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NOTE 2. Natural Law as 'Science'

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Chapter 2 Natural Law as Science

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It is indeed puzzling that so many modern philosophers should sniff at the very term

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nature as an injection of mysticism and the supernatural.

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An apple, let fall, will drop to the ground.

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This we all observe and acknowledge to be in the nature of the apple, as well as the world in general.

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Two atoms of hydrogen combined with one of oxygen will yield one molecule of water, behavior

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that is uniquely in the nature of hydrogen, oxygen and water.

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There is nothing arcane or mystical about such observations.

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Why then cavil at the concept of nature?

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The world, in fact, consists of a myriad number of observable things or entities.

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This is surely an observable fact.

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Since the world does not consist of one homogeneous thing or entity alone, it follows that each

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one of these different things possesses differing attributes, otherwise they would all be the

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same thing.

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But if A, B, C, etc. have different attributes, it follows immediately that they have different

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natures.

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It also follows that when these various things meet and interact, a specifically delimitable

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The observable and definable result will occur.

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In short, specific delimitable causes will have specific delimitable effects.

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The observable behavior of each of these entities is the law of their natures, and this law

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includes what happens as a result of the interactions.

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The complex that we may build up of these laws may be termed the structure of natural

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law.

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What is mystical about that?

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In the field of purely physical laws, this concept will usually differ from modern positivistic

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terminology only on high philosophical levels.

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Applied to man, however, the concept is far more controversial.

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And yet, if apples and stones and roses each have their specific natures, is man the only

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entity, the only being that cannot have one?

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And if man does have a nature, why cannot it too be open to rational observation and

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reflection?

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If all things have natures, then surely man's nature is open to inspection.

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The current brusque rejection of the concept of the nature of man is therefore arbitrary

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and a priori.

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One common flip criticism by opponents of natural law is, who is to establish the alleged

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Truths About Man.

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The answer is not who, but what, man's reason.

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Man's reason is objective, that is, it can be employed by all men to yield truths about

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the world.

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To ask what is man's nature is to invite the answer.

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Go thou and study and find out.

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It is as if one man were to assert that the nature of copper were open to rational investigation,

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and a critic were to challenge him to prove this immediately by setting forth on the spot

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all the laws that have been discovered about copper.

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Another common charge is that natural law theorists differ among themselves and that

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therefore all natural law theories must be discarded.

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This charge comes with peculiar ill grace when it comes, as it often does, from utilitarian

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and Economists.

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For economics has been a notoriously contentious science, and yet few people advocate tossing

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all economics, therefore, into the discard.

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Furthermore, difference of opinion is no excuse for discarding all sides to a dispute.

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The responsible person is the one who uses his reason to examine the various contentions

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and make up his own mind.

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He does not simply say, a priori, a plague on all your houses.

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The fact of man's reason does not mean that error is impossible.

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Even such hard sciences as physics and chemistry have had their errors and their fervent disputes.

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No man is omniscient or infallible.

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A law, by the way, of man's nature.

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The natural law ethic decrees that for all living things, goodness is the fulfillment

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of what is best for that type of creature.

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Goodness is therefore relative to the nature of the creature concerned.

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Thus, Professor Cropsey writes, The classical natural law doctrine is that each thing is

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excellent in the degree to which it can do the things for which its species is naturally

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equipped.

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Why is the natural good?

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Because there is neither a way nor a reason to prevent ourselves from distinguishing between

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and useless and serviceable beasts, for example, and the most empirical and rational standard

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of the serviceable, or the limit of the thing's activity, is set by its nature.

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We do not judge elephants to be good because they are natural, or because nature is morally

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good, whatever that would mean.

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We judge a particular elephant to be good by the light of what elephant nature makes

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In the case of man, the natural law ethics states that goodness or badness can be determined

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by what fulfills or thwarts what is best for man's nature.

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The natural law then elucidates what is best for man, what ends man should pursue that

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are most harmonious with, and best tend to fulfill, his nature.

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In a significant sense, then, natural law provides man with a science of happiness, with the

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paths which will lead to his real happiness.

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In contrast, praxeology or economics, as well as the utilitarian philosophy with which this

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science has been closely allied, treat happiness in the purely formal sense as the fulfillment

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of those ends which people happen, for whatever reason, to place high on their scales of value.

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Satisfaction of those ends yields to man his utility or satisfaction or happiness.

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Value in the sense of valuation or utility is purely subjective and decided by each individual.

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This procedure is perfectly proper for the formal science of praxeology or economic theory, but not necessarily elsewhere.

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For in natural law ethics, ends are demonstrated to be good or bad for man in varying degrees.

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Value here is objective, determined by the natural law of man's being.

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And here, happiness for man is considered in the commonsensical, contentual sense.

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As Father Keneally put it, this philosophy maintains that there is in fact an objective

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of Moral Order within the Range of Human Intelligence, to which human societies are bound in conscience

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to conform, and upon which the peace and happiness of personal, national and international life

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depend.

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And the eminent English jurist, Sir William Blackstone, summed up the natural law and

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its relation to human happiness as follows.

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This is the foundation of what we call ethics or natural law, demonstrating that this or

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that action tends to man's real happiness, and therefore very justly concluding that

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the performance of it is a part of the law of nature, or, on the other hand, that this

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or that action is destruction of man's real happiness, and therefore that the law of nature

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forbids it.

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But using the terminology of natural law, psychologist Leonard Carmichael has indicated

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how an objective, absolute ethic can be established for man on scientific methods, based upon

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biological and psychological inquiry.

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Because man has an unchanging and an age-old genetically determined anatomical, physiological

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and Psychological Makeup.

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There is reason to believe that at least some of the values that he recognized as good or

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bad have been discovered or have emerged as human individuals have lived together for

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thousands of years in many societies.

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Is there any reason to suggest that these values, once identified and tested, may not

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be thought of as essentially fixed and unchanging?

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For example, the wanton murder of one adult by another for the purely personal amusement

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of the person committing the murder, once it is recognized as a general wrong, is likely

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always to be so recognized.

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Such a murder has disadvantageous individual and social effects.

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Or to take a milder example from aesthetics, man is always likely to recognize in a special

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One common philosophic objection to natural law ethics is that it confuses or identifies

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the realism of fact and value.

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For purposes of our brief discussion, John Wilde's reply will suffice.

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In answer we may point out that their natural law of view identifies value not with existence,

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but rather with the fulfillment of tendencies determined by the structure of the existent

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entity.

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Furthermore, it identifies evil not with non-existence, but rather with a mode of existence in which

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natural tendencies are thwarted and deprived of realization.

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The young plant, whose leaves are withering for lack of light, is not non-existent.

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It exists, but in an unhealthy or privative mode.

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The lame man is not non-existent.

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He exists, but with a natural power partially unrealized.

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This metaphysical objection is based upon the common assumption that existence is fully

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finished or complete.

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But what is good is the fulfillment of being.

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After stating that ethics, for man as for any other entity, are determined by investigating

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verifiable existing tendencies of that entity, Wilde asks a question crucial to all non-theological

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ethics.

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Why are such principles felt to be binding on me?

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How do such universal tendencies of human nature become incorporated into a person's

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Subjective Value Scale

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Because the factual needs which underlie the whole procedure are common to man, the values

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founded on them are universal.

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Hence, if I made no mistake in my tendential analysis of human nature, and if I understand

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myself, I must exemplify the tendency, and must feel it subjectively as an imperative

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urge to action.

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David Hume is the philosopher supposed by modern philosophers to have effectively demolished

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the theory of natural law.

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Hume's demolition was two-pronged, the raising of the alleged fact-value dichotomy thus debarring

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the inference of value from fact, and his view that reason is and can only be a slave

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to the passions.

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In short, in contrast to the natural law view that man's reason can discover the proper

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ends for man to follow, Hume held that only the emotions can ultimately set man's ends,

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and that reason's place is as the technician and handmaiden to the emotions.

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Here Hume has been followed by modern social scientists since Max Weber.

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According to this view, people's emotions are assumed to be primary and unanalyzable

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givens.

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Professor Heselberg has shown, however, that Hume, in the course of his own discussions,

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was compelled to reintroduce a natural law conception into his social philosophy, and

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particularly into his theory of justice, thus illustrating the jibe of Étienne Gilson.

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The natural law always buries its undertakers.

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For Hume, in Hesselberg's words, recognized and accepted that the social order is an indispensable

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prerequisite to man's well-being and happiness, and that this is a statement of fact.

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The social order, therefore, must be maintained by man.

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Hesselberg continues, But a social order is not possible unless man is able to conceive

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conceive what it is and what its advantages are, and also conceive those norms of conduct

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which are necessary to its establishment and preservation, namely respect for another's

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person and for his rightful possessions, which is the substance of justice.

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But justice is the product of reason, not the passions.

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And justice is the necessary support of the social order, and the social order is necessary

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to Man's Well-Being and Happiness. If this is so, the norms of justice must control and

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regulate the passions, and not vice versa. Heselberg concludes that thus Hume's original

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primacy of the passions thesis is seen to be utterly untenable for his social and political

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theory, and he is compelled to reintroduce reason as a cognitive normative factor in

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and Human Social Relations.

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Indeed in discussing justice and the importance of the rights of private property, Hume was

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compelled to write that reason can establish such a social ethic.

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Nature provides a remedy in the judgment and understanding for what is irregular and uncommodious

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in the affections.

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In short, reason can be superior to the passions.

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We have seen from our discussion that the doctrine of natural law, the view that an

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objective ethics can be established through reason, has had to face two powerful groups

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of enemies in the modern world, both anxious to denigrate the power of man's reason to

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decide upon his destiny.

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These are the Fidaists who believe that ethics can only be given to man by supernatural revelation,

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and the skeptics who believe that man must take his ethics from arbitrary whim or emotion.

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We may sum up with Professor Grant's harsh but penetrating view of the strange contemporary

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alliance between those who doubt the capacity of human reason in the name of skepticism,

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probably scientific in origin, and those who denigrate its capacity in the name of revealed

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religion.

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It is only necessary to study the thought of Ockham to see how ancient this strange alliance

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is.

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For in Ockham can be seen how philosophic nominalism, unable to face the question of

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practical certainty, solves it by the arbitrary hypothesis of revelation.

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The will detached from the intellect, as it must be in a nominalism, can seek certainty

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only through such arbitrary hypotheses.

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The interesting fact, historically, is that these two anti-rationalist traditions, that

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of the liberal skeptic and the Protestant revelationist, should originally have come

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from two opposite views of man.

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The Protestant dependence upon revelation arose from a great pessimism about human nature.

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The immediately apprehended values of the liberal originate in a great optimism.

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Yet, after all, is not the dominating tradition in North America a Protestantism which has

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been transformed by pragmatic technology and liberal aspirations?
