WEBVTT

NOTE On Praxeology and the Praxeological Foundation of Epistemology: IV

1
00:00:00.000 --> 00:00:05.400
on Praxeology and the Praxeological Foundation of Epistemology

2
00:00:05.400 --> 00:00:06.900
Section 4

3
00:00:06.900 --> 00:00:17.400
In establishing the place of praxeology proper, I have come full circle in outlining the system of rationalist philosophy as ultimately grounded in the action axiom.

4
00:00:17.400 --> 00:00:26.400
It has been my goal here to reaffirm Mises' claim that economics is praxeology, that the case for praxeology is an indisputable one,

5
00:00:26.400 --> 00:00:33.400
and that empiricist or historicist-hermeneuticist interpretations of economics are self-contradictory doctrines.

6
00:00:33.400 --> 00:00:39.400
And it has been my objective to indicate that the Misesian insight into the nature of praxeology

7
00:00:39.400 --> 00:00:44.400
also provides the very foundation on which traditional rationalist philosophy

8
00:00:44.400 --> 00:00:48.400
can be successfully reconstructed and systematically integrated.

9
00:00:48.400 --> 00:00:53.400
For the rationalist philosopher, this would seem to imply that he should take account of praxeology,

10
00:00:53.400 --> 00:00:59.240
For it is precisely the insight into the praxeological constraints on the structure of knowledge,

11
00:00:59.240 --> 00:01:04.520
which provides the missing link in his intellectual defense against skepticism and relativism.

12
00:01:04.520 --> 00:01:08.760
For the economist in the tradition of Mises, it means, I claim, that he should explicitly

13
00:01:08.760 --> 00:01:14.000
come to recognize his place within the wider tradition of Western rationalism, and that

14
00:01:14.000 --> 00:01:18.840
he should learn to incorporate the insights provided by this tradition in order to construct

15
00:01:18.840 --> 00:01:26.840
an even more impressive and profound case for praxeology and Austrian economics than the one made by the great Mises himself.
