Volume 4, Chapter 37 Planning in the Winter of 1777
Howe's next objective was Philadelphia, but instead of taking it as he could at any time, he dwindled in New York through the winter and early spring, while Washington's army grew stronger.
Several sporadic forays took place during the spring.
In March the British burned the American port at Peekskill. The following month they sent New York Governor Tryon with 2,000 men to burn and destroy the large quantity of American military stores at Danbury, Connecticut.
After successfully accomplishing their mission unopposed, the British were neatly harried on the way back by impromptu militia led by General Benedict Arnold.
Arnold. Arnold had been at home in Connecticut, all but resigned from the Army. The fiery Arnold had made many enemies, and had been passed over by Congress for promotion, in favor of a brace of inferior generals. After his exploit near Danbury, Congress gave Arnold a belated promotion, and he was persuaded to rejoin the Northern Army.
British planning for the campaign of 1777 was in the hands of three men, Lord George Germain in London, General Howe and General John Burgoyne.
All three of them were to share responsibility for the British disaster of that year, but the greatest share must fall upon the bizarre strategy and tactics of Howe.
Howe. Burgoyne had been put in charge of the British Army in Canada, replacing General
Carlton. Carlton was one of the best of the British generals, but he had become personally
repugnant to the colonial secretary. Burgoyne's idea was that he would descend from Canada
down Lake Champlain. A smaller force would cut through Fort Oswego and the Mohawk Valley
Eastward and General Howe would bring his massive army up the Hudson Valley, the three
to meet triumphantly in Albany. The colonies would be cut in two and the combined British
forces could proceed to capture New England and then to turn upon the South. Given the
rising American strength in 1777 and the nature of popular revolutionary warfare, the British
A greater emphasis on Howe's strike north than on a move southward from Canada would have been an improvement, however, for the terrain of Canada and northern New York was not well suited for an unpopular invading army.
How, however, confused the situation completely by submitting three completely different strategic plans in succession, each one worse than the one before.
To begin with, he no longer saw any prospect of winning the war in 1777.
Neither, as Gruber puts it, did his subsequent performance endanger the fulfillment of his prediction.
His first plan, made while Washington was in the flood of retreat across Jersey, was sound and similar to Burgoyne's.
The key was that Howe would take 10,000 troops up the Hudson to join Burgoyne in Albany.
Rhode Island would then be used as a base to strike at New England, and then they would march southward to victory.
Soon after, even before Trenton, when the military situation had not yet changed, he submitted a radically different and much poorer plan to take the bulk of his army to capture Philadelphia.
Only 3,000 troops would be stationed in the lower Hudson Valley to assist Burgoyne.
and Mr. Burgoyne. Philadelphia at this stage was a needless diversion and distraction, accomplishing little, disastrously splitting the British forces and putting virtually the entire burden on Burgoyne's Canadian force.
Apart from his political views, which were probably reasonable, Howe was bemused by the
shimmer of innumerable Pennsylvania Tories arriving to greet him, a shimmer fostered in
all good faith by Galloway, the Allens and the other eager Tory émigrés in the British
camp. In April he submitted a third and even worse plan. Now there would not even be three
3,000 men to assist Burgoyne. Moreover, Howe would put his army to sea to invade Philadelphia
by the circuitous route of the Chesapeake Bay. In this plan his troops would be completely
cut off from the possibility of helping Burgoyne in case of trouble. He did promise to raise
3,000 Tories under Governor Tryon to operate out of New York City and up the Hudson, but
But he never bothered to do so.
If Howe made the principal errors of strategy, Germain erred in not cracking down on Howe,
while Gentleman Johnny Burgoyne, a wit and opposer, full of fustian, was supremely overconfident.
Hence neither Germain nor Burgoyne realized the disaster that Howe's strategy would open
up for the British.
In addition to Sir William's plans for 1777, the Howe's true outlook may be gauged by
Lord Howe's disobeying the Crown's orders to blockade the coast of the United States.
Instead, he directed his captains to allow subsistence fishing, to cultivate the goodwill
and confidence of the Americans, and to grant them every other indulgence legally possible.
The aim was to conciliate the friendly dispositions of the Americans. Moreover, the British sea
captains were prohibited from raiding the American coast and the American ports. Howe
persisted in this course despite the vigorous objections of his superiors in England and
remained bitterly charged that as a result of Howe's indulgence the waters of Great Britain
At the end of May, Washington had moved his camp southward to Middlebrook, in the hills above New Brunswick. General Howe made no attempt to seize Philadelphia quickly, and then returned to aid Burgoyne, but instead, he spent most of June trying to lure him down into open combat, once almost succeeding. Finally giving up, Howe evacuated New Jersey altogether at the end of May.
at the end of June, and moved his men to New York. The astute General Clinton, as well as most of the other top British officers, pleaded with him to change his mind and adopt the sound first plan to march north up the Hudson. But he proved adamant. On July 23, his armada of over 260 ships carrying 15,000 troops set sail from New York toward Philadelphia.
The enraged Clinton was left in New York City with 7,000 men, of whom half were American
Tories, a force barely large enough to defend the city, let alone move north, to aid Burgoyne's
army in the north. Burgoyne was left to fend for himself.