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NOTE Major Episodes in American Labor History: An Austrian Reevaluation, Part I

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This morning I want to start talking about issues involving labor unions and labor history,

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and in a way the title is sort of misleading because there's much that can be said about labor markets that is not peculiarly Austrian,

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but I didn't know how else to make it at least remotely provocative sounding, so I put the word Austrian in the title.

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Again, I want to start off by recommending a few books that are useful or at least a few authors you should look out for.

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And the first one, because I think it's been a relatively neglected book from about 1987,

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is a book by Howard Dickman called Industrial Democracy in America.

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And you should make sure that if you look into this that you get the book by Howard Dickman

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by Dickman, because there's another book called Industrial Democracy in America by other authors, which is not really as good.

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His book is subtitled Ideological Origins of National Labor Relations Policy.

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Then, of course, you can hardly go wrong with W.H. Hutt, who's, of course, written a great deal on labor economics and, incidentally, on matters of labor history.

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And then two of the great sort of free market labor economists out there would be of course Morgan Reynolds and Charles Baird.

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Now I've discussed this matter with one of those two gentlemen.

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I've noted that it seems that this is an area in which there's tremendous work still to be done.

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I know what it's like being a young scholar and you're wondering where's my niche and what work still needs to be done and what can I do, what's my role.

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Well, here's an area you might consider, and that is the area of labor history.

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Because labor history, as currently written, is practically unreadable.

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Because it's written by people who, frankly, understand apparently almost nothing about the economics of how labor markets work.

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It's based almost entirely on sentiment. I mean, it's like Lisa Simpson is writing all these books.

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She writes these books. She's very union-sympathetic.

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What we need are people who have a sound understanding of this

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and then can apply it to historical episodes.

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In fact, studying labor history is oftentimes the best thing to do

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rather than trying to read labor historians who, time after time,

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sometimes distort what actually happened, is to go back to the most primary source you can find.

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For example, in the late 19th century, even the New York Times was actually relatively reliable

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My father was a teamster for about 15 years, and there is a Simpsons reference here, of course, that the teamsters are doing some work at the Simpsons' home in New York City, New York City, New York City, New York City, New York City, New York City, New York City, New York City, New York City, New York City,

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And Homer Simpson walks outside and sees a few of the teamsters just standing around.

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He wants to see if he can outlaze the teamsters.

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So they're all seeing who can stretch the loudest and be as obnoxious as possible.

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But the fact is my father was a teamster.

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So I don't want to just make cheap shots at these folks.

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I want to be making deeper, more significant points.

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The fact is that any Marxist worth his salt would think that I'm just the victim of false consciousness.

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If I come from a working class family, then for heaven's sake I should favor working class interests.

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The fact is I do favor working class interests, which is precisely why I hold the positions I do.

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Practically everyone, every student, over the course of his education,

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hears the same kind of predictable story about the history of American labor and labor unions

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and that is that American laborers were terribly exploited and their wages were reduced to practically subsistence level

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and then it was only due to favorable legislation or to the work of labor unions that the condition of labor began to improve

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but had it not been for these it is simply taken for granted that the vast bulk of us would still be working 80-hour weeks

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A lot of my friends are working 80-hour weeks because they're lawyers or investment bankers.

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Yeah, they make more money than I do, but you know, I like my 15-hour week and my leisure time very much,

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much too much to give up for any other profession.

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Now, von Boehm-Bawerk actually said on the issue of labor that he noted that a lot of times people form their judgments on this matter

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He noted that a lot of times people form their judgments on this matter really out of emotional factors, really more than anything else.

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He says that this issue is, quote,

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on a field where the heart as well as the head is wont to speak.

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What people wish to believe, they believe very readily.

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Well, the standard tale of labor history is in fact almost entirely false.

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and those parts of it that are true, for example, the low standard of living that people undoubtedly did enjoy in the 19th century,

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are true for reasons other than those alleged by pro-union historians who see in them only confirmation of their prejudices against the market economy.

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Well, as late as the 1920s, labor law in America was based more or less on the following considerations.

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First, essential principles included freedom of contract and association.

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A laborer was perfectly free to reject any offer of compensation that an employer might make to him,

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and conversely an employer was likewise entitled to reject any offer made by a laborer.

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An employee was free to withhold his labor services if unsatisfied with his employer's terms.

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Likewise, a group of laborers jointly exercising this individual right were permitted to do so.

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But no one was allowed to prevent individuals who wished to work from exercising their right to do that.

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Strikers, like anyone else, were forbidden to interfere with consumers' right to shop where they liked.

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Strikes could not obstruct suppliers from making deliveries since to do so would again violate the rights of others.

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And finally, since the employer's plant was private property, the employer had the absolute right to decide who would be permitted to enter

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Now, incidentally, the way I'm going to do this is start off with some historical background, look at American labor law and then later try to address some of the myths of labor unionism and try to explain what was the actual cause for the rising standard of living in American history, because, again, it's sort of carelessness.

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Now this outlook, this posture, whereby both sides in the labor relation were permitted to make offers voluntarily, reject whatever offers they wished, is evident already in the early 19th century.

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In the 19th century, it is not true, as is often alleged by pro-union historians, that unions per se were being enjoined by the courts to cease and desist their activity.

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It was not union activity per se that the law sought to penalize.

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If a group of workers wish to organize themselves and to engage in peaceful activities,

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a non-obstructive strike or various social or other types of activities, negotiating type activities,

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the law did not stand in the way.

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It was simply when you began to bash people's heads in because they wanted to work when you didn't,

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or when you tried to obstruct deliveries to your employer or engaged in other kinds of property destruction or whatever,

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In 1806, there was a case in Philadelphia involving a group of journeymen who formed a union and then tried to get all local bootmakers to hire only members of their union and to fire any existing employees, anyone who was not a member of that union.

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Well, a judge found the unionists guilty of conspiracy and restraint of trade and levied a fine upon them.

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But he was levying the fine not because they organized themselves into a union,

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but because they attempted to interfere with the peaceful labor relations of other people who just happened not to be union members.

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Other cases like this in the early 19th century in other states only solidified this principle.

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So from the very beginning we see that the courts are acknowledging that people have a right to form unions, to join them, to partake in their activities, but they do not have any rights to interfere with the lives of non-union workers and employers.

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Now, a very prominent case that is quoted a lot in free market type books, typically, is an 1835 New York case called People vs. Fisher.

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This case involved unionists who were trying to prevent an independent boot maker from undercutting them in terms of wages.

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The man who owns an article of trade or commerce is not obliged to sell it for any particular price, nor is the mechanic obliged to labor for any particular price.

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He may say that he will not make coarse boots for less than one dollar per pair,

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But he has no right to say that no other mechanic shall make them for less.

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If one individual does not possess such a right over the conduct of another,

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no number of individuals can possess such a right.

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All combinations, therefore, to effect such an object are injurious not only

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to the individual particularly oppressed, but to the public at large.

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It may be that Pennock, who is the independent from greater industry or greater skill,

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Well, even into the 1920s, as I say, this understanding continued to prevail in the law.

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And a case that Professor Friedrich Hayek wrote about in his book,

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which is called The Law of the Law,

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is the case of a man who is a victim of the law.

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He is a victim of the law.

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He is a victim of the law.

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He is a victim of the law.

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in the Law. And a case that Professor Baird cites in a number of his works is that of the 1921 case of American Steel Foundries versus the Tri-City Central Trades Council.

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Now in this case, this is a case that involves some actions that had occurred years earlier, because sometimes obviously these cases take a long time to be heard.

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But what basically took place is that in late 1913, American Steel Foundries closed its doors.

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Business conditions were unfavorable and they had to lay off about 1,600 workers.

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Some of these workers were members of unions that were affiliated with the Tri-City Central Trades Council.

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But the company had permitted people of whatever union or no union to be employed.

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Well, a number of months later, the company, in fact, reopened, but on a limited basis and they rehired about 350 workers, some of them union members.

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But they rehired them on different pay scales.

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There were pay cuts ranging from 2 cents to 10 cents an hour compared to what the workers had been earning before the company had shut down in late 1913.

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Well, this Tri-City Trades Council, the vast majority of whom had never been employed by American Steel Foundries,

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decided to declare a strike in protest of this wage cut of the lower pay scale paid to these 350 workers.

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Well, of the 350 workers who had been rehired when Steel Foundries reopened, only two of them joined this strike.

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The other 348 wanted to keep working on the terms they'd been offered, but the Tri-City Trades Council, which from the point of view of the firm, is made up almost entirely of strangers, decided that they were going to go ahead with this strike, and they set up pickets, substantial pickets made up basically of strangers at every single entrance to the firm.

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And so for a period of about four weeks, this in effect stranger picket engaged in repeated beatings and assaults against those workers who went in and tried to work.

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We have reports of at least several employees who slept at the plant so they could continue working because they were afraid of facing the pickets.

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Well, finally, a federal court issued a restraining order and managed to put a stop to the violence.

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Well, the union argued that the court had no authority to do that because they argued that the Clayton Act of 1914

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had put restraints on the ability of the courts to intervene in that way.

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But the Supreme Court in this 1921 case disagreed.

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What the Supreme Court declared, for one thing, was first of all talked about what the Clayton Act said.

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The Clayton Act had been called the Magna Carta of labor unionism by Samuel Gompers,

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because the Clayton Act of 1914 had apparently at least exempted labor unions

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from prosecution under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act for conspiracies and restraint of trade.

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But what the Court found was that the Clayton Act protected unions

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In 1921, the Supreme Court went so far as to declare that even if you have a picket line that's peaceful, let alone what was happening in this case, where people are actually being beaten, even when you have a picket line that's peaceful,

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The Supreme Court declared that that is inherently intimidating

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and in effect tends to act as a barrier to entry to the struck firm

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and in that way interferes with any firm's ability to carry on its operations.

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And so the court declared that a picket would have to restrain itself to one,

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you could have one picket per entrance, but you couldn't have flying squadrons of strangers

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Showing up at every single entrance. Only employees of the struck firm could actually serve as picketers.

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And although the picketers could talk to, of course, could speak to non-striking employees,

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they could only engage in non-threatening discussion. If they, in effect, threaten people,

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Well then, the court can enjoin that type of behavior because, in effect, this is inherently threatening behavior.

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So that's, needless to say, labor historians hate this decision, but this is, that was, it doesn't matter what their opinion is, that was the state of the laws of 1921.

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Things begin to change, though, in the 1930s, first under Hoover and then under FDR.

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So, prior to the change in the law, the formation of unions, per se, was not considered legally actionable,

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but simply the use of coercion to coerce others to deny employment to people who did not join the union.

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Well, first we get in 1932, signed by Herbert Hoover, the Norris LaGuardia Act,

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which had a number of important provisions but will not be nearly as sweeping as what will come in the more distant future.

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First, this legislation made so-called yellow dog contracts unenforceable in the courts.

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These were contracts in which an employee could be required as a condition of employment to promise to restrain from union activity.

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Now, again, this is a position that a lot of people to this day oppose, that an employer should not be permitted as part of their contractual arrangement with their employees to be able to demand that employees not participate in union activity.

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But, of course, in a system of free contract, whatever terms people voluntarily agree on would be considered acceptable.

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And if, of course, if they can't attract enough employees by offering those terms, they would, under the pressure of the free market, be obligated to abandon them anyway.

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Morgan Reynolds has actually an interesting article in the Journal of Libertarian Studies.

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I think it's the only article he wrote for it, so it's easy to track down if you go to mises.org and you look for Morgan Reynolds.

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He has an article that, among other things, points out that yellow dog contracts, in many cases,

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were, in fact, initiated by employees themselves, who had had experience with unions,

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who found that oftentimes they turned out not to be beneficial to the workers,

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and they would rather not be bothered by a group of hostile strangers trying to interfere with their negotiations with their employers.

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So oftentimes, the initiative for yellow dog contracts, contrary to popular belief,

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came from the employees themselves.

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Well, according to this plank of the Norris LaGuardia Act,

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if you forbid yellow dog contracts,

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you're saying that employers cannot boycott union labor.

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They can't say that, if I'm going to hire you,

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you have to promise not to engage in labor union agitation.

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But on the other hand, unions were not forbidden to boycott non-union labor.

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They could, of course, carry on their activities.

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The act exempted labor unions from prosecution under the Sherman Antitrust Act once and for all.

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And in effect, it severely impaired the ability of the courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes.

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In fact, even when the labor disputes had turned violent,

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The burden of proof to demonstrate that violence was in fact taking place was so high and unreasonable

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that in practical terms it made it impossible for courts to issue injunctions to stop this violent activity.

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So, in other words, replacement workers could be being beaten and there was nothing that in effect a judge could do about it.

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Now, the reason that labor unions so disliked injunctions was that an injunction, the purpose of an injunction was, in fact, Morgan Reynolds, I think, explains it the best.

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He says, an injunction temporarily restrained union actions pending a trial.

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And this explains the intense union campaign against its use in labor disputes because once violence-ridden strikes were enjoined for a few days,

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In the last few days, they were very difficult to revive, reorganize and rekindle.

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Now, it is one of the many myths, by the way, of American labor history that the courts just issued injunctions frequently and indiscriminately.

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They just issued injunctions even when labor unions were engaged in perfectly peaceful activities.

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But this is why you should look at the work of labor economist Sylvester Petro,

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The Labor Policy of a Free Society was dedicated in part to Ludwig von Mises

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who wrote a great many scholarly articles on this subject

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and he actually did a study of work stoppages between the years 1880 and 1932

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and he found that injunctions were extremely rare.

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He said federal injunctions were issued in not even 1% of all work stoppages

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while state injunctions were issued in less than 2% of all work stoppages

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And he says that even these very few injunctions were issued not to thwart labor union activity per se,

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but instead to put a stop to violence against persons and property.

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Well, now even this protection of the employer's rights, yes, employers have rights too, would henceforth be absent.

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Incidentally, there was a book that was published in 1930 called The Labor Injunction

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that was written, co-authored by Felix Frankfurter, the Justice.

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In this book, the thesis was that labor unions had been treated unfairly in the common law

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with excessive use of injunctions against peaceful activity.

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And this revisionist work that's been carried on not only by Petro and others, Dickman,

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has shown that, in fact, the Frankfurter book is completely, entirely dishonest.

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I mean, it's either grossly incompetent or just frankly dishonest.

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Now, the New Deal of Franklin Roosevelt added to this the National Labor Relations Act of 1935,

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which tends to instead be called the Wagner Act because of Robert Wagner who introduced it.

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Now, it used to be the case that a worker, if you didn't want to join a union or pay union dues, then you just didn't.

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You just refrained from joining and you didn't pay the dues.

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But the Wagner Act overturns this standard liberty.

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When you begin with the Wagner Act and going forward,

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if a majority of workers in a particular bargaining unit decide that they are going to unionize,

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then that union represents all workers, whether it was the workers who decided to join,

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The workers who did not want to join, the workers who didn't vote one way or the other, it represents the law.

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And it was argued that this was perfectly fair.

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So from then on, if a majority of workers choose to unionize, all the workers must join and pay union dues.

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Now, the usual defense of this was to say that, look, the Wagner Act calls for a single certified bargaining agent to represent all workers in a given bargaining unit.

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And so, if you're going to have a single labor union to represent all workers, which is called for by this Act,

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then it stands to reason that every worker who works in this unit should have to join that union and pay dues.

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Why should they get to free ride? Why should they enjoy, at no cost to themselves, all the benefits that come from the labor union negotiating on their behalf?

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That was the argument. Therefore, it makes sense to coerce, and it's just to coerce all workers into paying union dues,

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because all of them are enjoying the benefits of being represented by this single union.

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Well, of course, this overlooks the real problem, which is the idea of having an exclusive union in the first place.

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If the unions would just bargain on behalf of their own voluntary dues-paying members,

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then there wouldn't be a problem of non-members getting union benefits for free.

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If individuals were allowed to represent themselves and to enter into contracts with employers on their own terms,

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those who wished to remain non-union would not be free-riding on the benefits bestowed by labor unions,

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since the union would simply not bargain on their behalf.

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Now, it is true that in 1947 you get the Taft-Hartley Act, which was passed at a time when much of the American population had grown extremely impatient with labor unions and striking activity but the Taft-Hartley Act is quite mild in its provisions and it really doesn't overturn any of the major planks of the National Labor Relations Act, which again, in summary, had in effect

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Taking the position of exclusive bargaining, that once one union is decided, that union represents every single worker,

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and every single worker must pay union dues.

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It doesn't overturn the idea that there has to be just one union, and that union has exclusive representation,

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but what it did do was to give the states, in effect, the right to pass right to work laws,

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which at least said that a union couldn't force union membership

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and union dues on workers as the price for keeping their jobs.

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But it doesn't say that you can have company unions or any such thing as that.

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That's still forbidden.

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But it at least means that you could, in some states,

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I don't know how many, maybe 20-something states now, have right to work laws

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which at least mean that you can exempt yourself and not be in effect driven out

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or Denied Employment.

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Now it's interesting that just a year before the National Labor Relations Act was passed,

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Franklin Roosevelt had opposed this idea of exclusive representation.

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In 1934, the United Auto Workers had threatened to shut down the entire auto industry

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unless they were recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent for all auto workers.

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To avoid that strike, Franklin Roosevelt intervened and settled it on the basis of

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proportional representation. He said that the United Auto Workers represents only its own members

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and people who want to belong to other unions or company unions or whatever

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would represent those people. And people who wanted to have no union at all would represent themselves.

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And Franklin Roosevelt said that in his opinion this was the only kind of union representation that was consistent

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with the American tradition of liberty.

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So he took the position, at least in 1934, that we shouldn't have this position in which you have an exclusive bargaining agent and you can coerce people to be represented by it even if they don't want representation services from that union.

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Now why the president changed his mind is an interesting matter in itself, but let's just continue on this front.

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There's a term we need to introduce called Union Security.

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Union Security is the not so terrible sounding term that is used to refer to the practice

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whereby workers who don't even want the representation services of a union

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have them forced upon them and typically have to pay for them.

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These were the terms of the original 1935 legislation.

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This is called union security because it is security for the union and for the people who work for the union

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because, of course, it guarantees them an income. They're going to be collecting dues from everybody

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and that practice whereby people are coerced into paying these dues as a requirement for keeping their jobs

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which, as I say, was the original intent of the 1935 Act, is obviously of great benefit to unions.

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So in effect, what right to work laws do is they abolish union security. So people don't have to join a union as a condition of employment, but nevertheless it keeps this principle of exclusive representation intact for everybody else.

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Okay, let's see, what are the things we want to do? Oh yeah, another thing that's been said in defense of this, in defense of the idea that when a majority of workers vote to choose a particular union,

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to choose a particular union to represent them, that therefore it's legitimate for all workers to be, in effect, coerced into being represented by this one union.

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Sometimes it's argued that this is just democracy and, you know, we recognize democracy in political affairs and there's no reason that democracy should not be extended into labor relations.

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But the traditional common law principle was that when I sell my labor services, I am engaged in an action that is in the sphere of private human action, not in the sphere of government action.

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And that democracy in government involves, if you're going to have a government, the idea of democracy is that we restrain it by having it at least be somewhat responsive to the popular will.

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But we don't arrange all of human affairs according to this principle.

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We don't decide our dinner based on what the state of Alabama wants us to eat.

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We don't decide what our favorite color is based on what the consensus on our city block is.

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We don't apply the democratic principle to private affairs

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because we would consider that to be a completely unjust interference

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on the part of a majority of people on the rights of the minority.

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And likewise, that had been the view with regard to labor unionism

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that the individuals retain the right either to represent themselves

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or to choose to be represented by a different organization.

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Now, labor relations law has very often consisted of bizarre turns of phrase

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and strange almost Orwellian principles.

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And the National Labor Relations Act is no exception.

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Because notice what it says.

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It is an unfair labor practice for an employer by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment

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to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.

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So on the one hand, it would be unfair for an employer to discriminate in hiring or in granting tenure

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to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.

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Well, that would seem to make union security illegal.

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It would be unlawful for an employer in effect to be hiring or not hiring on the basis of union activity

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because of course that's what the unions would in effect say.

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You can't hire anybody unless they're going to be in our union.

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Once you hire them, we're going to force them into our union.

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It says here it would be an unfair labor practice for an employer to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.

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But, it goes on to say, provided that nothing in this act shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization

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to require, as a condition of employment, membership therein.

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Well, to translate that into normal English, what that's saying is that employers are forbidden from encouraging membership in a union,

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but they can compel membership in a union.

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This is how, when you have laws that are based on special interests, you get bizarre results such as this.

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Okay, now once a union has been certified by a majority of workers, I mean, basically, typically the way this goes is that

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once there's interest among the workers in setting up a union, establishing a union, certifying a union as their exclusive bargaining agent,

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Well, first what they try to do is to get workers to sign cards that authorize the union to act as their agent.

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And once they get maybe a third of the workers signing these authorization cards,

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then the National Labor Relations Board will step in and conduct a certification election.

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In other words, if a third of the workers have signed these cards,

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that's sort of a prima facie indication that there is an interest in organizing a union.

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and so the National Labor Relations Board will oversee, they'll be petitioned for a certification election.

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Then that election will be carried out by secret ballot, which is at least an improvement over the old just raise your hand.

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And if the union gets more than half, 50% plus one of the workers, then it gets representation privileges.

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Well, we've already seen that that privilege permits the union to represent or claim to be the institution of representation for all the workers, regardless of their own feelings about unionization.

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But what's significant is that there is no routine decertification election. It's not like every two years they go back and say, well, how do we feel now?

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Even if it's 20 years later and most of the workers have either died or retired or moved on to other jobs

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and the bulk of the remainder are either indifferent or not interested in the union, it is presumed to continue.

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There's no automatic decertification and you have to really jump through hoops to get a decertification election taking place.

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Now this principle of exclusive representation, which once a union has been certified, it is declared to represent everybody.

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When it comes to democratic countries, the United States is basically alone in organizing its labor relations in this way.

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Canada also does it this way, but basically they got the idea from the United States.

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in the United States. Other democratic countries permit a variety of representation within a particular firm, including things like company unions, but also just a variety of different unions or no union at all.

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This is considered to be a decision up to the individual worker. And it's that in other countries the assumption is the old traditional American assumption that people should not have to submit themselves to the will of a majority

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in cases involving the disposition of their own labor services.

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Now, at least from 1935 to 1947,

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and then there were still some problems after 1947,

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there were limits on the free speech of the employer that were in place.

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The National Labor Relations Act in fact said,

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Well, actually I'll just point out, before going into that, that an employer could not actually say to the workers,

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hey, you shouldn't vote in favor of the union.

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Like when he knew that a certification election was coming, he shouldn't go around saying,

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you should or shouldn't do this. He had to be absolutely quiet.

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So he had to permit total strangers to come onto his property and propagandize his workers.

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And he, in effect, had to stay entirely out,

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could not really speak in a way that would tend to influence the election.

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Well, in 1947, with the Taft-Hartley amendments, which was amending the National Labor Relations Act,

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we get this statement that seems to give free speech rights to the employer.

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It says,

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This expression contains no threat of reprisal, or force, or promise of benefit.

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Now, as I say, there was no free speech provision in the Wagner Act.

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Employers, until 1947, were just required to sit there and they couldn't do anything.

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But this provision that was inserted in 1947, it turns out, has got a loophole you could drive a truck through.

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Notice it says that an employer cannot be accused of engaging in an unfair labor practice just because he expresses a view, just because he says something.

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But if expressing that view contains a threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit, well then he can be hauled into court.

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Well, the thing is, almost anything that an employer might say with regard to labor unionism could in some way be twisted as being a threat of reprisal or a promise of benefit.

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I mean, if the union says, hey, you know, I think this is really not in your interest and someday you may regret this, well, there you go.

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That's a threat. Isn't that some kind of a threat? You may regret this. Well, you better be more precise. How will I regret this?

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Well, you know, things may turn bad for you.

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The company may go out of business because of the wage demands or something.

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Can't say that.

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So it turns out that, yes, you can speak against unionism,

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but only in some weird way that no one really knows exactly how to do it.

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So, for instance, the Supreme Court in 1969,

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in a case that involved the National Labor Relations Board

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and the Gissell Packing Company made an unbelievable judgment.

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It involved a company that in 1952 had suffered a strike that had paralyzed it.

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Two of its plants were shut down for three months and it did tremendous damage.

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And eventually when they reopened, they reopened on a non-union basis.

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Well, years later, the mid-60s, the Teamsters got the requisite number of signatures on those cards, and they were going to hold a certification election.

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Well, during the campaign to try to get workers to go ahead and vote to certify the Teamsters, the employer went around telling people,

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you know, did you not forget what happened in 1952? The last time we had unions here, we had the strike. It was not in the best interest of anybody.

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The Supreme Court declared that those statements were threats of reprisal, and so even though the certification election went against the Union, the Court, as Baird points out, set aside the election results, and imposed on the Supreme Court that it would be difficult for you to find other jobs.

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The Supreme Court declared that those statements were threats of reprisal.

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And so even though the certification election went against the Union,

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the Court, as Baird points out, set aside the election results

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and imposed a bargaining order on the employer.

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So the employer was ordered to recognize and bargain with the Union

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as exclusive bargaining agent without a second election.

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So, in effect, although the employer, as Baird points out, may express general views about unions,

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what he says cannot sound like a threat.

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Well, in effect, the employers now can't say anything that's sort of remotely anti-union,

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because you could always twist that around to sound as if it were a threat of reprisal.

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Now, the National Labor Relations Act also requires that once a single certified union is established,

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employers are required to bargain in good faith with that organization.

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Now, whether an employer has bargained in good faith is, of course, not an easy thing to determine.

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What exactly would constitute in good faith?

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Well, don't worry, the National Labor Relations Board will determine what constitutes in good faith.

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So oftentimes what it means is that if a company just simply says look, this is the package we're prepared to offer, this is the only reasonable package, the best package we have, and they say that's final, that's our final offer, we can't possibly improve on it, they would almost certainly be accused of not bargaining in good faith, so what they have to start doing is, they have to come out, like it's a big game, they have to come out with a terrible offer, so that the union will say well, that's terrible, how about this one?

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Employers under the Act are required to permit union organizers, who were not employed in their firm, to use their own property, in order to persuade their employees to unionize with the union.

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with their union. Union workers can in fact block the employer's access to replacements,

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they can block deliveries coming in, they can block customers. Not only is mass picketing

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now permitted, which remember under the Tri-City Trades Council case, you could have one picket

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per entrance, but now you can have mass picketing, you can have total strangers picketing and

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Employers are now forced to rehire, in many cases, strikers, even if they've been engaged in acts of violence, they have to rehire them.

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Now, there's a National Labor Relations Board ruling that actually said that, obviously, if a striker, let's say, killed somebody, you wouldn't really be obligated to rehire him.

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But the National Labor Relations Board said that the employer can refuse to rehire a striker

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if his misconduct during the strike is so violent or of such serious character as to render him unfit for further service.

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But, on the other hand, you have to rehire him if simply his behavior constitutes a trivial, rough incident that occurred, quote,

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in a moment of animal exuberance.

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Now, the explanation was that certain kinds of impulsive behavior,

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being, quote, normal outgrowths of the intense feelings developed on picket lines,

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must have been in Congress' minds when they developed this law

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and were defending the right to strike.

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And so Charles Baird points out that

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that excused instances of animal exuberance have included beatings, stabbings, bombings,

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threatening of non-strikers' families, destruction of property, blocking entrances to struck

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firms with broken glass and nails, and hurling brick bats. So an employer, in other words,

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in all of those cases, has been required to hire back people who were guilty of such offenses.

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It also meant, under the Wagner Act, that the principle of vicarious responsibility did not hold.

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So if the union organizer actually says to his union, everybody I want you to go beat people over the head,

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and the union as an organization bears no penalty for that, would bear no penalty for that at all.

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Now there are two kinds of strikes that since the late 1930s have been recognized in American labor law.

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And they've sometimes been called, on the one hand, economic strikes and, on the other hand, unfair labor practice, or ULP strikes.

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Now, an economic strike is what we sort of tend to think of when we think of a strike.

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A strike that is undertaken in pursuit of higher wages, better working conditions, shorter hours perhaps, and the like.

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An unfair labor practice strike, on the other hand, is undertaken in response to a perception that the employer in the course of bargaining,

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or perhaps in his very refusal to bargain, has violated National Labor Relations Act rules.

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So in other words, in the course of the bargaining, or in some type of behavior, or in trying to, you know, whatever.

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And if in any way he violates any of the standards that we've seen, then the strike against him in that case would be an unfair labor practice strike.

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So, for example, a lot of times when there's collective bargaining going on, the union's bargaining, the company's bargaining, they're going back and forth.

381
00:44:39.080 --> 00:44:51.080
But if they hit a brick wall in the bargaining, well, sometimes a union will strike and say, the employer is not bargaining in good faith, so it's an unfair labor practice strike.

382
00:44:51.080 --> 00:44:56.080
Now, what's the difference? Who cares whether it's an economic strike or an unfair labor practice strike?

383
00:44:56.080 --> 00:45:01.080
Well, the difference is that ever since about 1938, when the Supreme Court ruled on this,

384
00:45:01.080 --> 00:45:07.080
employers are not allowed to hire permanent replacements in unfair labor practice strikes.

385
00:45:07.080 --> 00:45:10.080
They can hire only temporary replacements.

386
00:45:10.080 --> 00:45:19.080
When that strike is over, they have to hire back any employee who wants to be rehired in that type of strike.

387
00:45:19.080 --> 00:45:26.080
They have to hire them back immediately or otherwise they would have to start paying back pay to them.

388
00:45:26.080 --> 00:45:30.080
So it's very significant what type of strike it is.

389
00:45:30.080 --> 00:45:38.080
But with an economic strike, employers do in fact have the right, according to the Supreme Court, to hire permanent replacement workers.

390
00:45:38.080 --> 00:45:49.080
So, strikers, therefore, have a right in the law to be immediately reinstated after every ULP strike is over,

391
00:45:49.080 --> 00:45:56.080
and they have the right to be reinstated at the end of an economic strike in cases where replacements have not been hired.

392
00:45:56.080 --> 00:46:04.080
If there are still openings that have not been filled by replacements, then the strikers, in effect, have a claim on those positions.

393
00:46:04.080 --> 00:46:09.080
Now, this may seem like an artificial distinction, and of course, in some ways it is.

394
00:46:09.080 --> 00:46:16.080
The way that the court defended this distinction was to say that an employer who finds himself

395
00:46:16.080 --> 00:46:20.800
the subject of an economic strike, whose workers are striking for higher wages or whatever,

396
00:46:20.800 --> 00:46:23.680
has not necessarily done anything that violates the law.

397
00:46:23.680 --> 00:46:27.920
He may simply just not have offered a package that was satisfactory to the workers, and

398
00:46:27.920 --> 00:46:31.480
that's not ipso facto legally actionable.

399
00:46:31.480 --> 00:46:37.480
Whereas, in an unfair labor practice strike, the presumption is that the employer has in fact broken the law

400
00:46:37.480 --> 00:46:42.480
because he's violated some principle of American labor law, and so he should not...

401
00:46:42.480 --> 00:46:46.480
you know, there's a sort of standard legal principle that if you break the law,

402
00:46:46.480 --> 00:46:51.480
or you're doing something that's unlawful, you shouldn't enjoy material benefits as a result of that.

403
00:46:51.480 --> 00:47:00.480
So there should be a particular, a harsher penalty in a fact imposed, obviously, on a firm that is breaking the law,

404
00:47:00.480 --> 00:47:07.480
The National Labor Relations Act provides that nothing in this act shall be construed so as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike.

405
00:47:07.480 --> 00:47:16.480
It does not follow that an employer, guilty of no act denounced by the statute, has lost the right to protect and continue his business by supplying places like this to the public.

406
00:47:16.480 --> 00:47:20.520
This act shall be construed so as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the

407
00:47:20.520 --> 00:47:22.080
right to strike.

408
00:47:22.080 --> 00:47:26.960
It does not follow that an employer, guilty of no act denounced by the statute, has lost

409
00:47:26.960 --> 00:47:32.440
the right to protect and continue his business by supplying places left vacant by strikers.

410
00:47:32.440 --> 00:47:39.400
And he is not bound to discharge those hired to fill the places of strikers upon the election

411
00:47:39.400 --> 00:47:46.400
of the latter to resume their employment in order to create places for them.

412
00:47:46.400 --> 00:47:53.400
Some labor union sympathizers have argued that the Supreme Court here is not rendering

413
00:47:53.400 --> 00:47:58.440
this decision in line with the original intent of the National Labor Relations Act, that

414
00:47:58.440 --> 00:48:01.020
the Act did not, in fact, envision this.

415
00:48:01.020 --> 00:48:07.400
But Robert Wagner himself said in 1939 that he was in favor of every step that the Supreme

416
00:48:07.400 --> 00:48:12.400
The Supreme Court has taken toward clarifying the meaning and defining the scope of the Act.

417
00:48:17.400 --> 00:48:26.400
Now, it may seem, by the way, because although the law prohibits the employer to just fire a striker, typically,

418
00:48:27.400 --> 00:48:33.400
there are exceptions to that, but you can't just fire a striker, you can hire permanent replacements, as we've seen.

419
00:48:33.400 --> 00:48:38.400
You can hire permanent replacements in the case of an economic strike,

420
00:48:38.400 --> 00:48:42.400
and you can hire temporary replacements in the case of an unfair labor practice strike.

421
00:48:42.400 --> 00:48:48.400
But what the heck is the difference between firing somebody for striking

422
00:48:48.400 --> 00:48:52.400
and, on the other hand, hiring a permanent replacement for that person?

423
00:48:52.400 --> 00:48:55.400
Permanent replacement for that person seems like the same thing.

424
00:48:55.400 --> 00:49:01.400
And again, unionists have long claimed that this is just a semantic difference, and there is no difference.

425
00:49:01.400 --> 00:49:26.840
For one thing, a permanent replacement has, in other words, what I mean to say is, a striker who is striking in an economic strike, who has had a permanent replacement worker hired to replace him, has indefinite preferential rehiring rights, that is to say, that in the future, if an opening comes up at that firm, the first

426
00:49:26.840 --> 00:49:40.840
And in the future, if an opening comes up at that firm, the first people the employer is legally obligated to go to, to ask, do you want this position, would be strikers who've had permanent replacements to replace them.

427
00:49:40.840 --> 00:49:51.840
So in effect, any time there's any job vacancy at all, the employer cannot hire any new person until any eligible striker who is interested has been reinstated.

428
00:49:51.840 --> 00:49:54.840
And there's no time limit on this. It could be years and years in the future.

429
00:49:54.840 --> 00:50:01.840
He must go and give preferential hiring consideration to people who had been strikers.

430
00:50:01.840 --> 00:50:10.840
And it's not even just that if the same job that the striker went on strike for reopens,

431
00:50:10.840 --> 00:50:14.840
that I have to go to that person. If any job in my firm comes open,

432
00:50:14.840 --> 00:50:19.840
I have to go to that person. Even if it's a job that, even if I'm a tire manufacturer

433
00:50:19.840 --> 00:50:24.840
If I get a fracture and I start making bagels, I have to go back to the original strikers

434
00:50:24.840 --> 00:50:27.840
and ask, would you like a job making bagels?

435
00:50:27.840 --> 00:50:31.840
So it is actually a fairly substantial difference between being fired,

436
00:50:31.840 --> 00:50:35.840
in which case of course you would have no claim whatsoever on the employer,

437
00:50:35.840 --> 00:50:42.840
whereas if you have been permanently replaced, nevertheless you are the first person to get any opening.

438
00:50:42.840 --> 00:50:45.840
Does it also have to be of the same weight?

439
00:50:45.840 --> 00:50:55.840
Not necessarily. In fact, it can even be for a more prestigious position, in fact.

440
00:50:55.840 --> 00:50:59.840
So it wouldn't even necessarily have to be at the same wage.

441
00:50:59.840 --> 00:51:07.840
If the worker has found substantially equivalent employment elsewhere, then this provision would lapse.

442
00:51:07.840 --> 00:51:14.840
Now all of these legislative measures obviously make it much easier for labor unions to accomplish their goals.

443
00:51:14.840 --> 00:51:22.840
In order to fulfill the purpose of a labor union, the stated purpose is to increase the wages of their members.

444
00:51:22.840 --> 00:51:29.840
What labor unions have to do is to restrict an employer's access to alternative sources of labor.

445
00:51:29.840 --> 00:51:34.840
So the idea is to artificially reduce the number of people in the labor force,

446
00:51:34.840 --> 00:51:39.840
so to reduce the supply and therefore that would increase the price, that would increase the wage.

447
00:51:39.840 --> 00:51:42.840
That's the purpose of the labor union.

448
00:51:42.840 --> 00:51:49.840
So the labor unions typically are organized, you know, partly against their employer, but they're primarily organized against other workers.

449
00:51:49.840 --> 00:51:55.840
They're organized against people who want employment, let's say, with this firm and who are non-union.

450
00:51:55.840 --> 00:52:02.840
They're not interested in that. They want to restrict the supply so as to increase wages for their own workers. That's the point.

451
00:52:02.840 --> 00:52:11.840
So non-union workers who wish to seek employment on the terms offered by an employer whose firm is unionized must be prevented from doing so.

452
00:52:11.840 --> 00:52:18.840
So, Edward Chamberlain of Harvard University once described the legal status that labor unions have thereby been granted.

453
00:52:18.840 --> 00:52:20.840
He said this,

454
00:52:20.840 --> 00:52:27.840
If A is bargaining with B over the sale of his house, and if A were given the privileges of a modern labor union,

455
00:52:27.840 --> 00:52:33.840
he would be able, one, to conspire with all other owners of houses not to make any alternative offer to B,

456
00:52:33.840 --> 00:52:37.840
using violence or the threat of violence if necessary to prevent them,

457
00:52:37.840 --> 00:52:42.840
2. To deprive B himself of access to any alternative offers.

458
00:52:42.840 --> 00:52:49.840
3. To surround the house of B and cut off all deliveries, including food, except by parcel post.

459
00:52:49.840 --> 00:52:56.840
4. To stop all movement from B's house, so that if he were, for instance, a doctor, he could not sell his services and make a living.

460
00:52:56.840 --> 00:52:59.840
5. To institute a boycott of B's business.

461
00:52:59.840 --> 00:53:05.840
All of these privileges, if he were capable of carrying them out, would no doubt strengthen A's position.

462
00:53:05.840 --> 00:53:11.840
But they would not be regarded by anyone as part of, quote, bargaining, unless A, we're a labor union.

463
00:53:11.840 --> 00:53:16.840
It's for this reason that Hayek once said, I think it was in the Constitution of Liberty,

464
00:53:16.840 --> 00:53:22.840
Hayek said, we have now reached a state where unions have become uniquely privileged institutions

465
00:53:22.840 --> 00:53:26.840
to which the general rules of law do not apply.

466
00:53:26.840 --> 00:53:32.840
Now, of course, because there is such sympathy, there's this kind of a mythos that surrounds labor unions

467
00:53:32.840 --> 00:53:37.840
The Theory of Money and Credit

468
00:54:02.840 --> 00:54:21.840
Jack London said, after God had finished the rattlesnake, the toad, the vampire, he had some awful substance left with which he made a scab.

469
00:54:21.840 --> 00:54:25.840
Kind of dehumanizing, I think.

470
00:54:25.840 --> 00:54:31.840
Well, in any case, what will often happen then would be that the police,

471
00:54:31.840 --> 00:54:34.840
you know, we need the public police to keep law and order.

472
00:54:34.840 --> 00:54:37.840
Well, they'll just stand there, like, you know, somebody's getting his head bashed in,

473
00:54:37.840 --> 00:54:41.840
the policeman will say, hey, I think I've got to go give that guy a ticket over there.

474
00:54:41.840 --> 00:54:45.840
He's going 43 miles an hour in a 40-mile zone.

475
00:54:45.840 --> 00:54:49.840
So, in other words, they'll just stand there and let this type of behavior go on.

476
00:54:49.840 --> 00:54:55.840
Even in the face of intimidation, violence, oftentimes this will just not happen.

477
00:54:55.840 --> 00:55:00.840
There won't be any redress by the public authorities.

478
00:55:00.840 --> 00:55:08.840
So, in effect, coercion or the threat of coercion is at the heart of the labor union experience

479
00:55:08.840 --> 00:55:16.840
because how else are you going to keep other people from voluntarily entering into agreements with employers

480
00:55:16.840 --> 00:55:20.840
and thus, at least apparently, driving down wages.

481
00:55:20.840 --> 00:55:24.640
Well, you have to intimidate them into not doing this or use violence against them

482
00:55:24.640 --> 00:55:29.940
or build up this mythos in people's minds that they wouldn't dream of doing it.

483
00:55:29.940 --> 00:55:32.740
This is why Henry George once wrote in the 19th century,

484
00:55:32.740 --> 00:55:37.440
those who tell you of trade unions bent on raising wages by moral suasion alone

485
00:55:37.440 --> 00:55:42.840
are like those who would tell you of tigers that live on oranges.

486
00:55:42.840 --> 00:55:50.840
Now, there are a couple of examples of incidents that occurred in the course of American labor history

487
00:55:50.840 --> 00:55:54.840
that I found particularly revealing in what they tell us about labor law.

488
00:55:54.840 --> 00:55:58.840
For example, there was a United Mine Workers strike in the early 80s,

489
00:55:58.840 --> 00:56:04.840
in which, as Morgan Reynolds points out, he says,

490
00:56:04.840 --> 00:56:11.840
non-union miners and mine owners armed themselves or shut down their operations for the duration of the strike.

491
00:56:11.840 --> 00:56:18.540
Truck convoys used lead trucks with five-foot-long magnets to sweep up nails and spikes on the road.

492
00:56:18.540 --> 00:56:20.840
These were some of the tactics that were being used.

493
00:56:20.840 --> 00:56:24.340
When UMW ambushes and gun battles broke out,

494
00:56:24.340 --> 00:56:29.840
Kentucky Governor John Y. Brown adopted a policy of what he called strict neutrality,

495
00:56:29.840 --> 00:56:33.840
declaring, we're not going to camp on one side or the other.

496
00:56:33.840 --> 00:56:36.340
A non-union mine operator protested,

497
00:56:36.340 --> 00:56:43.340
The concept of neutrality toward breaking the law is not found in any statute or practice in our society.

498
00:56:43.340 --> 00:56:48.340
But in other words, violence could be used by unionists and the governor will say,

499
00:56:48.340 --> 00:56:52.340
well, you know, who am I to decide who's right in this situation?

500
00:56:52.340 --> 00:56:58.340
Or there was an interesting arbitration ruling by the National Labor Relations Board in the mid-1970s

501
00:56:58.340 --> 00:57:05.340
that was speaking of a firm that had kept its plant open during a strike

502
00:57:05.340 --> 00:57:18.340
And the ruling said this, although the company had a legal right to keep the plant open, its decision to do so gives it some share of responsibility for creating an environment conducive to violence.

503
00:57:18.340 --> 00:57:26.340
So the company, right, the company kept its plant open and so it's really sort of their fault, isn't it? I mean, they should have just shut down.

504
00:57:26.340 --> 00:57:32.340
Now, the result of union activity then is to reduce the number of jobs in an industry

505
00:57:32.340 --> 00:57:36.940
and to raise the money wages of union labor, while at the same time, and here's the thing

506
00:57:36.940 --> 00:57:42.040
that is not seen, relegating many workers driven out of this line of work now by the

507
00:57:42.040 --> 00:57:47.200
decreased quantity of labor demanded there to other lines of work whose money wages must

508
00:57:47.200 --> 00:57:52.640
decrease as a result of the greater supply of workers now forced to compete for them.

509
00:57:52.640 --> 00:57:57.280
But it's not simply that labor union activity tends to displace people.

510
00:57:57.280 --> 00:58:03.080
That, well, I'd like to get a job in this, but I'm not in the union, and they don't want to let me in.

511
00:58:03.080 --> 00:58:07.920
They want to restrict the number of workers, so I'm sort of forced out of this industry.

512
00:58:07.920 --> 00:58:09.680
I've got to go work for something else.

513
00:58:09.680 --> 00:58:14.840
It's not just simply that, well, I would have worked here, but now I work here, and so it's just a wash.

514
00:58:14.840 --> 00:58:20.000
The gains to certain workers are more than offset by the disabilities inflicted upon other workers.

515
00:58:20.000 --> 00:58:27.000
I mean, quite apart from the subjective factor mentally of being driven from your chosen field,

516
00:58:27.000 --> 00:58:33.000
when union activity reduces the number of people who can be profitably employed in skilled trades,

517
00:58:33.000 --> 00:58:38.000
it correspondingly increases the number of skilled laborers who are now forced to find work

518
00:58:38.000 --> 00:58:41.000
in fields that are well below their level of competence.

519
00:58:41.000 --> 00:58:45.000
The outcome of this displacement of skilled labor is no different from a situation

520
00:58:45.000 --> 00:58:49.000
in which laborers never possess these skills in the first place.

521
00:58:49.000 --> 00:58:53.160
If union privilege prevents some workers from putting their skills to proper use,

522
00:58:53.280 --> 00:58:57.480
the effect is the same as if they had never gone to the trouble to acquire them at all.

523
00:58:57.600 --> 00:59:00.000
Thus, society produces below its potential,

524
00:59:00.120 --> 00:59:04.280
and wealth that would otherwise have been created never sees the light of day.

525
00:59:06.720 --> 00:59:11.760
Now, of course, much of the reason that labor unions have the sympathy that they do

526
00:59:11.880 --> 00:59:15.200
is that people have this sense that, of course, without unions,

527
00:59:15.320 --> 00:59:17.640
how could workers be prosperous?

528
00:59:17.640 --> 00:59:20.040
They don't have a strong negotiating position.

529
00:59:20.040 --> 00:59:22.840
Employers have a much stronger negotiating position.

530
00:59:22.840 --> 00:59:26.240
And so, therefore, they have to have a counterbalance

531
00:59:26.240 --> 00:59:30.240
to that natural advantage that employers are alleged to enjoy.

532
00:59:30.240 --> 00:59:35.040
And this is a position that we see, in effect, given voice,

533
00:59:35.040 --> 00:59:38.040
even in Adam Smith's book, The Wealth of Nations.

534
00:59:38.040 --> 00:59:42.840
In speaking of workers and employers, Smith said as follows.

535
00:59:42.840 --> 00:59:44.040
He said,

536
00:59:44.040 --> 00:59:50.040
It is not, however, difficult to foresee which of the two parties must, upon all ordinary occasions,

537
00:59:50.040 --> 00:59:55.040
have the advantage in the dispute and force the other into a compliance with their terms.

538
00:59:55.040 --> 01:00:00.040
The masters, being fewer in number, can combine much more easily,

539
01:00:00.040 --> 01:00:04.040
and the law, besides, authorizes or at least does not prohibit their combinations

540
01:00:04.040 --> 01:00:06.040
while it prohibits those of the workmen.

541
01:00:06.040 --> 01:00:08.040
Well, not in the U.S., certainly.

542
01:00:08.040 --> 01:00:12.040
Now, we have no Acts of Parliament against combining to lower the price of work,

543
01:00:12.040 --> 01:00:29.040
In all such disputes, and here's the key, the masters can hold out much longer, a landlord, a farmer, a master manufacturer or merchant, though they did not employ a single workman could generally live a year or two upon the stocks which they have already acquired.

544
01:00:29.040 --> 01:00:35.040
Many workmen could not subsist a week, few could subsist a month and scarce any a year without employment.

545
01:00:35.040 --> 01:00:43.040
In the long run, the workman may be as necessary to his master as his master is to him, but the necessity is not so immediate.

546
01:00:43.040 --> 01:00:50.040
Well, I think that's a fairly standard understanding that most people have.

547
01:00:50.040 --> 01:00:58.040
But yet, I'm going to suggest that this is in fact not an accurate way of thinking about what actually happens in labor markets

548
01:00:58.040 --> 01:01:07.040
and that it doesn't correspond either to sound theory or to, in fact, the experience that various countries have had throughout recent history.

549
01:01:07.040 --> 01:01:19.040
Now, if it's true, first of all, that because the employer allegedly can afford to wait longer because he's got bigger stocks of things he needs for subsistence,

550
01:01:19.040 --> 01:01:24.040
whereas the worker is typically living very, very close to subsistence and can't just sit around and wait,

551
01:01:24.040 --> 01:01:30.040
If the employer can just sit there and say, look, this is my offer. I'll just sit here and wait for you to crawl up to me and take it.

552
01:01:30.040 --> 01:01:37.040
If that really is true, then certain things should follow from that, that don't in fact seem to follow from that.

553
01:01:37.040 --> 01:01:44.040
If labor is more easily exploited, let's say, than capital, I mean, you can't say to a pile of steel,

554
01:01:44.040 --> 01:01:50.040
you know, I'm only going to give you five bucks a pound, so you just sit there and I'll just sit here and wait.

555
01:01:50.040 --> 01:02:00.040
The argument of labor exploitation would be that it's easier to exploit labor and hire it at a wage that its level of productivity doesn't adjust.

556
01:02:00.040 --> 01:02:08.040
In other words, when you hire labor, the argument is that I can hire people for, like, nothing because they're going to starve otherwise.

557
01:02:08.040 --> 01:02:13.040
But if I use capital, well, pretty much everything is going to go to waste.

558
01:02:13.040 --> 01:02:18.320
The argument is that I can hire people for like nothing because they're going to starve otherwise.

559
01:02:18.320 --> 01:02:22.720
But if I use capital, well, pretty much when I purchase some capital equipment,

560
01:02:23.840 --> 01:02:27.680
I got to purchase it at the going rate. I have to purchase it at a rate that is in some way

561
01:02:27.680 --> 01:02:32.800
commensurate with the benefits that will accrue to me from it because I'm buying it from, after all,

562
01:02:32.800 --> 01:02:37.680
another capitalist who himself has stocks of goods. So I can't exploit capital in the way I

563
01:02:37.680 --> 01:02:39.680
and the way I can exploit a laborer.

564
01:02:39.680 --> 01:02:45.680
Well, if that really were true, then we would expect to find profits being much higher

565
01:02:45.680 --> 01:02:49.680
in labor-intensive industries than in capital-intensive industries.

566
01:02:49.680 --> 01:02:53.680
But this does not seem to have empirical support.

567
01:02:53.680 --> 01:02:58.680
There are also certain myths of labor union history that are incorrect,

568
01:02:58.680 --> 01:03:04.680
that are based on this presumption that the laborer is at a bargaining and negotiating disadvantage.

569
01:03:04.680 --> 01:03:10.480
For example, before there was anything remotely approaching substantial unionism in the United States,

570
01:03:10.480 --> 01:03:17.480
there was already a very substantial upward trend in wages throughout the 19th century, all into the 20th.

571
01:03:17.480 --> 01:03:23.080
Right now, labor unions account for, I think, 9% of American labor is actually unionized.

572
01:03:23.080 --> 01:03:27.480
It's basically always been a very insubstantial figure, relatively small.

573
01:03:27.480 --> 01:03:31.080
It's gone up, it went up in the 30s, of course, because the law was giving it a lot of advantages,

574
01:03:31.080 --> 01:03:51.080
by the year 1900, it was about 3%. 3% of the labor force is unionized, and yet American workers into the 1920s were continuing to have substantially higher wages than their much more heavily unionized counterparts in Europe, they got the 8-hour day sooner, and so on.

575
01:03:51.080 --> 01:03:59.080
There's a standard view that says that large-scale employers, the great big companies, tend to exploit unorganized workers.

576
01:03:59.080 --> 01:04:06.080
But in fact, the empirical evidence is that the larger firms were in fact paying better than the smaller firms.

577
01:04:06.080 --> 01:04:13.080
There's this claim that workers are at a disadvantage because they don't have as much in terms of savings,

578
01:04:13.080 --> 01:04:17.080
where they can subsist on that while they're waiting for the employer to give in.

579
01:04:17.080 --> 01:04:27.080
But in fact, there does not seem to be any difference in the wage rates that workers with substantial savings received and workers without savings received.

580
01:04:27.080 --> 01:04:40.580
Now, labor unionism, in fact, impoverishes society in a variety of ways that are not immediately apparent, they're not intuitive, I think.

581
01:04:40.580 --> 01:04:46.780
First, we have the distortions in the labor market that we've seen, I mean, people being forced to go into fields for which they're overqualified

582
01:04:46.780 --> 01:04:51.780
The Federal Reserve has shut them out of the field for which they had trained.

583
01:04:51.780 --> 01:04:56.780
But in fact the damage that unions have inflicted on the economy in recent American history

584
01:04:56.780 --> 01:05:01.780
is actually far greater than anybody might suppose.

585
01:05:01.780 --> 01:05:06.780
And I cite in my book a study by veteran Galloway

586
01:05:06.780 --> 01:05:10.780
that was published jointly by the National Legal and Policy Center

587
01:05:10.780 --> 01:05:14.780
and the John M. Olin Institute for Employment Practice and Policy.

588
01:05:14.780 --> 01:05:20.780
But veteran Galloway did this study in 2002 that is available online, I think, to this day.

589
01:05:20.780 --> 01:05:24.780
And I think I can, in fact, if you just did a Google search of all those names,

590
01:05:24.780 --> 01:05:29.780
veteran Galloway, National Legal and Policy Center, John M. Olin Institute, you'd probably find it.

591
01:05:29.780 --> 01:05:33.780
But here's what they concluded, and this sounds absolutely counterintuitive at the beginning.

592
01:05:33.780 --> 01:05:42.780
They concluded that over the past half century alone, labor unions have cost the American economy a whopping $50 trillion.

593
01:05:42.780 --> 01:05:50.220
That seems like they must have just, they forgot to carry the one, or they've got too many zeros, or this can't possibly be so.

594
01:05:50.220 --> 01:05:56.420
But in fact, this is not a misprint. That was in fact their conclusion.

595
01:05:56.420 --> 01:05:57.860
And they write this, they say,

596
01:05:57.860 --> 01:06:04.220
The deadweight economic losses that are brought on by labor unionism are not one-shot impacts on the economy.

597
01:06:04.220 --> 01:06:09.380
What our simulations reveal is the powerful effect of the compounding over more than half a century

598
01:06:09.380 --> 01:06:13.100
of what appears at first to be small annual effects.

599
01:06:13.100 --> 01:06:18.900
Now, the study did find that union labor does typically earn wages that are 15% higher

600
01:06:18.900 --> 01:06:21.260
than those of their non-union counterparts.

601
01:06:21.260 --> 01:06:27.220
But it also found that wages in general suffered dramatically as a result of an economy

602
01:06:27.220 --> 01:06:34.300
that is 30 to 40% smaller than it would have been in the absence of labor unionism.

603
01:06:34.300 --> 01:06:42.060
Now, I have a bunch of, I think, pretty overwhelming evidence on this,

604
01:06:42.060 --> 01:06:47.220
about how unionism has, in fact, contributed to not the well-being of workers,

605
01:06:47.220 --> 01:06:51.420
but actually to the overall impoverishment of American labor.

606
01:06:51.420 --> 01:06:53.860
But I think I'm going to save most of that for next time,

607
01:06:53.860 --> 01:06:58.220
and then I'm going to look at a couple of historical episodes next time.

608
01:06:58.220 --> 01:07:04.180
But I will just simply conclude with a thought experiment before taking any question.

609
01:07:04.180 --> 01:07:14.180
And the thought experiment is this, as we know, the usual argument is that in the absence of labor unions, employers will pay unconscionably low wages.

610
01:07:14.180 --> 01:07:24.180
But George Reisman has got a useful thought experiment to the contrary. He says, let's suppose you have a car in New York City, which, by the way, is an unbelievable hassle.

611
01:07:24.180 --> 01:07:30.180
Where would you park it? It costs a fortune. It's a nightmare. There's traffic all the time anyway.

612
01:07:30.180 --> 01:07:33.180
And let's just say you decide that you just want to get rid of this car.

613
01:07:33.180 --> 01:07:37.180
And you pretty much take anything that you can get for it.

614
01:07:37.180 --> 01:07:40.180
In fact, you take one dollar for the car.

615
01:07:40.180 --> 01:07:44.180
In fact, let's say you would pay somebody to take this car off your hands.

616
01:07:44.180 --> 01:07:52.180
Now the question is, does that mean that in practice you are in fact going to have to pay somebody to take that car away?

617
01:07:52.180 --> 01:07:56.180
Or you're going to have to accept a bid of one dollar?

618
01:07:56.180 --> 01:08:03.180
Well, the fact is there are a lot of people in New York who want to buy cars and they're going to outbid each other.

619
01:08:03.180 --> 01:08:13.180
If a potential buyer offered you one dollar, you would turn him down even if it were true that in a state of complete despair you would have sold it at a dollar.

620
01:08:13.180 --> 01:08:17.180
That is not a relevant factor here, what you would do in a desperate situation.

621
01:08:17.180 --> 01:08:24.180
It's not relevant to what you would do in a real life situation in which you have many buyers.

622
01:08:24.180 --> 01:08:31.180
So this person, because of his low bid, will miss out on the opportunity to own the car altogether, since his rivals will simply outbid him.

623
01:08:31.180 --> 01:08:36.180
Well, in effect, the same thing happens in the labor market. I mean, this is how Charles Baird explains it. He says,

624
01:08:36.180 --> 01:08:42.180
This idea that workers without unions will inherently have a disadvantage in bargaining power relative to employers

625
01:08:42.180 --> 01:08:47.180
is the basis for most individuals' support of unionism and is picked up again in the Wagner Act.

626
01:08:47.180 --> 01:08:53.180
In fact, the Wagner Act expressly says, in the Act itself, actually includes a statement saying that

627
01:08:53.180 --> 01:08:58.680
Because we all know that laborers are at a disadvantage in bargaining, therefore we have to do this.

628
01:08:58.680 --> 01:09:01.180
I mean, they just state it as if it's obvious.

629
01:09:01.180 --> 01:09:04.180
But that disadvantage is a hoary myth, says Baird.

630
01:09:04.180 --> 01:09:07.180
A worker's bargaining power depends on the worker's alternatives.

631
01:09:07.180 --> 01:09:11.180
If a worker either works for employer A or does not work,

632
01:09:11.180 --> 01:09:17.180
that is, if employer A is a monopsinist, that is the only buyer, in effect,

633
01:09:17.180 --> 01:09:20.180
in that case the worker has little bargaining power.

634
01:09:20.180 --> 01:09:25.180
If the worker has several employment alternatives, on the other hand, he has strong bargaining power.

635
01:09:25.180 --> 01:09:31.180
There may have been instances of monopsony or oligopsony in the 19th century, but they were short-lived.

636
01:09:31.180 --> 01:09:38.180
Monopsony has not been a significant factor in the American labor market since the introduction and widespread use of the automobile.

637
01:09:38.180 --> 01:09:46.180
And in fact, Baird on another occasion says that Henry Ford did more for the typical American worker than did Samuel Gompers,

638
01:09:46.180 --> 01:10:09.180
The empirical evidence simply does not bear out the conventional wisdom regarding unions.

639
01:10:09.180 --> 01:10:14.180
If it were true that employers were really in a position to impose whatever wage rate they wished,

640
01:10:14.180 --> 01:10:21.180
Then why, in the decades before large-scale labor unionism, why weren't wages heading towards zero?

641
01:10:21.180 --> 01:10:25.180
In fact, real wages were increasing dramatically at that time.

642
01:10:25.180 --> 01:10:29.180
Or why is it that skilled workers would earn more than unskilled workers?

643
01:10:29.180 --> 01:10:33.180
They should all be earning subsistence, according to the exploitation theory.

644
01:10:33.180 --> 01:10:36.180
They should be able to just, because, hey, they can't wait.

645
01:10:36.180 --> 01:10:39.180
They're going to starve. They've got to take whatever offer you give them.

646
01:10:39.180 --> 01:10:44.180
Why should there be any differentiation in the wages paid to skilled versus unskilled workers?

647
01:10:44.180 --> 01:10:48.180
Why not just pay them both the same pittance?

648
01:10:48.180 --> 01:10:51.180
Well, this has all been sort of a negative overview.

649
01:10:51.180 --> 01:10:56.180
First, laying out what the basic principles are of American labor law at this point,

650
01:10:56.180 --> 01:11:05.180
and then looking at why it is that, in fact, labor unions are not responsible for the increased standard of living,

651
01:11:05.180 --> 01:11:10.880
Standard of Living, in fact, why they helped to depress it, but although I do want to continue on that line a little bit next time,

652
01:11:10.880 --> 01:11:19.080
I want to give an alternative explanation, an alternative version of history that explains what, in fact, does account for the rising standard of living

653
01:11:19.080 --> 01:11:23.980
that American workers have enjoyed from the 19th century to the present.

654
01:11:23.980 --> 01:11:33.580
So I think that'll be it for right now, and we'll see if anybody thinks anything about this or has any comments or any horror stories to share with us,

655
01:11:33.580 --> 01:11:38.580
because my father sure had plenty of them, because my father worked because he felt like it was the right thing to do

656
01:11:38.580 --> 01:11:43.580
and there'd be people, he felt there were people who were taking advantage of the unionized situation

657
01:11:43.580 --> 01:11:47.580
who would hurt their thumb and they'd be out for eight weeks and that drove him crazy

658
01:11:47.580 --> 01:11:50.580
and he sort of felt like the honorable thing is to do your, do your day's work

659
01:11:50.580 --> 01:11:57.580
and so, you know, we hope that my father being now nine years deceased that he has received his eternal reward for that.

660
01:11:57.580 --> 01:12:02.580
Are you going to go into any of the initial history of union?

661
01:12:02.580 --> 01:12:07.580
I mean, my general question is that the ones that got unionized first

662
01:12:07.580 --> 01:12:11.580
were the ones that paid the best to start with, like the rebels.

663
01:12:11.580 --> 01:12:14.580
I mean, are you going to go into that?

664
01:12:27.580 --> 01:12:32.580
You asked, of course, an example of a horror story with the board there, the National Relations Board.

665
01:12:32.580 --> 01:12:37.580
This happened in South Carolina, which was a right-of-work state, but there were unions there,

666
01:12:37.580 --> 01:12:42.580
and this guy who was very conservative started paying a lot of money,

667
01:12:42.580 --> 01:12:47.580
and he had a lot of money, and he had a lot of money, and he had a lot of money,

668
01:12:47.580 --> 01:12:52.580
and he had a lot of money, and he had a lot of money, and he had a lot of money,

669
01:12:52.580 --> 01:13:01.580
This guy, who was very conservative, started paying each worker each week in actual cash.

670
01:13:01.580 --> 01:13:07.580
So he'd hand the cash to the guy, but after you got the pay window, you couldn't leave.

671
01:13:07.580 --> 01:13:12.580
You had to go to the next window, and the first thing they did was take out the Social Security.

672
01:13:12.580 --> 01:13:20.580
Then you went to the next window, and they took out the Federal, and then the State, and then the Union dues, and then you ended up with what was left.

673
01:13:20.580 --> 01:13:36.580
And then at the end of each week, they took all the Social Security and the Federal, and they had this huge blast thing, like a giant aquarium, and they dumped it into this, and put a sign on it, and said, this is your money going to Washington.

674
01:13:36.580 --> 01:13:49.580
And it was garbage. And every week, you know, this thing was just huge. And so, anyway, what happened was, not only did that make them, but they said, well, the first thing they knew, they couldn't do much with the taxes,

675
01:13:49.580 --> 01:14:15.580
Oh, that's like one of the best things I've ever heard. And they had to stop it? Oh, that's an outrage. That's an outrage. All right. Good. Yes.

676
01:14:15.580 --> 01:14:22.580
I thought of the difference between the non-governmental market and the government.

677
01:14:22.580 --> 01:14:26.580
I used to work for the U.S. government and they were very restrictive on unions,

678
01:14:26.580 --> 01:14:31.580
and at a level more like the level I was at, you couldn't even join a union.

679
01:14:31.580 --> 01:14:38.580
And in Congress, their employees would have even more restrictions than the executive branch did.

680
01:14:38.580 --> 01:14:47.580
I don't know if you want to comment on that kind of stuff, but that's the difference between what's good for the goose and good for the gander.

681
01:15:08.580 --> 01:15:35.580
I can't give you any specifics, but I know when I'm arguing with people that are sympathetic to unions, they would say, yeah, unions sometimes use violence, but that's a very selective interpretation, and that especially in the late 1800s, the miners would go on strike and then the miners would call in their goons and beat them up and they paid off the police, and so in the 20th century it was more like making a level playing field in terms of the use of violence.

682
01:15:35.580 --> 01:15:49.580
I think, actually, not really, because I think that, you know, like Bob Higgs, for instance, who is, you know, as small government or, you know, whatever a guy is, you can find.

683
01:15:49.580 --> 01:16:04.580
Nevertheless, he likes President Grover Cleveland in spite of what a lot of people criticize him for, which is that he, you know, he sometimes did intervene in labor disputes or to try to restore order in the midst of strikes

684
01:16:04.580 --> 01:16:11.580
and that sort of thing, and Higgs absolutely insisted that case after case, he's totally justified in doing so,

685
01:16:11.580 --> 01:16:17.580
that the violence that's taking place is typically on the part of the Union,

686
01:16:17.580 --> 01:16:23.580
and that intervening or having injunctions were exactly the right thing to do.

687
01:16:23.580 --> 01:16:29.580
In fact, there's a reasonably good discussion of the Pullman Strike, as I recall, in Crisis and Leviathan,

688
01:16:29.580 --> 01:16:44.580
My reading of it is that, hold on, on the goon question, let me revisit the goon question,

689
01:16:44.580 --> 01:16:51.580
like they bring in their goons, because I am going to talk later today about the Homestead Strike,

690
01:16:51.580 --> 01:16:58.580
because there you did have some people who were considered to be goons, the Pinkerton Detective Agency was hired,

691
01:16:58.580 --> 01:17:01.980
But typically that was done, even though the Pinkertons were hated by people.

692
01:17:01.980 --> 01:17:06.680
They were typically hired because the public police weren't protecting the plant.

693
01:17:06.680 --> 01:17:09.180
They had a history of not protecting the plant.

694
01:17:09.180 --> 01:17:12.480
So if you know that the public authorities aren't going to protect the plant,

695
01:17:12.480 --> 01:17:19.480
then you really have no choice other than to arm yourself with whatever private organization you can find.

696
01:17:19.480 --> 01:17:23.580
Not many people have spoken on behalf of the Pinkerton Detective Agency over the past hundred years,

697
01:17:23.580 --> 01:17:26.080
but that's about the best I can do.

698
01:17:26.080 --> 01:17:29.080
Other, I'll see. Yes, Harry.

699
01:17:29.080 --> 01:17:33.080
This is not in your local position to take it.

700
01:17:33.080 --> 01:17:37.080
I'm going to be just confused for a moment, but

701
01:17:37.080 --> 01:17:41.080
in this sort of building up from Mr. Southerbury's question

702
01:17:41.080 --> 01:17:44.080
or comment about government unions

703
01:17:44.080 --> 01:17:47.080
and making a thought experiment of

704
01:17:47.080 --> 01:17:52.080
the socialized countries of Eastern Europe or something like that

705
01:17:52.080 --> 01:18:03.080
that might be justified for someone like Rothbard, who would say that the factories are owned by, probably by the workers themselves,

706
01:18:03.080 --> 01:18:14.080
that in as much as government isn't properly owned by the people who direct it,

707
01:18:14.080 --> 01:18:44.000
and certain state affiliated capitalists like defense contractors are also illegitimate that certain actions that restrict business are addressed against the employers in those cases are legitimate, like sit-downs or even restricting entrance from other workers, even as much as those workers might own the plant.

708
01:18:44.000 --> 01:19:14.000
Okay, I never thought of it that way, but I never would have thought of that, but that may be a legitimate Rothbardian point, where Rothbard would say that when you're dealing with government enterprises, or for example, when you're dealing with the question of how do you desocialize in Eastern Europe, and how do you assign property rights to, you know, government-owned firms and properties, whatever,

709
01:19:14.000 --> 01:19:22.000
I recall reading as well that Rothbard's view oftentimes, which would also be his view of slaves working on a plantation,

710
01:19:22.000 --> 01:19:24.000
would be that they are the legitimate owners.

711
01:19:24.000 --> 01:19:32.000
Likewise, people in Eastern Europe, the actual workers themselves would be the legitimate owners

712
01:19:32.000 --> 01:19:37.000
because there's no way that the communist state could be a legitimate owner of anything.

713
01:19:37.000 --> 01:19:41.000
And of course for Rothbard, there's no way that any state could be a legitimate owner of anything

714
01:19:41.000 --> 01:20:11.000
In this case, in the case of government unions, then I think you may be able to have a point in saying that maybe

715
01:20:11.000 --> 01:20:19.000
The employees of these institutions are, at least in some way, perhaps more legitimately the owners.

716
01:20:19.000 --> 01:20:24.000
And so they might be able, in fact, to engage in things like preventing people from coming onto the property,

717
01:20:24.000 --> 01:20:26.000
because perhaps it is their property.

718
01:20:26.000 --> 01:20:32.000
But at the same time, there is the fact that these institutions are taxpayer funded.

719
01:20:32.000 --> 01:20:37.000
And so, you know, I could just as well say that I'm at least a partial owner of that thing.

720
01:20:37.000 --> 01:20:42.500
So, couldn't I, in fact, impose some kind of rule as to how it's going to function?

721
01:20:42.500 --> 01:20:48.500
It's a complicated question, and so it makes me more and more happy that I haven't done any work in government unions.

722
01:20:48.500 --> 01:20:51.500
But thanks, I never would have thought of that. Yeah, Dan?

723
01:20:51.500 --> 01:21:21.500
This kind of might throw a wrench in this debate as well, in the sense that the current media response of government employees in government sectors, which are commonly unionized, is a hesitation towards privatization, like especially things like police officer unions, in the sense that I think the way in which these occupations develop in terms of their entrepreneurship

724
01:21:21.500 --> 01:21:50.500
is kind of thrown out of whack, being that all government operations are, in a sense, a subsidy and throw a misallocation of resources in terms of, in a very Kirznerian sense of who capitalizes on a profit opportunity is the real entrepreneur, and in a general production process of, say, like, any consumer good, like if you have a unionized labor force of car makers or something, it's a lot of money.

725
01:21:50.500 --> 01:22:08.500
It's less thrown out of whack without a subsidy in the sense that the laborers recognize, oh, the capitalist is taking a killing off of our labor, so we're going to collectively bargain so as to obstruct some of that profit and be entrepreneurial ourselves,

726
01:22:08.500 --> 01:22:14.500
versus an entirely government-subsidized industry like, say, police, security.

727
01:22:14.500 --> 01:22:21.500
It's thrown out of whack right off the beginning from the capitalist investment in the general process.

728
01:22:21.500 --> 01:22:25.500
It's government-subsidized, and so the people who are the employees,

729
01:22:25.500 --> 01:22:29.500
there's a misallocation of resources before they even have the opportunity to say,

730
01:22:29.500 --> 01:22:34.500
we're in a production process for something that's profitable that we should profit off of.

731
01:22:34.500 --> 01:22:41.500
So, to say whether or not there are appropriate residual claimants in the process isn't necessarily clear.

732
01:22:41.500 --> 01:22:47.500
Yeah, that's right. And as I got to the end of my thinking that issue through, I was not so certain.

733
01:22:47.500 --> 01:22:51.500
At the end of my answer, as I was at the beginning, I think, for at least some of those reasons. Thanks.

734
01:22:51.500 --> 01:22:54.500
Okay. Yes, sir. And then we'll go here and then come back to you.

735
01:22:54.500 --> 01:23:00.500
My hometown is the heart of the United Nations transition.

736
01:23:00.500 --> 01:23:10.500
And I can relay a lot of stories about it, but I'll relay a personal one. I mean, my background was in the CPA and I don't do that anymore, by the way. I hate accounting.

737
01:23:10.500 --> 01:23:28.500
But I was engaged in a consulting deal with a company called Bindree. Bindree is someone who finds books or does something similar to that. And they had a large contract with General Motors and they lost it.

738
01:23:28.500 --> 01:23:36.500
and that was the only one that went into the catallactics and I was engaged to come in and do strategic planning.

739
01:23:36.500 --> 01:23:45.500
One of the things I did was institute statistical process control to be able to guarantee quality as it came out

740
01:23:45.500 --> 01:23:55.500
and convince General Motors that we now have a quality product and they scheduled a visit to the plant, there were three plants

741
01:23:55.500 --> 01:24:02.500
And writing on it was about a $5 million contract with a company that did a gross of $10 million.

742
01:24:02.500 --> 01:24:04.500
This was a pretty big deal.

743
01:24:04.500 --> 01:24:11.500
One of the employees was not happy with this whole idea of accountability and responsibility.

744
01:24:11.500 --> 01:24:20.500
One person out of about 120 employees had began threatening to bring her brothers and sisters and friends

745
01:24:20.500 --> 01:24:29.500
The cause of a lot of violence on the day that GM was going to show up, we had people's jobs and everything else was riding in the midst.

746
01:24:29.500 --> 01:24:37.500
So the day before, the threats got really real. We walked out and there were about 10 cars out in the parking lot.

747
01:24:37.500 --> 01:24:44.500
And these were only people and not related to the, and this is private property again.

748
01:24:44.500 --> 01:24:54.500
So the, I told the, and this is a non-union shop, not a union organization, so I told the president of the company, well what I would do is just fire her.

749
01:24:54.500 --> 01:25:03.500
So he did, he fired her. Well the next thing, we're in front of the National Labor Relation Board, yeah, this is a non-union.

750
01:25:03.500 --> 01:25:16.000
I'll make a long story short. The NLRB found against us that we did not allow for organized labor to protest, to be able to organize on our property, blah, blah, blah.

751
01:25:16.000 --> 01:25:20.500
Well, there was no union there. How could you find against us?

752
01:25:20.500 --> 01:25:31.500
The result was that the president of the company had to assemble the entire organization and the person for back wages, which was about $45,000, right on the spot.

753
01:25:31.500 --> 01:25:47.500
And the NLRD, in their finding, insisted that the president had to publicly apologize in front of the entire organization, that he fired her wrongly, and that it was his heartfelt remorse that he didn't.

754
01:25:47.500 --> 01:25:53.500
I mean, this is, they told him exactly what he had to say at Bravo. And we're sitting there going, how could this happen in this country?

755
01:25:53.500 --> 01:26:06.500
It's unbelievable that the National Labor Relations Board must be made up of just ideological zealots who take pleasure in hobbling a productive, decent, normal human being like this.

756
01:26:06.500 --> 01:26:13.500
I mean, actually writing out what the guy has to say to humiliate himself. There's something seriously twisted about that.

757
01:26:13.500 --> 01:26:24.500
The referee was almost gleeful in this finding that we're talking about people losing their jobs, there was a huge contract.

758
01:26:24.500 --> 01:26:34.500
This one individual that was threatening violence, it was amazing. We just sat there and we hired the best law firm in the city of Detroit that was used to labor problems.

759
01:26:34.500 --> 01:26:37.500
Because we couldn't even believe we were in front of the NLRB in the first place.

760
01:26:37.500 --> 01:26:43.500
Yeah, I know it. Make sure you just ask, you know, who is John Galt? You know, you just want to...

761
01:26:43.500 --> 01:26:45.500
Okay, yes?

762
01:26:45.500 --> 01:26:53.500
My question was regarding the 19th century ruling, the one we mentioned, the people versus Fisher,

763
01:26:53.500 --> 01:27:00.500
that the court ruled that trying to get a minimum wage for workers in this industry was injurious to others.

764
01:27:00.500 --> 01:27:05.500
And I was wondering, was there any violent action on the part of people trying to get the minimum wage,

765
01:27:05.500 --> 01:27:17.500
Let's see, you know what, let me check on that over the break and just to refresh my memory on it and try to get to the bottom of that question.

766
01:27:17.500 --> 01:27:20.500
And then, sir, that will be the last one.

767
01:27:20.500 --> 01:27:43.500
I have two short questions. One is more of a comment. One of our employees was a small agency. He constantly was an inventor, and he constantly, as an employee, got multiple patents, and those patents were used widely commercially, so he, more than paid for his wages, probably paid for the whole cost of our agency for this patent. The agriculture industry used them.

768
01:27:43.500 --> 01:27:53.500
How would one treat a U.S. government entity getting patents when those patents basically ping to the whole operations of the state government?

769
01:27:53.500 --> 01:28:03.500
We had a, our agency was smallest in the Department of Agriculture, the second smallest, I think we had like 60 employees, so that was one question.

770
01:28:03.500 --> 01:28:15.500
And the other was, I know for a fact the guilds in the Middle Ages, they didn't allow Jews to join unions, or guilds, and that was restricted.

771
01:28:15.500 --> 01:28:21.500
In the United States where the race or religious restriction was on unions, I don't know if you can comment on that.

772
01:28:33.500 --> 01:29:03.500
The medieval guilds are sometimes pointed to as wonderful examples of what we need because they had both the workers and the employers in them and it was mutually harmonious and everything, but I was just reading the other day that the guilds were so anti-competitive that you were actually forbidden, if you were a seller, if you were actually our master producing some product,

773
01:29:03.500 --> 01:29:08.500
You could not even sneeze in front of your store because that might draw undue attention to you.

774
01:29:08.500 --> 01:29:17.500
You weren't supposed to try to outdo your competition or undersell them or call special attention or advertise,

775
01:29:17.500 --> 01:29:19.500
such as that was possible in those days.

776
01:29:19.500 --> 01:29:24.500
But even sneezing might be your secret way of getting people to look over in your direction.

777
01:29:24.500 --> 01:29:29.500
So you have to just stand there like an automaton waiting for people to come by.

778
01:29:29.500 --> 01:29:34.000
I happen to think that would not be a good model, you know, for the economy.

779
01:29:34.000 --> 01:29:36.000
Alright, let's go eat. Thanks a lot.