on Praxeology and the Praxeological Foundation of Epistemology
Section 4
In establishing the place of praxeology proper, I have come full circle in outlining the system of rationalist philosophy as ultimately grounded in the action axiom.
It has been my goal here to reaffirm Mises' claim that economics is praxeology, that the case for praxeology is an indisputable one,
and that empiricist or historicist-hermeneuticist interpretations of economics are self-contradictory doctrines.
And it has been my objective to indicate that the Misesian insight into the nature of praxeology
also provides the very foundation on which traditional rationalist philosophy
can be successfully reconstructed and systematically integrated.
For the rationalist philosopher, this would seem to imply that he should take account of praxeology,
For it is precisely the insight into the praxeological constraints on the structure of knowledge,
which provides the missing link in his intellectual defense against skepticism and relativism.
For the economist in the tradition of Mises, it means, I claim, that he should explicitly
come to recognize his place within the wider tradition of Western rationalism, and that
he should learn to incorporate the insights provided by this tradition in order to construct
an even more impressive and profound case for praxeology and Austrian economics than the one made by the great Mises himself.