Volume 4, Chapter 56, Gates Meets the Enemy
Into this more hopeful situation for the Americans now stepped a new Continental troop from Maryland and Delaware that Washington had sent southward under the German General DeKalb.
Marching south on April 16 to the aid of Charleston from Morristown, New Jersey, DeKalb had reached North Carolina with 1,400 men when he learned that Charleston had been taken.
Furthermore, difficulties mounted as North Carolina failed to cooperate in supplying DeKalb's force, which became increasingly short of food.
Even forging and plundering of the inhabitants gained few supplies.
With the capture of General Lincoln, Congress decided to call back, as commander of the Southern Department, General Horatio Gates, the hero of Saratoga, to save the South.
This was done, of course, over the strenuous objections of George Washington, who still did not trust Gates because of his part in the Conway cabal.
Gates took command of the unhappy Continental Force at Deep River in North Carolina on
July 25, to the sardonic warning of his friend Charles Lee, take care lest your northern
laurels turn to southern willows.
The brief but most unhappy conduct of Gates' campaign has been subjected to a literally
savage denigration by historians, even those who are always eager to put the best face
on Campaigns by All Other American Generals. The reason for this singular treatment seems
clear, the great rift between Gates and Washington. Washington's actions are almost always painted
in rosy colors, and devotion to his legend requires equal devotion to tearing down Gates's
reputation. Gates soon found that the southern theater was very different from the north.
For one thing, food was difficult to obtain, and distances were large between towns and farms.
Secondly, gates, familiar with the heroic deeds of the northern militia, did not realize that the longer distances, the wider area, and the lower population density of the southern theater meant that the southern militia were no longer fighting for their own homes and neighborhoods,
Thus giving up one of the major advantages of the People's Militia War.
But his most important error was to forget the main principle of the guerrilla-like war
that he had waged so successfully in the North,
never to fight in open confrontation with a more heavily armed enemy
well trained in conventional field tactics.
Gates's first decision made almost upon his arrival
was to strike directly south into South Carolina to attack the British base at Camden. He has
been very severely criticized for not taking DeKalb's advice to pursue a circuitous route
westward to Camden through a country of prosperous farms, abundant food, and a populace loyal
to the American cause. Instead, the shorter route Gates adopted led through desolate swamps
People heavily by Tories. While Gates overestimated the health and morale of his troops, his decision was by no means absurd. His goal was to strike at Camden quickly before Cornwallis could reinforce it. Furthermore, his route allowed him to join with the force of North Carolina militia led by General Richard Caswell who had stubbornly refused to move to join DeKalb. By striking quickly at Camden, Gates believed he could set back any
Cornwallis Invasion of North Carolina. It was Gates's ill luck that Cornwallis would
reach Camden just in time. On his march, Gates was reinforced by 800 Virginia militia and
Caswell's 1200 North Carolina militia, thus raising his force to a formidable 3,000 men.
But it was a force increasingly hungry, ill, exhausted and discouraged. By August 13, Gates
Gates had encamped a few miles north of Camden, but unknown to him, Cornwallis had already
arrived with his reinforcements.
On August 15, Gates, with 3,000 men, fit for duty out of a total of about 4,100, decided
on a quick night strike at Camden.
He was driven to this step by his growing lack of food, but the idea was not unsound
in light of the fact that he did not know of Cornwallis' arrival. Furthermore, ill luck
dogged Gates, for in one of history's amazing coincidences, Cornwallis had also decided
on that very night for a surprise attack on Gates. The two armies blundered into each
other at night on Saunders Creek, north of Camden. Facing Gates' 3,000 men were Cornwallis
Cornwallis and Rawdon with 2,200, but two-thirds of their force were highly trained regulars
while only one-third of the Americans were regulars and two-thirds militia, and regulars
were far superior in mass confrontation on an open field.
Cornwallis decided to wait until daylight to give battle, an error because it could have
permitted Gates to slip away in the night, but here Gates decided to stay and fight on
in the Open Field, An Error of His Own, which later allowed his traducers full sway.
It should be emphasized that Gates called a council war before making the decision and
not one of his top officers called for a retreat or objected to giving battle.
A swift bayonet charge by the British regulars panicked the North Carolina and Virginia
militiamen holding down the American left wing.
The British were never able to cope with the open field bayonet fighting at which the British
excelled.
A fact Gates had overlooked when he formed the left wing out of militia alone.
The militiamen simply broke and ran, most of them without firing a shot.
And Gates, unable to rally them, was forced to flee to the rear to avoid capture.
The American right wing, the Maryland and Delaware Continentals, more than held their
The American Army was on their own against the Tory troops, but once surrounded they were smashed by Tarleton's ferocious cavalry charge. Tarleton then pursued the fleeing Americans for 20 miles northward, capturing great quantities of ammunition on the way. It was a devastating and crushing defeat. DeKalb was killed and the Americans lost 650 precious Continentals, while almost the entire force of the North Carolina and Virginia
The militia scattered and fled to their homes. In exchange, Cornwallis lost only 320 men.
Gates has been severely criticized and attacked for cowardice for speeding north from Camden
200 miles to Hillsboro in three days, stopping only for sleep. But no amount of cowardice
would have required that great a distance of flight. Clearly he sped to Hillsboro to
to begin forming a new army as quickly as possible, hoping to tap the resources of Virginia
as well as North Carolina.
He began with 700 men, the shattered remnants of the force routed at Camden.
To this were soon added other military remnants, bringing the total force up to 2,000.
He was joined in mid-September by Dan Morgan, who had also been neglected and in semi-retirement.
And Gates managed to persuade Congress at long last to make Morgan a general.
At first it seemed that Cornwallis's way north would be blocked by the South Carolina guerrilla
troops.
On August 15, two days after the victory at Saunders Creek, Colonel Sumter and 700 men
captured a British wagon train and took 100 British and Tory prisoners.
Out on August 18 at Fishing Creek, Tarleton, with only 160 men, was able to cut off Sumter's
force from its arms and smash it completely, killing 150 and capturing over 300, with the
loss of only a few men. Two days later, Colonel Francis Marion, with only 16 men, fell upon
won some British and Tory troops and freed 160 American prisoners, but Sumter's blundering
route at Fishing Creek had left North Carolina open to the enemy.