INTRODUCTION
1. METHODOLOGICAL DUALISM
Mortal man does not know how the universe and all that it contains may appear to a superhuman
intelligence. Perhaps such an exalted mind is in a position to elaborate a coherent and
comprehensive monistic interpretation of all phenomena. Man, up to now at least, has always
He's gone lamentably amiss in his attempts to bridge the gulf that he sees yawning between
mind and matter, between the rider and the horse, between the mason and the stone.
It would be preposterous to view this failure as a sufficient demonstration of the soundness
of a dualistic philosophy.
All that we can infer from it is that science, at least for the time being, must adopt a
Methodological Dualism Refrains from any proposition concerning
essences and metaphysical constructs.
It merely takes into account the fact that we do not know how external events, physical,
chemical, and physiological, affect human thoughts, ideas, and judgments of value.
This ignorance splits the realm of knowledge into two separate fields, the realm of external
events, commonly called nature, and the realm of human thought and action.
Older ages looked upon the issue from a moral or religious point of view. Materialist monism
was rejected as incompatible with the Christian dualism of the Creator and the creation and
and of the Immortal Soul and the Mortal Body.
Determinism was rejected as incompatible with the fundamental principles of morality as well
as with the penal code.
Most of what was advanced in these controversies to support the respective dogmas was unessential
and is irrelevant from the methodological point of view of our day.
The determinists did little more than repeat their thesis again and again without trying
to substantiate it.
The indeterminists denied their adversaries' statements but were unable to strike at their
weak points.
The long debates were not very helpful.
The scope of the controversy changed when the new science of economics entered the scene.
Political parties which passionately rejected all the practical conclusions to which the
The results of economic thought inevitably led, but were unable to raise any tenable
objections against their truth and correctness, shifted the arguments to the fields of epistemology
and methodology.
They proclaimed the experimental methods of the natural sciences to be the only adequate
mode of research, and induction from sensory experience the only legitimate mode of scientific
reasoning.
They behaved as if they had never heard about the logical problems involved in induction.
Everything that was neither experimentation nor induction was in their eyes metaphysics,
a term that they employed as synonymous with nonsense.
2.
ECONOMICS AND METAPHYSICS
The sciences of human action start from the fact that man purposefully aims at ends he
he has chosen.
It is precisely this that all brands of positivism, behaviorism and panphysicalism want either
to deny altogether or to pass over in silence.
Now it would simply be silly to deny the fact that man manifestly behaves as if he were
really aiming at definite ends.
Thus the denial of purposefulness in man's attitudes can be sustained only if one assumes
that the choosing both of ends and of means is merely apparent and that human behavior
is ultimately determined by physiological events which can be fully described in the
terminology of physics and chemistry.
Even the most fanatical champions of the Unified Science sect shrink from unambiguously espousing
this blunt formulation of their fundamental thesis.
There are good reasons for this reticence.
So long as no definite relation is discovered between ideas and physical or chemical events
of which they would occur as the regular sequel, the positivist thesis remains an epistemological
postulate derived not from scientifically established experience but from a metaphysical
world view.
The positivists tell us that one day a new scientific discipline will emerge which will
will make good their promises and will describe in every detail the physical and chemical
processes that produce in the body of man definite ideas.
Let us not quarrel today about such issues of the future.
But it is evident that such a metaphysical proposition can in no way invalidate the results
of the discursive reasoning of the sciences of human action.
The positivists, for emotional reasons, do not like the conclusions that acting man must
necessarily draw from the teachings of economics.
As they are not in a position to find any flaw either in the reasoning of economics
or in the inferences derived from it, they resort to metaphysical schemes in order to
discredit the epistemological foundations and the methodological approach of economics.
There is nothing vicious about metaphysics.
cannot do without it.
The positivists are lamentably wrong in employing the term metaphysics as a synonym for nonsense.
But no metaphysical proposition must contradict any of the findings of discursive reasoning.
Metaphysics is not science, and the appeal to metaphysical notions is vain in the context
of a logical examination of scientific problems.
This is true also of the metaphysics of positivism to which its supporters have given the name
of anti-metaphysics.
3.
REGULARITY AND PREDICTION
Epistemologically, the distinctive mark of what we call nature is to be seen in the ascertainable
and inevitable regularity in the concatenation and sequence of phenomena.
On the other hand, the distinctive mark of what we call the human sphere, or history,
or better, the realm of human action, is the absence of such a universally prevailing regularity.
Under identical conditions, stones always react to the same stimuli in the same way.
We can learn something about these regular patterns of reacting, and we can make use
The use of this knowledge in directing our actions toward definite goals.
Our classification of natural objects and our assigning names to these classes is an
outcome of this cognition.
A stone is a thing that reacts in a definite way.
Men react to the same stimuli in different ways, and the same man, at different instants
of time, may react in ways different from his previous or later conduct.
It is impossible to group men into classes whose members always react in the same way.
This is not to say that future human actions are totally unpredictable.
They can, in a certain way, be anticipated to some extent.
But the methods applied in such anticipations and their scope are logically and epistemologically
4.
THE CONCEPT OF THE LAWS OF NATURE
Experience is always experience of past happenings.
It refers to what has been and is no longer to events sunk forever in the flux of time.
The awareness of regularity in the concatenation and sequence of many phenomena does not affect
this reference of experience to something that occurred once in the past at a definite
place and time, under the circumstances prevailing there and then.
The cognition of regularity, too, refers exclusively to past events.
The most experience can teach us is, in all cases observed in the past, there was an ascertainable
From time immemorial all men of all races and civilizations have taken it for granted
that the regularity observed in the past will also prevail in the future.
The category of causality and the idea that natural events will in the future follow the
same pattern they showed in the past are fundamental principles of human thought as well as of
human action.
Our material civilization is the product of conduct guided by them.
Any doubt concerning their validity within the sphere of past human action is dispelled
by the results of technological designing.
History teaches us irrefutably that our forefathers and we ourselves up to this very moment have
acted wisely in adopting them.
They are true in the sense that pragmatism attaches to the concept of truth, they work
or more precisely, they have worked in the past.
Leaving aside the problem of causality with its metaphysical implications, we have to realize
that the natural sciences are based entirely on the assumption that a regular conjunction
of phenomena prevails in the realm they investigate.
They do not search merely for frequent conjunction, but for a regularity that prevailed without
are without exception in all cases observed in the past and is expected to prevail in
the same way in all cases to be observed in the future.
Where they can discover only a frequent conjunction, as is often the case in biology, for example,
they assume that it is solely the inadequacy of our methods of inquiry that prevents us
temporarily from discovering strict regularity.
The two concepts of invariable and of frequent conjunction must not be confused.
In referring to invariable conjunction, people mean that no deviation from the regular pattern,
the law of conjunction, has ever been observed, and that they are certain, as far as men can
be certain about anything, that no such deviation is possible and will ever happen.
The best elucidation of the idea of inexorable regularity in the concatenation of natural
phenomena is provided by the concept of miracles.
A miraculous event is something that simply cannot happen in the normal course of world
affairs as we know it, because its happening could not be accounted for by the laws of
nature.
If nonetheless the occurrence of such an event is reported, two different interpretations
are provided, both of which, however, fully agree in taking for granted the inexorability
of the laws of nature.
The devout say, This could not happen in the normal course of affairs.
It came to pass only because the Lord has the power to act without being restricted
by the laws of nature.
It is an event incomprehensible and inexplicable for the human mind.
It is a mystery, a miracle.
The rationalists say, it could not happen and therefore it did not happen.
The reporters were either liars or victims of a delusion.
If the concept of laws of nature were to mean not inexorable regularity but merely frequent
connection, the notion of miracles would never have been conceived.
One would simply say, A is frequently followed by B, but in some instances this effect failed
to appear.
Nobody says that stones thrown into the air at an angle of 45 degrees will frequently
fall down to earth, or that a human limb lost by an accident frequently does not grow again.
All our thinking and all our actions are guided by the knowledge that in such cases we are
not faced with frequent repetition of the same connection but with regular repetition.
5.
THE LIMITATIONS OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
Human knowledge is conditioned by the power of the human mind and by the extent of the
sphere in which objects evoke human sensations.
Perhaps there are in the universe things that our senses cannot perceive and relations that
our minds cannot comprehend.
There may also exist outside of the orbit we call the universe, other systems of things
be replaced by another arrangement.
Such and similar thoughts may induce in a conscientious scientist the utmost caution
in formulating the results of his studies.
It behooves the philosopher to be still more restrained in dealing with the a priori categories
of causality and the regularity in the sequence of natural phenomena.
The a priori forms and categories of human thinking and reasoning cannot be traced back
It is contradictory to expect that logic could be of any service in demonstrating the correctness
or validity of the fundamental logical principles.
All that can be said about them is that to deny their correctness or validity appears
to the human mind nonsensical and that thinking guided by them has led to modes of successful
acting.
Hume's skepticism was the reaction to a postulate of absolute certainty that is forever unattainable
to man.
Those divines who saw that nothing but revelation could provide man with perfect certainty were
right.
Human scientific inquiry cannot proceed beyond the limits drawn by the insufficiency of man's
senses and the narrowness of his mind.
There is no deductive demonstration possible of the principle of causality and of the ampliative
6.
REGULARITY AND CHOOSING
The main fact about human action is that, in regard to it, there is no such regularity
in the conjunction of phenomena.
It is not a shortcoming of the sciences of human action that they have not succeeded
in discovering determinate stimulus-response patterns.
What does not exist cannot be discovered.
If there were no regularity in nature, it would be impossible to assert anything with
regard to the behavior of classes of objects.
One would have to study the individual cases and to combine what one has learned about
them into a historical account.
Let us, for the sake of argument, assume that all those physical quantities that we
call constants are in fact continually changing and that the inadequacy of our methods of
inquiry alone prevents us from becoming aware of these slow changes.
We do not take account of them because they have no perceptible influence upon our conditions
and do not noticeably affect the outcome of our actions.
Therefore, one could say that these quantities established by the experimental natural sciences
may fairly be looked upon as constants since they remain unchanged during a period of time
that by far exceeds the ages for which we may plan to provide.
But it is not permissible to argue in an analogous way with regard to the quantities we observe
in the field of human action.
These quantities are manifestly variable.
Changes occurring in them plainly affect the result of our actions.
Every quantity that we can observe is a historical event, a fact which cannot be fully described
without specifying the time and geographical point.
The econometrician is unable to disprove this fact, which cuts the ground from under his
reasoning.
He cannot help admitting that there are no behavior constants.
Nonetheless, he wants to introduce some numbers arbitrarily chosen on the basis of a historical
fact as unknown behavior constants.
The sole excuse he advances is that his hypotheses are, saying only that these unknown numbers
A reasonably constant ratio prevailed between the numerical values of two factors.
But this is something fundamentally different from the constants of physics.
It is the assertion of a historical fact, not of a constant that can be resorted to
in attempts to predict future events.
Leaving aside for the present any reference to the problem of the human will or free will,
We may say, non-human entities react according to regular patterns man chooses.
Man chooses first ultimate ends and then the means to attain them.
These acts of choosing are determined by thoughts and ideas about which, at least for the time
being, the natural sciences do not know how to give us any information.
In the mathematical treatment of physics, the distinction between constants and variables
This makes sense.
It is essential in every instance of technological computation.
In economics, there are no constant relations between various magnitudes.
Consequently, all ascertainable data are variables, or what amounts to the same thing, historical
data.
The mathematical economists reiterate that the plight of mathematical economics consists
in the fact that there are a great number of variables.
The truth is that there are only variables and no constants.
It is pointless to talk of variables where there are no invariables.
7.
Means and Ends To choose is to pick one out of two or more
possible modes of conduct and to set aside the alternatives.
Whatever a human being is in a situation in which various modes of behavior precluding
one another are open to him, he chooses.
Thus life implies an endless sequence of acts of choosing.
Action is conduct directed by choices.
The mental acts that determine the content of a choice refer either to ultimate ends
or to the means to attain ultimate ends.
The former are called judgments of value.
The latter are technical decisions derived from factual propositions.
In the strict sense of the term, acting man aims only at one ultimate end, at the attainment
of a state of affairs that suits him better than the alternatives.
Philosophers and economists describe this undeniable fact by declaring that man prefers
what makes him happier to what makes him less happy, that he aims at happiness.
There is no need to refute anew the arguments advanced for more than two thousand years
against the principles of eudaimonism, hedonism and utilitarianism.
For an exposition of the formal and subjectivistic character of the concepts pleasure and pain
as employed in the context of these doctrines, see Mises, Human Action.
Of course, those who recognize no happiness but that given by the orgasm, alcohol and
and so forth, continue to repeat the old errors and distortions.
Happiness, in the purely formal sense in which ethical theory applies the term, is the only
ultimate end, and all other things and states of affair sought are merely means to the realization
of the supreme ultimate end.
It is customary, however, to employ a less precise mode of expression, frequently assigning
MAKING THE NAME OF ULTIMATE ENDS TO ALL THOSE MEANS THAT ARE FIT TO PRODUCE SATISFACTION
DIRECTLY AND IMMEDIATELY.
THE CHARACTERISTIC MARK OF ULTIMATE ENDS IS THAT THEY DEPEND ENTIRELY ON EACH INDIVIDUAL'S
PERSONAL AND SUBJECTIVE JUDGMENT WHICH CANNOT BE EXAMINED, MEASURED, STILL LESS CORRECTED
BY ANY OTHER PERSON.
EACH INDIVIDUAL IS THE ONLY AND FINAL ARBITER IN MATTERS CONCERNING HIS OWN SATISFACTION
and Happiness.
As this fundamental cognition is often considered to be incompatible with the Christian doctrine,
it may be proper to illustrate its truth by examples drawn from the early history of the
Christian creed.
The martyrs rejected what others considered supreme delights in order to win salvation
and eternal bliss.
They did not heed their well-meaning fellows who exhorted them to save their lives by bowing
to the Statue of the Divine Emperor, but chose to die for their cause rather than to preserve
their lives by forfeiting everlasting happiness in heaven.
What arguments could a man bring forward who wanted to dissuade his fellows from martyrdom?
He could try to undermine the spiritual foundations of his faith in the message of the Gospels
and their interpretation by the Church.
This would have been an attempt to shake the Christian's confidence in the efficacy of
of Money.
If this failed, further argument could avail nothing, for what remained was the decision
between two ultimate ends, the choice between eternal bliss and eternal damnation.
Then martyrdom appeared the means to attain an end which in the martyr's opinion warranted
supreme and everlasting happiness.
As soon as people venture to question and to examine an end, they no longer look upon
it as an end but deal with it as a means to attain a still higher end.
The ultimate end is beyond any rational examination.
All other ends are but provisional.
They turn into means as soon as they are weighed against other ends or means.
Mises are judged and appreciated according to their ability to produce definite effects.
While judgments of value are personal, subjective and final, judgments about means are essentially
inferences drawn from factual propositions concerning the power of the means in question
to produce definite effects.
About the power of a means to produce a definite effect, there can be dissension and dispute
between men.
For the evaluation of ultimate ends, there is no interpersonal standard available.
Choosing means is a technical problem, as it were, the term technique being taken in
its broadest sense.
Choosing ultimate ends is a personal, subjective, individual affair.
Choosing means is a matter of reason.
Building Ultimate Ends, A Matter of the Soul and the Will.