WEBVTT NOTE 56. Gates Meets the Enemy 1 00:00:00.000 --> 00:00:06.000 Volume 4, Chapter 56, Gates Meets the Enemy 2 00:00:06.000 --> 00:00:19.000 Into this more hopeful situation for the Americans now stepped a new Continental troop from Maryland and Delaware that Washington had sent southward under the German General DeKalb. 3 00:00:19.000 --> 00:00:33.000 Marching south on April 16 to the aid of Charleston from Morristown, New Jersey, DeKalb had reached North Carolina with 1,400 men when he learned that Charleston had been taken. 4 00:00:33.000 --> 00:00:43.000 Furthermore, difficulties mounted as North Carolina failed to cooperate in supplying DeKalb's force, which became increasingly short of food. 5 00:00:43.000 --> 00:00:48.000 Even forging and plundering of the inhabitants gained few supplies. 6 00:00:48.000 --> 00:01:00.000 With the capture of General Lincoln, Congress decided to call back, as commander of the Southern Department, General Horatio Gates, the hero of Saratoga, to save the South. 7 00:01:00.000 --> 00:01:11.000 This was done, of course, over the strenuous objections of George Washington, who still did not trust Gates because of his part in the Conway cabal. 8 00:01:11.000 --> 00:01:16.360 Gates took command of the unhappy Continental Force at Deep River in North Carolina on 9 00:01:16.360 --> 00:01:24.340 July 25, to the sardonic warning of his friend Charles Lee, take care lest your northern 10 00:01:24.340 --> 00:01:27.960 laurels turn to southern willows. 11 00:01:27.960 --> 00:01:33.960 The brief but most unhappy conduct of Gates' campaign has been subjected to a literally 12 00:01:33.960 --> 00:01:40.000 savage denigration by historians, even those who are always eager to put the best face 13 00:01:40.000 --> 00:01:46.200 on Campaigns by All Other American Generals. The reason for this singular treatment seems 14 00:01:46.200 --> 00:01:54.360 clear, the great rift between Gates and Washington. Washington's actions are almost always painted 15 00:01:54.360 --> 00:02:02.320 in rosy colors, and devotion to his legend requires equal devotion to tearing down Gates's 16 00:02:02.320 --> 00:02:09.000 reputation. Gates soon found that the southern theater was very different from the north. 17 00:02:09.000 --> 00:02:16.500 For one thing, food was difficult to obtain, and distances were large between towns and farms. 18 00:02:16.500 --> 00:02:37.000 Secondly, gates, familiar with the heroic deeds of the northern militia, did not realize that the longer distances, the wider area, and the lower population density of the southern theater meant that the southern militia were no longer fighting for their own homes and neighborhoods, 19 00:02:37.000 --> 00:02:42.000 Thus giving up one of the major advantages of the People's Militia War. 20 00:02:42.000 --> 00:02:48.000 But his most important error was to forget the main principle of the guerrilla-like war 21 00:02:48.000 --> 00:02:51.000 that he had waged so successfully in the North, 22 00:02:51.000 --> 00:02:58.000 never to fight in open confrontation with a more heavily armed enemy 23 00:02:58.000 --> 00:03:01.000 well trained in conventional field tactics. 24 00:03:01.000 --> 00:03:06.000 Gates's first decision made almost upon his arrival 25 00:03:06.000 --> 00:03:12.960 was to strike directly south into South Carolina to attack the British base at Camden. He has 26 00:03:12.960 --> 00:03:19.800 been very severely criticized for not taking DeKalb's advice to pursue a circuitous route 27 00:03:19.800 --> 00:03:26.720 westward to Camden through a country of prosperous farms, abundant food, and a populace loyal 28 00:03:26.720 --> 00:03:34.320 to the American cause. Instead, the shorter route Gates adopted led through desolate swamps 29 00:03:34.320 --> 00:04:04.320 People heavily by Tories. While Gates overestimated the health and morale of his troops, his decision was by no means absurd. His goal was to strike at Camden quickly before Cornwallis could reinforce it. Furthermore, his route allowed him to join with the force of North Carolina militia led by General Richard Caswell who had stubbornly refused to move to join DeKalb. By striking quickly at Camden, Gates believed he could set back any 30 00:04:04.320 --> 00:04:10.840 Cornwallis Invasion of North Carolina. It was Gates's ill luck that Cornwallis would 31 00:04:10.840 --> 00:04:17.380 reach Camden just in time. On his march, Gates was reinforced by 800 Virginia militia and 32 00:04:17.380 --> 00:04:24.380 Caswell's 1200 North Carolina militia, thus raising his force to a formidable 3,000 men. 33 00:04:25.520 --> 00:04:32.520 But it was a force increasingly hungry, ill, exhausted and discouraged. By August 13, Gates 34 00:04:32.520 --> 00:04:38.760 Gates had encamped a few miles north of Camden, but unknown to him, Cornwallis had already 35 00:04:38.760 --> 00:04:41.520 arrived with his reinforcements. 36 00:04:41.520 --> 00:04:48.780 On August 15, Gates, with 3,000 men, fit for duty out of a total of about 4,100, decided 37 00:04:48.780 --> 00:04:51.720 on a quick night strike at Camden. 38 00:04:51.720 --> 00:04:57.380 He was driven to this step by his growing lack of food, but the idea was not unsound 39 00:04:57.380 --> 00:05:04.440 in light of the fact that he did not know of Cornwallis' arrival. Furthermore, ill luck 40 00:05:04.440 --> 00:05:11.860 dogged Gates, for in one of history's amazing coincidences, Cornwallis had also decided 41 00:05:11.860 --> 00:05:18.180 on that very night for a surprise attack on Gates. The two armies blundered into each 42 00:05:18.180 --> 00:05:25.380 other at night on Saunders Creek, north of Camden. Facing Gates' 3,000 men were Cornwallis 43 00:05:25.380 --> 00:05:31.740 Cornwallis and Rawdon with 2,200, but two-thirds of their force were highly trained regulars 44 00:05:31.740 --> 00:05:38.020 while only one-third of the Americans were regulars and two-thirds militia, and regulars 45 00:05:38.020 --> 00:05:44.260 were far superior in mass confrontation on an open field. 46 00:05:44.260 --> 00:05:49.160 Cornwallis decided to wait until daylight to give battle, an error because it could have 47 00:05:49.160 --> 00:05:54.300 permitted Gates to slip away in the night, but here Gates decided to stay and fight on 48 00:05:54.300 --> 00:06:01.420 in the Open Field, An Error of His Own, which later allowed his traducers full sway. 49 00:06:01.420 --> 00:06:06.060 It should be emphasized that Gates called a council war before making the decision and 50 00:06:06.060 --> 00:06:11.740 not one of his top officers called for a retreat or objected to giving battle. 51 00:06:11.740 --> 00:06:17.000 A swift bayonet charge by the British regulars panicked the North Carolina and Virginia 52 00:06:17.000 --> 00:06:21.400 militiamen holding down the American left wing. 53 00:06:21.400 --> 00:06:26.520 The British were never able to cope with the open field bayonet fighting at which the British 54 00:06:26.520 --> 00:06:27.520 excelled. 55 00:06:27.520 --> 00:06:32.920 A fact Gates had overlooked when he formed the left wing out of militia alone. 56 00:06:32.920 --> 00:06:38.240 The militiamen simply broke and ran, most of them without firing a shot. 57 00:06:38.240 --> 00:06:44.580 And Gates, unable to rally them, was forced to flee to the rear to avoid capture. 58 00:06:44.580 --> 00:06:49.700 The American right wing, the Maryland and Delaware Continentals, more than held their 59 00:06:49.700 --> 00:07:19.700 The American Army was on their own against the Tory troops, but once surrounded they were smashed by Tarleton's ferocious cavalry charge. Tarleton then pursued the fleeing Americans for 20 miles northward, capturing great quantities of ammunition on the way. It was a devastating and crushing defeat. DeKalb was killed and the Americans lost 650 precious Continentals, while almost the entire force of the North Carolina and Virginia 60 00:07:19.700 --> 00:07:26.700 The militia scattered and fled to their homes. In exchange, Cornwallis lost only 320 men. 61 00:07:28.780 --> 00:07:34.420 Gates has been severely criticized and attacked for cowardice for speeding north from Camden 62 00:07:34.420 --> 00:07:41.420 200 miles to Hillsboro in three days, stopping only for sleep. But no amount of cowardice 63 00:07:41.500 --> 00:07:47.020 would have required that great a distance of flight. Clearly he sped to Hillsboro to 64 00:07:47.020 --> 00:07:53.100 to begin forming a new army as quickly as possible, hoping to tap the resources of Virginia 65 00:07:53.100 --> 00:07:55.180 as well as North Carolina. 66 00:07:55.180 --> 00:08:01.500 He began with 700 men, the shattered remnants of the force routed at Camden. 67 00:08:01.500 --> 00:08:07.780 To this were soon added other military remnants, bringing the total force up to 2,000. 68 00:08:07.780 --> 00:08:15.020 He was joined in mid-September by Dan Morgan, who had also been neglected and in semi-retirement. 69 00:08:15.020 --> 00:08:20.700 And Gates managed to persuade Congress at long last to make Morgan a general. 70 00:08:20.700 --> 00:08:25.860 At first it seemed that Cornwallis's way north would be blocked by the South Carolina guerrilla 71 00:08:25.860 --> 00:08:27.100 troops. 72 00:08:27.100 --> 00:08:33.540 On August 15, two days after the victory at Saunders Creek, Colonel Sumter and 700 men 73 00:08:33.540 --> 00:08:39.240 captured a British wagon train and took 100 British and Tory prisoners. 74 00:08:39.240 --> 00:08:46.560 Out on August 18 at Fishing Creek, Tarleton, with only 160 men, was able to cut off Sumter's 75 00:08:46.560 --> 00:08:54.960 force from its arms and smash it completely, killing 150 and capturing over 300, with the 76 00:08:54.960 --> 00:09:02.480 loss of only a few men. Two days later, Colonel Francis Marion, with only 16 men, fell upon 77 00:09:02.480 --> 00:09:10.120 won some British and Tory troops and freed 160 American prisoners, but Sumter's blundering 78 00:09:10.120 --> 00:09:15.120 route at Fishing Creek had left North Carolina open to the enemy.