WEBVTT NOTE 11. The Gypsy Cab Driver 1 00:00:00.000 --> 00:00:03.000 Part 4. Outlaw 2 00:00:03.000 --> 00:00:08.000 Chapter 11. The Gypsy Cab Driver 3 00:00:08.000 --> 00:00:19.000 The taxi business in the United States usually works to the detriment of the poor and minority groups in two ways, as consumers and as producers. 4 00:00:19.000 --> 00:00:25.000 As consumers, their plight is well demonstrated by ethnic taxi cab jokes, 5 00:00:25.000 --> 00:00:31.560 jokes, and by the subterfuge and embarrassment blacks undergo in order to get a cab, which 6 00:00:31.560 --> 00:00:34.480 they are frequently unable to do. 7 00:00:34.480 --> 00:00:37.640 The reasons are not difficult to fathom. 8 00:00:37.640 --> 00:00:43.760 Taxi rates are set by law and are invariant, regardless of the destination of the trip. 9 00:00:43.760 --> 00:00:49.120 However, some destinations are more dangerous than others, and drivers are reluctant to 10 00:00:49.120 --> 00:00:55.600 to service these areas which are usually the home neighborhoods of the poor and the minorities. 11 00:00:55.600 --> 00:01:01.240 So when given a choice, cab drivers are likely to select customers on the basis of their 12 00:01:01.240 --> 00:01:05.040 economic status or skin color. 13 00:01:05.040 --> 00:01:11.140 It is important to realize that given the differential crime rates, it is solely government 14 00:01:11.140 --> 00:01:16.200 control of taxi rates that engenders this situation. 15 00:01:16.200 --> 00:01:22.800 In the absence of such controls, rates to unsafe areas could be set so as to compensate 16 00:01:22.800 --> 00:01:26.880 cab drivers for the greater risks involved. 17 00:01:26.880 --> 00:01:32.280 If this were done, blacks would have to pay more than whites for a cab, if not in the 18 00:01:32.280 --> 00:01:39.160 form of higher payments on the meter, perhaps in the form of older or lower quality cabs. 19 00:01:39.160 --> 00:01:45.640 But at least they would be able to secure the services of a taxi if they so desired. 20 00:01:45.640 --> 00:01:49.640 Under the present system, they do not even have the choice. 21 00:01:49.640 --> 00:01:56.320 The inability to obtain a cab is not a small inconvenience to the poor black consumer, 22 00:01:56.320 --> 00:02:00.800 although many of the white middle class might think otherwise. 23 00:02:00.800 --> 00:02:08.240 Public transportation, bus, trolley and train, plans and routes, were designed and constructed 24 00:02:08.240 --> 00:02:11.560 50 to 75 years ago. 25 00:02:11.560 --> 00:02:16.880 In those years, transportation lines were usually owned by private concerns, who were 26 00:02:16.880 --> 00:02:21.620 dependent on their customers for their profits and success. 27 00:02:21.620 --> 00:02:26.020 They were designed specifically to meet customer needs. 28 00:02:26.020 --> 00:02:33.040 In many cases, these transport lines are unsuitable for the needs of the present-day community. 29 00:02:33.040 --> 00:02:38.380 Transit lines today are publicly owned, and therefore lack the incentive to tailor them 30 00:02:38.380 --> 00:02:40.720 to the needs of the customer. 31 00:02:40.720 --> 00:02:47.360 If customers refuse to patronize a transit corridor and that corridor becomes unprofitable, 32 00:02:47.360 --> 00:02:52.880 the public authority simply makes up the difference out of general tax revenues. 33 00:02:52.880 --> 00:03:00.520 Consequently, city dwellers must choose between a fast ride home by taxi and a long, indirect 34 00:03:00.520 --> 00:03:04.120 and halting ride via public transit. 35 00:03:04.120 --> 00:03:10.340 This is especially true for the poor and minority groups who lack the political power to influence 36 00:03:10.340 --> 00:03:17.340 Public Transit Authorities or Decisions Concerning the Construction of New Lines 37 00:03:17.340 --> 00:03:23.340 Restricted access to cabs in areas where public transportation is inadequate is often more 38 00:03:23.340 --> 00:03:25.300 than inconvenient. 39 00:03:25.300 --> 00:03:30.300 When health is involved, for example, the cab is an excellent and cheap substitute for 40 00:03:30.300 --> 00:03:36.820 an ambulance, but in poor neighborhoods which are inadequately served by public transportation 41 00:03:36.820 --> 00:03:44.420 and whose residents cannot afford private cars, it is usually difficult to find a taxi. 42 00:03:44.420 --> 00:03:50.720 Under the present system, the poor also suffer as producers. In New York City, for example, 43 00:03:50.720 --> 00:03:57.820 the government requires all cabs to be licensed. The licenses, medallions, are strictly limited 44 00:03:57.820 --> 00:04:05.320 in number, so much so that they have been sold for as much as $30,000. The price varies, 45 00:04:05.320 --> 00:04:11.320 Depending on whether the medallion is for an individual cab or part of a fleet. 46 00:04:11.320 --> 00:04:16.360 This effectively bars the poor from entering the field as owners. 47 00:04:16.360 --> 00:04:23.280 What would have happened to the Horatio Alger hero if he had needed $30,000 before he could 48 00:04:23.280 --> 00:04:28.040 enter the shoeshine or newspaper delivery business? 49 00:04:28.040 --> 00:04:34.000 Some years ago, in response to the limitations placed upon them both as consumers and as 50 00:04:34.000 --> 00:04:40.960 Producers, the poor and minority group members began to enter the taxi industry in a time-honored 51 00:04:40.960 --> 00:04:49.800 American tradition dating back to the Revolutionary War of 1776, disobedience of the law. They 52 00:04:49.800 --> 00:04:56.000 simply had their used cars outfitted with meters, special lights and signs, and declared 53 00:04:56.000 --> 00:05:02.900 themselves to be cabs. In these gypsy cabs they cruised the streets of the ghetto areas 54 00:05:02.900 --> 00:05:08.700 Business which were shunned by medallion taxi drivers and began to earn an honest, albeit 55 00:05:08.700 --> 00:05:15.780 illegal living. Their initial success in avoiding punishment under the existing laws was probably 56 00:05:15.780 --> 00:05:23.080 due to two factors, police fear of unrest in the ghetto if these cabs were harassed, 57 00:05:23.080 --> 00:05:28.200 and the fact that the gypsies worked only within the ghetto and therefore did not take 58 00:05:28.200 --> 00:05:35.520 Business from the medallioned cabs. These idyllic times, however, were not to last. 59 00:05:35.520 --> 00:05:42.140 Gypsy cab drivers, perhaps emboldened by their success in the ghetto, began to venture outside. 60 00:05:42.140 --> 00:05:47.700 If the medallioned taxi drivers had looked upon the gypsies with suspicion before, they 61 00:05:47.700 --> 00:05:54.580 now exhibited outright hostility toward them, and with good reason. At this time, the taxi 62 00:05:54.580 --> 00:06:00.540 The taxi lobby in New York succeeded in pressuring the City Council to enact a bill allowing 63 00:06:00.540 --> 00:06:07.680 an increase in taxi fares. Patronage dropped precipitously, and the immediate effect was 64 00:06:07.680 --> 00:06:14.140 a sharp decrease in the income of medallioned taxi drivers. It became obvious that many 65 00:06:14.140 --> 00:06:21.720 of their former riders were using gypsy cabs. At this juncture, irate medallioned taxi drivers 66 00:06:21.720 --> 00:06:29.280 Gipsies began to attack and burn gypsy cabs, and they retaliated in kind. After a few violent 67 00:06:29.280 --> 00:06:35.640 weeks, a compromise was reached. Yellow, the traditional color of taxi cabs, was to be 68 00:06:35.640 --> 00:06:42.120 reserved for medallioned cabs. The gypsies would have to use another color. A tentative 69 00:06:42.120 --> 00:06:47.220 plan for licensing gypsy cabs was also discussed. 70 00:06:47.220 --> 00:06:51.520 What of the future of the taxi industry in New York City? 71 00:06:51.520 --> 00:06:57.240 If the dominant liberal consensus politics holds sway, as it usually does in questions 72 00:06:57.240 --> 00:07:03.000 of this kind, some compromise with the gypsies will be reached and they will be brought under 73 00:07:03.000 --> 00:07:06.040 the rule of the Taxi Commission. 74 00:07:06.040 --> 00:07:11.020 Perhaps they will be granted a restricted license out of deference to the yellow cabs. 75 00:07:11.020 --> 00:07:16.920 If so, the system will remain the same as it is at present, a situation which resembles 76 00:07:16.920 --> 00:07:21.880 Suppose a gang of robbers allowing a few new members to join. 77 00:07:21.880 --> 00:07:26.760 But the robbery will not be halted, nor the victims substantially helped. 78 00:07:26.760 --> 00:07:33.220 Suppose, according to one plan, 5,000 new licenses are created. 79 00:07:33.220 --> 00:07:39.280 This may help in a minor way in that there will be extra cabs potentially available for 80 00:07:39.280 --> 00:07:40.280 blacks. 81 00:07:40.280 --> 00:07:46.040 Thus, although blacks will still be second-class citizens, they may have a slightly easier 82 00:07:46.040 --> 00:07:53.600 Time Finding a Cab. But, paradoxically, this concession to the greater need for cabs will 83 00:07:53.600 --> 00:07:59.740 stifle future demands for improvements. It will enable the Taxi Commission to pose as 84 00:07:59.740 --> 00:08:06.400 the liberal and bountiful grantor of taxi medallions based on its act of generosity 85 00:08:06.400 --> 00:08:12.880 in licensing gypsy cabs, even though it has not granted a single extra medallion since 86 00:08:12.880 --> 00:08:15.400 1939. 87 00:08:15.400 --> 00:08:22.280 As producers and entrepreneurs, the position of the poor may improve somewhat, for an additional 88 00:08:22.280 --> 00:08:28.240 5,000 licenses may result in a decreased purchase price of a medallion. 89 00:08:28.240 --> 00:08:35.460 However, there is a possibility that the purchase price will rise after the extra 5,000 licenses 90 00:08:35.460 --> 00:08:42.080 are granted, for the great uncertainty presently keeping down the value of a medallion may 91 00:08:42.080 --> 00:08:48.960 may well end. If it does, the value of medallions will remain high and the position of the poor 92 00:08:48.960 --> 00:08:56.840 will not have improved at all. No, a proper solution to the taxi cab crisis is not to 93 00:08:56.840 --> 00:09:03.080 co-opt the movement of gypsy cab drivers by the offer to take them into the system, but 94 00:09:03.080 --> 00:09:10.620 rather to destroy the system of restrictive cab licenses. In terms of the everyday workings 95 00:09:10.620 --> 00:09:16.900 As of the market, it would mean that any qualified driver with a valid chauffeur's license could 96 00:09:16.900 --> 00:09:24.000 use any vehicle which has passed the certification examination to pick up and deliver fares to 97 00:09:24.000 --> 00:09:30.840 any street of their mutual choosing for any mutually agreeable price. 98 00:09:30.840 --> 00:09:35.900 The market for taxi cabs in New York City would thus work in much the same way that 99 00:09:35.900 --> 00:09:42.740 Rick Shaw's work in Hong Kong. Or, to take a less exotic example, the taxi cab market 100 00:09:42.740 --> 00:09:48.480 would work in much the way that the babysitter market operates, completely dependent upon 101 00:09:48.480 --> 00:09:54.020 mutual agreement and consent between the contracting parties. 102 00:09:54.020 --> 00:09:59.140 The taxi problems encountered by the poor and minority group members would be quickly 103 00:09:59.140 --> 00:10:06.100 be resolved. Residents in high-crime areas could then offer the cab drivers a premium. 104 00:10:06.100 --> 00:10:10.780 Though it is deplorable that they will be forced to pay this premium, they would no 105 00:10:10.780 --> 00:10:18.220 longer be second-class citizens insofar as obtaining a cab was concerned. The only real 106 00:10:18.220 --> 00:10:24.300 and lasting solution to this problem, however, is a reduction in the high-crime rate in ghetto 107 00:10:24.300 --> 00:10:29.280 Show Areas, which would be responsible for the extra charges. 108 00:10:29.280 --> 00:10:34.620 For the present, however, the people living in these areas must not be prohibited from 109 00:10:34.620 --> 00:10:39.900 taking the necessary steps to obtain adequate cab service. 110 00:10:39.900 --> 00:10:45.220 Poor people would benefit as producers as they set up their own businesses. 111 00:10:45.220 --> 00:10:51.100 They would, of course, have to assume ownership of a car, but the artificial and insurmountable 112 00:10:51.100 --> 00:11:01.100 There are, however, objections that will be raised to a free market in taxi cabs. 113 00:11:01.100 --> 00:11:08.100 1. A free market would lead to chaos and anarchy if medallions were eliminated. 114 00:11:08.100 --> 00:11:14.100 Taxis would flood the city and weaken the capacity of any cab driver to earn a living. 115 00:11:14.100 --> 00:11:21.600 So, drivers would leave the industry in droves and there would be far fewer taxis available than needed. 116 00:11:21.600 --> 00:11:30.600 Without medallions to regulate the number of taxis, the public would be caught between two unsatisfactory alternatives. 117 00:11:30.600 --> 00:11:38.600 The answer is that even if there were an initial rush into the industry and the market was glutted, 118 00:11:38.600 --> 00:11:42.100 only some drivers would leave the field. 119 00:11:42.100 --> 00:11:51.100 The number of cabs, therefore, would not swing erratically from a horrendous oversupply to none at all and back again. 120 00:11:51.100 --> 00:12:02.100 Moreover, the drivers who would tend to leave the industry would be the inefficient ones, whose earnings were low, or those with better alternatives in other industries. 121 00:12:02.100 --> 00:12:09.100 By leaving, they would allow the earnings of those who remained to rise, and thus stabilize the field. 122 00:12:09.100 --> 00:12:26.100 One does not, after all, gain any insurance against the possibility of too many or too few lawyers, doctors or shoeshine boys, by fixing an arbitrary upper limit to the number of people who can enter these occupations. 123 00:12:26.100 --> 00:12:32.740 We depend upon the forces of supply and demand. When there are too many workers in a field, 124 00:12:32.740 --> 00:12:38.820 the relative salaries decrease, and some will be encouraged to enter other occupations. 125 00:12:39.460 --> 00:12:43.540 If too few, wages and new occupants increase. 126 00:12:45.140 --> 00:12:52.100 2. The argument that licensing protects the riding public is one of the most disingenuous 127 00:12:52.100 --> 00:12:54.740 Arguments for Taxi Medallions. 128 00:12:54.740 --> 00:13:01.180 It is the same one used by psychiatrists who strive to protect us from encounter groups 129 00:13:01.180 --> 00:13:08.340 and others who make inroads in their incomes, by lily-white unionists who protect the public 130 00:13:08.340 --> 00:13:15.300 by keeping qualified blacks out, and by doctors who protect us by refusing to grant medical 131 00:13:15.300 --> 00:13:19.020 licenses to qualified foreign doctors. 132 00:13:19.020 --> 00:13:22.900 Two people are fooled by these arguments today. 133 00:13:22.900 --> 00:13:28.100 Surely the special chauffeur's license test and car inspections can ensure the quality 134 00:13:28.100 --> 00:13:31.020 of drivers and cars. 135 00:13:31.020 --> 00:13:32.780 3. 136 00:13:32.780 --> 00:13:38.040 The medallion would have no value if there were an unlimited amount of taxis. 137 00:13:38.040 --> 00:13:42.900 This would be unfair to all those who have invested thousands of dollars in the purchase 138 00:13:42.900 --> 00:13:45.620 of their medallions. 139 00:13:45.620 --> 00:13:50.540 Some light can be shed on this argument by considering a short fable. 140 00:13:50.540 --> 00:13:56.740 A warlord granted permission to a group of highwaymen to rob all passers-by. 141 00:13:56.740 --> 00:14:04.580 For this right, the warlord charged the highwaymen a fee of $2,500, and then the people overthrew 142 00:14:04.580 --> 00:14:06.580 the system. 143 00:14:06.580 --> 00:14:11.620 Who should bear the cost of what turned out to be an unprofitable investment on the part 144 00:14:11.620 --> 00:14:13.460 of the highwaymen? 145 00:14:13.460 --> 00:14:18.900 If the choice was limited to the warlord and the robbers, we might say, a plague on both 146 00:14:18.900 --> 00:14:20.700 your houses. 147 00:14:20.700 --> 00:14:25.820 If we had to choose between them, we might root for the highwaymen, on the grounds that 148 00:14:25.820 --> 00:14:31.140 they were less of a threat than the warlord, and perhaps had made the original payment 149 00:14:31.140 --> 00:14:34.040 out of monies honestly earned. 150 00:14:34.040 --> 00:14:40.060 But in no case would we countenance a plan whereby the long-suffering highway travelers 151 00:14:40.060 --> 00:14:46.720 were forced to pay off the highwaymen for having lost the privilege of robbing them. 152 00:14:46.720 --> 00:14:52.220 In the same way, the argument should not be accepted that the long-suffering taxi-riding 153 00:14:52.220 --> 00:14:58.320 public should compensate owners for valueless medallions already purchased. 154 00:14:58.320 --> 00:15:04.900 If it ever came to a showdown between medallion owners and medallion grantors, politicians, 155 00:15:04.900 --> 00:15:10.440 The public should perhaps favor the owners, on the grounds that they pose less of a danger 156 00:15:10.440 --> 00:15:17.460 to them, and perhaps had originally paid for their medallions with money honestly earned. 157 00:15:17.460 --> 00:15:23.240 It is the politician's personal funds, or the funds of their estates, which should be 158 00:15:23.240 --> 00:15:26.380 used to pay off the medallion owners. 159 00:15:26.380 --> 00:15:29.580 A warlord is a warlord. 160 00:15:29.580 --> 00:15:34.900 out of public funds would only amount to further penalizing the public. 161 00:15:34.900 --> 00:15:40.380 If the money is not forthcoming from the politician's personal funds, the medallion owners must 162 00:15:40.380 --> 00:15:42.320 suffer the loss. 163 00:15:42.320 --> 00:15:47.660 When a permit which permits the robbery of the public is purchased, the purchaser must 164 00:15:47.660 --> 00:15:50.940 accept the risks attendant to his investment.