WEBVTT

NOTE 16. Knowledge, True and False

1
00:00:00.000 --> 00:00:06.800
CHAPTER XVI. KNOWLEDGE, TRUE AND FALSE.

2
00:00:06.800 --> 00:00:12.800
Our theory of property rights can be used to unravel a tangled skein of complex problems

3
00:00:12.800 --> 00:00:20.780
revolving around questions of knowledge, true and false, and the dissemination of that knowledge.

4
00:00:20.780 --> 00:00:26.640
Does Smith, for example, have the right—again, we are concerned about his right, not the

5
00:00:26.640 --> 00:00:40.640
to print and disseminate the statement that Jones is a liar, or that Jones is a convicted thief, or that Jones is a homosexual.

6
00:00:40.640 --> 00:00:45.640
There are three logical possibilities about the truth of such a statement.

7
00:00:45.640 --> 00:00:48.640
A. That the statement about Jones is true.

8
00:00:48.640 --> 00:00:52.640
B. That it is false and Smith knows it is false.

9
00:00:52.640 --> 00:00:59.280
Or, see, most realistically, that the truth or falsity of the statement is a fuzzy zone,

10
00:00:59.280 --> 00:01:02.360
not certainly and precisely knowable.

11
00:01:02.360 --> 00:01:07.980
For example, in the above cases, whether or not someone is a liar depends on how many

12
00:01:07.980 --> 00:01:14.080
and how intense the pattern of lies a person has told, and is a judge to add up to the

13
00:01:14.080 --> 00:01:22.400
category of liar, an area where individual judgments can and will properly differ.

14
00:01:22.400 --> 00:01:26.120
Suppose that Smith's statement is definitely true.

15
00:01:26.120 --> 00:01:31.240
It seems clear then that Smith has a perfect right to print and disseminate the statement,

16
00:01:31.240 --> 00:01:34.560
for it is within his property right to do so.

17
00:01:34.560 --> 00:01:39.120
It is also, of course, within the property right of Jones to try to rebut the statement

18
00:01:39.120 --> 00:01:41.060
in his turn.

19
00:01:41.060 --> 00:01:47.260
The current libel laws make Smith's action illegal if done with malicious intent, even

20
00:01:47.260 --> 00:01:49.880
though the information be true.

21
00:01:49.880 --> 00:01:56.020
And yet, surely, legality or illegality should depend not on the motivation of the actor,

22
00:01:56.020 --> 00:01:59.080
but on the objective nature of the act.

23
00:01:59.080 --> 00:02:04.320
If an action is objectively non-invasive, then it should be legal regardless of the

24
00:02:04.320 --> 00:02:10.000
benevolent or malicious intentions of the actor, though the latter may well be relevant

25
00:02:10.000 --> 00:02:13.000
to the morality of the action.

26
00:02:13.000 --> 00:02:18.660
And this is aside from the obvious difficulties in legally determining an individual's subjective

27
00:02:18.660 --> 00:02:34.660
It might, however, be charged that Smith does not have the right to print such a statement, because Jones has a right to privacy, his human right, which Smith does not have the right to violate.

28
00:02:34.660 --> 00:02:45.660
But is there really such a right to privacy? How can there be? How can there be a right to prevent Smith by force from disseminating knowledge which he possesses?

29
00:02:45.660 --> 00:02:52.780
Surely, there can be no such right. Smith owns his own body, and therefore has the property

30
00:02:52.780 --> 00:02:58.980
right to own the knowledge he has inside his head, including his knowledge about Jones,

31
00:02:58.980 --> 00:03:05.060
and therefore he has the corollary right to print and disseminate that knowledge. In short,

32
00:03:05.060 --> 00:03:10.400
as in the case of the human right to free speech, there is no such thing as a right

33
00:03:10.400 --> 00:03:16.400
to Privacy except the right to protect one's property from invasion.

34
00:03:16.400 --> 00:03:21.920
The only right to privacy is the right to protect one's property from being invaded

35
00:03:21.920 --> 00:03:24.080
by someone else.

36
00:03:24.080 --> 00:03:29.360
In brief, no one has the right to burgle someone else's home or to wiretap someone's

37
00:03:29.360 --> 00:03:31.660
phone lines.

38
00:03:31.660 --> 00:03:37.600
Wiretapping is properly a crime not because of some vague and woolly invasion of a right

39
00:03:37.600 --> 00:03:45.400
to Privacy but because it is an invasion of the property right of the person being wiretapped.

40
00:03:45.400 --> 00:03:50.520
At the present time the courts distinguish between persons in the public eye who are

41
00:03:50.520 --> 00:03:56.960
adjudged not to have a right to privacy against being mentioned in the public press, and private

42
00:03:56.960 --> 00:04:00.680
persons who are considered to have such a right.

43
00:04:00.680 --> 00:04:04.120
And yet such distinctions are surely fallacious.

44
00:04:04.120 --> 00:04:09.060
To the libertarian, everyone has the same right in his person and in the goods which

45
00:04:09.060 --> 00:04:15.480
he finds, inherits or buys, and it is illegitimate to make distinctions in property right between

46
00:04:15.480 --> 00:04:18.320
one group of people and another.

47
00:04:18.320 --> 00:04:24.000
If there were some sort of right to privacy, then simply being mentioned widely in the

48
00:04:24.000 --> 00:04:30.460
press, that is, previous losses of the right, could scarcely warrant being deprived of such

49
00:04:30.460 --> 00:04:32.040
right completely.

50
00:04:32.040 --> 00:04:39.400
No, the only proper course is to maintain that no one has any spurious right to privacy

51
00:04:39.400 --> 00:04:45.440
or right not to be mentioned publicly, while everyone has the right to protect his property

52
00:04:45.440 --> 00:04:47.540
against invasion.

53
00:04:47.540 --> 00:04:53.220
No one can have a property right in the knowledge in someone else's head.

54
00:04:53.220 --> 00:04:58.160
In recent years, Watergate and the Pentagon Papers have brought to the fore such questions

55
00:04:58.160 --> 00:05:04.760
Treatments as Privacy, the Privileges of Newspaper Men, and the Public's Right to Know.

56
00:05:04.760 --> 00:05:09.640
Should for example a Newspaper Man have the right to protect his sources of information

57
00:05:09.640 --> 00:05:11.480
in court?

58
00:05:11.480 --> 00:05:17.320
Many people claim that Newspaper Men have such a right, basing that claim either A.

59
00:05:17.320 --> 00:05:24.600
on special privileges of confidentiality allegedly accruing to Newspaper Men, lawyers, doctors,

60
00:05:24.600 --> 00:05:35.600
on the public's right to know, and hence on the widest possible knowledge as disseminated in the press.

61
00:05:35.600 --> 00:05:40.600
And yet it should be clear by this point that both such claims are spurious.

62
00:05:40.600 --> 00:05:48.600
On the latter point, no one person or group of people, and therefore the public, has the right to know anything.

63
00:05:48.600 --> 00:05:53.600
They have no right to knowledge which other people have and refuse to disseminate.

64
00:05:53.600 --> 00:06:00.600
For if a man has the absolute right to disseminate knowledge inside his head, he also has the

65
00:06:00.600 --> 00:06:04.880
corollary right not to disseminate that knowledge.

66
00:06:04.880 --> 00:06:07.280
There is no right to know.

67
00:06:07.280 --> 00:06:13.360
There is only the right of the knower to either disseminate his knowledge or to keep silent.

68
00:06:13.360 --> 00:06:18.980
Neither can any particular profession, be it newsmen or physicians, claim any particular

69
00:06:18.980 --> 00:06:34.000
The solution to the problem of the newsman's sources, indeed, rests in the right of the

70
00:06:34.000 --> 00:06:41.760
knower, any knower, to keep silent, to not disseminate knowledge if he so desires. Hence

71
00:06:41.760 --> 00:06:47.300
not only newsmen and physicians, but everyone should have the right to protect their sources

72
00:06:47.300 --> 00:06:51.540
or to be silent, in court or anywhere else.

73
00:06:51.540 --> 00:06:56.500
And this indeed is the other side of the coin of our previous strictures against the compulsory

74
00:06:56.500 --> 00:06:58.480
subpoena power.

75
00:06:58.480 --> 00:07:04.500
No one should be forced to testify at all, not only against himself, as in the Fifth

76
00:07:04.500 --> 00:07:09.740
Amendment, but against or for anyone else.

77
00:07:09.740 --> 00:07:15.820
Compulsory testimony itself is the central evil in this entire problem.

78
00:07:15.820 --> 00:07:20.540
There is, however, an exception to the right to use and disseminate the knowledge within

79
00:07:20.540 --> 00:07:26.880
one's head, namely, if it was procured from someone else as a conditional rather than

80
00:07:26.880 --> 00:07:28.620
absolute ownership.

81
00:07:28.620 --> 00:07:34.900
Thus, suppose that Brown allows Green into his home and shows him an invention of Brown's

82
00:07:34.900 --> 00:07:41.940
hitherto kept secret, but only on the condition that Green keeps this information private.

83
00:07:41.940 --> 00:07:47.180
In that case, Brown has granted to Greene not absolute ownership of the knowledge of

84
00:07:47.180 --> 00:07:53.140
his invention, but conditional ownership, with Brown retaining the ownership power to

85
00:07:53.140 --> 00:07:56.660
disseminate the knowledge of the invention.

86
00:07:56.660 --> 00:08:01.880
If Greene discloses the invention anyway, he is violating the residual property right

87
00:08:01.880 --> 00:08:09.800
of Brown to disseminate knowledge of the invention, and is therefore to that extent a thief.

88
00:08:09.800 --> 00:08:16.300
Violation of common law copyright is an equivalent violation of contract and theft of property.

89
00:08:16.300 --> 00:08:22.080
For suppose that Brown builds a better mousetrap and sells it widely, but stamps each mousetrap

90
00:08:22.080 --> 00:08:24.680
copyright Mr. Brown.

91
00:08:24.680 --> 00:08:30.200
What he is then doing is selling not the entire property right in each mousetrap, but the

92
00:08:30.200 --> 00:08:36.560
right to do anything with the mousetrap except to sell it, or an identical copy, to someone

93
00:08:36.560 --> 00:08:38.120
else.

94
00:08:38.120 --> 00:08:45.080
The right to sell the brown mousetrap is retained in perpetuity by Brown. Hence for a mousetrap

95
00:08:45.080 --> 00:08:51.440
buyer, green, to go ahead and sell identical mousetraps is a violation of his contract

96
00:08:51.440 --> 00:08:59.320
and of the property right of Brown, and therefore prosecutable as theft. Hence our theory of

97
00:08:59.320 --> 00:09:05.520
property rights includes the inviolability of contractual copyright.

98
00:09:05.520 --> 00:09:08.440
A common objection runs as follows.

99
00:09:08.440 --> 00:09:14.120
All right, it would be criminal for Green to produce and sell the brown mousetrap.

100
00:09:14.120 --> 00:09:19.280
But suppose that someone else, Black, who had not made a contract with Brown, happens

101
00:09:19.280 --> 00:09:25.060
to see Green's mousetrap and then goes ahead and produces and sells the replica.

102
00:09:25.060 --> 00:09:28.040
Why should he be prosecuted?

103
00:09:28.040 --> 00:09:33.120
The answer is that, as in the case of our critique of negotiable instruments, no one

104
00:09:33.120 --> 00:09:38.440
One can acquire a greater property title in something than has already been given away

105
00:09:38.440 --> 00:09:40.440
or sold.

106
00:09:40.440 --> 00:09:45.520
Green did not own the total property right in his mousetrap in accordance with his contract

107
00:09:45.520 --> 00:09:51.840
with Brown, but only all rights except to sell it or a replica.

108
00:09:51.840 --> 00:09:57.520
But therefore Black's title in the mousetrap, the ownership of the ideas in Black's head,

109
00:09:57.520 --> 00:10:03.680
can be no greater than Green's, and therefore he too would be a violator of Brown's property

110
00:10:03.680 --> 00:10:08.720
even though he himself had not made the actual contract.

111
00:10:08.720 --> 00:10:13.680
Of course there may be some difficulties in the actual enforcement of Brown's property

112
00:10:13.680 --> 00:10:21.100
right, namely that as in all cases of alleged theft or other crime, every defendant is innocent

113
00:10:21.100 --> 00:10:23.460
until proven guilty.

114
00:10:23.460 --> 00:10:29.520
It would be necessary for Brown to prove that black, green would not pose a problem, had

115
00:10:29.520 --> 00:10:36.600
access to Brown's mousetrap and did not invent this kind of mousetrap by himself independently.

116
00:10:36.600 --> 00:10:42.460
By the nature of things, some products, for example, books, paintings, are easier to prove

117
00:10:42.460 --> 00:10:50.040
to be unique products of individual minds than others, for example, mousetraps.

118
00:10:50.040 --> 00:10:56.080
If then Smith has the absolute right to disseminate knowledge about Jones, we are still assuming

119
00:10:56.080 --> 00:11:00.920
that the knowledge is correct, and has the corollary right to keep silent about that

120
00:11:00.920 --> 00:11:07.760
knowledge, then a fortiori, surely he also has the right to go to Jones and receive payment

121
00:11:07.760 --> 00:11:11.680
in exchange for not disseminating such information.

122
00:11:11.680 --> 00:11:16.160
In short, Smith has the right to blackmail Jones.

123
00:11:16.160 --> 00:11:21.680
As in all voluntary exchanges, both parties benefit from such an exchange. Smith receives

124
00:11:21.680 --> 00:11:27.240
money and Jones obtains the service of Smith's not disseminating information about him, which

125
00:11:27.240 --> 00:11:33.400
Jones does not wish to see others possess. The right to blackmail is deducible from the

126
00:11:33.400 --> 00:11:38.880
general property right in one's person and knowledge, and the right to disseminate or

127
00:11:38.880 --> 00:11:45.760
not disseminate that knowledge. How can the right to blackmail be denied?

128
00:11:45.760 --> 00:11:51.600
When I first briefly adumbrated the right to blackmail in Man, Economy and State, Volume

129
00:11:51.600 --> 00:11:57.240
1, I was met with a storm of abuse by critics who apparently believed that I was advocating

130
00:11:57.240 --> 00:12:03.520
the morality of blackmail, again a failure to make the crucial distinction between the

131
00:12:03.520 --> 00:12:10.280
legitimacy of a right and the morality or aesthetics of exercising that right.

132
00:12:10.280 --> 00:12:31.280
Furthermore, as Professor Walter Block has trenchantly pointed out, on utilitarian grounds, the consequence of outlawing blackmail, for example, of preventing Smith from offering to sell his silence to Jones, will be to encourage Smith to disseminate his information, since he is coercively blocked from selling his silence.

133
00:12:31.280 --> 00:12:44.280
The result will be an increased dissemination of derogatory information, so that Jones will be worse off from the outlawry of blackmail than he would have been if blackmail had been permitted.

134
00:12:44.280 --> 00:12:57.280
Thus Block writes, What exactly is blackmail? Blackmail is the offer of a trade. It is the offer to trade something, usually silence, for some other good, usually money.

135
00:12:57.280 --> 00:13:06.280
If the offer of the blackmail trade is accepted, then the blackmailer maintains his silence and the blackmailee pays the agreed amount of money.

136
00:13:06.280 --> 00:13:15.280
If the blackmail offer is rejected, then the blackmailer may exercise his right of free speech and perhaps announce and publicize the secret.

137
00:13:15.280 --> 00:13:24.280
The only difference between a gossip and blabbermouth and the blackmailer is that the blackmailer will refrain from speaking for a price.

138
00:13:24.280 --> 00:13:30.080
In a sense, the gossip or the blabbermouth is much worse than the blackmailer, for the

139
00:13:30.080 --> 00:13:36.000
blackmailer at least gives you a chance to shut him up. The blabbermouth and gossip just

140
00:13:36.000 --> 00:13:42.080
up and spill the beans. A person with a secret he once kept will be much better off if a

141
00:13:42.080 --> 00:13:47.920
blackmailer rather than a gossip or blabbermouth gets hold of it. With the blabbermouth or

142
00:13:47.920 --> 00:13:51.500
For gossip, as we have said, all is lost.

143
00:13:51.500 --> 00:13:57.500
With the blackmailer, one can only gain, or, at worst, be no worse off.

144
00:13:57.500 --> 00:14:02.500
If the price required by the blackmailer for his silence is worth less than the secret,

145
00:14:02.500 --> 00:14:06.880
the secret holder will pay off and accept the lesser of the two evils.

146
00:14:06.880 --> 00:14:11.240
He will gain the difference to him between the value of the secret and the price of the

147
00:14:11.240 --> 00:14:12.960
blackmailer.

148
00:14:12.960 --> 00:14:17.840
It is only in the case that the blackmailer demands more than the secret is worth that

149
00:14:17.840 --> 00:14:45.360
There are other and less important problems with the outlawry of a blackmail contract.

150
00:14:45.360 --> 00:14:50.960
It goes that in the above case, instead of Smith going to Jones with an offer of silence,

151
00:14:50.960 --> 00:14:55.800
Jones had heard of Smith's knowledge and his intent to print it, and went to Smith to offer

152
00:14:55.800 --> 00:14:58.540
to purchase the latter's silence.

153
00:14:58.540 --> 00:15:01.000
Should that contract be illegal?

154
00:15:01.000 --> 00:15:03.420
And if so, why?

155
00:15:03.420 --> 00:15:08.440
But if Jones' offer should be legal while Smith's is illegal, should it be illegal for

156
00:15:08.440 --> 00:15:14.900
Smith to turn down Jones' offer and then ask for more money as the price of his silence?

157
00:15:14.900 --> 00:15:20.840
Furthermore, should it be illegal for Smith to subtly let Jones know that Smith has the

158
00:15:20.840 --> 00:15:27.220
information and intends to publish, and then allow Jones to make the actual offer?

159
00:15:27.220 --> 00:15:33.460
But how could this simple letting Jones know in advance be considered as illegal?

160
00:15:33.460 --> 00:15:38.340
Could it not be rather construed as a simple act of courtesy to Jones?

161
00:15:38.340 --> 00:15:44.060
The Shoals get muddier and muddier, and the support for outlawry of blackmail contracts,

162
00:15:44.060 --> 00:15:50.180
especially by libertarians who believe in property rights becomes ever more flimsy.

163
00:15:50.180 --> 00:15:55.580
Of course, if Smith and Jones make a blackmail contract and then Smith violates it by printing

164
00:15:55.580 --> 00:16:02.460
the information anyway, then Smith has stolen Jones' property, his money, and can be prosecuted

165
00:16:02.460 --> 00:16:07.200
as in the case of any other thief who has aggressed against property rights by violating

166
00:16:07.200 --> 00:16:08.820
a contract.

167
00:16:08.820 --> 00:16:14.780
But there is nothing unique about blackmail contracts in this regard.

168
00:16:14.780 --> 00:16:20.140
In contemplating the law of a free society, therefore, the libertarian must look at people

169
00:16:20.140 --> 00:16:26.340
as acting within a general framework of absolute property rights and of the conditions of the

170
00:16:26.340 --> 00:16:29.820
world around them at any given time.

171
00:16:29.820 --> 00:16:35.220
In any exchange, any contract that they make, they believe that they will be better off

172
00:16:35.220 --> 00:16:36.940
from making the exchange.

173
00:16:36.940 --> 00:16:43.940
Hence, all of these contracts are productive in making them, at least prospectively, better off.

174
00:16:43.940 --> 00:16:50.940
And, of course, all of these voluntary contracts are legitimate and licit in the free society.

175
00:16:50.940 --> 00:16:57.940
We have therefore affirmed the legitimacy, the right, of Smith's either disseminating knowledge about Jones,

176
00:16:57.940 --> 00:17:04.940
keeping silent about the knowledge, or engaging in a contract with Jones to sell his silence.

177
00:17:04.940 --> 00:17:09.440
We have so far been assuming that Smith's knowledge is correct.

178
00:17:09.440 --> 00:17:16.440
Suppose, however, that the knowledge is false, and Smith knows that it is false, the worst case.

179
00:17:16.440 --> 00:17:20.940
Does Smith have the right to disseminate false information about Jones?

180
00:17:20.940 --> 00:17:26.440
In short, should libel and slander be illegal in the free society?

181
00:17:26.440 --> 00:17:30.440
And yet, once again, how can they be?

182
00:17:30.440 --> 00:17:35.440
Smith has a property right to the ideas or opinions in his own head.

183
00:17:35.440 --> 00:17:40.440
He also has a property right to print anything he wants and disseminate it.

184
00:17:40.440 --> 00:17:48.440
He has a property right to say that Jones is a thief, even if he knows it to be false, and to print and sell that statement.

185
00:17:48.440 --> 00:17:56.440
The counter view, and the current basis for holding libel and slander, especially of false statements to be illegal,

186
00:17:56.440 --> 00:18:11.440
is that every man has a property right in his own reputation, that Smith's falsehoods damage that reputation and that therefore Smith's libels are invasions of Jones' property right in his reputation and should be illegal.

187
00:18:11.440 --> 00:18:23.440
Yet again, on closer analysis, this is a fallacious view. For everyone, as we have stated, owns his own body. He has a property right in his own head and person.

188
00:18:23.440 --> 00:18:29.440
But since every man owns his own mind, he cannot, therefore, own the minds of anyone else.

189
00:18:29.440 --> 00:18:38.440
And yet, Joan's reputation is neither a physical entity, nor is it something contained within or on his own person.

190
00:18:38.440 --> 00:18:47.440
Joan's reputation is purely a function of the subjective attitudes and beliefs about him contained in the minds of other people.

191
00:18:47.440 --> 00:19:09.480
Let us consider in fact the implications of believing in a property right in one's reputation.

192
00:19:09.480 --> 00:19:14.240
Suppose that Brown has produced his mousetrap and then Robinson comes out with a better

193
00:19:14.240 --> 00:19:15.480
1.

194
00:19:15.480 --> 00:19:21.600
The reputation of Brown for excellence in mousetraps now declines sharply, as consumers

195
00:19:21.600 --> 00:19:27.620
shift their attitudes and their purchases and buy Robinson's mousetrap instead.

196
00:19:27.620 --> 00:19:33.100
Can we not then say, on the principle of the reputation theory, that Robinson has injured

197
00:19:33.100 --> 00:19:39.740
the reputation of Brown, and can we not then outlaw Robinson from competing with Brown?

198
00:19:39.740 --> 00:19:41.780
If not, why not?

199
00:19:41.780 --> 00:19:48.580
Or should it be illegal for Robinson to advertise and to tell the world that his mousetrap is better?

200
00:19:48.580 --> 00:19:54.140
Or, to take another example, suppose that Robinson publishes an investment advisory letter

201
00:19:54.140 --> 00:19:59.020
in which he sets forth his opinion that a certain corporation's stock is unsound

202
00:19:59.020 --> 00:20:01.620
and will probably decline.

203
00:20:01.620 --> 00:20:05.760
As a result of this advice, the stock falls in price.

204
00:20:05.760 --> 00:20:11.260
Robinson's opinion has injured the reputation of the corporation and damaged its shareholders

205
00:20:11.260 --> 00:20:16.100
through the decline in price caused by the lowering of confidence by investors in the

206
00:20:16.100 --> 00:20:17.660
market.

207
00:20:17.660 --> 00:20:20.620
Should Robinson's advice therefore be outlawed?

208
00:20:20.620 --> 00:20:27.020
Or, in yet another example, A writes a book, B reviews the book and states that the book

209
00:20:27.020 --> 00:20:28.380
is a bad one.

210
00:20:28.380 --> 00:20:33.800
The result is an injury to A's reputation and a decline in the sales of the book as

211
00:20:33.800 --> 00:20:36.260
well as A's income.

212
00:20:36.260 --> 00:20:40.520
Should all unfavorable book reviews therefore be illegal?

213
00:20:40.520 --> 00:20:46.280
As such are some of the logical implications of the property and reputation argument.

214
00:20:46.280 --> 00:20:52.000
I am indebted for the stock market example to Williamson M. Evers.

215
00:20:52.000 --> 00:20:58.160
In fact, of course, people's subjective attitudes and ideas about someone or his product will

216
00:20:58.160 --> 00:21:06.920
fluctuate continually, and hence it is impossible for Brown to stabilize his reputation by coercion.

217
00:21:06.920 --> 00:21:13.280
say it would be immoral and aggressive against other people's property right to try.

218
00:21:13.280 --> 00:21:19.400
Aggressive and criminal, then, either to outlaw one's competition or to outlaw false libel's

219
00:21:19.400 --> 00:21:23.480
spread about one or one's product.

220
00:21:23.480 --> 00:21:28.800
We can, of course, readily concede the gross immorality of spreading false libel's about

221
00:21:28.800 --> 00:21:30.480
another person.

222
00:21:30.480 --> 00:21:36.200
But we must, nevertheless, maintain the legal right of anyone to do so.

223
00:21:36.200 --> 00:21:55.720
Pragmatically, again, this situation may well redound to the benefit of the people being libeled, for in the current situation, when false libels are outlawed, the average person tends to believe that all derogatory reports spread about people are true, otherwise they'd sue for libel.

224
00:21:55.720 --> 00:22:00.840
This situation discriminates against the poor, since poorer people are less likely to file

225
00:22:00.840 --> 00:22:03.360
suits against libelers.

226
00:22:03.360 --> 00:22:09.400
Hence the reputations of poorer or less wealthy persons are liable to suffer more now when

227
00:22:09.400 --> 00:22:14.240
libel is outlawed than they would if libel were legitimate.

228
00:22:14.240 --> 00:22:20.120
For in that libertarian society, since everyone would know that false stories are legal, there

229
00:22:20.120 --> 00:22:24.840
would be far more skepticism on the part of the reading or listening public, who would

230
00:22:24.840 --> 00:22:31.640
would insist on far more proof and believe fewer derogatory stories than they do now.

231
00:22:31.640 --> 00:22:37.480
Furthermore, the current system discriminates against poorer people in another way, for

232
00:22:37.480 --> 00:22:43.640
their own speech is restricted, since they are less likely to disseminate true but derogatory

233
00:22:43.640 --> 00:22:49.480
knowledge about the wealthy for fear of having costly libel suits filed against them.

234
00:22:49.480 --> 00:22:56.400
Hence, the outlawing of libel harms people of limited means in two ways, by making them

235
00:22:56.400 --> 00:23:02.200
easier prey for libels, and by hampering their own dissemination of accurate knowledge about

236
00:23:02.200 --> 00:23:03.800
the wealthy.

237
00:23:03.800 --> 00:23:11.040
Finally, if anyone has the right knowingly to spread false libels about someone else,

238
00:23:11.040 --> 00:23:16.320
then a fortiori, he of course has the right to disseminate those large numbers of statements

239
00:23:16.320 --> 00:23:21.880
about others, which are in the fuzzy zone of not being clear or certain whether or not

240
00:23:21.880 --> 00:23:24.240
the statements are true or false.
