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NOTE 1. Defense Services on the Free Market

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Power and Market

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Chapter 1 Defense Services on the Free Market

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Economists have referred innumerable times to the free market,

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the social array of voluntary exchanges of goods and services.

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But despite this abundance of treatment,

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their analysis has slighted the deeper implications of free exchange.

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Exchange.

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Thus, there has been general neglect of the fact that free exchange means exchange of

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titles of ownership to property, and that therefore the economist is obliged to inquire

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into the conditions and the nature of the property ownership that would obtain in the

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free society.

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If a free society means a world in which no one aggresses against the person or property

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of Others, then this implies a society in which every man has the absolute right of

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property in his own self, and in the previously unowned natural resources that he finds, transforms

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by his own labor, and then gives to or exchanges with others.

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A firm property right in one's own self, and in the resources that one finds, transforms,

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gives or exchanges leads to the property structure that is found in free market capitalism.

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Thus, an economist cannot fully analyze the exchange structure of the free market without

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setting forth the theory of property rights, of justice in property that would have to

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obtain in a free market society.

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In our analysis of the free market in man economy and state, we assumed that no invasion

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of Property takes place there, either because everyone voluntarily refrains from such aggression,

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or because whatever method of forcible defense exists on the free market is sufficient to

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prevent any such aggression.

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But economists have almost invariably and paradoxically assumed that the market must be kept free

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Free by the use of invasive and unfree actions, in short, by governmental institutions outside

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the market nexus.

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A supply of defense services on the free market would mean maintaining the axiom of the free

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society, namely that there be no use of physical force except in defense against those using

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force to invade person or property.

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This would imply the complete absence of a state apparatus or government.

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For the state, unlike all other persons and institutions in society, acquires its revenue

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not by exchanges freely contracted, but by a system of unilateral coercion called taxation.

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Defense in the free society, including such defense services to person and property as

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as Police Protection and Judicial Findings would therefore have to be supplied by people or firms who

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a. gained their revenue voluntarily rather than by coercion, and

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b. did not, as the state does, arrogate to themselves a compulsory monopoly of police or judicial protection.

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Only such libertarian provision of defense service would be consonant with a free market

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and a free society. Thus, defense firms would have to be as freely competitive and as invaders

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as are all other suppliers of goods and services on the free market. Defense services,

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like all other services, would be marketable and marketable only.

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Those economists and others who espouse the philosophy of laissez-faire believe that the freedom of the market should be upheld, and that property rights must not be invaded.

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Nevertheless, they strongly believe that defense service cannot be supplied by the market,

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and that defense against invasion of property must therefore be supplied outside the free

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market by the coercive force of the government.

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In arguing thus, they are caught in an insoluble contradiction, for they sanction and advocate

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massive invasion of property by the very agency, government, that is supposed to defend people

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against invasion.

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For a laissez-faire, government would necessarily have to seize its revenues by the invasion

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of property called taxation, and would arrogate to itself a compulsory monopoly of defense

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services over some arbitrarily designated territorial area.

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The laissez-faire theorists, who are here joined by almost all other writers, attempt

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to redeem their position from this glaring contradiction by asserting that a purely free-market

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defense service could not exist, and that therefore those who value highly forcible

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defense against violence would have to fall back on the state, despite its black historical

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The Federal Record as the great engine of invasive violence as a necessary evil for the protection of person and property.

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The laissez-faireists offer several objections to the idea of free market defense.

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One objection holds that since a free market of exchanges presupposes a system of property rights,

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of Property Rights, Therefore the State is needed to define and allocate the structure

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of such rights.

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But we have seen that the principles of a free society do imply a very definite theory

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of property rights, namely self-ownership and the ownership of natural resources found

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and transformed by one's labor.

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Therefore, no state or similar agency, contrary to the market, is needed to define or allocate

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property rights.

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This can and will be done by the use of reason and through market processes themselves.

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Any other allocation or definition would be completely arbitrary and contrary to the principles

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of the free society.

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A similar doctrine holds that defense must be supplied by the state because of the unique

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status of defense as a necessary precondition of market activity, as a function without

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which a market economy could not exist.

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Yet this argument is a non sequitur that proves far too much.

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It was the fallacy of the classical economists to consider goods and services in terms of

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of Large Classes Instead, modern economics demonstrates that

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services must be considered in terms of marginal units, for all actions on the market are marginal.

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If we begin to treat whole classes instead of marginal units, we can discover a great

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myriad of necessary indispensable goods and services, all of which might be considered

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as pre-conditions of market activity is not land room vital or food for each participant

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or clothing or shelter?

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Can a market long exist without them?

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And what of paper, which has become a basic requisite of market activity in the complex

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modern economy?

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Must all these goods and services therefore be supplied by the state and the state only?

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The laissez-fairest also assumes that there must be a single compulsory monopoly of coercion

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and decision-making in society, that there must, for example, be one supreme court to

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hand down final and unquestioned decisions.

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But he fails to recognize that the world has lived quite well throughout its existence

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without a single ultimate decision-maker over its whole inhabited surface.

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The Argentinian, for example, lives in a state of anarchy, of non-government in relation

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to the citizen of Uruguay or of Ceylon.

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And yet, the private citizens of these and other countries live and trade together without

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Without getting into insoluble legal conflicts, despite the absence of a common governmental

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ruler.

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The Argentinian who believes he has been aggressed upon by a Salonese, for example, takes his

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grievance to an Argentinian court, and its decision is recognized by the Salonese courts,

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and vice versa if the Salonese is the aggrieved party.

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Although it is true that the separate nation-states have warred interminably against each other,

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the private citizens of the various countries, despite widely differing legal systems, have

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managed to live together in harmony without having a single government over them.

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If the citizens of northern Montana and of Saskatchewan across the border can live and

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and trade together in harmony without a common government, so can the citizens of northern

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and of southern Montana.

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In short, the present-day boundaries of nations are purely historical and arbitrary, and there

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is no more need for a monopoly government over the citizens of one country than there

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is for one between the citizens of two different nations.

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It is all the more curious, incidentally, that while laissez-faireists should, by the

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logic of their position, be ardent believers in a single, unified world government, so

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that no one will live in a state of anarchy in relation to anyone else, they almost never

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are.

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And once one concedes that a single world government is not necessary, then where does

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Why does one logically stop at the permissibility of separate states?

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If Canada and the United States can be separate nations without being denounced as being in

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a state of impermissible anarchy, why may not the South secede from the United States,

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New York State from the Union, New York City from the State?

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Why may not Manhattan secede?

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Each neighborhood, each block, each house, each person.

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But of course, if each person may secede from government, we have virtually arrived at the

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purely free society, where defense is supplied along with all other services by the free

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market and where the invasive state has ceased to exist.

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The role of freely competitive judiciaries has, in fact, been far more important in the

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history of the West than is often recognized.

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The law merchant, admiralty law, and much of the common law began to be developed by

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privately competitive judges who were sought out by litigants for their expertise in understanding

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the legal areas involved.

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The fairs of Champagne and the great marches of international trade in the Middle Ages enjoyed

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freely competitive courts, and people could patronize those that they deemed most accurate

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and efficient.

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Let us then examine in a little more detail what a free market defense system might look

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like.

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It is, we must realize, impossible to blueprint the exact institutional conditions of any

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Any Market in Advance, just as it would have been impossible 50 years ago to predict the

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exact structure of the television industry today.

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However, we can postulate some of the workings of a freely competitive, marketable system

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of police and judicial services.

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Most likely, such services would be sold on an advance subscription basis, with premiums

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Payments paid regularly and services to be supplied on call.

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Many competitors would undoubtedly arise, each attempting by earning a reputation for

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efficiency and probity to win a consumer market for its services.

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Of course it is possible that in some areas a single agency would out-compete all others.

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But this does not seem likely when we realize that there is no territorial monopoly and

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that efficient firms would be able to open branches in other geographical areas.

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It seems likely also that supplies of police and judicial service would be provided by

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insurance companies, because it would be to their direct advantage to reduce the amount

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of crime as much as possible.

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One common objection to the feasibility of marketable protection, its desirability is

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not the problem here, runs as follows.

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Suppose that Jones subscribes to defense agency X and Smith subscribes to defense agency Y.

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We will assume, for convenience, that the defense agency includes a police force and

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and a court or courts, although in practice these two functions might well be performed

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by separate firms.

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Smith alleges that he has been assaulted or robbed by Jones.

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Jones denies the charge.

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How then is justice to be dispensed?

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Clearly, Smith will file charges against Jones and institute suit or trial proceedings in

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the why court system.

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Jones is invited to defend himself against the charges, although there can be no subpoena

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power since any sort of force used against a man not yet convicted of a crime is itself

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an invasive and criminal act that could not be consonant with the free society as we have

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been postulating.

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If Jones is declared innocent, or if he is declared guilty and consents to the finding,

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Then there is no problem on this level, and the why courts then institute suitable measures

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of punishment.

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Suppose that Smith, convinced of Jones' guilt, takes the law into his own hands rather than

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go through the court procedure.

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What then?

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In itself, this would be legitimate and not punishable as a crime, since no court or agency

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may have the right in a free society to use force for defense beyond the self-same right

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of each individual.

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However, Smith would then have to face the consequences of a possible counter-suit and

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trial by Jones, and he himself would have to face punishment as a criminal if Jones

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is found to be innocent.

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But what if Jones challenges the finding?

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In that case, he can either take the case to his ex-court system, or take it directly

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to a privately competitive appeals court of a type that will undoubtedly spring up in

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abundance on the market to fill the great need for such tribunals.

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Probably there will be just a few appeals court systems, far fewer than the number of

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of Primary Courts, and each of the lower courts will boast to its customers about being members

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of those appeals court systems noted for their efficiency and probity.

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The appeals court decision can then be taken by the society as binding.

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Indeed, in the basic legal code of the free society, there probably would be enshrined

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some such clause as that the decision of any two courts will be considered binding, that

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is, will be the point at which the court will be able to take action against the party adjudged

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guilty.

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The law code of the purely free society would simply enshrine the libertarian axiom, prohibition

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of any violence against the person or property of another, except in defense of someone's

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Transformation or Property, Property to be defined as self-ownership plus the ownership

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of resources that one has found, transformed or bought or received after such transformation.

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The task of the code would be to spell out the implications of this axiom.

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For example, the libertarian sections of the law merchant or common law would be co-opted,

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While the statist accretions would be discarded, the code would then be applied to specific

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cases by the free market judges who would all pledge themselves to follow it.

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Every legal system needs some sort of socially agreed upon cut-off point, a point at which

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judicial procedure stops and punishment against the convicted criminal begins.

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But a single monopoly court of ultimate decision-making need not be imposed, and, of course, cannot

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be in a free society, and a libertarian legal code might well have a two-court cut-off point,

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since there are always two contesting parties, the plaintiff and the defendant.

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Another common objection to the workability of free-market defense wonders, may not one

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One or more of the defense agencies turn its coercive power to criminal uses.

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In short, may not a private police agency use its force to aggress against others, or

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may not a private court collude to make fraudulent decisions and thus aggress against its subscribers

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and victims?

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It is very generally assumed that those who postulate a stateless society are also naive

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The Theory of Money and Credit

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No government apparatus, the control of which, provides a secure monopoly for invasion of person and property.

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When a state exists, there does exist such a built-in channel, namely, the coercive taxation power and the compulsory monopoly of forcible protection.

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In the purely free market society, a would-be criminal, police or judiciary would find it very difficult to take power,

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since there would be no organized state apparatus to seize and use as the instrumentality of command.

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To create such an instrumentality de novo is very difficult, and indeed almost impossible.

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Historically, it took state rulers centuries to establish a functioning state apparatus.

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Furthermore, the purely free market stateless society would contain within itself a system

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of built-in checks and balances that would make it almost impossible for such organized

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crime to succeed.

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There has been much talk about checks and balances in the American system, but these

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These can scarcely be considered checks at all, since every one of these institutions

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is an agency of the central government, and eventually of the ruling party of that government.

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The checks and balances in the stateless society consist precisely in the free market, that

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is, the existence of freely competitive police and judicial agencies that could quickly be

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be mobilized to put down any outlaw agency.

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It is true that there can be no absolute guarantee that a purely market society would not fall

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prey, but this concept is far more workable than the truly utopian ideal of a strictly

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limited government, an idea that has never worked, historically, and understandably so,

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For the state's built-in monopoly of aggression and inherent absence of free-market checks

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has enabled it to burst easily any bonds that well-meaning people have tried to place upon

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it.

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Finally, the worst that could possibly happen would be for the state to be re-established,

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and since the state is what we have now, any experimentation with a stateless society would

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have nothing to lose and everything to gain.

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Many economists object to marketable defense on the grounds that defense is one of an alleged

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category of collective goods that can be supplied only by the state.

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This fallacious theory is refuted elsewhere.

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And Merlin H. Hunter and Harry K. Allen, two of the very few economists who have conceded

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and the possibility of a purely market defense have written,

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If then individuals were willing to pay sufficiently high price, protection, general education,

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recreation, the army, navy, police departments, schools and parks might be provided through

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individual initiative as well as food, clothing and automobiles.

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Actually, Hunter and Allen greatly underestimated the workability of private action in providing

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these services.

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For a compulsory monopoly, gaining its revenues out of generalized coercion rather than by

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the voluntary payment of the customers is bound to be strikingly less efficient than

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a freely competitive private enterprise supply of such services.

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The price paid would be a great gain to society and to the consumers, rather than an imposed

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extra cost.

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Thus, a truly free market is totally incompatible with the existence of a state, an institution

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that presumes to defend person and property by itself subsisting on the unilateral coercion

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Against Private Property, known as taxation.

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On the free market, defense against violence would be a service, like any other, obtainable

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from freely competitive private organizations.

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Whatever problems remain in this area could easily be solved in practice by the market

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process, that very process which has solved countless organizational problems of far greater

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intricacy.

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Those laissez-faire economists and writers, past and present, who have stopped short at

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the impossibly utopian ideal of a limited government, are trapped in a grave inner contradiction.

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This contradiction of laissez-faire was lucidly exposed by the British political philosopher

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Auberon Herbert

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A is to compel B to cooperate with him, or B to compel A. But in any case, cooperation

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cannot be secured, as we are told, unless, through all time, one section is compelling

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another section to form a state.

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Very good.

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But then, what has become of our system of individualism?

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A has got hold of B or B of A and has he disapproves, extracts service and payment from him which

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he does not wish to render, has virtually become his master.

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What is all this but socialism on a reduced scale?

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Believing then that the judgment of every individual who has not aggressed against his

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is supreme as regards his actions, and that this is the rock on which individualism rests.

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I deny that A and B can go to C and force him to form a state, and extract from him

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certain payments and services in the name of such state.

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And I go on to maintain that if you act in this manner, you at once justify state socialism.
