Volume 4, Chapter 60, The Battle of Guilford Courthouse
Lord Cornwallis now found himself in a position often faced by imperialist commanders fighting against guerrillas and a revolutionary people.
By classical standards he was in an excellent position.
He was the conqueror of Georgia and all of the Carolinas, and no real army was left to oppose him south of the Dan River.
But, in fact, he had no boats and few supplies and could not pursue green into Virginia.
Furthermore, Green's army would outnumber his when it was reinforced by the divisions
of continentals being raised in Virginia by General Steuben.
Cornwallis, therefore, fell back on the fundamental axiom of British strategy.
The rallying of the supposed majority of North Carolina Tories to form the solid support
for British occupation and regime.
He withdrew to Hillsboro and eagerly issued a proclamation on February 20, inviting all
loyal subjects to join his army in the reestablishment of legitimate government in the province.
Meanwhile, Green was having his troubles across the dam.
His militia, their enlistments up, had largely left him, and neither the expected reinforcements
from Steuben's Virginia Continentals nor Virginia militia had appeared.
In addition, the level of the dam was falling, exposing him to a potential blow from Cornwallis.
He therefore determined to cross the river back into North Carolina.
He sent Williamson Lee across to join Pickens guerrillas, inhering the British and suppressing
and Armed Tories. On February 23, they found a company of 400 mounted Tory recruits at
Hall River under the command of Colonel John Pyle. Pickens and Lee duped, surprised, and
virtually massacred the enemy. Most of the Tory force was killed or wounded. Not a man
in the American force was even injured. Understandably, the massacre at Hall River dried up Tory
Recruiting in the State.
On the same day, Green, finally reinforced by Virginia riflemen, recrossed the Dan and
headed towards Hillsboro, his force now numbering 2,100.
His plan was to harass Cornwallis, discourage Tory risings and wait for reinforcements before
engaging in any frontal action.
Cornwallis found to his dismay that Green's recrossing and the harassment by his light
Infantry under Williams were, like the route of Pyle, effectively crushing the incipient
flocking of North Carolina Tories to the British cause.
At Hillsboro, Cornwallis found himself among more and more enemies and ever fewer friends.
The increase of enemies aggravated by British plundering and requisitions of foodstuffs,
which were growing increasingly scarce in the area.
It was clear that he had to leave Hillsborough. On February 27, he marched southwest to the
south side of the Alamance, where he would be in a strategic position to march west to
Guilford or Salisbury or southeast to Cross Creek or Wilmington on the Atlantic coast.
Green encamped on the north side and shifted his camp continually, keeping Cornwallis off
Off Balance, while awaiting reinforcements.
On March 6th, Cornwallis tried to attack Williams in a sudden surprise, but Williams's corps
managed to escape.
Finally, both armies rested.
Green received his long-awaited reinforcements of over 1,000 North Carolina militia, nearly
1,700 Virginia militia, and a few Virginia Continentals.
By mid-March he was at peak strength, over 4,500 men, greatly outnumbering the better-trained
British force of about 1,900.
Finding his food supplies running low, Green decided to make his stand promptly at Guilford
Courthouse.
This decision to do battle was strategically sound.
Green's great numerical superiority ensured that the worst would be a minor defeat and
and Victory could well have led to the final route of the British troops.
For his part, Cornwallis could do nothing else.
The entire long-run British strategy of occupying the South and calling forth the Tories rested
on triumph over the American army in open battle.
Following Morgan's earlier advice, Green arranged his army as Morgan had done with
and such success at Cowpens, a front and second line of militia, a third line of crack-continentals
and two cavalry units on the flanks under Washington and Lee.
But while Green was a brilliant strategist, he was far inferior to Morgan as a tactician,
and he made the grave error of stationing his three lines much too far apart.
Morgan had placed the lines 150 yards apart.
The King now placed them 300 and 400 yards apart, leaving the militia too great a distance
before they could find cover.
This also forced the cavalry to cover too much ground before it could come up to aid
the front lines.
The British swung into battle on March 15.
The first American line of North Carolina militia panicked at the British advance and
fled from the scene without bothering to reform at the rear.
The second line of Virginia militia fought well, however, and did great damage to the
British troops with its withering rifle fire.
The third line of continentals was again very effective, but twice Green failed to administer
the coup de grace to the British for fear of risking his army.
Cornwallis finally managed to stop Washington's advance by firing his artillery indiscriminately
into the fray.
As the British reformed and advanced, Green withdrew from the battle, a technical defeat
for the Americans, but actually a smashing victory, for at the Battle of Guilford Courthouse,
the British had lost no fewer than 530 men, more than one-fourth of their army.
In contrast, Green had suffered only 260 casualties.
Where his severe mauling Cornwallis retreated southeast to Cross Creek, but there he made
a fateful decision that was to bring the war to a close.
Disregarding Clinton's instructions to safeguard Charleston and South Carolina above all, he
abandoned the entire south below Virginia.
Pushing on to Wilmington on the coast of North Carolina, where he could obtain supplies by
C, he allowed Green to turn into South Carolina, leaving the Tories of Cross Creek to their
fate. Never a man to assume a strategic defensive as a withdrawal into South Carolina would
have been, Cornwallis decided on his own to march north into the privileged sanctuary
of Virginia, the supply route for the Carolinas where other British forces were already deployed.
For this unilateral change in fundamental British strategy in abandoning the South and
the Southern Tories, Clinton sharply criticized Cornwallis.
As Cornwallis pushed northward into Virginia at the end of April 1781, Clinton and the
British could only come up with a middle-states variant of the now-abandoned Southern strategy.
The plan now was to conduct a campaign in Maryland, Delaware and lower Pennsylvania where again
Tories could supposedly be relied upon to organize and control the area after its conquest
by British troops.
Cornwallis disgusted with the extent of Tory support, now scorned the Tory strategy and
Clinton continued the offensive against Virginia, an offensive Clinton knew to be unworkable
because unlike the middle states, there were few Tories in that state to hold it after
conquest.
In this quarrel, each man was right in his criticisms of the other.
On the one hand, Virginia ultimately could not be held.
On the other hand, there were not sufficient Tories to implement Clinton's new project.