WEBVTT

NOTE Robert Nozick and Murray Rothbard

1
00:00:00.000 --> 00:00:06.700
I'm getting ready for the final episode of the History of Political Philosophy with Dr. David Gordon.

2
00:00:06.700 --> 00:00:14.000
But before we finish here today, I'd like to introduce to you the founder of the Ludwig von Mises Institute, President Lew Rockwell.

3
00:00:14.000 --> 00:00:15.000
Thank you, Mark.

4
00:00:15.000 --> 00:00:27.000
Before we get started, I just want to thank the two generous donors who made this conference possible this week,

5
00:00:27.000 --> 00:00:57.000
Mr. Steve Berger and Mr. Ken Garshina. These are two of the small but very effective group, the Austrian hedge fund managers, both stars on Wall Street. Ken came to us because he'd been a student of Walter Block's at Holy Cross College. Steve Berger because of his readings in Austrian economics and we thank them very much for making this Gordon seminar possible.

6
00:00:57.000 --> 00:01:04.000
And I want to take this opportunity to present to David, David if you want to come up here.

7
00:01:04.000 --> 00:01:10.000
Each year the Mises Institute presents the Murray and Rothbard Medal of Freedom and David

8
00:01:10.000 --> 00:01:17.680
is the recipient this year. This was established by Mr. George W. Connell. George was a civil

9
00:01:17.680 --> 00:01:23.800
engineer graduate of Purdue who worked all over the world in Libya, in Saudi Arabia,

10
00:01:23.800 --> 00:01:29.760
in California and Texas and England and had a great devotion to the principles of freedom

11
00:01:29.760 --> 00:01:35.760
and shortly before his death in 2004 he asked us to establish an annual Rothbard prize to

12
00:01:35.760 --> 00:01:42.240
be given to a scholar or a public intellectual for a lifetime of achievement for the ideals

13
00:01:42.240 --> 00:01:47.480
of liberty and the tradition of Murray Rothbard and we're very delighted to give this to David

14
00:01:47.480 --> 00:01:48.480
this year.

15
00:01:48.480 --> 00:01:58.480
It's a beautiful medal with Murray's picture on it. It also includes a $20 gold piece from the days when the American government hadn't been entirely corrupted.

16
00:01:58.480 --> 00:02:11.480
And, of course, David could tell many stories about David. People who have been at this seminar and watched it on the internet already know that there can't be too many people who could give ten lectures of this sort without a note.

17
00:02:11.480 --> 00:02:18.880
When I had the privilege of going through Murray Rothbard's office in Las Vegas after his death,

18
00:02:18.880 --> 00:02:24.880
one of the letters I came upon was from the mid-1970s. Murray had been to a Liberty Fund conference

19
00:02:24.880 --> 00:02:28.380
and he was writing someone about it and I talked a little bit about the conference,

20
00:02:28.380 --> 00:02:32.280
but he said the most extraordinary and wonderful thing that happened to him at the conference

21
00:02:32.280 --> 00:02:37.080
was that he met the closest thing to a universal genius that he'd ever met in his life

22
00:02:37.080 --> 00:02:42.320
and it was this young man, David Gorton, and of course they became very close. I always

23
00:02:42.320 --> 00:02:47.840
think that even aside from David's intellectual achievements, when I would see the two of

24
00:02:47.840 --> 00:02:52.580
them together, especially when I would see Murray's face after seeing David and not having

25
00:02:52.580 --> 00:02:56.760
seen him for a while, that it was really the look of a father upon a son. I think David

26
00:02:56.760 --> 00:03:04.760
was in many ways Murray's son as well as his intellectual collaborator and heir and just

27
00:03:04.760 --> 00:03:10.760
One of the many things David has done, this most wonderful, essential Rothbard, and David

28
00:03:10.760 --> 00:03:17.060
of course has much else to do. He's done much, and David, it's a great honor to present you

29
00:03:17.060 --> 00:03:20.060
this medal. Come on up here.

30
00:03:20.060 --> 00:03:40.780
Thanks very much, Lew. I'm very grateful to you and the Mises Institute for your support

31
00:03:40.780 --> 00:03:46.340
over the years and for this great honor. It was a complete surprise to me. In fact, I'm

32
00:03:46.340 --> 00:03:53.340
So surprised I won't be able to give the final lecture.

33
00:03:56.540 --> 00:04:00.100
I'm going to talk today about

34
00:04:00.100 --> 00:04:02.340
Robert Nozick and

35
00:04:02.340 --> 00:04:04.740
Murray Rothbard.

36
00:04:04.740 --> 00:04:11.740
Robert Nozick lived from 1938 to 2002.

37
00:04:11.740 --> 00:04:19.700
graduated from Columbia and then attended Princeton. His main teachers in philosophy

38
00:04:19.700 --> 00:04:27.740
department were Carl Hemphill, the philosopher of science, Hilary Putnam was then at Princeton

39
00:04:27.740 --> 00:04:34.700
also a philosopher of science and the specialist in Greek philosophy, Gregory Blasto. Since

40
00:04:34.700 --> 00:04:42.140
Since it's the last lecture, it will allow me to tell one story that Nozick told me.

41
00:04:42.140 --> 00:04:50.420
When he was in the class of Hilary Putnam, Putnam had on the final exam, one of the questions

42
00:04:50.420 --> 00:04:54.900
was, write your own question and answer it.

43
00:04:54.900 --> 00:05:02.540
So Nozick's question was, write your own question and answer it, and the answer was, write your

44
00:05:02.540 --> 00:05:21.300
After he graduated from Princeton, he studied at Oxford for a while, and then he became

45
00:05:21.300 --> 00:05:31.300
professor at Harvard, where he taught, I think, from the mid-1960s, with a couple years interruption

46
00:05:31.300 --> 00:05:38.540
at Rockefeller University down to his death. I think he was, at the time, one of the youngest

47
00:05:38.540 --> 00:05:48.340
persons ever to get tenure at Harvard. I think he got it around age 30.

48
00:05:48.340 --> 00:05:56.500
Nozick was extraordinarily fast in argument. His specialty was counter-arguments. Any position

49
00:05:56.500 --> 00:06:07.660
In fact, Thomas Nagel, who was a very close friend of Nozick's for a long time till he

50
00:06:07.660 --> 00:06:14.220
wrote a review of Anarchy State Utopia that offended Nozick, said about him, it was in

51
00:06:14.220 --> 00:06:23.020
the eulogy he wrote, he gave at Nozick's funeral, he said, Nozick could destroy any position

52
00:06:23.020 --> 00:06:28.040
when he himself came up with, so he knew when he would write something he would have to

53
00:06:28.040 --> 00:06:33.240
stop giving arguments at some point because he knew he couldn't come up with anything

54
00:06:33.240 --> 00:06:44.640
that he himself would be unable to demolish. Now, he wrote not only on political philosophy

55
00:06:44.640 --> 00:06:51.440
in Anarchy, State and Utopia, but he had a very wide range of interests. He wrote philosophical

56
00:06:51.440 --> 00:07:01.440
Explanations, which came out in 1981, and he wrote other works that examine life and

57
00:07:01.440 --> 00:07:08.440
nature rationality, and then his last book was Invariances. He also has a collection

58
00:07:08.440 --> 00:07:16.060
of his essays called Socratic Puzzles. I'm going to be confining my remarks entirely

59
00:07:16.060 --> 00:07:24.060
to his most famous work in political philosophy, Anarchy, State and Utopia.

60
00:07:24.060 --> 00:07:33.700
After he wrote the book, which is his libertarian work, he, for a while, abandoned libertarianism.

61
00:07:33.700 --> 00:07:42.460
The most anti-libertarian remarks he made are in the book The Examined Life, but toward

62
00:07:42.460 --> 00:08:12.460
By the end of his life, he came back to a somewhat libertarian position. He told me that his own position was, he felt he was fairly close to Hayek's position. He didn't think he had deviated. He said, if you consider that libertarian view, then he thought he qualified as libertarian. He said, well, people usually are willing to classify Hayek as libertarian.

63
00:08:12.460 --> 00:08:16.540
at least in the classical liberal tradition. So he didn't think that the fact that he had

64
00:08:16.540 --> 00:08:24.620
at one time held a more radical view should disqualify him from being called a libertarian.

65
00:08:24.620 --> 00:08:29.840
There are a whole lot of things, topics one could talk about in Anarchy, State, and Utopia,

66
00:08:29.840 --> 00:08:37.740
but I just want to, I'll just mention a few things. First, I want to say something about

67
00:08:37.740 --> 00:08:48.540
His classification of theories of distribution and the famous Wilt Chamberlain example that

68
00:08:48.540 --> 00:08:53.220
arises out of that classification, because the reason I want to say something about this

69
00:08:53.220 --> 00:09:03.900
is that people confuse very often, he sometimes talks about end state principles of distribution,

70
00:09:03.900 --> 00:09:32.900
Nozick first distinguished two kinds of theories of distribution, theories that say how wealth or any other good should be distributed.

71
00:09:32.900 --> 00:09:44.900
One is one view in which the only thing that matters is a certain structure of the distribution.

72
00:09:44.900 --> 00:09:53.900
Supposing we have, let's say, there are five people and we want, say, a particular, let's say a single good with five people,

73
00:09:53.900 --> 00:10:04.540
And we have the good distributed this way, so we have three people get one unit, two

74
00:10:04.540 --> 00:10:13.700
people get two units of the good. Now, on this kind of view, which is an, he calls an

75
00:10:13.700 --> 00:10:25.020
End-State View, all that matters is that you have this distribution, doesn't of course

76
00:10:25.020 --> 00:10:29.800
have to be this particular one, but all that matters is structure, a certain structure

77
00:10:29.800 --> 00:10:37.060
of the distribution is instantiated. So it doesn't matter who the people are in the distribution,

78
00:10:37.060 --> 00:10:43.700
As long as you have the range this way, then the principal is satisfied.

79
00:10:43.700 --> 00:10:51.260
You can have current time slice, this is under this, you have current time slice where what

80
00:10:51.260 --> 00:11:04.780
matters is what the situation is, say, at the present moment, you say, well, you want

81
00:11:04.780 --> 00:11:11.780
the distribution to be this way now, so then you could have variations of other end states

82
00:11:12.900 --> 00:11:17.820
that aren't current time slice that would depend, say, you want a certain pattern to

83
00:11:17.820 --> 00:11:24.820
be, a certain arrangement to be realized in the future. We could see the diff, to get

84
00:11:26.180 --> 00:11:33.180
an example of this, suppose you take, which is not, this would not be an end state theory,

85
00:11:33.180 --> 00:11:40.280
Suppose you take a, you accept the Marxist view, which I'll later be talking about in

86
00:11:40.280 --> 00:11:49.380
No Six Reasons to Reject, the Marxists say that workers are exploited under capitalism.

87
00:11:49.380 --> 00:11:58.740
So suppose somebody was like this end state view and he said, well, let's say this under

88
00:11:58.740 --> 00:12:03.540
of Capitalism, this is the actual, this turns out to be the actual distribution, say the

89
00:12:03.540 --> 00:12:09.340
workers are these, you have two capitalists, so they get twice as much, and this comes

90
00:12:09.340 --> 00:12:16.660
about because the workers are exploited. A Marxist, someone who thought that was a bad

91
00:12:16.660 --> 00:12:23.380
thing, wouldn't be satisfied if the support of the end state theory said, well look, since

92
00:12:23.380 --> 00:12:33.940
These workers are getting exploited, all that we're saying is that these people are getting

93
00:12:33.940 --> 00:12:39.460
more rather than these people, but in your view it would be just the same pattern with

94
00:12:39.460 --> 00:12:46.300
other people in the better position, but it would be the same arrangement.

95
00:12:46.300 --> 00:12:51.300
So the markets would say, you know, it matters which people are in which positions, but the

96
00:12:51.300 --> 00:13:01.300
So one of the end state theories say, no, all that counts is a particular arrangement, is all that's required for the correct distribution.

97
00:13:01.300 --> 00:13:11.300
So you have these end state theories. Now these are opposed to historical theories.

98
00:13:11.300 --> 00:13:17.300
Now in historical theory, the distribution doesn't just depend on this particular arrangement.

99
00:13:17.300 --> 00:13:25.380
It depends how you got to the particular arrangement that you're holding is just.

100
00:13:25.380 --> 00:13:38.740
So say in libertarian theory, any libertarian who knows himself would hold, say your just

101
00:13:38.740 --> 00:13:47.940
This arrangement is one that depends on who is a legitimate owner of a property and that

102
00:13:47.940 --> 00:13:52.620
depends on how the property was acquired in the past by particular people.

103
00:13:52.620 --> 00:14:02.380
So you see, in the historical theory, it's not just a matter of a particular state of

104
00:14:02.380 --> 00:14:07.980
affairs at one time, it depends on what's happened in the past.

105
00:14:07.980 --> 00:14:11.820
Now, here's where the part that I think people get confused.

106
00:14:11.820 --> 00:14:16.620
Within the historical theory, there are two kinds of historical theory.

107
00:14:16.620 --> 00:14:23.340
One is patterned and the other is non-patterned.

108
00:14:23.340 --> 00:14:30.260
So the confusion is people think that the pattern is the same as the end state, but

109
00:14:30.260 --> 00:14:36.140
remember, the end state is the non-historical view, patterned and non-patterned are variants

110
00:14:36.140 --> 00:14:37.140
of the historical view.

111
00:14:37.140 --> 00:14:53.140
Now, the patterned view would say what the correct distribution now is depends on some

112
00:14:53.140 --> 00:15:01.620
fact, some dimension, natural dimension of people at a particular time in the past.

113
00:15:01.620 --> 00:15:10.660
For example, suppose somebody said wealth or income should be distributed according to

114
00:15:10.660 --> 00:15:18.540
how much people in the past benefited consumers, then that's a particular dimension, how much

115
00:15:18.540 --> 00:15:25.500
in the past people benefited consumers, that determines the present distribution.

116
00:15:25.500 --> 00:15:34.500
So by knowing certain information, certain characteristics of people in the past, we can then determine the present distribution.

117
00:15:34.500 --> 00:15:48.500
Now there are also some examples, suppose you say everyone should get equal incomes,

118
00:16:18.500 --> 00:16:42.500
and the advantage of a lease well-off. So if you have any, you would say at a particular time, you'd say, what are the, what are the distribution? And you say, are these any inequalities to the advantage of a lease well-off? If they're not, then you change matters so they become, so that it fits this principle.

119
00:16:42.500 --> 00:17:12.500
But you could also say in the theory that Nozick favors non-pattern principle because it just says if you're the legitimate owner of something, you can pass it on to anyone you want or exchange it with anybody you want, so there isn't any way of taking the distribution at one time and then saying, well, there's some characteristic of that distribution which enables us to sort of map onto that and get

120
00:17:12.500 --> 00:17:13.500
The New Distribution

121
00:17:13.500 --> 00:17:21.180
Now you might be able to say, sort of, come up with some tricky way of fitting the non-pattern

122
00:17:21.180 --> 00:17:27.540
view and say you could come up with some, say that there's really a pattern there, somehow,

123
00:17:27.540 --> 00:17:33.180
but it isn't really the same as a pattern because it's just saying whatever happens,

124
00:17:33.180 --> 00:17:38.180
anything the just owners come up with is all right.

125
00:17:38.180 --> 00:17:42.380
You could rig up some sort of pattern just when you see what they do, but you couldn't

126
00:17:42.380 --> 00:17:49.380
in advance come up with some sort of way of going from what the libertarian owners do

127
00:17:52.340 --> 00:17:57.140
to get to what the distribution should be in some future time. You just have to say

128
00:17:57.140 --> 00:18:03.220
whatever they come up with is all right. I think we can see what a non-pattern view,

129
00:18:03.220 --> 00:18:09.300
I haven't explained it too well, but I can see more if we look at the famous Wilt Chamberlain

130
00:18:09.300 --> 00:18:20.820
an example. What Nozick imagines is, well, let's start off with some sort of distribution,

131
00:18:20.820 --> 00:18:27.960
say, that some supporter of egalitarianism favors. Let's suppose we start off, we say

132
00:18:27.960 --> 00:18:38.740
everyone has an equal income. Then he says, well, each person has been assigned a certain

133
00:18:38.740 --> 00:18:47.740
So he says supposing Wilt Chamberlain, for those of you who are too young to remember he was a famous basketball player,

134
00:18:47.740 --> 00:19:00.740
suppose he says he'll play basketball and he sets up a game and he charges people 25 cents admission to see him play basketball.

135
00:19:00.740 --> 00:19:08.260
Ball. And it turns out everybody else is interested in seeing him play, so it turns out because

136
00:19:08.260 --> 00:19:16.740
of that, he gets $250,000, which means much more than anybody else get. In those days

137
00:19:16.740 --> 00:19:22.860
when he wrote in 1974, that was an enormous salary. I imagine it still would be if you

138
00:19:22.860 --> 00:19:28.420
adjusted for inflation. I take it even if you don't adjust for inflation.

139
00:19:28.420 --> 00:19:40.760
Alright, so Nozick says, well, could the egalitarian object to this? He would say, you start off

140
00:19:40.760 --> 00:19:48.180
with everybody having equal amount, you've given everybody his proper share, everybody

141
00:19:48.180 --> 00:19:54.060
has just given up a quarter of his own money and the result is a situation where Wilt Chamberlain

142
00:19:54.060 --> 00:19:59.620
now has $250,000, so the supporter of the pattern principle would say, well, we then

143
00:19:59.620 --> 00:20:06.460
have to take the money away from Chamberlain, redistribute it so everybody has an equal

144
00:20:06.460 --> 00:20:14.220
amount of money, but then Nozick said, well, look, then you're saying that a person can't

145
00:20:14.220 --> 00:20:23.220
even spend 25 cents of money that you yourself say is his legitimate share as he wants, because

146
00:20:23.220 --> 00:20:30.980
Everybody, remembering the example, is voluntarily paid 25 cents to see Chamberlain play basketball.

147
00:20:30.980 --> 00:20:38.380
So I say, if you want to maintain a pattern, if you want some sort of distribution of this

148
00:20:38.380 --> 00:20:48.300
kind where what people get depends on some natural dimension of what they got at some

149
00:20:48.300 --> 00:20:56.700
point in the past, you say they should be all equal, so you then say, well, what are

150
00:20:56.700 --> 00:21:00.900
the deviations from that? So you're now having to correct that. He says that will require

151
00:21:00.900 --> 00:21:09.100
constant interferences with liberty. So his point, which applies very much to Rawls' theory,

152
00:21:09.100 --> 00:21:16.620
is that pattern theories of justice, pattern theories of distribution are very hard to

153
00:21:16.620 --> 00:21:21.740
to Maintain, and I think this is a very important insight.

154
00:21:21.740 --> 00:21:30.260
I want to turn now to another topic in Anarchy State Utopia, the famous first part, where,

155
00:21:30.260 --> 00:21:38.100
as you know, in libertarian theory, there are two views among libertarians.

156
00:21:38.100 --> 00:21:44.980
Some say a minimal state, so-called night watchman state, is justifiable, and then others

157
00:21:44.980 --> 00:21:54.500
such as Murray Rothbard say, no, even protection and justice should be provided by competing

158
00:21:54.500 --> 00:21:57.420
agencies on the free market.

159
00:21:57.420 --> 00:22:03.100
So Nozick was the foremost defender of the minimal state view.

160
00:22:03.100 --> 00:22:11.100
I want to say something about his arguments for that in the first part of the book.

161
00:22:11.100 --> 00:22:19.180
This is, unfortunately, his argument, to get his argument, involves saying a little bit

162
00:22:19.180 --> 00:22:25.940
about his chapter on risk, which is the most difficult chapter in the whole book.

163
00:22:25.940 --> 00:22:36.220
This is, it's really, as I mentioned, he had a labyrinthine mind, and this is the most

164
00:22:36.220 --> 00:22:39.220
labyrinthine of all the chapters in the book.

165
00:22:39.220 --> 00:22:44.140
He's not one writer who will just set out his argument very clearly.

166
00:22:44.140 --> 00:22:52.180
He'll say something and then you have to look at, say, one sentence that he said somewhere

167
00:22:52.180 --> 00:22:57.200
else and try to figure out how he's fit things all in.

168
00:22:57.200 --> 00:23:04.160
Of course, the days when one could call him up and ask him were much easier to handle

169
00:23:04.160 --> 00:23:33.160
Nozick's argument against the anarchists was this. He said, well, let's start with the situation that libertarian anarchists support, where we start off with each person has libertarian natural rights, and he's free to protect himself, and he's free to do whatever he wants to do.

170
00:23:33.160 --> 00:23:48.160
and protect other people. If there are violations of rights, he can punish rights violators or hire people to do that, so just as libertarian anarchists want.

171
00:23:48.160 --> 00:24:00.160
So what he wants to do is say, well, from this starting point, he can show by a series of steps that you can derive a minimal state.

172
00:24:00.160 --> 00:24:21.160
By a state, he means an agency that has a de facto or close to monopoly on the use of force in the society.

173
00:24:21.160 --> 00:24:27.160
Say, you would have, just like the United States, the government is the final arbiter

174
00:24:27.160 --> 00:24:55.160
There may be circumstances in which the state will allow private people to exercise force in themselves, but the state claims the right to supervise anyone else's use of force, plus a state will provide protective services, if necessary, without cost to everybody.

175
00:24:55.160 --> 00:25:24.160
We won't have a situation, say, in a situation, say, where everybody bought protective services, even if it was, say, everybody favored the same agency, all bought protection from that agency, that wouldn't be a state on Nozick's Construal because it would just be something like everybody's buying from one firm, say, just as it turns out everybody buys this car from a single firm,

176
00:25:24.160 --> 00:25:30.120
If you had a firm, everybody likes the cars that this firm puts out, that wouldn't mean

177
00:25:30.120 --> 00:25:36.320
convert the car agency into a socialist firm.

178
00:25:36.320 --> 00:25:42.520
It would still be a private firm, but it would just be everybody buys from that firm.

179
00:25:42.520 --> 00:25:49.640
So if you had just one protection agency, but everybody bought that, voluntarily bought

180
00:25:49.640 --> 00:25:54.800
The protection from that, that wouldn't be a Nozickian state.

181
00:25:54.800 --> 00:26:02.080
So Nozick thinks he can show that a minimal state will arise from the starting point by

182
00:26:02.080 --> 00:26:09.240
a series of steps, none of which violates libertarian rights.

183
00:26:09.240 --> 00:26:18.360
Now this isn't enough because you could imagine, let's say each of you voluntarily gives me

184
00:26:18.360 --> 00:26:27.860
all your money. You all decide you like my lectures or you want me to hurry up and finish, so to get me to do this, you give me all your money.

185
00:26:27.860 --> 00:26:34.020
That's, I think, a very good idea, but it's probably not, from your point of view, a good thing to do.

186
00:26:34.020 --> 00:26:42.360
So you wouldn't be violating any of your rights or anybody else's rights if you did that, but there'd be no reason to do it.

187
00:26:42.360 --> 00:26:51.360
So it isn't enough for Nozick to say there's a series of steps that everybody can take

188
00:26:51.360 --> 00:26:57.280
that don't violate anybody's rights and will result in a minimal state, starting from a

189
00:26:57.280 --> 00:26:59.160
state of libertarian anarchy.

190
00:26:59.160 --> 00:27:09.880
He has to show that each step will be to the advantage of people to take in that state.

191
00:27:09.880 --> 00:27:17.880
There's a complication in the final step that I'll get to when I reach that point, but he

192
00:27:17.880 --> 00:27:18.880
claims he can do that.

193
00:27:18.880 --> 00:27:27.000
He can show, starting from libertarian anarchy, he can show how to get to the state.

194
00:27:27.000 --> 00:27:35.360
What he imagines, he says, well, we will start off with people who form protection agencies,

195
00:27:35.360 --> 00:27:42.400
policies, just, as I say, just the way Murray Rothbard favors, just the way any libertarian

196
00:27:42.400 --> 00:27:43.400
anarchist would.

197
00:27:43.400 --> 00:27:50.240
I should mention that he says in the preface to Anarchy State Utopia, it was a long conversation

198
00:27:50.240 --> 00:27:55.640
with Murray Rothbard that got him interested in individualist anarchism.

199
00:27:55.640 --> 00:28:03.000
So you could take part one of the book to be in effect an explanation why I am not a

200
00:28:03.000 --> 00:28:09.880
of Rothbardian, that's what Nozick is doing there. So, you have been competing private

201
00:28:09.880 --> 00:28:20.520
protection agencies. Now, Nozick assumes that, say, supposing one agency gets more customers,

202
00:28:20.520 --> 00:28:28.720
he assumes that agencies will generally be stronger the more customers they get. So,

203
00:28:28.720 --> 00:28:35.520
Once you get, say, there's some sort of imbalance, some agency has significantly more customers

204
00:28:35.520 --> 00:28:43.400
than another, people will tend to shift from the other agencies to that one because you

205
00:28:43.400 --> 00:28:48.640
want to be in an agency that, if there's any disputes, will win the disputes.

206
00:28:48.640 --> 00:28:54.240
Nozick's imagining that if, say, two agencies come into conflict and they can't settle the

207
00:28:54.240 --> 00:28:56.240
The Theory of Money and State The Theory of Money and State

208
00:29:24.240 --> 00:29:30.960
isn't telling the other agencies you can't defend people, try to attract clients or compete

209
00:29:30.960 --> 00:29:38.040
with us. It will win disputes if other agencies choose to fight with it, but that doesn't

210
00:29:38.040 --> 00:29:50.240
stop these other agencies from existing. Also, it isn't providing protective services to

211
00:29:50.240 --> 00:30:00.600
anyone, if necessary without cost, it's just providing services to people who agree to

212
00:30:00.600 --> 00:30:02.360
pay for its services.

213
00:30:02.360 --> 00:30:09.320
So what Nozick is going to go on is to say he can show from that situation where you

214
00:30:09.320 --> 00:30:35.320
If you have a dominant agency, the dominant agency will be able to turn itself into a minimal state and it will do so in a way that not only doesn't violate anyone's libertarian rights, but it will be to the advantage, everyone, it will be to the advantage of people in that dominant agency to get into the minimal state.

215
00:30:35.320 --> 00:30:37.320
They'll find it in their interest to do so.

216
00:30:37.320 --> 00:31:07.320
Now, before I get to Nozick's argument for that, I think there's a problem for the argument, as I've so far presented it. Remember, what he's saying is that because of this process where the larger agency will win out over smaller agencies, once an agency gets significantly more money, the larger agency will win out over smaller agencies, once an agency gets significantly more money, the larger

217
00:31:07.320 --> 00:31:13.000
is larger, there'll be a tendency for people to go to that agency until you get a dominant

218
00:31:13.000 --> 00:31:20.080
agency. So he's saying, unlike the standard case, there's no natural tendency toward monopoly

219
00:31:20.080 --> 00:31:26.240
on the free market. The size of a firm relative to other firms, how many firms are in the

220
00:31:26.240 --> 00:31:30.640
industry, just depends on particular economic conditions of the industry. There's no natural

221
00:31:30.640 --> 00:31:36.680
tendency to monopoly. Nozick fully accepted that point about economics, but he thought

222
00:31:36.680 --> 00:31:44.680
With protection services, it's different because one agency's strength is another's weakness.

223
00:31:44.680 --> 00:31:49.680
So you have this snowballing effect will take place.

224
00:31:49.680 --> 00:31:58.680
So what I think is the problem with this is his argument might work too well in this sense.

225
00:31:58.680 --> 00:32:09.120
And if he's right, then not only will the people in one agency get to be dominant over

226
00:32:09.120 --> 00:32:14.400
the other, it would seem like people would, or almost all people would leave that agency

227
00:32:14.400 --> 00:32:18.480
and join the monopoly agency.

228
00:32:18.480 --> 00:32:23.300
For his argument to work, there have to be a significant number of people outside the

229
00:32:23.300 --> 00:32:28.660
Dominated Agency, because as you'll see, his argument depends on saying that the

230
00:32:28.660 --> 00:32:33.940
dominant agency can restrict the other agencies in certain ways and then it has

231
00:32:33.940 --> 00:32:39.300
to compensate its clients by providing them with low-cost or free protection

232
00:32:39.300 --> 00:32:44.620
services. So if it doesn't do that because everybody's in the dominant

233
00:32:44.620 --> 00:32:50.300
agency, then it isn't meeting the second criterion that Nozick has set out for

234
00:32:50.300 --> 00:32:55.500
of the State, because say everybody, almost everybody joins a monopoly agency and they're

235
00:32:55.500 --> 00:33:02.980
paying for its services, they're not meeting the criteria Nozick has set up where the agency

236
00:33:02.980 --> 00:33:13.780
is providing low cost or no charge protection services for people who are at least some

237
00:33:13.780 --> 00:33:16.780
people in the society.

238
00:33:16.780 --> 00:33:23.460
So Nozick seems to have an arbitrary stopping point. He's saying, well, here's the reason

239
00:33:23.460 --> 00:33:32.460
people will get into the, leave their protection agencies and get into the dominant agency,

240
00:33:32.460 --> 00:33:38.300
but this process will stop at a certain point that enables the rest of my argument to go

241
00:33:38.300 --> 00:33:42.580
through. And he doesn't say why there would be this stopping point.

242
00:33:42.580 --> 00:33:48.620
All right, but let's put this aside. So we now have, if he's right, there's a dominant

243
00:33:48.620 --> 00:33:57.780
agency and various other agencies who are independent, who people are in those agencies

244
00:33:57.780 --> 00:34:04.340
they're protecting themselves. If they're in a dispute with the dominant agency, then

245
00:34:04.340 --> 00:34:10.540
they'll lose, but still they're operating. Possibly they're people who don't, independent

246
00:34:10.540 --> 00:34:40.540
Now we get to the difficult chapter, which is the one on risk. Nozick says, what happens, let's imagine a situation where a client of a dominant agency commits some crime, or is charged with some crime, or is charged with some crime,

247
00:34:40.540 --> 00:34:44.540
and Crime against the client of one of the non-dominant agencies.

248
00:34:44.540 --> 00:34:53.940
So the non-dominant agency puts the client of the dominant agency on trial and then imposes

249
00:34:53.940 --> 00:34:56.100
some punishment.

250
00:34:56.100 --> 00:35:04.620
So you might think, well, that isn't a problem because if it turns out, let's say the client

251
00:35:04.620 --> 00:35:11.980
then goes to his dominant agency and they decide he's not guilty, then the dominant

252
00:35:11.980 --> 00:35:20.360
agency can simply say the other agency should pay compensation to the client for putting

253
00:35:20.360 --> 00:35:27.160
him on trial and saying wrongly in their view holding that he was guilty.

254
00:35:27.160 --> 00:35:32.160
So why is there a particular problem here?

255
00:35:32.160 --> 00:35:36.160
Why would this lead to any difficulty for the independent agency?

256
00:35:36.160 --> 00:35:43.320
They might not like having to pay compensation, but they're still in existence, they're still

257
00:35:43.320 --> 00:35:44.320
operating.

258
00:35:44.320 --> 00:35:55.920
Now Nozick thinks, though, supposing there are certain kinds of penalty that they could

259
00:35:55.920 --> 00:36:03.240
He said impose like, say, the death penalty or putting people in prison for a long time.

260
00:36:03.240 --> 00:36:16.880
He said if people who might be on trial, they might be afraid if, let's say, this non-dominant

261
00:36:16.880 --> 00:36:23.480
agency used what the first agency thought was risky decision procedure, procedures they

262
00:36:23.480 --> 00:36:30.940
thought had an undue risk of imposing these bad penalties on them. This would make them

263
00:36:30.940 --> 00:36:39.180
afraid. People would say, oh, well, what if I'm arrested by this agency, then they might

264
00:36:39.180 --> 00:36:45.880
decide to put me on trial where, say, you only need 6 out of 12 jurors for a guilty

265
00:36:45.880 --> 00:36:57.760
And then I might be, they might subject me to execution, so even if, I'd be really afraid

266
00:36:57.760 --> 00:37:03.400
of this, so they're imposing this risky decision procedure on me.

267
00:37:03.400 --> 00:37:11.760
So you might say, well, couldn't you then sort of say if they impose such a procedure,

268
00:37:11.760 --> 00:37:41.760
And you say, well, the dominant agencies can say, don't carry out the sentence till we have a chance to look at it, and then you can just, if it turns out we disagree, then you can just compensate our client for the getting him afraid, so you can still have compensation there, you're still paying, you can still have, the non-dominant agency can still put its

269
00:37:41.760 --> 00:37:48.440
Use whatever procedures it wants, it just has to compensate people that it's put under

270
00:37:48.440 --> 00:37:55.160
this risk if they're found not guilty by the dominant agency.

271
00:37:55.160 --> 00:37:57.920
So Nozick said, no, this won't work.

272
00:37:57.920 --> 00:38:05.800
You see how he thinks of all sorts of complications, because he said if people know that an agency

273
00:38:05.800 --> 00:38:13.560
will impose risky decision procedures, then even people who were never arrested for any

274
00:38:13.560 --> 00:38:19.320
crime will be afraid because they'll be afraid that if they are arrested, they will be subject

275
00:38:19.320 --> 00:38:21.880
to non-risky decision procedure.

276
00:38:21.880 --> 00:38:27.700
So they'll be afraid and they will never be compensated because remember they're not arrested

277
00:38:27.700 --> 00:38:32.000
for anything, so the agency hasn't done anything to them.

278
00:38:32.000 --> 00:38:38.080
It's just the fear that if they were arrested and subject to these risky decision procedures,

279
00:38:38.080 --> 00:38:46.480
they would be, get these bad penalties that makes them afraid.

280
00:38:46.480 --> 00:38:54.040
So there is uncompensated for fear here and Nozick thinks as a result of this, the dominant

281
00:38:54.040 --> 00:39:04.200
Agency can tell the other agencies, you can't impose risky decision procedures that we contend

282
00:39:04.200 --> 00:39:08.200
are risky on our clients.

283
00:39:08.200 --> 00:39:14.520
Now, suppose it does that, it says you can't impose these procedures because you'll be

284
00:39:14.520 --> 00:39:21.640
generating this kind of fear, you're unable to compensate our clients for this because

285
00:39:21.640 --> 00:39:30.520
Because even if you find them guilty and we disagree and find them not guilty, you won't

286
00:39:30.520 --> 00:39:38.200
be compensating the ones, the clients of our clients who were made afraid and who didn't

287
00:39:38.200 --> 00:39:41.400
do anything that you didn't put on trial and arrest.

288
00:39:41.400 --> 00:39:47.720
So it can tell the agencies, you can't use risky decision procedures.

289
00:39:47.720 --> 00:39:54.720
Yet one more complication. When we're imagining these agencies use risky decision procedures,

290
00:39:57.120 --> 00:40:04.120
they're not doing anything that's intrinsically wrong. They're not violating rights because

291
00:40:05.080 --> 00:40:12.080
it isn't that they're using decision procedures that everybody realizes are wrong, that would

292
00:40:12.080 --> 00:40:24.080
wrong that would be unfair or inequitable to use. It isn't say, we're deciding whether clients are guilty by reading tea leaves.

293
00:40:24.080 --> 00:40:32.080
It's say they just have a different view of what proper procedures are from that of the dominant agency.

294
00:40:32.080 --> 00:40:45.160
So, the Nozick Hold, if the agency prohibits them from using procedures, then these risky

295
00:40:45.160 --> 00:40:51.280
procedures is really putting the clients of that agency at a disadvantage because then

296
00:40:51.280 --> 00:40:57.120
they can't protect themselves in the way that they think best, in the way that they

297
00:40:57.120 --> 00:40:59.960
think is suitable.

298
00:40:59.960 --> 00:41:04.840
They think these procedures are all right, but they can't use them.

299
00:41:04.840 --> 00:41:10.440
Remember, the first agency can prohibit them because according to its own view of risky

300
00:41:10.440 --> 00:41:16.960
procedures, these procedures are too risky, but it has to recognize the clients of the

301
00:41:16.960 --> 00:41:19.680
non-dominant agency find these procedures acceptable.

302
00:41:19.680 --> 00:41:26.560
So nobody said, well, if it prohibits them, then it has to offer them, those people, the

303
00:41:26.560 --> 00:41:56.560
and independence who are disadvantaged and not being able to protect themselves, has to offer them compensation and the compensation is that they get either low-cost or no-cost protection services from the dominant agency, so it's kind of an odd sort of compensation is that if instead of being able to get protection from the agency you want, you

304
00:41:56.560 --> 00:42:02.280
receive protection from the agency you don't want. Now you do have the right to refuse

305
00:42:02.280 --> 00:42:09.280
and say, well, I want to get, say, compensation and money instead, but Nozick thinks very

306
00:42:09.920 --> 00:42:14.020
few people will want to do that because then they won't be able to protect themselves

307
00:42:14.020 --> 00:42:21.020
in the way that they want. So Nozick thinks, well, if this is right, then what's going

308
00:42:21.020 --> 00:42:51.020
is right, then what's going to happen? You'll have not only an agency that will be able to be dominant in the sense that no agency can challenge it, but it is able to supervise the use of force by all the other agencies. These other agencies are still able to protect clients so long as they don't have disputes with the dominant agency, but

309
00:42:51.020 --> 00:43:01.020
This, Nozick says, well, any state should be willing to do this, any state should be willing to let people settle disputes among themselves, as they wish.

310
00:43:01.020 --> 00:43:19.020
Plus, not only is it supervising the use of force, though, but it has to provide protection services for those who it's disadvantaged by prohibiting using the risky decision procedures

311
00:43:19.020 --> 00:43:49.020
that agency. So it's met, according to Nozick, these two criteria for the state. So we have then, first, the ultra-minimal state, you have the dominant agency, is prohibiting other agencies from using risky decision procedures on its clients. Then it's required immediately morally to transform itself into the minimal state, the state that is providing

312
00:43:49.020 --> 00:43:59.020
The protection services at non-market prices are free to the clients. It's disadvantaged.

313
00:43:59.020 --> 00:44:06.020
So according to Nozick then, it's a minimal state. We've shown, we've drawn the rabbit out of the hat.

314
00:44:06.020 --> 00:44:14.020
We've shown how you get from libertarian anarchy to minimal state without violating any libertarian rights.

315
00:44:14.020 --> 00:44:24.260
and in a way that shows how people operate each step as people be acting in their interests.

316
00:44:24.260 --> 00:44:38.060
I don't find this derivation very plausible because first of all it would first apply

317
00:44:38.060 --> 00:44:48.060
only to cases where there are very severe penalties, such as hanging or long imprisonment.

318
00:44:48.060 --> 00:44:53.820
It's hard to think of anything other than death penalty, which could apply because even

319
00:44:53.820 --> 00:45:00.760
if, say, you were sentenced to long imprisonment, you would know that your agency can review

320
00:45:00.760 --> 00:45:01.760
the case.

321
00:45:01.760 --> 00:45:06.220
Maybe you'd still be afraid because you think your agency, I mean, if your agency confirmed

322
00:45:06.220 --> 00:45:36.140
by its own procedures, you really couldn't object much, although maybe you'd still be feeling the extra fear then, but it would apply then only to a few cases, you couldn't say, how could you say, prohibit the non-dominant agencies from acting in all sorts of other crimes, so long as it doesn't apply these penalties, and then couldn't it also always refuse to apply the risky decision procedures to clients or the dominant agencies.

323
00:45:36.140 --> 00:45:49.140
Why would the other agencies have to put so much emphasis on these particular decision procedures that's arousing the dominant agency to act?

324
00:45:49.140 --> 00:45:57.140
And then, is it very likely that most people will think they're going to be seized and arrested anyway?

325
00:45:57.140 --> 00:46:05.860
I mean, suppose there's some agency, say, that uses six-man juries, so you think if

326
00:46:05.860 --> 00:46:14.260
somebody's arrested for murder, you'll have not a chance, if you're innocent, you'll

327
00:46:14.260 --> 00:46:19.820
have more of a chance of being wrongly found guilty than you would with a normal 12-person

328
00:46:19.820 --> 00:46:21.540
unanimous jury.

329
00:46:21.540 --> 00:46:28.480
Is that going to make people really fearful, given that most people or very few people

330
00:46:28.480 --> 00:46:30.980
were ever arrested for murder?

331
00:46:30.980 --> 00:46:38.120
It seems like he knows that he's just taken one very small possibility and somehow elevated

332
00:46:38.120 --> 00:46:47.520
it into something extraordinarily serious, it seems like, much ado about very little.

333
00:46:47.520 --> 00:46:55.560
So supposing he does get, supposing though his argument works, as I'm sure he would

334
00:46:55.560 --> 00:47:04.880
have granted his argument works, then what happens if, say you have, in addition to the

335
00:47:04.880 --> 00:47:11.640
dominant agency, suppose you have a second agency that's the second most powerful, couldn't

336
00:47:11.640 --> 00:47:19.160
It used the same sort of argument as Nozick had to prohibit clients of the third agency

337
00:47:19.160 --> 00:47:26.000
from imposing risky decision procedures on its client. So then if it did that, then it

338
00:47:26.000 --> 00:47:33.680
would be exercising state-like function. So it would be, seems odd to say, you could say

339
00:47:33.680 --> 00:47:40.580
there's a state in existence if the dominant agency isn't the only one who can prohibit

340
00:47:40.580 --> 00:47:46.380
and other people from using risky decision procedures in the way Nozick won.

341
00:47:46.380 --> 00:47:56.020
But now I want to turn to the second person in my lecture, Murray Rothbard, who's the

342
00:47:56.020 --> 00:48:05.540
writer who's most influenced my own thinking in politics and political theory.

343
00:48:05.540 --> 00:48:19.260
Murray Rothbard is the one who, I think, is the one who has the most plausible position of any of the philosophers I mentioned.

344
00:48:19.260 --> 00:48:25.180
Rothbard lived from 1926 to 1995.

345
00:48:25.180 --> 00:48:32.340
He was a PhD in economic history from Columbia University,

346
00:48:32.340 --> 00:48:42.380
where he studied under Joseph Dorfman and then he had it he worked for the

347
00:48:42.380 --> 00:48:48.420
William Volcker Fund where he wrote reviews and reports on an amazing variety

348
00:48:48.420 --> 00:48:54.980
of scholarly subjects he had an extraordinary range of command of

349
00:48:54.980 --> 00:49:00.780
sources and books on all sorts of things not only economics but history

350
00:49:00.780 --> 00:49:11.460
Philosophy, Political Science, anything you mention he knew a great deal about. He taught

351
00:49:11.460 --> 00:49:21.660
at Brooklyn Polytechnic and then at the University of Nevada Las Vegas until his death in 1995.

352
00:49:21.660 --> 00:49:32.460
Unfortunately, I can't recommend any good secondary literature on Rothbard.

353
00:49:32.460 --> 00:49:41.320
I want to talk in particular about Rothbard's main book on political theory, The Ethics

354
00:49:41.320 --> 00:49:48.240
of Liberty, which was originally published in 1982, and it's since been reissued and

355
00:49:48.240 --> 00:50:00.160
published by the Mises Institute, or available through the Mises Institute, I should say.

356
00:50:00.160 --> 00:50:06.360
In this book, there are an enormous number of insights. It would be easy to give different

357
00:50:06.360 --> 00:50:13.080
lectures on various topics. I've just selected a few. Now, one that I want to start with

358
00:50:13.080 --> 00:50:22.520
is one point where I think Rothbard makes a decisive advance from Nozick. Nozick isn't

359
00:50:22.520 --> 00:50:30.220
really clear on this issue. I think he probably had the correct view, but Rothbard is the

360
00:50:30.220 --> 00:50:36.340
clearest on this, and his precursor in the people I've talked about before is really

361
00:50:36.340 --> 00:50:45.640
Immanuel Kant on this particular point, and the point is this, in the Lockean tradition

362
00:50:45.640 --> 00:50:54.380
that Nozick was in of how property is acquired, individuals can acquire property by mixing

363
00:50:54.380 --> 00:51:05.020
their labor with land, they come to acquire it, Locke said that the earth is given to

364
00:51:05.020 --> 00:51:11.900
to Everyone in Common. So everyone starts off with, you start off with common ownership

365
00:51:11.900 --> 00:51:20.900
and then you ask, how do people go from common ownership to individual ownership? Now, in

366
00:51:20.900 --> 00:51:26.060
Rothbard's view, I don't claim he was the first to say this, but as I say, Kant has

367
00:51:26.060 --> 00:51:32.300
this also, and I mentioned in other arguments, very clear in Rothbard's system that this

368
00:51:32.300 --> 00:51:39.500
This is the case, you start off with property as being unowned, you say, no one has any

369
00:51:39.500 --> 00:51:45.060
claim to land until people do something to acquire it.

370
00:51:45.060 --> 00:51:55.540
Now, we say Nozick is a bit unclear on this, we have to distinguish what the situation

371
00:51:55.540 --> 00:52:00.860
that Rothbard is describing, unowned property from this situation.

372
00:52:00.860 --> 00:52:09.060
Suppose we say in the situation before people start acquiring land, let's say you just have

373
00:52:09.060 --> 00:52:14.820
people living on the earth, no one has appropriated any land yet.

374
00:52:14.820 --> 00:52:24.820
We could say, we could imagine this system, people are free to use whatever exists as

375
00:52:24.820 --> 00:52:35.420
they like, but they can't prevent other people from using this also. I don't mean to imagine

376
00:52:35.420 --> 00:52:40.220
a Hobbesian state of affairs where you have the right to take what you want in the sense

377
00:52:40.220 --> 00:52:45.860
you're under no obligation not to, but anyone else is free to take it from you if you can.

378
00:52:45.860 --> 00:52:56.660
I imagine a situation where, say, if I come across an oasis in the desert, I'm free to

379
00:52:56.660 --> 00:53:06.660
take water from it, but I can't, say I've had my water and I walk away, I can't say,

380
00:53:06.660 --> 00:53:17.940
Okay, this is my oasis now, so you can't use it in ordinary property. When you acquire property,

381
00:53:17.940 --> 00:53:23.460
you have the right to exclude others from the use of the property. That's the whole point of

382
00:53:23.460 --> 00:53:30.820
ownership. So I'm imagining, say, a system of common use where somebody else can't push you away

383
00:53:30.820 --> 00:53:41.180
Say, while you're drinking water, but you can't stop them from also taking water.

384
00:53:41.180 --> 00:53:51.140
We could see a situation somewhat like this, checking out books in a public library, say,

385
00:53:51.140 --> 00:53:58.980
you can use the books, but you can't prevent other people from using them also.

386
00:53:58.980 --> 00:54:03.300
I'll say when you return them, then other people are free to take them out.

387
00:54:03.300 --> 00:54:08.180
You can't say, this is my book, you can use it only if I say so.

388
00:54:08.180 --> 00:54:14.660
So this is a very different system from one where you say, you start off land as

389
00:54:14.660 --> 00:54:21.220
unknown, people are free to acquire it. Now the reason I think Nozick doesn't say

390
00:54:21.220 --> 00:54:27.940
explicitly he's starting off with a common use rule, but he has, he spends a

391
00:54:27.940 --> 00:54:38.580
a great deal of time on provisos to the Lockean labor mixture. He says, well, maybe you should

392
00:54:38.580 --> 00:54:49.140
say, besides being able to acquire land by doing something to it, like mixing your labor

393
00:54:49.140 --> 00:54:56.020
under certain conditions, you also have to make sure that no one is made worse off by

394
00:54:56.020 --> 00:55:03.900
These provisos make a great deal of sense if you start with the common use system, because

395
00:55:03.900 --> 00:55:11.100
then when you appropriate land, you're depriving people of something, you're saying those people

396
00:55:11.100 --> 00:55:18.580
no longer have a liberty, which they did before, namely abusing that when they wanted, provided

397
00:55:18.580 --> 00:55:20.140
nobody else was using.

398
00:55:20.140 --> 00:55:26.620
Now, even if you're not using some item that you appropriate, no one else can use it without

399
00:55:26.620 --> 00:55:27.620
your permission.

400
00:55:27.620 --> 00:55:29.140
So, there's been a loss there.

401
00:55:29.140 --> 00:55:34.380
So, it makes much more sense to talk about, are there qualifications, are there provisos

402
00:55:34.380 --> 00:55:39.900
to add to initial appropriation if you favor that system.

403
00:55:39.900 --> 00:55:49.020
But on Rothbard's view, you say, you start off, no one owns any land, so it makes more

404
00:55:49.020 --> 00:55:55.300
There's more sense to say that you don't have to meet any provisos other than appropriate,

405
00:55:55.300 --> 00:56:02.180
you just have to appropriate the land because you're not depriving anyone of some liberty

406
00:56:02.180 --> 00:56:10.180
that he had before. It isn't that the other person had he got there before you could have

407
00:56:10.180 --> 00:56:18.200
appropriated land so he's losing something there, but he isn't losing any liberty to

408
00:56:18.200 --> 00:56:27.360
to use any unused object that he wants, even one that someone else had used first.

409
00:56:27.360 --> 00:56:35.640
So this, I think, is a decisive advantage of Rothbard over Nozick.

410
00:56:35.640 --> 00:56:42.960
Nozick is, I think, could get out of possibly saying that he favors the common use system.

411
00:56:42.960 --> 00:56:51.440
We could say, well, the provisers are just because we can't specify fully what the correct

412
00:56:51.440 --> 00:56:58.520
principle of appropriation is, but it's very, rather hazy what he meant.

413
00:56:58.520 --> 00:57:02.840
So Rothbard, I think, is much clearer here.

414
00:57:02.840 --> 00:57:07.400
As I mentioned, Kant also had the same view.

415
00:57:07.400 --> 00:57:15.160
Kant said we start with the surface of the earth and then people are free to appropriate

416
00:57:15.160 --> 00:57:16.160
parts of it.

417
00:57:16.160 --> 00:57:21.240
We have to do so in a way where their acts of appropriation become possible, they can

418
00:57:21.240 --> 00:57:28.920
all be realized together, but in Kant's view you don't have to, all you have to do to appropriate

419
00:57:28.920 --> 00:57:34.800
something is to come to possess it, you don't have to meet any provisos.

420
00:57:34.800 --> 00:57:45.840
Now, if you take matters in Rothbard's, if you take Rothbard's view of property, here

421
00:57:45.840 --> 00:57:52.960
I'm not just talking about this particular point, but his whole view of property, then

422
00:57:52.960 --> 00:58:02.220
I think you can see that the problem of distribution, as Rawls has put it, really doesn't arise

423
00:58:02.220 --> 00:58:12.780
at all, because Rawls is saying, well, we're starting off with a group of people in a society

424
00:58:12.780 --> 00:58:20.940
and we're asking, how should we distribute all the land, say, all the territory that

425
00:58:20.940 --> 00:58:27.980
this is, the group is resident in, like we're imagining, say, the people of the United States

426
00:58:27.980 --> 00:58:34.460
are all getting together and saying, how should we distribute the land in the U.S.? What should

427
00:58:34.460 --> 00:58:41.140
be the rules governing the distribution of property? In Rothbard's system, there's no

428
00:58:41.140 --> 00:58:48.620
question of distribution in that sense at all. And he starts all, I think you can see

429
00:58:48.620 --> 00:58:54.940
this in one of the very important chapters, I think the sixth chapter, called A Crusoe

430
00:58:54.940 --> 00:59:02.220
So social philosophy, and he imagines a single person, Robinson Crusoe, who's on an island

431
00:59:02.220 --> 00:59:10.520
by himself, so he says, well, couldn't Crusoe just appropriate the island to his own use

432
00:59:10.520 --> 00:59:18.820
and build things, make, grow food, build tools, and clearly they would all be his.

433
00:59:18.820 --> 00:59:27.180
Now we could imagine people on different islands, different Robinson Crusoe, they all have the

434
00:59:27.180 --> 00:59:37.060
same name of course, but they'd be appropriating land on their own areas and we could imagine

435
00:59:37.060 --> 00:59:43.700
these people becoming aware of one another and then engaging in trade, they'd each be

436
00:59:43.700 --> 00:59:50.900
the exchanging items that they made for others that they might like better.

437
00:59:50.900 --> 00:59:56.780
So Rothbard said, well, could anybody object to that?

438
00:59:56.780 --> 01:00:07.220
We say each one is the owner of his island, his or her island, and then people are engaging

439
01:00:07.220 --> 01:00:09.280
in voluntary exchange.

440
01:00:09.280 --> 01:00:13.680
So isn't this perfectly all right?

441
01:00:13.680 --> 01:00:23.680
We couldn't have a Rawlsian come in and say, oh, you can't do that. You have to meet certain criteria of exchange.

442
01:00:23.680 --> 01:00:38.680
You have to exchange. Some islands might have more resources on them than others, so it's unfair that you're able to benefit more from this island than the other islands.

443
01:00:38.680 --> 01:00:49.680
Rothbard says, isn't it quite clear that people could, would be the proprietors of their own island, could exchange freely the way they wanted?

444
01:00:49.680 --> 01:00:57.680
And I should say, if you look at Rawls' book, A Law of Peoples, I didn't talk about that this morning lecture on Rawls,

445
01:00:57.680 --> 01:01:07.680
but Rawls himself says that people in different countries don't have to, you don't have to apply the difference principle between countries.

446
01:01:07.680 --> 01:01:13.200
He thinks it's all right for one country to have a higher standard of living than another.

447
01:01:13.200 --> 01:01:18.200
He said even if one country has more natural resources than another, he doesn't think

448
01:01:18.200 --> 01:01:20.560
this is grounds for redistribution.

449
01:01:20.560 --> 01:01:24.880
So here he himself is rather Rothbardian.

450
01:01:24.880 --> 01:01:28.160
He just doesn't apply that within society.

451
01:01:28.160 --> 01:01:33.800
But now Rothbard says, well, supposing we imagine instead of having each person on a

452
01:01:33.800 --> 01:01:39.720
on a separate island, we have the people are all on the same territory and each one is

453
01:01:39.720 --> 01:01:46.680
appropriated property. Why can't they do that? What's wrong with that? Why did the

454
01:01:46.680 --> 01:01:53.680
fact they're all in the same territory mean that there's some special problem of distribution

455
01:01:53.680 --> 01:02:00.200
of the kind Rawls favors? I think if you look at matters in this Rothbardian way, you can

456
01:02:00.200 --> 01:02:09.880
You can see that the whole Rawlsian way of looking at distribution dissolves.

457
01:02:09.880 --> 01:02:13.840
There is no separate process of distribution at all.

458
01:02:13.840 --> 01:02:19.680
You just have individuals who legitimately acquire property, and then those individuals

459
01:02:19.680 --> 01:02:24.640
are free to trade or give gifts as they wish.

460
01:02:24.640 --> 01:02:27.600
That's all there is to it.

461
01:02:27.600 --> 01:02:39.920
In Ethics of Liberty, Rothbard doesn't confine himself to what happens in a libertarian,

462
01:02:39.920 --> 01:02:45.480
once we have a libertarian system, or problems of libertarian theory.

463
01:02:45.480 --> 01:02:52.440
He's also concerned with another topic that we've discussed a great deal in these lectures,

464
01:02:52.440 --> 01:03:03.480
mainly the nature of ethics, how do we know what is right, what's good, we've seen different

465
01:03:03.480 --> 01:03:12.280
theories such as Aristotle's, we've had the Lockean theory, Hobbes' theory, we've seen

466
01:03:12.280 --> 01:03:21.840
various approaches. Rothbard was very much in the Aristotelian natural law tradition,

467
01:03:21.840 --> 01:03:34.480
much like Aristotle and St. Thomas were one writers he thought very highly of.

468
01:03:34.480 --> 01:03:44.200
He thought though that there had been an important modification in correct natural law views

469
01:03:44.200 --> 01:03:54.680
Mises applied to political philosophy beginning especially with Locke and other individualist

470
01:03:54.680 --> 01:04:02.480
philosophers that was better than, there is an improvement on Aristotle and Aquinas.

471
01:04:02.480 --> 01:04:13.640
I remember in the lecture on Aristotle I mentioned there was a problem in that Aristotle first

472
01:04:13.640 --> 01:04:22.080
discusses how each person can lead a good life, that each person has a nature and our

473
01:04:22.080 --> 01:04:31.480
purpose is to realize our nature, mainly reason, fully exercising itself, so he has a whole

474
01:04:31.480 --> 01:04:34.120
count of how we do that.

475
01:04:34.120 --> 01:04:41.960
But then he also starts talking about the polis, which is the complete community of

476
01:04:41.960 --> 01:04:43.440
which people live well.

477
01:04:43.440 --> 01:04:49.840
And sometimes he says that people are just parts of the polis. The polis is superior to people.

478
01:04:49.840 --> 01:04:59.340
I suggested, following Fred Miller, that there's a way of taking Aristotle in a more individualist way.

479
01:04:59.340 --> 01:05:02.840
He isn't saying that people are completely subordinate to the polis.

480
01:05:02.840 --> 01:05:10.240
But, on the other hand, he does have these passages that suggest that it's not completely individualist.

481
01:05:10.240 --> 01:05:18.520
There's some sort of common good that's different from the goods of each particular individual.

482
01:05:18.520 --> 01:05:26.280
And as a result, the people in the policy are subject, even in his ideal city state,

483
01:05:26.280 --> 01:05:35.400
they're subject to quite a bit of central, of control by the ruling authorities.

484
01:06:05.400 --> 01:06:13.400
and there's all sorts of disputes in his theory on just what the relation is between the common good and the individual good.

485
01:06:13.400 --> 01:06:23.400
So Rothbard thought that it's important to eliminate the notion of the common good from natural law theory,

486
01:06:23.400 --> 01:06:34.400
If you're taking the common good to be something apart from the good of the individuals who are in the society.

487
01:06:34.400 --> 01:06:43.400
So all you have in his version of natural law is each individual is trying to achieve the best life for him or herself.

488
01:06:43.400 --> 01:06:51.240
yourself, and the society in which they live, where you have the competing protection agencies,

489
01:06:51.240 --> 01:06:56.520
is simply a framework in which they can do this.

490
01:06:56.520 --> 01:07:08.200
It isn't, there's no entity with a good of its own.

491
01:07:08.200 --> 01:07:17.040
In these lectures I've had quite a few critical comments on the Straussian political interpretation

492
01:07:17.040 --> 01:07:22.840
of various philosophers where they're all, they say they're all secret atheists.

493
01:07:22.840 --> 01:07:29.720
There isn't a Straussian view of Murray Rothbard as far as I know, but I mention Strauss because

494
01:07:29.720 --> 01:07:39.960
Here, for once, there's a point at which Rothbard praises Strauss, and he thinks very highly

495
01:07:39.960 --> 01:07:50.360
of an argument that Strauss gives in Natural Right and History. The argument is this, one

496
01:07:50.360 --> 01:08:14.360
The view that's opposed to the Aristotelian, Thomistic natural law position that Rothbard favors is one that says ethics is completely subjective, people, ethical terms just express persons' preferences.

497
01:08:14.360 --> 01:08:30.360
If I say something is good, either it's just equivalent to a statement that I like that thing, or I'm not stating I like it, but just I'm expressing a like for it.

498
01:08:30.360 --> 01:08:40.360
These are, of course, theories of the kind held by logical positivists, such as A.J. Ayer and Charles Stevenson.

499
01:08:40.360 --> 01:08:46.360
There is no truth in ethics, just people have different preferences.

500
01:08:46.360 --> 01:08:54.360
Now one argument that Leo Strauss used against that view, one that Rothbard accepted, is

501
01:08:54.360 --> 01:09:07.360
there are terms that we use in ordinary language that have clear criteria for use, but nevertheless

502
01:09:07.360 --> 01:09:15.040
Using these terms involves some judgment of something being good or bad.

503
01:09:15.040 --> 01:09:19.880
Suppose, for example, that I say, someone is a coward.

504
01:09:19.880 --> 01:09:24.160
Well, that is a statement.

505
01:09:24.160 --> 01:09:27.600
It isn't just an expression of...

506
01:09:27.600 --> 01:09:35.520
I'm not just expressing some sort of liking or disliking that I could do as I like.

507
01:09:35.520 --> 01:09:49.520
I like orange juice. You can't really say, well, you're wrong about that. Just, well, I like orange juice. If you don't, you're not disagreeing with me. You just have a different preference. You don't like orange juice.

508
01:09:49.520 --> 01:10:02.520
Here, if I say, someone's a coward, then you might say, no, he isn't at all. And say, he wasn't really fleeing in battle. He misunderstood what was going on.

509
01:10:02.520 --> 01:10:09.520
If I was wrong, I couldn't just say, well, I just say he's a coward, that's all there is to it.

510
01:10:09.520 --> 01:10:14.520
There are criteria for the correct and incorrect use of the concept.

511
01:10:14.520 --> 01:10:22.520
Nevertheless, if I've said someone is a coward, I've certainly expressed...

512
01:10:22.520 --> 01:10:28.520
I've said the person has a bad trait.

513
01:10:28.520 --> 01:10:57.520
So, just using the term necessary, it entails that I've also made a judgment of value, so there isn't, in using this term, there isn't, as David Hume famously said, a split or dichotomy between the fact, namely, the person, say, has fled in the face of the enemy, and the value judgment, I'm free to make the value judgment or not, as I like it.

514
01:10:57.520 --> 01:11:10.520
The two are inextricably combined. Just saying, using the terms, involves one in value judgments as well.

515
01:11:10.520 --> 01:11:23.520
So, on Strauss's view, which Rothbard accepted, then just using our ordinary language brings value judgments with it.

516
01:11:23.520 --> 01:11:29.520
and how values are not, as this view says, purely subjective.

517
01:11:29.520 --> 01:11:38.520
Strauss anticipated a famous argument, this very influential analytic philosophy,

518
01:11:38.520 --> 01:11:49.520
that Philippa Foote used and other writers used this also, exactly the same kind of argument.

519
01:11:49.520 --> 01:12:08.520
Ludwig von Mises didn't accept the argument. He replied to Strauss, and his reply anticipated the reply that R.M. Heer, remember I mentioned him in the, is responding to Roth, gave to, gave to Philippa Foote.

520
01:12:08.520 --> 01:12:18.480
So the Strauss-Mises exchange anticipated this analytical philosophy exchange between foot

521
01:12:18.480 --> 01:12:19.480
and hair.

522
01:12:19.480 --> 01:12:28.960
I should say also, just passing, I understand Mises and Strauss really didn't like each

523
01:12:28.960 --> 01:12:29.960
other personally.

524
01:12:29.960 --> 01:12:36.240
They met at a conference on relativism where this issue was discussed and they didn't

525
01:12:36.240 --> 01:12:37.840
get along at all.

526
01:12:37.840 --> 01:12:45.440
I think Mises, Murray Rothbard told me, Mises remarked of Strauss, he said,

527
01:12:45.440 --> 01:12:51.440
in Germany was nothing but a high school teacher.

528
01:12:51.440 --> 01:13:03.440
So Rothbard then, as I say, defended a natural law view and he thought this was one argument,

529
01:13:03.440 --> 01:13:15.880
the very good argument to refute ethical subjectivism. He also, in defending natural law of view,

530
01:13:15.880 --> 01:13:24.240
he disagreed with the views of his own great teacher in economics, Ludwig von Mises. Mises

531
01:13:24.240 --> 01:13:31.000
thought one could get around the whole problem of nature of ethics and still defend the free

532
01:13:31.000 --> 01:13:42.360
Market, and the way Mises did this, he said, well, we can show that interferences with

533
01:13:42.360 --> 01:13:48.320
the free market will fail from the point of view of the ones who want to interfere with

534
01:13:48.320 --> 01:13:49.720
the market themselves.

535
01:13:49.720 --> 01:13:55.000
So we don't have to make, have any appeal to natural law, Mises didn't accept natural

536
01:13:55.000 --> 01:14:00.920
law, we don't have to appeal to any controversial value judge, we just say to the person, say,

537
01:14:00.920 --> 01:14:08.640
Well, you want to achieve certain goals and the measures you propose won't get you where

538
01:14:08.640 --> 01:14:09.640
you want.

539
01:14:09.640 --> 01:14:13.760
Remember, it's just like one of the hypothetical imperative that I was talking about in the

540
01:14:13.760 --> 01:14:14.920
Kant lecture.

541
01:14:14.920 --> 01:14:21.280
If you want this, you should do that, so Mises is saying you won't get what you want by doing

542
01:14:21.280 --> 01:14:22.280
what you're saying.

543
01:14:22.280 --> 01:14:28.080
So it's just, it's not making value judgment to say that you shouldn't be a socialist or

544
01:14:28.080 --> 01:14:46.080
or interventionist, it means, right, it's just sort of an imperative, there's a sort of a principle no one could rationally refuse that you should adopt suitable means to the ends you want, then that's all that's needed, according to Mises, to argue for the free market.

545
01:14:46.080 --> 01:14:55.920
For example, suppose the government says there isn't enough cheap housing available for

546
01:14:55.920 --> 01:15:04.120
poor people, so the government passes a rent control law.

547
01:15:04.120 --> 01:15:09.200
That's an example, incidentally, there's an interesting story that I'm not going to go

548
01:15:09.200 --> 01:15:34.400
The government says we want to have more housing available to poor people, so we have rent control.

549
01:15:34.400 --> 01:15:50.400
But what's going to happen, once you have rent control, then landlords won't be very anxious to put rental property on the market or they'll withdraw, they won't keep apartments in good repair.

550
01:15:50.400 --> 01:15:54.400
They'll tend to withdraw apartments from the market.

551
01:15:54.400 --> 01:16:10.400
So the result will be that there are fewer apartments available for the poor, so you won't be getting what the people who favor rent control won't be getting what they want.

552
01:16:10.400 --> 01:16:20.400
Mises goes on to argue, well, then there they can try to cope with that by more intervention, and then that will fail also.

553
01:16:20.400 --> 01:16:28.400
So they'll either have to, they could stay where they are if they want, but then they'd just be in a situation where they're not getting what they want.

554
01:16:28.400 --> 01:16:35.200
So they could either try to have more, even more intervention, it'll fail, or they'll have to go back to the free market.

555
01:16:35.200 --> 01:16:46.000
Then also we are as well, if they try to apply, just socialize everything, then his famous calculation argument shows that can't possibly work.

556
01:16:46.000 --> 01:16:53.820
They won't be able to have a developed economy producing a wide variety of goods under socialism,

557
01:16:53.820 --> 01:16:55.480
so that won't work.

558
01:16:55.480 --> 01:17:01.880
So Mises said, look, you don't have to have any special natural law arguments or any other

559
01:17:01.880 --> 01:17:05.320
kind of special arguments to defend capitalism.

560
01:17:05.320 --> 01:17:12.940
You can just use these value-free arguments to say, these measures won't get you what

561
01:17:12.940 --> 01:17:15.940
you want.

562
01:17:15.940 --> 01:17:20.180
Rothbard doesn't reject these arguments, quite the contrary, he thinks there's a great deal

563
01:17:20.180 --> 01:17:21.180
to them.

564
01:17:21.180 --> 01:17:27.300
He certainly thinks Mises is right that interventionism fails or socialism won't work.

565
01:17:27.300 --> 01:17:32.780
He himself has given the same points in his own books.

566
01:17:32.780 --> 01:17:44.040
But he says it isn't sufficient, using these arguments doesn't suffice to defend the market.

567
01:17:44.040 --> 01:17:53.800
It won't get rid of all the opponents because let's say someone favors rent control.

568
01:17:53.800 --> 01:18:00.520
He could say, well, what I'm aiming for is just cheap apartments for a particular group

569
01:18:00.520 --> 01:18:07.800
of people and I'll make sure by the legislation that they get access to the low-cost apartments.

570
01:18:07.800 --> 01:18:15.120
So I don't care if other people aren't able to get apartments at a low rent, or if those

571
01:18:15.120 --> 01:18:24.400
people, as a result of the measures I want, other people, or more people can't get apartments

572
01:18:24.400 --> 01:18:25.760
than before.

573
01:18:25.760 --> 01:18:32.040
I don't care about the effects of other people's long as the ones I want get something.

574
01:18:32.040 --> 01:18:38.840
So if somebody took that view, then Mises' argument wouldn't work against him, because

575
01:18:38.840 --> 01:18:44.360
they wouldn't have the goal that Mises is attributing to them.

576
01:18:44.360 --> 01:18:51.320
Mises is certainly right that certain goals can't be achieved by intervention, but he

577
01:18:51.320 --> 01:18:56.680
hasn't shown that all interventionists have to have those particular goals.

578
01:18:56.680 --> 01:19:00.320
They might have other goals that can be achieved.

579
01:19:00.320 --> 01:19:11.320
So we can't, although Mises' arguments are extremely important, part of the case for the free market, they don't do the full job.

580
01:19:11.320 --> 01:19:24.320
I just want to conclude with one other, I think very good, excellent insight in the book that Rothbard has,

581
01:19:24.320 --> 01:19:33.480
Because he discusses the unanimity criteria, you remember I mentioned this briefly this

582
01:19:33.480 --> 01:19:41.120
morning where it was a case where I said where probably Rawls would seem to have to oppose

583
01:19:41.120 --> 01:19:47.640
a situation where everybody is better off by a certain distribution of wealth and no

584
01:19:47.640 --> 01:19:54.000
one worse off because he would have to say some distribution where some people were poorer

585
01:19:54.000 --> 01:20:05.000
is closer to the difference principle, the one where, say, these other people are better off, because it's closer to equality.

586
01:20:05.000 --> 01:20:19.000
So, Rothbard doesn't reject the unanimity criteria. In this sense, he doesn't say, well, suppose some change makes some people better off, doesn't make anyone worse off.

587
01:20:19.000 --> 01:20:27.000
How is this established? Suppose everybody approves the change, then it's all right.

588
01:20:27.000 --> 01:20:34.000
He doesn't say, no, that's wrong. Even if everybody approves a certain change, we shouldn't do it.

589
01:20:34.000 --> 01:20:49.000
But he says this is not, you can't use this as the basis of a correct or a real full political ethics.

590
01:20:49.000 --> 01:21:00.000
He thinks that James Buchanan, not the president before Lincoln, but the famous economist, is guilty of this point.

591
01:21:00.000 --> 01:21:09.000
At this point, Buchanan and his colleague, Gordon Tullock, try to justify measures by using the unanimity criterion.

592
01:21:09.000 --> 01:21:17.000
Then they say, well, since you can't have unanimity, then they try to say, well, you have practical unanimity, come close to that.

593
01:21:17.000 --> 01:21:23.000
So you come as close as you can to that, and that's really a key part of their whole system.

594
01:21:23.000 --> 01:21:33.000
So Rothbard said, well, what's the big problem with doing social philosophy in this way, relying on the unanimity criteria?

595
01:21:33.000 --> 01:21:38.000
It privileges the status quo, the existing state of affairs.

596
01:21:38.000 --> 01:21:43.000
I mean, supposing, let's say, you start off with a system of slavery.

597
01:21:43.000 --> 01:21:56.040
Slavery, some people, or slaves, you could say, well, should we free the slaves?

598
01:21:56.040 --> 01:22:01.520
You couldn't do so on the grounds of the unimity criteria because the owners wouldn't be made

599
01:22:01.520 --> 01:22:05.160
better off, they wouldn't like the change.

600
01:22:05.160 --> 01:22:10.600
So freeing slaves doesn't meet the unimity criteria.

601
01:22:10.600 --> 01:22:18.240
But certainly we would say you should do it, the slaves are being deprived of their natural

602
01:22:18.240 --> 01:22:19.240
rights.

603
01:22:19.240 --> 01:22:29.040
So Rothbard said you can't, as you can in other people who favor modern welfare economics,

604
01:22:29.040 --> 01:22:32.260
do away with natural rights.

605
01:22:32.260 --> 01:22:37.400
You need this for correct political ethics.

606
01:22:37.400 --> 01:22:46.400
and in this I think he was entirely right. So I think I'll now end. Any questions?

607
01:23:07.400 --> 01:23:37.400
The question was, do either Nozick or Rothbard talk about how an individual's anarchist society would respond to external threats, and it was suggested that in response to such threats, a society would need a unified form of defense, that an

608
01:23:37.400 --> 01:23:45.200
and Individualist Anarchist system wouldn't work. Well, so far as I know, Nozick didn't

609
01:23:45.200 --> 01:23:53.840
write on foreign policy issues. He did have views about foreign policy. I think he probably

610
01:23:53.840 --> 01:24:00.400
would have agreed with you on the point. He didn't. Rothbard did write on foreign policy

611
01:24:00.400 --> 01:24:07.080
Defense Issues, he didn't agree with you, he claimed that the free market or system

612
01:24:07.080 --> 01:24:18.080
protection agency could adequately defend against other agencies, against external threats.

613
01:24:18.080 --> 01:24:23.400
I think if you want to pursue this further, there are two very good anthologies, one's

614
01:24:23.400 --> 01:24:31.560
One is edited by Hans Hoppe and another by Ed Stringham, in which this issue is very

615
01:24:31.560 --> 01:24:39.520
much discussed, but the details on how the individualist anarchist system would do this,

616
01:24:39.520 --> 01:24:49.420
I don't think I can go into now, but in general I would say, if you say, if we think in general

617
01:24:49.420 --> 01:24:56.380
The market is more efficient than the government in providing services.

618
01:24:56.380 --> 01:25:01.580
It's not clear why defense should be an exception.

619
01:25:01.580 --> 01:25:06.500
If you need some kind of unification, as you suggest, to defend against, say, some massive

620
01:25:06.500 --> 01:25:18.180
external threat, what would prevent the relevant agencies from making agreements to have unified

621
01:25:18.180 --> 01:25:23.260
defense measure, it's not an area that's something not the defense policy is not

622
01:25:23.260 --> 01:25:30.740
something I specialize in, so I can't give you any more detailed answer. Matthew?

623
01:26:18.180 --> 01:26:37.180
But so many people in the 20th century thought in those terms. Could it be that if you see private association, the logic moving toward competitive minimalist states, that people could end up identifying with competing bureaucracies as defenders of freedom?

624
01:26:48.180 --> 01:27:11.180
and private protection agencies. Is this at all like the situation, say, in the Cold War, where you had competing blocks of nation, some, say, one would claim to represent freedom, and there would be opposition of different bureaucracies, and we suggested this is, I think, right, this was not a very desirable state of affairs.

625
01:27:11.180 --> 01:27:21.060
Affairs. Well, you remember both in Nozick and in Rothbard, we're assuming everybody

626
01:27:21.060 --> 01:27:28.820
accepts basically libertarian law code. You don't have competing agencies in the sense,

627
01:27:28.820 --> 01:27:37.180
say, that some support libertarian rights and there are others who say are totalitarian

628
01:27:37.180 --> 01:27:42.820
or who have completely different views of rights.

629
01:27:42.820 --> 01:27:46.400
You do have a problem with what, if you had such an agency that would be considered an

630
01:27:46.400 --> 01:27:49.880
outlaw agency and then there's a question of how to deal with that.

631
01:27:49.880 --> 01:27:56.640
But in the system that Nozick is setting up, you wouldn't have such a phenomenon.

632
01:27:56.640 --> 01:27:58.660
That's not the way you set up the hypothesis.

633
01:27:58.660 --> 01:28:04.920
You do have, this he goes into in part three of Energy, State, Utopia on Utopia, you do

634
01:28:04.920 --> 01:28:14.420
have people who have communities with different conceptions of life, they're within the framework

635
01:28:14.420 --> 01:28:22.380
of a minimal state, you would have separate communities where people would each be pursuing

636
01:28:22.380 --> 01:28:37.380
and different views of the good life, but none of these would be violating anyone's right through acting as these bureaucratic blocks that you call attention to.

637
01:28:37.380 --> 01:28:39.380
Dan?

638
01:28:39.380 --> 01:28:50.020
You mentioned Rothbard's risk of getting essentialism as a method for performing natural law bearing and risk of getting it.

639
01:28:50.020 --> 01:29:08.020
I'm wondering if you think his chapter on emotional punishment is consistent with that method or if he changes years closer to war on the most deontological justification for punishment as a response to property rights violations.

640
01:29:08.020 --> 01:29:31.020
The question was, I talked about Rothbard's Aristotelian essentialism. Is this view consistent with what Rothbard says in his book?

641
01:29:31.020 --> 01:29:40.700
and is this view consistent with what Rothbard says in his chapter on proportional punishment

642
01:29:40.700 --> 01:29:52.060
that perhaps the view there is one more ontological theory that rather than stress what the natural

643
01:29:52.060 --> 01:29:58.220
tendencies would be, there he's relying on other considerations.

644
01:29:58.220 --> 01:30:06.220
Well, it's certainly true that Rothbard's views in that chapter are different from Aristotle's.

645
01:30:06.220 --> 01:30:15.660
Remember, Aristotle's view was correct, justice was you restore the situation as best you

646
01:30:15.660 --> 01:30:20.580
can to what it was before the crime was committed.

647
01:30:20.580 --> 01:30:27.780
And in fact, Fred Miller, when he discusses this, has a footnote citing, say, Randy Barnett

648
01:30:27.780 --> 01:30:35.740
That had a similar view, you know, Randy Barnett's view, you don't have anything beyond making

649
01:30:35.740 --> 01:30:39.420
the person who's committed the crime give back what he's given.

650
01:30:39.420 --> 01:30:48.620
But whether this means that you couldn't have an Aristotelian theory on the basis for Rothbard's

651
01:30:48.620 --> 01:30:51.220
views, I don't know.

652
01:30:51.220 --> 01:30:57.240
You see, when you talk about natural tendencies in the Aristotelian sense, you're not talking

653
01:30:57.240 --> 01:31:09.160
about what it's likely people are going to do. You would be saying what is most in accord

654
01:31:09.160 --> 01:31:15.720
with reason exercised to its fullest. And then to make your point, you would have to

655
01:31:15.720 --> 01:31:22.600
show that this is incompatible with the desert-based view that Rothbard has, or maybe he would

656
01:31:22.600 --> 01:31:40.600
have to show that it's compatible with the Aristotelian view. He doesn't really give any, try to derive the view from any view, Aristotelian view of essence. He does discuss it independently, but I think that leaves the question.

657
01:31:40.600 --> 01:31:58.080
On behalf of Lew Rockwell of the Mises Institute, I want to thank you for being here this week.

658
01:31:58.080 --> 01:32:01.720
I want to thank our audience who's visited us on the web.

659
01:32:01.720 --> 01:32:05.520
These lectures will be archived in the media archives of Mises.org.

660
01:32:05.520 --> 01:32:11.440
Board, and once again I'd like to thank Steve Berger and Ken Garshina for sponsoring this

661
01:32:11.440 --> 01:32:17.080
event and our production crew and staff for taking such good care of us this week and

662
01:32:17.080 --> 01:32:21.920
most especially to Dr. David Gordon to thank him and to congratulate him on his work here

663
01:32:21.920 --> 01:32:22.920
this week.

664
01:32:23.920 --> 01:32:25.920
Thank you very much.