WEBVTT NOTE 58. Greene's Unorthodox Strategy 1 00:00:00.000 --> 00:00:06.000 Volume 4, Chapter 58, Green's unorthodox strategy. 2 00:00:06.000 --> 00:00:15.000 It was inevitable, however, that Gates would be removed from command in semi-disgrace, as he was in October. 3 00:00:15.000 --> 00:00:27.000 A chastened Congress entrusted the choice of his replacement to Washington, and fortunately Washington chose the one highly able general whom he had not turned against, 4 00:00:27.000 --> 00:00:34.000 A man whose talents had been languishing for years in the post of Quartermaster General, Nathaniel Greene. 5 00:00:34.000 --> 00:00:42.000 Both Greene and Morgan were fully cognizant of the necessity for guerrilla strategy in fighting the British. 6 00:00:42.000 --> 00:00:48.000 Greene arrived at Charlotte, where the American Army was now stationed, in early December, 7 00:00:48.000 --> 00:00:54.000 taking over a force of fewer than 1,500 fit for duty, and these hungry and wretched. 8 00:00:54.000 --> 00:00:59.400 and Wretched. It was clear to him that a move must be made right away, for the food supply 9 00:00:59.400 --> 00:01:05.120 of the entire Charlotte area had been stripped clear by the foraging and plundering of British 10 00:01:05.120 --> 00:01:11.800 troops. In addition, Cornwallis was about to begin his long-delayed and final invasion 11 00:01:11.800 --> 00:01:18.800 of North Carolina. At first, Green proposed an immediate hit-and-run attack on Windsboro, 12 00:01:18.800 --> 00:01:25.760 But he deferred to Morgan's judgment of its excessive risk. He then decided to march his army 13 00:01:25.760 --> 00:01:33.040 southeast for winter quarters to Sheraw Hill, 75 miles east of the British camp at Windsborough. 14 00:01:33.840 --> 00:01:40.240 But so that this would not seem like a retreat from the British invasion route, he split his 15 00:01:40.240 --> 00:01:47.920 already inferior force in a daring and highly unorthodox maneuver. Accordingly, on December 16 00:01:47.920 --> 00:01:54.440 December 16, Morgan quickly took 600 men to South Carolina, north of Windsboro, while 17 00:01:54.440 --> 00:02:01.600 Green set out for Sheraw Hill on December 20 with 1100 men, arriving there on December 18 00:02:01.600 --> 00:02:10.040 26. Here was a brilliant piece of strategy in defiance of the sound classical injunction 19 00:02:10.040 --> 00:02:16.540 never to split an inferior force, lest each in turn be attacked and destroyed. But this 20 00:02:16.540 --> 00:02:22.500 This injunction rested on the assumption that frontal engagements would then be fought and 21 00:02:22.500 --> 00:02:28.860 in Green's strategy it was the task of the American forces to be swift and mobile and 22 00:02:28.860 --> 00:02:31.820 to avoid frontal battles. 23 00:02:31.820 --> 00:02:35.460 In the face of this split, Cornwallis was in a bind. 24 00:02:35.460 --> 00:02:41.460 He could not chase Morgan or invade northward without leaving Charleston open to Green's 25 00:02:41.460 --> 00:02:47.700 Invasion, and he could not strike out for Chirah without allowing Morgan to strike west 26 00:02:47.700 --> 00:02:54.980 at 96 or Augusta. Furthermore, if Cornwallis advanced, he could be hit on both flanks, 27 00:02:54.980 --> 00:03:00.420 and if he tried to return to Charleston, he could be harassed on both flanks also. At 28 00:03:00.420 --> 00:03:06.700 the same time, the various ineffective guerrilla bands could continually harry the British 29 00:03:06.700 --> 00:03:08.660 wherever they might be. 30 00:03:08.660 --> 00:03:14.340 To counteract the multiple threats posed by the two forces, Cornwallis would also have 31 00:03:14.340 --> 00:03:19.300 to split his army, indeed, to split it into three parts. 32 00:03:19.300 --> 00:03:25.460 He sent Leslie east to Camden to defend against any possible attack by Greene. 33 00:03:25.460 --> 00:03:29.780 He sent the mobile Tarleton North defined in Crush Morgan. 34 00:03:29.780 --> 00:03:35.900 And he moved himself slowly into western North Carolina to destroy the expected remnants 35 00:03:35.900 --> 00:03:38.540 of Morgan's Force. 36 00:03:38.540 --> 00:03:45.220 While Cornwallis was preparing his blow, American guerrilla action grew more and more menacing. 37 00:03:45.220 --> 00:03:50.860 Taking up his post at the Pakalette River and reinforced by over 300 North Carolina 38 00:03:50.860 --> 00:03:55.980 militia, Morgan threatened the British base at 96. 39 00:03:55.980 --> 00:04:01.900 On December 27, he sent the mobile cavalry of Lieutenant Colonel William Washington 40 00:04:01.900 --> 00:04:08.900 Washington with over 200 men to the vicinity of 96 where they crushed a Tory force at Faux 41 00:04:08.900 --> 00:04:17.900 Fort Creek. Nearly 200 of the 250 Tories were lost while Washington lost nary a man. Meanwhile, 42 00:04:17.900 --> 00:04:24.700 to the east the great cavalry unit of Colonel Light Horse Harry Lee arrived from the north 43 00:04:24.700 --> 00:04:31.260 and was sent east to assist Marion's guerrilla operations. Marion and Lee struck against 44 00:04:31.260 --> 00:04:36.020 the British base at Georgetown and nearly captured the post. 45 00:04:36.020 --> 00:04:42.620 In this deteriorating situation, it was clearer than ever to Cornwallis that the guerrillas 46 00:04:42.620 --> 00:04:49.240 and especially Morgan must be crushed in a frontal engagement before the invasion northward 47 00:04:49.240 --> 00:04:50.880 could proceed. 48 00:04:50.880 --> 00:04:56.820 As Higginbotham notes, his lordship was not the only British military leader in the war 49 00:04:56.820 --> 00:05:04.420 to discover that rear areas could not be treated in the European sense as free of enemy forces 50 00:05:04.420 --> 00:05:07.600 and simply as zones of communication. 51 00:05:07.600 --> 00:05:14.700 Because of the activities of Morgan, Sumter, Pickens and others, the front behind the front 52 00:05:14.700 --> 00:05:17.980 became a theater of operations in its own right. 53 00:05:17.980 --> 00:05:23.460 Hence, before Cornwallis could launch his long planned invasion of North Carolina and 54 00:05:23.460 --> 00:05:28.020 In the Upper South, Morgan would have to be eliminated. 55 00:05:28.020 --> 00:05:31.560 If anyone could catch up with Morgan, it was Tarleton. 56 00:05:31.560 --> 00:05:38.260 With more than 3,300 men, he gave chase to Morgan's force of now a little over 1,000, 57 00:05:38.260 --> 00:05:44.820 although it was soon to be raised to 1,100 when Colonel Pickens and his band joined him. 58 00:05:44.820 --> 00:05:51.140 In trained regulars, of course, Tarleton's force outnumbered Morgan's by over 3 to 1. 59 00:05:51.140 --> 00:05:57.380 For militia had been expected to join Morgan, but Cornwallis had successfully roused the 60 00:05:57.380 --> 00:06:03.820 Indians to attack the frontier post, and militia units had to remain in the west. 61 00:06:03.820 --> 00:06:09.780 Hearing of Tarleton's advance, Morgan began to flee northward, properly trying to avoid 62 00:06:09.780 --> 00:06:15.300 open combat, but Tarleton was approaching with remarkable speed, and Morgan was forced 63 00:06:15.300 --> 00:06:26.300 Morgan was forced to turn and fight on open ground at the plain of the Calpins on the south side of the Broad River, a little bit south of the North Carolina border. 64 00:06:26.300 --> 00:06:37.300 On the highly unfavorable terrain and open field with no protection on his flanks and no protection from Tarleton's famed horsemen, Morgan seemed doomed. 65 00:06:37.300 --> 00:06:50.300 Wheatley contends that Morgan could have avoided the highly unfavorable position, but that an impetuous desire for a confrontation led him into what could have been a fatal error. 66 00:06:50.300 --> 00:07:01.300 If Morgan's terrain for making a stand could scarcely have been worse, his disposition of troops was novel and displayed his brilliance as a tactician. 67 00:07:01.300 --> 00:07:09.300 He decided to make use of the sharp shooting skills of his frontier militia without forcing them to stand for long in the front lines. 68 00:07:09.300 --> 00:07:20.300 He stationed a small body of 150 frontier riflemen in the front line with Colonel Pickens' Carolina militia of 300 directly behind them. 69 00:07:20.300 --> 00:07:29.300 Behind these, on the crest of the slope behind the militia, were stationed Colonel John Howard in charge of the Continentals 70 00:07:29.300 --> 00:07:33.300 and some militia totaling 450. 71 00:07:33.300 --> 00:07:42.300 Behind Howard, Colonel Washington commanded a force of over 100 cavalry as a reserve, stationed behind a rear hill. 72 00:07:42.300 --> 00:07:48.300 The plan was for the front line militia to fire a few volleys from behind trees, 73 00:07:48.300 --> 00:07:52.300 and then to retreat quickly to the second line militia, 74 00:07:52.300 --> 00:08:01.300 who, after further firing, would also retreat on their horses to Howard's forces and reform behind them. 75 00:08:01.300 --> 00:08:10.300 With this plan, Morgan brilliantly incorporated the militia's propensity to flee under the fire of an open confrontation 76 00:08:10.300 --> 00:08:15.300 into a favorable aspect of the plan of battle itself. 77 00:08:15.300 --> 00:08:21.300 Morgan knew that a successful militia war rested on the high morale of the troops, 78 00:08:21.300 --> 00:08:43.300 He went to great pains to instill confidence in high morale, spending the whole night exhorting the troops by reminding them of British and Tory atrocities and of the great past successes of the American arms during the war and promising them victory. 79 00:08:43.300 --> 00:08:49.300 In addition, he carefully explained his subtle battle plan to all his men. 80 00:08:49.300 --> 00:08:58.300 The popular and respected Morgan was thereby highly successful in inspiring, encouraging and enlightening his troops. 81 00:08:58.300 --> 00:09:08.300 The British launched the attack on the morning of January 17, 1781 with a charge by Tarleton's formidable cavalry. 82 00:09:08.300 --> 00:09:17.300 Thus, there came face to face two of the most formidable military instruments developed during the Revolutionary War. 83 00:09:17.300 --> 00:09:24.300 The First Line soon retreated to join the Second Line as prearranged. Tarleton threw his whole line forward against the Americans. Again, the Americans coolly and skillfully took a heavy toll, and again the line retreated. 84 00:09:47.300 --> 00:09:53.460 The line withdrew to the rear as prearranged, with Colonel Washington's cavalry suddenly 85 00:09:53.460 --> 00:10:00.180 appearing from the rear and routing the dragoons. The British, understandably fooled into thinking 86 00:10:00.180 --> 00:10:07.020 that the withdrawal of the line was a full-scale retreat, rushed forward against Howard's main 87 00:10:07.020 --> 00:10:14.780 line, but were again met with cool and accurate fire. As Howard, due to a mix-up in orders, 88 00:10:14.780 --> 00:10:20.780 When the Americans began to retreat behind the hill, the British were sure that the Americans were now beaten and en route. 89 00:10:21.780 --> 00:10:25.780 Tarleton's men rushed forward in wild disarray for the kill. 90 00:10:26.780 --> 00:10:38.780 Morgan, his American line seemingly in retreat, ordered Howard's line to wheel about en masse and fire foursquare into the wildly onrushing British. 91 00:10:38.780 --> 00:10:48.780 Confusion and panic hit the British and the Americans immediately followed with a bayonet charge, which for once was wielded by the American forces. 92 00:10:48.780 --> 00:10:58.780 In the meantime, the British right and left were simultaneously surrounded in a crushing double envelopment by Pickens and Washington. 93 00:10:58.780 --> 00:11:06.780 It was a great victory for Morgan and exhibited perhaps the most brilliant battle tactics of the war. 94 00:11:06.780 --> 00:11:11.280 The American victory at Kalpins had been total and shattering. 95 00:11:11.280 --> 00:11:18.280 The British lost no fewer than 900 men killed and captured, nearly nine-tenths of their force, 96 00:11:18.280 --> 00:11:22.780 along with a large quantity of arms, supplies and ammunition. 97 00:11:22.780 --> 00:11:27.280 In contrast, the American casualties totaled only 70. 98 00:11:27.280 --> 00:11:35.780 Tarleton's force had been decisively smashed, and the flower of the British forces in America had been destroyed. 99 00:11:35.780 --> 00:11:39.780 The victory was understandably cheered throughout the country.