520 --> 00:08:14.800 with General John Sullivan, who by his rashness had turned the retreat from Canada into a 80 00:08:14.800 --> 00:08:21.200 virtual rout. As the British landed, Washington had second thoughts and flightily replaced 81 00:08:21.200 --> 00:08:33.200 Major Aaron Burr, again, only succeeded in irritating Washington by having the temerity and wisdom to urge that the troops be pulled out of Brooklyn while there was still time. 82 00:08:33.200 --> 00:08:49.200 Major Aaron Burr again only succeeded in irritating Washington by having the temerity and wisdom to urge that the troops be pulled out of Brooklyn while there was still time. 83 00:08:49.200 --> 00:09:02.200 Among the three of them, Washington, Sullivan, and Putnam, managed to leave the Jamaica Pass and the left wing of the ridge undefended, an arrangement that had passed muster with Washington. 84 00:09:02.200 --> 00:09:08.240 Washington. Learning of this gap in the American lines, Howe executed a brilliant tactical 85 00:09:08.240 --> 00:09:14.840 maneuver. While the center and left of the British forces frontally attacked the ridge, 86 00:09:14.840 --> 00:09:20.600 Howe, guided by Tories, moved through the Jamaica Pass in a flanking maneuver during 87 00:09:20.600 --> 00:09:28.640 the night of August 26 and surprised, encircled, and fell upon Sullivan's forces. Washington 88 00:09:28.640 --> 00:09:33.880 could easily have learned of this flanking maneuver in one of two ways, by recognizing 89 00:09:33.880 --> 00:09:40.280 the significance of a previous shift to British troops toward the eastern flank, or by employing 90 00:09:40.280 --> 00:09:47.440 cavalry in his patrols. But he did neither. Furthermore, old Putnam, after learning of 91 00:09:47.440 --> 00:09:54.920 the penetration of the Jamaica Pass, failed to notify his commanders. Consequently, Sullivan's 92 00:09:54.920 --> 00:10:00.920 England's division was smashed, and Sullivan himself captured, as was General Sterling, 93 00:10:00.920 --> 00:10:03.480 commander of the American right wing. 94 00:10:03.480 --> 00:10:09.040 Nearly 2,000 Americans were killed, wounded, or captured in the Battle of Long Island, 95 00:10:09.040 --> 00:10:12.800 while the British lost only 300 men. 96 00:10:12.800 --> 00:10:18.520 Instead of pulling out his forces as quickly as possible, Washington compounded his series 97 00:10:18.520 --> 00:10:26.520 and the use of blunders by rushing six more regiments into Long Island and assuming personal command. 98 00:10:26.520 --> 00:10:33.520 By pressing his advantage, General Howe could have annihilated Washington's army then and there. 99 00:10:33.520 --> 00:10:42.520 But again, against the pleas of his commanders, he failed to move, allowing the Americans to regroup on Brooklyn Heights. 100 00:10:42.520 --> 00:10:56.520 For three days, he stalled and failed to mount an attack which could easily have overrun the entrapped American Army, and neither did his brother's fleet ships shell the Americans into submission. 101 00:10:56.520 --> 00:11:05.520 On the night of the 29th, Washington at last decided to move, mounting a mass evacuation of his army from Brooklyn. 102 00:11:05.520 --> 00:11:11.520 The evacuation proceeded successfully in a fleet of small boats. 103 00:11:11.520 --> 00:11:23.520 He has been extravagantly praised for a heroic retreat, but it could never have taken place had Admiral Howe bothered to station his ships in the East River. 104 00:11:23.520 --> 00:11:32.520 Furthermore, instead of moving his troops to the mainland, Washington sailed into another potential death trap, Manhattan Island. 105 00:11:32.520 --> 00:11:39.520 The fleet of fishermen from Salem and Marblehead, however, assuredly performed a heroic job 106 00:11:39.520 --> 00:11:46.280 of shuttling the entire force of 9,500 men and their equipment across the river in a 107 00:11:46.280 --> 00:11:48.360 night of poor weather. 108 00:11:48.360 --> 00:11:55.840 The morale of the Americans was in great disrepair as a result of the defeat on Long Island. 109 00:11:55.840 --> 00:11:59.600 Entire regiments deserted and left for home. 110 00:11:59.600 --> 00:12:06.080 Respect for Washington's military acumen among his officers had plummeted. 111 00:12:06.080 --> 00:12:11.800 One of his most brilliant officers, Colonel John Haslett of the Delaware Regiment, wrote, 112 00:12:11.800 --> 00:12:26.800 What to heaven General Lee were here is the language of officers and men. Once again Washington remained where he could be encircled and smashed and once more howl-dottled and did nothing. 113 00:12:26.800 --> 00:12:32.340 His brother opened another round of feudal peace talks with the Americans, releasing 114 00:12:32.340 --> 00:12:38.280 the sympathetic General Sullivan to convey terms to the Continental Congress, terms which 115 00:12:38.280 --> 00:12:43.880 the Americans, now committed to independence, predictably spurned. 116 00:12:43.880 --> 00:12:50.360 General Greene, Colonel Joseph Reed, Washington's adjutant, and other officers strongly urged 117 00:12:50.360 --> 00:12:55.720 a speedy evacuation of New York, and even the burning of that largely Tory city to the 118 00:12:55.720 --> 00:13:09.720 Congress vetoed the idea of destroying New York but Washington refused to evacuate. Instead, as a supposed compromise, ineffectually stringing his men out across Manhattan Island. 119 00:13:09.720 --> 00:13:15.720 Once again he was courting potential disaster by splitting his none too strong forces. 120 00:13:15.720 --> 00:13:21.720 Putnam's division was stationed in New York City at the southern tip of Manhattan Island. 121 00:13:21.720 --> 00:13:27.800 in Ireland. General William Heath's forces were put on the northern tip of Manhattan and 122 00:13:27.800 --> 00:13:34.160 a small force under green over his strenuous protest was placed in the middle of south-central 123 00:13:34.160 --> 00:13:40.680 Manhattan at the East River near what is now 34th Street. Characteristically, General 124 00:13:40.680 --> 00:13:46.680 Howe did not land in northern Manhattan and trap the Americans. Rather, he waited until 125 00:13:46.680 --> 00:13:52.320 General Washington was beginning to move his forces that direction and then landed in the 126 00:13:52.320 --> 00:14:00.720 Southerly Park at Kips Bay and Turtle Bay on September 15. Again, he was terribly sluggish 127 00:14:00.720 --> 00:14:06.920 and failed to march across Manhattan to cut off Putnam's retreat. Even so, the energetic 128 00:14:06.920 --> 00:14:12.800 but bumbling Putnam would not have escaped were it not for Burr, who conducted the troops 129 00:14:12.800 --> 00:14:18.000 is up a little known road near the Hudson River on the west side of the island. 130 00:14:18.000 --> 00:14:23.720 The properly wild flight north of Green's small force of militia was unsuccessfully 131 00:14:23.720 --> 00:14:29.600 impeded by the explosive rage of Washington, who himself was almost captured during a foolish 132 00:14:29.600 --> 00:14:33.480 attempt to rally them for a stand in the south. 133 00:14:33.480 --> 00:14:39.400 The next day, however, American troops in an open skirmish in front of Harlem Heights 134 00:14:39.400 --> 00:14:43.440 fought well, giving a boost to drooping American morale. 135 00:14:43.440 --> 00:14:50.440 Again, General Howe failed to pursue his advantage, allowing Washington to fortify Harlem Heights 136 00:14:50.440 --> 00:14:53.720 and Fort Washington in northern Manhattan. 137 00:14:53.720 --> 00:15:00.720 Almost incredibly, Howe spent another month erecting defensive fortifications in New York 138 00:15:00.720 --> 00:15:02.000 City. 139 00:15:02.000 --> 00:15:09.000 As Professor Alden puts it, Howe allowed day after day of good campaigning weather to pass 140 00:15:39.400 --> 00:15:51.400 Green was sent off with a rather small force to hold Fort Constitution on New Jersey's shore, opposite Fort Washington. 141 00:15:51.400 --> 00:16:03.400 The rest of the army was divided between Fort Washington and King's Bridge across the Harlem River from the northernmost tip of the island, guarding the exit route to the mainland. 142 00:16:03.400 --> 00:16:11.200 Meanwhile, supplies grew increasingly short and the soldiers were deserting in droves. 143 00:16:11.200 --> 00:16:17.480 On September 22, while Howe was dithering in New York City, the British executed Captain 144 00:16:17.480 --> 00:16:24.320 Nathan Hale, a 21-year-old schoolteacher from Connecticut who had volunteered to spy behind 145 00:16:24.320 --> 00:16:26.000 enemy lines. 146 00:16:26.000 --> 00:16:31.160 He had been betrayed by a Tory relative and was hanged without even the formality of a 147 00:16:31.160 --> 00:16:37.640 of a Trial or Benefit of Clergy. His last-minute letters to his family and fiancé were torn 148 00:16:37.640 --> 00:16:44.240 up in front of his eyes. Before dying, the gallant young Hale uttered his famous words, 149 00:16:44.240 --> 00:16:50.440 I only regret that I have but one life to lose for my country. 150 00:16:50.440 --> 00:16:56.400 When Howe finally moved on October 12, he blundered once again. He landed nearly his 151 00:16:56.400 --> 00:17:03.400 Washington was about to decide to fight off this flanking action rather than to retreat when, on October 14, Charles Lee rushing up from St. Louis to the US. 152 00:17:26.400 --> 00:17:32.960 Washington, South Carolina, reached the Army to the undisguised joy of the American officers 153 00:17:32.960 --> 00:17:34.520 and men. 154 00:17:34.520 --> 00:17:39.720 He was immediately placed in charge of the hot spot on the American left flank facing 155 00:17:39.720 --> 00:17:41.480 Howe's Army. 156 00:17:41.480 --> 00:17:47.000 He began a strong and vigorous denunciation of Washington's decision to stay and fight 157 00:17:47.000 --> 00:17:52.540 on Harlem Heights, a decision that most of Washington's generals had supported. 158 00:17:52.540 --> 00:17:57.640 He urged the absolute necessity of quickly getting off Manhattan, where the Americans 159 00:17:57.640 --> 00:18:02.700 were in imminent danger of being surrounded by the British, and moving on to defensible 160 00:18:02.700 --> 00:18:09.580 ground. His pressure forced an American Council of War on October 16, and Washington and the 161 00:18:09.580 --> 00:18:13.540 Council were finally persuaded of this view. 162 00:18:13.540 --> 00:18:20.640 Lee's wisdom and determination here proved momentous, for the troops were thereby enabled 163 00:18:20.640 --> 00:18:26.680 to leave Manhattan in the nick of time, saving the American cause and probably the American 164 00:18:26.680 --> 00:18:28.160 Republic. 165 00:18:28.160 --> 00:18:34.040 This high judgment of Lee's last-minute achievement was voiced by many contemporaries, including 166 00:18:34.040 --> 00:18:39.680 Joseph Reed and Washington's close friend and admirer, the Marquis de Lafayette. 167 00:18:39.680 --> 00:18:47.040 But Washington seems to have been incapable of making a completely correct military decision 168 00:18:47.040 --> 00:18:53.560 Even after pressure and lengthy reconsideration of his initial blunders, agreeing to retreat, 169 00:18:53.560 --> 00:18:59.280 he yet overruled Lee in one of the most disastrous decisions of the war. 170 00:18:59.280 --> 00:19:03.160 He left 2,000 men at Fort Washington. 171 00:19:03.160 --> 00:19:09.720 Totally isolated and soon to be surrounded by the formidable British force, the 2,000 172 00:19:09.720 --> 00:19:12.560 were doomed to certain capture. 173 00:19:12.560 --> 00:19:19.600 Meanwhile, after stumbling around in an impossible position at Throg's neck and losing six precious 174 00:19:19.600 --> 00:19:27.880 days, Howe withdrew his entire force on October 18 to Pells Point, three miles to the northeast, 175 00:19:27.880 --> 00:19:34.800 where he should have landed originally, and slogged north past Yonkers toward White Plains. 176 00:19:34.800 --> 00:19:41.520 On the same day, Washington's army left Manhattan, Howe could easily have sliced west and dispatched 177 00:19:41.520 --> 00:19:48.880 the long line of them. Instead, he lingered at New Rochelle in Mammaronic on the east 178 00:19:48.880 --> 00:19:55.920 coast of Westchester for an entire week, thoughtfully allowing Washington to gather and entrench 179 00:19:55.920 --> 00:20:02.920 his entire army on the hills overlooking White Plains. Howe's intended flanking movement 180 00:20:02.920 --> 00:20:11.120 could now never materialize. As the English historian Trevelyan acidly put it, the sun 181 00:20:11.120 --> 00:20:19.200 had set and risen more than 40 times since General Howe broke up his summer contolments 182 00:20:19.200 --> 00:20:26.480 on Staten Island. In seven weeks, with an irresistible army and a fleet which there 183 00:20:26.480 --> 00:20:37.560 was nothing to resist, he had traversed from point to point, a distance of exactly 35 miles. 184 00:20:37.560 --> 00:20:43.600 On October 28, the British finally attacked Chatterton's Hill on the right wing of the 185 00:20:43.600 --> 00:20:46.500 American position at White Plains. 186 00:20:46.500 --> 00:20:52.280 The British won the hill after several hundred casualties on both sides, but failed to pursue 187 00:20:52.280 --> 00:20:55.180 the routed Americans. 188 00:20:55.180 --> 00:21:01.560 More egregious was Howe's failure to launch a simultaneous attack on the main positions 189 00:21:01.560 --> 00:21:04.880 of the Americans with the bulk of his forces. 190 00:21:04.880 --> 00:21:11.120 Instead, the Americans were allowed to rest and regroup, and, at Lee's urging, to fall 191 00:21:11.120 --> 00:21:17.800 back to more defensible positions on North Castle Heights, five miles to the north. 192 00:21:17.800 --> 00:21:23.720 After never having engaged the full body of his forces, Howe decided on November 5 not 193 00:21:23.720 --> 00:21:30.480 to attack the Americans and to withdraw southwestward to Dobbs Ferry on the Hudson. 194 00:21:30.480 --> 00:21:34.080 The Continental Army was safe at last. 195 00:21:34.080 --> 00:21:39.840 While Howe was graciously saving the American Army from Washington's repeated blunders, 196 00:21:39.840 --> 00:21:44.360 the Americans were confronting another grave threat in the North. 197 00:21:44.360 --> 00:21:50.760 The American forces had retreated from Canada in complete disarray in the spring, settling 198 00:21:50.760 --> 00:21:53.680 at the southern tip of Lake Champlain. 199 00:21:53.680 --> 00:21:59.080 In mid-June, Congress had ordered Washington to place the command of the forces in the 200 00:21:59.080 --> 00:22:05.320 in the North under General Horatio Gates, probably second only to his friend Lee, as 201 00:22:05.320 --> 00:22:11.600 the best general in the American Army. Congress did not have the courage of its convictions, 202 00:22:11.600 --> 00:22:19.040 however, and retained the less competent General Schuler in overall command in the North. After 203 00:22:19.040 --> 00:22:24.680 Gates arrived in the North in early July, he and Schuler, over Washington's and Putnam's 204 00:22:24.680 --> 00:22:31.800 Objections decided to withdraw southward from the crumbling fortifications at Crown Point 205 00:22:31.800 --> 00:22:34.040 to Fort Ticonderoga. 206 00:22:34.040 --> 00:22:39.000 Shuler took over all command at Albany, while Gates remained in charge of the troops at 207 00:22:39.000 --> 00:22:40.000 Ticonderoga. 208 00:22:40.000 --> 00:22:47.440 A buildup of militia raised the number of American effectives at or near Ticonderoga 209 00:22:47.440 --> 00:22:50.120 to nearly 6,500. 210 00:22:50.120 --> 00:22:55.960 In the meanwhile, General Carlton was gathering ten thousand redcoats at the northern end 211 00:22:55.960 --> 00:23:01.920 of Lake Champlain, preparatory to a strike southward to join General Howe and cut New 212 00:23:01.920 --> 00:23:04.080 York in two. 213 00:23:04.080 --> 00:23:09.720 While Carlton was building a fleet to sail down Lake Champlain, Gates brilliantly prepared 214 00:23:09.720 --> 00:23:16.280 the American defenses, combating smallpox in the camp, greatly raising troop morale, 215 00:23:16.280 --> 00:23:21.700 and swiftly constructing a defensive fleet, which he placed under the command of Benedict 216 00:23:21.700 --> 00:23:29.180 Arnold. Gates had ordered Arnold to deploy his Champlain fleet defensively and to avoid 217 00:23:29.180 --> 00:23:36.460 engaging the more powerful British fleet. But from October 11 to October 13, the rash 218 00:23:36.460 --> 00:23:43.960 and headstrong Arnold foolishly got his force into a slugging match off Valcour Island in 219 00:23:43.960 --> 00:23:50.580 In the northern part of the lake, and Carlton's fleet smashed the Americans, sinking eleven 220 00:23:50.580 --> 00:23:57.580 of sixteen ships. Arnold himself only managed to escape capture by miraculously slipping 221 00:23:57.580 --> 00:24:04.580 through British naval and allied Indian lines. Carlton pressed his advantage by swooping 222 00:24:04.600 --> 00:24:10.740 down to capture Crown Point. He then appeared before Ticonderoga. But Gates had built the 223 00:24:10.740 --> 00:24:15.640 of Fortifications Too Well, and winter was fast setting in. 224 00:24:15.640 --> 00:24:18.400 Confronted by these formidable obstacles, 225 00:24:18.400 --> 00:24:21.840 Carleton turned back to Canada about the same time 226 00:24:21.840 --> 00:24:24.640 Howe withdrew from White Plains. 227 00:24:24.640 --> 00:24:28.800 The British menace from the North was over for another year. 228 00:24:28.800 --> 00:24:33.120 And as it turned out, the delay was fatal 229 00:24:33.120 --> 00:24:34.980 to the British cause. 230 00:24:34.980 --> 00:24:38.600 Benedict Arnold, sharply and properly criticized 231 00:24:38.600 --> 00:24:44.760 by his contemporaries for his overwhelming losses on Lake Champlain has nonetheless been 232 00:24:44.760 --> 00:24:52.360 extravagantly praised by historians for delaying Carlton until he was forced to turn back north. 233 00:24:52.360 --> 00:24:58.080 But if he had used his fleet defensively in herring raids, he would have delayed Carlton 234 00:24:58.080 --> 00:25:04.240 even longer and avoided the destruction of his own fleet. The real credit for forcing 235 00:25:04.240 --> 00:25:09.880 When the delay on Carleton belongs to Gates, it was he who ordered the construction of 236 00:25:09.880 --> 00:25:16.440 the fleet, which forced Carleton to construct his, and he who had fortified Ticonderoga. 237 00:25:16.440 --> 00:25:22.440 Gates, not Arnold, was the true hero of the repulse of the British in the North.