WEBVTT

NOTE The Origin and Nature of International Conflict

1
00:00:00.000 --> 00:00:13.120
Thank you, Gary. Thank you, Lou. I'm greatly honored as a recipient of this prize that

2
00:00:13.120 --> 00:00:19.040
makes me join the ranks of Otto von Habsburg and Ralph Reiko, who is still outside and

3
00:00:19.040 --> 00:00:47.040
I've been smoking this cigarette for a while, I was contemplating talking about something about my intellectual biography but then I noticed that intellectual biographies are in the meantime written already by 25 year olds and I realized that I was already too old for that.

4
00:00:47.040 --> 00:01:06.040
And instead of doing this, I followed Lew Rockwell's advice and chose a subject that fits into the general theme of this conference, reflections on state and war.

5
00:01:06.040 --> 00:01:17.040
And I want to begin my speech by saying something that I have said many times before that will not be a surprise to anyone.

6
00:01:17.040 --> 00:01:27.040
I will start with a definition of a state and then continue from there on.

7
00:01:27.040 --> 00:01:35.040
The state is defined as an agency with two unique characteristics.

8
00:01:35.040 --> 00:01:46.040
First, the state is a compulsory territorial monopolist of ultimate decision making or of jurisdiction.

9
00:01:46.040 --> 00:01:57.040
That is, it is the ultimate arbiter in every case of conflict, including conflicts involving itself, the state itself.

10
00:01:57.040 --> 00:02:02.040
And second, the state is a territorial monopolist of taxation.

11
00:02:02.040 --> 00:02:12.040
That is, it is an agency that unilaterally fixes the price that citizens must pay for its provision of law and order.

12
00:02:12.040 --> 00:02:23.040
Now, predictably, if one can only appeal to the state for justice, justice will be perverted in favor of the state.

13
00:02:23.040 --> 00:02:31.040
Instead of resolving conflict, the state will provoke conflict in order to settle it to its own advantage.

14
00:02:31.040 --> 00:02:42.040
And worse, while the quality of justice will fall under monopolistic auspices, the price of justice will always rise.

15
00:02:42.040 --> 00:02:56.040
Now, instead of concentrating on the internal consequences of the institution of the state, however, I will focus on its external consequences, on foreign policy.

16
00:02:56.040 --> 00:03:07.040
For one, as an agency that perverts justice and imposes taxes, every state is threatened with exit.

17
00:03:07.040 --> 00:03:16.040
That is, especially its most productive citizens may leave the territory of the state.

18
00:03:16.040 --> 00:03:35.040
No state likes this, of course. Instead of seeing the range of control and its tax base shrink, every state prefers that the tax base and the range of control is expanded.

19
00:03:35.040 --> 00:03:40.040
Yet that brings a state into conflict with other states.

20
00:03:40.040 --> 00:03:46.040
And unlike the competition between natural persons and institutions,

21
00:03:46.040 --> 00:03:52.040
the competition between states is an eliminative competition.

22
00:03:52.040 --> 00:04:01.040
That is, there can be only one monopolist of ultimate decision making and taxation in any given area.

23
00:04:01.040 --> 00:04:14.040
Consequently, the competition between states promotes a tendency toward political centralization and ultimately a single world state.

24
00:04:14.040 --> 00:04:24.040
Furthermore, as a tax-funded monopolist of ultimate decision making, states are aggressive institutions.

25
00:04:24.040 --> 00:04:37.040
Whereas natural persons and institutions must bear the cost of aggression themselves, states can externalize this cost onto their taxpayers.

26
00:04:37.040 --> 00:04:53.040
Hence, state agents are prone to become provocateurs and aggressors, and the process of centralization can be expected to proceed by means of interstate war.

27
00:04:53.040 --> 00:05:10.040
Moreover, given that states must begin small, and assuming as a starting point a multitude of independent territorial units, something specific about the requirement of success can be stated.

28
00:05:10.040 --> 00:05:26.040
Victory or defeat in interstate warfare depends, of course, on many factors, but in the long run, the decisive factor is the relative amount of economic resources at a state's disposal.

29
00:05:26.040 --> 00:05:33.040
Now, in taxing and regulating, states do not contribute to the creation of economic wealth.

30
00:05:33.040 --> 00:05:39.040
However, state governments can influence the amount of existing wealth negatively.

31
00:05:39.040 --> 00:05:46.040
That is to say, the lower the tax and regulation burden imposed on the domestic economy,

32
00:05:46.040 --> 00:05:53.040
the larger will be the amount of wealth on which the state can draw in its conflicts.

33
00:05:53.040 --> 00:05:59.040
That is, states which tax and regulate their economies comparatively little,

34
00:05:59.040 --> 00:06:09.040
That is, liberal states in the European sense tend to defeat and expand their territories at the expense of less liberal states.

35
00:06:09.040 --> 00:06:17.040
Now, this explains why Western Europe came to dominate the rest of the world instead of the other way around.

36
00:06:17.040 --> 00:06:28.040
And more specifically, it explains why it was first the Dutch, then the British, and finally the United States, which became the dominant imperial power.

37
00:06:28.040 --> 00:06:40.040
And why the United States, which is internally one of the most liberal states, again in a good sense, has conducted the most aggressive foreign policy.

38
00:06:40.040 --> 00:06:54.040
While the former Soviet Union, for instance, which is entirely illiberal, repressive domestic policy, has engaged in a comparatively peaceful and cautious foreign policy.

39
00:06:54.040 --> 00:07:01.040
because the United States knew that it could militarily beat any other state

40
00:07:01.040 --> 00:07:10.040
and in contrast, the Soviet Union knew that it was bound to lose a military confrontation with any state of substantial size

41
00:07:10.040 --> 00:07:14.040
unless it could win within a few weeks.

42
00:07:14.040 --> 00:07:24.040
Now, historically, most states were monarchies, ruled by absolute or constitutional kings.

43
00:07:24.040 --> 00:07:38.040
And democratic states, including so-called parliamentary monarchies, such as Britain, for instance, headed by presidents, were rare until the French Revolution.

44
00:07:38.040 --> 00:07:45.040
And these democracies have assumed historical importance only after World War I.

45
00:07:45.040 --> 00:07:55.040
Now while all states must be expected to be aggressive, the incentive structure faced by traditional kings on the one hand

46
00:07:55.040 --> 00:08:03.040
and by modern presidents on the other is different enough to account for different kinds of war.

47
00:08:03.040 --> 00:08:15.040
Whereas kings viewed themselves as the private owner of the territory under their control, presidents consider themselves as temporary caretakers.

48
00:08:15.040 --> 00:08:30.040
The owner of a resource, of a country, is concerned about the current income that is to be derived from the resource and about the capital value embodied in a country.

49
00:08:30.040 --> 00:08:40.040
His interests are because of this long run, with a concern for the preservation of the capital values embodied in his country.

50
00:08:40.040 --> 00:08:52.040
In contrast, the caretaker of a resource is concerned about his current income and pays little or no attention to capital values.

51
00:08:52.040 --> 00:09:05.040
The empirical upshot of this different incentive structure is that monarchical wars tended to be moderate and conservative as compared to democratic warfare.

52
00:09:05.040 --> 00:09:11.040
Monarchical wars typically arose out of inheritance disputes.

53
00:09:11.040 --> 00:09:21.040
They were characterized by tangible territorial objectives and not by ideological motives.

54
00:09:21.040 --> 00:09:33.040
The public considered the war, the king's private affair, to be executed with his own money and his own military forces.

55
00:09:33.040 --> 00:09:44.040
Moreover, as conflicts between different ruling families, kings felt compelled to recognize a distinction between combatants and noncombatants

56
00:09:44.040 --> 00:09:51.040
and target their war efforts exclusively against each other and their family estates.

57
00:09:51.040 --> 00:10:01.040
In contrast to the limited warfare of the Ancien Regime, the era of democratic warfare which began with the French Revolution

58
00:10:01.040 --> 00:10:09.040
and the Napoleonic Wars, which then continued during the 19th century with the American War of Southern Independence

59
00:10:09.040 --> 00:10:17.040
and which reached its apex with World War I and World War II, this era has been the era of total war.

60
00:10:17.040 --> 00:10:26.040
In blurring the distinction between the rulers and the ruled under democracy, we all rule ourselves, as you know,

61
00:10:26.040 --> 00:10:32.040
democracy has strengthened the identification of the public with a particular state,

62
00:10:32.040 --> 00:10:53.040
Rather than dynastic property disputes which could be resolved through conquest and occupation, democratic wars became ideological battles which could only be resolved through cultural, linguistic or religious domination and, if necessary, extermination.

63
00:10:53.040 --> 00:11:04.040
It became increasingly difficult for members of the public to extricate themselves from personal involvement in a war.

64
00:11:04.040 --> 00:11:10.040
Resistance against higher taxes to fund a war was considered to be treason.

65
00:11:10.040 --> 00:11:21.040
Because the democratic state, unlike a monarchy, was owned by all, conscription became the rule rather than the exception.

66
00:11:21.040 --> 00:11:40.040
and with mass armies of cheap and hence easily disposable conscripts fighting for national goals backed by the economic resources of the entire nation, all distinctions between combatants and non-combatants disappeared.

67
00:11:40.040 --> 00:11:49.040
Collateral damage was no longer an unintended side effect but became an integral part of warfare.

68
00:11:49.040 --> 00:12:13.040
Now so far I have explained how the institution of a state leads to war. Why, seemingly paradoxical, internally liberal states tend to be imperialist powers and how the spirit of democracy has contributed to the de-civilization in the conduct of war.

69
00:12:13.040 --> 00:12:37.040
More specifically, I have explained the rise of the United States to the rank of the world's foremost imperial power and as a consequence of its transformation, the transformation of the United States from the beginnings as an aristocratic republic into a mass democracy, the role of the United States as an increasingly arrogant warmonger.

70
00:12:37.040 --> 00:12:50.040
Now, what appears to be standing in the way of peace and civilization, then, is above all the state and democracy, and specifically, of course, the world's model democracy, the United States.

71
00:12:50.040 --> 00:13:03.040
But ironically, if not surprisingly, it is precisely the United States which claims that it is the solution to the quest for peace.

72
00:13:03.040 --> 00:13:20.040
The reason for this claim is the so-called doctrine of democratic peace, which goes back to the days of Woodrow Wilson and World War I, and has been revived in recent years by George Bush and his neoconservative advisors.

73
00:13:20.040 --> 00:13:31.040
Now, this theory of democratic peace claims the following. First, democracies do not go to war against each other.

74
00:13:31.040 --> 00:13:39.040
Second, hence, in order to create lasting peace, the entire world must be made democratic.

75
00:13:39.040 --> 00:13:50.040
And as a largely unstated corollary, three, today many states are not democratic and resist internal democratic reform.

76
00:13:50.040 --> 00:14:00.040
And fourth, hence war must be waged on those states in order to convert them to democracy and thus create lasting peace.

77
00:14:00.040 --> 00:14:16.040
Now, I do not have the patience for a full critique of the theory, but I shall provide a brief critique at least of the theory's premise and of its final conclusion.

78
00:14:16.040 --> 00:14:23.040
First thing, do democracies not go to war against each other?

79
00:14:23.040 --> 00:14:32.040
Now, since almost no democracies existed before the 20th century, the answer must obviously be found within the last 100 years or so.

80
00:14:32.040 --> 00:14:46.040
And in fact, the bulk of the evidence that is offered in favor of this thesis is that the countries of Western Europe have not gone to war against each other in the post-World War II era.

81
00:14:46.040 --> 00:14:53.040
Likewise, in the Pacific region, Japan and South Korea have not warred against each other.

82
00:14:53.040 --> 00:14:56.040
Now, does this evidence prove the case?

83
00:14:56.040 --> 00:15:00.040
Now, the democratic peace theorists obviously think so.

84
00:15:00.040 --> 00:15:05.040
As they see it, there are plenty of cases on which they can build their case.

85
00:15:05.040 --> 00:15:09.040
Germany did not war against France, Italy and England.

86
00:15:09.040 --> 00:15:12.040
France did not war against Spain, Italy and Belgium.

87
00:15:12.040 --> 00:15:30.040
Belgium and moreover there are permutations involved also. Germany did not attack France and France did not attack Germany. Thus we have seemingly dozens of confirmations and not a single counter example for more than 60 years but do we really have that?

88
00:15:30.040 --> 00:15:37.040
And the answer is of course no. What we actually have is no more than one single case.

89
00:15:37.040 --> 00:15:47.040
With the end of World War II, all of Western Europe and Japan and Korea in the Pacific region became part of the United States Empire,

90
00:15:47.040 --> 00:15:53.040
as is indicated by the presence of United States troops practically everywhere in these countries.

91
00:15:53.040 --> 00:16:09.040
Now, what the post-World War II period of peace then proves is not that democracies do not go to war against each other, but that an imperialist power such as the United States did not let its various colonial parts go to war against each other.

92
00:16:09.040 --> 00:16:19.040
You also did not see, by the way, any wars breaking out between all those countries that were dominated by the Soviet Union as long as the Soviet Empire existed,

93
00:16:19.040 --> 00:16:29.040
from which we also do not draw the conclusion that communist dictatorships under Russian control do not go to war against each other, so because of that we have to introduce something like this.

94
00:16:36.040 --> 00:16:42.040
So then, second point is, what about democracy as a solution to anything?

95
00:16:42.040 --> 00:16:54.040
First point, the theory involves a conceptual conflation of democracy and liberty or freedom that one can only call scandalous.

96
00:16:54.040 --> 00:17:06.040
The foundation of liberty is private property and private or exclusive property is incompatible with democracy which is nothing else but majority rule.

97
00:17:06.040 --> 00:17:19.040
Democracy is a soft variant of communism, and rarely in the history of ideas has it been taken for anything else but this, except of course Mr. Bush.

98
00:17:19.040 --> 00:17:33.040
Second, the theory of democratic peace distinguishes only between democracy and non-democracy, which it all summarily labels as dictatorships.

99
00:17:33.040 --> 00:17:45.040
Everything that is not a democracy is a dictatorship for them. Thus not only disappear all aristocratic republican regimes from its view, but also all traditional monarchies.

100
00:17:45.040 --> 00:17:58.040
They all are equated with dictatorships a la Lenin, Mussolini, Hitler, Stalin and Mao. In fact, however, traditional monarchies have little in common with dictatorships.

101
00:17:58.040 --> 00:18:09.040
Monarchies are the semi-organic outgrowth of hierarchically structured, natural, stateless societies.

102
00:18:09.040 --> 00:18:13.040
Kings are the heads of extended families, tribes and nations.

103
00:18:13.040 --> 00:18:21.040
They command a great deal of voluntarily acknowledged authority, which was accumulated over many generations.

104
00:18:21.040 --> 00:18:29.040
and it is within the framework of such orders that liberalism in the European sense first developed and flourished.

105
00:18:29.040 --> 00:18:33.040
And in contrast democracies are egalitarian in outlook.

106
00:18:33.040 --> 00:18:43.040
Characteristically the transition from the monarchical age to the democratic age beginning in the second half of the 19th century

107
00:18:43.040 --> 00:18:50.040
has seen the steady decline of liberal parties again in the European sense of the term liberal

108
00:18:50.040 --> 00:18:55.040
and a corresponding strengthening of socialists of all stripes.

109
00:18:55.040 --> 00:19:00.040
Democracy and socialism go hand in hand.

110
00:19:00.040 --> 00:19:06.040
Third, it follows from this that the view democratic peace theorists have of

111
00:19:06.040 --> 00:19:12.040
conflagrations such as World War I must be considered to be grotesque.

112
00:19:12.040 --> 00:19:19.040
For them, World War I was essentially a war of democracy against dictatorship

113
00:19:19.040 --> 00:19:26.040
And hence, it was progressive, peace enhancing and ultimately a justified war.

114
00:19:26.040 --> 00:19:29.040
In fact, however, matters are very, very different.

115
00:19:29.040 --> 00:19:39.040
To be sure, pre-war Germany, pre-World War I Germany and Austria may not have been as democratic as England or the United States.

116
00:19:39.040 --> 00:19:46.040
But Germany and Austria were not dictatorships but increasingly emasculated monarchies

117
00:19:46.040 --> 00:19:54.040
and as such arguably as liberal, if not more so than their counterparts, the United States and England.

118
00:19:54.040 --> 00:20:01.040
For instance, in the United States, anti-war proponents were jailed.

119
00:20:01.040 --> 00:20:07.040
The German language was essentially outlawed and citizens of German descent were harassed.

120
00:20:07.040 --> 00:20:12.040
Nothing comparable occurred in Austria and Germany at that time.

121
00:20:12.040 --> 00:20:28.040
In any case, however, the result of the crusade to make the world safe for democracy was less liberal than what had existed before and the Versailles Peace Dictate precipitated, as we all know, World War II.

122
00:20:28.040 --> 00:20:46.040
Not only did state power grow faster after World War I, after the democratization taking place, than before, in particular the treatment of minorities deteriorated in the democratized post-World War I period.

123
00:20:46.040 --> 00:21:05.040
In the newly founded Czechoslovakia, for instance, the Germans were systematically mistreated until they were finally expelled by the millions and butchered by the tens of thousands after World War II by the majority Czechs.

124
00:21:05.040 --> 00:21:11.040
Nothing remotely comparable had happened to the Czechs during the Habsburg reign, for instance.

125
00:21:11.040 --> 00:21:22.040
And the situation regarding the relations between Germans and South Slavs in pre-war Austria versus post-war Yugoslavia was quite similar.

126
00:21:22.040 --> 00:21:32.040
Democracy then, and this is something that Mises recognized in his 1919 book on nation economy and state,

127
00:21:32.040 --> 00:21:44.040
Democracy does not work in multi-ethnic societies. It does not create peace there, but promotes conflict and has potentially genocidal tendencies.

128
00:21:44.040 --> 00:21:53.040
Fourth point, the democratic peace theorists claim that democracy is a stable equilibrium.

129
00:21:53.040 --> 00:22:05.040
This has been stated most clearly by Francis Fukuyama who labeled the New Democratic World Order as the end of history.

130
00:22:05.040 --> 00:22:14.040
However, evidence exists that this claim is patently wrong on purely theoretical grounds.

131
00:22:14.040 --> 00:22:28.040
Now, how can democracy be at equilibrium if it is possible that democracy can be transformed democratically into a dictatorship, that is, a system which is considered to be not stable?

132
00:22:28.040 --> 00:22:37.040
The answer is that makes, of course, no sense whatsoever. In addition, empirically democracies are anything but stable.

133
00:22:37.040 --> 00:22:49.040
As indicated before in multicultural societies, democracy regularly leads to the oppression or even expulsion and extermination of minorities.

134
00:22:49.040 --> 00:22:55.040
That seems to be hardly a peaceful equilibrium.

135
00:22:55.040 --> 00:23:05.040
And in homogeneous societies, democracy regularly leads to class warfare, which leads to economic crises, which leads to dictatorship.

136
00:23:05.040 --> 00:23:23.040
Think for example of post-Zarist Russia, or think of post-World War I Italy, or of Weimar Germany, or of Spain or Portugal in more recent times, Greece, Turkey, Guatemala, Argentina, Chile and Pakistan.

137
00:23:23.040 --> 00:23:45.040
Not only is this correlation between democracy and dictatorship troublesome for democratic peace theorists. Worse, they must face the fact that the dictatorships emerging from crisis of democracy are not always worse from a libertarian point of view than what would have resulted otherwise.

138
00:23:45.040 --> 00:23:51.040
Cases can be cited where dictatorships were preferable. Think of Italy and Mussolini.

139
00:23:51.040 --> 00:23:59.040
Definitely preferable for having a democratically established communist Italy or Spain and Franco.

140
00:23:59.040 --> 00:24:06.040
In addition, how is one to square the advocacy of democracy with the fact that dictators,

141
00:24:06.040 --> 00:24:13.040
quite unlike kings, who although are ranked to an accident of birth, are often favorites of the masses.

142
00:24:13.040 --> 00:24:29.040
Just think of Lenin and Stalin, who were certainly more democratic than Tsar Nicholas II, or think of Hitler, who was definitely more democratic than Kaiser Willem or Franz Josef.

143
00:24:29.040 --> 00:24:58.040
According to the democratic peace theorists then, it would seem that we are supposed to war against foreign dictators, whether kings or demagogues, in order to install democracies which then turn into modern dictatorships until finally, one supposes, the United States itself has turned into a dictatorship owing to the growth of the internal state power which results from endless emergencies engendered by foreign wars.

144
00:24:58.040 --> 00:25:14.040
Now, better I dare say to heed the advice of Eric von Kühnel-Ledin and instead of aiming to make the world safe for democracy, we try making it safe from democracy everywhere, but most importantly, of course, in the United States.

145
00:25:14.040 --> 00:25:27.040
Now, after this excursion into the theory of democratic peace, I'm back to the proposition that there is no greater threat to lasting peace than the democratic state and in particular the United States.

146
00:25:27.040 --> 00:25:33.340
and the question thus is how to defend oneself against the United States.

147
00:25:33.340 --> 00:25:37.160
Now incidentally this is not only a question for foreigners

148
00:25:37.160 --> 00:25:39.720
but a question for Americans as well.

149
00:25:39.720 --> 00:25:46.240
After all the territory constituting the United States too is occupied territory

150
00:25:46.240 --> 00:25:50.320
conquered by the United States government.

151
00:25:50.320 --> 00:25:54.520
Now let us assume then that a small territory within the borders of the

152
00:25:54.520 --> 00:25:56.720
current United States

153
00:25:56.720 --> 00:26:04.720
A village, or a town, or a county declares its independence and secedes from the United States.

154
00:26:04.720 --> 00:26:10.720
What can and will the United States do in response to this?

155
00:26:10.720 --> 00:26:17.720
It is certainly possible that the United States will invade the territory and crush the secessionists.

156
00:26:17.720 --> 00:26:23.720
This is what the French Republic did to the Vendée during the French Revolution.

157
00:26:23.720 --> 00:26:33.720
This is what the Union did to the Confederacy and on a much smaller scale this is what the United States government did in Waco.

158
00:26:33.720 --> 00:26:41.720
But history also provides examples to the contrary. The Czechs and the Slovaks separated peacefully.

159
00:26:41.720 --> 00:26:49.720
Russia let Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia go. The Slovenes were let go by Yugoslavia at that time.

160
00:26:49.720 --> 00:26:54.720
Singapore was often even expelled from previous union with Malaysia.

161
00:26:54.720 --> 00:27:02.720
Now obviously the relative population size matters in the decision to war or not to war.

162
00:27:02.720 --> 00:27:08.720
Likewise it matters what resources are at the sessionist disposal.

163
00:27:08.720 --> 00:27:14.720
Also the geographical location can weigh in favor or against intervention.

164
00:27:14.720 --> 00:27:18.720
But this cannot be all.

165
00:27:18.720 --> 00:27:36.720
For how is one to explain, for instance, that France has not long ago conquered Monaco, or Germany, Luxembourg, or Switzerland, Liechtenstein, or Italy, the Vatican City, or the United States, Costa Rica?

166
00:27:36.720 --> 00:27:44.720
Or how is one to explain that the United States does not finish the job in Iraq by simply killing all Iraqis?

167
00:27:44.720 --> 00:27:52.720
Surely in terms of population, technology and geography, such are manageable tasks.

168
00:27:52.720 --> 00:28:02.720
Now the reason is not that French, German, Swiss, Italian or United States state rulers have scruples against conquest,

169
00:28:02.720 --> 00:28:12.720
confiscation and the imprisonment or killing of innocents. They do these things all the time on a daily basis, basis to their own population.

170
00:28:12.720 --> 00:28:18.720
Bush, for instance, has no compunction ordering to kill innocent Iraqis. He does so every day.

171
00:28:18.720 --> 00:28:23.720
Rather, what constrains the conduct of state rulers is public opinion.

172
00:28:23.720 --> 00:28:35.720
As Laboi, Ti, Rium, Mises, Rothbard have explained, government power ultimately rests on opinion and not on brute force.

173
00:28:35.720 --> 00:28:47.720
Bush does not kill himself or put a gun to the head of those he orders to kill. Generals and soldiers follow his orders on their own.

174
00:28:47.720 --> 00:28:59.720
Nor can Bush force anyone to continue providing him with the funds needed for his aggression. The citizenry must do so on its own.

175
00:28:59.720 --> 00:29:13.720
On the other hand, if the majority of general soldiers and citizens stop believing in the legitimacy of Bush's command, his commands turn into nothing more than hot air.

176
00:29:13.720 --> 00:29:22.720
It is this need for legitimacy that explains why state governments itching to go to war must offer a reason.

177
00:29:22.720 --> 00:29:31.720
The public is not typically in favor of killing innocent bystanders for fun and profit.

178
00:29:31.720 --> 00:29:42.720
Rather, in order to enlist the public's assistance, evidence must be manipulated so as to make aggression appear as defense.

179
00:29:42.720 --> 00:29:46.720
For what reasonable person could be against defense?

180
00:29:46.720 --> 00:29:58.720
Now, and we know, of course, the catchwords in all of this. They are Fort Sumter, the USS Maine, the Lusitania, Pearl Harbor and 9-11.

181
00:29:58.720 --> 00:30:06.720
It just turns out that not even an overwhelming size advantage is decisive in determining the course of action.

182
00:30:06.720 --> 00:30:19.720
That David Koresh and his followers in Waco could be brutally killed by the United States government was due to the fact that they could be portrayed as a bunch of crazy child molesters.

183
00:30:19.720 --> 00:30:25.720
Had there been normal people, an invasion might have been considered a public relations disaster.

184
00:30:25.720 --> 00:30:45.720
Moreover, regardless of whatever disadvantage that the secessionists have in terms of size, resources or location, this can all be made up by a favorable international public opinion, especially in the internet age when the spread of news is almost instantaneous.

185
00:30:45.720 --> 00:30:50.720
Now these considerations then bring me to my final points.

186
00:30:50.720 --> 00:31:00.720
The new secessionist country can be either another state or it can be a free stateless society.

187
00:31:00.720 --> 00:31:08.720
And I want to argue that the likelihood of successful defense against the United States

188
00:31:08.720 --> 00:31:18.720
is higher if the secessionists form a stateless society than if they opt for another smaller state.

189
00:31:18.720 --> 00:31:28.720
For whether large or small, states are always good at aggression, but always bad at defense.

190
00:31:28.720 --> 00:31:37.720
A society remark granting maybe prematurely that the United States had nothing to do with 9-11 directly.

191
00:31:37.720 --> 00:31:56.720
The events of that day certainly show that the United States was not good at defending its own citizens, first, by provoking the attacks, and secondly, in having its population disarmed and defenseless vis-à-vis box-cutting, wielding foreign invaders.

192
00:31:56.720 --> 00:32:03.720
Now, how would the defense of a free society differ from that of a state?

193
00:32:03.720 --> 00:32:14.720
As I explained, the likelihood of an attack depends essentially on the ease of manipulating the evidence so as to camouflage aggression as defense.

194
00:32:14.720 --> 00:32:20.720
And to discover such evidence is much easier in the case of a state.

195
00:32:20.720 --> 00:32:41.720
Even the most liberal state has a monopoly of jurisdiction and taxation and thus cannot but create victims who can be properly stylized as victims of human rights violations and thereby then provide an excuse for an invasion.

196
00:32:41.720 --> 00:33:05.720
Worse, if the new state is a democracy, it is unavoidable that one group, the Catholics or the Protestants, the Shiites or the Sunnis, the Whites or the Blacks, will use its power to dominate another, and again there exists then an excuse for invasion, namely to free the oppressed minority.

197
00:33:05.720 --> 00:33:11.720
Better still, the oppressed are incited to cry out for help.

198
00:33:11.720 --> 00:33:18.720
Moreover, in reaction to domestic oppression, terrorists may grow up who try to revenge the injustice.

199
00:33:18.720 --> 00:33:26.720
Just think of the Red Brigades, the RAF, the IRA, the ETA in bus country,

200
00:33:26.720 --> 00:33:46.720
and both the continued existence as well as the attempt of eradicating these terrorist organizations may provide reason to intervene, namely on the one hand to prevent the spread of terrorism or on the other hand to come to the rescue of freedom fighters.

201
00:33:46.720 --> 00:33:56.720
In contrast, in a free society, only private property owners and firms, including insurers, police and arbitration agencies, exist.

202
00:33:56.720 --> 00:34:04.720
And if there are any aggressions, they are those of criminals, of murderers, rapists, burglars and plain frauds.

203
00:34:04.720 --> 00:34:11.720
And it is very difficult to portray the treatment of criminals as criminals, as a reason for an invasion.

204
00:34:11.720 --> 00:34:22.040
and invasion. Now what if an attack does occur after all? In that case it might well be best

205
00:34:22.040 --> 00:34:31.280
to give up quickly, especially if the secessionist territory is very small. Thus Morgens Glistrup,

206
00:34:31.280 --> 00:34:38.160
the founder of the Danish Progress Party, he once recommended that the defense department

207
00:34:38.160 --> 00:34:45.160
of teeny Denmark be replaced with an answering machine announcing at that time to the Russians

208
00:34:45.720 --> 00:34:52.720
that we surrender. This way no destruction would occur and yet the reputation of the

209
00:34:56.080 --> 00:35:03.080
invading government as a defender and promoter of liberty would be soiled forever. Now this

210
00:35:03.080 --> 00:35:12.080
Now this leads then to our central question regarding the effectiveness of states versus free societies in matters of defense.

211
00:35:12.080 --> 00:35:22.080
Now as a monopolist of ultimate decision making, the state decides for everyone bindingly whether to resist or not to resist.

212
00:35:22.080 --> 00:35:30.080
If to resist, whether in the form of civil disobedience, armed resistance or some combination of these things.

213
00:35:30.080 --> 00:35:59.080
And if armed resistance of what form? If the state decides to put up no resistance, this may be a well-meaning decision, or it may be the result of bribes or threats by the invading state, but in any case, it will be contrary to the will of many who would have liked to resist and who are thus put in double jeopardy, because as resistors they now disobey their own state as well as the invaders.

214
00:36:00.080 --> 00:36:09.080
And on the other hand, if the state decides to resist, this again may be a well-meaning decision or it may be the result of pride or fear.

215
00:36:09.080 --> 00:36:19.080
But again, in any case, it too will be contrary to the preferences of many who would have liked not to resist or to resist by different means

216
00:36:19.080 --> 00:36:26.440
and who are now entangled as accomplices in the state schemes and subjected to the same

217
00:36:26.440 --> 00:36:33.320
collateral fallout and victor's justice as everyone else.

218
00:36:33.320 --> 00:36:38.320
The reaction of a free territory would be distinctly different.

219
00:36:38.320 --> 00:36:42.600
There is no government which makes one decision.

220
00:36:42.600 --> 00:36:50.120
Inside there are numerous institutions and individuals who choose their own defense strategy,

221
00:36:50.120 --> 00:36:54.200
each in accordance with one's own risk assessment.

222
00:36:54.200 --> 00:37:01.200
Consequently, the aggressor has far more difficulties conquering the territory.

223
00:37:01.200 --> 00:37:09.800
It is no longer sufficient to know the government, to win one decisive battle, or to gain control

224
00:37:09.800 --> 00:37:19.840
of Government Headquarters. Even if one opponent is known, one battle is won and one defense

225
00:37:19.840 --> 00:37:29.880
agency is defeated, this has no bearing whatsoever on others. Moreover, the multitude of command

226
00:37:29.880 --> 00:37:37.160
structures and strategies as well as the contractual character of free societies affect the conduct

227
00:37:37.160 --> 00:37:46.040
of both armed and unarmed resistance. As for armed resistance, in state territories the

228
00:37:46.040 --> 00:37:54.000
civilian population is typically unarmed and heavy reliance exists on regular tax and draft

229
00:37:54.000 --> 00:38:02.280
funded armies and conventional warfare. Hence the defense force create enemies even among

230
00:38:02.280 --> 00:38:15.280
are its own citizenry which the aggressor then can use to its own advantage and in any case there is little to fear for the aggressor once the regular army is defeated.

231
00:38:15.280 --> 00:38:31.280
In contrast, the population of free territories is likely heavily armed and the fighting is done by irregular militias led by defense professionals and in the form of guerrilla or partisan warfare.

232
00:38:31.280 --> 00:38:41.280
All fighters are volunteers and all of their support, food, shelter, logistical help and so on, is also voluntary.

233
00:38:41.280 --> 00:38:46.280
Hence, guerrillas must be extremely friendly to their own population.

234
00:38:46.280 --> 00:38:59.280
But precisely this, their entirely defensive character and their near unanimous support in public opinion can render them nearly invincible.

235
00:38:59.280 --> 00:39:12.280
Even by numerically far superior invading armies. History provides numerous examples for this. Napoleon's defeat in Spain against guerrillas fighting him.

236
00:39:12.280 --> 00:39:20.280
France's defeat in Algeria, for instance. The United States' defeat in Vietnam and Israel's defeat in South Lebanon.

237
00:39:20.280 --> 00:39:27.280
This consideration leads immediately to the other form of defense, namely civil disobedience.

238
00:39:27.280 --> 00:39:39.280
Provided only that the secessionists have the will to be free, the effectiveness of a strategy of civil disobedience can hardly be overestimated.

239
00:39:39.280 --> 00:39:47.280
Recall that power does not rest alone on brute force but must rely on opinion.

240
00:39:47.280 --> 00:39:54.280
The conquerors cannot put one man next to each secessionist and force him to obey their orders.

241
00:39:54.280 --> 00:40:03.280
The secessionists must obey by their own free will. However, if they do not, the conquerors will fail.

242
00:40:03.280 --> 00:40:09.280
Most importantly, civil disobedience can occur in many forms and degrees.

243
00:40:09.280 --> 00:40:17.280
It can range from ostentatious acts of defiance to entirely unobtrusive ways,

244
00:40:17.280 --> 00:40:22.280
thus allowing almost everyone to participate in the defense effort.

245
00:40:22.280 --> 00:40:30.680
effort, the courageous and the timid, the young and the old, leaders and followers.

246
00:40:30.680 --> 00:40:35.240
One may hide armed fighters or not hinder them.

247
00:40:35.240 --> 00:40:42.000
One may publicly refuse to obey certain laws or evade and ignore them.

248
00:40:42.000 --> 00:40:49.840
One may engage in sabotage, obstruction, negligence or simply display a lack of diligence.

249
00:40:49.840 --> 00:41:05.840
One may openly scoff at orders or comply only incompletely. Tax payments may be refused or evaded. There may be demonstrations, sit-ins, boycotts, work stoppages or plane slacking off.

250
00:41:05.840 --> 00:41:14.840
The conquerors may be maltreated, molested, ridiculed, laughed at or simply ostracized and never assisted in anything.

251
00:41:14.840 --> 00:41:26.840
In any case, all of this contributes to the very same result, namely to render the conquerors powerless, to make them despair and finally resign and withdraw.

252
00:41:26.840 --> 00:41:37.840
Now, as is often the case, the first step in the anti-imperialist, anti-democratic struggle is always the most difficult one.

253
00:41:37.840 --> 00:41:43.840
Indeed, the difficulties are enormous. I do not want to just minimize this.

254
00:41:43.840 --> 00:41:49.840
But once the first step has been successfully taken, however, things get successively easier.

255
00:41:49.840 --> 00:41:55.840
Once the number of secessionist territories has reached a critical mass,

256
00:41:55.840 --> 00:42:01.840
and every success in one location will promote imitation in other localities,

257
00:42:01.840 --> 00:42:07.840
then the difficulties of crushing the secessionists will increase exponentially.

258
00:42:07.840 --> 00:42:18.840
In fact, the more time passes, the greater will be the comparative economic and technological advantage of free territories.

259
00:42:18.840 --> 00:42:27.840
And in light of the ever increasing attractiveness and economic opportunities offered by free territories,

260
00:42:27.840 --> 00:42:39.840
The imperialist powers will be increasingly happy if they can hang on to their power rather than risk whatever legitimacy they still have in an attack.

261
00:42:39.840 --> 00:42:44.840
So there is some hope at least. Thank you very much.
