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NOTE 24. The Moral Status of Relations to the State

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Chapter 24 The Moral Status of Relations to the State

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If the state, then, is a vast engine of institutionalized crime and aggression, the organization of

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the political means to wealth, then this means that the state is a criminal organization,

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and that therefore its moral status is radically different from any of the just property owners

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that we have been discussing in this volume.

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And this means that the moral status of contracts with the state, promises to it and by it,

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differs radically as well.

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It means, for example, that no one is morally required to obey the state, except in so far

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as the state simply affirms the right of just private property against aggression.

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For as a criminal organization, with all of its income and assets derived from the crime

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In the realm of taxation, the state cannot possess any just property.

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This means that it cannot be unjust or immoral to fail to pay taxes to the state, to appropriate

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the property of the state, which is in the hands of aggressors, to refuse to obey state

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orders, or to break contracts with the state, since it cannot be unjust to break contracts

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with criminals.

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Morally, from the point of view of proper political philosophy, stealing from the state,

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for example, is removing property from criminal hands, is, in a sense, homesteading property,

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except that instead of homesteading unused land, the person is removing property from

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the criminal sector of society, a positive good.

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Here a partial exception can be made where the state has clearly stolen the property

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of a Specific Person. Suppose, for example, that the state confiscates jewels belonging to Brown.

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If Green then steals the jewels from the state, he is not committing a criminal offense from the

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point of view of libertarian theory. However, the jewels are still not his, and Brown would be

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justified in using force to repossess the jewels from Green. In most cases, of course, the state's

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Most confiscations, taking place in the form of taxation, are mixed into a common pot,

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and it is impossible to point to specific owners of its specific property.

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Who, for example, properly owns a TVA dam or a post office building?

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In these majority cases, then, green's theft or homesteading from the State would be legitimate

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as well as non-criminal, and would confer a just homesteading property title upon green.

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Lying to the State, then, also becomes a fortiori, morally legitimate.

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Just as no one is morally required to answer a robber truthfully when he asks if there

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are any valuables in one's house, so no one can be morally required to answer truthfully

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All this does not mean, of course, that we must counsel or require civil disobedience,

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non-payment of taxes, or lying to or theft from the State, for these may well be prudentially

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unwise considering the force majeure possessed by the State apparatus.

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But what we are saying is that these actions are just and morally licit.

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Relations with the state, then, become purely prudential and pragmatic considerations for

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the particular individuals involved, who must treat the state as an enemy with currently

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prevailing power.

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Many libertarians fall into confusion on specific relations with the state, even when they concede

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The General Immorality or Criminality of State Actions or Interventions

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Thus there is the question of default, or more widely, repudiation of government debt.

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Many libertarians assert that the government is morally bound to pay its debts, and that

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therefore default or repudiation must be avoided.

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The problem here is that these libertarians are analogizing from the perfectly proper

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Theoretical Theory of Money and Credit Theoretical Theory of Money and Credit

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The bondholder appears in a very different light when we consider that the purchase of a government bond is simply making an investment in the future loot from the robbery of taxation.

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As an eager investor in future robbery then, the bondholder appears in a very different moral light from what is usually assumed.

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Another question to be placed in a new light is the problem of breaking contracts with the state.

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We have explained above our contention that since enforceable contracts are properly title

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transfers and not promises, that therefore it would be legitimate in the free society

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to resign from an army despite the signing of a voluntary contract for a longer term

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of enlistment.

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But regardless of which theory of contract we adopt, such considerations apply only to

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private armies in the free market.

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State armies are criminal aggressors, both in their actions as well as their means of

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revenue, it would be morally licit to leave the state's army at any time, regardless

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of the terms of enlistment.

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It is morally the individual's right to do so, although, again, whether such an action

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is prudential or not is another matter entirely.

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Let us consider in this light the question of bribery of government officials.

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We saw above that in a free society or free market, the briber is acting legitimately,

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whereas it is the bribee who is defrauding someone, for example, an employer, and therefore

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deserves prosecution.

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What of bribery of government officials?

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Here a distinction must be made between aggressive and defensive bribery.

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The first should be considered improper and aggressive, whereas the latter should be considered

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Consider a typical aggressive bribe. A mafia leader bribes police officials to exclude other competing operators of gambling casinos from a certain territorial area.

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Here, the mafioso acts in collaboration with the government to coerce competing gambling proprietors.

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The mafioso is, in this case, an initiator and accessory to governmental aggression against his competitors.

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and its competitors.

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On the other hand, a defensive bribe has a radically different moral status.

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In such a case, for example, Robinson, seeing that gambling casinos are outlawed in a certain

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area, bribes policemen to allow his casino to operate, a perfectly legitimate response

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to an unfortunate situation.

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Defensive bribery, in fact, performs an important social function throughout the world, for

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For in many countries, business could not be transacted at all without the lubricant

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of bribery.

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In this way, crippling and destructive regulations and exactions can be avoided.

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A corrupt government, then, is not necessarily a bad thing, compared to an incorruptible

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government whose officials enforce the laws with great severity.

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Corruption can at least allow a partial flowering of voluntary transactions and actions in a

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and a Society. Of course, in neither case are either the regulations or prohibitions,

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or the enforcement officials themselves, justified, since neither they nor the exactions should

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be in existence at all.

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There is considerable evidence that the Soviet economy only works at all because of the pervasiveness

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of bribery, or blot. Margaret Miller calls it the shadow system of private enterprise

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is Within Planning

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H. L. Mencken tells a charming and instructive story of the contrast between corruption and

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reform.

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He, Mencken's father, believed that political corruption was inevitable under democracy,

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and even argued out of his own experience that it had its uses.

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One of his favorite anecdotes was about a huge swinging sign that used to hang outside

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his place of business in Paca Street.

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When the building was built in 1885, he simply hung out the sign, sent for the city councilman

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of the district and gave him $20.

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This was in full settlement for ever more of all permit and privilege fees, easement

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taxes and other such costs and imposts.

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The city councilman pocketed the money and in return was supposed to stave off any cops,

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building inspectors or other functionaries who had any lawful interest in the matter

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or tried to horn in for private profit. Being an honorable man, according to his lights,

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he kept his bargain, and the sign flapped and squeaked in the breeze for ten years.

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But then, in 1895, Baltimore had a reform wave. The councilman was voted out of office,

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and the idealists in the city hall sent word that a license to maintain the sign would

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would cost $62.75 a year. It came down the next day. This was proof to my father that

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reform was mainly only a conspiracy of prehensile charlatans to molt taxpayers.

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In some areas, a radical distinction between private persons and government officials is

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acknowledged in existing law and opinion. Thus, a private individual's right to privacy

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or Right to Keep Silent does not and should not apply to government officials, whose records

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and operations should be open to public knowledge and evaluation.

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There are two democratic arguments for denying the right to privacy to government officials,

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which, while not strictly libertarian, are valuable as far as they go.

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Namely, one, that in a democracy the public can only decide on public issues and vote

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The Libertarian Argument would add that since government is an aggressor organization against the rights and persons of its citizens, then full disclosure of its operations is at least one right that its subjects might rest from the state, and which they may be able to do so if they have complete knowledge of government operations, and two, that since the taxpayers pay the bill for government, they should have the right to know what government is doing.

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Another area where the law now distinguishes between private citizens and public officials

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is the law of libel.

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We have maintained above that libel laws are illegitimate.

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But even given laws against libel, it is important to distinguish between libeling a private

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citizen and a government official or agency.

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By the nineteenth century we had fortunately gotten rid of the pernicious common law of

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seditious libel, which had been used as a club to repress almost any criticisms of government.

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Currently libel laws have now been fortunately weakened when applied not merely to government

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per se, but also to politicians or government officials.

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Many anarchist libertarians claim it immoral to vote or to engage in political action,

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the argument being that by participating in this way in state activity, the libertarian

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places his moral imprematur upon the state apparatus itself.

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But a moral decision must be a free decision, and the state has placed individuals in society

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in an unfree environment, in a general matrix of coercion.

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The state, unfortunately, exists, and people must necessarily begin with this matrix to

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try to remedy their condition.

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As Lysander Spooner pointed out, in an environment of state coercion, voting does not imply voluntary

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consent.

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Indeed, if the state allows us a periodic choice of rulers, limited though that choice

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may be, it surely cannot be considered immoral to make use of that limited choice to try

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The State, then, is not simply a part of society.

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The brunt of this part of the present volume, in fact, is to demonstrate that the State

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is not, as most utilitarian free-market economists like to think, a legitimate social institution

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that tends to be bumbling and inefficient in most of its activities.

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On the contrary, the State is an inherently illegitimate institution of organized aggression,

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of organized and regularized crime against the persons and properties of its subjects.

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Rather than necessary to society, it is a profoundly anti-social institution which lives

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parasitically off of the productive activities of private citizens.

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Morally, it must be considered as illegitimate and outside of the ordinary libertarian legal system, such as adumbrated in Part 2 above, which delimits and ensures the rights and just properties of private citizens.

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Thus, from the point of view of justice and morality, the State can own no property, require no obedience, enforce no contracts made with it, and indeed cannot exist at all.

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A common defense of the state holds that man is a social animal, that he must live in society,

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and that individualists and libertarians believe in the existence of atomistic individuals,

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uninfluenced by and unrelated to their fellow men.

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But no libertarians have ever held individuals to be isolated atoms.

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On the contrary, all libertarians have recognized the necessity and the enormous advantages

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of Living in Society and of Participating in the Social Division of Labor.

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The great non-sequitur committed by defenders of the state, including classical Aristotelian

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and Thomist philosophers, is to leap from the necessity of society to the necessity

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of the state.

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On the contrary, as we have indicated, the state is an anti-social instrument, crippling

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Volunteering Voluntary Interchange, Individual Creativity and the Division of Labor.

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Society is a convenient label for the voluntary interrelations of individuals, in peaceful

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exchange and on the market.

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Here we may point to Albert J. Nuck's penetrating distinction between social power, the fruits

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of voluntary interchange in the economy and in civilization, and state power, the coercive

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Interference and Exploitation of Those Fruits.

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In that light, Knox showed that human history is basically a race between state power and

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social power, between the beneficent fruits of peaceful and voluntary production and creativity

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on the one hand, and the crippling and parasitic blight of state power upon the voluntary and

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productive social process.

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All of the services commonly thought to require the state, from the coining of money to police

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protection to the development of law in defense of the rights of person and property, can

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be and have been supplied far more efficiently and certainly more morally by private persons.

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The state is in no sense required by the nature of man.

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The Contrary